{"context":"McSperitt's claims against Hartford for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA are likewise preempt ed. The Fifth Circuit has concluded that ERISA preempts claims brought under the Texas DTPA for failure to pay or misrepresenting benefits under an ERISA plan because such claims \"relate to\" the plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66","parenthetical":"holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \"reli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\"","sentence":"Hogan, 969 F.2d at 144; Boren v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \u201creli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\u201d), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3283, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); see also Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-64 (finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer\u2019s plan and thus preempted by ERISA). ERISA therefore preempts McSperitt\u2019s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"890 F.2d 762, 762-64","parenthetical":"finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer's plan and thus preempted by ERISA","sentence":"Hogan, 969 F.2d at 144; Boren v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \u201creli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\u201d), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3283, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); see also Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-64 (finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer\u2019s plan and thus preempted by ERISA). ERISA therefore preempts McSperitt\u2019s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA."},"case_id":8905712,"label":"a"}
{"context":"McSperitt's claims against Hartford for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA are likewise preempt ed. The Fifth Circuit has concluded that ERISA preempts claims brought under the Texas DTPA for failure to pay or misrepresenting benefits under an ERISA plan because such claims \"relate to\" the plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"890 F.2d 762, 762-64","parenthetical":"finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer's plan and thus preempted by ERISA","sentence":"Hogan, 969 F.2d at 144; Boren v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \u201creli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\u201d), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3283, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); see also Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-64 (finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer\u2019s plan and thus preempted by ERISA). ERISA therefore preempts McSperitt\u2019s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \"reli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\"","sentence":"Hogan, 969 F.2d at 144; Boren v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \u201creli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\u201d), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3283, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); see also Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-64 (finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer\u2019s plan and thus preempted by ERISA). ERISA therefore preempts McSperitt\u2019s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA."},"case_id":8905712,"label":"b"}
{"context":"McSperitt's claims against Hartford for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA are likewise preempt ed. The Fifth Circuit has concluded that ERISA preempts claims brought under the Texas DTPA for failure to pay or misrepresenting benefits under an ERISA plan because such claims \"relate to\" the plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \"reli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\"","sentence":"Hogan, 969 F.2d at 144; Boren v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \u201creli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\u201d), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3283, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); see also Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-64 (finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer\u2019s plan and thus preempted by ERISA). ERISA therefore preempts McSperitt\u2019s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"890 F.2d 762, 762-64","parenthetical":"finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer's plan and thus preempted by ERISA","sentence":"Hogan, 969 F.2d at 144; Boren v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \u201creli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\u201d), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3283, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); see also Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-64 (finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer\u2019s plan and thus preempted by ERISA). ERISA therefore preempts McSperitt\u2019s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA."},"case_id":8905712,"label":"a"}
{"context":"McSperitt's claims against Hartford for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA are likewise preempt ed. The Fifth Circuit has concluded that ERISA preempts claims brought under the Texas DTPA for failure to pay or misrepresenting benefits under an ERISA plan because such claims \"relate to\" the plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"890 F.2d 762, 762-64","parenthetical":"finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer's plan and thus preempted by ERISA","sentence":"Hogan, 969 F.2d at 144; Boren v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \u201creli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\u201d), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3283, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); see also Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-64 (finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer\u2019s plan and thus preempted by ERISA). ERISA therefore preempts McSperitt\u2019s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \"reli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\"","sentence":"Hogan, 969 F.2d at 144; Boren v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.1989) (holding that ERISA preempts the Texas DTPA because plaintiff \u201creli[ed] on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated\u201d), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3283, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); see also Ramirez, 890 F.2d at 762-64 (finding that the plaintiffs efforts to collect his medical benefits based on a provision of the Texas Insurance Code, which incorporates the Texas DTPA, were related to his employer\u2019s plan and thus preempted by ERISA). ERISA therefore preempts McSperitt\u2019s claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and for alleged violations of the Texas DTPA."},"case_id":8905712,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In short, the incremental information that the defendant sought to discover was largely irrelevant. Under the circumstances, the lower court was not obliged to convene an evidentiary hearing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"907 F.2d 1267, 1273","parenthetical":"no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \"make a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991) (sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.1989) (decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court); see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990) (no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \u201cmake a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\u201d); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1545 (1st Cir.1989) (in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \u201cto justify holding an evidentiary hearing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"924 F.2d 427, 430","parenthetical":"sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991) (sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.1989) (decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court); see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990) (no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \u201cmake a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\u201d); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1545 (1st Cir.1989) (in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \u201cto justify holding an evidentiary hearing\u201d)."},"case_id":10521527,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In short, the incremental information that the defendant sought to discover was largely irrelevant. Under the circumstances, the lower court was not obliged to convene an evidentiary hearing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"924 F.2d 427, 430","parenthetical":"sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991) (sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.1989) (decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court); see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990) (no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \u201cmake a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\u201d); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1545 (1st Cir.1989) (in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \u201cto justify holding an evidentiary hearing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"878 F.2d 1535, 1545","parenthetical":"in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \"to justify holding an evidentiary hearing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991) (sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.1989) (decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court); see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990) (no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \u201cmake a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\u201d); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1545 (1st Cir.1989) (in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \u201cto justify holding an evidentiary hearing\u201d)."},"case_id":10521527,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In short, the incremental information that the defendant sought to discover was largely irrelevant. Under the circumstances, the lower court was not obliged to convene an evidentiary hearing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"891 F.2d 364, 367","parenthetical":"decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991) (sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.1989) (decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court); see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990) (no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \u201cmake a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\u201d); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1545 (1st Cir.1989) (in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \u201cto justify holding an evidentiary hearing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"907 F.2d 1267, 1273","parenthetical":"no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \"make a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991) (sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.1989) (decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court); see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990) (no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \u201cmake a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\u201d); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1545 (1st Cir.1989) (in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \u201cto justify holding an evidentiary hearing\u201d)."},"case_id":10521527,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In short, the incremental information that the defendant sought to discover was largely irrelevant. Under the circumstances, the lower court was not obliged to convene an evidentiary hearing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"878 F.2d 1535, 1545","parenthetical":"in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \"to justify holding an evidentiary hearing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991) (sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.1989) (decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court); see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990) (no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \u201cmake a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\u201d); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1545 (1st Cir.1989) (in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \u201cto justify holding an evidentiary hearing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"891 F.2d 364, 367","parenthetical":"decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Ibanez, 924 F.2d 427, 430 (2d Cir.1991) (sentencing court need not conduct full-blown evidentiary hearing every time a defendant requests one); United States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir.1989) (decision whether or not to conduct an evidentiary hearing lies within sound discretion of the sentencing court); see also United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273 (1st Cir.1990) (no evidentiary hearing required in criminal ease where defendant failed to \u201cmake a sufficient threshold showing that material facts were in doubt or dispute\u201d); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1545 (1st Cir.1989) (in a criminal case, the movant ordinarily has the obligation \u201cto justify holding an evidentiary hearing\u201d)."},"case_id":10521527,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In several decisions the Supreme Court has considered whether and to what extent a state or local prosecutor qua prosecutor is immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983. As the Court has recognized, the law of immunity in a Bivens claim against a federal official mirrors that in a section 1983 claim against a state official.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"438 U.S. 478, 504","parenthetical":"deeming it \"untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under SS 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (deeming it \u201cuntenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under \u00a7 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\u201d); see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17-18 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1977) (\u201c[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a \u00a7 1983 suit against a state official.\u201d) (emphasis origi nal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a SS 1983 suit against a state official.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (deeming it \u201cuntenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under \u00a7 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\u201d); see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17-18 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1977) (\u201c[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a \u00a7 1983 suit against a state official.\u201d) (emphasis origi nal)."},"case_id":5709149,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In several decisions the Supreme Court has considered whether and to what extent a state or local prosecutor qua prosecutor is immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983. As the Court has recognized, the law of immunity in a Bivens claim against a federal official mirrors that in a section 1983 claim against a state official.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a SS 1983 suit against a state official.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (deeming it \u201cuntenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under \u00a7 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\u201d); see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17-18 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1977) (\u201c[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a \u00a7 1983 suit against a state official.\u201d) (emphasis origi nal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10","parenthetical":"deeming it \"untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under SS 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (deeming it \u201cuntenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under \u00a7 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\u201d); see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17-18 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1977) (\u201c[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a \u00a7 1983 suit against a state official.\u201d) (emphasis origi nal)."},"case_id":5709149,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In several decisions the Supreme Court has considered whether and to what extent a state or local prosecutor qua prosecutor is immune from liability under 42 U.S.C. SS 1983. As the Court has recognized, the law of immunity in a Bivens claim against a federal official mirrors that in a section 1983 claim against a state official.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a SS 1983 suit against a state official.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (deeming it \u201cuntenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under \u00a7 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\u201d); see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17-18 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1977) (\u201c[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a \u00a7 1983 suit against a state official.\u201d) (emphasis origi nal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"deeming it \"untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under SS 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-10, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (deeming it \u201cuntenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under \u00a7 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials\u201d); see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 17-18 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1977) (\u201c[Assuming the rule of Bivens comprehends a damage action for a particular constitutional infringement by a federal officer, the federally-determined immunity applicable in such a case should be no different from the federally-determined immunity available in a \u00a7 1983 suit against a state official.\u201d) (emphasis origi nal)."},"case_id":5709149,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, Miranda does not require the police to accept as conclusive any statement, no matter how ambiguous, as a sign that the suspect desires to cut off questioning. Rather, a defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent must be clear and unequivocal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"silence alone is not enough to invoke the right to cease an interrogation","sentence":"See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (the right to counsel must be invoked unambiguously; the articulation must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable police officer would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney); Evans v. Demosthenes, 902 F.Supp. 1253 (D.Nev.1995) (Davis \u2019 \u201cclear articulation\u201d rule applies to the right to remain silent); see also People v. Cooper, 731 P.2d 781 (Colo.App.1986) (silence alone is not enough to invoke the right to cease an interrogation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Davis ' \"clear articulation\" rule applies to the right to remain silent","sentence":"See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (the right to counsel must be invoked unambiguously; the articulation must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable police officer would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney); Evans v. Demosthenes, 902 F.Supp. 1253 (D.Nev.1995) (Davis \u2019 \u201cclear articulation\u201d rule applies to the right to remain silent); see also People v. Cooper, 731 P.2d 781 (Colo.App.1986) (silence alone is not enough to invoke the right to cease an interrogation)."},"case_id":11626080,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the weight of authority, the court may justifiably decline to conduct the necessary line-by-line analysis of the Movants' requests which this court finds to be too extreme and therefore declines at this time to award monetary sanctions in their favor which fall into the first two categories of sanctions identified above.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"944 F.2d 949, 958","parenthetical":"suggesting that inflated and\/or inadequate fee applications place intolerable burdens on the court thereby providing sufficient grounds for denying application","sentence":"Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir. 1991) (suggesting that inflated and\/or inadequate fee applications place intolerable burdens on the court thereby providing sufficient grounds for denying application); Thelen Oil Co., Inc. v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co., 962 F.2d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 1992) (\"it is not inappropriate to deny fees completely when the fee request is outrageously excessive and unsupported by adequate documentation\"); Sun Publishing Co. Inc. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 823 F.2d 818, 819 (4th Cir. 1987); Farris v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980); cf., Cimador v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 645 F.Supp. 1273, 1275 (W.D.Pa. 1986) (relying on Brown to eliminate certain excessive claims as \"plain profiteering\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"645 F.Supp. 1273, 1275","parenthetical":"relying on Brown to eliminate certain excessive claims as \"plain profiteering\"","sentence":"Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir. 1991) (suggesting that inflated and\/or inadequate fee applications place intolerable burdens on the court thereby providing sufficient grounds for denying application); Thelen Oil Co., Inc. v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co., 962 F.2d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 1992) (\"it is not inappropriate to deny fees completely when the fee request is outrageously excessive and unsupported by adequate documentation\"); Sun Publishing Co. Inc. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 823 F.2d 818, 819 (4th Cir. 1987); Farris v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980); cf., Cimador v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 645 F.Supp. 1273, 1275 (W.D.Pa. 1986) (relying on Brown to eliminate certain excessive claims as \"plain profiteering\")."},"case_id":2667098,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the weight of authority, the court may justifiably decline to conduct the necessary line-by-line analysis of the Movants' requests which this court finds to be too extreme and therefore declines at this time to award monetary sanctions in their favor which fall into the first two categories of sanctions identified above.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"645 F.Supp. 1273, 1275","parenthetical":"relying on Brown to eliminate certain excessive claims as \"plain profiteering\"","sentence":"Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir. 1991) (suggesting that inflated and\/or inadequate fee applications place intolerable burdens on the court thereby providing sufficient grounds for denying application); Thelen Oil Co., Inc. v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co., 962 F.2d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 1992) (\"it is not inappropriate to deny fees completely when the fee request is outrageously excessive and unsupported by adequate documentation\"); Sun Publishing Co. Inc. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 823 F.2d 818, 819 (4th Cir. 1987); Farris v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980); cf., Cimador v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 645 F.Supp. 1273, 1275 (W.D.Pa. 1986) (relying on Brown to eliminate certain excessive claims as \"plain profiteering\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"962 F.2d 821, 824","parenthetical":"\"it is not inappropriate to deny fees completely when the fee request is outrageously excessive and unsupported by adequate documentation\"","sentence":"Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 958 (1st Cir. 1991) (suggesting that inflated and\/or inadequate fee applications place intolerable burdens on the court thereby providing sufficient grounds for denying application); Thelen Oil Co., Inc. v. Fina Oil & Chemical Co., 962 F.2d 821, 824 (8th Cir. 1992) (\"it is not inappropriate to deny fees completely when the fee request is outrageously excessive and unsupported by adequate documentation\"); Sun Publishing Co. Inc. v. Mecklenburg News, Inc., 823 F.2d 818, 819 (4th Cir. 1987); Farris v. Cox, 508 F. Supp. 222, 227 (6th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980); cf., Cimador v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 645 F.Supp. 1273, 1275 (W.D.Pa. 1986) (relying on Brown to eliminate certain excessive claims as \"plain profiteering\")."},"case_id":2667098,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because Thomas's convictions were not already enhanced by a specific habitual offender scheme, use of the general habitual offender statute does not result in double enhancement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that defendant's auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a Class C felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute","sentence":"See Haymaker v. State, 667 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind.1996) (holding that defendant\u2019s habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute); see also Williams v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that defendant\u2019s auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a Class C felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that defendant's habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute","sentence":"See Haymaker v. State, 667 N.E.2d 1113 (Ind.1996) (holding that defendant\u2019s habitual traffic violator conviction could also serve as a predicate felony conviction under the general habitual offender statute); see also Williams v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that defendant\u2019s auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a Class C felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute)."},"case_id":11894088,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For starters, the sheer length of the delay, when coupled with her prior five-month leave from December 2011 to May 2012, jumps off the page. Courts confronted with similar requests--even ones for half the amount of time that Delgado requested-- have concluded that such requests are not facially reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850","parenthetical":"holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591","parenthetical":"\"[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional's] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"case_id":12276653,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For starters, the sheer length of the delay, when coupled with her prior five-month leave from December 2011 to May 2012, jumps off the page. Courts confronted with similar requests--even ones for half the amount of time that Delgado requested-- have concluded that such requests are not facially reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850","parenthetical":"holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"328 F.3d 379, 380-81","parenthetical":"suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \"[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"case_id":12276653,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For starters, the sheer length of the delay, when coupled with her prior five-month leave from December 2011 to May 2012, jumps off the page. Courts confronted with similar requests--even ones for half the amount of time that Delgado requested-- have concluded that such requests are not facially reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2016 WL 7404677, at *3","parenthetical":"holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591","parenthetical":"\"[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional's] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"case_id":12276653,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For starters, the sheer length of the delay, when coupled with her prior five-month leave from December 2011 to May 2012, jumps off the page. Courts confronted with similar requests--even ones for half the amount of time that Delgado requested-- have concluded that such requests are not facially reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"328 F.3d 379, 380-81","parenthetical":"suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \"[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2016 WL 7404677, at *3","parenthetical":"holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"case_id":12276653,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For starters, the sheer length of the delay, when coupled with her prior five-month leave from December 2011 to May 2012, jumps off the page. Courts confronted with similar requests--even ones for half the amount of time that Delgado requested-- have concluded that such requests are not facially reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591","parenthetical":"\"[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional's] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27","parenthetical":"holding that teacher's request for four months' leave was not a reasonable accommodation","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"case_id":12276653,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For starters, the sheer length of the delay, when coupled with her prior five-month leave from December 2011 to May 2012, jumps off the page. Courts confronted with similar requests--even ones for half the amount of time that Delgado requested-- have concluded that such requests are not facially reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"328 F.3d 379, 380-81","parenthetical":"suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \"[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27","parenthetical":"holding that teacher's request for four months' leave was not a reasonable accommodation","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"case_id":12276653,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For starters, the sheer length of the delay, when coupled with her prior five-month leave from December 2011 to May 2012, jumps off the page. Courts confronted with similar requests--even ones for half the amount of time that Delgado requested-- have concluded that such requests are not facially reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591","parenthetical":"\"[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional's] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"case_id":12276653,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For starters, the sheer length of the delay, when coupled with her prior five-month leave from December 2011 to May 2012, jumps off the page. Courts confronted with similar requests--even ones for half the amount of time that Delgado requested-- have concluded that such requests are not facially reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"328 F.3d 379, 380-81","parenthetical":"suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \"[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Hwang v. Kan. State Univ., 753 F.3d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.); see also Luke v. Bd. of Trustees of Fla. A & M Univ., No. 15-13995, 674 Fed.Appx. 847, 850, 2016 WL 7404677, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016) (holding that request for additional leave, after employee had already received nine months of leave, was unreasonable-accommodation request where employee would remain unable to perform essential function for another six months); Stallings v. Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 Fed.Appx. 221, 226-27 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that teacher\u2019s request for four months\u2019 leave was not a reasonable accommodation); Epps v. City of Pine Lawn, 353 F.3d 588, 593 n.5 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that employee failed to show that requested accommodation of six months of leave was reasonable); cf. Larson v. United Nat. Foods W., Inc., 518 Fed.Appx. 589, 591 (9th Cir. 2013) (\u201c[A]n indefinite, but at least six-month long,-leave of absence to permit [the employee] to fulfill the [substance-abuse professional\u2019s] treatment recommendations so that he might eventually be physically qualified under the DOT regulations is not a reasonable accommodation.\u201d); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 380-81 (7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting that two months employee spent away from work for treatment for mental difficulties would not qualify as reasonable accommodation because \u201c[i]nability to work for a multi-month period removes a person from the class protected by the ADA\u201d)."},"case_id":12276653,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a complaint \"attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of actions elements will not do.\" In order to survive a motion to dismiss, however, the court \"[does] not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[0]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss\"","sentence":"Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (\u201c[0]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss\u201d). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court \u201cmust accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, and ... indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"129 S.Ct. 1949, 1949","parenthetical":"\"[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.\"","sentence":"Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citations omitted); but see Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (\u201c[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.\u201d)."},"case_id":4098414,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a complaint \"attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of actions elements will not do.\" In order to survive a motion to dismiss, however, the court \"[does] not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"129 S.Ct. 1949, 1949","parenthetical":"\"[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.\"","sentence":"Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citations omitted); but see Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (\u201c[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950","parenthetical":"\"[0]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss\"","sentence":"Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (\u201c[0]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss\u201d). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court \u201cmust accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, and ... indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant.\u201d"},"case_id":4098414,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a complaint \"attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of actions elements will not do.\" In order to survive a motion to dismiss, however, the court \"[does] not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[0]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss\"","sentence":"Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (\u201c[0]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss\u201d). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court \u201cmust accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, and ... indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"129 S.Ct. 1949, 1949","parenthetical":"\"[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.\"","sentence":"Sommers Oil Co. v. United States, 241 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citations omitted); but see Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (\u201c[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.\u201d)."},"case_id":4098414,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"546 N.E.2d 609, 612","parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"566 So.2d 408, 413-14","parenthetical":"recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"644 So.2d 1218, 1223","parenthetical":"putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother's marriage to another man","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301","parenthetical":"putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"738 P.2d 254, 260-62","parenthetical":"while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father's action to establish paternity could be heard","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62","parenthetical":"hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father's action to establish paternity could be heard","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"546 N.E.2d 609, 612","parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"566 So.2d 408, 413-14","parenthetical":"recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"644 So.2d 1218, 1223","parenthetical":"putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother's marriage to another man","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301","parenthetical":"putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"738 P.2d 254, 260-62","parenthetical":"while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father's action to establish paternity could be heard","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"817 P.2d 37, 40","parenthetical":"interpreting \"father\" in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\"","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62","parenthetical":"hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father's action to establish paternity could be heard","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"546 N.E.2d 609, 612","parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"566 So.2d 408, 413-14","parenthetical":"recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"644 So.2d 1218, 1223","parenthetical":"putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother's marriage to another man","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301","parenthetical":"putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"738 P.2d 254, 260-62","parenthetical":"while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father's action to establish paternity could be heard","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62","parenthetical":"hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father's action to establish paternity could be heard","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"546 N.E.2d 609, 612","parenthetical":"although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"566 So.2d 408, 413-14","parenthetical":"recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"644 So.2d 1218, 1223","parenthetical":"putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother's marriage to another man","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301","parenthetical":"putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"738 P.2d 254, 260-62","parenthetical":"while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father's action to establish paternity could be heard","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Linda L. Chezem & Sarah L. Nagy, Judicial Abrogation of a Husband's Paternity: Can a Third Party Seek to Establish Paternity Over a Child Born into a Marriage While that Marriage Remains Intact?, 30 Ind. L.Rev. 467 (1997). Other states interpret the statutory language to grant the putative father standing to challenge paternity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"761 S.W.2d 924, 926","parenthetical":"statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62","parenthetical":"hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father's action to establish paternity could be heard","sentence":"See, e.g., R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 817 P.2d 37, 40 (Ct.App.1991) (interpreting \"father\u201d in statute listing individuals permitted to commence a paternity-action to include \"putative father\u201d); Willmon v. Hunter, 297 Ark. 358, 761 S.W.2d 924, 926 (1988) (statutory legitimacy presumptions do not preclude a party from litigating paternity); see also Simcox v. Simcox, 131 Ill.2d 491, 137 Ill.Dec. 664, 546 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1989) (although putative father had statutory right to bring paternity action, issue of whether he was barred from such action was not ripe); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 404 (Ind.1996) (statute permits putative father to maintain paternity action); Smith v. Jones, 566 So.2d 408, 413-14 (La.Ct.App.1990) (recognizing dual paternity, where biological father has actual relationship with child or has been prevented from forming relationship by mother, and acts to establish paternity within a reasonable time of child's birth, he may use compulsory blood test in avowal action); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218, 1223 (Miss.1994) (putative father has standing to challenge paternity to child born during mother\u2019s marriage to another man); M.F. v. N.H., 252 N.J.Super. 420, 599 A.2d 1297, 1299-1301 (App.Div.1991) (putative father had standing to bring paternity action, but action could not proceed unless in the best interests of the child); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash.2d 299, 738 P.2d 254, 260-62 (1987) (while paternity statute permits putative father standing to contest paternity, action will not go forward unless it is in the best interests of the child); In re T.R.B., 154 Wis.2d 637, 454 N.W.2d 561, 561-62 (Ct.App.1990) (hearing to determine child's best interests necessary before putative father\u2019s action to establish paternity could be heard)."},"case_id":11635047,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Brosnan Aff. UTI2, 4.) It is well-settled that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"833 F.2d 43, 46","parenthetical":"interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff's argument that city's articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 807, 807","parenthetical":"stating that \"the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit\"","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"case_id":7409760,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Brosnan Aff. UTI2, 4.) It is well-settled that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 807, 807","parenthetical":"stating that \"the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit\"","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"case_id":7409760,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Brosnan Aff. UTI2, 4.) It is well-settled that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"833 F.2d 43, 46","parenthetical":"interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff's argument that city's articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 2130, 2130","parenthetical":"stating that \"the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit\"","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"case_id":7409760,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Brosnan Aff. UTI2, 4.) It is well-settled that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 2130, 2130","parenthetical":"stating that \"the visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City's power to prohibit\"","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"case_id":7409760,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Brosnan Aff. UTI2, 4.) It is well-settled that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"453 U.S. 507, 507-08","parenthetical":"finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"833 F.2d 43, 46","parenthetical":"interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff's argument that city's articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"case_id":7409760,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Brosnan Aff. UTI2, 4.) It is well-settled that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"453 U.S. 507, 507-08","parenthetical":"finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"case_id":7409760,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Brosnan Aff. UTI2, 4.) It is well-settled that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"833 F.2d 43, 46","parenthetical":"interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff's argument that city's articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 S.Ct. 2892, 2892-93","parenthetical":"finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"case_id":7409760,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Brosnan Aff. UTI2, 4.) It is well-settled that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 S.Ct. 2892, 2892-93","parenthetical":"finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons","sentence":"See Vincent, 466 U.S. at 807, 104 S.Ct. at 2130 (stating that \u201cthe visual assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property [] constitutes a significant substantive evil within the City\u2019s power to prohibit\u201d); Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892-93 (finding that both traffic safety and aesthetics are substantial governmental goals); see also Georgia Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Waynesville, 833 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir.1987) (interpreting Metromedia as foreclosing Plaintiff\u2019s argument that city\u2019s articulated goal of traffic safety is mere pretense); Major Media of Southeast, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 792 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir.1986) (interpreting Metromedia as standing for the proposition that a city may prohibit all off-premise signs and billboards for aesthetics and safety reasons)."},"case_id":7409760,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the Harcar court did not specifically address the appealability of the order finding mother in contempt but declining imposition of sanctions, it seems that because mother's contempt was \"flagrant,\" the trial court's finding of contempt without imposition of sanctions was effectively a denial of father's motion for contempt, which left father aggrieved. We might also simply reason that the trial court's order in the instant ease is clearly appealable as to Father inasmuch as it is a denial of relief to Father, similar to a complete denial of a motion for contempt, which is an appealable order.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"713 A.2d 673, 674","parenthetical":"reiterating that \"[w]here a petition alleges refusal to comply with a court order, and the trial court denies the petition, the denial order is appealable\"","sentence":"See Basham v. Basham, 713 A.2d 673, 674 (Pa.Super. 1998) (reiterating that \u201c[w]here a petition alleges refusal to comply with a court order, and the trial court denies the petition, the denial order is appealable\u201d); see also Flannery v. Iberti, 763 A.2d 927, 930 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2000) (noting that \u201ca trial court\u2019s denial of a civil contempt petition is appealable\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"a trial court's denial of a civil contempt petition is appealable\"","sentence":"See Basham v. Basham, 713 A.2d 673, 674 (Pa.Super. 1998) (reiterating that \u201c[w]here a petition alleges refusal to comply with a court order, and the trial court denies the petition, the denial order is appealable\u201d); see also Flannery v. Iberti, 763 A.2d 927, 930 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2000) (noting that \u201ca trial court\u2019s denial of a civil contempt petition is appealable\u201d)."},"case_id":12321126,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That is not so in this case. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in permitting the former wife to testify regarding domestic violence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"648 So.2d 660, 664","parenthetical":"confirming that a \"trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion\"","sentence":"See Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994)(confirming that a \u201ctrial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion\u201d); Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla.1989) (finding that \u201c[ajbsent an abuse of discretion, a trial court\u2019s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed\u201d); see also Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 42 (Fla.2000) (noting that \u201c[a] trial judge is afforded significant discretion in determining whether the prejudicial nature of evidence outweighs any relevance the evidence may have at trial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"753 So.2d 29, 42","parenthetical":"noting that \"[a] trial judge is afforded significant discretion in determining whether the prejudicial nature of evidence outweighs any relevance the evidence may have at trial\"","sentence":"See Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994)(confirming that a \u201ctrial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion\u201d); Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla.1989) (finding that \u201c[ajbsent an abuse of discretion, a trial court\u2019s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed\u201d); see also Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 42 (Fla.2000) (noting that \u201c[a] trial judge is afforded significant discretion in determining whether the prejudicial nature of evidence outweighs any relevance the evidence may have at trial\u201d)."},"case_id":8425007,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That is not so in this case. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in permitting the former wife to testify regarding domestic violence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"753 So.2d 29, 42","parenthetical":"noting that \"[a] trial judge is afforded significant discretion in determining whether the prejudicial nature of evidence outweighs any relevance the evidence may have at trial\"","sentence":"See Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994)(confirming that a \u201ctrial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion\u201d); Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla.1989) (finding that \u201c[ajbsent an abuse of discretion, a trial court\u2019s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed\u201d); see also Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 42 (Fla.2000) (noting that \u201c[a] trial judge is afforded significant discretion in determining whether the prejudicial nature of evidence outweighs any relevance the evidence may have at trial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"547 So.2d 111, 114","parenthetical":"finding that \"[ajbsent an abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed\"","sentence":"See Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994)(confirming that a \u201ctrial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence and such determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion\u201d); Castro v. State, 547 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla.1989) (finding that \u201c[ajbsent an abuse of discretion, a trial court\u2019s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed\u201d); see also Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 42 (Fla.2000) (noting that \u201c[a] trial judge is afforded significant discretion in determining whether the prejudicial nature of evidence outweighs any relevance the evidence may have at trial\u201d)."},"case_id":8425007,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We reject Hawley's argument. Because of the division of powers between the federal government and the states under the dual sovereignty principle of our form of government, a defendant may not, by agreement with state authorities, compel the federal government to impose a sentence that is concurrent with an existing state sentence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"federal court cannot, by attempting to impose a federal sentence to run consecutively to a state sentence which was yet to be imposed, preempt the right of a state court to apply its own sentencing laws","sentence":"See also United States v. Eastman, 758 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.1985) (federal court cannot, by attempting to impose a federal sentence to run consecutively to a state sentence which was yet to be imposed, preempt the right of a state court to apply its own sentencing laws)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"704 F.2d 29, 32","parenthetical":"\"under the dual sovereignty principle, Sackinger could not, by agreement with state authorities, compel the federal government to grant a concurrent sentence\"","sentence":"United States v. Sackinger, 704 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir.1983) (\u201cunder the dual sovereignty principle, Sackinger could not, by agreement with state authorities, compel the federal government to grant a concurrent sentence\u201d)."},"case_id":10541076,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is one of four, now three, basic statutes that have been in our law over most of that period to define the responsibilities of towns for the upkeep of roads and the consequence of failure to meet those responsibilities. The other two existing statutes provide (1) for criminal liability of a town which \"liable to keep in repair a highway . . . fails to do so,\" 19 V.S.A. SS 991; see also 1840 R.S. ch. 21, SS 30, and (2) relief through county road commissioners and the superior court when a highway \"is out of repair or unsafe for travel.\" 19 V.S.A. SS 971; see also 1840 R.L. SS 3101. The fourth statute, now narrowed to apply only to bridges and culverts, allowed individuals to sue towns for damages caused by \"insufficiency or want of repair\" of a highway the town is obligated to keep in repair. 19 V.S.A. SS 985(a); see also 1840 R.S. ch. 21, SS 26. These statutes all deal with aspects of the same subject and must be viewed in pari materia.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"161 Vt. 187, 192","parenthetical":"provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia","sentence":"See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 192, 636 A.2d 342, 346 (1993) (provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia); see also Moody v. Town of Bristol, 71 Vt. 473, 475, 45 A. 1038, 1038 (1899) (statutes create duty on towns \u201cto keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"71 Vt. 473, 475","parenthetical":"statutes create duty on towns \"to keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\"","sentence":"See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 192, 636 A.2d 342, 346 (1993) (provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia); see also Moody v. Town of Bristol, 71 Vt. 473, 475, 45 A. 1038, 1038 (1899) (statutes create duty on towns \u201cto keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\u201d)."},"case_id":1220358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is one of four, now three, basic statutes that have been in our law over most of that period to define the responsibilities of towns for the upkeep of roads and the consequence of failure to meet those responsibilities. The other two existing statutes provide (1) for criminal liability of a town which \"liable to keep in repair a highway . . . fails to do so,\" 19 V.S.A. SS 991; see also 1840 R.S. ch. 21, SS 30, and (2) relief through county road commissioners and the superior court when a highway \"is out of repair or unsafe for travel.\" 19 V.S.A. SS 971; see also 1840 R.L. SS 3101. The fourth statute, now narrowed to apply only to bridges and culverts, allowed individuals to sue towns for damages caused by \"insufficiency or want of repair\" of a highway the town is obligated to keep in repair. 19 V.S.A. SS 985(a); see also 1840 R.S. ch. 21, SS 26. These statutes all deal with aspects of the same subject and must be viewed in pari materia.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"161 Vt. 187, 192","parenthetical":"provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia","sentence":"See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 192, 636 A.2d 342, 346 (1993) (provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia); see also Moody v. Town of Bristol, 71 Vt. 473, 475, 45 A. 1038, 1038 (1899) (statutes create duty on towns \u201cto keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"45 A. 1038, 1038","parenthetical":"statutes create duty on towns \"to keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\"","sentence":"See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 192, 636 A.2d 342, 346 (1993) (provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia); see also Moody v. Town of Bristol, 71 Vt. 473, 475, 45 A. 1038, 1038 (1899) (statutes create duty on towns \u201cto keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\u201d)."},"case_id":1220358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is one of four, now three, basic statutes that have been in our law over most of that period to define the responsibilities of towns for the upkeep of roads and the consequence of failure to meet those responsibilities. The other two existing statutes provide (1) for criminal liability of a town which \"liable to keep in repair a highway . . . fails to do so,\" 19 V.S.A. SS 991; see also 1840 R.S. ch. 21, SS 30, and (2) relief through county road commissioners and the superior court when a highway \"is out of repair or unsafe for travel.\" 19 V.S.A. SS 971; see also 1840 R.L. SS 3101. The fourth statute, now narrowed to apply only to bridges and culverts, allowed individuals to sue towns for damages caused by \"insufficiency or want of repair\" of a highway the town is obligated to keep in repair. 19 V.S.A. SS 985(a); see also 1840 R.S. ch. 21, SS 26. These statutes all deal with aspects of the same subject and must be viewed in pari materia.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"636 A.2d 342, 346","parenthetical":"provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia","sentence":"See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 192, 636 A.2d 342, 346 (1993) (provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia); see also Moody v. Town of Bristol, 71 Vt. 473, 475, 45 A. 1038, 1038 (1899) (statutes create duty on towns \u201cto keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"71 Vt. 473, 475","parenthetical":"statutes create duty on towns \"to keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\"","sentence":"See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 192, 636 A.2d 342, 346 (1993) (provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia); see also Moody v. Town of Bristol, 71 Vt. 473, 475, 45 A. 1038, 1038 (1899) (statutes create duty on towns \u201cto keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\u201d)."},"case_id":1220358,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is one of four, now three, basic statutes that have been in our law over most of that period to define the responsibilities of towns for the upkeep of roads and the consequence of failure to meet those responsibilities. The other two existing statutes provide (1) for criminal liability of a town which \"liable to keep in repair a highway . . . fails to do so,\" 19 V.S.A. SS 991; see also 1840 R.S. ch. 21, SS 30, and (2) relief through county road commissioners and the superior court when a highway \"is out of repair or unsafe for travel.\" 19 V.S.A. SS 971; see also 1840 R.L. SS 3101. The fourth statute, now narrowed to apply only to bridges and culverts, allowed individuals to sue towns for damages caused by \"insufficiency or want of repair\" of a highway the town is obligated to keep in repair. 19 V.S.A. SS 985(a); see also 1840 R.S. ch. 21, SS 26. These statutes all deal with aspects of the same subject and must be viewed in pari materia.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"45 A. 1038, 1038","parenthetical":"statutes create duty on towns \"to keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\"","sentence":"See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 192, 636 A.2d 342, 346 (1993) (provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia); see also Moody v. Town of Bristol, 71 Vt. 473, 475, 45 A. 1038, 1038 (1899) (statutes create duty on towns \u201cto keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"636 A.2d 342, 346","parenthetical":"provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia","sentence":"See Robes v. Town of Hartford, 161 Vt. 187, 192, 636 A.2d 342, 346 (1993) (provisions part of the same statutory scheme must be read in pari materia); see also Moody v. Town of Bristol, 71 Vt. 473, 475, 45 A. 1038, 1038 (1899) (statutes create duty on towns \u201cto keep their highways and bridges reasonably safe for travel thereon\u201d)."},"case_id":1220358,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on this claim. Participation in a voluntary reha bilitation program which requires inmates to accept responsibility of their crimes does not offend the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"inmate's limited interest in refusal to participate in sex offender treatment designed to help offenders accept responsibility outweighed by penological interest in rehabilitation","sentence":"See Russell v. Eaves, 722 F.Supp. 558, 560 (E.D.Mo.1989) (voluntary sexual offender treatment program requiring inmates to accept responsibility for crimes did not violate Fifth Amendment), appeal dismissed, 902 F.2d 1574 (8th Cir.1990); cf. Sundby v. Fiedler, 827 F.Supp. 580 (W.D.Wis.1993) (inmate\u2019s limited interest in refusal to participate in sex offender treatment designed to help offenders accept responsibility outweighed by penological interest in rehabilitation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"722 F.Supp. 558, 560","parenthetical":"voluntary sexual offender treatment program requiring inmates to accept responsibility for crimes did not violate Fifth Amendment","sentence":"See Russell v. Eaves, 722 F.Supp. 558, 560 (E.D.Mo.1989) (voluntary sexual offender treatment program requiring inmates to accept responsibility for crimes did not violate Fifth Amendment), appeal dismissed, 902 F.2d 1574 (8th Cir.1990); cf. Sundby v. Fiedler, 827 F.Supp. 580 (W.D.Wis.1993) (inmate\u2019s limited interest in refusal to participate in sex offender treatment designed to help offenders accept responsibility outweighed by penological interest in rehabilitation)."},"case_id":360663,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs are not entitled to relief on this claim. Participation in a voluntary reha bilitation program which requires inmates to accept responsibility of their crimes does not offend the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"inmate's limited interest in refusal to participate in sex offender treatment designed to help offenders accept responsibility outweighed by penological interest in rehabilitation","sentence":"See Russell v. Eaves, 722 F.Supp. 558, 560 (E.D.Mo.1989) (voluntary sexual offender treatment program requiring inmates to accept responsibility for crimes did not violate Fifth Amendment), appeal dismissed, 902 F.2d 1574 (8th Cir.1990); cf. Sundby v. Fiedler, 827 F.Supp. 580 (W.D.Wis.1993) (inmate\u2019s limited interest in refusal to participate in sex offender treatment designed to help offenders accept responsibility outweighed by penological interest in rehabilitation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"voluntary sexual offender treatment program requiring inmates to accept responsibility for crimes did not violate Fifth Amendment","sentence":"See Russell v. Eaves, 722 F.Supp. 558, 560 (E.D.Mo.1989) (voluntary sexual offender treatment program requiring inmates to accept responsibility for crimes did not violate Fifth Amendment), appeal dismissed, 902 F.2d 1574 (8th Cir.1990); cf. Sundby v. Fiedler, 827 F.Supp. 580 (W.D.Wis.1993) (inmate\u2019s limited interest in refusal to participate in sex offender treatment designed to help offenders accept responsibility outweighed by penological interest in rehabilitation)."},"case_id":360663,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, we construe the district court's dismissal of Mr. Abernathy's petition as resting on a lack of statutory jurisdiction. And, as such, it was a dismissal without prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"365 U.S. 265, 284-85","parenthetical":"construing a district court's dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 F.3d 1213, 1216","parenthetical":"\"Since standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\"","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, we construe the district court's dismissal of Mr. Abernathy's petition as resting on a lack of statutory jurisdiction. And, as such, it was a dismissal without prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construing a district court's dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 F.3d 1213, 1216","parenthetical":"\"Since standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\"","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, we construe the district court's dismissal of Mr. Abernathy's petition as resting on a lack of statutory jurisdiction. And, as such, it was a dismissal without prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 F.3d 1213, 1216","parenthetical":"\"Since standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\"","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construing a district court's dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, we construe the district court's dismissal of Mr. Abernathy's petition as resting on a lack of statutory jurisdiction. And, as such, it was a dismissal without prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"365 U.S. 265, 284-85","parenthetical":"construing a district court's dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 F.2d 1121, 1126","parenthetical":"\"It is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\"","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, we construe the district court's dismissal of Mr. Abernathy's petition as resting on a lack of statutory jurisdiction. And, as such, it was a dismissal without prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 F.2d 1121, 1126","parenthetical":"\"It is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\"","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construing a district court's dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, we construe the district court's dismissal of Mr. Abernathy's petition as resting on a lack of statutory jurisdiction. And, as such, it was a dismissal without prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construing a district court's dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"472 F.2d 1121, 1126","parenthetical":"\"It is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\"","sentence":"See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir.2006) (\u201cSince standing is a jurisdictional mandate, a dismissal with prejudice for lack of standing is inappropriate, and should be corrected to a dismissal without prejudice.\u201d); Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir.1973) (\u201cIt is fundamental, of course, that a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits and therefore dismissal of [plaintiffs] claim must be without prejudice.\u201d); cf. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 284-85, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (construing a district court\u2019s dismissal as being for lack of jurisdiction and thus without prejudice, even though the court was silent regarding whether its dismissal was with or without prejudice)."},"case_id":3560062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"Of course the mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal.\" Fed. Commc'ns Comm. v. Fox TV.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"588 F.3d 1085, 1089","parenthetical":"\"Reasoned decision making, therefore, necessarily requires the agency to acknowledge and provide an adequate explanation for its departure from established precedent.\" (citing Fox TV., 129 S.Ct. at 1811","sentence":"Safety Bd., 588 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C.Cir.2009) (\u201cReasoned decision making, therefore, necessarily requires the agency to acknowledge and provide an adequate explanation for its departure from established precedent.\u201d (citing Fox TV., 129 S.Ct. at 1811)). Here, the Secretary has offered no explanation, much less a reasoned one, for her departure from her earlier interpretation of the phrase \u201centitled to benefits under [Medicare] part A.\u201d Accordingly, even at Chevron step two, the Court would still vacate the Secretary\u2019s final decision and remand for further proceedings."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"588 F.3d 1095, 1095","parenthetical":"\"[B]ecause the Board departed from its precedent without reasoned explanation, we grant the petition for review, vacate the order, and remand for further proceedings.\"","sentence":"See Dillmon, 588 F.3d at 1095 (\u201c[B]ecause the Board departed from its precedent without reasoned explanation, we grant the petition for review, vacate the order, and remand for further proceedings.\u201d)."},"case_id":5723512,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"Of course the mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal.\" Fed. Commc'ns Comm. v. Fox TV.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"129 S.Ct. 1811, 1811","parenthetical":"\"Reasoned decision making, therefore, necessarily requires the agency to acknowledge and provide an adequate explanation for its departure from established precedent.\" (citing Fox TV., 129 S.Ct. at 1811","sentence":"Safety Bd., 588 F.3d 1085, 1089 (D.C.Cir.2009) (\u201cReasoned decision making, therefore, necessarily requires the agency to acknowledge and provide an adequate explanation for its departure from established precedent.\u201d (citing Fox TV., 129 S.Ct. at 1811)). Here, the Secretary has offered no explanation, much less a reasoned one, for her departure from her earlier interpretation of the phrase \u201centitled to benefits under [Medicare] part A.\u201d Accordingly, even at Chevron step two, the Court would still vacate the Secretary\u2019s final decision and remand for further proceedings."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"588 F.3d 1095, 1095","parenthetical":"\"[B]ecause the Board departed from its precedent without reasoned explanation, we grant the petition for review, vacate the order, and remand for further proceedings.\"","sentence":"See Dillmon, 588 F.3d at 1095 (\u201c[B]ecause the Board departed from its precedent without reasoned explanation, we grant the petition for review, vacate the order, and remand for further proceedings.\u201d)."},"case_id":5723512,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Accordingly, a plaintiff in a partisan gerrymandering case-cannot satisfy the discriminatory intent requirement simply:by proving, that- the redistricting body intended to rely on political data or to take into account partisan considerations. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the redistricting body intended to. apply partisan classifications \"in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \"a naked desire to increase partisan strength\"","sentence":"Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \u201ca naked desire to increase partisan strength\u201d); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (defining an \u201cinvidious\u201d classification as \u201ca classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\u201d). To that end, a plaintiff satisfies.the discrimi natory purpose or intent requirement by introducing evidence establishing that the state redistricting body acted with an intent, to \u201csubordinate adherents of one political party'and entrench a rival party in power.\u201d Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. at 2658."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"517 U.S. 620, 632","parenthetical":"defining an \"invidious\" classification as \"a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\"","sentence":"Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \u201ca naked desire to increase partisan strength\u201d); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (defining an \u201cinvidious\u201d classification as \u201ca classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\u201d). To that end, a plaintiff satisfies.the discrimi natory purpose or intent requirement by introducing evidence establishing that the state redistricting body acted with an intent, to \u201csubordinate adherents of one political party'and entrench a rival party in power.\u201d Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. at 2658."},"case_id":12273004,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Accordingly, a plaintiff in a partisan gerrymandering case-cannot satisfy the discriminatory intent requirement simply:by proving, that- the redistricting body intended to rely on political data or to take into account partisan considerations. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the redistricting body intended to. apply partisan classifications \"in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \"a naked desire to increase partisan strength\"","sentence":"Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \u201ca naked desire to increase partisan strength\u201d); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (defining an \u201cinvidious\u201d classification as \u201ca classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\u201d). To that end, a plaintiff satisfies.the discrimi natory purpose or intent requirement by introducing evidence establishing that the state redistricting body acted with an intent, to \u201csubordinate adherents of one political party'and entrench a rival party in power.\u201d Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. at 2658."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defining an \"invidious\" classification as \"a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\"","sentence":"Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \u201ca naked desire to increase partisan strength\u201d); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (defining an \u201cinvidious\u201d classification as \u201ca classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\u201d). To that end, a plaintiff satisfies.the discrimi natory purpose or intent requirement by introducing evidence establishing that the state redistricting body acted with an intent, to \u201csubordinate adherents of one political party'and entrench a rival party in power.\u201d Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. at 2658."},"case_id":12273004,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Accordingly, a plaintiff in a partisan gerrymandering case-cannot satisfy the discriminatory intent requirement simply:by proving, that- the redistricting body intended to rely on political data or to take into account partisan considerations. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the redistricting body intended to. apply partisan classifications \"in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \"a naked desire to increase partisan strength\"","sentence":"Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \u201ca naked desire to increase partisan strength\u201d); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (defining an \u201cinvidious\u201d classification as \u201ca classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\u201d). To that end, a plaintiff satisfies.the discrimi natory purpose or intent requirement by introducing evidence establishing that the state redistricting body acted with an intent, to \u201csubordinate adherents of one political party'and entrench a rival party in power.\u201d Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. at 2658."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defining an \"invidious\" classification as \"a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\"","sentence":"Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \u201ca naked desire to increase partisan strength\u201d); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (defining an \u201cinvidious\u201d classification as \u201ca classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\u201d). To that end, a plaintiff satisfies.the discrimi natory purpose or intent requirement by introducing evidence establishing that the state redistricting body acted with an intent, to \u201csubordinate adherents of one political party'and entrench a rival party in power.\u201d Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. at 2658."},"case_id":12273004,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Accordingly, a plaintiff in a partisan gerrymandering case-cannot satisfy the discriminatory intent requirement simply:by proving, that- the redistricting body intended to rely on political data or to take into account partisan considerations. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the redistricting body intended to. apply partisan classifications \"in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \"a naked desire to increase partisan strength\"","sentence":"Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \u201ca naked desire to increase partisan strength\u201d); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (defining an \u201cinvidious\u201d classification as \u201ca classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\u201d). To that end, a plaintiff satisfies.the discrimi natory purpose or intent requirement by introducing evidence establishing that the state redistricting body acted with an intent, to \u201csubordinate adherents of one political party'and entrench a rival party in power.\u201d Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. at 2658."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"135 S.Ct. 2658, 2658","parenthetical":"defining an \"invidious\" classification as \"a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\"","sentence":"Vieth, 541 U.S. at 307, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 339, 124 S.Ct. 1769 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (holding redistricting plan would violate Equal Protection Clause if it reflected \u201ca naked desire to increase partisan strength\u201d); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (defining an \u201cinvidious\u201d classification as \u201ca classification of persons undertaken for its own sake .,. inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class it affects\u201d). To that end, a plaintiff satisfies.the discrimi natory purpose or intent requirement by introducing evidence establishing that the state redistricting body acted with an intent, to \u201csubordinate adherents of one political party'and entrench a rival party in power.\u201d Ariz. State Leg., 135 S.Ct. at 2658."},"case_id":12273004,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"44 F.3d 201, 201","parenthetical":"prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"528 F.Supp. 592, 592","parenthetical":"declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties' agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"621 F.2d 560, 564-65","parenthetical":"recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties' bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"44 F.3d 201, 201","parenthetical":"prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"228 A.2d 659, 659","parenthetical":"prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"528 F.Supp. 592, 592","parenthetical":"declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties' agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"621 F.2d 560, 564-65","parenthetical":"recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties' bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"228 A.2d 659, 659","parenthetical":"prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524","parenthetical":"prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"528 F.Supp. 592, 592","parenthetical":"declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties' agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"621 F.2d 560, 564-65","parenthetical":"recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties' bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524","parenthetical":"prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"421 F.Supp.2d 540, 540-41","parenthetical":"evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant's liability to $50","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"528 F.Supp. 592, 592","parenthetical":"declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties' agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"421 F.Supp.2d 540, 540-41","parenthetical":"evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant's liability to $50","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"621 F.2d 560, 564-65","parenthetical":"recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties' bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"528 F.Supp. 592, 592","parenthetical":"declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties' agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"965 F.2d 395, 395-96","parenthetical":"parties' prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Many courts have addressed the issue of whether the parties' prior course of dealing and\/or trade usage is sufficient to show that the parties intended to incorporate limitation of liability, warranty, or arbitration clauses in their agreements. The courts have granted motions for summary judgment when the evidence established a prior course of dealing between the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"965 F.2d 395, 395-96","parenthetical":"parties' prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"621 F.2d 560, 564-65","parenthetical":"recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties' bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties","sentence":"See, e.g., Valhal Corp., 44 F.3d at 201 (prior course of dealing, consisting of negotiations, several written proposals which included limitation of liability clause, and revisions which did not eliminate the limitation, established consent to limitation of liability provision even though final version of contract was not signed, but approval given in separate letter); Westinghouse Elec. Co. v. Murphy, Inc., 228 A.2d at 659 (prior course of dealing established where parties contracted to provide maintenance service on over 80 occasions in six years using purchase orders which incorporated terms and conditions through reference to an attached appendix); Gov\u2019t of United Kingdom of Great Britain & N. Ireland v. Northstar Serv., Ltd., 1 F.Supp.2d 521, 524 (D.Md.1998) (prior course of dealing, consisting of at least 100 transactions between the parties where terms and conditions appeared on every invoice without any affirmative exclusionary provision, established that the invoice terms and conditions were part of contract); Well Luck, 421 F.Supp.2d at 540-41 (evidence that parties conducted over 150 transactions involving invoice containing copy of terms and conditions of service, including limitation of liability provision, was legally sufficient to establish a course of dealing between parties limiting defendant\u2019s liability to $50); Capitol Converting Equip., 965 F.2d at 395-96 (parties\u2019 prior course of dealing on hundreds of occasions, involving receipt and payment of invoices which all included limitation of liability provisions, supplemented their oral contract which was silent as to limitation of liability); but cf. Argo Welded Prod., 528 F.Supp. at 592 (declining to find that limitation of liability was incorporated into parties\u2019 agreement based solely on prior course of dealing on at least five prior occasions during which standard printed delivery receipts containing limitation of liability clause were issued to purchaser and signed by its agent, who admitted that he was familiar with the form, but finding a binding agreement based on signature of agent); Kunststoffwerk Alfred Huber v. R.J. Dick, Inc., 621 F.2d 560, 564-65 (3d Cir.1980) (recognizing that course of dealing may establish limitation of damages as part of parties\u2019 bargain in fact, but finding record was devoid of any evidence to establish a prior course of dealing between parties)."},"case_id":2997364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, plaintiffs allegation that she was \"[forced] ... to republish the false information to explain her circumstances\" is also insufficient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 F.2d 1123, 1126","parenthetical":"where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \"it was his own hand that was on the dagger\"","sentence":"See Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1990) (no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); see also Campos v. Guillot, 743 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \u201cit was his own hand that was on the dagger\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"915 F.2d 1410, 1414","parenthetical":"no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers","sentence":"See Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1990) (no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); see also Campos v. Guillot, 743 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \u201cit was his own hand that was on the dagger\u201d)."},"case_id":5661205,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, plaintiffs allegation that she was \"[forced] ... to republish the false information to explain her circumstances\" is also insufficient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 F.2d 1123, 1126","parenthetical":"where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \"it was his own hand that was on the dagger\"","sentence":"See Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1990) (no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); see also Campos v. Guillot, 743 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \u201cit was his own hand that was on the dagger\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers","sentence":"See Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1990) (no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); see also Campos v. Guillot, 743 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \u201cit was his own hand that was on the dagger\u201d)."},"case_id":5661205,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, plaintiffs allegation that she was \"[forced] ... to republish the false information to explain her circumstances\" is also insufficient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers","sentence":"See Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1990) (no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); see also Campos v. Guillot, 743 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \u201cit was his own hand that was on the dagger\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 F.2d 1123, 1126","parenthetical":"where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \"it was his own hand that was on the dagger\"","sentence":"See Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1990) (no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); see also Campos v. Guillot, 743 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \u201cit was his own hand that was on the dagger\u201d)."},"case_id":5661205,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, plaintiffs allegation that she was \"[forced] ... to republish the false information to explain her circumstances\" is also insufficient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 F.2d 1123, 1126","parenthetical":"where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \"it was his own hand that was on the dagger\"","sentence":"See Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1990) (no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); see also Campos v. Guillot, 743 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \u201cit was his own hand that was on the dagger\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers","sentence":"See Derstein v. Kansas, 915 F.2d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1990) (no liberty interest impinged when plaintiff himself reveals reasons for discharge in response to questions by prospective employers), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1391, 113 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991); see also Campos v. Guillot, 743 F.2d 1123, 1126 (5th Cir.1984) (where plaintiff demanded that charges be made public, \u201cit was his own hand that was on the dagger\u201d)."},"case_id":5661205,"label":"b"}
{"context":"NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"113 Nev. 600, 604","parenthetical":"recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"121 Nev. 396, 400-01","parenthetical":"concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer's premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"case_id":4282591,"label":"a"}
{"context":"NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"116 P.3d 56, 58-59","parenthetical":"concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer's premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"113 Nev. 600, 604","parenthetical":"recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"case_id":4282591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"113 Nev. 600, 604","parenthetical":"recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant's injury arose out of employment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 736, 121 P.3d at 1034; see also Rio All Suite Hotel & Casino v. Phillips, 126 Nev. 346, 240 P.3d 2 (2010) (adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant\u2019s injury arose out of employment)."},"case_id":4282591,"label":"a"}
{"context":"NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant's injury arose out of employment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 736, 121 P.3d at 1034; see also Rio All Suite Hotel & Casino v. Phillips, 126 Nev. 346, 240 P.3d 2 (2010) (adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant\u2019s injury arose out of employment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"113 Nev. 600, 604","parenthetical":"recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"case_id":4282591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"121 Nev. 396, 400-01","parenthetical":"concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer's premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"939 P.2d 1043, 1046","parenthetical":"recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"case_id":4282591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"116 P.3d 56, 58-59","parenthetical":"concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer's premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"939 P.2d 1043, 1046","parenthetical":"recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"case_id":4282591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant's injury arose out of employment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 736, 121 P.3d at 1034; see also Rio All Suite Hotel & Casino v. Phillips, 126 Nev. 346, 240 P.3d 2 (2010) (adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant\u2019s injury arose out of employment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"939 P.2d 1043, 1046","parenthetical":"recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"case_id":4282591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"NRS 616C. 150(1). An in jury occurs within the course of employment when there is a causal connection between the injury and the nature of the work or the workplace.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant's injury arose out of employment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 736, 121 P.3d at 1034; see also Rio All Suite Hotel & Casino v. Phillips, 126 Nev. 346, 240 P.3d 2 (2010) (adopting the increased-risk test for determining whether a claimant\u2019s injury arose out of employment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"939 P.2d 1043, 1046","parenthetical":"recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment","sentence":"Wood, 121 Nev. at 733, 121 P.3d at 1032; Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. Gorsky, 113 Nev. 600, 604, 939 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1997) (recognizing that an injury arises out of the employment relationship if it can be traced to the nature of employment or the workplace environment); see also MGM Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400-01, 116 P.3d 56, 58-59 (2005) (concluding that an injury that occurs when an employee is on the employer\u2019s premises and is coming or going to work is considered to have occurred in the course of employment). If the nature of the work or the workplace contributes to or increases the risk of injury more than that of the general public, the injury is covered by the NIIA."},"case_id":4282591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This court has held repeatedly, \"the proper avenue for pursuing such claims is through a collateral proceeding in which the factual basis for the claim may be developed.\" Id. at 598. There is, however, a narrow exception to the rule that defendants cannot attack the efficacy of their counsel on direct appeal. Where the record is sufficient to allow determination of ineffective assistance of counsel, an evidentiary hearing to develop the facts is not needed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"866 F.2d 598, 598","parenthetical":"no direct review \"[u]nless the record sufficiently establishes a basis for our review\"","sentence":"Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133 (3d Cir.1984) (defendant\u2019s counsel was ineffective because of a conflict of interest); see also Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 598 (no direct review \u201c[u]nless the record sufficiently establishes a basis for our review\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"748 F.2d 125, 133","parenthetical":"defendant's counsel was ineffective because of a conflict of interest","sentence":"Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 133 (3d Cir.1984) (defendant\u2019s counsel was ineffective because of a conflict of interest); see also Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 598 (no direct review \u201c[u]nless the record sufficiently establishes a basis for our review\u201d)."},"case_id":10546702,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, when police find a rented window-tinted van parked by itself in the middle of the night with its engine running in a \"hot area for drug trafficking,\" it is not unreasonable for police to suspect that a crime, particularly a drug crime, might be afoot. Tr. at 52 (\"It looked like they were just waiting for people to purchase [drugs].\"). And it is well recognized that firearms are \"regularly found on narcotics traffickers.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"945 F.2d 47, 51","parenthetical":"it is well known that \"narcotics dealers frequently carry weapons\"","sentence":"United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir.2003) (firearms are common \u201ctools of the trade\u201d for drug traffickers); see United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1991) (it is well known that \u201cnarcotics dealers frequently carry weapons\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"353 F.3d 148, 154","parenthetical":"firearms are common \"tools of the trade\" for drug traffickers","sentence":"United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir.2003) (firearms are common \u201ctools of the trade\u201d for drug traffickers); see United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1991) (it is well known that \u201cnarcotics dealers frequently carry weapons\u201d)."},"case_id":9012778,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The reliability-based test of Roberts for determining whether the Sixth Amendment requires confrontation thus was the principal foundation of our decision in Howard. That foundation was removed when the Supreme Court overruled Roberts in Crawford. In light of that overruling, Howard's constitutional holding no longer can be considered binding precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"604 A.2d 861, 870","parenthetical":"\"When intervening constitutional rulings necessitate a change in prior law, a division of this court is empowered to recognize that earlier decisions no longer have force.\"","sentence":"See Kleinbart v. United States, 604 A.2d 861, 870 (D.C.1992) (\u201cWhen intervening constitutional rulings necessitate a change in prior law, a division of this court is empowered to recognize that earlier decisions no longer have force.\u201d); see also Allison v. United States, 623 A.2d 590, 592 (D.C.1993) (\u201cTo the extent that its [constitutional law] decisions may be inconsistent with ours, we must defer to the Supreme Court .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"623 A.2d 590, 592","parenthetical":"\"To the extent that its [constitutional law] decisions may be inconsistent with ours, we must defer to the Supreme Court .... \"","sentence":"See Kleinbart v. United States, 604 A.2d 861, 870 (D.C.1992) (\u201cWhen intervening constitutional rulings necessitate a change in prior law, a division of this court is empowered to recognize that earlier decisions no longer have force.\u201d); see also Allison v. United States, 623 A.2d 590, 592 (D.C.1993) (\u201cTo the extent that its [constitutional law] decisions may be inconsistent with ours, we must defer to the Supreme Court .... \u201d)."},"case_id":8331923,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is incumbent on the court to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action before it can address plaintiffs' motion to confirm the attachment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"712 F.2d 1034, 1036","parenthetical":"federal court \"must satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"660 F.2d 56, 59","parenthetical":"\"A court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"case_id":569213,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is incumbent on the court to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action before it can address plaintiffs' motion to confirm the attachment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"660 F.2d 56, 59","parenthetical":"\"A court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"federal court \"must satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"case_id":569213,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is incumbent on the court to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action before it can address plaintiffs' motion to confirm the attachment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"660 F.2d 56, 59","parenthetical":"\"A court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"federal court \"must satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"case_id":569213,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is incumbent on the court to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action before it can address plaintiffs' motion to confirm the attachment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"660 F.2d 56, 59","parenthetical":"\"A court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"federal court \"must satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"case_id":569213,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is incumbent on the court to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action before it can address plaintiffs' motion to confirm the attachment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"610 F.2d 471, 474","parenthetical":"\"The initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"660 F.2d 56, 59","parenthetical":"\"A court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"case_id":569213,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is incumbent on the court to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action before it can address plaintiffs' motion to confirm the attachment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"660 F.2d 56, 59","parenthetical":"\"A court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167","parenthetical":"\"jurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\"","sentence":"See Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir.1983) (federal court \u201cmust satisfy itself that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the dispute before it addresses the merits of the claims\u201d), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025, 104 S.Ct. 1281, 79 L.Ed.2d 684 (1984); Rice v. Rice Found., 610 F.2d 471, 474 (7th Cir.1979) (\u201cThe initial inquiry in any suit filed in federal court must be whether the federal court possesses subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1167 (E.D.Pa.1978) (\u201cjurisdictional issues must be re solved before other questions may properly be considered\u201d); cf. Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications Inc., 660 F.2d 56, 59 (2d Cir.1981) (\u201cA court must have in personam jurisdiction over a party before it can validly enter even an interlocutory injunction against him.\u201d)."},"case_id":569213,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, I would hold the court erred when it dismissed the complaint with prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief","sentence":"Sealy v. Dodge, 289 S.C. 543, 544, 347 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1986) (\u201c[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\u201d); cf. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 108 S.C. 258, 94 S.E. 15 (1917) (dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"289 S.C. 543, 544","parenthetical":"\"[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\"","sentence":"Sealy v. Dodge, 289 S.C. 543, 544, 347 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1986) (\u201c[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\u201d); cf. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 108 S.C. 258, 94 S.E. 15 (1917) (dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief)."},"case_id":281851,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, I would hold the court erred when it dismissed the complaint with prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief","sentence":"Sealy v. Dodge, 289 S.C. 543, 544, 347 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1986) (\u201c[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\u201d); cf. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 108 S.C. 258, 94 S.E. 15 (1917) (dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"289 S.C. 543, 544","parenthetical":"\"[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\"","sentence":"Sealy v. Dodge, 289 S.C. 543, 544, 347 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1986) (\u201c[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\u201d); cf. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 108 S.C. 258, 94 S.E. 15 (1917) (dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief)."},"case_id":281851,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, I would hold the court erred when it dismissed the complaint with prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief","sentence":"Sealy v. Dodge, 289 S.C. 543, 544, 347 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1986) (\u201c[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\u201d); cf. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 108 S.C. 258, 94 S.E. 15 (1917) (dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"347 S.E.2d 504, 505","parenthetical":"\"[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\"","sentence":"Sealy v. Dodge, 289 S.C. 543, 544, 347 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1986) (\u201c[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\u201d); cf. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 108 S.C. 258, 94 S.E. 15 (1917) (dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief)."},"case_id":281851,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, I would hold the court erred when it dismissed the complaint with prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"347 S.E.2d 504, 505","parenthetical":"\"[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\"","sentence":"Sealy v. Dodge, 289 S.C. 543, 544, 347 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1986) (\u201c[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\u201d); cf. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 108 S.C. 258, 94 S.E. 15 (1917) (dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief","sentence":"Sealy v. Dodge, 289 S.C. 543, 544, 347 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1986) (\u201c[Dismissal ... does not bar a subsequent action brought before expiration of the statute of limitations if the dismissal is based merely on the insufficiency of the complaint.\u201d); cf. Owens v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 108 S.C. 258, 94 S.E. 15 (1917) (dismissal is proper and will bar another action if the complaint affirmatively shows that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief)."},"case_id":281851,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"435 U.S. 247, 266","parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"435 U.S. 247, 266","parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"435 U.S. 247, 266","parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054","parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054","parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054","parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Domegan obtained a final judgment for damages on a significant constitutional claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating: Carey \"makes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\"","sentence":"See id. & infra note 32; see also Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 2544 n. 11, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986) (stating: Carey \u201cmakes clear that nominal damages ... are the appropriate means of \u2018vindicating\u2019 rights whose deprivation has not caused actual, provable injury.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"as procedural due process is an \"absolute\" right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \"the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\"","sentence":"See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (as procedural due process is an \u201cabsolute\u201d right, its denial is actionable without proof of actual injury, because of \u201cthe importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed\u201d). Although the monetary damage award is minuscule in amount, in the eyes of the law its remedial significance is substantial, as society recognizes the intrinsic deterrent effect in judgments against public officials who violate procedural due process rights guaranteed under the Constitution."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another's negligence","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another's negligence","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"111 Nev. 405, 409","parenthetical":"declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"893 P.2d 345, 347","parenthetical":"declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another's negligence","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another's negligence","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"111 Nev. 405, 409","parenthetical":"declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"893 P.2d 345, 347","parenthetical":"declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another's negligence","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"111 Nev. 405, 409","parenthetical":"declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"893 P.2d 345, 347","parenthetical":"declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another's negligence","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"111 Nev. 405, 409","parenthetical":"declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another's negligence","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the instances in which we have created a new common law cause of action, the facts have been more clear-cut and the issues better defined by other jurisdictions than in the case before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another's negligence","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"893 P.2d 345, 347","parenthetical":"declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues","sentence":"See Rupert, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (creating a cause of action in tort for personal injury from a motor vehicle accident for one spouse against another by abrogating the doctrine of spousal immunity); see also Eaton, 101 Nev. 705, 710 P.2d 1370 (creating a cause of action for emotional distress caused by apprehending the death or serious injury of a loved one due to another\u2019s negligence); cf. Greco v. United States, 111 Nev. 405, 409, 893 P.2d 345, 347 (1995) (declining to recognize a wrongful life cause of action because of the difficulty of the issues)."},"case_id":9272102,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"808 F.2d 1180, 1186","parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"231 F.2d 22, 24-25","parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"808 F.2d 1180, 1186","parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"808 F.2d 1180, 1186","parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"808 F.2d 1180, 1186","parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"231 F.2d 22, 24-25","parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"231 F.2d 22, 24-25","parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"231 F.2d 22, 24-25","parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Neither this court nor the Supreme Court have extended the open fields doctrine to anything beyond observation searches.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field","sentence":"See generally Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-03, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2539-40, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (Fourth Amendment applies to searches of mines); see also Allinder v. State of Ohio, 808 F.2d 1180, 1186 (6th Cir.) (open fields doctrine limited to visual inspection and Fourth Amendment applies to search of apiaries in a field), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1065, 107 S.Ct. 2455, 95 L.Ed.2d 865 (1987); but see Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 24-25 (10th Cir.) (open fields doctrine precludes Fourth Amendment application to search of a closed, artificial cave in a field), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932, 76 S.Ct. 788, 100 L.Ed. 1461 (1956)."},"case_id":10520906,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We note that other circuits have construed the ERISA enforcement statute narrowly, proscribing those parties entitled to bring ERISA claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"fiduciary of plan had no standing to sue for a declaration of its rights under the plan","sentence":"See, e.g., Gulf Life Ins. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.1987) (fiduciary of plan had no standing to sue for a declaration of its rights under the plan); Grand Union Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Ass'n, 808 F.2d 66 (D.C.Cir.1987) (employer had no standing to sue under ERISA); Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.1988) (health care provider had no standing to sue under ERISA); but see Fentron Indus., 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.1982) (employer did have standing to sue under ERISA to protect employer-employee relations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"employer did have standing to sue under ERISA to protect employer-employee relations","sentence":"See, e.g., Gulf Life Ins. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.1987) (fiduciary of plan had no standing to sue for a declaration of its rights under the plan); Grand Union Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Ass'n, 808 F.2d 66 (D.C.Cir.1987) (employer had no standing to sue under ERISA); Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.1988) (health care provider had no standing to sue under ERISA); but see Fentron Indus., 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.1982) (employer did have standing to sue under ERISA to protect employer-employee relations)."},"case_id":10540771,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We note that other circuits have construed the ERISA enforcement statute narrowly, proscribing those parties entitled to bring ERISA claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"employer did have standing to sue under ERISA to protect employer-employee relations","sentence":"See, e.g., Gulf Life Ins. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.1987) (fiduciary of plan had no standing to sue for a declaration of its rights under the plan); Grand Union Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Ass'n, 808 F.2d 66 (D.C.Cir.1987) (employer had no standing to sue under ERISA); Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.1988) (health care provider had no standing to sue under ERISA); but see Fentron Indus., 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.1982) (employer did have standing to sue under ERISA to protect employer-employee relations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"health care provider had no standing to sue under ERISA","sentence":"See, e.g., Gulf Life Ins. v. Arnold, 809 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir.1987) (fiduciary of plan had no standing to sue for a declaration of its rights under the plan); Grand Union Co. v. Food Employers Labor Relations Ass'n, 808 F.2d 66 (D.C.Cir.1987) (employer had no standing to sue under ERISA); Hermann Hosp., 845 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.1988) (health care provider had no standing to sue under ERISA); but see Fentron Indus., 674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.1982) (employer did have standing to sue under ERISA to protect employer-employee relations)."},"case_id":10540771,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Deer Creek urges this court not to follow Oklahoma but instead to apply California's approach on this issue. Under California law, if an underlying action is dismissed against a nonconsenting defendant because it was a necessary condition of settlement with the other defendants in the underlying litigation, the dismissal with prejudice does not reflect on the substantive merits of the case and is therefore not a favorable termination for malicious prosecution purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"244 Cal.Rptr. 490, 490","parenthetical":"holding that a dismissal of a defendant who did not agree to settlement is not a favorable termination if dismissal of that defendant was a condition of settlement","sentence":"See Haight, 244 Cal.Rptr. at 490 (holding that a dismissal of a defendant who did not agree to settlement is not a favorable termination if dismissal of that defendant was a condition of settlement). The California courts have reasoned that the dismissal of an objecting defendant from a case does not reflect on the underlying merits of the claim against that defendant if the dismissal was a condition of settlement with the other defendants in the underlying litigation."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"6 Cal.Rptr.2d 649, 649","parenthetical":"finding that \"even where a defendant does not agree to a settlement made on his behalf, his or her dismissal from the lawsuit pursuant to that settlement will not be viewed as a favorable termination as long as it was a necessary condition to settlement\"","sentence":"See id.; see also Villa, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d at 649 (finding that \u201ceven where a defendant does not agree to a settlement made on his behalf, his or her dismissal from the lawsuit pursuant to that settlement will not be viewed as a favorable termination as long as it was a necessary condition to settlement\u201d). \u201cSuch a dismissal is not considered unilateral because it was required by the terms of a settlement agreement, and it will act as a bar to a later malicious prosecution action by the nonsettling defendant.\u201d"},"case_id":11086791,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court denied the new trial, finding that it had properly excluded the evidence because whatever relevance and probative value it had was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, relying on rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. While a correct legal standard, it is not clear from an examination of the record that this was the actual reason that the evidence was excluded during the trial. But even if the trial court's analysis in ruling on the motion for a new trial was flawed, we can sustain its result on alternative grounds.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"645 P.2d 605, 607","parenthetical":"stating court's duty to sustain trial court's order on any proper grounds","sentence":"See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Utah 1997) (\u201c[T]his court will \u2018sustain a trial court\u2019s evidentiary ruling on any available ground, even though it may be one not advanced below.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 400 (Utah 1989)); see also In re Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1982) (stating court\u2019s duty to sustain trial court\u2019s order on any proper grounds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"943 P.2d 1347, 1353","parenthetical":"\"[T]his court will 'sustain a trial court's evidentiary ruling on any available ground, even though it may be one not advanced below.' \"","sentence":"See State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1353 (Utah 1997) (\u201c[T]his court will \u2018sustain a trial court\u2019s evidentiary ruling on any available ground, even though it may be one not advanced below.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 400 (Utah 1989)); see also In re Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1982) (stating court\u2019s duty to sustain trial court\u2019s order on any proper grounds)."},"case_id":11492514,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, the Court concludes that while Epstein can properly assist the trier of fact by pointing out marked differences and unusual similarities between Mrs. Ramsey's writing and the Ransom Note, he has not demonstrated a methodology whereby he can draw a conclusion, to an absolute certainty, that a given writer wrote the Note. Such a holding is consistent with numerous other districts that have allowed a qualified handwriting expert to testify as to the \"similarities\" between a challenged document and a known exemplar, but have not allowed the expert to express his ultimate \"opinion\" on the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552","parenthetical":"finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony's reliability","sentence":"But see United States v. Lewis, 220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552 (S.D.W.Va. 2002) (finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony\u2019s reliability); United States v. Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106 (D.Alaska 2001) (excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524","parenthetical":"allowing an expert to testify about \"the specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524 (D.N.J.2000) (allowing an expert to testify about \u201cthe specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy.\u201d); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (D.Neb.2000) (limiting a forensic document examiner\u2019s testimony to \u201cidentifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents.\u201d); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 68 (D.Mass.1999) (permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings)."},"case_id":9141171,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, the Court concludes that while Epstein can properly assist the trier of fact by pointing out marked differences and unusual similarities between Mrs. Ramsey's writing and the Ransom Note, he has not demonstrated a methodology whereby he can draw a conclusion, to an absolute certainty, that a given writer wrote the Note. Such a holding is consistent with numerous other districts that have allowed a qualified handwriting expert to testify as to the \"similarities\" between a challenged document and a known exemplar, but have not allowed the expert to express his ultimate \"opinion\" on the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106","parenthetical":"excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable","sentence":"But see United States v. Lewis, 220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552 (S.D.W.Va. 2002) (finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony\u2019s reliability); United States v. Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106 (D.Alaska 2001) (excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524","parenthetical":"allowing an expert to testify about \"the specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524 (D.N.J.2000) (allowing an expert to testify about \u201cthe specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy.\u201d); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (D.Neb.2000) (limiting a forensic document examiner\u2019s testimony to \u201cidentifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents.\u201d); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 68 (D.Mass.1999) (permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings)."},"case_id":9141171,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, the Court concludes that while Epstein can properly assist the trier of fact by pointing out marked differences and unusual similarities between Mrs. Ramsey's writing and the Ransom Note, he has not demonstrated a methodology whereby he can draw a conclusion, to an absolute certainty, that a given writer wrote the Note. Such a holding is consistent with numerous other districts that have allowed a qualified handwriting expert to testify as to the \"similarities\" between a challenged document and a known exemplar, but have not allowed the expert to express his ultimate \"opinion\" on the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194","parenthetical":"limiting a forensic document examiner's testimony to \"identifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524 (D.N.J.2000) (allowing an expert to testify about \u201cthe specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy.\u201d); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (D.Neb.2000) (limiting a forensic document examiner\u2019s testimony to \u201cidentifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents.\u201d); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 68 (D.Mass.1999) (permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552","parenthetical":"finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony's reliability","sentence":"But see United States v. Lewis, 220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552 (S.D.W.Va. 2002) (finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony\u2019s reliability); United States v. Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106 (D.Alaska 2001) (excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable)."},"case_id":9141171,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Accordingly, the Court concludes that while Epstein can properly assist the trier of fact by pointing out marked differences and unusual similarities between Mrs. Ramsey's writing and the Ransom Note, he has not demonstrated a methodology whereby he can draw a conclusion, to an absolute certainty, that a given writer wrote the Note. Such a holding is consistent with numerous other districts that have allowed a qualified handwriting expert to testify as to the \"similarities\" between a challenged document and a known exemplar, but have not allowed the expert to express his ultimate \"opinion\" on the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106","parenthetical":"excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable","sentence":"But see United States v. Lewis, 220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552 (S.D.W.Va. 2002) (finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony\u2019s reliability); United States v. Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106 (D.Alaska 2001) (excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194","parenthetical":"limiting a forensic document examiner's testimony to \"identifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524 (D.N.J.2000) (allowing an expert to testify about \u201cthe specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy.\u201d); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (D.Neb.2000) (limiting a forensic document examiner\u2019s testimony to \u201cidentifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents.\u201d); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 68 (D.Mass.1999) (permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings)."},"case_id":9141171,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, the Court concludes that while Epstein can properly assist the trier of fact by pointing out marked differences and unusual similarities between Mrs. Ramsey's writing and the Ransom Note, he has not demonstrated a methodology whereby he can draw a conclusion, to an absolute certainty, that a given writer wrote the Note. Such a holding is consistent with numerous other districts that have allowed a qualified handwriting expert to testify as to the \"similarities\" between a challenged document and a known exemplar, but have not allowed the expert to express his ultimate \"opinion\" on the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 F.Supp.2d 62, 68","parenthetical":"permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524 (D.N.J.2000) (allowing an expert to testify about \u201cthe specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy.\u201d); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (D.Neb.2000) (limiting a forensic document examiner\u2019s testimony to \u201cidentifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents.\u201d); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 68 (D.Mass.1999) (permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552","parenthetical":"finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony's reliability","sentence":"But see United States v. Lewis, 220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552 (S.D.W.Va. 2002) (finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony\u2019s reliability); United States v. Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106 (D.Alaska 2001) (excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable)."},"case_id":9141171,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Accordingly, the Court concludes that while Epstein can properly assist the trier of fact by pointing out marked differences and unusual similarities between Mrs. Ramsey's writing and the Ransom Note, he has not demonstrated a methodology whereby he can draw a conclusion, to an absolute certainty, that a given writer wrote the Note. Such a holding is consistent with numerous other districts that have allowed a qualified handwriting expert to testify as to the \"similarities\" between a challenged document and a known exemplar, but have not allowed the expert to express his ultimate \"opinion\" on the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 F.Supp.2d 62, 68","parenthetical":"permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Van Wyk, 83 F.Supp.2d 515, 524 (D.N.J.2000) (allowing an expert to testify about \u201cthe specific similarities and idiosyncrasies between the known writings and the questioned writings, as well as testimony regarding, for example, how frequently or infrequently in his experience, he has seen a particular idiosyncrasy.\u201d); United States v. Rutherford, 104 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1194 (D.Neb.2000) (limiting a forensic document examiner\u2019s testimony to \u201cidentifying and explaining the similarities and dissimilarities between the known exemplars and the questioned documents.\u201d); United States v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 68 (D.Mass.1999) (permitting forensic examiner to testify about unique features common or absent in the writings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106","parenthetical":"excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable","sentence":"But see United States v. Lewis, 220 F.Supp.2d 548, 552 (S.D.W.Va. 2002) (finding that proponent of forensic document expert had failed to establish testimony\u2019s reliability); United States v. Saelee, 162 F.Supp.2d 1097, 1106 (D.Alaska 2001) (excluding handwriting expert testimony in its entirety as inherently unreliable)."},"case_id":9141171,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the question is one of adequacy of attorney representation, potential remediation might involve examination of the administration of substantial number of individual cases. Thus, we conclude that the declaratory relief sought by Plaintiffs so intrudes in the administration of the Sacramento County Dependency Court as to require abstention under O'Shea.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"401 U.S. 66, 72-73","parenthetical":"noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief","sentence":"See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (same); see also O\u2019Shea, 414 U.S. at 500, 94 S.Ct. 669; Parker, 626 F.2d at 7 (\u201cWhen the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 F.2d 7, 7","parenthetical":"\"When the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\"","sentence":"See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (same); see also O\u2019Shea, 414 U.S. at 500, 94 S.Ct. 669; Parker, 626 F.2d at 7 (\u201cWhen the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\u201d)."},"case_id":3833391,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the question is one of adequacy of attorney representation, potential remediation might involve examination of the administration of substantial number of individual cases. Thus, we conclude that the declaratory relief sought by Plaintiffs so intrudes in the administration of the Sacramento County Dependency Court as to require abstention under O'Shea.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief","sentence":"See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (same); see also O\u2019Shea, 414 U.S. at 500, 94 S.Ct. 669; Parker, 626 F.2d at 7 (\u201cWhen the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 F.2d 7, 7","parenthetical":"\"When the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\"","sentence":"See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (same); see also O\u2019Shea, 414 U.S. at 500, 94 S.Ct. 669; Parker, 626 F.2d at 7 (\u201cWhen the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\u201d)."},"case_id":3833391,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because the question is one of adequacy of attorney representation, potential remediation might involve examination of the administration of substantial number of individual cases. Thus, we conclude that the declaratory relief sought by Plaintiffs so intrudes in the administration of the Sacramento County Dependency Court as to require abstention under O'Shea.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief","sentence":"See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (same); see also O\u2019Shea, 414 U.S. at 500, 94 S.Ct. 669; Parker, 626 F.2d at 7 (\u201cWhen the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 F.2d 7, 7","parenthetical":"\"When the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\"","sentence":"See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971) (noting that claims for declaratory relief can be just as intrusive as claims for injunctive relief); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 977 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (same); see also O\u2019Shea, 414 U.S. at 500, 94 S.Ct. 669; Parker, 626 F.2d at 7 (\u201cWhen the state agency in question is a state court ... the equitable restraint considerations appear to be nearly absolute.\u201d)."},"case_id":3833391,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Whistleblower Act expressly states that a report is properly made to \"an appropriate law enforcement authority if the authority is a part of a state or local government entity .., that the employee in good faith believes is authorized to ... investigate or prosecute a violation of criminal law.\" Thus, in determining whether a report was properly made to an appropriate law enforcement authority, it is the entity's authority to investigate allegations of criminal wrongdoing that must be the focus of the court's inquiry, and the individual to whom a report is made must be a \"part of' that entity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"451 S.W.3d 410, 421","parenthetical":"individual to whom -report is made must be \"part of' the relevant governmental entity that has authority to conduct the investigation","sentence":"See, e.g., Robertson County v. Wymola, 17 S.W.3d 334, 340-41 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (the term \u201cauthority\u201d as used in the Act refers to the governmental entity receiving the report, rather than to the individual within the entity); see also Hunt County Cmty. Supervision & Corr. Dep\u2019t v. Gaston, 451 S.W.3d 410, 421 (Tex.App.-Austin 2014, pet. denied) (individual to whom -report is made must be \u201cpart of\u2019 the relevant governmental entity that has authority to conduct the investigation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"17 S.W.3d 334, 340-41","parenthetical":"the term \"authority\" as used in the Act refers to the governmental entity receiving the report, rather than to the individual within the entity","sentence":"See, e.g., Robertson County v. Wymola, 17 S.W.3d 334, 340-41 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. denied) (the term \u201cauthority\u201d as used in the Act refers to the governmental entity receiving the report, rather than to the individual within the entity); see also Hunt County Cmty. Supervision & Corr. Dep\u2019t v. Gaston, 451 S.W.3d 410, 421 (Tex.App.-Austin 2014, pet. denied) (individual to whom -report is made must be \u201cpart of\u2019 the relevant governmental entity that has authority to conduct the investigation)."},"case_id":12178600,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although the charge conference between court and counsel was not transcribed, the record contains, in addition to Ramsey's requested instructions, a memorandum which sets forth Ramsey's position with respect to its requested instructions. Thus, although Ramsey's formal objections to the court's refusal to give its requested instructions are not accompanied by a distinct statement of its grounds, Ramsey, by making its position known to the court prior to stating its formal objections, adequately preserved these issues for review.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"624 F.2d 1279, 1279","parenthetical":"Rule 51 \"is not without exceptions, however, and the failure to object may be disregarded if the party's position has previously been made clear to the court and it is plain that a further objection would have been unavailing.\"","sentence":"Cf. Lang, 624 F.2d at 1279 (Rule 51 \u201cis not without exceptions, however, and the failure to object may be disregarded if the party\u2019s position has previously been made clear to the court and it is plain that a further objection would have been unavailing.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"428 F.2d 1061, 1069","parenthetical":"approving procedure whereby counsel provides court with reasons for its objections prior to the time, prescribed by Rule 51, for formal objections, followed by simple objections, without reasons, at the Rule 51 time","sentence":"See, e.g., Little v. Green, 428 F.2d 1061, 1069 (5th Cir.) (approving procedure whereby counsel provides court with reasons for its objections prior to the time, prescribed by Rule 51, for formal objections, followed by simple objections, without reasons, at the Rule 51 time), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 366, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970)."},"case_id":292614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although the charge conference between court and counsel was not transcribed, the record contains, in addition to Ramsey's requested instructions, a memorandum which sets forth Ramsey's position with respect to its requested instructions. Thus, although Ramsey's formal objections to the court's refusal to give its requested instructions are not accompanied by a distinct statement of its grounds, Ramsey, by making its position known to the court prior to stating its formal objections, adequately preserved these issues for review.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"624 F.2d 1279, 1279","parenthetical":"Rule 51 \"is not without exceptions, however, and the failure to object may be disregarded if the party's position has previously been made clear to the court and it is plain that a further objection would have been unavailing.\"","sentence":"Cf. Lang, 624 F.2d at 1279 (Rule 51 \u201cis not without exceptions, however, and the failure to object may be disregarded if the party\u2019s position has previously been made clear to the court and it is plain that a further objection would have been unavailing.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"approving procedure whereby counsel provides court with reasons for its objections prior to the time, prescribed by Rule 51, for formal objections, followed by simple objections, without reasons, at the Rule 51 time","sentence":"See, e.g., Little v. Green, 428 F.2d 1061, 1069 (5th Cir.) (approving procedure whereby counsel provides court with reasons for its objections prior to the time, prescribed by Rule 51, for formal objections, followed by simple objections, without reasons, at the Rule 51 time), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 366, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970)."},"case_id":292614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although the charge conference between court and counsel was not transcribed, the record contains, in addition to Ramsey's requested instructions, a memorandum which sets forth Ramsey's position with respect to its requested instructions. Thus, although Ramsey's formal objections to the court's refusal to give its requested instructions are not accompanied by a distinct statement of its grounds, Ramsey, by making its position known to the court prior to stating its formal objections, adequately preserved these issues for review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"approving procedure whereby counsel provides court with reasons for its objections prior to the time, prescribed by Rule 51, for formal objections, followed by simple objections, without reasons, at the Rule 51 time","sentence":"See, e.g., Little v. Green, 428 F.2d 1061, 1069 (5th Cir.) (approving procedure whereby counsel provides court with reasons for its objections prior to the time, prescribed by Rule 51, for formal objections, followed by simple objections, without reasons, at the Rule 51 time), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 366, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"624 F.2d 1279, 1279","parenthetical":"Rule 51 \"is not without exceptions, however, and the failure to object may be disregarded if the party's position has previously been made clear to the court and it is plain that a further objection would have been unavailing.\"","sentence":"Cf. Lang, 624 F.2d at 1279 (Rule 51 \u201cis not without exceptions, however, and the failure to object may be disregarded if the party\u2019s position has previously been made clear to the court and it is plain that a further objection would have been unavailing.\u201d)."},"case_id":292614,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the charge conference between court and counsel was not transcribed, the record contains, in addition to Ramsey's requested instructions, a memorandum which sets forth Ramsey's position with respect to its requested instructions. Thus, although Ramsey's formal objections to the court's refusal to give its requested instructions are not accompanied by a distinct statement of its grounds, Ramsey, by making its position known to the court prior to stating its formal objections, adequately preserved these issues for review.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"624 F.2d 1279, 1279","parenthetical":"Rule 51 \"is not without exceptions, however, and the failure to object may be disregarded if the party's position has previously been made clear to the court and it is plain that a further objection would have been unavailing.\"","sentence":"Cf. Lang, 624 F.2d at 1279 (Rule 51 \u201cis not without exceptions, however, and the failure to object may be disregarded if the party\u2019s position has previously been made clear to the court and it is plain that a further objection would have been unavailing.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"approving procedure whereby counsel provides court with reasons for its objections prior to the time, prescribed by Rule 51, for formal objections, followed by simple objections, without reasons, at the Rule 51 time","sentence":"See, e.g., Little v. Green, 428 F.2d 1061, 1069 (5th Cir.) (approving procedure whereby counsel provides court with reasons for its objections prior to the time, prescribed by Rule 51, for formal objections, followed by simple objections, without reasons, at the Rule 51 time), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964, 91 S.Ct. 366, 27 L.Ed.2d 384 (1970)."},"case_id":292614,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Since the CO's initial code designation and OHA's decision rejecting that designation -- a decision that Areata argues violates the SBA's regulations governing OHA's standard of review for NAICS code appeals and the selection of NAICS codes -- are both \"in connection with\" a proposed ongoing procurement, 28 U.S.C. SS 1491(b)(1) authorizes the court to adjudicate the claims alleged in the December 7, 2012 Complaint. See RAMCOR Servs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"185 F.3d 1289, 1289","parenthetical":"\"As long as a statute has a connection to a procurement proposal, an alleged violation suffices to supply jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"Grp., 185 F.3d at 1289 (\u201cAs long as a statute has a connection to a procurement proposal, an alleged violation suffices to supply jurisdiction.\u201d); see also InGenesis, Inc. v. United States, 104 Fed.Cl. 43, 48 (2012) (determining that the United States Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction, because the contracting officer\u2019s NAICS code designation and the OHA\u2019s decision reviewing that NAICS code designation were \u201cin connection with\u201d a proposed procurement) (citing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491(b)(1); Ceres Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed.Cl. 23, 33 (2002))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"104 Fed.Cl. 43, 48","parenthetical":"determining that the United States Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction, because the contracting officer's NAICS code designation and the OHA's decision reviewing that NAICS code designation were \"in connection with\" a proposed procurement","sentence":"Grp., 185 F.3d at 1289 (\u201cAs long as a statute has a connection to a procurement proposal, an alleged violation suffices to supply jurisdiction.\u201d); see also InGenesis, Inc. v. United States, 104 Fed.Cl. 43, 48 (2012) (determining that the United States Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction, because the contracting officer\u2019s NAICS code designation and the OHA\u2019s decision reviewing that NAICS code designation were \u201cin connection with\u201d a proposed procurement) (citing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1491(b)(1); Ceres Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed.Cl. 23, 33 (2002))."},"case_id":4128935,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, in this Circuit, Quarles applies only to an exigency involving a stray or suspected weapon.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"272 Fed.Appx. 473, 477","parenthetical":"describing 2007 Williams case as \"set[ting] forth the standard the government must satisfy in order ... [to use] the Quarles public safety exception.\"","sentence":"See Liddell, 517 F.3d at 1013 (noting strict rule in Sixth Circuit); United States v. Williams, 272 Fed.Appx. 473, 477 (6th Cir.2008) (describing 2007 Williams case as \u201cset[ting] forth the standard the government must satisfy in order ... [to use] the Quarles public safety exception.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir.2005) (\u201cIn order for the public safety exception to apply, there must have been \u2018an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from an immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted); United States v. Blackmon, No. 96-6701, 1998 WL 109992, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 1998) (unpublished) (jail ease discussing Quarles as applying to \u201cthe location of a gun\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"406 F.3d 1160, 1165","parenthetical":"\"In order for the public safety exception to apply, there must have been 'an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from an immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.' \"","sentence":"See Liddell, 517 F.3d at 1013 (noting strict rule in Sixth Circuit); United States v. Williams, 272 Fed.Appx. 473, 477 (6th Cir.2008) (describing 2007 Williams case as \u201cset[ting] forth the standard the government must satisfy in order ... [to use] the Quarles public safety exception.\u201d); see also United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir.2005) (\u201cIn order for the public safety exception to apply, there must have been \u2018an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from an immediate danger associated with [a] weapon.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted); United States v. Blackmon, No. 96-6701, 1998 WL 109992, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 1998) (unpublished) (jail ease discussing Quarles as applying to \u201cthe location of a gun\u201d)."},"case_id":5722409,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He also refused to inquire whether other jurors had knowledge of the incident and about the possible impact on them. We therefore agree with Leaper that while he has tibe burden of showing prejudice, and eventually abuse of judicial discretion in the denial of his mistrial motion, he is slowed in meeting his burden by the trial court's refusal. And in the absence of a judicial admonition and instruction to any of the jurors, they may mistakenly believe that consideration of Roderick's tape taking was appropriate.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"mistrial declared only when an event of prejudicial misconduct and damaging effect cannot be removed by admonition and instruction","sentence":"State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. at 55 (appellate review of denial of mistrial should consider whether limiting instruction was given); cf. Angelo, 287 Kan. 262 (mistrial declared only when an event of prejudicial misconduct and damaging effect cannot be removed by admonition and instruction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"289 Kan. 55, 55","parenthetical":"appellate review of denial of mistrial should consider whether limiting instruction was given","sentence":"State v. Dixon, 289 Kan. at 55 (appellate review of denial of mistrial should consider whether limiting instruction was given); cf. Angelo, 287 Kan. 262 (mistrial declared only when an event of prejudicial misconduct and damaging effect cannot be removed by admonition and instruction)."},"case_id":4148556,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We note that three slate supreme courts have concluded that the use of a tracking device is impermissible under their respective state constitutions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant","sentence":"See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy","sentence":"But see Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy). In Weaver, for example, the New York Court of Appeals expressed fear that to permit the police to use tracking devices \"would be to countenance an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.\u201d 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. \"But the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.\u2019 \" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978))."},"case_id":3507653,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We note that three slate supreme courts have concluded that the use of a tracking device is impermissible under their respective state constitutions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy","sentence":"But see Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy). In Weaver, for example, the New York Court of Appeals expressed fear that to permit the police to use tracking devices \"would be to countenance an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.\u201d 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. \"But the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.\u2019 \" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant","sentence":"See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution)."},"case_id":3507653,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We note that three slate supreme courts have concluded that the use of a tracking device is impermissible under their respective state constitutions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy","sentence":"But see Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy). In Weaver, for example, the New York Court of Appeals expressed fear that to permit the police to use tracking devices \"would be to countenance an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.\u201d 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. \"But the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.\u2019 \" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant","sentence":"See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution)."},"case_id":3507653,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We note that three slate supreme courts have concluded that the use of a tracking device is impermissible under their respective state constitutions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant","sentence":"See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy","sentence":"But see Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy). In Weaver, for example, the New York Court of Appeals expressed fear that to permit the police to use tracking devices \"would be to countenance an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.\u201d 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. \"But the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.\u2019 \" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978))."},"case_id":3507653,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We note that three slate supreme courts have concluded that the use of a tracking device is impermissible under their respective state constitutions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution","sentence":"See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy","sentence":"But see Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy). In Weaver, for example, the New York Court of Appeals expressed fear that to permit the police to use tracking devices \"would be to countenance an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.\u201d 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. \"But the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.\u2019 \" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978))."},"case_id":3507653,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We note that three slate supreme courts have concluded that the use of a tracking device is impermissible under their respective state constitutions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy","sentence":"But see Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy). In Weaver, for example, the New York Court of Appeals expressed fear that to permit the police to use tracking devices \"would be to countenance an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.\u201d 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. \"But the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.\u2019 \" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution","sentence":"See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution)."},"case_id":3507653,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We note that three slate supreme courts have concluded that the use of a tracking device is impermissible under their respective state constitutions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy","sentence":"But see Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy). In Weaver, for example, the New York Court of Appeals expressed fear that to permit the police to use tracking devices \"would be to countenance an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.\u201d 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. \"But the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.\u2019 \" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution","sentence":"See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution)."},"case_id":3507653,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We note that three slate supreme courts have concluded that the use of a tracking device is impermissible under their respective state constitutions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy","sentence":"But see Osburn v. State, 118 Nev. 323, 44 P.3d 523 (2002) (following Mclver and holding that the police use of a mobile tracking device does not infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy). In Weaver, for example, the New York Court of Appeals expressed fear that to permit the police to use tracking devices \"would be to countenance an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police agencies of government upon personal privacy.\u201d 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. \"But the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests abuse.\u2019 \" Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85, 103 S.Ct. 1081 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution","sentence":"See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009); State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (holding, under a state constitutional provision more protective than the Fourth Amendment, that police may not use a mobile tracking device without a warrant); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (holding that using a track ing device without a warrant or obviating exigency violates the state constitution)."},"case_id":3507653,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This case involves only the constitutional components of the standing requirement. Congress may eclipse prudential standing limitations by \"granting] an express right of action to persons who would otherwise be barred by prudential standing rules.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"793 F.2d 1336, 1336","parenthetical":"\"EPCA clearly removes the judicial authority to create prudential barriers\"","sentence":"See CAS I, 793 F.2d at 1336 (\u201cEPCA clearly removes the judicial authority to create prudential barriers\u201d); see also id. at 1336-37 (listing numerous cases construing similar provisions to eclipse the prudential standing barrier); National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 704 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1988) (also construing statutory provision authorizing suits by \u201cadversely affected\u201d persons to obviate prudential standing limitations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"also construing statutory provision authorizing suits by \"adversely affected\" persons to obviate prudential standing limitations","sentence":"See CAS I, 793 F.2d at 1336 (\u201cEPCA clearly removes the judicial authority to create prudential barriers\u201d); see also id. at 1336-37 (listing numerous cases construing similar provisions to eclipse the prudential standing barrier); National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 704 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1988) (also construing statutory provision authorizing suits by \u201cadversely affected\u201d persons to obviate prudential standing limitations)."},"case_id":5657113,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Davids' warranty deed includes a gulf-to-sound pedestrian easement that makes no mention of the dock on Parcel A. And while the Davids' warranty deed states that the property was \"[subject to current taxes, easements and restrictions of record,\" it is undisputed that the Declaration and the purported dock easement in that Declaration were not yet \"of record\" when the deed was delivered to the Davids. The Davids took title to Parcel A at the earliest fifty days before Ip- polite recorded the Declaration or at the latest forty minutes before Ippolite recorded the Declaration.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 So.2d 306, 307","parenthetical":"\"[A] deed takes effect from the date of delivery, and the recording of a deed is not essential to its validity as between the parties or those taking with notice,\"","sentence":"See Sweat v. Yates, 468 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (\u201c[A] deed takes effect from the date of delivery, and the recording of a deed is not essential to its validity as between the parties or those taking with notice,\u201d); see also Sargent v. Baxter, 673 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (\u201cA grantor\u2019s recording of a deed ... is generally presumed equivalent to delivery\u201d). Thus, even if the Declaration clearly creates an easement for access to the dock on Parcel A, it was not a recorded document at the time that the Davids took the property."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"673 So.2d 979, 980","parenthetical":"\"A grantor's recording of a deed ... is generally presumed equivalent to delivery\"","sentence":"See Sweat v. Yates, 468 So.2d 306, 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (\u201c[A] deed takes effect from the date of delivery, and the recording of a deed is not essential to its validity as between the parties or those taking with notice,\u201d); see also Sargent v. Baxter, 673 So.2d 979, 980 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (\u201cA grantor\u2019s recording of a deed ... is generally presumed equivalent to delivery\u201d). Thus, even if the Declaration clearly creates an easement for access to the dock on Parcel A, it was not a recorded document at the time that the Davids took the property."},"case_id":6771755,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We hold that La.Rev.Stat.Ann. 13:3886, as interpreted by the district court, cannot be squared with Mennonite's allocation of notice burdens. Appellee argues, however, that a recent line of authority establishes the correctness of the district court's holding.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government","sentence":"Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct. 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest, or failed to file a claim with the State, within a twenty year period); see United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (holding constitutional a federal recording system requiring owners of certain mineral interests on federal lands to file annual claims of their interest, in the absence of which the interest would escheat to the federal government); see also Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340."},"case_id":10538827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our conclusion is not changed by the fact that, in structuring its proposal, Cen-tech apparently relied upon the later-retracted Policy Memorandum. The Air Force Material Command could not, through the Policy Memorandum, alter the requirements of the LOS clause, which was mandated by statute and regulation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"476 U.S. 926, 937","parenthetical":"noting that \"not all agency publications are of binding force\" and that \"an agency's power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\"","sentence":"See United States v. Amdahl Carp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed.Cir.1986) (\u201cAdministrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\u201d); cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (noting that \u201cnot all agency publications are of binding force\u201d and that \u201can agency\u2019s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\u201d). In short, the Policy Memorandum could not override the LOS clause."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"786 F.2d 387, 392-93","parenthetical":"\"Administrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Amdahl Carp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed.Cir.1986) (\u201cAdministrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\u201d); cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (noting that \u201cnot all agency publications are of binding force\u201d and that \u201can agency\u2019s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\u201d). In short, the Policy Memorandum could not override the LOS clause."},"case_id":3685108,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our conclusion is not changed by the fact that, in structuring its proposal, Cen-tech apparently relied upon the later-retracted Policy Memorandum. The Air Force Material Command could not, through the Policy Memorandum, alter the requirements of the LOS clause, which was mandated by statute and regulation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"786 F.2d 387, 392-93","parenthetical":"\"Administrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Amdahl Carp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed.Cir.1986) (\u201cAdministrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\u201d); cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (noting that \u201cnot all agency publications are of binding force\u201d and that \u201can agency\u2019s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\u201d). In short, the Policy Memorandum could not override the LOS clause."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"not all agency publications are of binding force\" and that \"an agency's power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\"","sentence":"See United States v. Amdahl Carp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed.Cir.1986) (\u201cAdministrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\u201d); cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (noting that \u201cnot all agency publications are of binding force\u201d and that \u201can agency\u2019s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\u201d). In short, the Policy Memorandum could not override the LOS clause."},"case_id":3685108,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our conclusion is not changed by the fact that, in structuring its proposal, Cen-tech apparently relied upon the later-retracted Policy Memorandum. The Air Force Material Command could not, through the Policy Memorandum, alter the requirements of the LOS clause, which was mandated by statute and regulation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"786 F.2d 387, 392-93","parenthetical":"\"Administrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Amdahl Carp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed.Cir.1986) (\u201cAdministrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\u201d); cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (noting that \u201cnot all agency publications are of binding force\u201d and that \u201can agency\u2019s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\u201d). In short, the Policy Memorandum could not override the LOS clause."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"not all agency publications are of binding force\" and that \"an agency's power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\"","sentence":"See United States v. Amdahl Carp., 786 F.2d 387, 392-93 (Fed.Cir.1986) (\u201cAdministrative actions taken in violation of statutory authorization or requirement are of no effect.\u201d); cf. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937, 106 S.Ct. 2333, 90 L.Ed.2d 921 (1986) (noting that \u201cnot all agency publications are of binding force\u201d and that \u201can agency\u2019s power is no greater than that delegated to it by Congress\u201d). In short, the Policy Memorandum could not override the LOS clause."},"case_id":3685108,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are no cases that are directly on point with this case; i.e., addressing whether the defendanl\/claimant substantially prevails in instances where the case is dismissed with prejudice. However, the Supreme Court has considered several fee-shifting statutes that award attorneys' fees under the \"prevailing party\" standard and has consistently held that such statutes prohibit an award of fees to the plaintiff unless the court awards relief on the merit s, either through a judgment on the merits or through a settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"case_id":3670969,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are no cases that are directly on point with this case; i.e., addressing whether the defendanl\/claimant substantially prevails in instances where the case is dismissed with prejudice. However, the Supreme Court has considered several fee-shifting statutes that award attorneys' fees under the \"prevailing party\" standard and has consistently held that such statutes prohibit an award of fees to the plaintiff unless the court awards relief on the merit s, either through a judgment on the merits or through a settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"case_id":3670969,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There are no cases that are directly on point with this case; i.e., addressing whether the defendanl\/claimant substantially prevails in instances where the case is dismissed with prejudice. However, the Supreme Court has considered several fee-shifting statutes that award attorneys' fees under the \"prevailing party\" standard and has consistently held that such statutes prohibit an award of fees to the plaintiff unless the court awards relief on the merit s, either through a judgment on the merits or through a settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"case_id":3670969,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are no cases that are directly on point with this case; i.e., addressing whether the defendanl\/claimant substantially prevails in instances where the case is dismissed with prejudice. However, the Supreme Court has considered several fee-shifting statutes that award attorneys' fees under the \"prevailing party\" standard and has consistently held that such statutes prohibit an award of fees to the plaintiff unless the court awards relief on the merit s, either through a judgment on the merits or through a settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"case_id":3670969,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are no cases that are directly on point with this case; i.e., addressing whether the defendanl\/claimant substantially prevails in instances where the case is dismissed with prejudice. However, the Supreme Court has considered several fee-shifting statutes that award attorneys' fees under the \"prevailing party\" standard and has consistently held that such statutes prohibit an award of fees to the plaintiff unless the court awards relief on the merit s, either through a judgment on the merits or through a settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"case_id":3670969,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There are no cases that are directly on point with this case; i.e., addressing whether the defendanl\/claimant substantially prevails in instances where the case is dismissed with prejudice. However, the Supreme Court has considered several fee-shifting statutes that award attorneys' fees under the \"prevailing party\" standard and has consistently held that such statutes prohibit an award of fees to the plaintiff unless the court awards relief on the merit s, either through a judgment on the merits or through a settlement agreement enforced through a consent decree.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act","sentence":"See Buckhannon ..., 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835 ... (addressing a request for attorneys' fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 [105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114] ... (1985) (addressing a request for attorneys\u2019 fees under the Civil Rights Attorney\u2019s Fees Awards Act of 1976)."},"case_id":3670969,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed the action because Marks's claims were raised, or could have been raised, in prior actions between the parties or their privies that resulted in a final judgment on the merits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"297 F.3d 953, 956","parenthetical":"the doctrine of res judicata bars subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in the prior action","sentence":"See Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 987 (setting forth claim preclusion elements and requirements for identity of claims under federal law); Manufactured Home Cmties., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir.2005) (describing claim preclusion under California law); see also Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.2002) (the doctrine of res judicata bars subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in the prior action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"430 F.3d 987, 987","parenthetical":"setting forth claim preclusion elements and requirements for identity of claims under federal law","sentence":"See Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 987 (setting forth claim preclusion elements and requirements for identity of claims under federal law); Manufactured Home Cmties., Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1031 (9th Cir.2005) (describing claim preclusion under California law); see also Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir.2002) (the doctrine of res judicata bars subsequent litigation both of claims that were raised and those that could have been raised in the prior action)."},"case_id":4213432,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5","parenthetical":"applying \"a version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \" in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \"is reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"462 F.3d 876, 886","parenthetical":"acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \"are considerably less than those held by members of free society,\" but that such individuals are \"entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\" than prison inmates","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"382 F.3d 870, 874","parenthetical":"\"Although an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5","parenthetical":"applying \"a version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \" in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \"is reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"567 F.3d 944, 953","parenthetical":"finding that \"governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar'in material aspects to that of running a prison\" because \"[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients' own safety\" and concluding, therefore, that \"the government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5","parenthetical":"applying \"a version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \" in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \"is reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5","parenthetical":"applying \"a version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \" in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \"is reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar'in material aspects to that of running a prison\" because \"[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients' own safety\" and concluding, therefore, that \"the government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5","parenthetical":"applying \"a version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \" in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \"is reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar'in material aspects to that of running a prison\" because \"[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients' own safety\" and concluding, therefore, that \"the government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5","parenthetical":"applying \"a version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \" in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \"is reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar'in material aspects to that of running a prison\" because \"[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients' own safety\" and concluding, therefore, that \"the government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5","parenthetical":"applying \"a version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \" in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \"is reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"690 F.3d 1017, 1039","parenthetical":"applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application","sentence":"But see Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir.2012) (applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"462 F.3d 876, 886","parenthetical":"acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \"are considerably less than those held by members of free society,\" but that such individuals are \"entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\" than prison inmates","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"690 F.3d 1017, 1039","parenthetical":"applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application","sentence":"But see Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir.2012) (applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"690 F.3d 1017, 1039","parenthetical":"applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application","sentence":"But see Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir.2012) (applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"382 F.3d 870, 874","parenthetical":"\"Although an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"567 F.3d 944, 953","parenthetical":"finding that \"governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar'in material aspects to that of running a prison\" because \"[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients' own safety\" and concluding, therefore, that \"the government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"690 F.3d 1017, 1039","parenthetical":"applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application","sentence":"But see Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir.2012) (applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"690 F.3d 1017, 1039","parenthetical":"applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application","sentence":"But see Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir.2012) (applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar'in material aspects to that of running a prison\" because \"[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients' own safety\" and concluding, therefore, that \"the government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"690 F.3d 1017, 1039","parenthetical":"applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application","sentence":"But see Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir.2012) (applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar'in material aspects to that of running a prison\" because \"[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients' own safety\" and concluding, therefore, that \"the government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Sept. 30, 2008)).) While the Court need not conclusively resolve the issue of the precise, applicable standard today, the Court considers each of Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims in light of appropriate therapeutic interests as well as relevant safety and security concerns.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"690 F.3d 1017, 1039","parenthetical":"applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application","sentence":"But see Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1039 (8th Cir.2012) (applying the four-factor Turner test to a First Amendment claim asserted by civilly committed sex offenders where the parties agreed to its application)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"governmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar'in material aspects to that of running a prison\" because \"[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients' own safety\" and concluding, therefore, that \"the government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\"","sentence":"Ivey, 2008 WL 4527792, at *4-5 (applying \u201ca version of the Turner test, moderated to account for the principles stated in Senty-Haugen \u201d in order to determine whether an MSOP policy \u201cis reasonably related to legitimate institutional and therapeutic interests\u201d); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir.2006) (acknowledging that the liberty interests of individuals committed to state custody as dangerous persons \u201care considerably less than those held by members of free society,\u201d but that such individuals are \u201centitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement\u201d than prison inmates) (internal citations omitted); Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 874 (8th Cir.2004) (\u201cAlthough an involuntarily committed patient of a state hospital is not a prisoner per se, his confinement is subject to the same safety and security concerns as that of a prisoner.\u201d); Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944, 953 (8th Cir.2009), cert, denied, 558 U.S. 972, 130 S.Ct. 465, 175 L.Ed.2d 312 (2009) (finding that \u201cgovernmental interests in running a state mental hospital are similar\u2019in material aspects to that of running a prison\u201d because \u201c[a]dministrators have a vital interest in ensuring the safety of their staff, other patients, and of course in ensuring the patients\u2019 own safety\u201d and concluding, therefore, that \u201cthe government may take steps' to maintain security at its institutions where sexually violent persons are confined\u201d)."},"case_id":4205007,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While Goins proceeded throughout this case pro se, Rule 9011 \"unambiguously [states] that any signer must conduct a 'reasonable inquiry' or face sanctions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"810 F.2d 658, 661-62","parenthetical":"\"The fact that [the pro se party] filed the complaint without the assistance of counsel ... did not excuse him from having to investigate the factual basis of his suit.\"","sentence":"Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 548, 111 S.Ct. at 932 (emphasis added); Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir.1987) (\u201cThe fact that [the pro se party] filed the complaint without the assistance of counsel ... did not excuse him from having to investigate the factual basis of his suit.\u201d); see Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 n. 1 (8th Cir.1979) (Rule 11 applies with equal strength to attorneys and pro se litigants); In re 1801 Restaurant, Inc., 40 B.R. 455, 457-58 (Bankr.D.Md.1984) (\u201cPro se litigants have the same duties and obligations as attorneys under [Rule] 11, no more and no less.\u201d). Thus, one appearing pro se has \u201cno impenetrable shield ... [and] has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Rule 11 applies with equal strength to attorneys and pro se litigants","sentence":"Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 548, 111 S.Ct. at 932 (emphasis added); Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir.1987) (\u201cThe fact that [the pro se party] filed the complaint without the assistance of counsel ... did not excuse him from having to investigate the factual basis of his suit.\u201d); see Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 n. 1 (8th Cir.1979) (Rule 11 applies with equal strength to attorneys and pro se litigants); In re 1801 Restaurant, Inc., 40 B.R. 455, 457-58 (Bankr.D.Md.1984) (\u201cPro se litigants have the same duties and obligations as attorneys under [Rule] 11, no more and no less.\u201d). Thus, one appearing pro se has \u201cno impenetrable shield ... [and] has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.\u201d"},"case_id":6512778,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While Goins proceeded throughout this case pro se, Rule 9011 \"unambiguously [states] that any signer must conduct a 'reasonable inquiry' or face sanctions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"810 F.2d 658, 661-62","parenthetical":"\"The fact that [the pro se party] filed the complaint without the assistance of counsel ... did not excuse him from having to investigate the factual basis of his suit.\"","sentence":"Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 548, 111 S.Ct. at 932 (emphasis added); Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir.1987) (\u201cThe fact that [the pro se party] filed the complaint without the assistance of counsel ... did not excuse him from having to investigate the factual basis of his suit.\u201d); see Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 n. 1 (8th Cir.1979) (Rule 11 applies with equal strength to attorneys and pro se litigants); In re 1801 Restaurant, Inc., 40 B.R. 455, 457-58 (Bankr.D.Md.1984) (\u201cPro se litigants have the same duties and obligations as attorneys under [Rule] 11, no more and no less.\u201d). Thus, one appearing pro se has \u201cno impenetrable shield ... [and] has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"40 B.R. 455, 457-58","parenthetical":"\"Pro se litigants have the same duties and obligations as attorneys under [Rule] 11, no more and no less.\"","sentence":"Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 548, 111 S.Ct. at 932 (emphasis added); Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658, 661-62 (7th Cir.1987) (\u201cThe fact that [the pro se party] filed the complaint without the assistance of counsel ... did not excuse him from having to investigate the factual basis of his suit.\u201d); see Ginter v. Southern, 611 F.2d 1226, 1227-28 n. 1 (8th Cir.1979) (Rule 11 applies with equal strength to attorneys and pro se litigants); In re 1801 Restaurant, Inc., 40 B.R. 455, 457-58 (Bankr.D.Md.1984) (\u201cPro se litigants have the same duties and obligations as attorneys under [Rule] 11, no more and no less.\u201d). Thus, one appearing pro se has \u201cno impenetrable shield ... [and] has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation, and abuse already overloaded court dockets.\u201d"},"case_id":6512778,"label":"a"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"249 F.2d 576, 580","parenthetical":"recognizing that, where the credibility of the government's witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 N.W.2d 172, 175","parenthetical":"successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \"credibility was not that crucial\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"a"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"249 F.2d 576, 580","parenthetical":"recognizing that, where the credibility of the government's witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"40 So.3d 557, 563","parenthetical":"reversing successor judge's vacating of original trial court's grant of new trial because original trial court \"observed the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\"","sentence":"But see Pinecrest, LLC v. Harris, 40 So.3d 557, 563 (Miss.2010) (reversing successor judge\u2019s vacating of original trial court\u2019s grant of new trial because original trial court \u201cobserved the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\u201d); Adkins v. Adkins, 43 Ohio App.3d 95, 539 N.E.2d 686, 692 (1988) (\u201cWhile it is always desirable to have the factfinder personally observe the witnesses whose credibility he or she is called upon to determine, considerations of judicial economy may weigh against the additional delay and expense represented by a new trial."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"a"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 N.W.2d 172, 175","parenthetical":"successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \"credibility was not that crucial\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \"is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"40 So.3d 557, 563","parenthetical":"reversing successor judge's vacating of original trial court's grant of new trial because original trial court \"observed the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\"","sentence":"But see Pinecrest, LLC v. Harris, 40 So.3d 557, 563 (Miss.2010) (reversing successor judge\u2019s vacating of original trial court\u2019s grant of new trial because original trial court \u201cobserved the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\u201d); Adkins v. Adkins, 43 Ohio App.3d 95, 539 N.E.2d 686, 692 (1988) (\u201cWhile it is always desirable to have the factfinder personally observe the witnesses whose credibility he or she is called upon to determine, considerations of judicial economy may weigh against the additional delay and expense represented by a new trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \"is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 N.W.2d 172, 175","parenthetical":"successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \"credibility was not that crucial\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"350 P.2d 734, 737","parenthetical":"holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \"is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"40 So.3d 557, 563","parenthetical":"reversing successor judge's vacating of original trial court's grant of new trial because original trial court \"observed the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\"","sentence":"But see Pinecrest, LLC v. Harris, 40 So.3d 557, 563 (Miss.2010) (reversing successor judge\u2019s vacating of original trial court\u2019s grant of new trial because original trial court \u201cobserved the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\u201d); Adkins v. Adkins, 43 Ohio App.3d 95, 539 N.E.2d 686, 692 (1988) (\u201cWhile it is always desirable to have the factfinder personally observe the witnesses whose credibility he or she is called upon to determine, considerations of judicial economy may weigh against the additional delay and expense represented by a new trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"350 P.2d 734, 737","parenthetical":"holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \"is not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 N.W.2d 172, 175","parenthetical":"successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \"credibility was not that crucial\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39","parenthetical":"successor judge could rule on criminal defendant's motion for new trial because the grounds raised \"were all matters which could be determined from the record\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"40 So.3d 557, 563","parenthetical":"reversing successor judge's vacating of original trial court's grant of new trial because original trial court \"observed the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\"","sentence":"But see Pinecrest, LLC v. Harris, 40 So.3d 557, 563 (Miss.2010) (reversing successor judge\u2019s vacating of original trial court\u2019s grant of new trial because original trial court \u201cobserved the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\u201d); Adkins v. Adkins, 43 Ohio App.3d 95, 539 N.E.2d 686, 692 (1988) (\u201cWhile it is always desirable to have the factfinder personally observe the witnesses whose credibility he or she is called upon to determine, considerations of judicial economy may weigh against the additional delay and expense represented by a new trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39","parenthetical":"successor judge could rule on criminal defendant's motion for new trial because the grounds raised \"were all matters which could be determined from the record\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 N.W.2d 172, 175","parenthetical":"successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \"credibility was not that crucial\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the applicable rule of procedure \"vests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"40 So.3d 557, 563","parenthetical":"reversing successor judge's vacating of original trial court's grant of new trial because original trial court \"observed the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\"","sentence":"But see Pinecrest, LLC v. Harris, 40 So.3d 557, 563 (Miss.2010) (reversing successor judge\u2019s vacating of original trial court\u2019s grant of new trial because original trial court \u201cobserved the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\u201d); Adkins v. Adkins, 43 Ohio App.3d 95, 539 N.E.2d 686, 692 (1988) (\u201cWhile it is always desirable to have the factfinder personally observe the witnesses whose credibility he or she is called upon to determine, considerations of judicial economy may weigh against the additional delay and expense represented by a new trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the applicable rule of procedure \"vests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 A.2d 413, 415","parenthetical":"holding that the applicable rule of procedure \"vests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 N.W.2d 172, 175","parenthetical":"successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \"credibility was not that crucial\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"a"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"291 A.2d 413, 415","parenthetical":"holding that the applicable rule of procedure \"vests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"40 So.3d 557, 563","parenthetical":"reversing successor judge's vacating of original trial court's grant of new trial because original trial court \"observed the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\"","sentence":"But see Pinecrest, LLC v. Harris, 40 So.3d 557, 563 (Miss.2010) (reversing successor judge\u2019s vacating of original trial court\u2019s grant of new trial because original trial court \u201cobserved the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\u201d); Adkins v. Adkins, 43 Ohio App.3d 95, 539 N.E.2d 686, 692 (1988) (\u201cWhile it is always desirable to have the factfinder personally observe the witnesses whose credibility he or she is called upon to determine, considerations of judicial economy may weigh against the additional delay and expense represented by a new trial."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"a"}
{"context":"ited, essentially because a successor judge is in no position to pass on the credibility of witnesses whom he has not seen.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"40 So.3d 557, 563","parenthetical":"reversing successor judge's vacating of original trial court's grant of new trial because original trial court \"observed the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\"","sentence":"But see Pinecrest, LLC v. Harris, 40 So.3d 557, 563 (Miss.2010) (reversing successor judge\u2019s vacating of original trial court\u2019s grant of new trial because original trial court \u201cobserved the entire trial, all witnesses, and the jury ... [and] was ... in the best place to judge the prejudicial effect of evidence and to judge whether any evidence led to bias, passion, and prejudice on the part of the jury ... [such that original trial court] was in a far superior position to determine the necessity of a new trial\u201d); Adkins v. Adkins, 43 Ohio App.3d 95, 539 N.E.2d 686, 692 (1988) (\u201cWhile it is always desirable to have the factfinder personally observe the witnesses whose credibility he or she is called upon to determine, considerations of judicial economy may weigh against the additional delay and expense represented by a new trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"505 N.W.2d 172, 175","parenthetical":"successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \"credibility was not that crucial\"","sentence":"Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. 373, 363 P.2d 61, 64 (1961); see also Connelly v. United States, 249 F.2d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 1957) (recognizing that, where the credibility of the government\u2019s witnesses was a serious issue in a criminal case, a successor judge should not rule on a motion for new trial); Anderson v. Dewey, 82 Idaho 173, 350 P.2d 734, 737 (1960) (holding that a successor judge may consider a motion for new trial in a case tried to the court where she \u201cis not required to weigh conflicting evidence or pass upon the credibility of witnesses, but can resolve such issues ... upon evidence which is not materially in conflict\u201d); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 835, 838-39 (Ky.1969) (successor judge could rule on criminal defendant\u2019s motion for new trial because the grounds raised \u201cwere all matters which could be determined from the record\u201d); Paulson v. Meinke, 352 N.W.2d 191, 193-94 (N.D.1984) (adopting Anderson v. Dewey); Ruggieri v. Beauregard, 110 R.I. 197, 291 A.2d 413, 415 (1972) (holding that the applicable rule of procedure \u201cvests a successor judge with judicial discretion to review the jury verdict on a motion for new trial on the ground that such verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence where the record clearly discloses that no question of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony will require resolution by him\u201d); cf. Hunter v. Union State Bank, 505 N.W.2d 172, 175 (Iowa 1993) (successor judge could decide case tried to previous judge because \u201ccredibility was not that crucial\u201d)."},"case_id":6892206,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This definition does not get us very far. We believe, however, that only individuals who receive compensation from an employer can be deemed \"employees\" under the statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"6 F.3d 211, 221-22","parenthetical":"reversing a grant of summary judgment for employer because question of whether benefits provided to plaintiff were sufficient \"compensation\" to render plaintiff an employee was one of disputed fact","sentence":"See O\u2019Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2nd Cir.1997), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1048, 140 L.Ed.2d 112 (1998) (\u201cWhere no financial benefit is obtained by the purported employee from the employer, no plausible employment relationship of any sort can be said to exist because ... compensation ... is an essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.\u201d (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 221-22 (4th Cir.1993) (reversing a grant of summary judgment for employer because question of whether benefits provided to plaintiff were sufficient \u201ccompensation\u201d to render plaintiff an employee was one of disputed fact); cf. McClure, 460 F.2d at 557 (holding that an individual who was \u201cselected, employed, controlled, trained, and paid \u201d by the employer was an employee (emphasis added))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"460 F.2d 557, 557","parenthetical":"holding that an individual who was \"selected, employed, controlled, trained, and paid \" by the employer was an employee (emphasis added","sentence":"See O\u2019Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115-16 (2nd Cir.1997), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1048, 140 L.Ed.2d 112 (1998) (\u201cWhere no financial benefit is obtained by the purported employee from the employer, no plausible employment relationship of any sort can be said to exist because ... compensation ... is an essential condition to the existence of an employer-employee relationship.\u201d (internal quotations and citations omitted)); see also Haavistola v. Community Fire Co., 6 F.3d 211, 221-22 (4th Cir.1993) (reversing a grant of summary judgment for employer because question of whether benefits provided to plaintiff were sufficient \u201ccompensation\u201d to render plaintiff an employee was one of disputed fact); cf. McClure, 460 F.2d at 557 (holding that an individual who was \u201cselected, employed, controlled, trained, and paid \u201d by the employer was an employee (emphasis added))."},"case_id":11789491,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court of limited jurisdiction created by Congress as a forum where private parties could sue the government for non-tort money claims, where the claims would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity. E.g.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"105 F.3d 621, 624","parenthetical":"taxpayers' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims","sentence":"Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed.Cir.1997) (taxpayers\u2019 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"395 U.S. 1, 2-3","parenthetical":"jurisdiction of Court of Claims is limited to money claims and does not extend to equitable matters","sentence":"See also United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-3, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1501-1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969) (jurisdiction of Court of Claims is limited to money claims and does not extend to equitable matters); Beck v. Secretary of Dep\u2019t of HHS, 924 F.2d 1029, 1036 (Fed.Cir.1991) (\u201cClaims Court has no general equitable power to issue injunctions in cases other than those in which such power has explicitly been granted.\u201d)"},"case_id":1270960,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court of limited jurisdiction created by Congress as a forum where private parties could sue the government for non-tort money claims, where the claims would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity. E.g.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1501, 1501-1502","parenthetical":"jurisdiction of Court of Claims is limited to money claims and does not extend to equitable matters","sentence":"See also United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-3, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1501-1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969) (jurisdiction of Court of Claims is limited to money claims and does not extend to equitable matters); Beck v. Secretary of Dep\u2019t of HHS, 924 F.2d 1029, 1036 (Fed.Cir.1991) (\u201cClaims Court has no general equitable power to issue injunctions in cases other than those in which such power has explicitly been granted.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"105 F.3d 621, 624","parenthetical":"taxpayers' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims","sentence":"Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed.Cir.1997) (taxpayers\u2019 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims)."},"case_id":1270960,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court of limited jurisdiction created by Congress as a forum where private parties could sue the government for non-tort money claims, where the claims would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity. E.g.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jurisdiction of Court of Claims is limited to money claims and does not extend to equitable matters","sentence":"See also United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-3, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1501-1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969) (jurisdiction of Court of Claims is limited to money claims and does not extend to equitable matters); Beck v. Secretary of Dep\u2019t of HHS, 924 F.2d 1029, 1036 (Fed.Cir.1991) (\u201cClaims Court has no general equitable power to issue injunctions in cases other than those in which such power has explicitly been granted.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"105 F.3d 621, 624","parenthetical":"taxpayers' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims","sentence":"Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed.Cir.1997) (taxpayers\u2019 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims)."},"case_id":1270960,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court of limited jurisdiction created by Congress as a forum where private parties could sue the government for non-tort money claims, where the claims would otherwise be barred by sovereign immunity. E.g.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"105 F.3d 621, 624","parenthetical":"taxpayers' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims","sentence":"Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed.Cir.1997) (taxpayers\u2019 claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were outside jurisdiction of Court of Federal Claims)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"924 F.2d 1029, 1036","parenthetical":"\"Claims Court has no general equitable power to issue injunctions in cases other than those in which such power has explicitly been granted.\"","sentence":"See also United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 2-3, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1501-1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969) (jurisdiction of Court of Claims is limited to money claims and does not extend to equitable matters); Beck v. Secretary of Dep\u2019t of HHS, 924 F.2d 1029, 1036 (Fed.Cir.1991) (\u201cClaims Court has no general equitable power to issue injunctions in cases other than those in which such power has explicitly been granted.\u201d)"},"case_id":1270960,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With sufficient autonomy from the state, especially with regard to financial matters, an agency, political subdivision, or state university is the real party in interest and is thus a \"citizen\" for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"721 F.Supp. 403, 403","parenthetical":"state university with \"a considerable amount of economic and operational authority\" is a citizen, not an alter ego of the state","sentence":"See University of R.I., supra, 721 F.Supp. at 403 (state university with \u201ca considerable amount of economic and operational authority\u201d is a citizen, not an alter ego of the state); Howard supra, 744 F.2d at 886 (suggesting that \u201c[a]n autonomous governmental corporation\u201d is not an alter ego of the state because it is financially independent even though it received periodic appropriations from the state treasury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"888 F.2d 943, 943","parenthetical":"state agency that received more than 70 percent of a recent annual budget from general funds of Puerto Rico and whose policies are under significant control by the governor's office found to be so financially and politically dependent upon the Commonwealth as to be an arm of it","sentence":"But see In re San Juan, supra, 888 F.2d at 943 (state agency that received more than 70 percent of a recent annual budget from general funds of Puerto Rico and whose policies are under significant control by the governor\u2019s office found to be so financially and politically dependent upon the Commonwealth as to be an arm of it); Whitten, supra, at 181 (university construction fund, with \u201cno financial independence of its own\u201d, was held to be an alter ego of the state); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1978) (extent and nature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico\u2019s financial support for the University of Puerto Rico was a dispositive factor in concluding that the university was an \u201carm\u201d of the state)."},"case_id":7389705,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With sufficient autonomy from the state, especially with regard to financial matters, an agency, political subdivision, or state university is the real party in interest and is thus a \"citizen\" for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"575 F.2d 21, 25","parenthetical":"extent and nature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's financial support for the University of Puerto Rico was a dispositive factor in concluding that the university was an \"arm\" of the state","sentence":"But see In re San Juan, supra, 888 F.2d at 943 (state agency that received more than 70 percent of a recent annual budget from general funds of Puerto Rico and whose policies are under significant control by the governor\u2019s office found to be so financially and politically dependent upon the Commonwealth as to be an arm of it); Whitten, supra, at 181 (university construction fund, with \u201cno financial independence of its own\u201d, was held to be an alter ego of the state); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1978) (extent and nature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico\u2019s financial support for the University of Puerto Rico was a dispositive factor in concluding that the university was an \u201carm\u201d of the state)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"721 F.Supp. 403, 403","parenthetical":"state university with \"a considerable amount of economic and operational authority\" is a citizen, not an alter ego of the state","sentence":"See University of R.I., supra, 721 F.Supp. at 403 (state university with \u201ca considerable amount of economic and operational authority\u201d is a citizen, not an alter ego of the state); Howard supra, 744 F.2d at 886 (suggesting that \u201c[a]n autonomous governmental corporation\u201d is not an alter ego of the state because it is financially independent even though it received periodic appropriations from the state treasury)."},"case_id":7389705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With sufficient autonomy from the state, especially with regard to financial matters, an agency, political subdivision, or state university is the real party in interest and is thus a \"citizen\" for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"888 F.2d 943, 943","parenthetical":"state agency that received more than 70 percent of a recent annual budget from general funds of Puerto Rico and whose policies are under significant control by the governor's office found to be so financially and politically dependent upon the Commonwealth as to be an arm of it","sentence":"But see In re San Juan, supra, 888 F.2d at 943 (state agency that received more than 70 percent of a recent annual budget from general funds of Puerto Rico and whose policies are under significant control by the governor\u2019s office found to be so financially and politically dependent upon the Commonwealth as to be an arm of it); Whitten, supra, at 181 (university construction fund, with \u201cno financial independence of its own\u201d, was held to be an alter ego of the state); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1978) (extent and nature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico\u2019s financial support for the University of Puerto Rico was a dispositive factor in concluding that the university was an \u201carm\u201d of the state)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"744 F.2d 886, 886","parenthetical":"suggesting that \"[a]n autonomous governmental corporation\" is not an alter ego of the state because it is financially independent even though it received periodic appropriations from the state treasury","sentence":"See University of R.I., supra, 721 F.Supp. at 403 (state university with \u201ca considerable amount of economic and operational authority\u201d is a citizen, not an alter ego of the state); Howard supra, 744 F.2d at 886 (suggesting that \u201c[a]n autonomous governmental corporation\u201d is not an alter ego of the state because it is financially independent even though it received periodic appropriations from the state treasury)."},"case_id":7389705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With sufficient autonomy from the state, especially with regard to financial matters, an agency, political subdivision, or state university is the real party in interest and is thus a \"citizen\" for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"575 F.2d 21, 25","parenthetical":"extent and nature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's financial support for the University of Puerto Rico was a dispositive factor in concluding that the university was an \"arm\" of the state","sentence":"But see In re San Juan, supra, 888 F.2d at 943 (state agency that received more than 70 percent of a recent annual budget from general funds of Puerto Rico and whose policies are under significant control by the governor\u2019s office found to be so financially and politically dependent upon the Commonwealth as to be an arm of it); Whitten, supra, at 181 (university construction fund, with \u201cno financial independence of its own\u201d, was held to be an alter ego of the state); Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1978) (extent and nature of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico\u2019s financial support for the University of Puerto Rico was a dispositive factor in concluding that the university was an \u201carm\u201d of the state)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"744 F.2d 886, 886","parenthetical":"suggesting that \"[a]n autonomous governmental corporation\" is not an alter ego of the state because it is financially independent even though it received periodic appropriations from the state treasury","sentence":"See University of R.I., supra, 721 F.Supp. at 403 (state university with \u201ca considerable amount of economic and operational authority\u201d is a citizen, not an alter ego of the state); Howard supra, 744 F.2d at 886 (suggesting that \u201c[a]n autonomous governmental corporation\u201d is not an alter ego of the state because it is financially independent even though it received periodic appropriations from the state treasury)."},"case_id":7389705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While our supreme court has not created a new rule or standard for addressing this issue, this court has adopted a two-prong test for determining the sufficiency of an indictment involving a purportedly overbroad time period: (1) whether time is a material element of the offense; and (2) whether the time period covered by the indictment occurred prior to the return of the indictment by the grand jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"304 S.C. 173, 175","parenthetical":"finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time","sentence":"State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (holding an indictment alleging commission of second-degree criminal conduct during periods of June 1 through July 20, 1995; July 1 through July 31, 1995; and August 1 through August 18, 1995, was sufficient as to time); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1991) (finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500-01, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1991) (\u201cThe specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"305 S.C. 496, 500-01","parenthetical":"\"The specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\"","sentence":"State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (holding an indictment alleging commission of second-degree criminal conduct during periods of June 1 through July 20, 1995; July 1 through July 31, 1995; and August 1 through August 18, 1995, was sufficient as to time); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1991) (finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500-01, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1991) (\u201cThe specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":3744535,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While our supreme court has not created a new rule or standard for addressing this issue, this court has adopted a two-prong test for determining the sufficiency of an indictment involving a purportedly overbroad time period: (1) whether time is a material element of the offense; and (2) whether the time period covered by the indictment occurred prior to the return of the indictment by the grand jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"409 S.E.2d 420, 423","parenthetical":"\"The specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\"","sentence":"State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (holding an indictment alleging commission of second-degree criminal conduct during periods of June 1 through July 20, 1995; July 1 through July 31, 1995; and August 1 through August 18, 1995, was sufficient as to time); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1991) (finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500-01, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1991) (\u201cThe specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"304 S.C. 173, 175","parenthetical":"finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time","sentence":"State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (holding an indictment alleging commission of second-degree criminal conduct during periods of June 1 through July 20, 1995; July 1 through July 31, 1995; and August 1 through August 18, 1995, was sufficient as to time); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1991) (finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500-01, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1991) (\u201cThe specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":3744535,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While our supreme court has not created a new rule or standard for addressing this issue, this court has adopted a two-prong test for determining the sufficiency of an indictment involving a purportedly overbroad time period: (1) whether time is a material element of the offense; and (2) whether the time period covered by the indictment occurred prior to the return of the indictment by the grand jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"403 S.E.2d 322, 323","parenthetical":"finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time","sentence":"State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (holding an indictment alleging commission of second-degree criminal conduct during periods of June 1 through July 20, 1995; July 1 through July 31, 1995; and August 1 through August 18, 1995, was sufficient as to time); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1991) (finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500-01, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1991) (\u201cThe specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"305 S.C. 496, 500-01","parenthetical":"\"The specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\"","sentence":"State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (holding an indictment alleging commission of second-degree criminal conduct during periods of June 1 through July 20, 1995; July 1 through July 31, 1995; and August 1 through August 18, 1995, was sufficient as to time); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1991) (finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500-01, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1991) (\u201cThe specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":3744535,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While our supreme court has not created a new rule or standard for addressing this issue, this court has adopted a two-prong test for determining the sufficiency of an indictment involving a purportedly overbroad time period: (1) whether time is a material element of the offense; and (2) whether the time period covered by the indictment occurred prior to the return of the indictment by the grand jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"409 S.E.2d 420, 423","parenthetical":"\"The specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\"","sentence":"State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (holding an indictment alleging commission of second-degree criminal conduct during periods of June 1 through July 20, 1995; July 1 through July 31, 1995; and August 1 through August 18, 1995, was sufficient as to time); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1991) (finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500-01, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1991) (\u201cThe specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"403 S.E.2d 322, 323","parenthetical":"finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time","sentence":"State v. Nicholson, 366 S.C. 568, 574, 623 S.E.2d 100, 103 (Ct.App.2005) (holding an indictment alleging commission of second-degree criminal conduct during periods of June 1 through July 20, 1995; July 1 through July 31, 1995; and August 1 through August 18, 1995, was sufficient as to time); State v. Wingo, 304 S.C. 173, 175, 403 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ct.App.1991) (finding an indictment charging first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor covering a two-year period was sufficient as to time); see also State v. Thompson, 305 S.C. 496, 500-01, 409 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1991) (\u201cThe specific date and time is not an element of the offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.\u201d)."},"case_id":3744535,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court likewise did not err in holding IMV jointly liable for the portion of those ill-gotten funds that it received. The relief defendants argue that IMV neither possesses nor benefitted from the funds it received and subsequently transferred, and that it therefore should not be subject to the disgorgement order. The district court was free to reject this argument because ongoing possession of the funds is not required for disgorgement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"617 F.3d 1098, 1098","parenthetical":"\"A person who controls the distribution of illegally obtained funds is liable for the funds he or she dissipated as well as the funds he or she retained.\"","sentence":"See Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1098 (\u201cA person who controls the distribution of illegally obtained funds is liable for the funds he or she dissipated as well as the funds he or she retained.\u201d); SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (\u201cThe manner in which [the recipient of ill-gotten funds] chose to spend the illegally obtained funds has no relevance to the disgorgement calculation.\u201d); see also Colello, 139 F.3d at 677 (approving the use of relief defendant procedures even where the disputed funds were \u201cpaid over to others\u201d by the relief defendant after their receipt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"139 F.3d 677, 677","parenthetical":"approving the use of relief defendant procedures even where the disputed funds were \"paid over to others\" by the relief defendant after their receipt","sentence":"See Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1098 (\u201cA person who controls the distribution of illegally obtained funds is liable for the funds he or she dissipated as well as the funds he or she retained.\u201d); SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (\u201cThe manner in which [the recipient of ill-gotten funds] chose to spend the illegally obtained funds has no relevance to the disgorgement calculation.\u201d); see also Colello, 139 F.3d at 677 (approving the use of relief defendant procedures even where the disputed funds were \u201cpaid over to others\u201d by the relief defendant after their receipt)."},"case_id":12275948,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court likewise did not err in holding IMV jointly liable for the portion of those ill-gotten funds that it received. The relief defendants argue that IMV neither possesses nor benefitted from the funds it received and subsequently transferred, and that it therefore should not be subject to the disgorgement order. The district court was free to reject this argument because ongoing possession of the funds is not required for disgorgement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"440 F.3d 1109, 1116","parenthetical":"\"The manner in which [the recipient of ill-gotten funds] chose to spend the illegally obtained funds has no relevance to the disgorgement calculation.\"","sentence":"See Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1098 (\u201cA person who controls the distribution of illegally obtained funds is liable for the funds he or she dissipated as well as the funds he or she retained.\u201d); SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (\u201cThe manner in which [the recipient of ill-gotten funds] chose to spend the illegally obtained funds has no relevance to the disgorgement calculation.\u201d); see also Colello, 139 F.3d at 677 (approving the use of relief defendant procedures even where the disputed funds were \u201cpaid over to others\u201d by the relief defendant after their receipt)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"139 F.3d 677, 677","parenthetical":"approving the use of relief defendant procedures even where the disputed funds were \"paid over to others\" by the relief defendant after their receipt","sentence":"See Platforms Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1098 (\u201cA person who controls the distribution of illegally obtained funds is liable for the funds he or she dissipated as well as the funds he or she retained.\u201d); SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2006) (\u201cThe manner in which [the recipient of ill-gotten funds] chose to spend the illegally obtained funds has no relevance to the disgorgement calculation.\u201d); see also Colello, 139 F.3d at 677 (approving the use of relief defendant procedures even where the disputed funds were \u201cpaid over to others\u201d by the relief defendant after their receipt)."},"case_id":12275948,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Rule 8.4 generally prohibits attorney misconduct. Subsection (c) of Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. \"The retention of unearned fees paid by a client, alone, may constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(c).\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"371 Md. 673, 712","parenthetical":"holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients' money in trust","sentence":"Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients\u2019 money in trust). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, deposited the fee into an account other than an attorney trust account and did not perform any legal services in exchange for the fee."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"372 Md. 467, 502-03","parenthetical":"holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients","sentence":"Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients\u2019 money in trust). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, deposited the fee into an account other than an attorney trust account and did not perform any legal services in exchange for the fee."},"case_id":4308127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Rule 8.4 generally prohibits attorney misconduct. Subsection (c) of Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. \"The retention of unearned fees paid by a client, alone, may constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(c).\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"372 Md. 467, 502-03","parenthetical":"holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients","sentence":"Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients\u2019 money in trust). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, deposited the fee into an account other than an attorney trust account and did not perform any legal services in exchange for the fee."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"810 A.2d 996, 1019","parenthetical":"holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients' money in trust","sentence":"Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients\u2019 money in trust). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, deposited the fee into an account other than an attorney trust account and did not perform any legal services in exchange for the fee."},"case_id":4308127,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Rule 8.4 generally prohibits attorney misconduct. Subsection (c) of Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. \"The retention of unearned fees paid by a client, alone, may constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(c).\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"813 A.2d 1145, 1166","parenthetical":"holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients","sentence":"Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients\u2019 money in trust). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, deposited the fee into an account other than an attorney trust account and did not perform any legal services in exchange for the fee."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"371 Md. 673, 712","parenthetical":"holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients' money in trust","sentence":"Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients\u2019 money in trust). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, deposited the fee into an account other than an attorney trust account and did not perform any legal services in exchange for the fee."},"case_id":4308127,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Rule 8.4 generally prohibits attorney misconduct. Subsection (c) of Rule 8.4 states that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. \"The retention of unearned fees paid by a client, alone, may constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(c).\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"810 A.2d 996, 1019","parenthetical":"holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients' money in trust","sentence":"Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients\u2019 money in trust). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, deposited the fee into an account other than an attorney trust account and did not perform any legal services in exchange for the fee."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"813 A.2d 1145, 1166","parenthetical":"holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients","sentence":"Attorney Grievance v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 502-03, 813 A.2d 1145, 1166 (2002) (holding that an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney retained unearned fees from four clients); see also Attorney Grievance v. Gallagher, 371 Md. 673, 712, 810 A.2d 996, 1019 (2002) (holding an attorney violated Rule 8.4(c) when the attorney made misrepresentations about holding two clients\u2019 money in trust). Here, Respondent accepted a $1,500.00 fee, deposited the fee into an account other than an attorney trust account and did not perform any legal services in exchange for the fee."},"case_id":4308127,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Spencer failed to challenge the district court's dismissal of his action for failure to effectuate service of process, and has therefore waived any such challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"194 F.3d 1045, 1052","parenthetical":"\"[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived,\"","sentence":"See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (\u201c[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived,\u201d); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (\u2018We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 F.3d 971, 977","parenthetical":"'We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant .... \"","sentence":"See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (\u201c[O]n appeal, arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived,\u201d); see also Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (\u2018We will not manufacture arguments for an appellant .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12403784,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the other hand, section 58-33-275(E) applies only after a utility has already deviated from an existing base load review order and attempts to recoup costs from the deviation. In that situation, a party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the utility has deviated from the original base load review order, and then the utility may only recoup costs that were not the result of imprudence. Thus, the Commission correctly rejected Appellants' attempt to convert the modification proceeding into a deviation proceeding, and because SCE & G sought to update the existing base load review order, section 58-33-270 plainly applied.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"370 S.C. 452, 468","parenthetical":"\"A statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\"","sentence":"See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201c[I]t is not the court\u2019s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\u201d); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam\u2019rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006) (\u201cA statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"341 S.C. 79, 85","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\"","sentence":"See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201c[I]t is not the court\u2019s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\u201d); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam\u2019rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006) (\u201cA statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\u201d)."},"case_id":6055770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the other hand, section 58-33-275(E) applies only after a utility has already deviated from an existing base load review order and attempts to recoup costs from the deviation. In that situation, a party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the utility has deviated from the original base load review order, and then the utility may only recoup costs that were not the result of imprudence. Thus, the Commission correctly rejected Appellants' attempt to convert the modification proceeding into a deviation proceeding, and because SCE & G sought to update the existing base load review order, section 58-33-270 plainly applied.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"636 S.E.2d 598, 606","parenthetical":"\"A statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\"","sentence":"See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201c[I]t is not the court\u2019s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\u201d); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam\u2019rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006) (\u201cA statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"341 S.C. 79, 85","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\"","sentence":"See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201c[I]t is not the court\u2019s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\u201d); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam\u2019rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006) (\u201cA statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\u201d)."},"case_id":6055770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the other hand, section 58-33-275(E) applies only after a utility has already deviated from an existing base load review order and attempts to recoup costs from the deviation. In that situation, a party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the utility has deviated from the original base load review order, and then the utility may only recoup costs that were not the result of imprudence. Thus, the Commission correctly rejected Appellants' attempt to convert the modification proceeding into a deviation proceeding, and because SCE & G sought to update the existing base load review order, section 58-33-270 plainly applied.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"370 S.C. 452, 468","parenthetical":"\"A statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\"","sentence":"See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201c[I]t is not the court\u2019s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\u201d); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam\u2019rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006) (\u201cA statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 S.E.2d 578, 581","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\"","sentence":"See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201c[I]t is not the court\u2019s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\u201d); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam\u2019rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006) (\u201cA statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\u201d)."},"case_id":6055770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the other hand, section 58-33-275(E) applies only after a utility has already deviated from an existing base load review order and attempts to recoup costs from the deviation. In that situation, a party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the utility has deviated from the original base load review order, and then the utility may only recoup costs that were not the result of imprudence. Thus, the Commission correctly rejected Appellants' attempt to convert the modification proceeding into a deviation proceeding, and because SCE & G sought to update the existing base load review order, section 58-33-270 plainly applied.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"636 S.E.2d 598, 606","parenthetical":"\"A statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\"","sentence":"See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201c[I]t is not the court\u2019s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\u201d); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam\u2019rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006) (\u201cA statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 S.E.2d 578, 581","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\"","sentence":"See Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (\u201c[I]t is not the court\u2019s place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute.\u201d); see also Sloan v. S.C. Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam\u2019rs, 370 S.C. 452, 468, 636 S.E.2d 598, 606 (2006) (\u201cA statute as a whole must receive practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of lawmakers.\u201d)."},"case_id":6055770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, the jury heard testimony that even if the material strap was properly secured around the load, the materials could fall out. From this testimony, we believe the jury could utilize its common experience to find that Drury breached its duty to safely secure and lift the roofing materials by using a material handling strap, rather than an alternative method, to secure the bundles.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"982 S.W.2d 278, 285-86","parenthetical":"finding that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on a negligence claim because whether an unsecured wire rope cable posed a danger was a subject within the experience or knowledge of the jurors, rendering expert testimony unnecessary","sentence":"See Salem, 370 U.S. at 36, 82 S.Ct. 1119 (finding that the jury had \u201csufficient evidence, both from oral testimony and from photographs, ... to determine whether some railing or hand hold ... was reasonably necessary for the protection of a seaman .... \u201d); cf. Parra v. Bldg. Erection Servs., 982 S.W.2d 278, 285-86 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (finding that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on a negligence claim because whether an unsecured wire rope cable posed a danger was a subject within the experience or knowledge of the jurors, rendering expert testimony unnecessary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"370 U.S. 36, 36","parenthetical":"finding that the jury had \"sufficient evidence, both from oral testimony and from photographs, ... to determine whether some railing or hand hold ... was reasonably necessary for the protection of a seaman .... \"","sentence":"See Salem, 370 U.S. at 36, 82 S.Ct. 1119 (finding that the jury had \u201csufficient evidence, both from oral testimony and from photographs, ... to determine whether some railing or hand hold ... was reasonably necessary for the protection of a seaman .... \u201d); cf. Parra v. Bldg. Erection Servs., 982 S.W.2d 278, 285-86 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (finding that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on a negligence claim because whether an unsecured wire rope cable posed a danger was a subject within the experience or knowledge of the jurors, rendering expert testimony unnecessary)."},"case_id":4046555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, the jury heard testimony that even if the material strap was properly secured around the load, the materials could fall out. From this testimony, we believe the jury could utilize its common experience to find that Drury breached its duty to safely secure and lift the roofing materials by using a material handling strap, rather than an alternative method, to secure the bundles.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"982 S.W.2d 278, 285-86","parenthetical":"finding that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on a negligence claim because whether an unsecured wire rope cable posed a danger was a subject within the experience or knowledge of the jurors, rendering expert testimony unnecessary","sentence":"See Salem, 370 U.S. at 36, 82 S.Ct. 1119 (finding that the jury had \u201csufficient evidence, both from oral testimony and from photographs, ... to determine whether some railing or hand hold ... was reasonably necessary for the protection of a seaman .... \u201d); cf. Parra v. Bldg. Erection Servs., 982 S.W.2d 278, 285-86 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (finding that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on a negligence claim because whether an unsecured wire rope cable posed a danger was a subject within the experience or knowledge of the jurors, rendering expert testimony unnecessary)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the jury had \"sufficient evidence, both from oral testimony and from photographs, ... to determine whether some railing or hand hold ... was reasonably necessary for the protection of a seaman .... \"","sentence":"See Salem, 370 U.S. at 36, 82 S.Ct. 1119 (finding that the jury had \u201csufficient evidence, both from oral testimony and from photographs, ... to determine whether some railing or hand hold ... was reasonably necessary for the protection of a seaman .... \u201d); cf. Parra v. Bldg. Erection Servs., 982 S.W.2d 278, 285-86 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (finding that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant on a negligence claim because whether an unsecured wire rope cable posed a danger was a subject within the experience or knowledge of the jurors, rendering expert testimony unnecessary)."},"case_id":4046555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This is not a case in which appellant is objecting that the prosecutor's jury argument was a comment on her failure to testify, because in this case, appellant did testify. When a prosecutor's jury argument can reasonably be construed to refer to appellant's failure to produce evidence other than her own testimony, the comment is not improper.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"906 S.W.2d 481, 490-91","parenthetical":"holding the prosecutor's argument \"If it was there, they can bring it to you,\" was not an improper jury argument","sentence":"Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 490-91 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (holding the prosecutor\u2019s argument \u201cIf it was there, they can bring it to you,\u201d was not an improper jury argument); see also Thomas v. State, 688 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (stating that the prosecutor may comment on the defendant\u2019s failure to present any witnesses or evidence on his behalf)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"688 S.W.2d 481, 483","parenthetical":"stating that the prosecutor may comment on the defendant's failure to present any witnesses or evidence on his behalf","sentence":"Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 490-91 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (holding the prosecutor\u2019s argument \u201cIf it was there, they can bring it to you,\u201d was not an improper jury argument); see also Thomas v. State, 688 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (stating that the prosecutor may comment on the defendant\u2019s failure to present any witnesses or evidence on his behalf)."},"case_id":11611829,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Similarly, in a quasi-criminal case or a case in which the government is a party, the balance may be struck in favor of excluding illegally obtained evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film","sentence":"See, e. g., Standard Oil Co. v. Iowa, 408 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1969) (exclusion required in treble action antitrust action); Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968) (documents stolen by private citizen with the knowledge of the government may not be used by the government in a FTC proceeding); Carlisle v. State ex rel. Trammell, 276 Ala. 436, 163 So.2d 596 (1964) (suppression of illegally obtained evidence required in a proceeding to abate a gambling nuisance; decision rested in part on state statute); Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965) (evidence seized pursuant to deficient warrant must be excluded in a proceeding to abate public nuisance); People v. Moore, 69 Cal.2d 674, 446 P.2d 800, 72 Cal.Rptr. 800 (1968) (illegally seized evidence inadmissible in narcotic addict commitment proceeding); Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158 (La.1977) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future obscenity nuisance); State v. Spoke Committee, Univ. Center, 270 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1978) (illegally obtained evidence not admissible in action to enjoin future showing of obscene film)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments","sentence":"But see Webster v. Redmond, 599 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980) (in deciding to suspend teacher, school board may consider illegally seized evidence); United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1977) (evidence illegally seized by state officers not suppressed in federal tax case); NLRB v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970) (when government did not instigate private search, evidence held admissible); Lamartiniere v. Dept. of Emp. Sec., 372 So.2d 690 (La.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 945 (La. 1979) (illegally seized evidence admitted in proceeding to determine validity of claim for unemployment compensation payments)."},"case_id":1224574,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"490 U.S. 642, 656","parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"401 U.S. 424, 431","parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"401 U.S. 424, 431","parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"401 U.S. 424, 431","parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"490 U.S. 642, 656","parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"490 U.S. 642, 656","parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Unlike Title VII's prohibitions of intentional discrimination, the prohibition of disparate impact discrimination in certain circumstances is intended to redress procedures or policies that, without adequate justification, as a practical matter limit the job opportunities of historically-disfavored groups.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Our disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \"not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\"","sentence":"See Griggs v. Duke Power Co, 401 U.S. 424, 431, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (establishing the basis for disparate impact claims by construing Title VII to proscribe \u201cnot only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in practice\u201d); see also Wards Cove Parking Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989) (\u201cOur disparate impact cases have always focused on the impact of particular hiring practices on employment opportunities for minorities\u201d) (emphasis in original). It is difficult to see how one alleged instance of the defendant\u2019s failure to post a job \u2014 a job which the defendant was aware of, and interviewed for \u2014 is sufficient to plead an actionable employment practice or policy which limits the job opportunities of historically disfavored groups."},"case_id":11117705,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Phillips's claims stemming from his prior state civil actions as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because these claims constitute a \"de facto appeal\" of prior state court judgments, or are \"inextricably intertwined\" with those judgments.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"704 F.3d 772, 782-83","parenthetical":"concluding plaintiffs claim for conspiracy was \"inextricably intertwined\" with the state court's decision","sentence":"See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155-56 (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding plaintiffs claim for conspiracy was \u201cinextricably intertwined\u201d with the state court\u2019s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought \u201cwould require the district court to determine the state court\u2019s decision was wrong and thus void\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"341 F.3d 1155, 1155-56","parenthetical":"the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision","sentence":"See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155-56 (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding plaintiffs claim for conspiracy was \u201cinextricably intertwined\u201d with the state court\u2019s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought \u201cwould require the district court to determine the state court\u2019s decision was wrong and thus void\")."},"case_id":12404961,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Phillips's claims stemming from his prior state civil actions as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because these claims constitute a \"de facto appeal\" of prior state court judgments, or are \"inextricably intertwined\" with those judgments.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"341 F.3d 1155, 1155-56","parenthetical":"the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision","sentence":"See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155-56 (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding plaintiffs claim for conspiracy was \u201cinextricably intertwined\u201d with the state court\u2019s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought \u201cwould require the district court to determine the state court\u2019s decision was wrong and thus void\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"474 F.3d 609, 616","parenthetical":"Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought \"would require the district court to determine the state court's decision was wrong and thus void\"","sentence":"See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155-56 (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars de facto appeals of a state court decision); see also Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding plaintiffs claim for conspiracy was \u201cinextricably intertwined\u201d with the state court\u2019s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought \u201cwould require the district court to determine the state court\u2019s decision was wrong and thus void\")."},"case_id":12404961,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that it was Jackson who initiated the appeal of the original pre-guide-lines sentence, citing as error the district court's failure to sentence under the guidelines, somewhat undermines his claim that he held a crystallized expectation that his original sentence was final.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"849 F.2d 213, 218-19","parenthetical":"harsher resentencing no double jeopardy violation because defendant challenged legality of initial sentence and was on notice that his appeal could lead to a more severe sentence","sentence":"See Gauntlett v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 213, 218-19 (6th Cir.1988) (harsher resentencing no double jeopardy violation because defendant challenged legality of initial sentence and was on notice that his appeal could lead to a more severe sentence); United States v. Colunga, 812 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 484 U.S. 857, 108 S.Ct. 165, 98 L.Ed.2d 120 (1987); but see United States v. Bello, 767 F.2d 1065, 1070 (4th Cir.1985) (the fact that defendant initiated the appeal is not a dispositive determinant of defendant\u2019s legitimate expectation of finality). However, we rely on a still more basic reason to find that Jackson had no legit imate expectation of finality and, accordingly, that Jackson\u2019s resentencing comports with double jeopardy concerns."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"767 F.2d 1065, 1070","parenthetical":"the fact that defendant initiated the appeal is not a dispositive determinant of defendant's legitimate expectation of finality","sentence":"See Gauntlett v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 213, 218-19 (6th Cir.1988) (harsher resentencing no double jeopardy violation because defendant challenged legality of initial sentence and was on notice that his appeal could lead to a more severe sentence); United States v. Colunga, 812 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir.) cert. denied 484 U.S. 857, 108 S.Ct. 165, 98 L.Ed.2d 120 (1987); but see United States v. Bello, 767 F.2d 1065, 1070 (4th Cir.1985) (the fact that defendant initiated the appeal is not a dispositive determinant of defendant\u2019s legitimate expectation of finality). However, we rely on a still more basic reason to find that Jackson had no legit imate expectation of finality and, accordingly, that Jackson\u2019s resentencing comports with double jeopardy concerns."},"case_id":10541051,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, Nobles and Hales long knew of East's involvement in the transaction at issue, and should have known that RCIS was a subsidiary of Wells Fargo. Thus, their \"mistake\" was a mistake in legal judgment, not a mistake in the naming of the party, and thus it is not covered by Rule 15(c).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"148 F.3d 1223, 1227","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion in district court's refusal to allow relation back when plaintiffs knew defendants' identity before statute of limitations ran","sentence":"Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 917-18 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\u201c[A] plaintiffs mistaken belief that A is liable for a tort against her when in fact B is the responsible party ... is one of legal judgment rather than a mere misnomer.\u201d); see also Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.1998) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court\u2019s refusal to allow relation back when plaintiffs knew defendants\u2019 identity before statute of limitations ran)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"107 F.3d 913, 917-18","parenthetical":"\"[A] plaintiffs mistaken belief that A is liable for a tort against her when in fact B is the responsible party ... is one of legal judgment rather than a mere misnomer.\"","sentence":"Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 917-18 (D.C.Cir.1997) (\u201c[A] plaintiffs mistaken belief that A is liable for a tort against her when in fact B is the responsible party ... is one of legal judgment rather than a mere misnomer.\u201d); see also Powers v. Graff, 148 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.1998) (finding no abuse of discretion in district court\u2019s refusal to allow relation back when plaintiffs knew defendants\u2019 identity before statute of limitations ran)."},"case_id":9290631,"label":"b"}
{"context":"By enacting Senate Bill 0182-008, the General Assembly has provided persuasive evidence of its intent concerning the interpretation of SS 42-4-1801(9)(a)(II), making it clear that Senate Bill 01-168 was not intended to modify the penalties for vehicular homicide.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"while subsequent legislative declarations concerning the intent of an earlier statute are not controlling, they are entitled to significant weight","sentence":"See People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119 (Colo.1985)(while subsequent legislative declarations concerning the intent of an earlier statute are not controlling, they are entitled to significant weight); BQP Indus., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 694 P.2d 337 (Colo.App.1984)(noting that the same General Assembly enacted both provisions at issue there, and holding that, while subsequent legislative pronouncement of intent is not a part of the legislative history, such statements may be considered in construing the statute in question); cf. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo.2000)(courts cannot infer the intent of an earlier legislature from the views of a subsequent one)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"courts cannot infer the intent of an earlier legislature from the views of a subsequent one","sentence":"See People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119 (Colo.1985)(while subsequent legislative declarations concerning the intent of an earlier statute are not controlling, they are entitled to significant weight); BQP Indus., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 694 P.2d 337 (Colo.App.1984)(noting that the same General Assembly enacted both provisions at issue there, and holding that, while subsequent legislative pronouncement of intent is not a part of the legislative history, such statements may be considered in construing the statute in question); cf. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo.2000)(courts cannot infer the intent of an earlier legislature from the views of a subsequent one)."},"case_id":9095983,"label":"a"}
{"context":"By enacting Senate Bill 0182-008, the General Assembly has provided persuasive evidence of its intent concerning the interpretation of SS 42-4-1801(9)(a)(II), making it clear that Senate Bill 01-168 was not intended to modify the penalties for vehicular homicide.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the same General Assembly enacted both provisions at issue there, and holding that, while subsequent legislative pronouncement of intent is not a part of the legislative history, such statements may be considered in construing the statute in question","sentence":"See People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119 (Colo.1985)(while subsequent legislative declarations concerning the intent of an earlier statute are not controlling, they are entitled to significant weight); BQP Indus., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 694 P.2d 337 (Colo.App.1984)(noting that the same General Assembly enacted both provisions at issue there, and holding that, while subsequent legislative pronouncement of intent is not a part of the legislative history, such statements may be considered in construing the statute in question); cf. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo.2000)(courts cannot infer the intent of an earlier legislature from the views of a subsequent one)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"courts cannot infer the intent of an earlier legislature from the views of a subsequent one","sentence":"See People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119 (Colo.1985)(while subsequent legislative declarations concerning the intent of an earlier statute are not controlling, they are entitled to significant weight); BQP Indus., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 694 P.2d 337 (Colo.App.1984)(noting that the same General Assembly enacted both provisions at issue there, and holding that, while subsequent legislative pronouncement of intent is not a part of the legislative history, such statements may be considered in construing the statute in question); cf. State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo.2000)(courts cannot infer the intent of an earlier legislature from the views of a subsequent one)."},"case_id":9095983,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the first instance, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the actions of the Mayor himself towards plaintiff came to represent town policy or, to say the least, condoned a custom of sexual harassment by the town's officials and employees. In addition, a trier of fact could find that the Mayor's personal engagement in the allegedly unconstitutional treatment of plaintiff satisfied Turner's second criterion for municipal liability.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"915 F.2d 137, 137","parenthetical":"sheriff's alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \"sham\" trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under SS 1983","sentence":"See Turner, 915 F.2d at 137 (sheriff\u2019s alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \u201csham\u201d trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under \u00a7 1983); see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (\u201cmunicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"475 U.S. 469, 480","parenthetical":"\"municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\"","sentence":"See Turner, 915 F.2d at 137 (sheriff\u2019s alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \u201csham\u201d trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under \u00a7 1983); see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (\u201cmunicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\u201d)."},"case_id":7653077,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the first instance, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the actions of the Mayor himself towards plaintiff came to represent town policy or, to say the least, condoned a custom of sexual harassment by the town's officials and employees. In addition, a trier of fact could find that the Mayor's personal engagement in the allegedly unconstitutional treatment of plaintiff satisfied Turner's second criterion for municipal liability.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298","parenthetical":"\"municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\"","sentence":"See Turner, 915 F.2d at 137 (sheriff\u2019s alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \u201csham\u201d trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under \u00a7 1983); see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (\u201cmunicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"915 F.2d 137, 137","parenthetical":"sheriff's alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \"sham\" trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under SS 1983","sentence":"See Turner, 915 F.2d at 137 (sheriff\u2019s alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \u201csham\u201d trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under \u00a7 1983); see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (\u201cmunicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\u201d)."},"case_id":7653077,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the first instance, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the actions of the Mayor himself towards plaintiff came to represent town policy or, to say the least, condoned a custom of sexual harassment by the town's officials and employees. In addition, a trier of fact could find that the Mayor's personal engagement in the allegedly unconstitutional treatment of plaintiff satisfied Turner's second criterion for municipal liability.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\"","sentence":"See Turner, 915 F.2d at 137 (sheriff\u2019s alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \u201csham\u201d trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under \u00a7 1983); see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (\u201cmunicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"915 F.2d 137, 137","parenthetical":"sheriff's alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \"sham\" trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under SS 1983","sentence":"See Turner, 915 F.2d at 137 (sheriff\u2019s alleged participation as co-conspirator in plan to subject plaintiff to \u201csham\u201d trial in violation of her due process rights would, if proven, lead to municipal liability under \u00a7 1983); see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) (\u201cmunicipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers under appropriate circumstances\u201d)."},"case_id":7653077,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant, an expert marksman, also fired a shot into Burger's occupied car at close range, causing a bullet to narrowly miss Mandy McConnell who was sitting in the back seat. (N.T., at 24.) It can be inferred that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Mandy because the bullet he fired into the car missed her by only three inches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"case_id":9424032,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant, an expert marksman, also fired a shot into Burger's occupied car at close range, causing a bullet to narrowly miss Mandy McConnell who was sitting in the back seat. (N.T., at 24.) It can be inferred that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Mandy because the bullet he fired into the car missed her by only three inches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"case_id":9424032,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant, an expert marksman, also fired a shot into Burger's occupied car at close range, causing a bullet to narrowly miss Mandy McConnell who was sitting in the back seat. (N.T., at 24.) It can be inferred that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Mandy because the bullet he fired into the car missed her by only three inches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"case_id":9424032,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant, an expert marksman, also fired a shot into Burger's occupied car at close range, causing a bullet to narrowly miss Mandy McConnell who was sitting in the back seat. (N.T., at 24.) It can be inferred that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Mandy because the bullet he fired into the car missed her by only three inches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"case_id":9424032,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant, an expert marksman, also fired a shot into Burger's occupied car at close range, causing a bullet to narrowly miss Mandy McConnell who was sitting in the back seat. (N.T., at 24.) It can be inferred that appellant intended to cause serious bodily injury to Mandy because the bullet he fired into the car missed her by only three inches.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 559 Pa. 229, 739 A.2d 1023 (1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 829, 121 S.Ct. 79, 148 L.Ed.2d 41 (2000) (finding sufficient evidence presented to convict appellant of aggravated assault where appellant shot at and narrowly missed the victim); see also Commonwealth v. Woods, 710 A.2d 626 (Pa.Super.1998) (holding specific intent to harm may be inferred from the circumstances and that finding is a matter for the jury)."},"case_id":9424032,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As to the first excerpt, the use of the word \"alarm\" rather than \"monitor\" does not so alter the meaning of Samee's statements as to render them no longer \"substantially true.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"545 N.W.2d 699, 706","parenthetical":"in affirming trial court's application of \"substantial truth\" test, court held on appeal that \"a more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are 'substantially true' -- that is, 'supportable interpretations' of ambiguous underlying situations\"","sentence":"Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Minn.Ct.App.1996) (in affirming trial court\u2019s application of \u201csubstantial truth\u201d test, court held on appeal that \u201ca more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are \u2018substantially true\u2019 \u2014 that is, \u2018supportable interpretations\u2019 of ambiguous underlying situations\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Mas-son v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517-18, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2433, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (common law of libel \u201coverlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"501 U.S. 496, 517-18","parenthetical":"common law of libel \"overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\"","sentence":"Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Minn.Ct.App.1996) (in affirming trial court\u2019s application of \u201csubstantial truth\u201d test, court held on appeal that \u201ca more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are \u2018substantially true\u2019 \u2014 that is, \u2018supportable interpretations\u2019 of ambiguous underlying situations\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Mas-son v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517-18, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2433, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (common law of libel \u201coverlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\u201d)."},"case_id":447898,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As to the first excerpt, the use of the word \"alarm\" rather than \"monitor\" does not so alter the meaning of Samee's statements as to render them no longer \"substantially true.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"545 N.W.2d 699, 706","parenthetical":"in affirming trial court's application of \"substantial truth\" test, court held on appeal that \"a more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are 'substantially true' -- that is, 'supportable interpretations' of ambiguous underlying situations\"","sentence":"Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Minn.Ct.App.1996) (in affirming trial court\u2019s application of \u201csubstantial truth\u201d test, court held on appeal that \u201ca more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are \u2018substantially true\u2019 \u2014 that is, \u2018supportable interpretations\u2019 of ambiguous underlying situations\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Mas-son v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517-18, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2433, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (common law of libel \u201coverlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 2419, 2433","parenthetical":"common law of libel \"overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\"","sentence":"Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Minn.Ct.App.1996) (in affirming trial court\u2019s application of \u201csubstantial truth\u201d test, court held on appeal that \u201ca more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are \u2018substantially true\u2019 \u2014 that is, \u2018supportable interpretations\u2019 of ambiguous underlying situations\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Mas-son v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517-18, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2433, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (common law of libel \u201coverlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\u201d)."},"case_id":447898,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As to the first excerpt, the use of the word \"alarm\" rather than \"monitor\" does not so alter the meaning of Samee's statements as to render them no longer \"substantially true.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"545 N.W.2d 699, 706","parenthetical":"in affirming trial court's application of \"substantial truth\" test, court held on appeal that \"a more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are 'substantially true' -- that is, 'supportable interpretations' of ambiguous underlying situations\"","sentence":"Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Minn.Ct.App.1996) (in affirming trial court\u2019s application of \u201csubstantial truth\u201d test, court held on appeal that \u201ca more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are \u2018substantially true\u2019 \u2014 that is, \u2018supportable interpretations\u2019 of ambiguous underlying situations\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Mas-son v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517-18, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2433, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (common law of libel \u201coverlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"common law of libel \"overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\"","sentence":"Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Minn.Ct.App.1996) (in affirming trial court\u2019s application of \u201csubstantial truth\u201d test, court held on appeal that \u201ca more recent doctrine extends First Amendment protection to statements that are \u2018substantially true\u2019 \u2014 that is, \u2018supportable interpretations\u2019 of ambiguous underlying situations\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Mas-son v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517-18, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2433, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991) (common law of libel \u201coverlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon substantial truth\u201d)."},"case_id":447898,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A considerable body of case law instructs that when analyzing a Title IX claim courts should apply Title VII jurisprudence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"503 U.S. 73, 73-76","parenthetical":"\"the same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\"","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 F.3d 709, 714","parenthetical":"In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"case_id":7650563,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A considerable body of case law instructs that when analyzing a Title IX claim courts should apply Title VII jurisprudence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 1036, 1036-38","parenthetical":"\"the same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\"","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 F.3d 709, 714","parenthetical":"In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"case_id":7650563,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A considerable body of case law instructs that when analyzing a Title IX claim courts should apply Title VII jurisprudence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"57 F.3d 249, 249","parenthetical":"\"In reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\"","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 F.3d 709, 714","parenthetical":"In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"case_id":7650563,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A considerable body of case law instructs that when analyzing a Title IX claim courts should apply Title VII jurisprudence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"74 F.3d 1186, 1190","parenthetical":"Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 F.3d 709, 714","parenthetical":"In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"case_id":7650563,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A considerable body of case law instructs that when analyzing a Title IX claim courts should apply Title VII jurisprudence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"998 F.2d 824, 832","parenthetical":"Title VII provides \"the most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards.\"","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 F.3d 709, 714","parenthetical":"In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"case_id":7650563,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A considerable body of case law instructs that when analyzing a Title IX claim courts should apply Title VII jurisprudence.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 F.3d 709, 714","parenthetical":"In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII","sentence":"Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-76, 112 S.Ct. at 1036-38 (\u201cthe same rule [as when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate under Title VII] should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.\u201d); Murray, 57 F.3d at 249 (\u201cIn reviewing claims of discrimination brought under Title IX by employees, whether for sexual harassment or retaliation, courts have generally adopted the same legal standards that are applied to such claims under Title VII.\u201d); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (11th Cir.1996) (Title VII standards governing hostile working environment applicable to Title IX claim against school for knowingly failing to act to remedy hostile school environment); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir.1993) (Title VII provides \u201cthe most appropriate analogue when defining Title IX\u2019s substantive standards.\u201d); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir.1988) (Title VII standard for proving discriminatory treatment applies to claims arising under equal protection clause and Title IX); see also, Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 714 (2d Cir.1994) (In the case of gender discrimination occurring in college disciplinary proceedings, courts should interpret Title IX by looking to the body of law developed under Title VI, as well as the case law interpreting Title VII)."},"case_id":7650563,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor does it prevent other states from regulating gift card sales differently within their own territories.\"). In other words, under the state's interpretation of its own law, as sanctified by the Second Circuit, the statute was constitutional because it regulated only transactions within the state; whether any subsequent effects of the transaction -- such as the use of the gift card -- were felt out of state was irrelevant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"457 U.S. 642, 642","parenthetical":"noting that the Commerce Clause \"precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State\"","sentence":"See also Freedom Holdings, 624 F.3d at 66 (finding statute that applied only to cigarettes sold in the state did not regulate extraterritorially); cf. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642, 102 S.Ct. 2629 (noting that the Commerce Clause \u201cprecludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State\u2019s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"624 F.3d 66, 66","parenthetical":"finding statute that applied only to cigarettes sold in the state did not regulate extraterritorially","sentence":"See also Freedom Holdings, 624 F.3d at 66 (finding statute that applied only to cigarettes sold in the state did not regulate extraterritorially); cf. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642, 102 S.Ct. 2629 (noting that the Commerce Clause \u201cprecludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State\u2019s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State\u201d)."},"case_id":4280963,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor does it prevent other states from regulating gift card sales differently within their own territories.\"). In other words, under the state's interpretation of its own law, as sanctified by the Second Circuit, the statute was constitutional because it regulated only transactions within the state; whether any subsequent effects of the transaction -- such as the use of the gift card -- were felt out of state was irrelevant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"624 F.3d 66, 66","parenthetical":"finding statute that applied only to cigarettes sold in the state did not regulate extraterritorially","sentence":"See also Freedom Holdings, 624 F.3d at 66 (finding statute that applied only to cigarettes sold in the state did not regulate extraterritorially); cf. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642, 102 S.Ct. 2629 (noting that the Commerce Clause \u201cprecludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State\u2019s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Commerce Clause \"precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State\"","sentence":"See also Freedom Holdings, 624 F.3d at 66 (finding statute that applied only to cigarettes sold in the state did not regulate extraterritorially); cf. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642, 102 S.Ct. 2629 (noting that the Commerce Clause \u201cprecludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State\u2019s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State\u201d)."},"case_id":4280963,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Perez-Lopez's contention that the agency failed to consider all hardship factors does not state a colorable due process claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 F.3d 926, 930","parenthetical":"\"traditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.\"","sentence":"See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005) (\u201ctraditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the \u201cmisapplication of case law\u201d may not be reviewed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"255 F.3d 775, 779","parenthetical":"holding that the \"misapplication of case law\" may not be reviewed","sentence":"See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.2005) (\u201ctraditional abuse of discretion challenges recast as alleged due process violations do not constitute colorable constitutional claims that would invoke our jurisdiction.\u201d); see also Sanchez-Cruz v. INS, 255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the \u201cmisapplication of case law\u201d may not be reviewed)."},"case_id":8455640,"label":"a"}
{"context":"All of the Defendants here are potentially liable, yet aside from Pablo, no other Defendant has even a fraction of his assets under attachment in Switzerland.- Moreover, even with respect to Pablo's liability, the Plaintiff seeks to establish liability for a debt, not compel the relinquishment of specific, identifiable property in Switzerland. Indeed, although the Complaint asserts that stolen funds passed through Swiss accounts over which Pablo had control, it does not allege that such funds presently are in those same accounts. Thus, no identifiable bar precludes this Court from rendering appropriate relief to Ms. Madanes while still respecting the integrity of the Swiss action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"810 F.Supp. 116, 117-18","parenthetical":"collecting cases and explaining that court exercising jurisdiction second does not lose powers to make orders which do not conflict -with authority of first court","sentence":"See Central States, 600 F.2d at 675 n. 7 (holding that where prior state court had in rem jurisdiction, district court could maintain in person-am jurisdiction and simply deny requests for conflicting in rem relief because \u201cdistrict court is fully capable of preventing inappropriate conversion of the suit to a proceeding truly in rem\u201d); cf. United States v. $3,000,000 Obligation, 810 F.Supp. 116, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (collecting cases and explaining that court exercising jurisdiction second does not lose powers to make orders which do not conflict -with authority of first court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where prior state court had in rem jurisdiction, district court could maintain in person-am jurisdiction and simply deny requests for conflicting in rem relief because \"district court is fully capable of preventing inappropriate conversion of the suit to a proceeding truly in rem\"","sentence":"See Central States, 600 F.2d at 675 n. 7 (holding that where prior state court had in rem jurisdiction, district court could maintain in person-am jurisdiction and simply deny requests for conflicting in rem relief because \u201cdistrict court is fully capable of preventing inappropriate conversion of the suit to a proceeding truly in rem\u201d); cf. United States v. $3,000,000 Obligation, 810 F.Supp. 116, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (collecting cases and explaining that court exercising jurisdiction second does not lose powers to make orders which do not conflict -with authority of first court)."},"case_id":1140584,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ultimately, we need not weigh-in on this portion of the district court's opinion because there is no federally protected interest in seeking a state-court judgeship that, under state law (as interpreted by the state supreme court), already has been lawfully filled by gubernatorial appointment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"321 U.S. 1, 7","parenthetical":"\"The right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \"","sentence":"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (\u201cThe right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \u201d); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 161, 163 (6th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a suit challenging Ohio\u2019s judicial-appointment procedures under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (\u201cPublic office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d); see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201c[Tjhere is no constitutional right to run for state office protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86-87 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 F.3d 75, 86-87","parenthetical":"\"[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\"","sentence":"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (\u201cThe right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \u201d); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 161, 163 (6th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a suit challenging Ohio\u2019s judicial-appointment procedures under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (\u201cPublic office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d); see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201c[Tjhere is no constitutional right to run for state office protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86-87 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\u201d)."},"case_id":4161513,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ultimately, we need not weigh-in on this portion of the district court's opinion because there is no federally protected interest in seeking a state-court judgeship that, under state law (as interpreted by the state supreme court), already has been lawfully filled by gubernatorial appointment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 F.3d 75, 86-87","parenthetical":"\"[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\"","sentence":"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (\u201cThe right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \u201d); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 161, 163 (6th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a suit challenging Ohio\u2019s judicial-appointment procedures under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (\u201cPublic office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d); see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201c[Tjhere is no constitutional right to run for state office protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86-87 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \"","sentence":"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (\u201cThe right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \u201d); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 161, 163 (6th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a suit challenging Ohio\u2019s judicial-appointment procedures under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (\u201cPublic office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d); see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201c[Tjhere is no constitutional right to run for state office protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86-87 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\u201d)."},"case_id":4161513,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Ultimately, we need not weigh-in on this portion of the district court's opinion because there is no federally protected interest in seeking a state-court judgeship that, under state law (as interpreted by the state supreme court), already has been lawfully filled by gubernatorial appointment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \"","sentence":"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (\u201cThe right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \u201d); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 161, 163 (6th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a suit challenging Ohio\u2019s judicial-appointment procedures under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (\u201cPublic office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d); see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201c[Tjhere is no constitutional right to run for state office protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86-87 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 F.3d 75, 86-87","parenthetical":"\"[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\"","sentence":"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (\u201cThe right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \u201d); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 161, 163 (6th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a suit challenging Ohio\u2019s judicial-appointment procedures under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (\u201cPublic office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d); see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201c[Tjhere is no constitutional right to run for state office protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86-87 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\u201d)."},"case_id":4161513,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ultimately, we need not weigh-in on this portion of the district court's opinion because there is no federally protected interest in seeking a state-court judgeship that, under state law (as interpreted by the state supreme court), already has been lawfully filled by gubernatorial appointment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 F.3d 75, 86-87","parenthetical":"\"[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\"","sentence":"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (\u201cThe right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \u201d); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 161, 163 (6th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a suit challenging Ohio\u2019s judicial-appointment procedures under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (\u201cPublic office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d); see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201c[Tjhere is no constitutional right to run for state office protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86-87 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"470 F.2d 163, 165","parenthetical":"\"Public office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\"","sentence":"See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944) (\u201cThe right to become a candidate for state office ... is a right or privilege of state citizenship.... \u201d); Newman v. Voinovich, 986 F.2d 159, 161, 163 (6th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of a suit challenging Ohio\u2019s judicial-appointment procedures under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (\u201cPublic office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d); see also Wilson v. Birnberg, 667 F.3d 591, 598 (5th Cir.2012) (\u201c[Tjhere is no constitutional right to run for state office protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u201d (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 86-87 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201c[Plaintiff] lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.\u201d)."},"case_id":4161513,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But where the uncontradicted evidence in the record \"shows completion only of the greater offense, it is unnecessary for the trial court to charge on the lesser offense.\" Accordingly, when a defendant admits or does not dispute the facts authorizing his conviction for the greater offense, Georgia courts have affirmed the trial court's refusal to charge on the lesser included offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"264 Ga. 132, 132-133","parenthetical":"emphasizing importance of defendants' admissions to holdings in Sims and Hambrick","sentence":"See also Edwards, 264 Ga. at 132-133 (emphasizing importance of defendants\u2019 admissions to holdings in Sims and Hambrick)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"197 Ga. App. 214, 217","parenthetical":"trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on robbery and theft by taking as lesser offenses to charged offense of armed robbery in case where defendant admitted to having a shotgun during the incident in question","sentence":"See Sims v. State, 197 Ga. App. 214, 217 (5) (398 SE2d 244) (1990) (trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on robbery and theft by taking as lesser offenses to charged offense of armed robbery in case where defendant admitted to having a shotgun during the incident in question); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 447 (2) (330 SE2d 383) (1985) (trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on theft by taking as lesser offense to charged offenses of armed robbery and burglary in case where defendant did not dispute using a knife to rob the victim but challenged whether it was an \u201coffensive weapon\u201d under the armed robbery statute)."},"case_id":4333922,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But where the uncontradicted evidence in the record \"shows completion only of the greater offense, it is unnecessary for the trial court to charge on the lesser offense.\" Accordingly, when a defendant admits or does not dispute the facts authorizing his conviction for the greater offense, Georgia courts have affirmed the trial court's refusal to charge on the lesser included offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"264 Ga. 132, 132-133","parenthetical":"emphasizing importance of defendants' admissions to holdings in Sims and Hambrick","sentence":"See also Edwards, 264 Ga. at 132-133 (emphasizing importance of defendants\u2019 admissions to holdings in Sims and Hambrick)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"174 Ga. App. 444, 447","parenthetical":"trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on theft by taking as lesser offense to charged offenses of armed robbery and burglary in case where defendant did not dispute using a knife to rob the victim but challenged whether it was an \"offensive weapon\" under the armed robbery statute","sentence":"See Sims v. State, 197 Ga. App. 214, 217 (5) (398 SE2d 244) (1990) (trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on robbery and theft by taking as lesser offenses to charged offense of armed robbery in case where defendant admitted to having a shotgun during the incident in question); Hambrick v. State, 174 Ga. App. 444, 447 (2) (330 SE2d 383) (1985) (trial court did not err in refusing to instruct jury on theft by taking as lesser offense to charged offenses of armed robbery and burglary in case where defendant did not dispute using a knife to rob the victim but challenged whether it was an \u201coffensive weapon\u201d under the armed robbery statute)."},"case_id":4333922,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"328 U.S. 256, 266","parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"331 U.S. 745, 751","parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"328 U.S. 256, 266","parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"328 U.S. 256, 266","parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"331 U.S. 745, 751","parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"331 U.S. 745, 751","parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Notably in relation to the question before us, the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in which the Government took outright physical possession of the property involved. A temporary takings claim could be maintained as well when government action occurring outside the property gave rise to \"a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"flooding of claimant's land was a taking even though claimant successfully \"reclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\"","sentence":"United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266, 66 S.Ct. 1062, 90 L.Ed. 1206 (1946) (frequent overflights from a nearby airport resulted in a taking, for the flights deprived the property owner of the customary use of his property as a chicken farm); cf. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 751, 67 S.Ct. 1382, 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947) (flooding of claimant\u2019s land was a taking even though claimant successfully \u201creclaimed most of his land which the Government originally took by flooding\u201d)."},"case_id":4121782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This left the government and the court in the awkward position of having to sift through classified documents from the intelligence community to try to determine if any contained exculpatory information helpful to Seda's defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"448 F.3d 436, 458","parenthetical":"noting the difficult predicament of \"the defendants and their counsel, who are in the best position to know whether information would be helpful to their defense, [but] are disadvantaged by not being permitted to see the information and ... assist the court in its assessment of the information's helpfulness\"","sentence":"United States v. Amawi, 695 F.3d 457, 471 (6th Cir.2012) (\u201cRather than neutrally deciding disputes with an open record based on the adversarial process, [the court] must place [itself] in the shoes of the defense counsel, the very ones who cannot see the classified record, and act with a view to their interests.\u201d); see also United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 458 (D.C.Cir.2006) (noting the difficult predicament of \u201cthe defendants and their counsel, who are in the best position to know whether information would be helpful to their defense, [but] are disadvantaged by not being permitted to see the information and ... assist the court in its assessment of the information\u2019s helpfulness\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"695 F.3d 457, 471","parenthetical":"\"Rather than neutrally deciding disputes with an open record based on the adversarial process, [the court] must place [itself] in the shoes of the defense counsel, the very ones who cannot see the classified record, and act with a view to their interests.\"","sentence":"United States v. Amawi, 695 F.3d 457, 471 (6th Cir.2012) (\u201cRather than neutrally deciding disputes with an open record based on the adversarial process, [the court] must place [itself] in the shoes of the defense counsel, the very ones who cannot see the classified record, and act with a view to their interests.\u201d); see also United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 458 (D.C.Cir.2006) (noting the difficult predicament of \u201cthe defendants and their counsel, who are in the best position to know whether information would be helpful to their defense, [but] are disadvantaged by not being permitted to see the information and ... assist the court in its assessment of the information\u2019s helpfulness\u201d)."},"case_id":3696942,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dr. Evers's other designated liberty interest requires slightly closer inspection. The Due Process Clause protects against deprivation, without notice and hearing, of one's liberty interest in his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"965 F.2d 452, 456","parenthetical":"\"[Djefamation that is incident to the government's refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\"","sentence":"See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (\u201c[C]ertainly where the State attaches \u2018a badge of infamy\u2019 to the citizen, due process comes into play.\u201d); see also Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir.1992) (\u201c[Djefamation that is incident to the government\u2019s refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 U.S. 433, 437","parenthetical":"\"[C]ertainly where the State attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play.\"","sentence":"See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (\u201c[C]ertainly where the State attaches \u2018a badge of infamy\u2019 to the citizen, due process comes into play.\u201d); see also Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir.1992) (\u201c[Djefamation that is incident to the government\u2019s refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":5762683,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dr. Evers's other designated liberty interest requires slightly closer inspection. The Due Process Clause protects against deprivation, without notice and hearing, of one's liberty interest in his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"965 F.2d 452, 456","parenthetical":"\"[Djefamation that is incident to the government's refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\"","sentence":"See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (\u201c[C]ertainly where the State attaches \u2018a badge of infamy\u2019 to the citizen, due process comes into play.\u201d); see also Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir.1992) (\u201c[Djefamation that is incident to the government\u2019s refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ertainly where the State attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play.\"","sentence":"See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (\u201c[C]ertainly where the State attaches \u2018a badge of infamy\u2019 to the citizen, due process comes into play.\u201d); see also Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir.1992) (\u201c[Djefamation that is incident to the government\u2019s refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":5762683,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dr. Evers's other designated liberty interest requires slightly closer inspection. The Due Process Clause protects against deprivation, without notice and hearing, of one's liberty interest in his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[C]ertainly where the State attaches 'a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play.\"","sentence":"See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (\u201c[C]ertainly where the State attaches \u2018a badge of infamy\u2019 to the citizen, due process comes into play.\u201d); see also Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir.1992) (\u201c[Djefamation that is incident to the government\u2019s refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"965 F.2d 452, 456","parenthetical":"\"[Djefamation that is incident to the government's refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\"","sentence":"See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (\u201c[C]ertainly where the State attaches \u2018a badge of infamy\u2019 to the citizen, due process comes into play.\u201d); see also Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir.1992) (\u201c[Djefamation that is incident to the government\u2019s refusal to reemploy an individual can implicate a liberty interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":5762683,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"196 Va. 117, 130","parenthetical":"\"When the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 Va.App. 47, 47","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"82 S.E.2d 553, 561","parenthetical":"\"When the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 Va.App. 47, 47","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"167 Va. 206, 211","parenthetical":"\"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 Va.App. 47, 47","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 Va.App. 47, 47","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"188 S.E. 148, 150","parenthetical":"\"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"716 S.E.2d 488, 488","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"196 Va. 117, 130","parenthetical":"\"When the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"82 S.E.2d 553, 561","parenthetical":"\"When the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"716 S.E.2d 488, 488","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"167 Va. 206, 211","parenthetical":"\"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"716 S.E.2d 488, 488","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"188 S.E. 148, 150","parenthetical":"\"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"716 S.E.2d 488, 488","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1 Va.App. 219, 219","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"196 Va. 117, 130","parenthetical":"\"When the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"82 S.E.2d 553, 561","parenthetical":"\"When the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1 Va.App. 219, 219","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1 Va.App. 219, 219","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"167 Va. 206, 211","parenthetical":"\"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1 Va.App. 219, 219","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"188 S.E. 148, 150","parenthetical":"\"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"196 Va. 117, 130","parenthetical":"\"When the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"337 S.E.2d 299, at 302","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"337 S.E.2d 299, at 302","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"82 S.E.2d 553, 561","parenthetical":"\"When the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"337 S.E.2d 299, at 302","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"167 Va. 206, 211","parenthetical":"\"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an effort to avoid the conclusive effect of the award order, Starbucks contends that the award order was not a final judgment because it was \"administratively entered.\" This argument misplaces the inquiry this Court is required to make. An order by the commission awarding benefits to a claimant by agreement of the parties is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been, litigated in that suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"188 S.E. 148, 150","parenthetical":"\"The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\"","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"337 S.E.2d 299, at 302","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.' \" (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302","sentence":"See Brock, 59 Va.App. at 47, 716 S.E.2d at 488 (\u201c \u2018[T]he relationship of the [cjommission to an award is that of a court to a judgment during the term at which it is rendered.\u2019 \u201d (quoting K & L Trucking Co., 1 Va.App. at 219, 337 S.E.2d 299 at 302)); see also Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 130, 82 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1954) (\u201cWhen the parties are before a court of competent jurisdiction and a separation agreement is approved, confirmed and decreed upon, its validity is by that judgment rendered res judicata between the parties.\u201d); Martin v. Martin, 167 Va. 206, 211, 188 S.E. 148, 150 (1936) (\u201cThe judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, dismissing a suit agreed, on the ground that it has been agreed by the parties, is a final determination of the matters which were actually, or might have been litigated in that suit, as against said parties and all claiming under them.\u201d)."},"case_id":4138049,"label":"b"}
{"context":". If the record were unclear, summary judgment for a movant in USF & G's position would nonetheless be improper because the litigant's true identity is certainly a \"material fact\" under our summary judgment jurisprudence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"165 S.W.3d 336, 344","parenthetical":"\"In a summary judgment motion brought under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c","sentence":"See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex.2005) (\"In a summary judgment motion brought under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex.2005) (instructing that, to review a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment, we \"examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"168 S.W.3d 802, 824","parenthetical":"instructing that, to review a trial court's grant of summary judgment, we \"examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion\"","sentence":"See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex.2005) (\"In a summary judgment motion brought under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c), the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d); see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex.2005) (instructing that, to review a trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment, we \"examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against the motion\u201d)."},"case_id":8216037,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, Spencer expressly requested that the bankruptcy court set aside that state court judgment, which is exactly what Rooker-Feldman says lower federal courts cannot do. Cf. Taylor v. Federal Nat. Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"374 F.3d 529, 533-34","parenthetical":"claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \"that the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\"","sentence":"Ass\u2019n, 374 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2004) (claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \u201cthat the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\u201d); see also Mains v. Citibank N.A., No. 16-1985, 852 F.3d 669, 679, 2017 WL 1160901 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2017) (affirming dismissal of similar challenges to foreclosure judgment on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Schmid v. Bank of Am., N.A., 498 B.R. 221, 224-25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (dismissing an action challenging defendant\u2019s claim that it owned a mortgage and claiming fraud against defendant based on Rooker-Feldman, since the alleged injury was the state court foreclosure judgment being asserted against the plaintiff)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"852 F.3d 669, 679","parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of similar challenges to foreclosure judgment on Rooker-Feldman grounds","sentence":"Ass\u2019n, 374 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2004) (claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \u201cthat the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\u201d); see also Mains v. Citibank N.A., No. 16-1985, 852 F.3d 669, 679, 2017 WL 1160901 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2017) (affirming dismissal of similar challenges to foreclosure judgment on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Schmid v. Bank of Am., N.A., 498 B.R. 221, 224-25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (dismissing an action challenging defendant\u2019s claim that it owned a mortgage and claiming fraud against defendant based on Rooker-Feldman, since the alleged injury was the state court foreclosure judgment being asserted against the plaintiff)."},"case_id":12274936,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, Spencer expressly requested that the bankruptcy court set aside that state court judgment, which is exactly what Rooker-Feldman says lower federal courts cannot do. Cf. Taylor v. Federal Nat. Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"374 F.3d 529, 533-34","parenthetical":"claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \"that the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\"","sentence":"Ass\u2019n, 374 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2004) (claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \u201cthat the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\u201d); see also Mains v. Citibank N.A., No. 16-1985, 852 F.3d 669, 679, 2017 WL 1160901 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2017) (affirming dismissal of similar challenges to foreclosure judgment on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Schmid v. Bank of Am., N.A., 498 B.R. 221, 224-25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (dismissing an action challenging defendant\u2019s claim that it owned a mortgage and claiming fraud against defendant based on Rooker-Feldman, since the alleged injury was the state court foreclosure judgment being asserted against the plaintiff)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of similar challenges to foreclosure judgment on Rooker-Feldman grounds","sentence":"Ass\u2019n, 374 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2004) (claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \u201cthat the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\u201d); see also Mains v. Citibank N.A., No. 16-1985, 852 F.3d 669, 679, 2017 WL 1160901 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2017) (affirming dismissal of similar challenges to foreclosure judgment on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Schmid v. Bank of Am., N.A., 498 B.R. 221, 224-25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (dismissing an action challenging defendant\u2019s claim that it owned a mortgage and claiming fraud against defendant based on Rooker-Feldman, since the alleged injury was the state court foreclosure judgment being asserted against the plaintiff)."},"case_id":12274936,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, Spencer expressly requested that the bankruptcy court set aside that state court judgment, which is exactly what Rooker-Feldman says lower federal courts cannot do. Cf. Taylor v. Federal Nat. Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"498 B.R. 221, 224-25","parenthetical":"dismissing an action challenging defendant's claim that it owned a mortgage and claiming fraud against defendant based on Rooker-Feldman, since the alleged injury was the state court foreclosure judgment being asserted against the plaintiff","sentence":"Ass\u2019n, 374 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2004) (claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \u201cthat the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\u201d); see also Mains v. Citibank N.A., No. 16-1985, 852 F.3d 669, 679, 2017 WL 1160901 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2017) (affirming dismissal of similar challenges to foreclosure judgment on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Schmid v. Bank of Am., N.A., 498 B.R. 221, 224-25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (dismissing an action challenging defendant\u2019s claim that it owned a mortgage and claiming fraud against defendant based on Rooker-Feldman, since the alleged injury was the state court foreclosure judgment being asserted against the plaintiff)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"374 F.3d 529, 533-34","parenthetical":"claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \"that the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\"","sentence":"Ass\u2019n, 374 F.3d 529, 533-34 (7th Cir. 2004) (claims were not independent of state court foreclosure suit for Rooker-Feldman purposes where plaintiff alleged \u201cthat the Defendants had committed a fraud upon the court by instituting a wrongful foreclosure action against her\u201d); see also Mains v. Citibank N.A., No. 16-1985, 852 F.3d 669, 679, 2017 WL 1160901 (7th Cir. Mar. 29, 2017) (affirming dismissal of similar challenges to foreclosure judgment on Rooker-Feldman grounds); Schmid v. Bank of Am., N.A., 498 B.R. 221, 224-25 (W.D. Wis. 2013) (dismissing an action challenging defendant\u2019s claim that it owned a mortgage and claiming fraud against defendant based on Rooker-Feldman, since the alleged injury was the state court foreclosure judgment being asserted against the plaintiff)."},"case_id":12274936,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We begin with the undisputed proposition that the decision to settle is the client's to make, not the attorney's.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"180 U.S. 343, 352","parenthetical":"\"the utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client's claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\"","sentence":"United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 352, 21 S.Ct. 371, 374, 45 L.Ed. 563 (1901) (\u201cthe utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client\u2019s claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\u201d); Barthelmas v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir.1939) (same); see Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir.1974) (only \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d might empower an attorney to settle case without client\u2019s consent); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1980) (\u201cin civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 F.2d 88, 89","parenthetical":"only \"exigent circumstances\" might empower an attorney to settle case without client's consent","sentence":"United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 352, 21 S.Ct. 371, 374, 45 L.Ed. 563 (1901) (\u201cthe utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client\u2019s claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\u201d); Barthelmas v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir.1939) (same); see Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir.1974) (only \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d might empower an attorney to settle case without client\u2019s consent); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1980) (\u201cin civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer\u201d)."},"case_id":10527909,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We begin with the undisputed proposition that the decision to settle is the client's to make, not the attorney's.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"21 S.Ct. 371, 374","parenthetical":"\"the utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client's claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\"","sentence":"United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 352, 21 S.Ct. 371, 374, 45 L.Ed. 563 (1901) (\u201cthe utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client\u2019s claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\u201d); Barthelmas v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir.1939) (same); see Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir.1974) (only \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d might empower an attorney to settle case without client\u2019s consent); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1980) (\u201cin civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 F.2d 88, 89","parenthetical":"only \"exigent circumstances\" might empower an attorney to settle case without client's consent","sentence":"United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 352, 21 S.Ct. 371, 374, 45 L.Ed. 563 (1901) (\u201cthe utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client\u2019s claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\u201d); Barthelmas v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir.1939) (same); see Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir.1974) (only \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d might empower an attorney to settle case without client\u2019s consent); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1980) (\u201cin civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer\u201d)."},"case_id":10527909,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We begin with the undisputed proposition that the decision to settle is the client's to make, not the attorney's.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client's claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\"","sentence":"United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 352, 21 S.Ct. 371, 374, 45 L.Ed. 563 (1901) (\u201cthe utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client\u2019s claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\u201d); Barthelmas v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir.1939) (same); see Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir.1974) (only \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d might empower an attorney to settle case without client\u2019s consent); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1980) (\u201cin civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"490 F.2d 88, 89","parenthetical":"only \"exigent circumstances\" might empower an attorney to settle case without client's consent","sentence":"United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 352, 21 S.Ct. 371, 374, 45 L.Ed. 563 (1901) (\u201cthe utter want of power of an attorney, by virtue of his general retainer only, to compromise his client\u2019s claim, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed.\u201d); Barthelmas v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir.1939) (same); see Thomsen v. Terrace Navigation Corp., 490 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir.1974) (only \u201cexigent circumstances\u201d might empower an attorney to settle case without client\u2019s consent); Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-7 (1980) (\u201cin civil cases, it is for the client to decide whether he will accept a settlement offer\u201d)."},"case_id":10527909,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Authority from other jurisdictions also supports the basic proposition that ignorance of the law should not constitute excusable neglect for inmates or criminal defendants under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3210(e)(2).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28","parenthetical":"district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel's erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \"ignorance of the statute's existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\" to extend time limit on untimely filed petition","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"case_id":12416310,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Authority from other jurisdictions also supports the basic proposition that ignorance of the law should not constitute excusable neglect for inmates or criminal defendants under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3210(e)(2).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"162 N.J. 240, 246","parenthetical":"postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \"ignorance of the statute's existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\" to extend time limit on untimely filed petition","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"case_id":12416310,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Authority from other jurisdictions also supports the basic proposition that ignorance of the law should not constitute excusable neglect for inmates or criminal defendants under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3210(e)(2).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \"ignorance of the statute's existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\" to extend time limit on untimely filed petition","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"case_id":12416310,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Authority from other jurisdictions also supports the basic proposition that ignorance of the law should not constitute excusable neglect for inmates or criminal defendants under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3210(e)(2).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"832 F. Supp. 324, 327","parenthetical":"finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \"ignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28","parenthetical":"district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel's erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"case_id":12416310,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Authority from other jurisdictions also supports the basic proposition that ignorance of the law should not constitute excusable neglect for inmates or criminal defendants under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3210(e)(2).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"162 N.J. 240, 246","parenthetical":"postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"832 F. Supp. 324, 327","parenthetical":"finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \"ignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"case_id":12416310,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Authority from other jurisdictions also supports the basic proposition that ignorance of the law should not constitute excusable neglect for inmates or criminal defendants under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 22-3210(e)(2).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"832 F. Supp. 324, 327","parenthetical":"finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \"ignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Klein v. Neal, 45 F.3d 1395, 1397 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995) (even though petitioner in postconviction collateral attack was pro se inmate, court held \u201cignorance of the statute\u2019s existence insufficient to constitute excusable neglect\u201d to extend time limit on untimely filed petition); United States v. Gibson, 832 F. Supp. 324, 327 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding late filing of pro se criminal appeal not due to excusable neglect because \u201cignorance of the law or unfamiliarity with the federal rules will almost invariably fall short of excusable neglect\u201d); see also United States v. Madrid, 633 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2011) (district court abused its discretion in finding excusable neglect based upon defense counsel\u2019s erroneous belief that he had 30 days in which to file notice of criminal appeal); State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 246, 744 A.2d 131 (2000) (postconviction relief petition filed after 5-year time limit was not supported by excusable neglect when criminal defendant asserted he lacked sophistication in the law)."},"case_id":12416310,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although there were no exigent circumstances excusing the failure to obtain a warrant, a warrant was not constitutionally required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"423 Mass. 735, 738","parenthetical":"execution of searches subject to \"general strictures against unreasonable searches\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Garner, 423 Mass. 735, 738 (1996) (execution of searches subject to \u201cgeneral strictures against unreasonable searches\u201d); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 686 (2003) (\u201c[L]aw enforcement personnel are authorized to use reasonable force, and no more, to execute warrants and carry out lawful orders\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"860 F.2d 328, 336","parenthetical":"\"the legitimate penological purpose of strip searches -- to discover hidden weapons and contraband -- justifies using force necessary to induce compliance by difficult inmates\"","sentence":"See also Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) (\u201cthe legitimate penological purpose of strip searches \u2014 to discover hidden weapons and contraband \u2014 justifies using force necessary to induce compliance by difficult inmates\u201d); Craddock v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 539, 550-551 (2003) (removal of drugs from resisting arrestee\u2019s anal cavity \u2014 without having to pull on bag \u2014 did not render strip search unreasonable)."},"case_id":12461246,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although there were no exigent circumstances excusing the failure to obtain a warrant, a warrant was not constitutionally required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"423 Mass. 735, 738","parenthetical":"execution of searches subject to \"general strictures against unreasonable searches\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Garner, 423 Mass. 735, 738 (1996) (execution of searches subject to \u201cgeneral strictures against unreasonable searches\u201d); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 686 (2003) (\u201c[L]aw enforcement personnel are authorized to use reasonable force, and no more, to execute warrants and carry out lawful orders\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"40 Va. App. 539, 550-551","parenthetical":"removal of drugs from resisting arrestee's anal cavity -- without having to pull on bag -- did not render strip search unreasonable","sentence":"See also Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) (\u201cthe legitimate penological purpose of strip searches \u2014 to discover hidden weapons and contraband \u2014 justifies using force necessary to induce compliance by difficult inmates\u201d); Craddock v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 539, 550-551 (2003) (removal of drugs from resisting arrestee\u2019s anal cavity \u2014 without having to pull on bag \u2014 did not render strip search unreasonable)."},"case_id":12461246,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although there were no exigent circumstances excusing the failure to obtain a warrant, a warrant was not constitutionally required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"439 Mass. 678, 686","parenthetical":"\"[L]aw enforcement personnel are authorized to use reasonable force, and no more, to execute warrants and carry out lawful orders\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Garner, 423 Mass. 735, 738 (1996) (execution of searches subject to \u201cgeneral strictures against unreasonable searches\u201d); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 686 (2003) (\u201c[L]aw enforcement personnel are authorized to use reasonable force, and no more, to execute warrants and carry out lawful orders\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"860 F.2d 328, 336","parenthetical":"\"the legitimate penological purpose of strip searches -- to discover hidden weapons and contraband -- justifies using force necessary to induce compliance by difficult inmates\"","sentence":"See also Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) (\u201cthe legitimate penological purpose of strip searches \u2014 to discover hidden weapons and contraband \u2014 justifies using force necessary to induce compliance by difficult inmates\u201d); Craddock v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 539, 550-551 (2003) (removal of drugs from resisting arrestee\u2019s anal cavity \u2014 without having to pull on bag \u2014 did not render strip search unreasonable)."},"case_id":12461246,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although there were no exigent circumstances excusing the failure to obtain a warrant, a warrant was not constitutionally required.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"439 Mass. 678, 686","parenthetical":"\"[L]aw enforcement personnel are authorized to use reasonable force, and no more, to execute warrants and carry out lawful orders\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Garner, 423 Mass. 735, 738 (1996) (execution of searches subject to \u201cgeneral strictures against unreasonable searches\u201d); Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 686 (2003) (\u201c[L]aw enforcement personnel are authorized to use reasonable force, and no more, to execute warrants and carry out lawful orders\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"40 Va. App. 539, 550-551","parenthetical":"removal of drugs from resisting arrestee's anal cavity -- without having to pull on bag -- did not render strip search unreasonable","sentence":"See also Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 336 (9th Cir. 1988) (\u201cthe legitimate penological purpose of strip searches \u2014 to discover hidden weapons and contraband \u2014 justifies using force necessary to induce compliance by difficult inmates\u201d); Craddock v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 539, 550-551 (2003) (removal of drugs from resisting arrestee\u2019s anal cavity \u2014 without having to pull on bag \u2014 did not render strip search unreasonable)."},"case_id":12461246,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This court looked exclusively to Louisiana law to determine that the officers were without authority to file the petition. Throughout the many revisions to federal bankruptcy law, courts continue to resolve authority-to-file disputes according to state law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"69 B.R. 712, 712","parenthetical":"as a matter of Idaho law, partner who filed for Chapter 11 protection lacks \"authority as a general partner to bind the partnership to an involuntary bankruptcy petition\"","sentence":"See In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775, 778 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990) (\u201cthe authority to file a bankruptcy petition must be found in the instruments of the corporation and applicable state law\u201d) (citing In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 B.R. 155 (Bankr.D.Me. 1982)); In re Bel-Aire Invest., Inc., 97 B.R. 88, 89-90 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1989) (\u201cIt is well established that since the Bankruptcy code itself does not establish the requisites for the initiation of a voluntary corporate bankruptcy case, the validity of all the individuals acting on behalf of the corporation must be determined with reference to the laws of the State in which the corporation was chartered.\u201d; recognizing that application of state law would render corporation unable to file a voluntary petition) (citing In re Autumn Press, Inc., 20 B.R. 60 (Bankr.D.Mass.1982); Taylor v. Markus Enterprises, Inc. (In re Markus Enterprises, Inc.), 91 B.R. 459, 460 (M.D.Tenn. 1988) (\u201cWhether the debtor, in light of its dissolution, retains the capacity to file a petition under the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, is a matter of the law of [Tennessee].\u201d); see also In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. at 712 (as a matter of Idaho law, partner who filed for Chapter 11 protection lacks \u201cauthority as a general partner to bind the partnership to an involuntary bankruptcy petition\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 B.R. 775, 778","parenthetical":"\"the authority to file a bankruptcy petition must be found in the instruments of the corporation and applicable state law\"","sentence":"See In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775, 778 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990) (\u201cthe authority to file a bankruptcy petition must be found in the instruments of the corporation and applicable state law\u201d) (citing In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 B.R. 155 (Bankr.D.Me. 1982)); In re Bel-Aire Invest., Inc., 97 B.R. 88, 89-90 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1989) (\u201cIt is well established that since the Bankruptcy code itself does not establish the requisites for the initiation of a voluntary corporate bankruptcy case, the validity of all the individuals acting on behalf of the corporation must be determined with reference to the laws of the State in which the corporation was chartered.\u201d; recognizing that application of state law would render corporation unable to file a voluntary petition) (citing In re Autumn Press, Inc., 20 B.R. 60 (Bankr.D.Mass.1982); Taylor v. Markus Enterprises, Inc. (In re Markus Enterprises, Inc.), 91 B.R. 459, 460 (M.D.Tenn. 1988) (\u201cWhether the debtor, in light of its dissolution, retains the capacity to file a petition under the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, is a matter of the law of [Tennessee].\u201d); see also In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. at 712 (as a matter of Idaho law, partner who filed for Chapter 11 protection lacks \u201cauthority as a general partner to bind the partnership to an involuntary bankruptcy petition\u201d)."},"case_id":10524031,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This court looked exclusively to Louisiana law to determine that the officers were without authority to file the petition. Throughout the many revisions to federal bankruptcy law, courts continue to resolve authority-to-file disputes according to state law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"91 B.R. 459, 460","parenthetical":"\"Whether the debtor, in light of its dissolution, retains the capacity to file a petition under the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, is a matter of the law of [Tennessee].\"","sentence":"See In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775, 778 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990) (\u201cthe authority to file a bankruptcy petition must be found in the instruments of the corporation and applicable state law\u201d) (citing In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 B.R. 155 (Bankr.D.Me. 1982)); In re Bel-Aire Invest., Inc., 97 B.R. 88, 89-90 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1989) (\u201cIt is well established that since the Bankruptcy code itself does not establish the requisites for the initiation of a voluntary corporate bankruptcy case, the validity of all the individuals acting on behalf of the corporation must be determined with reference to the laws of the State in which the corporation was chartered.\u201d; recognizing that application of state law would render corporation unable to file a voluntary petition) (citing In re Autumn Press, Inc., 20 B.R. 60 (Bankr.D.Mass.1982); Taylor v. Markus Enterprises, Inc. (In re Markus Enterprises, Inc.), 91 B.R. 459, 460 (M.D.Tenn. 1988) (\u201cWhether the debtor, in light of its dissolution, retains the capacity to file a petition under the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, is a matter of the law of [Tennessee].\u201d); see also In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. at 712 (as a matter of Idaho law, partner who filed for Chapter 11 protection lacks \u201cauthority as a general partner to bind the partnership to an involuntary bankruptcy petition\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"69 B.R. 712, 712","parenthetical":"as a matter of Idaho law, partner who filed for Chapter 11 protection lacks \"authority as a general partner to bind the partnership to an involuntary bankruptcy petition\"","sentence":"See In re Quarter Moon Livestock Co., 116 B.R. 775, 778 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1990) (\u201cthe authority to file a bankruptcy petition must be found in the instruments of the corporation and applicable state law\u201d) (citing In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22 B.R. 155 (Bankr.D.Me. 1982)); In re Bel-Aire Invest., Inc., 97 B.R. 88, 89-90 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1989) (\u201cIt is well established that since the Bankruptcy code itself does not establish the requisites for the initiation of a voluntary corporate bankruptcy case, the validity of all the individuals acting on behalf of the corporation must be determined with reference to the laws of the State in which the corporation was chartered.\u201d; recognizing that application of state law would render corporation unable to file a voluntary petition) (citing In re Autumn Press, Inc., 20 B.R. 60 (Bankr.D.Mass.1982); Taylor v. Markus Enterprises, Inc. (In re Markus Enterprises, Inc.), 91 B.R. 459, 460 (M.D.Tenn. 1988) (\u201cWhether the debtor, in light of its dissolution, retains the capacity to file a petition under the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11, is a matter of the law of [Tennessee].\u201d); see also In re Sunset Developers, 69 B.R. at 712 (as a matter of Idaho law, partner who filed for Chapter 11 protection lacks \u201cauthority as a general partner to bind the partnership to an involuntary bankruptcy petition\u201d)."},"case_id":10524031,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is undisputed that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. We also conclude that the information sufficiently pled the necessary elements of aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer to put Jamerson on notice that the jury could be instructed on, and he could be convicted of, aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer, which is most certainly why neither he nor his attorney objected to this lesser included offense being included for the jury's consideration.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 F.Supp.2d 680, 682","parenthetical":"finding that the bite Studnicka, who had HIV, inflicted on a correctional officer who, as a result, was required to seek medical treatment to combat the serious possibility of infection with HIV, including a number of shots and daily \"cocktails\" or medication for a period of six months, which made the officer extremely ill, plus the traumatic effect while awaiting the results of the HIV tests \"fall between the level of serious bodily injury and permanent or life-threatening bodily injury\"","sentence":"See State v. Williams, 9 So.3d 658, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (concluding that biting the victim and causing the need for emergency medical attention was sufficient to establish requisite violence for imposing an enhanced sentence for felony battery); see also United States v. Studnicka, 450 F.Supp.2d 680, 682 (E.D.Tex.2006) (finding that the bite Studnicka, who had HIV, inflicted on a correctional officer who, as a result, was required to seek medical treatment to combat the serious possibility of infection with HIV, including a number of shots and daily \u201ccocktails\u201d or medication for a period of six months, which made the officer extremely ill, plus the traumatic effect while awaiting the results of the HIV tests \u201cfall between the level of serious bodily injury and permanent or life-threatening bodily injury\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"9 So.3d 658, 659","parenthetical":"concluding that biting the victim and causing the need for emergency medical attention was sufficient to establish requisite violence for imposing an enhanced sentence for felony battery","sentence":"See State v. Williams, 9 So.3d 658, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (concluding that biting the victim and causing the need for emergency medical attention was sufficient to establish requisite violence for imposing an enhanced sentence for felony battery); see also United States v. Studnicka, 450 F.Supp.2d 680, 682 (E.D.Tex.2006) (finding that the bite Studnicka, who had HIV, inflicted on a correctional officer who, as a result, was required to seek medical treatment to combat the serious possibility of infection with HIV, including a number of shots and daily \u201ccocktails\u201d or medication for a period of six months, which made the officer extremely ill, plus the traumatic effect while awaiting the results of the HIV tests \u201cfall between the level of serious bodily injury and permanent or life-threatening bodily injury\u201d)."},"case_id":7022902,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Often times in this setting, we were simply restating legal principles that the parties were not contesting in the case. When a legal principle is embraced by the parties by agreement and is not contested on appeal, the court's subsequent recitation of the legal principle is not a holding in the case that was a product of an adversary proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 N.W.2d 630, 635","parenthetical":"holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"734 F.3d 323, 335","parenthetical":"finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"case_id":12334063,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Often times in this setting, we were simply restating legal principles that the parties were not contesting in the case. When a legal principle is embraced by the parties by agreement and is not contested on appeal, the court's subsequent recitation of the legal principle is not a holding in the case that was a product of an adversary proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 N.W.2d 630, 635","parenthetical":"holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"209 F.3d 43, 49","parenthetical":"earlier case was not precedent because \"that issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\"","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"case_id":12334063,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Often times in this setting, we were simply restating legal principles that the parties were not contesting in the case. When a legal principle is embraced by the parties by agreement and is not contested on appeal, the court's subsequent recitation of the legal principle is not a holding in the case that was a product of an adversary proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 N.W.2d 630, 635","parenthetical":"holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"case_id":12334063,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Often times in this setting, we were simply restating legal principles that the parties were not contesting in the case. When a legal principle is embraced by the parties by agreement and is not contested on appeal, the court's subsequent recitation of the legal principle is not a holding in the case that was a product of an adversary proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17","parenthetical":"holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 N.W.2d 630, 635","parenthetical":"holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"case_id":12334063,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Often times in this setting, we were simply restating legal principles that the parties were not contesting in the case. When a legal principle is embraced by the parties by agreement and is not contested on appeal, the court's subsequent recitation of the legal principle is not a holding in the case that was a product of an adversary proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 N.W.2d 630, 635","parenthetical":"holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\"","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"case_id":12334063,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Often times in this setting, we were simply restating legal principles that the parties were not contesting in the case. When a legal principle is embraced by the parties by agreement and is not contested on appeal, the court's subsequent recitation of the legal principle is not a holding in the case that was a product of an adversary proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"607 N.W.2d 50, 54","parenthetical":"\"It is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\"","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 N.W.2d 630, 635","parenthetical":"holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law","sentence":"See Berger v. Gen. United Grp., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 1978) (holding that because plaintiffs assumed Delaware law was properly pled and proven by defendants, we would consider Delaware law, but stressed that this case was not precedent for ignoring our rules of pleading and proof on foreign law); see also United States v. Hemingway, 734 F.3d 323, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding a prior case to have no precedential value on a question because the issue was not contested in the earlier case); Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2000) (earlier case was not precedent because \u201cthat issue was neither contested by the parties, nor addressed by the panel\u201d); Fulton Found. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1961) (holding previous case when no one challenged the issue could not be precedent on the issue); Silver Lake Sanitary Dist. v. Wis. Dep\u2019t of Nat. Res., 232 Wis.2d 217, 607 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (\u201cIt is blackletter law that an opinion does not establish binding precedent for an issue, if that issue was neither contested nor decided.\u201d)."},"case_id":12334063,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court need not go through a detailed summary of Dierker's assertions, as he presents no additional theories having any legal merit. Particularly fatal to his position is that all of his arguments fail to address one important point: that he too was convicted, with finality on direct appeal of a crime involving willful dishonesty and fraud.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"113 Fed.Appx. 123, 123","parenthetical":"dishonesty exclusion satisfied where the insured willfully engaged in civil conspiracy to defraud","sentence":"See Dierker, 417 Fed.Appx. at 519 (\u201cAmple evidence and testimony indicated, however, that Dierker did knowingly join in the conspiracy to defraud investors.\u201d); see also Rice, 113 Fed.Appx. at 123 (dishonesty exclusion satisfied where the insured willfully engaged in civil conspiracy to defraud). This alone means he is subject to the dishonesty exclusion in Great American\u2019s policy."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 Fed.Appx. 519, 519","parenthetical":"\"Ample evidence and testimony indicated, however, that Dierker did knowingly join in the conspiracy to defraud investors.\"","sentence":"See Dierker, 417 Fed.Appx. at 519 (\u201cAmple evidence and testimony indicated, however, that Dierker did knowingly join in the conspiracy to defraud investors.\u201d); see also Rice, 113 Fed.Appx. at 123 (dishonesty exclusion satisfied where the insured willfully engaged in civil conspiracy to defraud). This alone means he is subject to the dishonesty exclusion in Great American\u2019s policy."},"case_id":4192104,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 33. If Gardner created such a bright-line limitation, we conclude it was wrongly decided. The cases Gardner cites as \"by their very terms . . . limited to cases involving gifted or inherited property,\" id. at 236 & n.l, do not in fact contain such limiting language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"126 Wis. 2d 225, 225","parenthetical":"\"The transfer of separately owned property into joint tenancy changes the character of the ownership interest in the entire property into marital property which is subject to division.\"","sentence":"See Trattles, 126 Wis. 2d at 225 (\"The transfer of separately owned property into joint tenancy changes the character of the ownership interest in the entire property into marital property which is subject to division.\"); Fowler, 158 Wis. 2d at 518 (quoting Trattles)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 Wis. 2d 241, 245","parenthetical":"\"We have held in several cases that a spouse can transfer into the marital estate property which would otherwise be retained as the spouse's separate property.\"","sentence":"See also Bonnell v. Bonnell, 117 Wis. 2d 241, 245, 344 N.W.2d 123 (1984) (\"We have held in several cases that a spouse can transfer into the marital estate property which would otherwise be retained as the spouse's separate property.\")."},"case_id":8201917,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 33. If Gardner created such a bright-line limitation, we conclude it was wrongly decided. The cases Gardner cites as \"by their very terms . . . limited to cases involving gifted or inherited property,\" id. at 236 & n.l, do not in fact contain such limiting language.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We have held in several cases that a spouse can transfer into the marital estate property which would otherwise be retained as the spouse's separate property.\"","sentence":"See also Bonnell v. Bonnell, 117 Wis. 2d 241, 245, 344 N.W.2d 123 (1984) (\"We have held in several cases that a spouse can transfer into the marital estate property which would otherwise be retained as the spouse's separate property.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"126 Wis. 2d 225, 225","parenthetical":"\"The transfer of separately owned property into joint tenancy changes the character of the ownership interest in the entire property into marital property which is subject to division.\"","sentence":"See Trattles, 126 Wis. 2d at 225 (\"The transfer of separately owned property into joint tenancy changes the character of the ownership interest in the entire property into marital property which is subject to division.\"); Fowler, 158 Wis. 2d at 518 (quoting Trattles)."},"case_id":8201917,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Based on this legal framework, \"[m]any federal courts have held that ... breach of contract or attorney malpractice claims properly belong in state court, even where the underlying case involved claims arising under federal law.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"666 F.Supp.2d 749, 753","parenthetical":"finding that \"Plaintiffs legal malpractice claim stemming from representation in a prior federal suit does not raise substantial questions of federal law\"","sentence":"Walker v. Dwoskin, Civ. No. 3:09cv4, 2009 WL 366387, *2 (W.D.Va. Feb. 12, 2009) (remanding malpractice action based on underlying Title VII claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, PLLC, 666 F.Supp.2d 749, 753 (E.D.Mich.2009) (finding that \u201cPlaintiffs legal malpractice claim stemming from representation in a prior federal suit does not raise substantial questions of federal law\u201d); Higbee v. Malleris, 470 F.Supp.2d 845, 851 (N.D.Ill.2007) (\u201cThere is, simply put, a plethora of putative attorney and\/or professional malpractice cases concerning underlying federal litigation, in which cases have been remanded to state court for adjudication or dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d) (compiling cases) (remanding malpractice action based on representation in underlying Title VII action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2009 WL 366387, *2","parenthetical":"remanding malpractice action based on underlying Title VII claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction","sentence":"Walker v. Dwoskin, Civ. No. 3:09cv4, 2009 WL 366387, *2 (W.D.Va. Feb. 12, 2009) (remanding malpractice action based on underlying Title VII claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Dickinson Wright, PLLC, 666 F.Supp.2d 749, 753 (E.D.Mich.2009) (finding that \u201cPlaintiffs legal malpractice claim stemming from representation in a prior federal suit does not raise substantial questions of federal law\u201d); Higbee v. Malleris, 470 F.Supp.2d 845, 851 (N.D.Ill.2007) (\u201cThere is, simply put, a plethora of putative attorney and\/or professional malpractice cases concerning underlying federal litigation, in which cases have been remanded to state court for adjudication or dismissed for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d) (compiling cases) (remanding malpractice action based on representation in underlying Title VII action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction)."},"case_id":3591329,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 30 Because the plain language demonstrates that resisting arrest is a victim-directed crime, when a defendant has resisted more than one person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest -- one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against -- without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"450 U.S. 344, 344","parenthetical":"\"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"case_id":4329237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 30 Because the plain language demonstrates that resisting arrest is a victim-directed crime, when a defendant has resisted more than one person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest -- one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against -- without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"450 U.S. 344, 344","parenthetical":"\"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42","parenthetical":"\"[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"case_id":4329237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 30 Because the plain language demonstrates that resisting arrest is a victim-directed crime, when a defendant has resisted more than one person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest -- one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against -- without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"450 U.S. 344, 344","parenthetical":"\"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"case_id":4329237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 30 Because the plain language demonstrates that resisting arrest is a victim-directed crime, when a defendant has resisted more than one person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest -- one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against -- without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"450 U.S. 344, 344","parenthetical":"\"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41","parenthetical":"holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"case_id":4329237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 30 Because the plain language demonstrates that resisting arrest is a victim-directed crime, when a defendant has resisted more than one person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest -- one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against -- without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"case_id":4329237,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 30 Because the plain language demonstrates that resisting arrest is a victim-directed crime, when a defendant has resisted more than one person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest -- one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against -- without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42","parenthetical":"\"[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"case_id":4329237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 30 Because the plain language demonstrates that resisting arrest is a victim-directed crime, when a defendant has resisted more than one person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest -- one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against -- without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"case_id":4329237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 30 Because the plain language demonstrates that resisting arrest is a victim-directed crime, when a defendant has resisted more than one person, the individual can be charged with and convicted of more than one count of resisting arrest -- one for each person that the individual has committed criminal conduct against -- without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41","parenthetical":"holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Where Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\"","sentence":"See Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137 (\u201cWhere Congress intended ... to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.\u201d); see also State v. Burdick, 211 Ariz. 583, 585-86 \u00b6\u00b6 5-10, 125 P.3d 1039, 1041-42 (App.2005) (\u201c[W]here crimes against persons are involved we believe a separate interest of society has been invaded with each victim and that, therefore, where two persons are assaulted, there are two separate offenses.\u201d); State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 45-6 \u00b6\u00b6 17-19, 992 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (App.1999) (holding the defendant properly convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery against bank employees even though the defendant robbed only the bank)."},"case_id":4329237,"label":"b"}
{"context":"128 It does not appear that the district court intended to respond substantively to the jury's question. Rather, the court sought to refer the jury back to the instructions because the jury's second question \"must be decided without my help.\" However, it is not the court's intention that controls the propriety of a supplemental instruction, but its resulting effect upon the jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"535 Fed.Appx. 824, 824","parenthetical":"explaining that a contradictory supplemental instruction is improper because, inter alia, \"it has the potential to confuse the jurors, leav ing them uncertain of which standard to apply\"","sentence":"See Mondestin, 535 Fed.Appx. at 824 (explaining that a contradictory supplemental instruction is improper because, inter alia, \"it has the potential to confuse the jurors, leav ing them uncertain of which standard to apply\"); see also United States v. Robinson, 86 Fed.Appx. 820, 823 (6th Cir.2003) (considering whether a supplemental instruction caused the jury to be confused or misled)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 Fed.Appx. 820, 823","parenthetical":"considering whether a supplemental instruction caused the jury to be confused or misled","sentence":"See Mondestin, 535 Fed.Appx. at 824 (explaining that a contradictory supplemental instruction is improper because, inter alia, \"it has the potential to confuse the jurors, leav ing them uncertain of which standard to apply\"); see also United States v. Robinson, 86 Fed.Appx. 820, 823 (6th Cir.2003) (considering whether a supplemental instruction caused the jury to be confused or misled)."},"case_id":6813309,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the present proceeding, Futura seeks to hold the Commonwealth accountable for the existing MD judgment as an alter ego of CDC. Like piercing the corporate veil, an alter ego claim presents a substantive theory seeking to establish liability on the part of a new party not otherwise liable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"972 F.2d 1217, 1217-18","parenthetical":"holding \"that federal enforcement jurisdiction does not reach alter ego claims unless sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the underlying action, as they involve \"different legal theories\"","sentence":"See also Sandlin, 972 F.2d at 1217-18 (holding \"that federal enforcement jurisdiction does not reach alter ego claims unless sufficiently intertwined with the merits of the underlying action, as they involve \u201cdifferent legal theories\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 F.3d 12, 12","parenthetical":"describing alter ego theory as \"a substantive theory for imposing liability upon entities that would, on first blush, not be thought liable\" and as requiring \"a subsequent and distinct inquiry\"","sentence":"See Futura II, 144 F.3d at 12 (describing alter ego theory as \u201ca substantive theory for imposing liability upon entities that would, on first blush, not be thought liable\u201d and as requiring \u201ca subsequent and distinct inquiry\u201d)."},"case_id":1094321,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, convenience to the Employee does not qualify as a valid excuse. The explanation that he saved time or found it easier to apply the staple without the gloves does not qualify as a plausible explanation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 S.W.2d 141, 141","parenthetical":"stating that where an employee considers \"his own comfort and convenience exclusively ... [t]his ... tend[s] to sustain the view that his misconduct was wil[l]ful\"","sentence":"See Gart, 125 S.W.2d at 141 (stating that where an employee considers \u201chis own comfort and convenience exclusively ... [t]his ... tend[s] to sustain the view that his misconduct was wil[l]ful\u201d); cf. Auto Lite Battery Corp. v. Indus. Accident Comm\u2019n, 77 Cal.App.2d 629, 176 P.2d 62, 63-64 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1947) (affirming the Commission\u2019s decision reducing an award of benefits where the employee violated a rule by transporting materials using a vehicle rather than carrying them by hand); Larson\u2019s \u00a7 35.04 (\u201c[A]fter all, most safety rules and safety devices do entail some inconvenience, discomfort, or loss of speed as the price of increased safety of operation.\u201d). Similarly, in light of the Employer\u2019s policy of immediately replacing damaged gloves at no cost or penalty to the Employee, the Employee\u2019s explanation that he removed his gloves to prevent possible damage is likewise invalid."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Commission's decision reducing an award of benefits where the employee violated a rule by transporting materials using a vehicle rather than carrying them by hand","sentence":"See Gart, 125 S.W.2d at 141 (stating that where an employee considers \u201chis own comfort and convenience exclusively ... [t]his ... tend[s] to sustain the view that his misconduct was wil[l]ful\u201d); cf. Auto Lite Battery Corp. v. Indus. Accident Comm\u2019n, 77 Cal.App.2d 629, 176 P.2d 62, 63-64 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1947) (affirming the Commission\u2019s decision reducing an award of benefits where the employee violated a rule by transporting materials using a vehicle rather than carrying them by hand); Larson\u2019s \u00a7 35.04 (\u201c[A]fter all, most safety rules and safety devices do entail some inconvenience, discomfort, or loss of speed as the price of increased safety of operation.\u201d). Similarly, in light of the Employer\u2019s policy of immediately replacing damaged gloves at no cost or penalty to the Employee, the Employee\u2019s explanation that he removed his gloves to prevent possible damage is likewise invalid."},"case_id":7315417,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, convenience to the Employee does not qualify as a valid excuse. The explanation that he saved time or found it easier to apply the staple without the gloves does not qualify as a plausible explanation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"176 P.2d 62, 63-64","parenthetical":"affirming the Commission's decision reducing an award of benefits where the employee violated a rule by transporting materials using a vehicle rather than carrying them by hand","sentence":"See Gart, 125 S.W.2d at 141 (stating that where an employee considers \u201chis own comfort and convenience exclusively ... [t]his ... tend[s] to sustain the view that his misconduct was wil[l]ful\u201d); cf. Auto Lite Battery Corp. v. Indus. Accident Comm\u2019n, 77 Cal.App.2d 629, 176 P.2d 62, 63-64 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1947) (affirming the Commission\u2019s decision reducing an award of benefits where the employee violated a rule by transporting materials using a vehicle rather than carrying them by hand); Larson\u2019s \u00a7 35.04 (\u201c[A]fter all, most safety rules and safety devices do entail some inconvenience, discomfort, or loss of speed as the price of increased safety of operation.\u201d). Similarly, in light of the Employer\u2019s policy of immediately replacing damaged gloves at no cost or penalty to the Employee, the Employee\u2019s explanation that he removed his gloves to prevent possible damage is likewise invalid."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 S.W.2d 141, 141","parenthetical":"stating that where an employee considers \"his own comfort and convenience exclusively ... [t]his ... tend[s] to sustain the view that his misconduct was wil[l]ful\"","sentence":"See Gart, 125 S.W.2d at 141 (stating that where an employee considers \u201chis own comfort and convenience exclusively ... [t]his ... tend[s] to sustain the view that his misconduct was wil[l]ful\u201d); cf. Auto Lite Battery Corp. v. Indus. Accident Comm\u2019n, 77 Cal.App.2d 629, 176 P.2d 62, 63-64 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.1947) (affirming the Commission\u2019s decision reducing an award of benefits where the employee violated a rule by transporting materials using a vehicle rather than carrying them by hand); Larson\u2019s \u00a7 35.04 (\u201c[A]fter all, most safety rules and safety devices do entail some inconvenience, discomfort, or loss of speed as the price of increased safety of operation.\u201d). Similarly, in light of the Employer\u2019s policy of immediately replacing damaged gloves at no cost or penalty to the Employee, the Employee\u2019s explanation that he removed his gloves to prevent possible damage is likewise invalid."},"case_id":7315417,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We conclude that the district court did not commit any procedural error in sentencing McNeely, and we further conclude that the court did not impose an unreasonable sentence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"575 F.3d 834, 849","parenthetical":"below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant's proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"572 F.3d 455, 461","parenthetical":"in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider SS 3553(a","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"case_id":5736231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We conclude that the district court did not commit any procedural error in sentencing McNeely, and we further conclude that the court did not impose an unreasonable sentence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant's proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"572 F.3d 455, 461","parenthetical":"in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider SS 3553(a","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"case_id":5736231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We conclude that the district court did not commit any procedural error in sentencing McNeely, and we further conclude that the court did not impose an unreasonable sentence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"572 F.3d 455, 461","parenthetical":"in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider SS 3553(a","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"534 F.3d 854, 856","parenthetical":"within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant's age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"case_id":5736231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We conclude that the district court did not commit any procedural error in sentencing McNeely, and we further conclude that the court did not impose an unreasonable sentence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"534 F.3d 854, 856","parenthetical":"within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant's age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"575 F.3d 834, 849","parenthetical":"below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant's proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"case_id":5736231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We conclude that the district court did not commit any procedural error in sentencing McNeely, and we further conclude that the court did not impose an unreasonable sentence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"534 F.3d 854, 856","parenthetical":"within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant's age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant's proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors","sentence":"See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (in reviewing sentence for reasonableness, this court first ensures district court committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating Guidelines range, treating Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider \u00a7 3553(a) factors, sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain chosen sentence, then considers substantive reasonableness of sentence under abuse-of-discretion standard); see also United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849 (8th Cir.2009) (below-Guidelines-range sentence was not unreasonable where record reflected that district court made individualized assessment based on facts presented and specifically addressed defendant\u2019s proffered information in its consideration of sentencing factors), cert. denied \u2014 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1309, \u2014 L.Ed.2d -(2010); cf. United States v. Zastrow, 534 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir.2008) (within-Guidelines-range sentence of 240 months was not unreasonable where record indicated that court considered defendant\u2019s age of 73 and medical conditions of high blood pressure and arthritis)."},"case_id":5736231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doctors and pharmacies, among others, have sued health insurers for refusing to let them bill patients directly amounts in addition to those the doctors and pharmacies receive from the insurers. Courts have consistently held that this \"ban on balance billing\" does not unreasonably restrain trade; the only restraint is the one that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by the insurer to buy services and products of a particular type from doctors and pharmacies, i.e., fully-paid services and products.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \"prevailing competitive rate\" as full reimbursement for their services","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers","sentence":"Medical Arts, 675 F.2d 502 (Blue Shield may require pharmacies to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers); Kartell v. Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir.1984) (Blue Shield may require doctors to accept Blue Shield payments as full reimbursement for services sold to Blue Shield subscribers; i.e., Blue Shield may ban balance billing); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973) (Blue Cross may require hospitals to accept Blue Cross payments as full reimbursement for services rendered to Blue Cross subscribers); see Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020, 102 S.Ct. 1717, 72 L.Ed.2d 138 (1982) (auto insurers may require repair shops to accept payment at the \u201cprevailing competitive rate\u201d as full reimbursement for their services)."},"case_id":7390466,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although one year is not an insignificant period of time, we are not persuaded that it is so long as to bar the newspapers from intervening. Indeed, \"[n]umerous courts have allowed third parties to intervene in cases . . . involving delays measured in years rather than weeks.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"966 F.2d 470, 471, 476","parenthetical":"trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 F.3d 1096, 1101","parenthetical":"noting that \"delays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public's right of access to judicial records\"","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although one year is not an insignificant period of time, we are not persuaded that it is so long as to bar the newspapers from intervening. Indeed, \"[n]umerous courts have allowed third parties to intervene in cases . . . involving delays measured in years rather than weeks.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 F.3d 1096, 1101","parenthetical":"noting that \"delays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public's right of access to judicial records\"","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although one year is not an insignificant period of time, we are not persuaded that it is so long as to bar the newspapers from intervening. Indeed, \"[n]umerous courts have allowed third parties to intervene in cases . . . involving delays measured in years rather than weeks.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 F.3d 1096, 1101","parenthetical":"noting that \"delays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public's right of access to judicial records\"","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although one year is not an insignificant period of time, we are not persuaded that it is so long as to bar the newspapers from intervening. Indeed, \"[n]umerous courts have allowed third parties to intervene in cases . . . involving delays measured in years rather than weeks.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 F.3d 1096, 1101","parenthetical":"noting that \"delays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public's right of access to judicial records\"","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although one year is not an insignificant period of time, we are not persuaded that it is so long as to bar the newspapers from intervening. Indeed, \"[n]umerous courts have allowed third parties to intervene in cases . . . involving delays measured in years rather than weeks.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 F.3d 1096, 1101","parenthetical":"noting that \"delays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public's right of access to judicial records\"","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although one year is not an insignificant period of time, we are not persuaded that it is so long as to bar the newspapers from intervening. Indeed, \"[n]umerous courts have allowed third parties to intervene in cases . . . involving delays measured in years rather than weeks.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 F.3d 1096, 1101","parenthetical":"noting that \"delays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public's right of access to judicial records\"","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"537 A.2d 1100, 1105","parenthetical":"reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention","sentence":"Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., supra, 858 F.2d 785; see Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. National Children\u2019s Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting \u201cgrowing consensus among [federal] courts of appeals that intervention to challenge confidentiality orders may take place long after a case has been terminated\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States District Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that \u201cdelays measured in years have been tolerated [when a prospective] intervenor is pressing the public\u2019s right of access to judicial records\u201d); Pansy v. Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201ca district court may properly consider a motion to intervene permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled\u201d [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Beckman Industries, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 471, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial court properly permitted intervention for purpose of seeking modification to protective orders approximately two years after underlying case had been settled and dismissed), cert. denied sub nom. International Ins. Co. v. Bridgestone\/Firestone, Inc., 506 U.S. 868, 113 S. Ct. 197, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., supra, 905 F.2d 1427 (allowing intervention three years after settlement of case because intervention was solely for purpose of challenging protective order); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. App. 1988) (reversing denial of intervention when intervenor sought to challenge protective orders barring public access to court documents despite four year delay between settlement of underlying action and motion to intervene, and even though intervenor became aware of action one year before seeking intervention)."},"case_id":3991121,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"371 U.S. 195, 200","parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"386 U.S. 171, 186","parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"371 U.S. 195, 200","parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"371 U.S. 195, 200","parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"386 U.S. 171, 186","parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"386 U.S. 171, 186","parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet the Supreme Court and this Court have held that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union","sentence":"See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173, 111 S.Ct. 498, 112 L.Ed.2d 508 (1990) (\u201cSection 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers; and contrary to earlier indications \u00a7 301 suits encompass those seeking to vindicate uniquely personal rights of employees such as wages\u201d) (quotation omitted); Smith v. Evening News Ass\u2019n, 371 U.S. 195, 200, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962) (holding that an employee may sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement without the union); Anderson v. AT&T Corp., 147 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir.1998) (same); see also Int\u2019l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 699, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union","sentence":"Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (an employee may be contractually bound to involve the union)."},"case_id":9242179,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Other circuits have accepted the target analysis, particularly where a fraud is perpetrated on a regulator for the purpose of defrauding a .protected class.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education","sentence":"See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McKinney, 156 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.Pa.1994) (certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education); see also United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir.1994) (defendant defrauded Alliance policyholders by misrepresentations to the Commissioner of Insurance); Learjet Corp. v. Spenlirihauer, 901 F.2d 198 (1st Cir.1990) (buyer of airplane defrauded by aircraft manufacturer\u2019s misrepresentations to the Federal Aviation Administration); United States v. Olatunji,, 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3rd Cir.1989) (Department of Education defrauded by defendants\u2019 false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant defrauded Alliance policyholders by misrepresentations to the Commissioner of Insurance","sentence":"See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McKinney, 156 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.Pa.1994) (certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education); see also United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir.1994) (defendant defrauded Alliance policyholders by misrepresentations to the Commissioner of Insurance); Learjet Corp. v. Spenlirihauer, 901 F.2d 198 (1st Cir.1990) (buyer of airplane defrauded by aircraft manufacturer\u2019s misrepresentations to the Federal Aviation Administration); United States v. Olatunji,, 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3rd Cir.1989) (Department of Education defrauded by defendants\u2019 false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Services)."},"case_id":569993,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Other circuits have accepted the target analysis, particularly where a fraud is perpetrated on a regulator for the purpose of defrauding a .protected class.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education","sentence":"See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McKinney, 156 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.Pa.1994) (certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education); see also United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir.1994) (defendant defrauded Alliance policyholders by misrepresentations to the Commissioner of Insurance); Learjet Corp. v. Spenlirihauer, 901 F.2d 198 (1st Cir.1990) (buyer of airplane defrauded by aircraft manufacturer\u2019s misrepresentations to the Federal Aviation Administration); United States v. Olatunji,, 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3rd Cir.1989) (Department of Education defrauded by defendants\u2019 false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"buyer of airplane defrauded by aircraft manufacturer's misrepresentations to the Federal Aviation Administration","sentence":"See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McKinney, 156 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.Pa.1994) (certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education); see also United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir.1994) (defendant defrauded Alliance policyholders by misrepresentations to the Commissioner of Insurance); Learjet Corp. v. Spenlirihauer, 901 F.2d 198 (1st Cir.1990) (buyer of airplane defrauded by aircraft manufacturer\u2019s misrepresentations to the Federal Aviation Administration); United States v. Olatunji,, 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3rd Cir.1989) (Department of Education defrauded by defendants\u2019 false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Services)."},"case_id":569993,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Other circuits have accepted the target analysis, particularly where a fraud is perpetrated on a regulator for the purpose of defrauding a .protected class.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"872 F.2d 1161, 1167","parenthetical":"Department of Education defrauded by defendants' false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Services","sentence":"See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McKinney, 156 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.Pa.1994) (certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education); see also United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir.1994) (defendant defrauded Alliance policyholders by misrepresentations to the Commissioner of Insurance); Learjet Corp. v. Spenlirihauer, 901 F.2d 198 (1st Cir.1990) (buyer of airplane defrauded by aircraft manufacturer\u2019s misrepresentations to the Federal Aviation Administration); United States v. Olatunji,, 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3rd Cir.1989) (Department of Education defrauded by defendants\u2019 false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Services)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education","sentence":"See, e.g., Rodriguez v. McKinney, 156 F.R.D. 112 (E.D.Pa.1994) (certifying class of vocational school students where defendant misrepresented the ability of the students to benefit from the program to the Department of Education); see also United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir.1994) (defendant defrauded Alliance policyholders by misrepresentations to the Commissioner of Insurance); Learjet Corp. v. Spenlirihauer, 901 F.2d 198 (1st Cir.1990) (buyer of airplane defrauded by aircraft manufacturer\u2019s misrepresentations to the Federal Aviation Administration); United States v. Olatunji,, 872 F.2d 1161, 1167 (3rd Cir.1989) (Department of Education defrauded by defendants\u2019 false statements to the Immigration and Naturalization Services)."},"case_id":569993,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Again, this evidence suggests that mistreatment is directed foremost at political prisoners. Moreover, to the extent it supports Sevoian's claim, we think that the Board could reasonably give the non-governmental sources of evidence offered by Sevoian less weight than the State Department report -- which, as we have said, is consistent with the Board's ultimate decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"46 F.3d 902, 906","parenthetical":"giving strong evidentiary weight to State Department report, describing it as \"the most appropriate and perhaps the best resource\" on country conditions","sentence":"Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir.1995) (giving strong evidentiary weight to State Department report, describing it as \u201cthe most appropriate and perhaps the best resource\u201d on country conditions)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"119 F.3d 1055, 1064","parenthetical":"giving weight to private human rights group's report on country conditions in China where such reports were \"consistent with the State Department report,\" but stating: \"We do not suggest that relief to an alien should be granted based solely on such reports!,] particularly where they conflict with findings of the Department of State.\"","sentence":"Cf. Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1064 (3d Cir.1997) (giving weight to private human rights group\u2019s report on country conditions in China where such reports were \u201cconsistent with the State Department report,\u201d but stating: \u201cWe do not suggest that relief to an alien should be granted based solely on such reports!,] particularly where they conflict with findings of the Department of State.\u201d)."},"case_id":9432884,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"212 F.3d 413, 418-21","parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 F.3d 547, 552-53","parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"212 F.3d 413, 418-21","parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"212 F.3d 413, 418-21","parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"212 F.3d 413, 418-21","parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 F.3d 547, 552-53","parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 F.3d 547, 552-53","parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, Allen even set up the ground rules for his confession. We therefore conclude that Allen's waiver of his right to counsel was valid because it was knowing and intelligent, voluntarily given, and initiated by Allen, and therefore the district court did not err in denying Allen's motion to suppress the confession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding admissible suspect's statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights","sentence":"See also United States v. Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 552-53 (8th Cir.1998) (holding admissible suspect\u2019s statement to police after being informed that he had been identified in a lineup, which the court assumed without deciding was interrogation for purposes of the appeal, because the statements were voluntarily made without any coercion and came after the suspect was given and validly waived his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 1139, 143 L.Ed.2d 207 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent","sentence":"See Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 418-21 (8th Cir.) (holding ultimately that there was no Edwards violation and that the waiver of counsel was valid because Holman did not confess until the next day and the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary and knowing and intelligent), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 587, 148 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000)."},"case_id":11109737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doe was responsible to work her case plan and comply with the terms of her probation. She failed to do so. While the evidence is conflicting, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court's finding that Doe failed to follow her case plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"147 Idaho 356, 356","parenthetical":"concluding that while the case was not as \"clear-cut\" as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate's orders to complete their case plan","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"145 Idaho 662, 665","parenthetical":"recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate's findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"case_id":4074126,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doe was responsible to work her case plan and comply with the terms of her probation. She failed to do so. While the evidence is conflicting, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court's finding that Doe failed to follow her case plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 P.3d 1196, 1199","parenthetical":"recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate's findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"147 Idaho 356, 356","parenthetical":"concluding that while the case was not as \"clear-cut\" as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate's orders to complete their case plan","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"case_id":4074126,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doe was responsible to work her case plan and comply with the terms of her probation. She failed to do so. While the evidence is conflicting, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court's finding that Doe failed to follow her case plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"147 Idaho 356, 356","parenthetical":"concluding that while the case was not as \"clear-cut\" as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate's orders to complete their case plan","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"144 Idaho 314, 314","parenthetical":"concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"case_id":4074126,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doe was responsible to work her case plan and comply with the terms of her probation. She failed to do so. While the evidence is conflicting, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court's finding that Doe failed to follow her case plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"160 P.3d 753, 753","parenthetical":"concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"147 Idaho 356, 356","parenthetical":"concluding that while the case was not as \"clear-cut\" as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate's orders to complete their case plan","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"case_id":4074126,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doe was responsible to work her case plan and comply with the terms of her probation. She failed to do so. While the evidence is conflicting, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court's finding that Doe failed to follow her case plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"209 P.3d 653, 653","parenthetical":"concluding that while the case was not as \"clear-cut\" as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate's orders to complete their case plan","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"145 Idaho 662, 665","parenthetical":"recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate's findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"case_id":4074126,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Doe was responsible to work her case plan and comply with the terms of her probation. She failed to do so. While the evidence is conflicting, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court's finding that Doe failed to follow her case plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 P.3d 1196, 1199","parenthetical":"recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate's findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"209 P.3d 653, 653","parenthetical":"concluding that while the case was not as \"clear-cut\" as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate's orders to complete their case plan","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"case_id":4074126,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doe was responsible to work her case plan and comply with the terms of her probation. She failed to do so. While the evidence is conflicting, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court's finding that Doe failed to follow her case plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"144 Idaho 314, 314","parenthetical":"concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"209 P.3d 653, 653","parenthetical":"concluding that while the case was not as \"clear-cut\" as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate's orders to complete their case plan","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"case_id":4074126,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Doe was responsible to work her case plan and comply with the terms of her probation. She failed to do so. While the evidence is conflicting, there is substantial and competent evidence in the record supporting the magistrate court's finding that Doe failed to follow her case plan.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"160 P.3d 753, 753","parenthetical":"concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"209 P.3d 653, 653","parenthetical":"concluding that while the case was not as \"clear-cut\" as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate's orders to complete their case plan","sentence":"See Doe, 147 Idaho at 356, 209 P.3d at 653 (concluding that while the case was not as \u201cclear-cut\u201d as most parental termination cases, there was substantial, competent evidence in the record to support terminating parental rights where the parents had failed to comply with the magistrate\u2019s orders to complete their case plan); see also State, Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 145 Idaho 662, 665, 182 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2008) (recognizing that while evidence was conflicting, there was substantial and competent evidence to support magistrate\u2019s findings that Doe failed to comply with the case plan where she had seventeen months to do so and only began some compliance in the last six months by following the terms of her probation); Doe, 144 Idaho at 314, 160 P.3d at 753 (concluding that there was substantial and competent evidence upon which to base a termination where Doe did not complete three of the tasks in her case plan and where testimony indicated that while she did what she could in order to complete the case plan, she did not gain what she was supposed to from the completed tasks)."},"case_id":4074126,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because this statement was a factual, and not a legal, conclusion, it was admissible under Rule 704. Kapina's statement that Cash Today was an artifice or scheme to defraud is more problematic, however, because it comes much closer to embodying an impermissible legal conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"918 F.2d 905, 905","parenthetical":"police detective's use of term \"conspiracy\" was permissible because \"it did not track unduly the definition of the offense in 21 U.S.C. SS 846\"","sentence":"See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (expert\u2019s opinions that \u201cdrew directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying regulations concerning \u2018manipulation\u2019 and \u2018fraud\u2019 ... were legal conclusions that were highly prejudicial and went well beyond his province as an expert in securities trading\u201d); cf. Nixon, 918 F.2d at 905 (police detective\u2019s use of term \u201cconspiracy\u201d was permissible because \u201cit did not track unduly the definition of the offense in 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 846\u201d). Although this statement was plainly inadmissible, Long nevertheless eazmot show that his substantial rights were affected."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"846 F.2d 135, 140","parenthetical":"expert's opinions that \"drew directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying regulations concerning 'manipulation' and 'fraud' ... were legal conclusions that were highly prejudicial and went well beyond his province as an expert in securities trading\"","sentence":"See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (expert\u2019s opinions that \u201cdrew directly upon the language of the statute and accompanying regulations concerning \u2018manipulation\u2019 and \u2018fraud\u2019 ... were legal conclusions that were highly prejudicial and went well beyond his province as an expert in securities trading\u201d); cf. Nixon, 918 F.2d at 905 (police detective\u2019s use of term \u201cconspiracy\u201d was permissible because \u201cit did not track unduly the definition of the offense in 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 846\u201d). Although this statement was plainly inadmissible, Long nevertheless eazmot show that his substantial rights were affected."},"case_id":3178028,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is well settled that as to the contemnor, an order of contempt is not appealable if sanctions were not imposed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"550 A.2d 1022, 1022","parenthetical":"reiterating that \"[u]nless sanctions are imposed, an order declaring a party in contempt is interlocutory","sentence":"See Genovese, 550 A.2d at 1022 (reiterating that \u201c[u]nless sanctions are imposed, an order declaring a party in contempt is interlocutory); see also Rhoades v. Pryce, 874 A.2d 148, 153 (Pa.Super. 2005) (finding that where the imposition of sanctions causes the contemnor to suffer harm or a penalty, the contempt order is appealable). Therefore, Mother would have been precluded from appealing the finding of contempt against her."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"874 A.2d 148, 153","parenthetical":"finding that where the imposition of sanctions causes the contemnor to suffer harm or a penalty, the contempt order is appealable","sentence":"See Genovese, 550 A.2d at 1022 (reiterating that \u201c[u]nless sanctions are imposed, an order declaring a party in contempt is interlocutory); see also Rhoades v. Pryce, 874 A.2d 148, 153 (Pa.Super. 2005) (finding that where the imposition of sanctions causes the contemnor to suffer harm or a penalty, the contempt order is appealable). Therefore, Mother would have been precluded from appealing the finding of contempt against her."},"case_id":12321126,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It may also be necessary for the court to determine whether the present prosecutors, who have now been exposed to the information in Flemmi and Bulger's informant files, and thus may have been exposed to tainted evidence, may participate in Flemmi's trial if this case is not dismissed against him.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"870 F.2d 1, 18","parenthetical":"\"[W]e reject the notion that the mere exposure to immunized testimony or the mere possibility of nonevidentiary use automatically results in the dismissal of the indictment.\"","sentence":"But see United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 18 (1st Cir.1989) (\u201c[W]e reject the notion that the mere exposure to immunized testimony or the mere possibility of nonevidentiary use automatically results in the dismissal of the indictment.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In a Kastigar setting, we are of the firm opinion that it would be unwise to permit an attorney familiar with the immunized testimony to participate in the trial or preparation of the case\"","sentence":"Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1532 n. 11 (\u201cIn a Kastigar setting, we are of the firm opinion that it would be unwise to permit an attorney familiar with the immunized testimony to participate in the trial or preparation of the case\u201d); Palumbo, 897 F.2d at 251 (quoting Byrd); Tormos-Vega, 656 F.Supp. at 1531-32 (case dismissed in part because prosecutor was exposed to immunized testimony)."},"case_id":6458802,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It may also be necessary for the court to determine whether the present prosecutors, who have now been exposed to the information in Flemmi and Bulger's informant files, and thus may have been exposed to tainted evidence, may participate in Flemmi's trial if this case is not dismissed against him.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"656 F.Supp. 1531, 1531-32","parenthetical":"case dismissed in part because prosecutor was exposed to immunized testimony","sentence":"Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1532 n. 11 (\u201cIn a Kastigar setting, we are of the firm opinion that it would be unwise to permit an attorney familiar with the immunized testimony to participate in the trial or preparation of the case\u201d); Palumbo, 897 F.2d at 251 (quoting Byrd); Tormos-Vega, 656 F.Supp. at 1531-32 (case dismissed in part because prosecutor was exposed to immunized testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"870 F.2d 1, 18","parenthetical":"\"[W]e reject the notion that the mere exposure to immunized testimony or the mere possibility of nonevidentiary use automatically results in the dismissal of the indictment.\"","sentence":"But see United States v. Serrano, 870 F.2d 1, 18 (1st Cir.1989) (\u201c[W]e reject the notion that the mere exposure to immunized testimony or the mere possibility of nonevidentiary use automatically results in the dismissal of the indictment.\u201d)"},"case_id":6458802,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Dismissal of plaintiffs Ninth Amendment claim as too vague and concluso-ry was also appropriate. Equally unpersuasive are plaintiffs arguments that defendants unconstitutionally deprived him of a property interest in his blood without due process or just compensation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"874 F.Supp. 1210, 1216","parenthetical":"legislative process in enacting legislation affecting general class satisfies procedural due process to which those members of affected class entitled","sentence":"See Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562-53 (Due Process Clause does not require hearing before involuntary extraction of blood for DNA sample; when the only requirement for obtaining DNA sample is conviction of predicate offense, there would be little of substance to contest at hearing); Vanderlinden v. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210, 1216 (D.Kan.1995) (legislative process in enacting legislation affecting general class satisfies procedural due process to which those members of affected class entitled); cf. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1198 (where court had approved', in general, blood testing of inmates for AIDS, inmates were not entitled to individual due process hearings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"880 F.2d 1198, 1198","parenthetical":"where court had approved', in general, blood testing of inmates for AIDS, inmates were not entitled to individual due process hearings","sentence":"See Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562-53 (Due Process Clause does not require hearing before involuntary extraction of blood for DNA sample; when the only requirement for obtaining DNA sample is conviction of predicate offense, there would be little of substance to contest at hearing); Vanderlinden v. Kansas, 874 F.Supp. 1210, 1216 (D.Kan.1995) (legislative process in enacting legislation affecting general class satisfies procedural due process to which those members of affected class entitled); cf. Dunn, 880 F.2d at 1198 (where court had approved', in general, blood testing of inmates for AIDS, inmates were not entitled to individual due process hearings)."},"case_id":7643270,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But courts interpret both UM\/ UIM and PIP insurance provisions broadly, and our discussion of the term \"auto accident\" in Lindsey remains applicable to our analysis of the term \"motor vehicle accident\" in this case. See Stracener v. United Servs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\"","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.1989) (holding that UM\/UIM coverage \u201cis to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\u201d); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d at 308 (noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault); Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (stating that courts must interpret the \u00dcM\/UIM and PIP coverage provisions broadly to give full effect to \u201cthe state\u2019s interest in protecting conscientious and thoughtful motorists from financial loss\u201d); see also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich. 626, 563 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1997) (\u201cThe no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\u201d); 8D Apple-man on Insurance Law & Practice \u00a7 5171.55 (2003 Supp.) (\u201cThe terms [of no-fault and personal injury protection] are construed liberally to extend coverage broadly.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"777 S.W.2d 378, 382","parenthetical":"holding that UM\/UIM coverage \"is to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\"","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.1989) (holding that UM\/UIM coverage \u201cis to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\u201d); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d at 308 (noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault); Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (stating that courts must interpret the \u00dcM\/UIM and PIP coverage provisions broadly to give full effect to \u201cthe state\u2019s interest in protecting conscientious and thoughtful motorists from financial loss\u201d); see also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich. 626, 563 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1997) (\u201cThe no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\u201d); 8D Apple-man on Insurance Law & Practice \u00a7 5171.55 (2003 Supp.) (\u201cThe terms [of no-fault and personal injury protection] are construed liberally to extend coverage broadly.\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But courts interpret both UM\/ UIM and PIP insurance provisions broadly, and our discussion of the term \"auto accident\" in Lindsey remains applicable to our analysis of the term \"motor vehicle accident\" in this case. See Stracener v. United Servs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"777 S.W.2d 378, 382","parenthetical":"holding that UM\/UIM coverage \"is to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\"","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.1989) (holding that UM\/UIM coverage \u201cis to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\u201d); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d at 308 (noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault); Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (stating that courts must interpret the \u00dcM\/UIM and PIP coverage provisions broadly to give full effect to \u201cthe state\u2019s interest in protecting conscientious and thoughtful motorists from financial loss\u201d); see also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich. 626, 563 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1997) (\u201cThe no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\u201d); 8D Apple-man on Insurance Law & Practice \u00a7 5171.55 (2003 Supp.) (\u201cThe terms [of no-fault and personal injury protection] are construed liberally to extend coverage broadly.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"563 N.W.2d 683, 686","parenthetical":"\"The no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\"","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.1989) (holding that UM\/UIM coverage \u201cis to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\u201d); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d at 308 (noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault); Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (stating that courts must interpret the \u00dcM\/UIM and PIP coverage provisions broadly to give full effect to \u201cthe state\u2019s interest in protecting conscientious and thoughtful motorists from financial loss\u201d); see also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich. 626, 563 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1997) (\u201cThe no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\u201d); 8D Apple-man on Insurance Law & Practice \u00a7 5171.55 (2003 Supp.) (\u201cThe terms [of no-fault and personal injury protection] are construed liberally to extend coverage broadly.\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But courts interpret both UM\/ UIM and PIP insurance provisions broadly, and our discussion of the term \"auto accident\" in Lindsey remains applicable to our analysis of the term \"motor vehicle accident\" in this case. See Stracener v. United Servs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\"","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.1989) (holding that UM\/UIM coverage \u201cis to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\u201d); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d at 308 (noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault); Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (stating that courts must interpret the \u00dcM\/UIM and PIP coverage provisions broadly to give full effect to \u201cthe state\u2019s interest in protecting conscientious and thoughtful motorists from financial loss\u201d); see also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich. 626, 563 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1997) (\u201cThe no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\u201d); 8D Apple-man on Insurance Law & Practice \u00a7 5171.55 (2003 Supp.) (\u201cThe terms [of no-fault and personal injury protection] are construed liberally to extend coverage broadly.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"572 S.W.2d 308, 308","parenthetical":"noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.1989) (holding that UM\/UIM coverage \u201cis to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\u201d); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d at 308 (noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault); Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (stating that courts must interpret the \u00dcM\/UIM and PIP coverage provisions broadly to give full effect to \u201cthe state\u2019s interest in protecting conscientious and thoughtful motorists from financial loss\u201d); see also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich. 626, 563 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1997) (\u201cThe no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\u201d); 8D Apple-man on Insurance Law & Practice \u00a7 5171.55 (2003 Supp.) (\u201cThe terms [of no-fault and personal injury protection] are construed liberally to extend coverage broadly.\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But courts interpret both UM\/ UIM and PIP insurance provisions broadly, and our discussion of the term \"auto accident\" in Lindsey remains applicable to our analysis of the term \"motor vehicle accident\" in this case. See Stracener v. United Servs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"563 N.W.2d 683, 686","parenthetical":"\"The no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\"","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.1989) (holding that UM\/UIM coverage \u201cis to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\u201d); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d at 308 (noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault); Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (stating that courts must interpret the \u00dcM\/UIM and PIP coverage provisions broadly to give full effect to \u201cthe state\u2019s interest in protecting conscientious and thoughtful motorists from financial loss\u201d); see also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich. 626, 563 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1997) (\u201cThe no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\u201d); 8D Apple-man on Insurance Law & Practice \u00a7 5171.55 (2003 Supp.) (\u201cThe terms [of no-fault and personal injury protection] are construed liberally to extend coverage broadly.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"572 S.W.2d 308, 308","parenthetical":"noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault","sentence":"Auto. Ass\u2019n, 777 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex.1989) (holding that UM\/UIM coverage \u201cis to be construed liberally to give full effect to the public policy which led to its enactment\u201d); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co., 572 S.W.2d at 308 (noting that it is the public policy of the State that automobile policies include PIP benefits without regard to fault); Ortiz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 955 S.W.2d 353, 356-57 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, pet. denied) (stating that courts must interpret the \u00dcM\/UIM and PIP coverage provisions broadly to give full effect to \u201cthe state\u2019s interest in protecting conscientious and thoughtful motorists from financial loss\u201d); see also Putkamer v. Transamerica Ins. Corp. of Am., 454 Mich. 626, 563 N.W.2d 683, 686 (1997) (\u201cThe no-fault act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the persons who are intended to benefit from it.\u201d); 8D Apple-man on Insurance Law & Practice \u00a7 5171.55 (2003 Supp.) (\u201cThe terms [of no-fault and personal injury protection] are construed liberally to extend coverage broadly.\u201d)."},"case_id":9149655,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the present case, however, both Kahl and Ansley are readily distinguishable. Courts applying the UCC in Georgia recognize that a financing statement becomes seriously misleading when the names of the debtors are completely dissimilar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[a] financing statement becomes seriously misleading when the two names are completely dissimilar, as are WASLA, Inc. and John Hadden, such that a creditor searching under WASLA, Inc. would not be alerted to inquire into John Hadden's interests.\"","sentence":"See In re Cohutta Mills, Inc., 108 B.R. 815 (N.D.Ga.1989) (finding a financing statement to be seriously misleading when it was not amended to show the debtor\u2019s name change from \u201cKing\u2019s Tuft\u201d to \u201cCohutta Mills\u201d); see also Western Auto Supply Co. v. McKenzie, 227 Ga.App. 477, 489 S.E.2d 537, 539 n. 1 (1997) (noting that \u201c[a] financing statement becomes seriously misleading when the two names are completely dissimilar, as are WASLA, Inc. and John Hadden, such that a creditor searching under WASLA, Inc. would not be alerted to inquire into John Hadden\u2019s interests.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding a financing statement to be seriously misleading when it was not amended to show the debtor's name change from \"King's Tuft\" to \"Cohutta Mills\"","sentence":"See In re Cohutta Mills, Inc., 108 B.R. 815 (N.D.Ga.1989) (finding a financing statement to be seriously misleading when it was not amended to show the debtor\u2019s name change from \u201cKing\u2019s Tuft\u201d to \u201cCohutta Mills\u201d); see also Western Auto Supply Co. v. McKenzie, 227 Ga.App. 477, 489 S.E.2d 537, 539 n. 1 (1997) (noting that \u201c[a] financing statement becomes seriously misleading when the two names are completely dissimilar, as are WASLA, Inc. and John Hadden, such that a creditor searching under WASLA, Inc. would not be alerted to inquire into John Hadden\u2019s interests.\u201d)."},"case_id":8969776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the present case, however, both Kahl and Ansley are readily distinguishable. Courts applying the UCC in Georgia recognize that a financing statement becomes seriously misleading when the names of the debtors are completely dissimilar.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[a] financing statement becomes seriously misleading when the two names are completely dissimilar, as are WASLA, Inc. and John Hadden, such that a creditor searching under WASLA, Inc. would not be alerted to inquire into John Hadden's interests.\"","sentence":"See In re Cohutta Mills, Inc., 108 B.R. 815 (N.D.Ga.1989) (finding a financing statement to be seriously misleading when it was not amended to show the debtor\u2019s name change from \u201cKing\u2019s Tuft\u201d to \u201cCohutta Mills\u201d); see also Western Auto Supply Co. v. McKenzie, 227 Ga.App. 477, 489 S.E.2d 537, 539 n. 1 (1997) (noting that \u201c[a] financing statement becomes seriously misleading when the two names are completely dissimilar, as are WASLA, Inc. and John Hadden, such that a creditor searching under WASLA, Inc. would not be alerted to inquire into John Hadden\u2019s interests.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding a financing statement to be seriously misleading when it was not amended to show the debtor's name change from \"King's Tuft\" to \"Cohutta Mills\"","sentence":"See In re Cohutta Mills, Inc., 108 B.R. 815 (N.D.Ga.1989) (finding a financing statement to be seriously misleading when it was not amended to show the debtor\u2019s name change from \u201cKing\u2019s Tuft\u201d to \u201cCohutta Mills\u201d); see also Western Auto Supply Co. v. McKenzie, 227 Ga.App. 477, 489 S.E.2d 537, 539 n. 1 (1997) (noting that \u201c[a] financing statement becomes seriously misleading when the two names are completely dissimilar, as are WASLA, Inc. and John Hadden, such that a creditor searching under WASLA, Inc. would not be alerted to inquire into John Hadden\u2019s interests.\u201d)."},"case_id":8969776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A relationship of trust between the defendant and the victim is the sine qua non of the abuse-of-trust enhancement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"133 F.3d 839, 839","parenthetical":"\"[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 839 (\u201c[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Williams, 527 F.3d at 1250-52 (explaining that courts evaluate abuse-of-trust enhancement \u201cby assessing the defendant\u2019s relationship to the victim of the crime\u201d and reversing enhancement where \u201cthere is no evidence that [the victim] entrusted [the defendant] with discretionary authority or placed a special trust, akin to that of a fiduciary, in [the defendant]\u201d); United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1295-1300 (11th Cir.2002) (reversing application of enhancement where attorney participated in conspiracy to launder money but intended victims were not his clients); United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 941 (11th Cir.1998) (reversing enhancement because Medicare-funded care provider does not occupy position of trust vis-a-vis Medicare)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"527 F.3d 1250, 1250-52","parenthetical":"explaining that courts evaluate abuse-of-trust enhancement \"by assessing the defendant's relationship to the victim of the crime\" and reversing enhancement where \"there is no evidence that [the victim] entrusted [the defendant] with discretionary authority or placed a special trust, akin to that of a fiduciary, in [the defendant]\"","sentence":"See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 839 (\u201c[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Williams, 527 F.3d at 1250-52 (explaining that courts evaluate abuse-of-trust enhancement \u201cby assessing the defendant\u2019s relationship to the victim of the crime\u201d and reversing enhancement where \u201cthere is no evidence that [the victim] entrusted [the defendant] with discretionary authority or placed a special trust, akin to that of a fiduciary, in [the defendant]\u201d); United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1295-1300 (11th Cir.2002) (reversing application of enhancement where attorney participated in conspiracy to launder money but intended victims were not his clients); United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 941 (11th Cir.1998) (reversing enhancement because Medicare-funded care provider does not occupy position of trust vis-a-vis Medicare)."},"case_id":4230401,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A relationship of trust between the defendant and the victim is the sine qua non of the abuse-of-trust enhancement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"286 F.3d 1291, 1295-1300","parenthetical":"reversing application of enhancement where attorney participated in conspiracy to launder money but intended victims were not his clients","sentence":"See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 839 (\u201c[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Williams, 527 F.3d at 1250-52 (explaining that courts evaluate abuse-of-trust enhancement \u201cby assessing the defendant\u2019s relationship to the victim of the crime\u201d and reversing enhancement where \u201cthere is no evidence that [the victim] entrusted [the defendant] with discretionary authority or placed a special trust, akin to that of a fiduciary, in [the defendant]\u201d); United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1295-1300 (11th Cir.2002) (reversing application of enhancement where attorney participated in conspiracy to launder money but intended victims were not his clients); United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 941 (11th Cir.1998) (reversing enhancement because Medicare-funded care provider does not occupy position of trust vis-a-vis Medicare)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"133 F.3d 839, 839","parenthetical":"\"[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 839 (\u201c[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Williams, 527 F.3d at 1250-52 (explaining that courts evaluate abuse-of-trust enhancement \u201cby assessing the defendant\u2019s relationship to the victim of the crime\u201d and reversing enhancement where \u201cthere is no evidence that [the victim] entrusted [the defendant] with discretionary authority or placed a special trust, akin to that of a fiduciary, in [the defendant]\u201d); United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1295-1300 (11th Cir.2002) (reversing application of enhancement where attorney participated in conspiracy to launder money but intended victims were not his clients); United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 941 (11th Cir.1998) (reversing enhancement because Medicare-funded care provider does not occupy position of trust vis-a-vis Medicare)."},"case_id":4230401,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A relationship of trust between the defendant and the victim is the sine qua non of the abuse-of-trust enhancement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"138 F.3d 928, 941","parenthetical":"reversing enhancement because Medicare-funded care provider does not occupy position of trust vis-a-vis Medicare","sentence":"See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 839 (\u201c[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Williams, 527 F.3d at 1250-52 (explaining that courts evaluate abuse-of-trust enhancement \u201cby assessing the defendant\u2019s relationship to the victim of the crime\u201d and reversing enhancement where \u201cthere is no evidence that [the victim] entrusted [the defendant] with discretionary authority or placed a special trust, akin to that of a fiduciary, in [the defendant]\u201d); United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1295-1300 (11th Cir.2002) (reversing application of enhancement where attorney participated in conspiracy to launder money but intended victims were not his clients); United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 941 (11th Cir.1998) (reversing enhancement because Medicare-funded care provider does not occupy position of trust vis-a-vis Medicare)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"133 F.3d 839, 839","parenthetical":"\"[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\" (emphasis in original","sentence":"See Garrison, 133 F.3d at 839 (\u201c[T]he abuse of trust enhancement applies only where the defendant has abused discretionary authority entrusted to the defendant by the victim.\u201d (emphasis in original)); see also Williams, 527 F.3d at 1250-52 (explaining that courts evaluate abuse-of-trust enhancement \u201cby assessing the defendant\u2019s relationship to the victim of the crime\u201d and reversing enhancement where \u201cthere is no evidence that [the victim] entrusted [the defendant] with discretionary authority or placed a special trust, akin to that of a fiduciary, in [the defendant]\u201d); United States v. Morris, 286 F.3d 1291, 1295-1300 (11th Cir.2002) (reversing application of enhancement where attorney participated in conspiracy to launder money but intended victims were not his clients); United States v. Mills, 138 F.3d 928, 941 (11th Cir.1998) (reversing enhancement because Medicare-funded care provider does not occupy position of trust vis-a-vis Medicare)."},"case_id":4230401,"label":"b"}
{"context":"He testified: \"I didn't know at that point whether it was a weapon or just exactly what it was at that point, before I actually did a frisk.\" When asked whether he had anything in his pockets, Shaw replied that he had only $50. We hold that Sergeant Lee failed to articulate a sufficient basis for conducting the pat-down upon Appellant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lawful initial detention in high-crime area did not justify subsequent pat-down search conducted merely as a matter of routine police practice","sentence":"See M.A.H. v. State, 559 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (lawful initial detention in high-crime area did not justify subsequent pat-down search conducted merely as a matter of routine police practice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing order denying suppression motion, where officer testified he suspected the defendant had a weapon, although the officer did not know what was in the confiscated small manila envelope but knew it was neither metal nor wood","sentence":"Cf. Richardson v. State, 599 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); White v. State, 458 So.2d 1150 (1st DCA 1984), pet. for rev. den., 464 So.2d 556 (Fla.1985) (reversing order denying suppression motion, where officer testified he suspected the defendant had a weapon, although the officer did not know what was in the confiscated small manila envelope but knew it was neither metal nor wood)."},"case_id":11308948,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He testified: \"I didn't know at that point whether it was a weapon or just exactly what it was at that point, before I actually did a frisk.\" When asked whether he had anything in his pockets, Shaw replied that he had only $50. We hold that Sergeant Lee failed to articulate a sufficient basis for conducting the pat-down upon Appellant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lawful initial detention in high-crime area did not justify subsequent pat-down search conducted merely as a matter of routine police practice","sentence":"See M.A.H. v. State, 559 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (lawful initial detention in high-crime area did not justify subsequent pat-down search conducted merely as a matter of routine police practice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing order denying suppression motion, where officer testified he suspected the defendant had a weapon, although the officer did not know what was in the confiscated small manila envelope but knew it was neither metal nor wood","sentence":"Cf. Richardson v. State, 599 So.2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); White v. State, 458 So.2d 1150 (1st DCA 1984), pet. for rev. den., 464 So.2d 556 (Fla.1985) (reversing order denying suppression motion, where officer testified he suspected the defendant had a weapon, although the officer did not know what was in the confiscated small manila envelope but knew it was neither metal nor wood)."},"case_id":11308948,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In response to Mr. Cash's request to see him, Officer Brittingham asked \"what was going on[?]\" (ROA, Vol. II at 137). Although phrased as a question, this was merely an innocuous attempt to understand why Mr. Cash wanted to speak with him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"600 F.3d 847, 854","parenthetical":"no interrogation where defendant in custody requested to speak to detective and detective \"asked [the defendant] why he wanted to see him, but asked no leading questions of any sort\"","sentence":"See United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir.2010) (no interrogation where defendant in custody requested to speak to detective and detective \u201casked [the defendant] why he wanted to see him, but asked no leading questions of any sort\u201d); see also W. LaFave et al., 2 Crim. Proc. \u00a7 6.7(b) (3d ed.) (exclusion of \u201cinnocuous question[s]\u201d from the definition of interrogation is \u201ccertainly correct\u201d given the Innis Court\u2019s admonition that \u201c \u2018police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"446 U.S. 301, 301-02","parenthetical":"exclusion of \"innocuous question[s]\" from the definition of interrogation is \"certainly correct\" given the Innis Court's admonition that \" 'police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions.' \" (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682","sentence":"See United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir.2010) (no interrogation where defendant in custody requested to speak to detective and detective \u201casked [the defendant] why he wanted to see him, but asked no leading questions of any sort\u201d); see also W. LaFave et al., 2 Crim. Proc. \u00a7 6.7(b) (3d ed.) (exclusion of \u201cinnocuous question[s]\u201d from the definition of interrogation is \u201ccertainly correct\u201d given the Innis Court\u2019s admonition that \u201c \u2018police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682))."},"case_id":3714744,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In response to Mr. Cash's request to see him, Officer Brittingham asked \"what was going on[?]\" (ROA, Vol. II at 137). Although phrased as a question, this was merely an innocuous attempt to understand why Mr. Cash wanted to speak with him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"600 F.3d 847, 854","parenthetical":"no interrogation where defendant in custody requested to speak to detective and detective \"asked [the defendant] why he wanted to see him, but asked no leading questions of any sort\"","sentence":"See United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir.2010) (no interrogation where defendant in custody requested to speak to detective and detective \u201casked [the defendant] why he wanted to see him, but asked no leading questions of any sort\u201d); see also W. LaFave et al., 2 Crim. Proc. \u00a7 6.7(b) (3d ed.) (exclusion of \u201cinnocuous question[s]\u201d from the definition of interrogation is \u201ccertainly correct\u201d given the Innis Court\u2019s admonition that \u201c \u2018police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"exclusion of \"innocuous question[s]\" from the definition of interrogation is \"certainly correct\" given the Innis Court's admonition that \" 'police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions.' \" (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682","sentence":"See United States v. Jones, 600 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir.2010) (no interrogation where defendant in custody requested to speak to detective and detective \u201casked [the defendant] why he wanted to see him, but asked no leading questions of any sort\u201d); see also W. LaFave et al., 2 Crim. Proc. \u00a7 6.7(b) (3d ed.) (exclusion of \u201cinnocuous question[s]\u201d from the definition of interrogation is \u201ccertainly correct\u201d given the Innis Court\u2019s admonition that \u201c \u2018police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682))."},"case_id":3714744,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"724 A.2d 1168, 1168","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary when \"Specifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"372 U.S. 534, 534","parenthetical":"confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \"set up\" by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \"cooperate\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"372 U.S. 534, 534","parenthetical":"confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \"set up\" by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \"cooperate\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"667 A.2d 104, 104","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \"used promises and implied threat,\" when \"he generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"35 F.3d 1069, 1069","parenthetical":"suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"372 U.S. 534, 534","parenthetical":"confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \"set up\" by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \"cooperate\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"724 A.2d 1168, 1168","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary when \"Specifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \"set up\" by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \"cooperate\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \"set up\" by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \"cooperate\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"667 A.2d 104, 104","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \"used promises and implied threat,\" when \"he generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \"set up\" by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \"cooperate\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"35 F.3d 1069, 1069","parenthetical":"suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"724 A.2d 1168, 1168","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary when \"Specifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"365 U.S. 549, 549","parenthetical":"expressing view that \"issue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\" where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"365 U.S. 549, 549","parenthetical":"expressing view that \"issue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\" where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"667 A.2d 104, 104","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \"used promises and implied threat,\" when \"he generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"365 U.S. 549, 549","parenthetical":"expressing view that \"issue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\" where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"35 F.3d 1069, 1069","parenthetical":"suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expressing view that \"issue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\" where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"724 A.2d 1168, 1168","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary when \"Specifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expressing view that \"issue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\" where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"667 A.2d 104, 104","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \"used promises and implied threat,\" when \"he generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expressing view that \"issue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\" where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"35 F.3d 1069, 1069","parenthetical":"suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"724 A.2d 1168, 1168","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary when \"Specifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"360 U.S. 324, 324","parenthetical":"confession involuntary where the police used the suspect's \"childhood friend,\" who falsely stated that the suspect's \"telephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"360 U.S. 324, 324","parenthetical":"confession involuntary where the police used the suspect's \"childhood friend,\" who falsely stated that the suspect's \"telephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"667 A.2d 104, 104","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \"used promises and implied threat,\" when \"he generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"360 U.S. 324, 324","parenthetical":"confession involuntary where the police used the suspect's \"childhood friend,\" who falsely stated that the suspect's \"telephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"35 F.3d 1069, 1069","parenthetical":"suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confession involuntary where the police used the suspect's \"childhood friend,\" who falsely stated that the suspect's \"telephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"724 A.2d 1168, 1168","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary when \"Specifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confession involuntary where the police used the suspect's \"childhood friend,\" who falsely stated that the suspect's \"telephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"667 A.2d 104, 104","parenthetical":"finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \"used promises and implied threat,\" when \"he generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have already expressed doubt about the police's use of deceptive tactics to \"persuade\" a suspect that a confession is in his best interest, in light of the evidence already amassed by the government when, in fact, there is no such evidence. But the use of deception to exert psychological pressure that exploits vulnerabilities extraneous to the offense charged, such as the threat of adverse consequences to family members if the suspect does not confess or cooperate with the investigation, is in a different category that has been singled out for condemnation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confession involuntary where the police used the suspect's \"childhood friend,\" who falsely stated that the suspect's \"telephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\"","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"35 F.3d 1069, 1069","parenthetical":"suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him","sentence":"See Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917 (confession involuntary where suspect, who had been \u201cset up\u201d by informant and had no prior experience with criminal law, was threatened with loss of children and federal aid if she did not \u201ccooperate\u201d); Rogers, 365 U.S. at 549, 81 S.Ct. 735 (expressing view that \u201cissue of voluntariness might fairly have gone either way in the whole of the testimony\u201d where detained suspect who initially denied involvement in shooting confessed after being told that his wife would be brought into custody for questioning); Spano, 360 U.S. at 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202 (confession involuntary where the police used the suspect\u2019s \u201cchildhood friend,\u201d who falsely stated that the suspect\u2019s \u201ctelephone call [to him] had gotten him into trouble, that his job was in jeopardy, and that loss of his job would be disastrous to his three children, his wife and his unborn child\u201d); cf. Davis, 724 A.2d at 1168 (finding confession voluntary when \u201cSpecifically, [the police] made no threats or promises\u201d); Contee, 667 A.2d at 104 (finding confession voluntary although appellant asserted that the police \u201cused promises and implied threat,\u201d when \u201che generally does not articulate what those promises were ... nor does the record support his bare assertions\u201d); Ledbetter, 35 F.3d at 1069 (suspect who was not physically punished or threatened and who waived Miranda rights three times not coerced into confessing even though officers lied about evidence incriminating him)."},"case_id":8209868,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, G & G obtained an injunction from the district court, which materially altered the legal relationship between the parties by prohibiting the state from depriving G & G of property without any hearing. Certainly that change benefitted G & G and it is the prevailing party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"883 F.2d 739, 744","parenthetical":"injunction, which appellate court upheld, rendered plaintiffs prevailing parties despite vacatur of damage award","sentence":"See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 744 (9th Cir.1989) (injunction, which appellate court upheld, rendered plaintiffs prevailing parties despite vacatur of damage award); see also Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 543 (3d Cir.1994) (plaintiff who has received injunctive relief has prevailed for purposes of section 1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"21 F.3d 541, 543","parenthetical":"plaintiff who has received injunctive relief has prevailed for purposes of section 1988","sentence":"See Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 883 F.2d 739, 744 (9th Cir.1989) (injunction, which appellate court upheld, rendered plaintiffs prevailing parties despite vacatur of damage award); see also Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F.3d 541, 543 (3d Cir.1994) (plaintiff who has received injunctive relief has prevailed for purposes of section 1988)."},"case_id":1235420,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"467 U.S. 69, 78","parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"427 U.S. 176, 176","parenthetical":"holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\" racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"427 U.S. 176, 176","parenthetical":"holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\" racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"427 U.S. 176, 176","parenthetical":"holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\" racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\" racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"467 U.S. 69, 78","parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\" racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\" racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"413 U.S. 455, 470","parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"467 U.S. 69, 78","parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"413 U.S. 455, 470","parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"413 U.S. 455, 470","parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"467 U.S. 69, 78","parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"467 U.S. 69, 78","parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The majority's reference to the First Amendment roots of \"educational autonomy,\" see Maj. Op. at 841, is misleading since the Supreme Court has consistently rejected First Amendment interests as a justification for racial discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (holding that while, \"it may be assumed that parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote\u201d racial discrimination, \"it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institutions is also protected by the same principle\u201d); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (holding, \"[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections\u201d); see also Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (noting that under the First Amendment, \"[t]here is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union\u201d)."},"case_id":5663197,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Judges Levi and Damrell concluded that Pickem is distinguishable because it was primarily addressing a statute of limitations issue, and they believe that it did not fully adopt the Steger analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"389 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1249","parenthetical":"finding that plaintiffs \"standing to bring an ADA action must rest on the architectural barriers he contends he encountered during the visit that pre-dates the filing of the Complaint.\"","sentence":"See White v. Divine Investments, Inc., 2005 WL 2491543, *3 (finding in addition that Pic-kem was distinguishable on the ground that the Pickem plaintiff \u201cactually encountered all of the barriers that he sought to remedy in his suit.\u201d) ; Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, 2005 WL 2072013; see also Harris v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 389 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1249 (S.D.Cal.2005) (finding that plaintiffs \u201cstanding to bring an ADA action must rest on the architectural barriers he contends he encountered during the visit that pre-dates the filing of the Complaint.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 WL 2491543, *3","parenthetical":"finding in addition that Pic-kem was distinguishable on the ground that the Pickem plaintiff \"actually encountered all of the barriers that he sought to remedy in his suit.\"","sentence":"See White v. Divine Investments, Inc., 2005 WL 2491543, *3 (finding in addition that Pic-kem was distinguishable on the ground that the Pickem plaintiff \u201cactually encountered all of the barriers that he sought to remedy in his suit.\u201d) ; Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, 2005 WL 2072013; see also Harris v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 389 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1249 (S.D.Cal.2005) (finding that plaintiffs \u201cstanding to bring an ADA action must rest on the architectural barriers he contends he encountered during the visit that pre-dates the filing of the Complaint.\u201d)."},"case_id":65452,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court finds that the improper installation, and subsequent failure, of a device designed to lift small boats from the water onto a vessel while the vessel is docked in navigable waters, poses more than a fanciful risk of disrupting commercial activity at ports and on waterways. Among other possibilities, the failure of a boat-lift davit presents a hazard to nearby vessels at the time of the davit's malfunction and, subsequently, threatens to disrupt commercial traffic in order to provide medical treatment to persons who may have been injured by the failed equipment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"531 F.2d 1144, 1147","parenthetical":"rescue operations of Coast Guard following capsize of recreational sailboat establish incident's significant relationship to traditional maritime activities","sentence":"See Szollosy v. Hyatt Corp., 208 F.Supp.2d 205, 213 (D.Conn.2002) (\u201cthe emergency medical treatment of [the alleged victim] also carried the potential to disrupt maritime commerce\u201d); Emery v. Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 114, (C.D.Ill.1994) (finding that \u201ca personal injury aboard [a] vessel ... carries the potential of necessitating extraordinary rescue measures affecting [maritime] commerce\u201d); cf. Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir.1976) (rescue operations of Coast Guard following capsize of recreational sailboat establish incident\u2019s significant relationship to traditional maritime activities)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"208 F.Supp.2d 205, 213","parenthetical":"\"the emergency medical treatment of [the alleged victim] also carried the potential to disrupt maritime commerce\"","sentence":"See Szollosy v. Hyatt Corp., 208 F.Supp.2d 205, 213 (D.Conn.2002) (\u201cthe emergency medical treatment of [the alleged victim] also carried the potential to disrupt maritime commerce\u201d); Emery v. Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 114, (C.D.Ill.1994) (finding that \u201ca personal injury aboard [a] vessel ... carries the potential of necessitating extraordinary rescue measures affecting [maritime] commerce\u201d); cf. Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir.1976) (rescue operations of Coast Guard following capsize of recreational sailboat establish incident\u2019s significant relationship to traditional maritime activities)."},"case_id":2584757,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court finds that the improper installation, and subsequent failure, of a device designed to lift small boats from the water onto a vessel while the vessel is docked in navigable waters, poses more than a fanciful risk of disrupting commercial activity at ports and on waterways. Among other possibilities, the failure of a boat-lift davit presents a hazard to nearby vessels at the time of the davit's malfunction and, subsequently, threatens to disrupt commercial traffic in order to provide medical treatment to persons who may have been injured by the failed equipment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a personal injury aboard [a] vessel ... carries the potential of necessitating extraordinary rescue measures affecting [maritime] commerce\"","sentence":"See Szollosy v. Hyatt Corp., 208 F.Supp.2d 205, 213 (D.Conn.2002) (\u201cthe emergency medical treatment of [the alleged victim] also carried the potential to disrupt maritime commerce\u201d); Emery v. Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 114, (C.D.Ill.1994) (finding that \u201ca personal injury aboard [a] vessel ... carries the potential of necessitating extraordinary rescue measures affecting [maritime] commerce\u201d); cf. Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir.1976) (rescue operations of Coast Guard following capsize of recreational sailboat establish incident\u2019s significant relationship to traditional maritime activities)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"531 F.2d 1144, 1147","parenthetical":"rescue operations of Coast Guard following capsize of recreational sailboat establish incident's significant relationship to traditional maritime activities","sentence":"See Szollosy v. Hyatt Corp., 208 F.Supp.2d 205, 213 (D.Conn.2002) (\u201cthe emergency medical treatment of [the alleged victim] also carried the potential to disrupt maritime commerce\u201d); Emery v. Rock Island Boatworks, Inc., 847 F.Supp. 114, (C.D.Ill.1994) (finding that \u201ca personal injury aboard [a] vessel ... carries the potential of necessitating extraordinary rescue measures affecting [maritime] commerce\u201d); cf. Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir.1976) (rescue operations of Coast Guard following capsize of recreational sailboat establish incident\u2019s significant relationship to traditional maritime activities)."},"case_id":2584757,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Equally significant, Congress chose not to identify the countries, regions, or geographical areas included in the \"Southwest Asia\" term, nor did it provide a definition of the term. Indeed, the fact that the parties, in them briefs and at oral argument, could not agree as to the countries that should be included as part of the \"Southwest Asia\" region and cited different authorities supporting their positions reveals that the plain meaning of this term is not clear from the statute itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 U.S. 115, 118","parenthetical":"\"Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \"","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"7 Vet.App. 453, 461","parenthetical":"holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274865,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Equally significant, Congress chose not to identify the countries, regions, or geographical areas included in the \"Southwest Asia\" term, nor did it provide a definition of the term. Indeed, the fact that the parties, in them briefs and at oral argument, could not agree as to the countries that should be included as part of the \"Southwest Asia\" region and cited different authorities supporting their positions reveals that the plain meaning of this term is not clear from the statute itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"7 Vet.App. 453, 461","parenthetical":"holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \"","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274865,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Equally significant, Congress chose not to identify the countries, regions, or geographical areas included in the \"Southwest Asia\" term, nor did it provide a definition of the term. Indeed, the fact that the parties, in them briefs and at oral argument, could not agree as to the countries that should be included as part of the \"Southwest Asia\" region and cited different authorities supporting their positions reveals that the plain meaning of this term is not clear from the statute itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \"","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"7 Vet.App. 453, 461","parenthetical":"holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274865,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Equally significant, Congress chose not to identify the countries, regions, or geographical areas included in the \"Southwest Asia\" term, nor did it provide a definition of the term. Indeed, the fact that the parties, in them briefs and at oral argument, could not agree as to the countries that should be included as part of the \"Southwest Asia\" region and cited different authorities supporting their positions reveals that the plain meaning of this term is not clear from the statute itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 U.S. 115, 118","parenthetical":"\"Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \"","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274865,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Equally significant, Congress chose not to identify the countries, regions, or geographical areas included in the \"Southwest Asia\" term, nor did it provide a definition of the term. Indeed, the fact that the parties, in them briefs and at oral argument, could not agree as to the countries that should be included as part of the \"Southwest Asia\" region and cited different authorities supporting their positions reveals that the plain meaning of this term is not clear from the statute itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \"","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274865,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Equally significant, Congress chose not to identify the countries, regions, or geographical areas included in the \"Southwest Asia\" term, nor did it provide a definition of the term. Indeed, the fact that the parties, in them briefs and at oral argument, could not agree as to the countries that should be included as part of the \"Southwest Asia\" region and cited different authorities supporting their positions reveals that the plain meaning of this term is not clear from the statute itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \"","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways","sentence":"See Tallman v. Brown, 7 Vet.App. 453, 461 (1995) (holding that ambiguity exists when a statute can be interpreted by reasonably well-informed people in two or more ways), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 105 F.3d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994) (\u201cAmbiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context .... \u201d)."},"case_id":12274865,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"259 U.S. 309, 317","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"42 S.Ct. 469, 470","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"194 U.S. 205, 217","parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"259 U.S. 309, 317","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"42 S.Ct. 469, 470","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"194 U.S. 205, 217","parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"259 U.S. 309, 317","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"42 S.Ct. 469, 470","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"194 U.S. 205, 217","parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"259 U.S. 309, 317","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"42 S.Ct. 469, 470","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"194 U.S. 205, 217","parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing reference \"to federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\" of the offense for which extradition is sought","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"259 U.S. 309, 317","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"520 F.2d 726, 728","parenthetical":"national not state law \"sets the standard\" to determine sufficiency of evidence","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"42 S.Ct. 469, 470","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"520 F.2d 726, 728","parenthetical":"national not state law \"sets the standard\" to determine sufficiency of evidence","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"520 F.2d 726, 728","parenthetical":"national not state law \"sets the standard\" to determine sufficiency of evidence","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"520 F.2d 726, 728","parenthetical":"national not state law \"sets the standard\" to determine sufficiency of evidence","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"194 U.S. 205, 217","parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"520 F.2d 726, 728","parenthetical":"national not state law \"sets the standard\" to determine sufficiency of evidence","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"520 F.2d 726, 728","parenthetical":"national not state law \"sets the standard\" to determine sufficiency of evidence","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"259 U.S. 309, 317","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60","parenthetical":"examining both state and federal law in determining what is \"bribery\" despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"42 S.Ct. 469, 470","parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60","parenthetical":"examining both state and federal law in determining what is \"bribery\" despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60","parenthetical":"examining both state and federal law in determining what is \"bribery\" despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Louisiana law relied upon, \"But no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\"","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"194 U.S. 205, 217","parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60","parenthetical":"examining both state and federal law in determining what is \"bribery\" despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60","parenthetical":"examining both state and federal law in determining what is \"bribery\" despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While not all the cases are consistent, as a general matter the phrase in the Treaty, \"a felony under the law of the United States of America,\" refers to federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60","parenthetical":"examining both state and federal law in determining what is \"bribery\" despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada","sentence":"See, e. g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 910 n. 18 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973) (endorsing reference \u201cto federal law-when there is some-as a gauge for [the] gravity\u201d of the offense for which extradition is sought); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (federal not state statute of limitations controls); United States ex rel. Sakugucki v. Kaulukukui, 520 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1975) (national not state law \u201csets the standard\u201d to determine sufficiency of evidence); Freedman v. United States, 437 F.Supp. 1252, 1259-60 (N.D.Ga.1977) (examining both state and federal law in determining what is \u201cbribery\u201d despite slightly more ambiguous language in Webster-Ashburton Treaty with Canada)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes","sentence":"Cf. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317, 42 S.Ct. 469, 470, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (Louisiana law relied upon, \u201cBut no procedural rule of a state could give to a prisoner the right to introduce evidence made irrelevant by a treaty.\u201d); Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205, 217, 24 S.Ct. 657, 48 L.Ed. 938 (1904) (state law applicable for the purpose of assessing the probability of whether the person sought to be extradited committed the acts charged, there being no federal common law of crimes); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 23 S.Ct. 781, 47 L.Ed. 948 (1903) (same); Muller\u2019s Case, Case No. 9,913, 17 Fed.Cases 975, 976 (E.D.Pa.1863) (in absence of United States law, law of state where person is found applies)."},"case_id":4172641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That may be true, but, as Spencer Hospital correctly notes, \"year\" is defined as \"twelve consecutive months,\" month is defined as \"a calendar month,\" and \"two years\" or twenty-four consecutive months from February 28, 2010, is February 28, 2012. Whether the reference point is days, months, or years, the last day to file the lawsuit was February 28, 2012, as the district court originally concluded, not February 29, 2012.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he term 'year,' is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\"","sentence":"See Happle v. Monson, 235 Iowa 650, 17 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1945) (applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations); see also Schon v. Nat\u2019l Tea Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1969) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018year,\u2019 is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations","sentence":"See Happle v. Monson, 235 Iowa 650, 17 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1945) (applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations); see also Schon v. Nat\u2019l Tea Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1969) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018year,\u2019 is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\u201d)."},"case_id":7061119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That may be true, but, as Spencer Hospital correctly notes, \"year\" is defined as \"twelve consecutive months,\" month is defined as \"a calendar month,\" and \"two years\" or twenty-four consecutive months from February 28, 2010, is February 28, 2012. Whether the reference point is days, months, or years, the last day to file the lawsuit was February 28, 2012, as the district court originally concluded, not February 29, 2012.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations","sentence":"See Happle v. Monson, 235 Iowa 650, 17 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1945) (applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations); see also Schon v. Nat\u2019l Tea Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1969) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018year,\u2019 is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"250 N.E.2d 890, 892","parenthetical":"\"[T]he term 'year,' is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\"","sentence":"See Happle v. Monson, 235 Iowa 650, 17 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1945) (applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations); see also Schon v. Nat\u2019l Tea Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1969) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018year,\u2019 is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\u201d)."},"case_id":7061119,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That may be true, but, as Spencer Hospital correctly notes, \"year\" is defined as \"twelve consecutive months,\" month is defined as \"a calendar month,\" and \"two years\" or twenty-four consecutive months from February 28, 2010, is February 28, 2012. Whether the reference point is days, months, or years, the last day to file the lawsuit was February 28, 2012, as the district court originally concluded, not February 29, 2012.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he term 'year,' is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\"","sentence":"See Happle v. Monson, 235 Iowa 650, 17 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1945) (applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations); see also Schon v. Nat\u2019l Tea Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1969) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018year,\u2019 is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"17 N.W.2d 391, 392","parenthetical":"applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations","sentence":"See Happle v. Monson, 235 Iowa 650, 17 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1945) (applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations); see also Schon v. Nat\u2019l Tea Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1969) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018year,\u2019 is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\u201d)."},"case_id":7061119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That may be true, but, as Spencer Hospital correctly notes, \"year\" is defined as \"twelve consecutive months,\" month is defined as \"a calendar month,\" and \"two years\" or twenty-four consecutive months from February 28, 2010, is February 28, 2012. Whether the reference point is days, months, or years, the last day to file the lawsuit was February 28, 2012, as the district court originally concluded, not February 29, 2012.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"250 N.E.2d 890, 892","parenthetical":"\"[T]he term 'year,' is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\"","sentence":"See Happle v. Monson, 235 Iowa 650, 17 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1945) (applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations); see also Schon v. Nat\u2019l Tea Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1969) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018year,\u2019 is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"17 N.W.2d 391, 392","parenthetical":"applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations","sentence":"See Happle v. Monson, 235 Iowa 650, 17 N.W.2d 391, 392 (1945) (applying equivalent of section 4.1(34) and concluding that a judgment entered on June 22, 1932, and transcribed on June 22, 1942, was not barred by a ten-year statute of limitations); see also Schon v. Nat\u2019l Tea Co., 19 Ohio App.2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1969) (\u201c[T]he term \u2018year,\u2019 is that period of time commencing the following day after the act or event occurred and ending at the close of the first anniversary of the day the act occurred.\u201d)."},"case_id":7061119,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed Cotton's conspiracy claims because Cotton failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants conspired together to violate Cotton's rights based on his membership in a protected class.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"839 F.2d 621, 626","parenthetical":"\"A claim can be stated under section 1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under section 1985.\"","sentence":"See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (elements of a \u00a7 1985 claim); see also Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep\u2019t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (\u201cA claim can be stated under section 1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under section 1985.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"627 F.3d 338, 341-42","parenthetical":"although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief","sentence":"See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (elements of a \u00a7 1985 claim); see also Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep\u2019t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (\u201cA claim can be stated under section 1986 only if the complaint contains a valid claim under section 1985.\u201d)."},"case_id":12404967,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To help determine the plain and ordinary meaning, courts may turn to the dictionary for guidance. We agree with the BAP that \"public assistance benefits\" are those government benefits provided to the needy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 B.R. 722, 725","parenthetical":"consulting dictionaries and concluding \"public assistance\" means government benefits provided to the needy","sentence":"See Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722, 725 (8th Cir.BAP2013) (consulting dictionaries and concluding \u201cpublic assistance\u201d means government benefits provided to the needy); see also In re Hatch, 519 B.R. 783, 788 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 2014) (determining whether the ACTC fell within public assistance by analyzing whether the credit benefits low-income families)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"519 B.R. 783, 788","parenthetical":"determining whether the ACTC fell within public assistance by analyzing whether the credit benefits low-income families","sentence":"See Hardy v. Fink (In re Hardy), 503 B.R. 722, 725 (8th Cir.BAP2013) (consulting dictionaries and concluding \u201cpublic assistance\u201d means government benefits provided to the needy); see also In re Hatch, 519 B.R. 783, 788 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 2014) (determining whether the ACTC fell within public assistance by analyzing whether the credit benefits low-income families)."},"case_id":4227724,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We do not decide whether a jury -- as opposed to a judge at sentencing -- should be able to consider sentencing entrapment as a valid justification defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"38 F.3d 1108, 1108","parenthetical":"finding sentencing entrapment a valid reason to depart from the Guidelines","sentence":"See Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1108 (finding sentencing entrapment a valid reason to depart from the Guidelines); cf. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (11th Cir.2002) (questioning the validity of the sentencing entrapment defense after Apprendi, but ultimately not reaching the question because the defense would fail)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"289 F.3d 1339, 1342-43","parenthetical":"questioning the validity of the sentencing entrapment defense after Apprendi, but ultimately not reaching the question because the defense would fail","sentence":"See Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1108 (finding sentencing entrapment a valid reason to depart from the Guidelines); cf. United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (11th Cir.2002) (questioning the validity of the sentencing entrapment defense after Apprendi, but ultimately not reaching the question because the defense would fail)."},"case_id":5724360,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718","parenthetical":"finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"404 U.S. 357, 365","parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718","parenthetical":"finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718","parenthetical":"finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"404 U.S. 357, 365","parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an individual's property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an individual's property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an individual's property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"404 U.S. 357, 365","parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"448 F.2d 1266, 1267","parenthetical":"finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"448 F.2d 1266, 1267","parenthetical":"finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Such a minimal imposition does not trigger constitutional due process protection. The D.C. Circuit explained almost thirty years ago that \"matters involving a few dollars or less\" do not trigger due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"448 F.2d 1266, 1267","parenthetical":"finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \"smacks of administrative detail\" and is \"hardly to be classified as a 'fundamental' right\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Moncla v. Kelley, 430 Fed.Appx. 714, 718 (10th Cir.2011) (unpublished) (finding de minimis any lost interest on $20 that had been temporarily withheld); Kennedy v. City of Cincinnati, 595 F.3d 327 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that an individual\u2019s property interest in a $10 pool pass was de minimis); Northern v. Nelson, 448 F.2d 1266, 1267 (9th Cir.1971) (finding a claim for damages of $1.05 was properly dismissed as de minimis); cf. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365, 92 S.Ct. 479, 30 L.Ed.2d 502 (1971) (stating that a $7.50 bail fee imposed on an equally vulnerable population \u201csmacks of administrative detail\u201d and is \u201chardly to be classified as a \u2018fundamental\u2019 right\u201d)."},"case_id":5919827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Local 32B-32J, the union filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin the enforcement of rules adopted by the Port Authority regulating free speech activities, namely labor picketing, at the World Trade Center and the Port Authority Bus Terminal, Among the rules considered by the court was a rule that required an application thirty-six hours prior to the proposed use, approval within twenty-four hours, and an elaborate appellate procedure in the event an application was initially denied. The court upheld the waiting period based on evidence that it was necessary to prevent disruptions and \"self-evident\" that expressive activities on controversial issues may require additional security, and on the grounds that longer waiting periods had been upheld in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"twenty-day waiting period for permit for parade protesting racial discrimination is unconstitutional","sentence":"See Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C.Cir.1975)(upheld forty-eight hours waiting period); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1968)(upholding a public university's requirement of forty-eight-hours notice of a demonstration on campus is constitutional); Local 32B-32J, Service Employees International Union v. Port Authority, 944 F.Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (thirty-six-hour waiting period, while probably not necessary in many instances, must be required of all applicants to meet requirement that regulations be content neutral); but see NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.1984)(twenty-day waiting period for permit for parade protesting racial discrimination is unconstitutional)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a public university's requirement of forty-eight-hours notice of a demonstration on campus is constitutional","sentence":"See Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C.Cir.1975)(upheld forty-eight hours waiting period); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1968)(upholding a public university's requirement of forty-eight-hours notice of a demonstration on campus is constitutional); Local 32B-32J, Service Employees International Union v. Port Authority, 944 F.Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (thirty-six-hour waiting period, while probably not necessary in many instances, must be required of all applicants to meet requirement that regulations be content neutral); but see NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.1984)(twenty-day waiting period for permit for parade protesting racial discrimination is unconstitutional)."},"case_id":9440893,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Local 32B-32J, the union filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin the enforcement of rules adopted by the Port Authority regulating free speech activities, namely labor picketing, at the World Trade Center and the Port Authority Bus Terminal, Among the rules considered by the court was a rule that required an application thirty-six hours prior to the proposed use, approval within twenty-four hours, and an elaborate appellate procedure in the event an application was initially denied. The court upheld the waiting period based on evidence that it was necessary to prevent disruptions and \"self-evident\" that expressive activities on controversial issues may require additional security, and on the grounds that longer waiting periods had been upheld in other jurisdictions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"thirty-six-hour waiting period, while probably not necessary in many instances, must be required of all applicants to meet requirement that regulations be content neutral","sentence":"See Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C.Cir.1975)(upheld forty-eight hours waiting period); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1968)(upholding a public university's requirement of forty-eight-hours notice of a demonstration on campus is constitutional); Local 32B-32J, Service Employees International Union v. Port Authority, 944 F.Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (thirty-six-hour waiting period, while probably not necessary in many instances, must be required of all applicants to meet requirement that regulations be content neutral); but see NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.1984)(twenty-day waiting period for permit for parade protesting racial discrimination is unconstitutional)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"twenty-day waiting period for permit for parade protesting racial discrimination is unconstitutional","sentence":"See Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 717 (D.C.Cir.1975)(upheld forty-eight hours waiting period); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.1968)(upholding a public university's requirement of forty-eight-hours notice of a demonstration on campus is constitutional); Local 32B-32J, Service Employees International Union v. Port Authority, 944 F.Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (thirty-six-hour waiting period, while probably not necessary in many instances, must be required of all applicants to meet requirement that regulations be content neutral); but see NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.1984)(twenty-day waiting period for permit for parade protesting racial discrimination is unconstitutional)."},"case_id":9440893,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's October 15 Order allowing Plaintiffs to take the depositions of Davis and Steinhauser is overly broad because it failed to limit the scope of the depositions to the issue of qualified immunity. If the court had carefully tailored its order to allow the parties to only uncover those facts necessary to rule on Davis' immunity defense, we would not have jurisdiction to rule on the order at this time.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"834 F.2d 507, 507","parenthetical":"orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts","sentence":"See Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507 (orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense","sentence":"See Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507 (orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense)."},"case_id":1138320,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's October 15 Order allowing Plaintiffs to take the depositions of Davis and Steinhauser is overly broad because it failed to limit the scope of the depositions to the issue of qualified immunity. If the court had carefully tailored its order to allow the parties to only uncover those facts necessary to rule on Davis' immunity defense, we would not have jurisdiction to rule on the order at this time.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense","sentence":"See Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507 (orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"834 F.2d 507, 507","parenthetical":"orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts","sentence":"See Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507 (orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense)."},"case_id":1138320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, the district court's October 15 Order allowing Plaintiffs to take the depositions of Davis and Steinhauser is overly broad because it failed to limit the scope of the depositions to the issue of qualified immunity. If the court had carefully tailored its order to allow the parties to only uncover those facts necessary to rule on Davis' immunity defense, we would not have jurisdiction to rule on the order at this time.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense","sentence":"See Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507 (orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"834 F.2d 507, 507","parenthetical":"orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts","sentence":"See Lion Boulos, 834 F.2d at 507 (orders allowing limited discovery not immediately appealable when district court unable to rule on the immunity defense without further clarification of facts and order narrowly tailored to uncover only those facts); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (discovery permissible if limited to a specific factual dispute regarding availability of qualified immunity defense)."},"case_id":1138320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As in Salinas's other case, here, the record reflects that the court explicitly considered deterrence and protection of the public in imposing the above-range sentence and implicitly considered Salinas's history and characteristics.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"580 F.3d 264, 264","parenthetical":"\"The factual basis supporting [the district court's reasons] is implicit in [its] findings that most of the revocation charges were true.\"","sentence":"See Whitelaw, 580 F.3d at 264 (\u201cThe factual basis supporting [the district court\u2019s reasons] is implicit in [its] findings that most of the revocation charges were true.\u201d); see also United States v. Ontiveros, 584 Fed.Appx. 236, 237 (5th Cir. 2014) (\u201cThe court\u2019s reasons reflect its concern that an individual who drives while drinking 12 beers, while on supervised release from a prior conviction under conditions prohibiting such behavior, needs a sentence sufficient to deter and to protect the public.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"584 Fed.Appx. 236, 237","parenthetical":"\"The court's reasons reflect its concern that an individual who drives while drinking 12 beers, while on supervised release from a prior conviction under conditions prohibiting such behavior, needs a sentence sufficient to deter and to protect the public.\"","sentence":"See Whitelaw, 580 F.3d at 264 (\u201cThe factual basis supporting [the district court\u2019s reasons] is implicit in [its] findings that most of the revocation charges were true.\u201d); see also United States v. Ontiveros, 584 Fed.Appx. 236, 237 (5th Cir. 2014) (\u201cThe court\u2019s reasons reflect its concern that an individual who drives while drinking 12 beers, while on supervised release from a prior conviction under conditions prohibiting such behavior, needs a sentence sufficient to deter and to protect the public.\u201d)."},"case_id":12404175,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, the continuance only lasted about five months, and the trial itself occurred just two-and-a-half months after the court reporter completed and filed the transcripts the defendants had requested. Such a relatively short period of time is not unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"56 F.3d 584, 584-85","parenthetical":"noting that where district court \"memorialized\" its previous \"silent grant\" of defendant's motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant's motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court's \"oversight rather than deliberation,\" defendant's speedy trial rights were violated","sentence":"See, e.g., Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (holding that five-month open-ended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate Speedy Trial Act); Lattany, 982 F.2d at 874-76 (ruling that one-year delay resulting from district court\u2019s grant and then extension of open-ended ends-of-justice continuance was not unreasonable where defendant changed counsel several times and various counsel requested continuances to permit them to prepare for trial); United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir.1991) (determining that seven-month ends-of-justice continuance giving two defendants additional time to prepare for trial was reasonable delay that could be attributed to co-defendant); cf. Jones, 56 F.3d at 584-85 (noting that where district court \u201cmemorialized\u201d its previous \u201csilent grant\u201d of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant\u2019s motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court\u2019s \u201coversight rather than deliberation,\u201d defendant\u2019s speedy trial rights were violated)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"107 F.3d 1489, 1489","parenthetical":"holding that five-month open-ended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate Speedy Trial Act","sentence":"See, e.g., Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (holding that five-month open-ended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate Speedy Trial Act); Lattany, 982 F.2d at 874-76 (ruling that one-year delay resulting from district court\u2019s grant and then extension of open-ended ends-of-justice continuance was not unreasonable where defendant changed counsel several times and various counsel requested continuances to permit them to prepare for trial); United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir.1991) (determining that seven-month ends-of-justice continuance giving two defendants additional time to prepare for trial was reasonable delay that could be attributed to co-defendant); cf. Jones, 56 F.3d at 584-85 (noting that where district court \u201cmemorialized\u201d its previous \u201csilent grant\u201d of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant\u2019s motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court\u2019s \u201coversight rather than deliberation,\u201d defendant\u2019s speedy trial rights were violated)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the continuance only lasted about five months, and the trial itself occurred just two-and-a-half months after the court reporter completed and filed the transcripts the defendants had requested. Such a relatively short period of time is not unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"56 F.3d 584, 584-85","parenthetical":"noting that where district court \"memorialized\" its previous \"silent grant\" of defendant's motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant's motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court's \"oversight rather than deliberation,\" defendant's speedy trial rights were violated","sentence":"See, e.g., Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (holding that five-month open-ended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate Speedy Trial Act); Lattany, 982 F.2d at 874-76 (ruling that one-year delay resulting from district court\u2019s grant and then extension of open-ended ends-of-justice continuance was not unreasonable where defendant changed counsel several times and various counsel requested continuances to permit them to prepare for trial); United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir.1991) (determining that seven-month ends-of-justice continuance giving two defendants additional time to prepare for trial was reasonable delay that could be attributed to co-defendant); cf. Jones, 56 F.3d at 584-85 (noting that where district court \u201cmemorialized\u201d its previous \u201csilent grant\u201d of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant\u2019s motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court\u2019s \u201coversight rather than deliberation,\u201d defendant\u2019s speedy trial rights were violated)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"982 F.2d 874, 874-76","parenthetical":"ruling that one-year delay resulting from district court's grant and then extension of open-ended ends-of-justice continuance was not unreasonable where defendant changed counsel several times and various counsel requested continuances to permit them to prepare for trial","sentence":"See, e.g., Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (holding that five-month open-ended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate Speedy Trial Act); Lattany, 982 F.2d at 874-76 (ruling that one-year delay resulting from district court\u2019s grant and then extension of open-ended ends-of-justice continuance was not unreasonable where defendant changed counsel several times and various counsel requested continuances to permit them to prepare for trial); United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir.1991) (determining that seven-month ends-of-justice continuance giving two defendants additional time to prepare for trial was reasonable delay that could be attributed to co-defendant); cf. Jones, 56 F.3d at 584-85 (noting that where district court \u201cmemorialized\u201d its previous \u201csilent grant\u201d of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant\u2019s motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court\u2019s \u201coversight rather than deliberation,\u201d defendant\u2019s speedy trial rights were violated)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the continuance only lasted about five months, and the trial itself occurred just two-and-a-half months after the court reporter completed and filed the transcripts the defendants had requested. Such a relatively short period of time is not unreasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"935 F.2d 1223, 1236","parenthetical":"determining that seven-month ends-of-justice continuance giving two defendants additional time to prepare for trial was reasonable delay that could be attributed to co-defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (holding that five-month open-ended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate Speedy Trial Act); Lattany, 982 F.2d at 874-76 (ruling that one-year delay resulting from district court\u2019s grant and then extension of open-ended ends-of-justice continuance was not unreasonable where defendant changed counsel several times and various counsel requested continuances to permit them to prepare for trial); United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir.1991) (determining that seven-month ends-of-justice continuance giving two defendants additional time to prepare for trial was reasonable delay that could be attributed to co-defendant); cf. Jones, 56 F.3d at 584-85 (noting that where district court \u201cmemorialized\u201d its previous \u201csilent grant\u201d of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant\u2019s motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court\u2019s \u201coversight rather than deliberation,\u201d defendant\u2019s speedy trial rights were violated)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"56 F.3d 584, 584-85","parenthetical":"noting that where district court \"memorialized\" its previous \"silent grant\" of defendant's motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant's motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court's \"oversight rather than deliberation,\" defendant's speedy trial rights were violated","sentence":"See, e.g., Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (holding that five-month open-ended continuance based on ends of justice did not violate Speedy Trial Act); Lattany, 982 F.2d at 874-76 (ruling that one-year delay resulting from district court\u2019s grant and then extension of open-ended ends-of-justice continuance was not unreasonable where defendant changed counsel several times and various counsel requested continuances to permit them to prepare for trial); United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th Cir.1991) (determining that seven-month ends-of-justice continuance giving two defendants additional time to prepare for trial was reasonable delay that could be attributed to co-defendant); cf. Jones, 56 F.3d at 584-85 (noting that where district court \u201cmemorialized\u201d its previous \u201csilent grant\u201d of defendant\u2019s motion for a continuance more than a year after he filed the motion, defendant\u2019s motion only requested a two-month continuance, and continuance reflected the district court\u2019s \u201coversight rather than deliberation,\u201d defendant\u2019s speedy trial rights were violated)."},"case_id":199941,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Regarding the merits of this appeal, the narrow question we must decide is whether the United States can maintain an action to foreclose on the Mortgage even though it is barred under section 2415(a) from enforcing its right to collect money damages on the Note and the Thornburgs' personal guaranty. The United States argues that the state lien law theory that a mortgage cannot be foreclosed after the statute of limitations bars collecting contract damages is inapplicable to the federal government because it has the same effect as a state statute of limitations. We review de novo a district court's interpretation of the applicable law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"934 F.2d 229, 231","parenthetical":"whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity is reviewed de novo","sentence":"See Arford v. United States, 934 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir.1991) (whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity is reviewed de novo); see also, Mendez v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., 52 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir.1995) (a ruling on the appropriate statute of limitations is reviewed de novo)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"52 F.3d 799, 800","parenthetical":"a ruling on the appropriate statute of limitations is reviewed de novo","sentence":"See Arford v. United States, 934 F.2d 229, 231 (9th Cir.1991) (whether the United States has waived sovereign immunity is reviewed de novo); see also, Mendez v. Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co., 52 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir.1995) (a ruling on the appropriate statute of limitations is reviewed de novo)."},"case_id":7645297,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are presented with that very situation in the case before us. The debtor and the trustee have presented possible interpretations of the text that are supported by authority. Indeed, the differing outcomes of the bankruptcy courts that have examined this issue to date indicate that the language of 11 U.S.C. SS 1325(b) is not at all clear.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"359 B.R. 290, 300","parenthetical":"\"Although apparently straightforward, as with much of BAPCPA, the text Congress used plausibly lends itself to at least two different interpretations of what exactly 'applicable commitment period' means.\"","sentence":"See In re Laroy Davis, 392 B.R. 132, 137-41 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2008) (outlining cases that are divided on how to calculate a debtor\u2019s \u201cprojected disposable income\u201d); id. at 143-46 (outlining cases that are divided on whether the \u201capplicable commitment period\u201d is a monetary or temporal requirement); see also In re Green, 378 B.R. 30, 33 (Bank.N.D.N.Y.2007) (noting that BAPCPA rendered \u00a7 1325(b) \u201ca murky stew of conflicting judicial opinions about the plain language meaning of common words and phrases contained in the statute itself and the Congressional intent behind it\u201d); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 300 (Bankr.Nev.2007) (\u201cAlthough apparently straightforward, as with much of BAPCPA, the text Congress used plausibly lends itself to at least two different interpretations of what exactly \u2018applicable commitment period\u2019 means.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 B.R. 132, 137-41","parenthetical":"outlining cases that are divided on how to calculate a debtor's \"projected disposable income\"","sentence":"See In re Laroy Davis, 392 B.R. 132, 137-41 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2008) (outlining cases that are divided on how to calculate a debtor\u2019s \u201cprojected disposable income\u201d); id. at 143-46 (outlining cases that are divided on whether the \u201capplicable commitment period\u201d is a monetary or temporal requirement); see also In re Green, 378 B.R. 30, 33 (Bank.N.D.N.Y.2007) (noting that BAPCPA rendered \u00a7 1325(b) \u201ca murky stew of conflicting judicial opinions about the plain language meaning of common words and phrases contained in the statute itself and the Congressional intent behind it\u201d); In re Slusher, 359 B.R. 290, 300 (Bankr.Nev.2007) (\u201cAlthough apparently straightforward, as with much of BAPCPA, the text Congress used plausibly lends itself to at least two different interpretations of what exactly \u2018applicable commitment period\u2019 means.\u201d)."},"case_id":3860192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Such an argument is akin to the substance-over-form doctrine in tax law in which we look past the labels the parties give to a structure to determine its economic reality. The Supreme Court and many other courts, including this one, have applied the substance-over-form doctrine to consumer finance law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"566 F.2d 44, 46","parenthetical":"\"The [Truth in Lending] Act is remedial in nature, and the substance rather than the form of credit transactions should be examined in cases arising under it.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Mourning, 411 U.S. at 366 n. 26, 93 S.Ct. at 1659 n. 26; Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir.1976) (\u201c[A]ppellant\u2019s argument elevates form over substance in an effort to avoid the realities of the credit transaction.\u201d); see also Adiel v. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, 810 F.2d 1051, 1053 (11th Cir.1987) (same); Hickman v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Inc., 566 F.2d 44, 46 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cThe [Truth in Lending] Act is remedial in nature, and the substance rather than the form of credit transactions should be examined in cases arising under it.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"539 F.2d 511, 515","parenthetical":"\"[A]ppellant's argument elevates form over substance in an effort to avoid the realities of the credit transaction.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Mourning, 411 U.S. at 366 n. 26, 93 S.Ct. at 1659 n. 26; Meyers v. Clearview Dodge Sales, Inc., 539 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir.1976) (\u201c[A]ppellant\u2019s argument elevates form over substance in an effort to avoid the realities of the credit transaction.\u201d); see also Adiel v. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, 810 F.2d 1051, 1053 (11th Cir.1987) (same); Hickman v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Inc., 566 F.2d 44, 46 (8th Cir.1977) (\u201cThe [Truth in Lending] Act is remedial in nature, and the substance rather than the form of credit transactions should be examined in cases arising under it.\u201d)."},"case_id":288133,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court agreed with the [P] that the Lindamood-Bell placement was \"highly restrictive\" by IDEA standards.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"231 F.3d 96, 105","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board,\" but concluding that the IDEA'S mainstreaming requirement \"remains a consideration that bears upon a parent's choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate\"","sentence":"M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at *16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *49; see also M.S ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that \u201cparents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board,\u201d but concluding that the IDEA\u2019S mainstreaming requirement \u201cremains a consideration that bears upon a parent\u2019s choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2007 WL 1378545, at *16","parenthetical":"noting that \"the [IDEA]'s preference for mainstreaming was aimed at preventing schools from segregating handicapped students from the general student body\" and that \"the school district ha[d] presented no evidence that the [IDEA'S preference for mainstreaming] was meant to restrict parental options when the public schools fail to comply with the requirements of the [IDEA] (emphasis in original","sentence":"M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at *16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *49. Although we have never held that parental placements must meet the least restrictive environment requirement, see Carter, 950 F.2d at 160 (noting that \u201cthe [IDEA]\u2019s preference for mainstreaming was aimed at preventing schools from segregating handicapped students from the general student body\u201d and that \u201cthe school district ha[d] presented no evidence that the [IDEA\u2019S preference for mainstreaming] was meant to restrict parental options when the public schools fail to comply with the requirements of the [IDEA] (emphasis in original)), the district court\u2019s consideration of Lindamood-Bell\u2019s restrictive nature was proper because it considered the restrictive nature only as a factor in determining whether the placement was appropriate under the IDEA, not as a dispositive requirement."},"case_id":3718890,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court agreed with the [P] that the Lindamood-Bell placement was \"highly restrictive\" by IDEA standards.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *49","parenthetical":"noting that \"the [IDEA]'s preference for mainstreaming was aimed at preventing schools from segregating handicapped students from the general student body\" and that \"the school district ha[d] presented no evidence that the [IDEA'S preference for mainstreaming] was meant to restrict parental options when the public schools fail to comply with the requirements of the [IDEA] (emphasis in original","sentence":"M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at *16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *49. Although we have never held that parental placements must meet the least restrictive environment requirement, see Carter, 950 F.2d at 160 (noting that \u201cthe [IDEA]\u2019s preference for mainstreaming was aimed at preventing schools from segregating handicapped students from the general student body\u201d and that \u201cthe school district ha[d] presented no evidence that the [IDEA\u2019S preference for mainstreaming] was meant to restrict parental options when the public schools fail to comply with the requirements of the [IDEA] (emphasis in original)), the district court\u2019s consideration of Lindamood-Bell\u2019s restrictive nature was proper because it considered the restrictive nature only as a factor in determining whether the placement was appropriate under the IDEA, not as a dispositive requirement."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"231 F.3d 96, 105","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board,\" but concluding that the IDEA'S mainstreaming requirement \"remains a consideration that bears upon a parent's choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate\"","sentence":"M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at *16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *49; see also M.S ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that \u201cparents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board,\u201d but concluding that the IDEA\u2019S mainstreaming requirement \u201cremains a consideration that bears upon a parent\u2019s choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate\u201d)."},"case_id":3718890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court agreed with the [P] that the Lindamood-Bell placement was \"highly restrictive\" by IDEA standards.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"950 F.2d 160, 160","parenthetical":"noting that \"the [IDEA]'s preference for mainstreaming was aimed at preventing schools from segregating handicapped students from the general student body\" and that \"the school district ha[d] presented no evidence that the [IDEA'S preference for mainstreaming] was meant to restrict parental options when the public schools fail to comply with the requirements of the [IDEA] (emphasis in original","sentence":"M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at *16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *49. Although we have never held that parental placements must meet the least restrictive environment requirement, see Carter, 950 F.2d at 160 (noting that \u201cthe [IDEA]\u2019s preference for mainstreaming was aimed at preventing schools from segregating handicapped students from the general student body\u201d and that \u201cthe school district ha[d] presented no evidence that the [IDEA\u2019S preference for mainstreaming] was meant to restrict parental options when the public schools fail to comply with the requirements of the [IDEA] (emphasis in original)), the district court\u2019s consideration of Lindamood-Bell\u2019s restrictive nature was proper because it considered the restrictive nature only as a factor in determining whether the placement was appropriate under the IDEA, not as a dispositive requirement."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"231 F.3d 96, 105","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"parents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board,\" but concluding that the IDEA'S mainstreaming requirement \"remains a consideration that bears upon a parent's choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate\"","sentence":"M.S., No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 WL 1378545, at *16, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *49; see also M.S ex rel. S.S. v. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that \u201cparents seeking an alternative placement may not be subject to the same mainstreaming requirements as a school board,\u201d but concluding that the IDEA\u2019S mainstreaming requirement \u201cremains a consideration that bears upon a parent\u2019s choice of an alternative placement and may be considered by the hearing officer in determining whether the placement was appropriate\u201d)."},"case_id":3718890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts in this circuit have held that statutory framework may create a property interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"605 F.2d 605, 611","parenthetical":"holding that city administrative code created a property right in receipt of accident disability retirement benefits, where the code required officials to give benefits to applicants who met specified criteria","sentence":"See Kapps, 404 F.3d at 113-15; Basciano v. Herkimer, 605 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir.1978) (holding that city administrative code created a property right in receipt of accident disability retirement benefits, where the code required officials to give benefits to applicants who met specified criteria); see also Winston, 759 F.2d at 242; Sparveri v. Town of Rocky Hill, 396 F.Supp.2d 214, 218 (D.Conn.2005) (noting that the plaintiff claimed that her entitlement to the level of pension and healthcare benefits was rooted in the statutory pension scheme established by the Town Charter and Plan ordinance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"396 F.Supp.2d 214, 218","parenthetical":"noting that the plaintiff claimed that her entitlement to the level of pension and healthcare benefits was rooted in the statutory pension scheme established by the Town Charter and Plan ordinance","sentence":"See Kapps, 404 F.3d at 113-15; Basciano v. Herkimer, 605 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir.1978) (holding that city administrative code created a property right in receipt of accident disability retirement benefits, where the code required officials to give benefits to applicants who met specified criteria); see also Winston, 759 F.2d at 242; Sparveri v. Town of Rocky Hill, 396 F.Supp.2d 214, 218 (D.Conn.2005) (noting that the plaintiff claimed that her entitlement to the level of pension and healthcare benefits was rooted in the statutory pension scheme established by the Town Charter and Plan ordinance)."},"case_id":4234177,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 52 The relevance of this real-world situation to the present legal issue is that, simply stated, electronic credits have no actual physical location once they are created in Western Union's computer system. Instead, just like e-mail communications whose receipt is not limited to any particular location or computer, such electronic credits necessarily exist simultaneously in every place they can be instantly received.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"542 F.3d 879, 884","parenthetical":"Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place","sentence":"See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (\u201ccyberspace,\u201d in which e-mail exists, is \u201ca unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\u201d); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 590-91, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing impossibility of confining Internet to particular geographical areas); see also Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"521 U.S. 844, 851","parenthetical":"\"cyberspace,\" in which e-mail exists, is \"a unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\"","sentence":"See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (\u201ccyberspace,\u201d in which e-mail exists, is \u201ca unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\u201d); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 590-91, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing impossibility of confining Internet to particular geographical areas); see also Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place)."},"case_id":4043320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 52 The relevance of this real-world situation to the present legal issue is that, simply stated, electronic credits have no actual physical location once they are created in Western Union's computer system. Instead, just like e-mail communications whose receipt is not limited to any particular location or computer, such electronic credits necessarily exist simultaneously in every place they can be instantly received.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"cyberspace,\" in which e-mail exists, is \"a unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\"","sentence":"See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (\u201ccyberspace,\u201d in which e-mail exists, is \u201ca unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\u201d); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 590-91, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing impossibility of confining Internet to particular geographical areas); see also Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"542 F.3d 879, 884","parenthetical":"Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place","sentence":"See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (\u201ccyberspace,\u201d in which e-mail exists, is \u201ca unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\u201d); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 590-91, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing impossibility of confining Internet to particular geographical areas); see also Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place)."},"case_id":4043320,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 52 The relevance of this real-world situation to the present legal issue is that, simply stated, electronic credits have no actual physical location once they are created in Western Union's computer system. Instead, just like e-mail communications whose receipt is not limited to any particular location or computer, such electronic credits necessarily exist simultaneously in every place they can be instantly received.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"542 F.3d 879, 884","parenthetical":"Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place","sentence":"See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (\u201ccyberspace,\u201d in which e-mail exists, is \u201ca unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\u201d); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 590-91, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing impossibility of confining Internet to particular geographical areas); see also Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"cyberspace,\" in which e-mail exists, is \"a unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\"","sentence":"See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (\u201ccyberspace,\u201d in which e-mail exists, is \u201ca unique medium ... located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world\u201d); Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 590-91, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 152 L.Ed.2d 771 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing impossibility of confining Internet to particular geographical areas); see also Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Web site information available everywhere, not confined to discrete jurisdiction or exclusively located in any one place)."},"case_id":4043320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This court has not interpreted \"national origin\" so narrowly as to provide protections only to individuals who were born outside the United States.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"332 U.S. 633, 640","parenthetical":"discrimination against citizen due to father's Japanese birth violates equal protection","sentence":"See also Espinoza, supra at 88 (noting that words \u201cnational origin\u201d and \u201cancest[ryj\u201d were equated by drafters of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) (discrimination against citizen due to father\u2019s Japanese birth violates equal protection)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"418 Mass. 773, 775","parenthetical":"finding discrimination on basis of \"ethnicity\" when considering prosecutor's peremptory challenges of jurors with \"Irish-sounding surnames\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carleton, 418 Mass. 773, 775 (1994) (finding discrimination on basis of \u201cethnicity\u201d when considering prosecutor\u2019s peremptory challenges of jurors with \u201cIrish-sounding surnames\u201d)."},"case_id":4271396,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Given this state of the record, Surasky's statement, when viewed, as it must be, in the light most favorable to him, is fairly described as a mere \"denial of guilt\" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. SS 3C1.1. Accordingly, Surasky's statement cannot provide the basis for an obstruction of justice enhancement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"937 F.2d 1191, 1194","parenthetical":"noting that \"a simple denial of guilt -- as in pleading not guilty, or saying to an arresting officer, T didn't do anything' -- cannot be the basis for an obstruction enhancement under SS 3C1.1.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 289-90 (7th Cir.1991) (reversing an obstruction of justice enhancement imposed upon a motorist who, when asked by a state trooper if he had anything illegal the car, replied that he did not, even though there was marijuana in the vehicle); see also United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that \u201ca simple denial of guilt \u2014 as in pleading not guilty, or saying to an arresting officer, T didn\u2019t do anything\u2019 \u2014 cannot be the basis for an obstruction enhancement under \u00a7 3C1.1.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"929 F.2d 285, 289-90","parenthetical":"reversing an obstruction of justice enhancement imposed upon a motorist who, when asked by a state trooper if he had anything illegal the car, replied that he did not, even though there was marijuana in the vehicle","sentence":"See United States v. Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 289-90 (7th Cir.1991) (reversing an obstruction of justice enhancement imposed upon a motorist who, when asked by a state trooper if he had anything illegal the car, replied that he did not, even though there was marijuana in the vehicle); see also United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that \u201ca simple denial of guilt \u2014 as in pleading not guilty, or saying to an arresting officer, T didn\u2019t do anything\u2019 \u2014 cannot be the basis for an obstruction enhancement under \u00a7 3C1.1.\u201d)."},"case_id":11287947,"label":"b"}
{"context":"None of these cases involve the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to which persons on community custody in the State of Washington submit as a condition of being allowed to serve sentencing terms outside prison confinement. Thus, we note, but do not follow, the trend in other states and federal circuit courts to analogize and to treat electronic storage media as closed containers for search and seizure purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects","sentence":"But see State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"26 F. Supp. 2d 936, 936-37","parenthetical":"finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive","sentence":"See Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37 (finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534 (analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container)."},"case_id":4020534,"label":"b"}
{"context":"None of these cases involve the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to which persons on community custody in the State of Washington submit as a condition of being allowed to serve sentencing terms outside prison confinement. Thus, we note, but do not follow, the trend in other states and federal circuit courts to analogize and to treat electronic storage media as closed containers for search and seizure purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects","sentence":"But see State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"26 F. Supp. 2d 936, 936-37","parenthetical":"finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive","sentence":"See Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37 (finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534 (analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container)."},"case_id":4020534,"label":"b"}
{"context":"None of these cases involve the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to which persons on community custody in the State of Washington submit as a condition of being allowed to serve sentencing terms outside prison confinement. Thus, we note, but do not follow, the trend in other states and federal circuit courts to analogize and to treat electronic storage media as closed containers for search and seizure purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"26 F. Supp. 2d 936, 936-37","parenthetical":"finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive","sentence":"See Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37 (finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534 (analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"920 N.E.2d 949, 954","parenthetical":"arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects","sentence":"But see State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects)."},"case_id":4020534,"label":"a"}
{"context":"None of these cases involve the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to which persons on community custody in the State of Washington submit as a condition of being allowed to serve sentencing terms outside prison confinement. Thus, we note, but do not follow, the trend in other states and federal circuit courts to analogize and to treat electronic storage media as closed containers for search and seizure purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"26 F. Supp. 2d 936, 936-37","parenthetical":"finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive","sentence":"See Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37 (finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534 (analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects","sentence":"But see State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects)."},"case_id":4020534,"label":"a"}
{"context":"None of these cases involve the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to which persons on community custody in the State of Washington submit as a condition of being allowed to serve sentencing terms outside prison confinement. Thus, we note, but do not follow, the trend in other states and federal circuit courts to analogize and to treat electronic storage media as closed containers for search and seizure purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"830 F. Supp. 534, 534","parenthetical":"analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container","sentence":"See Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37 (finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534 (analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects","sentence":"But see State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects)."},"case_id":4020534,"label":"a"}
{"context":"None of these cases involve the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to which persons on community custody in the State of Washington submit as a condition of being allowed to serve sentencing terms outside prison confinement. Thus, we note, but do not follow, the trend in other states and federal circuit courts to analogize and to treat electronic storage media as closed containers for search and seizure purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects","sentence":"But see State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"830 F. Supp. 534, 534","parenthetical":"analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container","sentence":"See Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37 (finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534 (analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container)."},"case_id":4020534,"label":"b"}
{"context":"None of these cases involve the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to which persons on community custody in the State of Washington submit as a condition of being allowed to serve sentencing terms outside prison confinement. Thus, we note, but do not follow, the trend in other states and federal circuit courts to analogize and to treat electronic storage media as closed containers for search and seizure purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"920 N.E.2d 949, 954","parenthetical":"arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects","sentence":"But see State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"830 F. Supp. 534, 534","parenthetical":"analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container","sentence":"See Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37 (finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534 (analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container)."},"case_id":4020534,"label":"b"}
{"context":"None of these cases involve the corresponding diminished expectation of privacy to which persons on community custody in the State of Washington submit as a condition of being allowed to serve sentencing terms outside prison confinement. Thus, we note, but do not follow, the trend in other states and federal circuit courts to analogize and to treat electronic storage media as closed containers for search and seizure purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"830 F. Supp. 534, 534","parenthetical":"analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container","sentence":"See Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 936-37 (finding that the owner of a computer manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of data files by storing them on a computer hard drive); Chan, 830 F. Supp. at 534 (analogizing data in a pager to contents of a closed container)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects","sentence":"But see State v. Smith, 124 Ohio St. 3d 163, 2009-Ohio-6426, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010) (arguing that cell phones were not closed containers because they did not store physical objects)."},"case_id":4020534,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The record demonstrates: (1) the state's case rested solely on two teenage complainants' testimony of abuse; (2) Sebasky vigorously denied any misconduct; (3)the trial court found the other crime was sufficiently relevant to the charged offense; (4) the trial court gave a cautionary instruction at the time the evidence was received and again during final jury instructions; and (5) during final argument, the prosecutor stressed the limited purpose of the Spreigl evidence. Under these circumstances, the Spreigl evidence is relevant and its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"530 N.W.2d 191, 196-97","parenthetical":"requiring certain procedural safeguards, including a cautionary instruction upon receipt of the evidence and as part of the final instructions","sentence":"See Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d at 241-42 (affirming the admission of Spreigl evidence in a criminal sexual conduct case and finding it was highly relevant to the issue of whether the conduct occurred because the defendant denied the misconduct and the trial court found the other crime was sufficiently relevant to the charged crime); State v. Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn.1992) (stating that a closer relationship between the Spreigl evidence and the charged crime shows a greater probative value and a lesser likelihood that the evidence will be used improperly); see also State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Minn.1995) (requiring certain procedural safeguards, including a cautionary instruction upon receipt of the evidence and as part of the final instructions)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"497 N.W.2d 241, 241-42","parenthetical":"affirming the admission of Spreigl evidence in a criminal sexual conduct case and finding it was highly relevant to the issue of whether the conduct occurred because the defendant denied the misconduct and the trial court found the other crime was sufficiently relevant to the charged crime","sentence":"See Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d at 241-42 (affirming the admission of Spreigl evidence in a criminal sexual conduct case and finding it was highly relevant to the issue of whether the conduct occurred because the defendant denied the misconduct and the trial court found the other crime was sufficiently relevant to the charged crime); State v. Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn.1992) (stating that a closer relationship between the Spreigl evidence and the charged crime shows a greater probative value and a lesser likelihood that the evidence will be used improperly); see also State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Minn.1995) (requiring certain procedural safeguards, including a cautionary instruction upon receipt of the evidence and as part of the final instructions)."},"case_id":10695609,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The record demonstrates: (1) the state's case rested solely on two teenage complainants' testimony of abuse; (2) Sebasky vigorously denied any misconduct; (3)the trial court found the other crime was sufficiently relevant to the charged offense; (4) the trial court gave a cautionary instruction at the time the evidence was received and again during final jury instructions; and (5) during final argument, the prosecutor stressed the limited purpose of the Spreigl evidence. Under these circumstances, the Spreigl evidence is relevant and its probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"530 N.W.2d 191, 196-97","parenthetical":"requiring certain procedural safeguards, including a cautionary instruction upon receipt of the evidence and as part of the final instructions","sentence":"See Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d at 241-42 (affirming the admission of Spreigl evidence in a criminal sexual conduct case and finding it was highly relevant to the issue of whether the conduct occurred because the defendant denied the misconduct and the trial court found the other crime was sufficiently relevant to the charged crime); State v. Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn.1992) (stating that a closer relationship between the Spreigl evidence and the charged crime shows a greater probative value and a lesser likelihood that the evidence will be used improperly); see also State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Minn.1995) (requiring certain procedural safeguards, including a cautionary instruction upon receipt of the evidence and as part of the final instructions)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"484 N.W.2d 27, 31","parenthetical":"stating that a closer relationship between the Spreigl evidence and the charged crime shows a greater probative value and a lesser likelihood that the evidence will be used improperly","sentence":"See Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d at 241-42 (affirming the admission of Spreigl evidence in a criminal sexual conduct case and finding it was highly relevant to the issue of whether the conduct occurred because the defendant denied the misconduct and the trial court found the other crime was sufficiently relevant to the charged crime); State v. Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn.1992) (stating that a closer relationship between the Spreigl evidence and the charged crime shows a greater probative value and a lesser likelihood that the evidence will be used improperly); see also State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 196-97 (Minn.1995) (requiring certain procedural safeguards, including a cautionary instruction upon receipt of the evidence and as part of the final instructions)."},"case_id":10695609,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court found that the officer activated his lights to warn oncoming traffic that he was parked on the roadway. However, the officer's subjective intent in activating his emergency lights was irrelevant where, as here, this intent was never conveyed to appellant. The question is how the circumstances, viewed objectively, would have been perceived by a reasonable person in appellant's position.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Rjegardless of the officers' intent in activating the lights, whether a seizure occurred is determined by what a reasonable person in G.M.'s position would have concluded based upon the conduct of the officers.\"","sentence":"See G.M., 19 So.3d at 980 n. 5 (\u201c[Rjegardless of the officers\u2019 intent in activating the lights, whether a seizure occurred is determined by what a reasonable person in G.M.\u2019s position would have concluded based upon the conduct of the officers.\u201d); see also State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 318 (Tenn.2006) (\u201cWhile the officer may have subjectively intended to activate his blue lights solely for his safety and the safety of others on the road, the litmus test is the objective belief of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant, not that of the officer.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"185 S.W.3d 311, 318","parenthetical":"\"While the officer may have subjectively intended to activate his blue lights solely for his safety and the safety of others on the road, the litmus test is the objective belief of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant, not that of the officer.\"","sentence":"See G.M., 19 So.3d at 980 n. 5 (\u201c[Rjegardless of the officers\u2019 intent in activating the lights, whether a seizure occurred is determined by what a reasonable person in G.M.\u2019s position would have concluded based upon the conduct of the officers.\u201d); see also State v. Williams, 185 S.W.3d 311, 318 (Tenn.2006) (\u201cWhile the officer may have subjectively intended to activate his blue lights solely for his safety and the safety of others on the road, the litmus test is the objective belief of a reasonable person in the position of the defendant, not that of the officer.\u201d)."},"case_id":7009419,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant Rickhoff refused to issue a license because Holmes and Phariss are both men. This denial establishes an Article III injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"962 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1273-74","parenthetical":"noting couple proved standing because they sought marriage license and were denied such license because of their same-sex couple status","sentence":"See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that courts have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an Article III injury); see also Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74, 2014 WL 116013, at *14 (noting couple proved standing because they sought marriage license and were denied such license because of their same-sex couple status); see also Bostic, 970 F.Supp.2d at 473-74, 2014 WL 561978, at *14. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs De Leon and Dimetman contend that because Texas does not recognize same-sex marriage, Dimetman could not be considered their child\u2019s legal parent unless she went through the long administrative and expensive process of adoption. The Court finds these monetary damages constitute a concrete, injury in fact suffered by Plaintiffs due to Texas\u2019 ban on same-sex marriage."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 F.3d 370, 376","parenthetical":"holding that courts have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an Article III injury","sentence":"See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that courts have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an Article III injury); see also Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74, 2014 WL 116013, at *14 (noting couple proved standing because they sought marriage license and were denied such license because of their same-sex couple status); see also Bostic, 970 F.Supp.2d at 473-74, 2014 WL 561978, at *14. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs De Leon and Dimetman contend that because Texas does not recognize same-sex marriage, Dimetman could not be considered their child\u2019s legal parent unless she went through the long administrative and expensive process of adoption. The Court finds these monetary damages constitute a concrete, injury in fact suffered by Plaintiffs due to Texas\u2019 ban on same-sex marriage."},"case_id":4233804,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendant Rickhoff refused to issue a license because Holmes and Phariss are both men. This denial establishes an Article III injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 F.3d 370, 376","parenthetical":"holding that courts have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an Article III injury","sentence":"See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that courts have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an Article III injury); see also Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74, 2014 WL 116013, at *14 (noting couple proved standing because they sought marriage license and were denied such license because of their same-sex couple status); see also Bostic, 970 F.Supp.2d at 473-74, 2014 WL 561978, at *14. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs De Leon and Dimetman contend that because Texas does not recognize same-sex marriage, Dimetman could not be considered their child\u2019s legal parent unless she went through the long administrative and expensive process of adoption. The Court finds these monetary damages constitute a concrete, injury in fact suffered by Plaintiffs due to Texas\u2019 ban on same-sex marriage."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2014 WL 116013, at *14","parenthetical":"noting couple proved standing because they sought marriage license and were denied such license because of their same-sex couple status","sentence":"See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 376 (D.C.Cir.2007) (holding that courts have consistently treated a license or permit denial pursuant to a state or federal administrative scheme as an Article III injury); see also Bishop, 962 F.Supp.2d at 1273-74, 2014 WL 116013, at *14 (noting couple proved standing because they sought marriage license and were denied such license because of their same-sex couple status); see also Bostic, 970 F.Supp.2d at 473-74, 2014 WL 561978, at *14. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs De Leon and Dimetman contend that because Texas does not recognize same-sex marriage, Dimetman could not be considered their child\u2019s legal parent unless she went through the long administrative and expensive process of adoption. The Court finds these monetary damages constitute a concrete, injury in fact suffered by Plaintiffs due to Texas\u2019 ban on same-sex marriage."},"case_id":4233804,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, I think the instruction in the present case, if not inaccurate, was at least confusing. Confusing instructions are especially problematic in a factually close case, as is the situation here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \"significant this [was] not a close case\"","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"598 F.3d 982, 989-90","parenthetical":"holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"case_id":6889479,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, I think the instruction in the present case, if not inaccurate, was at least confusing. Confusing instructions are especially problematic in a factually close case, as is the situation here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"942 F.2d 405, 411-12","parenthetical":"reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \"significant this [was] not a close case\"","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"case_id":6889479,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, I think the instruction in the present case, if not inaccurate, was at least confusing. Confusing instructions are especially problematic in a factually close case, as is the situation here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"598 F.3d 982, 989-90","parenthetical":"holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01","parenthetical":"finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \"significant this [was] not a close case\"","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"case_id":6889479,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, I think the instruction in the present case, if not inaccurate, was at least confusing. Confusing instructions are especially problematic in a factually close case, as is the situation here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"942 F.2d 405, 411-12","parenthetical":"reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01","parenthetical":"finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \"significant this [was] not a close case\"","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"case_id":6889479,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, I think the instruction in the present case, if not inaccurate, was at least confusing. Confusing instructions are especially problematic in a factually close case, as is the situation here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \"could have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\"","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"598 F.3d 982, 989-90","parenthetical":"holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"case_id":6889479,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, I think the instruction in the present case, if not inaccurate, was at least confusing. Confusing instructions are especially problematic in a factually close case, as is the situation here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \"could have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\"","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"942 F.2d 405, 411-12","parenthetical":"reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"case_id":6889479,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, I think the instruction in the present case, if not inaccurate, was at least confusing. Confusing instructions are especially problematic in a factually close case, as is the situation here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 S.E.2d 260, 263","parenthetical":"noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \"could have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\"","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"598 F.3d 982, 989-90","parenthetical":"holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"case_id":6889479,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, I think the instruction in the present case, if not inaccurate, was at least confusing. Confusing instructions are especially problematic in a factually close case, as is the situation here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"942 F.2d 405, 411-12","parenthetical":"reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"647 S.E.2d 260, 263","parenthetical":"noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \"could have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\"","sentence":"See People v. James, 196 Cal. App.3d 272, 241 Cal.Rptr. 691, 700-01 (1987) (finding a confusing instruction harmless and noting it was \u201csignificant this [was] not a close case\u201d); Preston v. State, 282 Ga. 210, 647 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2007) (noting a particular instruction should not be given in the future, as it \u201ccould have the possibility of being confusing in a close case\u201d); see also United States v. Wisecar-ver, 598 F.3d 982, 989-90 (8th Cir.2010) (holding confusing jury instruction given in a close case seriously affected the fairness and integrity of the trial); United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411-12 (6th Cir.1991) (reversing and remanding for a new trial in a close case because the district court erred by giving an instruction that had the possibility of causing considerable jury confusion)."},"case_id":6889479,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We hold that this appeal has been mooted by the district court's dissolution of the preliminary injunction, as we can no longer grant Appellant's requested relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"396 Fed.Appx. 147, 147","parenthetical":"\"In order for this court to maintain appellate jurisdiction over Appellants' appeal of the preliminary injunction, it must be able to provide the parties with some type of effective relief.\"","sentence":"See In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc., 593 F.3d 418, 423 (5th Cir.2010) (\u201cIf an appellate court is unable to grant any remedy for an appellant, its opinion would be merely advisory and it must dismiss the appeal as moot.\u201d); see also Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 396 Fed.Appx. 147, 147 (5th Cir.2010) (\u201cIn order for this court to maintain appellate jurisdiction over Appellants\u2019 appeal of the preliminary injunction, it must be able to provide the parties with some type of effective relief.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"593 F.3d 418, 423","parenthetical":"\"If an appellate court is unable to grant any remedy for an appellant, its opinion would be merely advisory and it must dismiss the appeal as moot.\"","sentence":"See In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc., 593 F.3d 418, 423 (5th Cir.2010) (\u201cIf an appellate court is unable to grant any remedy for an appellant, its opinion would be merely advisory and it must dismiss the appeal as moot.\u201d); see also Hornbeck Offshore Servs., L.L.C. v. Salazar, 396 Fed.Appx. 147, 147 (5th Cir.2010) (\u201cIn order for this court to maintain appellate jurisdiction over Appellants\u2019 appeal of the preliminary injunction, it must be able to provide the parties with some type of effective relief.\u201d)."},"case_id":4211872,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As debtors will rarely admit an intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor, courts have long considered objective \"badges of fraud\" in determining the existence of fraudulent intent. See, e.g., In re Sharp Intern.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"403 F.3d 43, 56","parenthetical":"in fraudulent conveyance action, pleader may rely upon objective badges of fraud to support inference of actual fraudulent intent","sentence":"Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (in fraudulent conveyance action, pleader may rely upon objective badges of fraud to support inference of actual fraudulent intent); In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 764 (1st Cir. 1994) (determination that debtor had actual intent to fraudulently transfer property can be made based upon undisputed material facts); see also In re Marrama, 445 F.3d 518, 522 (1st Cir. 2006) (\u201c[I]n certain cases, circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently potent to establish fraudulent intent beyond hope of contradiction.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"445 F.3d 518, 522","parenthetical":"\"[I]n certain cases, circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently potent to establish fraudulent intent beyond hope of contradiction.\"","sentence":"Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (in fraudulent conveyance action, pleader may rely upon objective badges of fraud to support inference of actual fraudulent intent); In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 764 (1st Cir. 1994) (determination that debtor had actual intent to fraudulently transfer property can be made based upon undisputed material facts); see also In re Marrama, 445 F.3d 518, 522 (1st Cir. 2006) (\u201c[I]n certain cases, circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently potent to establish fraudulent intent beyond hope of contradiction.\u201d)."},"case_id":4139430,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As debtors will rarely admit an intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor, courts have long considered objective \"badges of fraud\" in determining the existence of fraudulent intent. See, e.g., In re Sharp Intern.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"445 F.3d 518, 522","parenthetical":"\"[I]n certain cases, circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently potent to establish fraudulent intent beyond hope of contradiction.\"","sentence":"Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (in fraudulent conveyance action, pleader may rely upon objective badges of fraud to support inference of actual fraudulent intent); In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 764 (1st Cir. 1994) (determination that debtor had actual intent to fraudulently transfer property can be made based upon undisputed material facts); see also In re Marrama, 445 F.3d 518, 522 (1st Cir. 2006) (\u201c[I]n certain cases, circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently potent to establish fraudulent intent beyond hope of contradiction.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"37 F.3d 760, 764","parenthetical":"determination that debtor had actual intent to fraudulently transfer property can be made based upon undisputed material facts","sentence":"Corp., 403 F.3d 43, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (in fraudulent conveyance action, pleader may rely upon objective badges of fraud to support inference of actual fraudulent intent); In re Varrasso, 37 F.3d 760, 764 (1st Cir. 1994) (determination that debtor had actual intent to fraudulently transfer property can be made based upon undisputed material facts); see also In re Marrama, 445 F.3d 518, 522 (1st Cir. 2006) (\u201c[I]n certain cases, circumstantial evidence may be sufficiently potent to establish fraudulent intent beyond hope of contradiction.\u201d)."},"case_id":4139430,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nonetheless, the risk of injecting unnecessary delay in resolving this case may be greater if this seven-year-old case is transferred. This Court is familiar with the multiple issues and lengthy procedural history of the case, and decided Toyobo's dispositive motions. Given the parties' voluminous filings, this experience is not insignificant, and a court in the Western District of Michigan will likely require a substantial amount of time to familiarize itself with the case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"587 F.2d 1156, 1156","parenthetical":"affirming denial of motion to transfer in part because of the delay that would arise while the transferee court familiarized itself with the complex case that the district court was already prepared to try","sentence":"See Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d at 1156 (affirming denial of motion to transfer in part because of the delay that would arise while the transferee court familiarized itself with the complex case that the district court was already prepared to try); cf. Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc., 403 F.Supp.2d 68, 73 (D.D.C.2005) (noting that \u201cthe case has not progressed so far that delay would result if another court must familiarize itself with the disputed facts or the procedural background\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"403 F.Supp.2d 68, 73","parenthetical":"noting that \"the case has not progressed so far that delay would result if another court must familiarize itself with the disputed facts or the procedural background\"","sentence":"See Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d at 1156 (affirming denial of motion to transfer in part because of the delay that would arise while the transferee court familiarized itself with the complex case that the district court was already prepared to try); cf. Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc., 403 F.Supp.2d 68, 73 (D.D.C.2005) (noting that \u201cthe case has not progressed so far that delay would result if another court must familiarize itself with the disputed facts or the procedural background\u201d)."},"case_id":3820270,"label":"a"}
{"context":"If the State's payments were'\"voluntary\" but do not accord with HHS's final position, then HHS should remit the money. If, however, HHS intends to keep the money under its view .of the Transitional Reinsurance Program's applicability, then such a decision would' be tantamount to the \"consummation of the agency's decision-making process .... by which rights-or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"520 U.S. 178, 178","parenthetical":"contrasting a \"tentative recommendation\" from \"a final- and binding determination\"","sentence":"Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (quotations omitted) (contrasting a \u201ctentative recommendation\u201d from \u201ca final- and binding determination\u201d); see also Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir.2004) (\u201cThe finality\u2018inquiry, we are told, is a \u2019flexible\u2019 and \u2018pragmatic\u2019 one.\u201d (quotation omitted)); cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that agency\u2019s settled position, upon which it will insist that state and local authorities comply with its understanding, is renewable under the APA)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"208 F.3d 1015, 1022","parenthetical":"holding that agency's settled position, upon which it will insist that state and local authorities comply with its understanding, is renewable under the APA","sentence":"Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (quotations omitted) (contrasting a \u201ctentative recommendation\u201d from \u201ca final- and binding determination\u201d); see also Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir.2004) (\u201cThe finality\u2018inquiry, we are told, is a \u2019flexible\u2019 and \u2018pragmatic\u2019 one.\u201d (quotation omitted)); cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that agency\u2019s settled position, upon which it will insist that state and local authorities comply with its understanding, is renewable under the APA)."},"case_id":4291018,"label":"a"}
{"context":"If the State's payments were'\"voluntary\" but do not accord with HHS's final position, then HHS should remit the money. If, however, HHS intends to keep the money under its view .of the Transitional Reinsurance Program's applicability, then such a decision would' be tantamount to the \"consummation of the agency's decision-making process .... by which rights-or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"contrasting a \"tentative recommendation\" from \"a final- and binding determination\"","sentence":"Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (quotations omitted) (contrasting a \u201ctentative recommendation\u201d from \u201ca final- and binding determination\u201d); see also Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir.2004) (\u201cThe finality\u2018inquiry, we are told, is a \u2019flexible\u2019 and \u2018pragmatic\u2019 one.\u201d (quotation omitted)); cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that agency\u2019s settled position, upon which it will insist that state and local authorities comply with its understanding, is renewable under the APA)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"208 F.3d 1015, 1022","parenthetical":"holding that agency's settled position, upon which it will insist that state and local authorities comply with its understanding, is renewable under the APA","sentence":"Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (quotations omitted) (contrasting a \u201ctentative recommendation\u201d from \u201ca final- and binding determination\u201d); see also Air Brake Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir.2004) (\u201cThe finality\u2018inquiry, we are told, is a \u2019flexible\u2019 and \u2018pragmatic\u2019 one.\u201d (quotation omitted)); cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1022 (D.C.Cir.2000) (holding that agency\u2019s settled position, upon which it will insist that state and local authorities comply with its understanding, is renewable under the APA)."},"case_id":4291018,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Congress specifically provided that, if a sentence is imposed for a failure to appear count, it must be \"consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3146(b)(2). The intent of the statute is clear: failure to appear for a court ordered proceeding is a serious crime and should be deterred by the imposition of a separate penalty through a consecutive sentence. The consecutive sentencing requirement of the statute is in conflict with Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G SS 2J1.6. The statute's requirement of a consecutive sentence, therefore, prevails over the Sentencing Guidelines.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94","parenthetical":"treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules","sentence":"But see United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94 (3d Cir.1994) (treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"13 F.3d 1206, 1214","parenthetical":"\"[Ejvery appellate court that has considered this question has ruled that a trial court has no discretion to ignore the directive for consecutive sentences that the [firearms sentencing] statute contains.\"","sentence":"See Packer, 70 F.3d at 360 (holding that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3146(b)(2) prevails over Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G \u00a7 2J1.6, because the commentary defeats the statute\u2019s intent); cf. United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1214 (8th Cir.1994) (\u201c[Ejvery appellate court that has considered this question has ruled that a trial court has no discretion to ignore the directive for consecutive sentences that the [firearms sentencing] statute contains.\u201d); United States v. Schweitzer 960 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir.1992) (\u201cAll of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\u201d), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1003, 113 S.Ct. 609, 121 L.Ed.2d 544 (1992)."},"case_id":1362629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Congress specifically provided that, if a sentence is imposed for a failure to appear count, it must be \"consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3146(b)(2). The intent of the statute is clear: failure to appear for a court ordered proceeding is a serious crime and should be deterred by the imposition of a separate penalty through a consecutive sentence. The consecutive sentencing requirement of the statute is in conflict with Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G SS 2J1.6. The statute's requirement of a consecutive sentence, therefore, prevails over the Sentencing Guidelines.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"960 F.2d 405, 408","parenthetical":"\"All of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\"","sentence":"See Packer, 70 F.3d at 360 (holding that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3146(b)(2) prevails over Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G \u00a7 2J1.6, because the commentary defeats the statute\u2019s intent); cf. United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1214 (8th Cir.1994) (\u201c[Ejvery appellate court that has considered this question has ruled that a trial court has no discretion to ignore the directive for consecutive sentences that the [firearms sentencing] statute contains.\u201d); United States v. Schweitzer 960 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir.1992) (\u201cAll of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\u201d), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1003, 113 S.Ct. 609, 121 L.Ed.2d 544 (1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94","parenthetical":"treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules","sentence":"But see United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94 (3d Cir.1994) (treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules)."},"case_id":1362629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Congress specifically provided that, if a sentence is imposed for a failure to appear count, it must be \"consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3146(b)(2). The intent of the statute is clear: failure to appear for a court ordered proceeding is a serious crime and should be deterred by the imposition of a separate penalty through a consecutive sentence. The consecutive sentencing requirement of the statute is in conflict with Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G SS 2J1.6. The statute's requirement of a consecutive sentence, therefore, prevails over the Sentencing Guidelines.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94","parenthetical":"treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules","sentence":"But see United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94 (3d Cir.1994) (treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"All of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\"","sentence":"See Packer, 70 F.3d at 360 (holding that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3146(b)(2) prevails over Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G \u00a7 2J1.6, because the commentary defeats the statute\u2019s intent); cf. United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1214 (8th Cir.1994) (\u201c[Ejvery appellate court that has considered this question has ruled that a trial court has no discretion to ignore the directive for consecutive sentences that the [firearms sentencing] statute contains.\u201d); United States v. Schweitzer 960 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir.1992) (\u201cAll of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\u201d), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1003, 113 S.Ct. 609, 121 L.Ed.2d 544 (1992)."},"case_id":1362629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Congress specifically provided that, if a sentence is imposed for a failure to appear count, it must be \"consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3146(b)(2). The intent of the statute is clear: failure to appear for a court ordered proceeding is a serious crime and should be deterred by the imposition of a separate penalty through a consecutive sentence. The consecutive sentencing requirement of the statute is in conflict with Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G SS 2J1.6. The statute's requirement of a consecutive sentence, therefore, prevails over the Sentencing Guidelines.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94","parenthetical":"treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules","sentence":"But see United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94 (3d Cir.1994) (treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"All of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\"","sentence":"See Packer, 70 F.3d at 360 (holding that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3146(b)(2) prevails over Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G \u00a7 2J1.6, because the commentary defeats the statute\u2019s intent); cf. United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1214 (8th Cir.1994) (\u201c[Ejvery appellate court that has considered this question has ruled that a trial court has no discretion to ignore the directive for consecutive sentences that the [firearms sentencing] statute contains.\u201d); United States v. Schweitzer 960 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir.1992) (\u201cAll of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\u201d), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1003, 113 S.Ct. 609, 121 L.Ed.2d 544 (1992)."},"case_id":1362629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Congress specifically provided that, if a sentence is imposed for a failure to appear count, it must be \"consecutive to the sentence of imprisonment for any other offense.\" 18 U.S.C. SS 3146(b)(2). The intent of the statute is clear: failure to appear for a court ordered proceeding is a serious crime and should be deterred by the imposition of a separate penalty through a consecutive sentence. The consecutive sentencing requirement of the statute is in conflict with Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G SS 2J1.6. The statute's requirement of a consecutive sentence, therefore, prevails over the Sentencing Guidelines.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"All of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\"","sentence":"See Packer, 70 F.3d at 360 (holding that 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3146(b)(2) prevails over Commentary 3 to U.S.S.G \u00a7 2J1.6, because the commentary defeats the statute\u2019s intent); cf. United States v. Vue, 13 F.3d 1206, 1214 (8th Cir.1994) (\u201c[Ejvery appellate court that has considered this question has ruled that a trial court has no discretion to ignore the directive for consecutive sentences that the [firearms sentencing] statute contains.\u201d); United States v. Schweitzer 960 F.2d 405, 408 (5th Cir.1992) (\u201cAll of the United States Courts of Appeal have agreed that statutorily mandated sentences ... prevail over the guidelines when in apparent conflict.\u201d), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1003, 113 S.Ct. 609, 121 L.Ed.2d 544 (1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94","parenthetical":"treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules","sentence":"But see United States v. Pardo, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193-94 (3d Cir.1994) (treating failure to appear as obstruction of justice enhancement to underlying fraud offense by applying grouping rules)."},"case_id":1362629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We decline Chase's invitation to conflate the two transfers made by Lee in the refinancing transaction and treat them as one for purposes of applying the earmarking defense. To do so would ignore what actually occurred in the transaction and disregard the Bankruptcy Code's plain meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"398 F.3d 746, 746","parenthetical":"\"The recording of a mortgage constitutes a transfer of an interest in the subject property for purposes of SS 547.\"","sentence":"See also In re Lewis, 398 F.3d at 746 (\u201cThe recording of a mortgage constitutes a transfer of an interest in the subject property for purposes of \u00a7 547.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 F.3d 16, 16","parenthetical":"\"[T]he earmarking concept does not provide [the refinancer] an escape from the plain language of [the Bankruptcy Code] in the case of a belatedly-perfected transfer of a security interest.\"","sentence":"See In re Lazarus, 478 F.3d at 16 (\u201c[T]he earmarking concept does not provide [the refinancer] an escape from the plain language of [the Bankruptcy Code] in the case of a belatedly-perfected transfer of a security interest.\u201d)."},"case_id":4061463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs demographic numbers are accurate, the. WIC Program staffs racial breakdown alone \"does not make it more or less likely that [Defendants] discriminated against [Plaintiff] because of her race.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"196 F.3d 435, 450","parenthetical":"finding statistical analysis that failed to account for major variables insufficient to support inference of discrimination","sentence":"Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir.1999) (finding statistical analysis that failed to account for major variables insufficient to support inference of discrimination); see also Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1990) (finding statistical report\u2019s \u201cinference of [age] discrimination solely on the basis of the raw numbers is impermissible in the absence of any attempt to account for other causes of the ... anomaly\u201d); Baron v. New York City Dep\u2019t of Educ., No. 06-CV-2816, 2009 WL 1938975, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57515, at *16 (E.D.N.Y."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"895 F.2d 80, 83","parenthetical":"finding statistical report's \"inference of [age] discrimination solely on the basis of the raw numbers is impermissible in the absence of any attempt to account for other causes of the ... anomaly\"","sentence":"Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir.1999) (finding statistical analysis that failed to account for major variables insufficient to support inference of discrimination); see also Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir.1990) (finding statistical report\u2019s \u201cinference of [age] discrimination solely on the basis of the raw numbers is impermissible in the absence of any attempt to account for other causes of the ... anomaly\u201d); Baron v. New York City Dep\u2019t of Educ., No. 06-CV-2816, 2009 WL 1938975, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57515, at *16 (E.D.N.Y."},"case_id":4229471,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While the Second Circuit has adopted a relatively broad interpretation of which statements may \"relate\" to a witness's direct testimony, I do not understand it to extend to the statements cited by El-Hage. Although certain statements useful for impeaching a witness may, under Second Circuit authority, relate to the witness's testimony, such statements appear to be limited to those that might impeach a witness for bias, interest, faulty memory, or some similar reason.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"609 F.2d 48, 48-49","parenthetical":"\"a statement may 'relate,' within the meaning of [the Jencks Act], not only to the witness' factual narrative, but also to impeachment of his direct testimony by showing bias and interest.\"","sentence":"See James, 609 F.2d at 48-49 (\u201ca statement may \u2018relate,\u2019 within the meaning of [the Jencks Act], not only to the witness\u2019 factual narrative, but also to impeachment of his direct testimony by showing bias and interest.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Borelli, 336 F.2d at 380 (\u201c[w]e can see no reason why. a statement that would support impeachment for bias and interest does not \u2018relate\u2019 to the witness\u2019 testimony as much as a statement permitting impeachment for faulty memory.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"336 F.2d 380, 380","parenthetical":"\"[w]e can see no reason why. a statement that would support impeachment for bias and interest does not 'relate' to the witness' testimony as much as a statement permitting impeachment for faulty memory.\"","sentence":"See James, 609 F.2d at 48-49 (\u201ca statement may \u2018relate,\u2019 within the meaning of [the Jencks Act], not only to the witness\u2019 factual narrative, but also to impeachment of his direct testimony by showing bias and interest.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Borelli, 336 F.2d at 380 (\u201c[w]e can see no reason why. a statement that would support impeachment for bias and interest does not \u2018relate\u2019 to the witness\u2019 testimony as much as a statement permitting impeachment for faulty memory.\u201d)."},"case_id":1304593,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To properly state a violation under any of the provisions of SS 1991(A), a complaint must identify \"each alleged untrue statement or material omission and the reason or reasons why the statement or omission is misleading or the omission is material.\" Ariz.Rev.Stat. SS 44-2082(A); see Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b) (requiring complainants to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake). Similarly, a complaint must set forth facts suggesting that each Defendant made the misrepresentations at issue, or at least had a duty to disclose the facts necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances, not misleading.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 174, 174","parenthetical":"\"When an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\"","sentence":"See Dunahay v. Struzik, 96 Ariz. 246, 249, 393 P.2d 930, 933 (1964) (\u201cWhile Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\u201d); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (\u201cWhen an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\u201d) (quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 Ariz. 246, 249","parenthetical":"\"While Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\"","sentence":"See Dunahay v. Struzik, 96 Ariz. 246, 249, 393 P.2d 930, 933 (1964) (\u201cWhile Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\u201d); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (\u201cWhen an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\u201d) (quotation omitted)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To properly state a violation under any of the provisions of SS 1991(A), a complaint must identify \"each alleged untrue statement or material omission and the reason or reasons why the statement or omission is misleading or the omission is material.\" Ariz.Rev.Stat. SS 44-2082(A); see Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b) (requiring complainants to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake). Similarly, a complaint must set forth facts suggesting that each Defendant made the misrepresentations at issue, or at least had a duty to disclose the facts necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances, not misleading.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\"","sentence":"See Dunahay v. Struzik, 96 Ariz. 246, 249, 393 P.2d 930, 933 (1964) (\u201cWhile Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\u201d); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (\u201cWhen an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\u201d) (quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 Ariz. 246, 249","parenthetical":"\"While Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\"","sentence":"See Dunahay v. Struzik, 96 Ariz. 246, 249, 393 P.2d 930, 933 (1964) (\u201cWhile Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\u201d); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (\u201cWhen an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\u201d) (quotation omitted)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To properly state a violation under any of the provisions of SS 1991(A), a complaint must identify \"each alleged untrue statement or material omission and the reason or reasons why the statement or omission is misleading or the omission is material.\" Ariz.Rev.Stat. SS 44-2082(A); see Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b) (requiring complainants to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake). Similarly, a complaint must set forth facts suggesting that each Defendant made the misrepresentations at issue, or at least had a duty to disclose the facts necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances, not misleading.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 174, 174","parenthetical":"\"When an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\"","sentence":"See Dunahay v. Struzik, 96 Ariz. 246, 249, 393 P.2d 930, 933 (1964) (\u201cWhile Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\u201d); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (\u201cWhen an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\u201d) (quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"393 P.2d 930, 933","parenthetical":"\"While Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\"","sentence":"See Dunahay v. Struzik, 96 Ariz. 246, 249, 393 P.2d 930, 933 (1964) (\u201cWhile Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\u201d); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (\u201cWhen an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\u201d) (quotation omitted)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To properly state a violation under any of the provisions of SS 1991(A), a complaint must identify \"each alleged untrue statement or material omission and the reason or reasons why the statement or omission is misleading or the omission is material.\" Ariz.Rev.Stat. SS 44-2082(A); see Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(b) (requiring complainants to state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake). Similarly, a complaint must set forth facts suggesting that each Defendant made the misrepresentations at issue, or at least had a duty to disclose the facts necessary to make the statement made, in light of the circumstances, not misleading.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\"","sentence":"See Dunahay v. Struzik, 96 Ariz. 246, 249, 393 P.2d 930, 933 (1964) (\u201cWhile Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\u201d); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (\u201cWhen an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\u201d) (quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"393 P.2d 930, 933","parenthetical":"\"While Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\"","sentence":"See Dunahay v. Struzik, 96 Ariz. 246, 249, 393 P.2d 930, 933 (1964) (\u201cWhile Fraud may be committed by the failure to speak, a duty to speak must be imposed.\u201d); see also Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 174, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994) (\u201cWhen an allegation of fraud ... is based on nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.\u201d) (quotation omitted)."},"case_id":4270812,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Although the Court's decision in Moses specifically mentioned only sections 3 and 4 of the FAA, section 10 also does not establish an independent jurisdictional basis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"9 U.S.C. SS 10 does not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for filing suit in federal court.\"","sentence":"See Smith v. Rush Retail Ctrs., Inc., 360 F.3d 504, 505 & n. 6 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that section 10 does not confer subject matter jurisdiction and listing cases from D.C., Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits holding same); see also Pinnavaia v. Nat\u2019l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 122 Fed.Appx. 862 (8th Cir.2004) (per curium) (\"9 U.S.C. \u00a7 10 does not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for filing suit in federal court.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that section 10 does not confer subject matter jurisdiction and listing cases from D.C., Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits holding same","sentence":"See Smith v. Rush Retail Ctrs., Inc., 360 F.3d 504, 505 & n. 6 (5th Cir.2004) (holding that section 10 does not confer subject matter jurisdiction and listing cases from D.C., Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits holding same); see also Pinnavaia v. Nat\u2019l Arbitration Forum, Inc., 122 Fed.Appx. 862 (8th Cir.2004) (per curium) (\"9 U.S.C. \u00a7 10 does not provide an independent jurisdictional basis for filing suit in federal court.\u201d)."},"case_id":8969422,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nonetheless, pertinent to our holding in this case, we take the opportunity to acknowledge that although some arbitration standards apply in processing appraisal results, Minnesota recognizes a distinction between appraisal and arbitration. Arbitrators are empowered to determine not only issues of fact, but also questions of law. In contrast, appraisers do not determine liability; rather, they make valuation determinations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"230 Minn. 384, 384","parenthetical":"holding that appraisers' finding that loss was not covered under the policy was a decision on a question of law not within the province of the appraisers","sentence":"See Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (\u201cIt is well settled that appraisal does not determine liability under a policy. Liability depends on a judicial determination.\u201d); see also Mork, 230 Minn. at 384, 42 N.W.2d at 35 (holding that appraisers\u2019 finding that loss was not covered under the policy was a decision on a question of law not within the province of the appraisers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"732 N.W.2d 346, 346","parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that appraisal does not determine liability under a policy. Liability depends on a judicial determination.\"","sentence":"See Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (\u201cIt is well settled that appraisal does not determine liability under a policy. Liability depends on a judicial determination.\u201d); see also Mork, 230 Minn. at 384, 42 N.W.2d at 35 (holding that appraisers\u2019 finding that loss was not covered under the policy was a decision on a question of law not within the province of the appraisers)."},"case_id":7078074,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nonetheless, pertinent to our holding in this case, we take the opportunity to acknowledge that although some arbitration standards apply in processing appraisal results, Minnesota recognizes a distinction between appraisal and arbitration. Arbitrators are empowered to determine not only issues of fact, but also questions of law. In contrast, appraisers do not determine liability; rather, they make valuation determinations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"732 N.W.2d 346, 346","parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that appraisal does not determine liability under a policy. Liability depends on a judicial determination.\"","sentence":"See Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (\u201cIt is well settled that appraisal does not determine liability under a policy. Liability depends on a judicial determination.\u201d); see also Mork, 230 Minn. at 384, 42 N.W.2d at 35 (holding that appraisers\u2019 finding that loss was not covered under the policy was a decision on a question of law not within the province of the appraisers)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"42 N.W.2d 35, 35","parenthetical":"holding that appraisers' finding that loss was not covered under the policy was a decision on a question of law not within the province of the appraisers","sentence":"See Johnson, 732 N.W.2d at 346 (\u201cIt is well settled that appraisal does not determine liability under a policy. Liability depends on a judicial determination.\u201d); see also Mork, 230 Minn. at 384, 42 N.W.2d at 35 (holding that appraisers\u2019 finding that loss was not covered under the policy was a decision on a question of law not within the province of the appraisers)."},"case_id":7078074,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, in showing reduction of earning capacity, the plaintiff may attempt to prove an impairment of his ability to perform the requirements of an occupation in which he has been employed and\/or an occupation in which he likely would have been employed, but for the accident.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher","sentence":"Compare Pratt v. Stein, 298 Pa.Super. 92, 444 A.2d 674 (1982) (loss of earning capacity based on plaintiff's prior employment as truck driver) with Hall v. George, 403 Pa. 563, 170 A.2d 367 (1961) (lost earning capacity of 18 year old student based on evidence of his ambitions to be a school teacher)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future","sentence":"See also Lewis v. Pruitt, 337 Pa.Super. 419, 487 A.2d 16 (1985) (where plaintiff had not been regularly employed as beautician for 16 years prior to the accident, but had maintained her license and skills as a beautician, practiced her trade on a casual, part-time basis, and engaged in discussions pointing toward a return to that occupation, question of impairment of earning capacity was properly submitted to the jury); Gottlob v. Hillegas, 195 Pa.Super. 453, 171 A.2d 868 (1961) (issue of reduced earning capacity properly excluded where plaintiff offered no evidence that she had ever been gainfully employed or that she would be employed in the future)."},"case_id":643086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court, on Feres grounds, denied Taber's motion to amend his complaint, and Taber has abandoned those claims on appeal. Thus, the tortfeasor-related discipline issues that concerned us in Bozeman and Sanchez III are simply not present here. Instead, in this case, the government's liability turns on the question of whether Maine was negligent in driving while he was intoxicated.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"813 F.2d 593, 595-96","parenthetical":"comparing the liability theory in Bozeman to the facts of Sanchez and remanding the case for further Feres consideration because \"it [did] not appear on the record that the district court [would] find it inevitably necessary to inquire into Marine Corps policies for staffing and operating its auto repair facilities\"","sentence":"See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58, 105 S.Ct. at 3043 (distinguishing \u201cnegligence alleged in the operation of a vehicle\u201d from claims that raise important disciplinary considerations); cf. Sanchez v. United States, 813 F.2d 593, 595-96 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cSanchez I \u201d) (comparing the liability theory in Bozeman to the facts of Sanchez and remanding the case for further Feres consideration because \u201cit [did] not appear on the record that the district court [would] find it inevitably necessary to inquire into Marine Corps policies for staffing and operating its auto repair facilities\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"473 U.S. 58, 58","parenthetical":"distinguishing \"negligence alleged in the operation of a vehicle\" from claims that raise important disciplinary considerations","sentence":"See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58, 105 S.Ct. at 3043 (distinguishing \u201cnegligence alleged in the operation of a vehicle\u201d from claims that raise important disciplinary considerations); cf. Sanchez v. United States, 813 F.2d 593, 595-96 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cSanchez I \u201d) (comparing the liability theory in Bozeman to the facts of Sanchez and remanding the case for further Feres consideration because \u201cit [did] not appear on the record that the district court [would] find it inevitably necessary to inquire into Marine Corps policies for staffing and operating its auto repair facilities\u201d)."},"case_id":7416018,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court, on Feres grounds, denied Taber's motion to amend his complaint, and Taber has abandoned those claims on appeal. Thus, the tortfeasor-related discipline issues that concerned us in Bozeman and Sanchez III are simply not present here. Instead, in this case, the government's liability turns on the question of whether Maine was negligent in driving while he was intoxicated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"105 S.Ct. 3043, 3043","parenthetical":"distinguishing \"negligence alleged in the operation of a vehicle\" from claims that raise important disciplinary considerations","sentence":"See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58, 105 S.Ct. at 3043 (distinguishing \u201cnegligence alleged in the operation of a vehicle\u201d from claims that raise important disciplinary considerations); cf. Sanchez v. United States, 813 F.2d 593, 595-96 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cSanchez I \u201d) (comparing the liability theory in Bozeman to the facts of Sanchez and remanding the case for further Feres consideration because \u201cit [did] not appear on the record that the district court [would] find it inevitably necessary to inquire into Marine Corps policies for staffing and operating its auto repair facilities\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"813 F.2d 593, 595-96","parenthetical":"comparing the liability theory in Bozeman to the facts of Sanchez and remanding the case for further Feres consideration because \"it [did] not appear on the record that the district court [would] find it inevitably necessary to inquire into Marine Corps policies for staffing and operating its auto repair facilities\"","sentence":"See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 58, 105 S.Ct. at 3043 (distinguishing \u201cnegligence alleged in the operation of a vehicle\u201d from claims that raise important disciplinary considerations); cf. Sanchez v. United States, 813 F.2d 593, 595-96 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cSanchez I \u201d) (comparing the liability theory in Bozeman to the facts of Sanchez and remanding the case for further Feres consideration because \u201cit [did] not appear on the record that the district court [would] find it inevitably necessary to inquire into Marine Corps policies for staffing and operating its auto repair facilities\u201d)."},"case_id":7416018,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute, the California Supreme Court has insisted on its language, including its preamble.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\"","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"case_id":4224062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute, the California Supreme Court has insisted on its language, including its preamble.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\"","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"case_id":4224062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute, the California Supreme Court has insisted on its language, including its preamble.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\"","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"969 P.2d 564, 568-73","parenthetical":"construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"case_id":4224062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute, the California Supreme Court has insisted on its language, including its preamble.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"52 P.3d 688, 688","parenthetical":"\"When on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\"","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"case_id":4224062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute, the California Supreme Court has insisted on its language, including its preamble.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"52 P.3d 688, 688","parenthetical":"\"When on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\"","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"case_id":4224062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In interpreting the anti-SLAPP statute, the California Supreme Court has insisted on its language, including its preamble.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"969 P.2d 564, 568-73","parenthetical":"construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"52 P.3d 688, 688","parenthetical":"\"When on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\"","sentence":"See Equilon Enters., 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d at 688 (\u201cWhen on previous occasions we have construed the anti-SLAPP statute, we have done so strictly by its terms ____\u201d); id. at 689 n. 3 (discussing the addition of the \u201cbroadly construed\u201d language to the statutory preamble as a correction of prior judicial decisions adopting narrowing constructions); Navellier, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d at 711 (rejecting a narrowing construction of the statute because it \u201cwould contravene the Legislature\u2019s express command that section 425.16 \u2018shall be construed broadly\u2019 \u201d (quoting Cal.Civ.Proc.Code \u00a7 425.16(a))); see also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564, 568-73 (1999) (construing plain language of the statute in light of the preamble)."},"case_id":4224062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As can be seen from section 1, and as the Ninth Circuit has noted, the language in the CAA is similar to that of section 1255(a).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2009 WL 4506544, at *1","parenthetical":"\"The language of the [CAA] mirrors that of SS 1255(a","sentence":"Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir.2007) (\u201cCuban Adjustment Act ... uses language similar to \u00a7 1255(a).\u201d); see also Ibaira v. Swaci na, No. 09-22354, 2009 WL 4506544, at *1 (S.D.Fla.2009) (\u201cThe language of the [CAA] mirrors that of \u00a7 1255(a)[.]\u201d). And, as can be seen from section 4, the CAA expressly provides that it is not intended to interfere with the administration of the INA, or any other immigration-related law."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"501 F.3d 1111, 1118","parenthetical":"\"Cuban Adjustment Act ... uses language similar to SS 1255(a","sentence":"Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir.2007) (\u201cCuban Adjustment Act ... uses language similar to \u00a7 1255(a).\u201d); see also Ibaira v. Swaci na, No. 09-22354, 2009 WL 4506544, at *1 (S.D.Fla.2009) (\u201cThe language of the [CAA] mirrors that of \u00a7 1255(a)[.]\u201d). And, as can be seen from section 4, the CAA expressly provides that it is not intended to interfere with the administration of the INA, or any other immigration-related law."},"case_id":4033512,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Beltran-Flores does not challenge the agency's finding that he failed to establish past persecution, and substantial evidence supports the agency s finding that he failed to establish a nexus between his feared future harm and a protected ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"675 F.3d 1182, 1191","parenthetical":"a personal dispute, standing alone, does not constitute persecution based on a protected ground","sentence":"See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (under the REAL ID Act, applicant must prove a protected ground is at least \u201cone central reason\u201d for persecution); see also Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir.2011) (a personal dispute, standing alone, does not constitute persecution based on a protected ground)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"555 F.3d 734, 740","parenthetical":"under the REAL ID Act, applicant must prove a protected ground is at least \"one central reason\" for persecution","sentence":"See Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.2009) (under the REAL ID Act, applicant must prove a protected ground is at least \u201cone central reason\u201d for persecution); see also Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir.2011) (a personal dispute, standing alone, does not constitute persecution based on a protected ground)."},"case_id":4315972,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To avoid the reach of that statute, the government appears to lean heavily on statutory construction arguments that fail to confront the plain language of the statute, and to rest rather lightly on what seems to me the more persuasive position: that Padilla in fact is detained \"pursuant to an Act of Congress.\" Thus, the government argues that reading SS 4001(a) to cov er Padilla's detention would bring that section in conflict with Article II, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution, which makes the President \"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,\" U.S. Const., art. 2, SS 2, cl. 1, and has been interpreted to grant the President independent authority to respond to an armed attack against the United States.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"67 U.S. 668, 668","parenthetical":"\"If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force ... without waiting for any special legislative authority.\"","sentence":"See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668, 2 Black 635 (\u201cIf a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force ... without waiting for any special legislative authority.\u201d); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d at 281-82 (\u201cThe authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section II.\u201d); Campbell 203 F.3d at 27 (Silberman, J., concurring) (collecting authorities for the proposition that \u201cthe President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific congressional authorization\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"296 F.3d 281, 281-82","parenthetical":"\"The authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section II.\"","sentence":"See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668, 2 Black 635 (\u201cIf a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force ... without waiting for any special legislative authority.\u201d); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d at 281-82 (\u201cThe authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section II.\u201d); Campbell 203 F.3d at 27 (Silberman, J., concurring) (collecting authorities for the proposition that \u201cthe President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific congressional authorization\u201d)."},"case_id":11378576,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To avoid the reach of that statute, the government appears to lean heavily on statutory construction arguments that fail to confront the plain language of the statute, and to rest rather lightly on what seems to me the more persuasive position: that Padilla in fact is detained \"pursuant to an Act of Congress.\" Thus, the government argues that reading SS 4001(a) to cov er Padilla's detention would bring that section in conflict with Article II, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution, which makes the President \"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,\" U.S. Const., art. 2, SS 2, cl. 1, and has been interpreted to grant the President independent authority to respond to an armed attack against the United States.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"296 F.3d 281, 281-82","parenthetical":"\"The authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section II.\"","sentence":"See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668, 2 Black 635 (\u201cIf a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force ... without waiting for any special legislative authority.\u201d); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d at 281-82 (\u201cThe authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section II.\u201d); Campbell 203 F.3d at 27 (Silberman, J., concurring) (collecting authorities for the proposition that \u201cthe President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific congressional authorization\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force ... without waiting for any special legislative authority.\"","sentence":"See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668, 2 Black 635 (\u201cIf a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force ... without waiting for any special legislative authority.\u201d); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d at 281-82 (\u201cThe authority to capture those who take up arms against America belongs to the Commander in Chief under Article II, Section II.\u201d); Campbell 203 F.3d at 27 (Silberman, J., concurring) (collecting authorities for the proposition that \u201cthe President has independent authority to repel aggressive acts by third parties even without specific congressional authorization\u201d)."},"case_id":11378576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the account statements indicated, at most, that the defendants had failed to fulfill their oral promise that Betz could withdraw $15,000 per month from her account without depleting the principal. As a matter of law, we cannot say that a declining account balance, in and of itself, would have spurred a reasonable investor to further inquire whether he or she had been defrauded.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"416 F.3d 951, 951","parenthetical":"\"This court has held that financial problems alone are generally insufficient to suggest fraud.\"","sentence":"See Gray, 82 F.3d at 881 (\u201cIt is well settled that poor financial performance, standing alone, does not necessarily suggest securities fraud ..., but could also be explained by poor management, general market conditions, or other events unrelated to fraud, creating a jury question on inquiry notice.\u201d); see also Livid Holdings, 416 F.3d at 951 (\u201cThis court has held that financial problems alone are generally insufficient to suggest fraud.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"82 F.3d 881, 881","parenthetical":"\"It is well settled that poor financial performance, standing alone, does not necessarily suggest securities fraud ..., but could also be explained by poor management, general market conditions, or other events unrelated to fraud, creating a jury question on inquiry notice.\"","sentence":"See Gray, 82 F.3d at 881 (\u201cIt is well settled that poor financial performance, standing alone, does not necessarily suggest securities fraud ..., but could also be explained by poor management, general market conditions, or other events unrelated to fraud, creating a jury question on inquiry notice.\u201d); see also Livid Holdings, 416 F.3d at 951 (\u201cThis court has held that financial problems alone are generally insufficient to suggest fraud.\u201d)."},"case_id":3551024,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Op. at 272 n. 3. With all respect, I believe that this reading of Wiley conflicts with Howard Johnson's treatment of Wiley. In Howard Johnson, the Supreme Court applied the analytical precepts of Wiley, interpreting Wiley as making \"substantial continuity in the identity of the business enterprise\" the centerpiece of the analysis of when a successor can be bound to arbitrate under a predecessor's CBA. The Court held in Howard Johnson that the successor corporation was not bound to arbitrate under the predecessor's CBA because there was insufficient substantial continuity in the business enterprise, and the clear implication of the opinion is that, if there had been such substantial continuity, then the successor would have been so bound. I see nothing in Howard Johnson that would lead me to the conclusion that the Court would have held that the successor was not bound to arbitrate even if there had been such substantial continuity, because the \"other factors\" present in Wiley were missing there.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 U.S. 264, 264-65","parenthetical":"\"Since there was plainly no substantial continuity of identity in the work force hired by Howard Johnson with that of the Grissoms, and no express or implied assumption of the agreement to arbitrate, the courts below erred in compelling the Company to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former Grissom employees.\"","sentence":"See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264-65, 94 S.Ct. 2236 (\u201cSince there was plainly no substantial continuity of identity in the work force hired by Howard Johnson with that of the Grissoms, and no express or implied assumption of the agreement to arbitrate, the courts below erred in compelling the Company to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former Grissom employees.\u201d); see also id. at 258, 94 S.Ct. 2236 {\u201cEven more important, in Wiley the surviving corporation hired all of the employees of the disappearing corporation.\u201d) (emphasis added); id. at 263, 94 S.Ct. 2236 (noting that the Court's holding \"is reflected in the emphasis most of the lower courts have placed on whether the successor employer hires a majority of the predecessor's employees in determining the legal obligations of the successor in \u00a7 301 suits under Wiley\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Court's holding \"is reflected in the emphasis most of the lower courts have placed on whether the successor employer hires a majority of the predecessor's employees in determining the legal obligations of the successor in SS 301 suits under Wiley\"","sentence":"See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264-65, 94 S.Ct. 2236 (\u201cSince there was plainly no substantial continuity of identity in the work force hired by Howard Johnson with that of the Grissoms, and no express or implied assumption of the agreement to arbitrate, the courts below erred in compelling the Company to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former Grissom employees.\u201d); see also id. at 258, 94 S.Ct. 2236 {\u201cEven more important, in Wiley the surviving corporation hired all of the employees of the disappearing corporation.\u201d) (emphasis added); id. at 263, 94 S.Ct. 2236 (noting that the Court's holding \"is reflected in the emphasis most of the lower courts have placed on whether the successor employer hires a majority of the predecessor's employees in determining the legal obligations of the successor in \u00a7 301 suits under Wiley\")."},"case_id":9498258,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Op. at 272 n. 3. With all respect, I believe that this reading of Wiley conflicts with Howard Johnson's treatment of Wiley. In Howard Johnson, the Supreme Court applied the analytical precepts of Wiley, interpreting Wiley as making \"substantial continuity in the identity of the business enterprise\" the centerpiece of the analysis of when a successor can be bound to arbitrate under a predecessor's CBA. The Court held in Howard Johnson that the successor corporation was not bound to arbitrate under the predecessor's CBA because there was insufficient substantial continuity in the business enterprise, and the clear implication of the opinion is that, if there had been such substantial continuity, then the successor would have been so bound. I see nothing in Howard Johnson that would lead me to the conclusion that the Court would have held that the successor was not bound to arbitrate even if there had been such substantial continuity, because the \"other factors\" present in Wiley were missing there.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Since there was plainly no substantial continuity of identity in the work force hired by Howard Johnson with that of the Grissoms, and no express or implied assumption of the agreement to arbitrate, the courts below erred in compelling the Company to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former Grissom employees.\"","sentence":"See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264-65, 94 S.Ct. 2236 (\u201cSince there was plainly no substantial continuity of identity in the work force hired by Howard Johnson with that of the Grissoms, and no express or implied assumption of the agreement to arbitrate, the courts below erred in compelling the Company to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former Grissom employees.\u201d); see also id. at 258, 94 S.Ct. 2236 {\u201cEven more important, in Wiley the surviving corporation hired all of the employees of the disappearing corporation.\u201d) (emphasis added); id. at 263, 94 S.Ct. 2236 (noting that the Court's holding \"is reflected in the emphasis most of the lower courts have placed on whether the successor employer hires a majority of the predecessor's employees in determining the legal obligations of the successor in \u00a7 301 suits under Wiley\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Court's holding \"is reflected in the emphasis most of the lower courts have placed on whether the successor employer hires a majority of the predecessor's employees in determining the legal obligations of the successor in SS 301 suits under Wiley\"","sentence":"See Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 264-65, 94 S.Ct. 2236 (\u201cSince there was plainly no substantial continuity of identity in the work force hired by Howard Johnson with that of the Grissoms, and no express or implied assumption of the agreement to arbitrate, the courts below erred in compelling the Company to arbitrate the extent of its obligations to the former Grissom employees.\u201d); see also id. at 258, 94 S.Ct. 2236 {\u201cEven more important, in Wiley the surviving corporation hired all of the employees of the disappearing corporation.\u201d) (emphasis added); id. at 263, 94 S.Ct. 2236 (noting that the Court's holding \"is reflected in the emphasis most of the lower courts have placed on whether the successor employer hires a majority of the predecessor's employees in determining the legal obligations of the successor in \u00a7 301 suits under Wiley\")."},"case_id":9498258,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Charles did not timely petition for review of the BIA's July 2012 decision, which found her ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") SS 212(h) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. Accordingly, her challenges to those findings are not properly before the Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"439 F.3d 111, 111","parenthetical":"noting that the Court is \" 'precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings' \" in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider","sentence":"See Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111 (noting that the Court is \u201c \u2018precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings\u2019 \u201d in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider) (quoting Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005)); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386. 405. 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen","sentence":"See Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111 (noting that the Court is \u201c \u2018precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings\u2019 \u201d in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider) (quoting Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005)); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386. 405. 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen)."},"case_id":4166176,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Charles did not timely petition for review of the BIA's July 2012 decision, which found her ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") SS 212(h) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. Accordingly, her challenges to those findings are not properly before the Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"439 F.3d 111, 111","parenthetical":"noting that the Court is \" 'precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings' \" in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider","sentence":"See Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111 (noting that the Court is \u201c \u2018precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings\u2019 \u201d in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider) (quoting Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005)); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386. 405. 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen","sentence":"See Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111 (noting that the Court is \u201c \u2018precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings\u2019 \u201d in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider) (quoting Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005)); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386. 405. 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen)."},"case_id":4166176,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Charles did not timely petition for review of the BIA's July 2012 decision, which found her ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") SS 212(h) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. Accordingly, her challenges to those findings are not properly before the Court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"439 F.3d 111, 111","parenthetical":"noting that the Court is \" 'precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings' \" in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider","sentence":"See Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111 (noting that the Court is \u201c \u2018precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings\u2019 \u201d in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider) (quoting Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005)); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386. 405. 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen","sentence":"See Jin Ming Liu, 439 F.3d at 111 (noting that the Court is \u201c \u2018precluded from passing on the merits of the underlying [] proceedings\u2019 \u201d in a petition for review from the denial of a motion to reconsider) (quoting Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005)); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386. 405. 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (requiring separate timely petitions for review from final removal order and denial of a motion to reconsider or reopen)."},"case_id":4166176,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Forcey's second point of error, he argues that his plea was rendered involuntary when the trial court rejected the plea bargain by imposing a fine greater than the plea agreement's maximum of $2,000. We have the authority to modify the judgment of the trial court on appeal, see Tex.R.App. P. 43.2(b), including modifying punishment to accurately reflect the intent of the trial court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"876 S.W.2d 214, 217","parenthetical":"modifying judgment so that sentence was within applicable range of punishment where trial court's intent to impose maximum sentence was clear from record","sentence":"See McCray v. State, 876 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, no pet.) (modifying judgment so that sentence was within applicable range of punishment where trial court\u2019s intent to impose maximum sentence was clear from record); see also Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (modifying judgment to reflect conviction of lesser-included offense); McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (modifying judgment to delete deadly-weapon finding not supported by evidence). In its findings of fact and conclusions of law issued in connection with Forcey\u2019s habeas petition, the trial court recommended that the sentence be modified to \u201cset the fine at the stated $2,000.00 as the trial court intended.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"200 S.W.3d 325, 329","parenthetical":"modifying judgment to delete deadly-weapon finding not supported by evidence","sentence":"See McCray v. State, 876 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, no pet.) (modifying judgment so that sentence was within applicable range of punishment where trial court\u2019s intent to impose maximum sentence was clear from record); see also Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (modifying judgment to reflect conviction of lesser-included offense); McGill v. State, 200 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.) (modifying judgment to delete deadly-weapon finding not supported by evidence). In its findings of fact and conclusions of law issued in connection with Forcey\u2019s habeas petition, the trial court recommended that the sentence be modified to \u201cset the fine at the stated $2,000.00 as the trial court intended.\u201d"},"case_id":8205654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"SunTrust argues that Johnson, and the majority view in general, fails to give prop er weight to Congress' intent to confer \"favorable treatment\" upon residential mortgagees in an effort to \"encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market.\" Although Johnson did not explicitly discuss Justice Stevens' brief concurrence, several Courts of Appeals that have opined on the legislative history have concluded that the favorable treatment afforded residential mortgagees under SS 1322(b)(2) extends only to first or purchase-money mortgages.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"313 F.3d 1227, 1227","parenthetical":"\"Furthermore, although Justice Stevens recognized a congressional policy in favor of promoting home lending, we join other courts in interpreting this as applying to first or purchase-money mortgages.\"","sentence":"See Zimmer, 313 F.3d at 1227 (\u201cFurthermore, although Justice Stevens recognized a congressional policy in favor of promoting home lending, we join other courts in interpreting this as applying to first or purchase-money mortgages.\u201d); Bartee, 212 F.3d at 294 (reviewing the legislative history of \u00a7 1322(b)(2) and concluding that \u201c[plassage of [the anti-modification provision] demonstrates that Congress intends to maintain the protections afforded home mortgage lenders, while preventing \u2018thinly disguised personal\u2019 lending from taking advantage of those protections.\u201d); see also Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (1st Cir. BAP 2000) (\u201c[Flailing to differentiate between true mortgage lending and the practice (seen by many as predatory) of obtaining mortgages on already oversecured property in support of the collection of otherwise unsecured dischargeable debt would do far more damage to the goals of Congress in enacting the anti-modification provision of \u00a7 1322(b)(2)\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"249 B.R. 831, 840","parenthetical":"\"[Flailing to differentiate between true mortgage lending and the practice (seen by many as predatory","sentence":"See Zimmer, 313 F.3d at 1227 (\u201cFurthermore, although Justice Stevens recognized a congressional policy in favor of promoting home lending, we join other courts in interpreting this as applying to first or purchase-money mortgages.\u201d); Bartee, 212 F.3d at 294 (reviewing the legislative history of \u00a7 1322(b)(2) and concluding that \u201c[plassage of [the anti-modification provision] demonstrates that Congress intends to maintain the protections afforded home mortgage lenders, while preventing \u2018thinly disguised personal\u2019 lending from taking advantage of those protections.\u201d); see also Domestic Bank v. Mann (In re Mann), 249 B.R. 831, 840 (1st Cir. BAP 2000) (\u201c[Flailing to differentiate between true mortgage lending and the practice (seen by many as predatory) of obtaining mortgages on already oversecured property in support of the collection of otherwise unsecured dischargeable debt would do far more damage to the goals of Congress in enacting the anti-modification provision of \u00a7 1322(b)(2)\u201d)."},"case_id":4121055,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The trial court found that William paid no support despite having the ability to do so. However, it concluded that William's consent was required because \"[tjhere was no Court order or other requirement that [William] pay support for the child.\" App. at 3. To the contrary, this Court has held that the common law duty of a parent to support his child satisfies the statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"712 N.E.2d 1012, 1014","parenthetical":"\"Irvin's failure to provide support for a child whom he acknowledged as his own establishes that he has failed to support his child 'as required by law or judicial decree.' \"","sentence":"In re Adoption of M.A.S., 815 N.E.2d 216, 220-21 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); In re Adoption of A.K.S., 713 N.E.2d 896, 899 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied; and Irvin v. Hood, 712 N.E.2d 1012, 1014 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (\u201cIrvin\u2019s failure to provide support for a child whom he acknowledged as his own establishes that he has failed to support his child \u2018as required by law or judicial decree.\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 N.E.2d 444, 445","parenthetical":"\"child support obligations arise out of a natural duty of the parent\"","sentence":"See also Pettit v. Pettit, 626 N.E.2d 444, 445 (Ind.1993) (\u201cchild support obligations arise out of a natural duty of the parent\u201d)."},"case_id":8367132,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It elicited information about the prospective jurors' habits, activities, work experiences, and families that was far more extensive and detailed than the generalizations appellants might have drawn from jurors' mere names and addresses. Thus, it sufficed to enable appellants to make effective use of their peremptory challenges.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"850 F.2d 1022, 1022-23","parenthetical":"agreeing with district court that written questionnaire addressing juror demographics left counsel \"in a much better position to assess the suitability of prospective jurors in this case than in most other trials, criminal or civil\"","sentence":"See Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1022-23 (agreeing with district court that written questionnaire addressing juror demographics left counsel \u201cin a much better position to assess the suitability of prospective jurors in this case than in most other trials, criminal or civil\u201d) (internal quotations omitted); see also Crockett, 979 F.2d at 1216 (\u201c[A] defendant\u2019s fundamental right to an unbiased jury is adequately protected by the court\u2019s conduct of a voir dire designed to uncover bias as to issues in the cases and as to the defendant himself.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted); Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"979 F.2d 1216, 1216","parenthetical":"\"[A] defendant's fundamental right to an unbiased jury is adequately protected by the court's conduct of a voir dire designed to uncover bias as to issues in the cases and as to the defendant himself.\"","sentence":"See Scarfo, 850 F.2d at 1022-23 (agreeing with district court that written questionnaire addressing juror demographics left counsel \u201cin a much better position to assess the suitability of prospective jurors in this case than in most other trials, criminal or civil\u201d) (internal quotations omitted); see also Crockett, 979 F.2d at 1216 (\u201c[A] defendant\u2019s fundamental right to an unbiased jury is adequately protected by the court\u2019s conduct of a voir dire designed to uncover bias as to issues in the cases and as to the defendant himself.\u201d) (internal quotations omitted); Paccione, 949 F.2d at 1192 (same)."},"case_id":7415104,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although Gaskin now states that he would have wanted counsel to discuss the relevant aggravators and mitigators at more length, this does not necessarily render trial counsel ineffective.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"659 So.2d 1069, 1073","parenthetical":"\"The standard is not how present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether there was both a deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.\"","sentence":"See Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla.1995) (\u201cThe standard is not how present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether there was both a deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.\u201d); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cEven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"466 U.S. 689, 689","parenthetical":"\"Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.\"","sentence":"See Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla.1995) (\u201cThe standard is not how present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether there was both a deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.\u201d); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cEven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.\u201d)."},"case_id":11458802,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although Gaskin now states that he would have wanted counsel to discuss the relevant aggravators and mitigators at more length, this does not necessarily render trial counsel ineffective.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.\"","sentence":"See Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla.1995) (\u201cThe standard is not how present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether there was both a deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.\u201d); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cEven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"659 So.2d 1069, 1073","parenthetical":"\"The standard is not how present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether there was both a deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.\"","sentence":"See Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069, 1073 (Fla.1995) (\u201cThe standard is not how present counsel would have proceeded, in hindsight, but rather whether there was both a deficient performance and a reasonable probability of a different result.\u201d); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cEven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.\u201d)."},"case_id":11458802,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I respectfully dissent. Our courts have consistently allowed recovery of mental anguish damages for the negligent handling of a dead body.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"99 S.W.2d 646, 650","parenthetical":"any interfer ence with next-of-kin's right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938","sentence":"Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1964, writ dism\u2019d); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Beaumont 1936) (any interfer ence with next-of-kin\u2019s right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1934) writ ref'd) (the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts); see also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.1987) (Spears, J., concurring) (\u201cThis state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"730 S.W.2d 649, 654","parenthetical":"\"This state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\"","sentence":"Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1964, writ dism\u2019d); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Beaumont 1936) (any interfer ence with next-of-kin\u2019s right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1934) writ ref'd) (the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts); see also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.1987) (Spears, J., concurring) (\u201cThis state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\u201d)."},"case_id":9472805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I respectfully dissent. Our courts have consistently allowed recovery of mental anguish damages for the negligent handling of a dead body.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"730 S.W.2d 649, 654","parenthetical":"\"This state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\"","sentence":"Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1964, writ dism\u2019d); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Beaumont 1936) (any interfer ence with next-of-kin\u2019s right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1934) writ ref'd) (the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts); see also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.1987) (Spears, J., concurring) (\u201cThis state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"any interfer ence with next-of-kin's right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938","sentence":"Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1964, writ dism\u2019d); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Beaumont 1936) (any interfer ence with next-of-kin\u2019s right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1934) writ ref'd) (the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts); see also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.1987) (Spears, J., concurring) (\u201cThis state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\u201d)."},"case_id":9472805,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I respectfully dissent. Our courts have consistently allowed recovery of mental anguish damages for the negligent handling of a dead body.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"any interfer ence with next-of-kin's right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938","sentence":"Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1964, writ dism\u2019d); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Beaumont 1936) (any interfer ence with next-of-kin\u2019s right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1934) writ ref'd) (the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts); see also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.1987) (Spears, J., concurring) (\u201cThis state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"730 S.W.2d 649, 654","parenthetical":"\"This state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\"","sentence":"Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1964, writ dism\u2019d); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Beaumont 1936) (any interfer ence with next-of-kin\u2019s right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1934) writ ref'd) (the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts); see also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.1987) (Spears, J., concurring) (\u201cThis state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\u201d)."},"case_id":9472805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I respectfully dissent. Our courts have consistently allowed recovery of mental anguish damages for the negligent handling of a dead body.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042","parenthetical":"the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts","sentence":"Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1964, writ dism\u2019d); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Beaumont 1936) (any interfer ence with next-of-kin\u2019s right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1934) writ ref'd) (the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts); see also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.1987) (Spears, J., concurring) (\u201cThis state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"730 S.W.2d 649, 654","parenthetical":"\"This state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\"","sentence":"Terrill v. Harbin, 376 S.W.2d 945, 945-46 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Eastland 1964, writ dism\u2019d); Love v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 99 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Beaumont 1936) (any interfer ence with next-of-kin\u2019s right to preserve and bury the body by mutilating it is a wrong for which the family can maintain a cause of action for damages, aff'd, 182 Tex. 280, 121 S.W.2d 986 (1938); Burnett v. Surratt, 67 S.W.2d 1041, 1042 (Tex.Civ.App.\u2014Dallas 1934) writ ref'd) (the right to bury a corpse and preserve its remains is a legal right recognized by the courts); see also St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 654 (Tex.1987) (Spears, J., concurring) (\u201cThis state has long recognized that establishing the mishandling of a corpse and establishing a feeling of closeness or love between the deceased and the one asking for damages is sufficient for a jury to consider mental anguish.\u201d)."},"case_id":9472805,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"239 Conn. 481, 499","parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"239 Conn. 481, 499","parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47","parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph larger than all others in array and against different background","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47","parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph larger than all others in array and against different background","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph larger than all others in array and against different background","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph larger than all others in array and against different background","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph larger than all others in array and against different background","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph larger than all others in array and against different background","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph larger than all others in array and against different background","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"200 Conn. 350, 355-56","parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Internal quotation marks omitted.) All photographs were of men with facial hair and skin coloring similar to that of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant's photograph larger than all others in array and against different background","sentence":"See State v. Taylor, 239 Conn. 481, 499, 687 A.2d 489 (1996) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph one of two that was glossier, brighter than others in array), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S. Ct. 2515, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (1997); State v. Plaza, 23 Conn. App. 543, 546-47, 583 A.2d 925 (1990) (identification not unnecessarily suggestive where defendant\u2019s photograph larger than all others in array and against different background), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 811, 587 A.2d 153 (1991); cf. State v. Evans, 200 Conn. 350, 355-56, 511 A.2d 1006 (1986) (identification unnecessarily suggestive where array of black and white photographs preceded single color photograph of defendant). Even if the detectives had implied that the defendant would be in the array, that factor does not on its own make it unnecessarily suggestive."},"case_id":1216974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But assuming it was, we are faced with Coreys argument that the admonishment might have caused a compromise verdict because it could infer the consequences of a mistrial from juror misconduct might also be the consequences of a hung jury. We are not firmly convinced this is what happened because \"jnjothing in the record demonstrates the juiy was near deadlock, deadlocked, pressured to reach a verdict, or concerned about the implications of another trial.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"294 Kan. 484, 515","parenthetical":"affirming conviction despite Salts error because there was substantial evidence of guilt and defendant did not explain why instruction made difference in deliberations","sentence":"State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 515, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (affirming conviction despite Salts error because there was substantial evidence of guilt and defendant did not explain why instruction made difference in deliberations); see Salts, 288 Kan. 263 (juiy would not have reached different verdict despite erroneous instruction that jury\u2019s failure to reach decision would leave charges undecided, State would decide whether to resubmit to different jury, and another trial would be burden on both sides)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"juiy would not have reached different verdict despite erroneous instruction that jury's failure to reach decision would leave charges undecided, State would decide whether to resubmit to different jury, and another trial would be burden on both sides","sentence":"State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 515, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (affirming conviction despite Salts error because there was substantial evidence of guilt and defendant did not explain why instruction made difference in deliberations); see Salts, 288 Kan. 263 (juiy would not have reached different verdict despite erroneous instruction that jury\u2019s failure to reach decision would leave charges undecided, State would decide whether to resubmit to different jury, and another trial would be burden on both sides)."},"case_id":12416506,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But assuming it was, we are faced with Coreys argument that the admonishment might have caused a compromise verdict because it could infer the consequences of a mistrial from juror misconduct might also be the consequences of a hung jury. We are not firmly convinced this is what happened because \"jnjothing in the record demonstrates the juiy was near deadlock, deadlocked, pressured to reach a verdict, or concerned about the implications of another trial.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming conviction despite Salts error because there was substantial evidence of guilt and defendant did not explain why instruction made difference in deliberations","sentence":"State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 515, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (affirming conviction despite Salts error because there was substantial evidence of guilt and defendant did not explain why instruction made difference in deliberations); see Salts, 288 Kan. 263 (juiy would not have reached different verdict despite erroneous instruction that jury\u2019s failure to reach decision would leave charges undecided, State would decide whether to resubmit to different jury, and another trial would be burden on both sides)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"juiy would not have reached different verdict despite erroneous instruction that jury's failure to reach decision would leave charges undecided, State would decide whether to resubmit to different jury, and another trial would be burden on both sides","sentence":"State v. Warrior, 294 Kan. 484, 515, 277 P.3d 1111 (2012) (affirming conviction despite Salts error because there was substantial evidence of guilt and defendant did not explain why instruction made difference in deliberations); see Salts, 288 Kan. 263 (juiy would not have reached different verdict despite erroneous instruction that jury\u2019s failure to reach decision would leave charges undecided, State would decide whether to resubmit to different jury, and another trial would be burden on both sides)."},"case_id":12416506,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After conducting a thorough review of the evidence in the record, the Commission ultimately decided its resources would be better utilized elsewhere, a decision entirely within its discretion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the FEC's decision to dismiss La Botz's complaint could have been justified under its prosecutorial discretion","sentence":"See Stark v. FEC, 683 F.Supp. 836, 840 (D.D.C.1988) (concluding it is \u201csurely committed to the [FEC\u2019s] discretion to determine where and when to commit its investigative resources\u201d); see also La Botz, 889 F.Supp.2d at 63 n. 6 (noting the FEC\u2019s decision to dismiss La Botz\u2019s complaint could have been justified under its prosecutorial discretion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"683 F.Supp. 836, 840","parenthetical":"concluding it is \"surely committed to the [FEC's] discretion to determine where and when to commit its investigative resources\"","sentence":"See Stark v. FEC, 683 F.Supp. 836, 840 (D.D.C.1988) (concluding it is \u201csurely committed to the [FEC\u2019s] discretion to determine where and when to commit its investigative resources\u201d); see also La Botz, 889 F.Supp.2d at 63 n. 6 (noting the FEC\u2019s decision to dismiss La Botz\u2019s complaint could have been justified under its prosecutorial discretion)."},"case_id":4165998,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The only item that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce in this case was the China-manufactured cell phone he used to take the images, but Ruggiero does not appear to contend that SS 2251(a) is unconstitutional as applied to him for lack of a sufficient nexus to foreign commerce. If he does, we reject that contention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"429 F.3d 73, 76-79","parenthetical":"applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state","sentence":"See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9, 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2201, 2205, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic \u2018class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\u201d); see also United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 76-79 (4th Cir.2005) (applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir.2005) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"545 U.S. 1, 9, 17","parenthetical":"holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\"","sentence":"See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9, 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2201, 2205, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic \u2018class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\u201d); see also United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 76-79 (4th Cir.2005) (applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir.2005) (same)."},"case_id":4275818,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The only item that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce in this case was the China-manufactured cell phone he used to take the images, but Ruggiero does not appear to contend that SS 2251(a) is unconstitutional as applied to him for lack of a sufficient nexus to foreign commerce. If he does, we reject that contention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"429 F.3d 73, 76-79","parenthetical":"applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state","sentence":"See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9, 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2201, 2205, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic \u2018class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\u201d); see also United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 76-79 (4th Cir.2005) (applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir.2005) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 S.Ct. 2195, 2201, 2205","parenthetical":"holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\"","sentence":"See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9, 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2201, 2205, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic \u2018class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\u201d); see also United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 76-79 (4th Cir.2005) (applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir.2005) (same)."},"case_id":4275818,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The only item that had traveled in interstate or foreign commerce in this case was the China-manufactured cell phone he used to take the images, but Ruggiero does not appear to contend that SS 2251(a) is unconstitutional as applied to him for lack of a sufficient nexus to foreign commerce. If he does, we reject that contention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"429 F.3d 73, 76-79","parenthetical":"applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state","sentence":"See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9, 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2201, 2205, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic \u2018class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\u201d); see also United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 76-79 (4th Cir.2005) (applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir.2005) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\"","sentence":"See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9, 17, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2201, 2205, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (holding that Congress may regulate purely local intrastate activities if they are part of an \"economic \u2018class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce\u201d); see also United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 76-79 (4th Cir.2005) (applying the Raich rationale to uphold a defendant's convictions for production and possession of child pornography that itself had never crossed state lines, but that was produced using cameras that were manufactured outside the state); United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir.2005) (same)."},"case_id":4275818,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As to the first argument, the Fifth Circuit has never recognized the legitimacy of a \"Chinese Wall\" approach.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2001 WL 1444933, at *2","parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he Fifth Circuit has never recognized the possibility of a 'Chinese Wall' to rebut [the] presumption\" that \"[t]he Rules presume that confidences obtained by an individual lawyer are shared with members of his or her firm\"","sentence":"Hampton, 2001 WL 1444933, at *2 (stating that \u201c[t]he Fifth Circuit has never recognized the possibility of a \u2018Chinese Wall\u2019 to rebut [the] presumption\u201d that \u201c[t]he Rules presume that confidences obtained by an individual lawyer are shared with members of his or her firm\u201d); see also Green, 1998 WL 24424, at *3 (stating that \u201c[t]he Fifth Circuit has never recognized the possibility of a \u2018Chinese Wall\u2019 to rebut this presumption\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1998 WL 24424, at *3","parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he Fifth Circuit has never recognized the possibility of a 'Chinese Wall' to rebut this presumption\"","sentence":"Hampton, 2001 WL 1444933, at *2 (stating that \u201c[t]he Fifth Circuit has never recognized the possibility of a \u2018Chinese Wall\u2019 to rebut [the] presumption\u201d that \u201c[t]he Rules presume that confidences obtained by an individual lawyer are shared with members of his or her firm\u201d); see also Green, 1998 WL 24424, at *3 (stating that \u201c[t]he Fifth Circuit has never recognized the possibility of a \u2018Chinese Wall\u2019 to rebut this presumption\u201d)."},"case_id":8938703,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In light of Colombia's tumultuous and violent relationship with NTOs, and in turn with the United States' efforts to infiltrate and control NTOs, working for the DEA would undoubtedly be considered a political opinion by the Cali cartel.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"175 F.3d 727, 729","parenthetical":"holding that \"Briones's activity as a confidential informer who sided with the Phillipine military in a conflict that was political at its core certainly would be perceived as a political act by the group informed upon.... \"","sentence":"See Sagaydak, 405 F.3d at 1043 (holding that uncovering corruption in a private organization was \u201cundeniably a political statement in the context of [Ukraine\u2019s] evolving politics.\u201d); see also Briones v. INS, 175 F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that \u201cBriones\u2019s activity as a confidential informer who sided with the Phillipine military in a conflict that was political at its core certainly would be perceived as a political act by the group informed upon.... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"405 F.3d 1043, 1043","parenthetical":"holding that uncovering corruption in a private organization was \"undeniably a political statement in the context of [Ukraine's] evolving politics.\"","sentence":"See Sagaydak, 405 F.3d at 1043 (holding that uncovering corruption in a private organization was \u201cundeniably a political statement in the context of [Ukraine\u2019s] evolving politics.\u201d); see also Briones v. INS, 175 F.3d 727, 729 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (holding that \u201cBriones\u2019s activity as a confidential informer who sided with the Phillipine military in a conflict that was political at its core certainly would be perceived as a political act by the group informed upon.... \u201d)."},"case_id":3213266,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court did not discuss Mr. Wright's IFP status, or what Mr. Wright should have done -- but failed to do -- to cause process to be served. It therefore is unclear to us how Mr. Wright was responsible for the delay in service. Under these circumstances, we cannot say whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Mr. Wright had not shown good cause for the untimely service: if the delay in service was the result of a delay by court staff or the USMS in fulfilling their obligations, Mr. Wright's complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 4(m).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 F.3d 444, 446","parenthetical":"once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86","parenthetical":"where inmate's complaint listed all defendants' addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"case_id":3551156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court did not discuss Mr. Wright's IFP status, or what Mr. Wright should have done -- but failed to do -- to cause process to be served. It therefore is unclear to us how Mr. Wright was responsible for the delay in service. Under these circumstances, we cannot say whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Mr. Wright had not shown good cause for the untimely service: if the delay in service was the result of a delay by court staff or the USMS in fulfilling their obligations, Mr. Wright's complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 4(m).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 F.3d 444, 446","parenthetical":"once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"14 F.3d 1415, 1422","parenthetical":"where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS's failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"case_id":3551156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court did not discuss Mr. Wright's IFP status, or what Mr. Wright should have done -- but failed to do -- to cause process to be served. It therefore is unclear to us how Mr. Wright was responsible for the delay in service. Under these circumstances, we cannot say whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Mr. Wright had not shown good cause for the untimely service: if the delay in service was the result of a delay by court staff or the USMS in fulfilling their obligations, Mr. Wright's complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 4(m).","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS's failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 F.3d 444, 446","parenthetical":"once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"case_id":3551156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court did not discuss Mr. Wright's IFP status, or what Mr. Wright should have done -- but failed to do -- to cause process to be served. It therefore is unclear to us how Mr. Wright was responsible for the delay in service. Under these circumstances, we cannot say whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Mr. Wright had not shown good cause for the untimely service: if the delay in service was the result of a delay by court staff or the USMS in fulfilling their obligations, Mr. Wright's complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 4(m).","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS's failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 F.3d 444, 446","parenthetical":"once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"case_id":3551156,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court did not discuss Mr. Wright's IFP status, or what Mr. Wright should have done -- but failed to do -- to cause process to be served. It therefore is unclear to us how Mr. Wright was responsible for the delay in service. Under these circumstances, we cannot say whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that Mr. Wright had not shown good cause for the untimely service: if the delay in service was the result of a delay by court staff or the USMS in fulfilling their obligations, Mr. Wright's complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 4(m).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 F.3d 444, 446","parenthetical":"once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS's failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m","sentence":"See Lindsey v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 101 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.1996) (once IFP plaintiff has taken reasonable steps to identify defendants, court must issue plaintiffs process to USMS, who in turn must effectuate service); cf. Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (8th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (where inmate\u2019s complaint listed all defendants\u2019 addresses, it was improperly dismissed under Rule 4(m) for lack of timely service, as completing waiver-of-service forms was component of \u201call process\u201d and \u201call duties\u201d required by court officers, and was USMS\u2019s responsibility); Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.1994) (where prisoner has furnished information necessary to identify defendant, USMS\u2019s failure to effect service is automatically good cause under Rule 4(m)), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995)."},"case_id":3551156,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The reasoning behind, enforcing direct appeal waivers mandates that the SS 2255 waiver be upheld and enforced. The Fourth Circuit has clearly indicated the validity of direct appeal waivers, and it has not questioned the validity of SS 2255 waivers that have come before it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"33 F.3d 415, 418","parenthetical":"interpreting a waiver in a plea agreement as waiving the defendant's rights to launch a collateral attack under SS 2255 on any grounds other than ineffective assistance of counsel","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir.1994) (interpreting a waiver in a plea agreement as waiving the defendant\u2019s rights to launch a collateral attack under \u00a7 2255 on any grounds other than ineffective assistance of counsel); cf. Hailstock v. United States, 2001 WL 1131989, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (upholding a \u00a7 2255 waiver because Second Circuit law clearly upholds waivers of direct appeals and had not struck down \u00a7 2255 waivers that have come before it)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2001 WL 1131989, at *2","parenthetical":"upholding a SS 2255 waiver because Second Circuit law clearly upholds waivers of direct appeals and had not struck down SS 2255 waivers that have come before it","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 418 (4th Cir.1994) (interpreting a waiver in a plea agreement as waiving the defendant\u2019s rights to launch a collateral attack under \u00a7 2255 on any grounds other than ineffective assistance of counsel); cf. Hailstock v. United States, 2001 WL 1131989, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (upholding a \u00a7 2255 waiver because Second Circuit law clearly upholds waivers of direct appeals and had not struck down \u00a7 2255 waivers that have come before it)."},"case_id":9461645,"label":"a"}
{"context":". To the contrary, although the case law on this point is sparse in this circuit, the only authorities we have found indicate that the crime and the enhancements require an intentional act, not merely a reckless or accidental one.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"420 U.S. 671, 686","parenthetical":"SS111 requires \"the criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\"","sentence":"See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (\u00a7111 requires \u201cthe criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\u201d); United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (under \u00a7 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\u201d); United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (weapon must be used intentionally under \u00a7 111(b)); cf. Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing assault under \u00a7 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing assault under SS 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly","sentence":"See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (\u00a7111 requires \u201cthe criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\u201d); United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (under \u00a7 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\u201d); United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (weapon must be used intentionally under \u00a7 111(b)); cf. Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing assault under \u00a7 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly)."},"case_id":12277534,"label":"a"}
{"context":". To the contrary, although the case law on this point is sparse in this circuit, the only authorities we have found indicate that the crime and the enhancements require an intentional act, not merely a reckless or accidental one.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"SS111 requires \"the criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\"","sentence":"See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (\u00a7111 requires \u201cthe criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\u201d); United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (under \u00a7 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\u201d); United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (weapon must be used intentionally under \u00a7 111(b)); cf. Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing assault under \u00a7 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing assault under SS 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly","sentence":"See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (\u00a7111 requires \u201cthe criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\u201d); United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (under \u00a7 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\u201d); United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (weapon must be used intentionally under \u00a7 111(b)); cf. Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing assault under \u00a7 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly)."},"case_id":12277534,"label":"a"}
{"context":". To the contrary, although the case law on this point is sparse in this circuit, the only authorities we have found indicate that the crime and the enhancements require an intentional act, not merely a reckless or accidental one.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing assault under SS 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly","sentence":"See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (\u00a7111 requires \u201cthe criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\u201d); United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (under \u00a7 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\u201d); United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (weapon must be used intentionally under \u00a7 111(b)); cf. Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing assault under \u00a7 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"SS111 requires \"the criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\"","sentence":"See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (\u00a7111 requires \u201cthe criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\u201d); United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (under \u00a7 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\u201d); United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (weapon must be used intentionally under \u00a7 111(b)); cf. Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing assault under \u00a7 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly)."},"case_id":12277534,"label":"b"}
{"context":". To the contrary, although the case law on this point is sparse in this circuit, the only authorities we have found indicate that the crime and the enhancements require an intentional act, not merely a reckless or accidental one.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"690 F.3d 1111, 1123","parenthetical":"under SS 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\"","sentence":"See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (\u00a7111 requires \u201cthe criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\u201d); United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (under \u00a7 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\u201d); United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (weapon must be used intentionally under \u00a7 111(b)); cf. Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing assault under \u00a7 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing assault under SS 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly","sentence":"See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 43 L.Ed.2d 541 (1975) (\u00a7111 requires \u201cthe criminal intent to do the acts therein specified\u201d); United States v. Acosta-Sierra, 690 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (under \u00a7 111, defendant must have acted \"knowingly and intentionally and forcibly\u201d); United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (weapon must be used intentionally under \u00a7 111(b)); cf. Popal v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 249, 254 n.5 (3d Cir. 2005) (distinguishing assault under \u00a7 111, which requires willfulness, from Pennsylvania simple assault, which can be accomplished recklessly)."},"case_id":12277534,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For example, the Commission argues throughout its brief that the exercise is only relevant to its licensing decision to the extent it indicates that emergency preparedness plans are fundamentally flawed, and is not relevant as to minor or ad hoe problems occurring on the exercise day. Today, we in no way restrict the Commission's authority to adopt this as a substantive licensing standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 F.2d 783, 783","parenthetical":"\"broad responsibility ... reposed in [the NRC]\" justified its decision that the security of a power plant from enemy takeover is not relevant to licensing","sentence":"See Siegel, 400 F.2d at 783 (\u201cbroad responsibility ... reposed in [the NRC]\u201d justified its decision that the security of a power plant from enemy takeover is not relevant to licensing); see also North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC, 533 F.2d 655, 689-90 (D.C.Cir.1976) (upholding decision in a particular licensing proceeding that siting of plant on geological fault was not unduly unsafe); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States, 598 F.2d 759, 771-73 (3d Cir.1979) (NRC had broad discretion to impose moratorium on decisionmaking regarding recycling of nuclear fuel in light of uncertainty about efficacy of recycling). Under that standard, the NRC could summarily dismiss any claim that did not raise genuine issues of material fact about the fundamental nature of the emergency preparedness plans."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"533 F.2d 655, 689-90","parenthetical":"upholding decision in a particular licensing proceeding that siting of plant on geological fault was not unduly unsafe","sentence":"See Siegel, 400 F.2d at 783 (\u201cbroad responsibility ... reposed in [the NRC]\u201d justified its decision that the security of a power plant from enemy takeover is not relevant to licensing); see also North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC, 533 F.2d 655, 689-90 (D.C.Cir.1976) (upholding decision in a particular licensing proceeding that siting of plant on geological fault was not unduly unsafe); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States, 598 F.2d 759, 771-73 (3d Cir.1979) (NRC had broad discretion to impose moratorium on decisionmaking regarding recycling of nuclear fuel in light of uncertainty about efficacy of recycling). Under that standard, the NRC could summarily dismiss any claim that did not raise genuine issues of material fact about the fundamental nature of the emergency preparedness plans."},"case_id":3799509,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For example, the Commission argues throughout its brief that the exercise is only relevant to its licensing decision to the extent it indicates that emergency preparedness plans are fundamentally flawed, and is not relevant as to minor or ad hoe problems occurring on the exercise day. Today, we in no way restrict the Commission's authority to adopt this as a substantive licensing standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 F.2d 783, 783","parenthetical":"\"broad responsibility ... reposed in [the NRC]\" justified its decision that the security of a power plant from enemy takeover is not relevant to licensing","sentence":"See Siegel, 400 F.2d at 783 (\u201cbroad responsibility ... reposed in [the NRC]\u201d justified its decision that the security of a power plant from enemy takeover is not relevant to licensing); see also North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC, 533 F.2d 655, 689-90 (D.C.Cir.1976) (upholding decision in a particular licensing proceeding that siting of plant on geological fault was not unduly unsafe); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States, 598 F.2d 759, 771-73 (3d Cir.1979) (NRC had broad discretion to impose moratorium on decisionmaking regarding recycling of nuclear fuel in light of uncertainty about efficacy of recycling). Under that standard, the NRC could summarily dismiss any claim that did not raise genuine issues of material fact about the fundamental nature of the emergency preparedness plans."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"598 F.2d 759, 771-73","parenthetical":"NRC had broad discretion to impose moratorium on decisionmaking regarding recycling of nuclear fuel in light of uncertainty about efficacy of recycling","sentence":"See Siegel, 400 F.2d at 783 (\u201cbroad responsibility ... reposed in [the NRC]\u201d justified its decision that the security of a power plant from enemy takeover is not relevant to licensing); see also North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC, 533 F.2d 655, 689-90 (D.C.Cir.1976) (upholding decision in a particular licensing proceeding that siting of plant on geological fault was not unduly unsafe); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. United States, 598 F.2d 759, 771-73 (3d Cir.1979) (NRC had broad discretion to impose moratorium on decisionmaking regarding recycling of nuclear fuel in light of uncertainty about efficacy of recycling). Under that standard, the NRC could summarily dismiss any claim that did not raise genuine issues of material fact about the fundamental nature of the emergency preparedness plans."},"case_id":3799509,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is undisputed that Adams threatened each of his six carjacking victims with a gun. We must therefore determine whether sufficient evidence existed from which the jury could have determined that Adams's threats were actual rather than empty, and that they were indicative of his conditional intent to seriously harm or kill his victims. We think making this determination must require, at the least, a showing that Adams could have carried out his threats to harm his victims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 N.E. 647, 647","parenthetical":"applying conditional intent doctrine to those cases where the assailant,' \"with the present ability to destroy life or do great bodily harm,\" makes a threat and an unlawful demand","sentence":"See Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11-12, 119 S.Ct. 966 (requiring the United States to prove that \u201cthe defendant would have at least attempted\u201d to carry out his intimidating threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm); see also Connors, 97 N.E. at 647 (applying conditional intent doctrine to those cases where the assailant,' \u201cwith the present ability to destroy life or do great bodily harm,\u201d makes a threat and an unlawful demand) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"526 U.S. 11, 11-12","parenthetical":"requiring the United States to prove that \"the defendant would have at least attempted\" to carry out his intimidating threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm","sentence":"See Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11-12, 119 S.Ct. 966 (requiring the United States to prove that \u201cthe defendant would have at least attempted\u201d to carry out his intimidating threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm); see also Connors, 97 N.E. at 647 (applying conditional intent doctrine to those cases where the assailant,' \u201cwith the present ability to destroy life or do great bodily harm,\u201d makes a threat and an unlawful demand) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":9482231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is undisputed that Adams threatened each of his six carjacking victims with a gun. We must therefore determine whether sufficient evidence existed from which the jury could have determined that Adams's threats were actual rather than empty, and that they were indicative of his conditional intent to seriously harm or kill his victims. We think making this determination must require, at the least, a showing that Adams could have carried out his threats to harm his victims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 N.E. 647, 647","parenthetical":"applying conditional intent doctrine to those cases where the assailant,' \"with the present ability to destroy life or do great bodily harm,\" makes a threat and an unlawful demand","sentence":"See Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11-12, 119 S.Ct. 966 (requiring the United States to prove that \u201cthe defendant would have at least attempted\u201d to carry out his intimidating threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm); see also Connors, 97 N.E. at 647 (applying conditional intent doctrine to those cases where the assailant,' \u201cwith the present ability to destroy life or do great bodily harm,\u201d makes a threat and an unlawful demand) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring the United States to prove that \"the defendant would have at least attempted\" to carry out his intimidating threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm","sentence":"See Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11-12, 119 S.Ct. 966 (requiring the United States to prove that \u201cthe defendant would have at least attempted\u201d to carry out his intimidating threat to kill or cause serious bodily harm); see also Connors, 97 N.E. at 647 (applying conditional intent doctrine to those cases where the assailant,' \u201cwith the present ability to destroy life or do great bodily harm,\u201d makes a threat and an unlawful demand) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":9482231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With only one exception, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA has been incorporated into the SIAA by all of the circuit courts that have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"747 F.2d 700, 700","parenthetical":"adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"610 F.2d 7, 12-13","parenthetical":"reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"case_id":4089139,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With only one exception, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA has been incorporated into the SIAA by all of the circuit courts that have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"747 F.2d 700, 700","parenthetical":"adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"case_id":4089139,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With only one exception, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA has been incorporated into the SIAA by all of the circuit courts that have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"747 F.2d 700, 700","parenthetical":"adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"case_id":4089139,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With only one exception, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA has been incorporated into the SIAA by all of the circuit courts that have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"747 F.2d 700, 700","parenthetical":"adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"case_id":4089139,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With only one exception, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA has been incorporated into the SIAA by all of the circuit courts that have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"581 F.Supp. 847, 852","parenthetical":"adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"610 F.2d 7, 12-13","parenthetical":"reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"case_id":4089139,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With only one exception, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA has been incorporated into the SIAA by all of the circuit courts that have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"581 F.Supp. 847, 852","parenthetical":"adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"case_id":4089139,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With only one exception, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA has been incorporated into the SIAA by all of the circuit courts that have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"581 F.Supp. 847, 852","parenthetical":"adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"case_id":4089139,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With only one exception, the discretionary function exception to the FTCA has been incorporated into the SIAA by all of the circuit courts that have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"581 F.Supp. 847, 852","parenthetical":"adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary","sentence":"See, e.g., Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir.1986); Williams v. United States, 747 F.2d 700, 700 (11th Cir.1984) (adopting district court opinion reported at 581 F.Supp. 847, 852 (S.D.Ga. 1983)); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir.1982); Estate of Callas v. United States, 682 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir.1982); Canadian Transport Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C. Cir.1980); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837, 101 S.Ct. 112, 66 L.Ed.2d 44 (1980); Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1599, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); see also Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12-13 (1st Cir.1979) (reaffirming principle after noting Fourth Circuit authority to the contrary), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936, 100 S.Ct. 2155, 64 L.Ed.2d 789 (1980)."},"case_id":4089139,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Regardless which method is employed to plead scienter, the PSLRA mandates that plaintiffs state with particularity facts that give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind. See 15 U.S.C. SS 78u-4(b)(2). This court must interpret the statute according to the plain meaning of its words. \"When a statute does not define its terms, we employ the ordinary meaning of the words.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"183 F.3d 983, 983","parenthetical":"defining words \"facts\" and \"particularity\" in PSLRA by examining dictionary definitions","sentence":"Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 983 (defining words \u201cfacts\u201d and \u201cparticularity\u201d in PSLRA by examining dictionary definitions); see Hulsey v. USAir, Inc., 868 F.2d 1423, 1427 (5th Cir.1989) (\u201cWhere possible, courts interpret the words of statutes \u2018in their ordinary, everyday sense.\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"868 F.2d 1423, 1427","parenthetical":"\"Where possible, courts interpret the words of statutes 'in their ordinary, everyday sense.' \"","sentence":"Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 983 (defining words \u201cfacts\u201d and \u201cparticularity\u201d in PSLRA by examining dictionary definitions); see Hulsey v. USAir, Inc., 868 F.2d 1423, 1427 (5th Cir.1989) (\u201cWhere possible, courts interpret the words of statutes \u2018in their ordinary, everyday sense.\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":11504176,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While Plaintiff correctly notes that she is entitled to damages which are separate and distinct from those that may be recovered by the estate, courts applying Florida's Wrongful Death statute have concluded that the named plaintiff may sue only in her capacity as the personal representative of the decedent's estate and that survivors' claims must be brought by the personal representative. See, e.g., Morgan v. Am. Bankers Life Assur.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that after the adoption of Fla. Stat. SS 768.20 survivors may not assert independent claims arising out of a wrongful death and that survivors' claims must be brought through \"the medium of a personal representative\"","sentence":"Co. of Fla., 605 So.2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (concluding that after the adoption of Fla. Stat. \u00a7 768.20 survivors may not assert independent claims arising out of a wrongful death and that survivors\u2019 claims must be brought through \u201cthe medium of a personal representative\u201d); see also Veltmann v. Walpole Pharmacy, Inc., 928 F.Supp. 1161, 1161 (M.D.Fla.1996) (finding that, under Florida law, the real party in interest in a wrongful death action is the personal representative of the decedent\u2019s estate)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"928 F.Supp. 1161, 1161","parenthetical":"finding that, under Florida law, the real party in interest in a wrongful death action is the personal representative of the decedent's estate","sentence":"Co. of Fla., 605 So.2d 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (concluding that after the adoption of Fla. Stat. \u00a7 768.20 survivors may not assert independent claims arising out of a wrongful death and that survivors\u2019 claims must be brought through \u201cthe medium of a personal representative\u201d); see also Veltmann v. Walpole Pharmacy, Inc., 928 F.Supp. 1161, 1161 (M.D.Fla.1996) (finding that, under Florida law, the real party in interest in a wrongful death action is the personal representative of the decedent\u2019s estate)."},"case_id":3386699,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Likewise, the evidence she filed in response to UTEP's plea addressed only actions occurring before she filed her EEOC charge. It is axiomatic that UTEP's actions that occurred before Esparza filed her EEOC charge could not have been'caused by the EEOC filing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"293 S.W.3d 256, 263","parenthetical":"plaintiff cannot show a causal link in a retaliation claim when the employer's alleged acts in retaliation occurred long before the plaintiff engaged in any protected activity","sentence":"See Gumpert v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (plaintiff cannot show a causal link in a retaliation claim when the employer\u2019s alleged acts in retaliation occurred long before the plaintiff engaged in any protected activity); see also Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Farran, 409 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Tex.2013) (in Whistleblower Act claim, plaintiff failed to show his report to law enforcement caused the adverse personnel action, because the personnel action occurred before plaintiffs report to law enforcement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"409 S.W.3d 653, 656","parenthetical":"in Whistleblower Act claim, plaintiff failed to show his report to law enforcement caused the adverse personnel action, because the personnel action occurred before plaintiffs report to law enforcement","sentence":"See Gumpert v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 293 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (plaintiff cannot show a causal link in a retaliation claim when the employer\u2019s alleged acts in retaliation occurred long before the plaintiff engaged in any protected activity); see also Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Farran, 409 S.W.3d 653, 656 (Tex.2013) (in Whistleblower Act claim, plaintiff failed to show his report to law enforcement caused the adverse personnel action, because the personnel action occurred before plaintiffs report to law enforcement)."},"case_id":6840204,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"713 F.2d 39, 44","parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"592 F.2d 860, 860","parenthetical":"even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness' grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"592 F.2d 860, 860","parenthetical":"even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness' grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"592 F.2d 860, 860","parenthetical":"even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness' grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"592 F.2d 860, 860","parenthetical":"even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness' grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"534 F.2d 964, 973","parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"592 F.2d 860, 860","parenthetical":"even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness' grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"592 F.2d 860, 860","parenthetical":"even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness' grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"592 F.2d 860, 860","parenthetical":"even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness' grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"543 F.2d 1102, 1105","parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"713 F.2d 39, 44","parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"543 F.2d 1102, 1105","parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"543 F.2d 1102, 1105","parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"534 F.2d 964, 973","parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"543 F.2d 1102, 1105","parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"543 F.2d 1102, 1105","parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"543 F.2d 1102, 1105","parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"543 F.2d 1102, 1105","parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"713 F.2d 39, 44","parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"534 F.2d 964, 973","parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"713 F.2d 39, 44","parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"534 F.2d 964, 973","parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"713 F.2d 39, 44","parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"534 F.2d 964, 973","parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The courts have uniformly held that, in such circumstances, the inquiry is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the tardy disclosure. If the defendant received the material in time to put it to effective use at trial, his conviction should not be reversed simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and, indeed, should have been.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"disclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \"","sentence":"See United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306, 311-13 (5th Cir.) (failure to disclose immunity agreement with Government witness; not disclosed to defendant until witness\u2019 testimony), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 828, 102 S.Ct. 120, 70 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d at 860 (even assuming that Brady overrides Jencks Act, indictment should not have been dismissed because of tardy disclosure of witness\u2019 grand jury testimony containing exculpatory statements); United States v. Decker, 543 F.2d 1102, 1105 (5th Cir.1976) (Government fulfilled its disclosure duty by disclosing information to correct false testimony after witness testified but while still subject to recall), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1700, 52 L.Ed.2d 390 (1977); see also United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 486, 78 L.Ed.2d 682 (1983); United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983) (where Brady material has impeachment value only, disclosure on day witness testifies satisfies due process), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 725, 79 L.Ed.2d 185 (1984); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C.Cir.) (\u201cdisclosure by the government must be made at such time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case ... \u201d), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 324, 50 L.Ed.2d 292 (1976)."},"case_id":311795,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But Turnage has the burden on postconviction to set forth facts entitling him to the relief requested. We have said that to carry this burden petitioners must do more than offer concluso-ry, argumentative assertions, without factual support.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"566 N.W.2d 695, 695","parenthetical":"holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing","sentence":"See Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695 (holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing); see also Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (1970) (\u201c[PJostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions * * *.\u201d). The desire for finality in the criminal justice system is one reason it is appropriate to place this burden on the petitioner who seeks to set aside a conviction. See Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn.2002) (\u201cA petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a judgment which carries a presumption of regularity and which, therefore, cannot be lightly set aside.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"286 Minn. 14, 16","parenthetical":"\"[PJostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions * * *.\"","sentence":"See Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695 (holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing); see also Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (1970) (\u201c[PJostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions * * *.\u201d). The desire for finality in the criminal justice system is one reason it is appropriate to place this burden on the petitioner who seeks to set aside a conviction. See Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn.2002) (\u201cA petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a judgment which carries a presumption of regularity and which, therefore, cannot be lightly set aside.\u201d)."},"case_id":8329016,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But Turnage has the burden on postconviction to set forth facts entitling him to the relief requested. We have said that to carry this burden petitioners must do more than offer concluso-ry, argumentative assertions, without factual support.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"174 N.W.2d 131, 133-34","parenthetical":"\"[PJostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions * * *.\"","sentence":"See Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695 (holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing); see also Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (1970) (\u201c[PJostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions * * *.\u201d). The desire for finality in the criminal justice system is one reason it is appropriate to place this burden on the petitioner who seeks to set aside a conviction. See Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn.2002) (\u201cA petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a judgment which carries a presumption of regularity and which, therefore, cannot be lightly set aside.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"566 N.W.2d 695, 695","parenthetical":"holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing","sentence":"See Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695 (holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing); see also Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (1970) (\u201c[PJostconviction procedures * * * do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions * * *.\u201d). The desire for finality in the criminal justice system is one reason it is appropriate to place this burden on the petitioner who seeks to set aside a conviction. See Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn.2002) (\u201cA petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a judgment which carries a presumption of regularity and which, therefore, cannot be lightly set aside.\u201d)."},"case_id":8329016,"label":"b"}
{"context":"If the State had targeted one particular landowner and treated him unfairly, there might be more merit to the claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"140 S.W.3d 676, 676","parenthetical":"\"[I]t ordinarily is, and should be, harder for the government to show that its interests have been substantially advanced by regulation directed at one lone landowner.\"","sentence":"See Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 676 (\u201c[I]t ordinarily is, and should be, harder for the government to show that its interests have been substantially advanced by regulation directed at one lone landowner.\u201d); Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 936; but see Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d at 269, 271 (although SARA and the State targeted only the plaintiffs development, SARA was not liable for a taking because of its lack of regulatory authority)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"528 S.W.2d 269, 269, 271","parenthetical":"although SARA and the State targeted only the plaintiffs development, SARA was not liable for a taking because of its lack of regulatory authority","sentence":"See Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 676 (\u201c[I]t ordinarily is, and should be, harder for the government to show that its interests have been substantially advanced by regulation directed at one lone landowner.\u201d); Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 936; but see Garrett Bros., 528 S.W.2d at 269, 271 (although SARA and the State targeted only the plaintiffs development, SARA was not liable for a taking because of its lack of regulatory authority)."},"case_id":7126102,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The inquiry does not end there because there are two exceptions to the De-Shaney rule where the state has an affirmative duty to protect individual citizens, the \"special relationship\" exception and the \"state-created danger\" exception. First, the state is obligated to protect those individuals in custodial settings where the state has limited an individual's ability to care for himself.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"489 U.S. 199, 199-200","parenthetical":"the state has a duty to provide for the well-being of a private individual when the state \"takes [that] person into its custody and holds him there against his will.\"","sentence":"DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998 (the state has a duty to provide for the well-being of a private individual when the state \u201ctakes [that] person into its custody and holds him there against his will.\u201d); see also Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 827 (\u201cwhen a state has custody over a person, it must protect him because no alternative avenues of aid exist.\u201d); Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1075 (N.D.Ill.2010) (Kendall, J) (same). In other words, when the state restrains an individual\u2019s freedom through incarceration or institutionalization, that individual can no longer provide for himself, creating a state duty to provide for \u201cbasic human needs,\u201d such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and safety."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"570 F.3d 827, 827","parenthetical":"\"when a state has custody over a person, it must protect him because no alternative avenues of aid exist.\"","sentence":"DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998 (the state has a duty to provide for the well-being of a private individual when the state \u201ctakes [that] person into its custody and holds him there against his will.\u201d); see also Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 827 (\u201cwhen a state has custody over a person, it must protect him because no alternative avenues of aid exist.\u201d); Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1075 (N.D.Ill.2010) (Kendall, J) (same). In other words, when the state restrains an individual\u2019s freedom through incarceration or institutionalization, that individual can no longer provide for himself, creating a state duty to provide for \u201cbasic human needs,\u201d such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and safety."},"case_id":4187214,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The inquiry does not end there because there are two exceptions to the De-Shaney rule where the state has an affirmative duty to protect individual citizens, the \"special relationship\" exception and the \"state-created danger\" exception. First, the state is obligated to protect those individuals in custodial settings where the state has limited an individual's ability to care for himself.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the state has a duty to provide for the well-being of a private individual when the state \"takes [that] person into its custody and holds him there against his will.\"","sentence":"DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998 (the state has a duty to provide for the well-being of a private individual when the state \u201ctakes [that] person into its custody and holds him there against his will.\u201d); see also Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 827 (\u201cwhen a state has custody over a person, it must protect him because no alternative avenues of aid exist.\u201d); Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1075 (N.D.Ill.2010) (Kendall, J) (same). In other words, when the state restrains an individual\u2019s freedom through incarceration or institutionalization, that individual can no longer provide for himself, creating a state duty to provide for \u201cbasic human needs,\u201d such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and safety."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"570 F.3d 827, 827","parenthetical":"\"when a state has custody over a person, it must protect him because no alternative avenues of aid exist.\"","sentence":"DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998 (the state has a duty to provide for the well-being of a private individual when the state \u201ctakes [that] person into its custody and holds him there against his will.\u201d); see also Buchanan-Moore, 570 F.3d at 827 (\u201cwhen a state has custody over a person, it must protect him because no alternative avenues of aid exist.\u201d); Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1075 (N.D.Ill.2010) (Kendall, J) (same). In other words, when the state restrains an individual\u2019s freedom through incarceration or institutionalization, that individual can no longer provide for himself, creating a state duty to provide for \u201cbasic human needs,\u201d such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and safety."},"case_id":4187214,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"532 U.S. 782, 803-04","parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 1176, 1178","parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"532 U.S. 782, 803-04","parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"532 U.S. 782, 803-04","parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"532 U.S. 782, 803-04","parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 1176, 1178","parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 1176, 1178","parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Texas court's conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 1176, 1178","parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 397","parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 397","parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 397","parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"529 U.S. 362, 397","parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 1176, 1178","parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"225 F.3d 1176, 1178","parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We are acutely conscious of the deference we must accord to state courts' application of federal law, here, the reasonableness test for unavailability laid down in Ohio v. Roberts. Demanding as the AED-PA \"unreasonable application\" standard is, the Supreme Court and this court have sometimes held relief to be warranted under that standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law","sentence":"See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 803-04, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (Texas court\u2019s conclusion that jury instructions complied with Supreme Court mandate objectively unreasonable); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (state court decision contrary to and unreasonable application of federal precedent); Johnson v. Gibson, 254 F.3d 1155, 1165-66 (10th Cir.) (state court\u2019s application of federal harmless error standard unreasonable), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036, 122 S.Ct. 580, 151 L.Ed.2d 451 (2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1233-35 (10th Cir.2001) (state court\u2019s application of Strickland standard unreasonable); accord Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir.2002) (granting relief under AED-PA for unreasonable application of Confrontation Clause precedent); see also Herrera v. Lemaster, 225 F.3d 1176, 1178 (10th Cir.2000) (state court failure to identify correct rule resulted in decision contrary to federal law), on rehearing en banc, 301 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 1266, 154 L.Ed.2d 1035 (2003)."},"case_id":9347953,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the immobile nature of mobile homes subjects tenants to extreme financial loss upon-park closure; at the same time, this immobility makes the rental of pads profitable for the park owner.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"854 F.Supp. 1488, 1488","parenthetical":"park owners in \"superior bargaining position\" to that of tenants even if no shortage of mobile home spaces exists","sentence":"See Adamson, 854 F.Supp. at 1488 (park owners in \u201csuperior bargaining position\u201d to that of tenants even if no shortage of mobile home spaces exists); see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 523, 112 S.Ct. at 1526 (\u201cMobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of the mobile home itself.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"503 U.S. 523, 523","parenthetical":"\"Mobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of the mobile home itself.\"","sentence":"See Adamson, 854 F.Supp. at 1488 (park owners in \u201csuperior bargaining position\u201d to that of tenants even if no shortage of mobile home spaces exists); see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 523, 112 S.Ct. at 1526 (\u201cMobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of the mobile home itself.\u201d)."},"case_id":10738731,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the immobile nature of mobile homes subjects tenants to extreme financial loss upon-park closure; at the same time, this immobility makes the rental of pads profitable for the park owner.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 1526, 1526","parenthetical":"\"Mobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of the mobile home itself.\"","sentence":"See Adamson, 854 F.Supp. at 1488 (park owners in \u201csuperior bargaining position\u201d to that of tenants even if no shortage of mobile home spaces exists); see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 523, 112 S.Ct. at 1526 (\u201cMobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of the mobile home itself.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"854 F.Supp. 1488, 1488","parenthetical":"park owners in \"superior bargaining position\" to that of tenants even if no shortage of mobile home spaces exists","sentence":"See Adamson, 854 F.Supp. at 1488 (park owners in \u201csuperior bargaining position\u201d to that of tenants even if no shortage of mobile home spaces exists); see also Yee, 503 U.S. at 523, 112 S.Ct. at 1526 (\u201cMobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of the mobile home itself.\u201d)."},"case_id":10738731,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Express covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"case_id":4163027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663","parenthetical":"\"Express covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"case_id":4163027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"case_id":4163027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"case_id":4163027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134","parenthetical":"\"There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Express covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"case_id":4163027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134","parenthetical":"\"There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663","parenthetical":"\"Express covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"case_id":4163027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134","parenthetical":"\"There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"case_id":4163027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This conclusion is fully consistent with general principles of California contract law. See Faigin v. Signature Grp.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134","parenthetical":"\"There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\"","sentence":"Holdings, Inc., 211 Cal.App.4th 726, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 123, 134 (2012) (\u201cThere cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.\u201d) (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal.App.3d 467, 199 Cal.Rptr. 613 (1984)); see also Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 Cal.App.4th 1438, 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 651, 663 (2008) (\u201cExpress covenants abrogate the operation of implied covenants so courts will not permit implied agreements to overrule or modify the express contract of the parties.\u201d); Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 216 Cal. App.3d 1379, 265 Cal.Rptr. 412 (1989) (holding that there can be no implied contractual term at variance with an express term of a contract). \u201cThe reason for the rule is simply that where the parties have freely, fairly and voluntarily bargained for certain benefits in exchange for undertaking certain obligations, it would be inequitable to imply a different liability.\u201d"},"case_id":4163027,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Third, although not dispositive on the issue of whether there was discrimination in this case, an issue regarding the legitimacy of the reason provided by DCPS for plaintiffs termination is raised by the subsequent hiring of Rebecca Christian, a woman under the age of 30, who did not have the qualifications the plaintiff had as a social studies teacher, only four months after plaintiff was terminated. If it is true that the Business and Finance Academy had to reduce the number of social studies teachers to one, it is questionable how only four months later it was able to accommodate a second social studies teacher, who happened to be younger than the plaintiff.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"156 F.3d 1293, 1293","parenthetical":"\"If the jury can infer that the employer's explanation is not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts, but a lie, that should provide even stronger evidence of discrimination.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Aka, 156 F.3d at 1293 (\u201cIf the jury can infer that the employer\u2019s explanation is not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts, but a lie, that should provide even stronger evidence of discrimination.\u201d); but see Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 941 & n. 4 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that where ADEA plaintiff \u201cwas not replaced until [three] months after [his] discharge, and the discharge occurred in the context of a reduction in force due to economic necessity[,] ... substantially weaken[ed][his] ... claim.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where ADEA plaintiff \"was not replaced until [three] months after [his] discharge, and the discharge occurred in the context of a reduction in force due to economic necessity[,] ... substantially weaken[ed][his] ... claim.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Aka, 156 F.3d at 1293 (\u201cIf the jury can infer that the employer\u2019s explanation is not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts, but a lie, that should provide even stronger evidence of discrimination.\u201d); but see Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937, 941 & n. 4 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that where ADEA plaintiff \u201cwas not replaced until [three] months after [his] discharge, and the discharge occurred in the context of a reduction in force due to economic necessity[,] ... substantially weaken[ed][his] ... claim.\u201d)."},"case_id":9095909,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because Sessums' right to be present during court proceedings was a qualified right, the trial court should have weighed the relevant factors and had a reason for denying a bench warrant before it decided not to allow him to participate in person at the hearing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"48 S.W.3d 819, 819-20","parenthetical":"\"If, after considering these factors, the trial court determines that the prisoner is not entitled to appear personally, then the trial court should permit him to proceed by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means.\"","sentence":"See B.R.G., 48 S.W.3d at 819-20 (\u201cIf, after considering these factors, the trial court determines that the prisoner is not entitled to appear personally, then the trial court should permit him to proceed by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means.\u201d); see also Nichols v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, no writ) (concluding the trial court must make pertinent inquiries regarding an appellant\u2019s request to appear); cf. Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ) (the order reflects various findings demonstrating that the trial court did not arbitrarily refuse to issue the requested bench warrant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"776 S.W.2d 621, 623","parenthetical":"concluding the trial court must make pertinent inquiries regarding an appellant's request to appear","sentence":"See B.R.G., 48 S.W.3d at 819-20 (\u201cIf, after considering these factors, the trial court determines that the prisoner is not entitled to appear personally, then the trial court should permit him to proceed by affidavit, deposition, telephone, or other effective means.\u201d); see also Nichols v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1989, no writ) (concluding the trial court must make pertinent inquiries regarding an appellant\u2019s request to appear); cf. Nance v. Nance, 904 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ) (the order reflects various findings demonstrating that the trial court did not arbitrarily refuse to issue the requested bench warrant)."},"case_id":9100183,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in participating in the Program, and that their property interest is entitled to the protection of due process. United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"404 F.3d 105, 113","parenthetical":"\"procedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027","parenthetical":"\"A public housing tenant's interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"case_id":4009174,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in participating in the Program, and that their property interest is entitled to the protection of due process. United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027","parenthetical":"\"A public housing tenant's interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"case_id":4009174,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in participating in the Program, and that their property interest is entitled to the protection of due process. United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"404 F.3d 105, 113","parenthetical":"\"procedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"155 Misc.2d 556, 557","parenthetical":"\"A tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"case_id":4009174,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in participating in the Program, and that their property interest is entitled to the protection of due process. United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"155 Misc.2d 556, 557","parenthetical":"\"A tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"case_id":4009174,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in participating in the Program, and that their property interest is entitled to the protection of due process. United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141","parenthetical":"\"A tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"404 F.3d 105, 113","parenthetical":"\"procedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"case_id":4009174,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, for the purposes of this motion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have a protected property interest in participating in the Program, and that their property interest is entitled to the protection of due process. United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141","parenthetical":"\"A tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\"","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process","sentence":"1-C, Brooklyn, N.Y., 760 F.Supp. 1015, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (\u201cA public housing tenant\u2019s interest in his apartment is a property interest protected by the Constitution.\u201d); Jackson Terrace Ass\u2019n v. Paterson, 155 Misc.2d 556, 557, 589 N.Y.S.2d 141, 141 (N.Y.Dist.Ct.1992) (\u201cA tenant in a federally subsidized housing project has a constitutionally protected expectation of continued occupancy in the absence of good cause for termination and such statutory entitlements are protected by the due process clause of the constitution.\u201d); see also Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir.2005) (\u201cprocedural due process protections ordinarily attach where state or federal law confers an entitlement to benefits\u201d); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.1974) (tenant in a nonprofit housing development had an expectation in the renewal of her lease and nonrenewal without a hearing amounted to a deprivation of due process)."},"case_id":4009174,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Until Wilko is overruled, we are compelled to apply the Supreme Court's prevailing precedents with respect to predispute arbitration agreements and federal securities law. See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordon K.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"460 U.S. 533, 535","parenthetical":"\"Needless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"824 F.2d 219, 222","parenthetical":"\"Although the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"case_id":10659142,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Until Wilko is overruled, we are compelled to apply the Supreme Court's prevailing precedents with respect to predispute arbitration agreements and federal securities law. See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordon K.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"666 F.Supp. 219, 220","parenthetical":"the federal district court concluded \"the Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"460 U.S. 533, 535","parenthetical":"\"Needless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"case_id":10659142,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Until Wilko is overruled, we are compelled to apply the Supreme Court's prevailing precedents with respect to predispute arbitration agreements and federal securities law. See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordon K.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"824 F.2d 219, 222","parenthetical":"\"Although the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344","parenthetical":"\"Needless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"case_id":10659142,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Until Wilko is overruled, we are compelled to apply the Supreme Court's prevailing precedents with respect to predispute arbitration agreements and federal securities law. See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordon K.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"666 F.Supp. 219, 220","parenthetical":"the federal district court concluded \"the Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344","parenthetical":"\"Needless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"case_id":10659142,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Until Wilko is overruled, we are compelled to apply the Supreme Court's prevailing precedents with respect to predispute arbitration agreements and federal securities law. See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordon K.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"824 F.2d 219, 222","parenthetical":"\"Although the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Needless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"case_id":10659142,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Until Wilko is overruled, we are compelled to apply the Supreme Court's prevailing precedents with respect to predispute arbitration agreements and federal securities law. See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordon K.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Needless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"666 F.Supp. 219, 220","parenthetical":"the federal district court concluded \"the Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\"","sentence":"Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 1344, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (\u201cNeedless to say, only this [the Supreme] Court may overrule one of its precedents.\u201d); see also Chang v. Lin, 824 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir.1987) (\u201cAlthough the Supreme Court in McMahon questioned the rationale underlying Wilko, the Court nevertheless did not overrule that decision, and it continues to govern us.\u201d); Schultz v. Robinson-Humphrey\/American Express, Inc., 666 F.Supp. 219, 220 (M.D.Ga.1987) (the federal district court concluded \u201cthe Supreme Court did not overrule Wilko, and has implicitly reaffirmed the nonarbitrable nature of Section 12 claims\u201d)."},"case_id":10659142,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The case law, however, indicates that threats of litigation may not constitute inducement of \"fear\" under the Hobbs Act. See, e.g., I.S.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"870 F.2d 769, 774","parenthetical":"implying by hypothetical example that threat of litigation may constitute violation of Hobbs Act","sentence":"But see United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir.1989) (implying by hypothetical example that threat of litigation may constitute violation of Hobbs Act); Hall American Center Associates Limited Partnership v. Dick, 726 F.Supp. 1083, 1093-97 (E.D.Mich.1989) (holding that, at least where part of extensive scheme of other extortionate activity, threat of litigation may constitute extortion under Hobbs Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"751 F.2d 265, 267","parenthetical":"even bad faith threat of civil action does not constitute infliction of \"fear\" under Hobbs Act","sentence":"Joseph Co., Inc. v. J. Lauritzen A\/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir.1984) (even bad faith threat of civil action does not constitute infliction of \u201cfear\u201d under Hobbs Act); Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, 717 F.Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Pa.1989) (\u201cThe ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a \u2018wrongful use\u2019 of force or fear\u201d under Hobbs Act)."},"case_id":3818776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The case law, however, indicates that threats of litigation may not constitute inducement of \"fear\" under the Hobbs Act. See, e.g., I.S.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"726 F.Supp. 1083, 1093-97","parenthetical":"holding that, at least where part of extensive scheme of other extortionate activity, threat of litigation may constitute extortion under Hobbs Act","sentence":"But see United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir.1989) (implying by hypothetical example that threat of litigation may constitute violation of Hobbs Act); Hall American Center Associates Limited Partnership v. Dick, 726 F.Supp. 1083, 1093-97 (E.D.Mich.1989) (holding that, at least where part of extensive scheme of other extortionate activity, threat of litigation may constitute extortion under Hobbs Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"751 F.2d 265, 267","parenthetical":"even bad faith threat of civil action does not constitute infliction of \"fear\" under Hobbs Act","sentence":"Joseph Co., Inc. v. J. Lauritzen A\/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir.1984) (even bad faith threat of civil action does not constitute infliction of \u201cfear\u201d under Hobbs Act); Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, 717 F.Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Pa.1989) (\u201cThe ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a \u2018wrongful use\u2019 of force or fear\u201d under Hobbs Act)."},"case_id":3818776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The case law, however, indicates that threats of litigation may not constitute inducement of \"fear\" under the Hobbs Act. See, e.g., I.S.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"870 F.2d 769, 774","parenthetical":"implying by hypothetical example that threat of litigation may constitute violation of Hobbs Act","sentence":"But see United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir.1989) (implying by hypothetical example that threat of litigation may constitute violation of Hobbs Act); Hall American Center Associates Limited Partnership v. Dick, 726 F.Supp. 1083, 1093-97 (E.D.Mich.1989) (holding that, at least where part of extensive scheme of other extortionate activity, threat of litigation may constitute extortion under Hobbs Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"717 F.Supp. 332, 336","parenthetical":"\"The ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a 'wrongful use' of force or fear\" under Hobbs Act","sentence":"Joseph Co., Inc. v. J. Lauritzen A\/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir.1984) (even bad faith threat of civil action does not constitute infliction of \u201cfear\u201d under Hobbs Act); Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, 717 F.Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Pa.1989) (\u201cThe ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a \u2018wrongful use\u2019 of force or fear\u201d under Hobbs Act)."},"case_id":3818776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The case law, however, indicates that threats of litigation may not constitute inducement of \"fear\" under the Hobbs Act. See, e.g., I.S.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"717 F.Supp. 332, 336","parenthetical":"\"The ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a 'wrongful use' of force or fear\" under Hobbs Act","sentence":"Joseph Co., Inc. v. J. Lauritzen A\/S, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir.1984) (even bad faith threat of civil action does not constitute infliction of \u201cfear\u201d under Hobbs Act); Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, 717 F.Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.Pa.1989) (\u201cThe ordinary resort to legal process does not rise to the level of a \u2018wrongful use\u2019 of force or fear\u201d under Hobbs Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"726 F.Supp. 1083, 1093-97","parenthetical":"holding that, at least where part of extensive scheme of other extortionate activity, threat of litigation may constitute extortion under Hobbs Act","sentence":"But see United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 774 (1st Cir.1989) (implying by hypothetical example that threat of litigation may constitute violation of Hobbs Act); Hall American Center Associates Limited Partnership v. Dick, 726 F.Supp. 1083, 1093-97 (E.D.Mich.1989) (holding that, at least where part of extensive scheme of other extortionate activity, threat of litigation may constitute extortion under Hobbs Act)."},"case_id":3818776,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"[T]he purpose of the work product privilege is to protect the integrity of the adversary process.\" Not surprisingly, it does not apply to foster a distortion of the adversary process by protecting illegal actions by an attorney. Because its purpose \"is to protect the integrity of the adversary process[,] ... it would be improper to allow an attorney to exploit the privilege for ends that are antithetical to that process.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"707 F.2d 1271, 1271","parenthetical":"holding an attorney's unethical conduct in secretly recording conversations with witnesses vitiated the work product protection as to those recordings","sentence":"Parrott, 707 F.2d at 1271 (holding an attorney\u2019s unethical conduct in secretly recording conversations with witnesses vitiated the work product protection as to those recordings) (citing Moody v. I.R.S., 654 F.2d 795, 800 (D.C.Cir.1981)); see also In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1078 (4th Cir.1981) (\u201cNo court construing [the work product] rule ... has held that an attorney committing a crime could, by invoking the work product doctrine, insulate himself from criminal prosecution for abusing the system he is sworn to protect.\u201d). Indeed, as some of the above precedents indicate, conduct by an attorney that is merely unethical, as opposed to illegal, may be enough to vitiate the work product doctrine."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"662 F.2d 1073, 1078","parenthetical":"\"No court construing [the work product] rule ... has held that an attorney committing a crime could, by invoking the work product doctrine, insulate himself from criminal prosecution for abusing the system he is sworn to protect.\"","sentence":"Parrott, 707 F.2d at 1271 (holding an attorney\u2019s unethical conduct in secretly recording conversations with witnesses vitiated the work product protection as to those recordings) (citing Moody v. I.R.S., 654 F.2d 795, 800 (D.C.Cir.1981)); see also In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1078 (4th Cir.1981) (\u201cNo court construing [the work product] rule ... has held that an attorney committing a crime could, by invoking the work product doctrine, insulate himself from criminal prosecution for abusing the system he is sworn to protect.\u201d). Indeed, as some of the above precedents indicate, conduct by an attorney that is merely unethical, as opposed to illegal, may be enough to vitiate the work product doctrine."},"case_id":4341174,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the present case, Hag-gerty admitted that he was not working out as plant manager and initiated a request to step down. His relinquishment of the duties in those circumstances resulted in failed consideration and an abandonment of the three year plant manager contract, assuming it was previously enforceable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"482 So.2d 486, 490","parenthetical":"\"A party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\"","sentence":"See Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced); Boswell v. Dickinson, 300 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 742 (Fla.1975) (same); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930) (\u201cA party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\u201d); Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling, 526 So.2d 685 (Fla.1988) (broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker\u2019s contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"515 So.2d 1298, 1301","parenthetical":"Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced","sentence":"See Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced); Boswell v. Dickinson, 300 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 742 (Fla.1975) (same); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930) (\u201cA party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\u201d); Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling, 526 So.2d 685 (Fla.1988) (broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker\u2019s contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property)."},"case_id":7505866,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the present case, Hag-gerty admitted that he was not working out as plant manager and initiated a request to step down. His relinquishment of the duties in those circumstances resulted in failed consideration and an abandonment of the three year plant manager contract, assuming it was previously enforceable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"99 Fla. 1296, 1305","parenthetical":"\"A party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\"","sentence":"See Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced); Boswell v. Dickinson, 300 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 742 (Fla.1975) (same); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930) (\u201cA party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\u201d); Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling, 526 So.2d 685 (Fla.1988) (broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker\u2019s contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"515 So.2d 1298, 1301","parenthetical":"Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced","sentence":"See Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced); Boswell v. Dickinson, 300 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 742 (Fla.1975) (same); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930) (\u201cA party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\u201d); Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling, 526 So.2d 685 (Fla.1988) (broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker\u2019s contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property)."},"case_id":7505866,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the present case, Hag-gerty admitted that he was not working out as plant manager and initiated a request to step down. His relinquishment of the duties in those circumstances resulted in failed consideration and an abandonment of the three year plant manager contract, assuming it was previously enforceable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 So. 821, 824","parenthetical":"\"A party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\"","sentence":"See Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced); Boswell v. Dickinson, 300 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 742 (Fla.1975) (same); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930) (\u201cA party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\u201d); Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling, 526 So.2d 685 (Fla.1988) (broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker\u2019s contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"515 So.2d 1298, 1301","parenthetical":"Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced","sentence":"See Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced); Boswell v. Dickinson, 300 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 742 (Fla.1975) (same); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930) (\u201cA party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\u201d); Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling, 526 So.2d 685 (Fla.1988) (broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker\u2019s contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property)."},"case_id":7505866,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the present case, Hag-gerty admitted that he was not working out as plant manager and initiated a request to step down. His relinquishment of the duties in those circumstances resulted in failed consideration and an abandonment of the three year plant manager contract, assuming it was previously enforceable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker's contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property","sentence":"See Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced); Boswell v. Dickinson, 300 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 742 (Fla.1975) (same); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930) (\u201cA party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\u201d); Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling, 526 So.2d 685 (Fla.1988) (broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker\u2019s contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"515 So.2d 1298, 1301","parenthetical":"Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced","sentence":"See Gustafson v. Jensen, 515 So.2d 1298, 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (Parties may by their actions indicate abandonment of the terms of a contract and thereafter the contract may not be specifically enforced); Boswell v. Dickinson, 300 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 312 So.2d 742 (Fla.1975) (same); see also, Cordis Corp. v. Prooslin, 482 So.2d 486, 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), citing Seaboard Oil Co. v. Donovan, 99 Fla. 1296, 1305, 128 So. 821, 824 (1930) (\u201cA party is not entitled to enjoin the breach of contract by another unless he himself has performed what the contract requires of him so far as possible\u201d); Richland Grove & Cattle Co. v. Easterling, 526 So.2d 685 (Fla.1988) (broker not entitled to commission or enforcement of broker\u2019s contract where broker voluntarily abandoned his efforts to sell the property)."},"case_id":7505866,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The chance of a squeeze technique succeeding is usually improved if the squeeze remains in the dark about the affairs of the corporation and the actions of its directors and officers. The type of information withheld varies with the squeeze techniques being employed, but most commonly concerns the value of the enterprise and of an interest in it, the corporation's prospects for profitable operations in the future, the controlling shareholders' plans for the business, and any plans they may have for disposing of their interests in it. Since the public reporting and disclosure requirements of the federal securities law do not apply to close corporations, shareholders in a close corporation do not have access to sources of information available to securities holders in a public-issue corporation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"35 Clev. St. L. Rev. 130, 130","parenthetical":"holding that, in certain situations, it is oppressive for majority shareholders \"to parse out the information or documents that the duly elected and constituted secretary\/treasurer has access to\"","sentence":"O\u2019Neal, 35 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 130. See also, Leech, 762 A.2d at 720 (holding that, in certain situations, it is oppressive for majority shareholders \u201cto parse out the information or documents that the duly elected and constituted secretary\/treasurer has access to\u201d); Miller, Note, 12 J.L. & Com. at 81 (arguing that \u201cwithholding information relevant to the operation of the corporation as to important corporate matters\u201d would indicate the existence of oppressive conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"590 F. Supp. 1557, 1557","parenthetical":"tactics employed against a minority shareholder to effect a squeeze out and thus breaching the fiduciary duty owed such a shareholder may include \"withholding information relating to the operation of the corporation\"","sentence":"Cf. Orchard, 590 F. Supp. at 1557 (tactics employed against a minority shareholder to effect a squeeze out and thus breaching the fiduciary duty owed such a shareholder may include \u201cwithholding information relating to the operation of the corporation\u201d); Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 1099, 1115 (1999) (\u201cdenying the minority access to corporate information [has] contributed to findings of breach of fiduciary duty in the close corporation context\u201d)."},"case_id":277263,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The chance of a squeeze technique succeeding is usually improved if the squeeze remains in the dark about the affairs of the corporation and the actions of its directors and officers. The type of information withheld varies with the squeeze techniques being employed, but most commonly concerns the value of the enterprise and of an interest in it, the corporation's prospects for profitable operations in the future, the controlling shareholders' plans for the business, and any plans they may have for disposing of their interests in it. Since the public reporting and disclosure requirements of the federal securities law do not apply to close corporations, shareholders in a close corporation do not have access to sources of information available to securities holders in a public-issue corporation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"590 F. Supp. 1557, 1557","parenthetical":"tactics employed against a minority shareholder to effect a squeeze out and thus breaching the fiduciary duty owed such a shareholder may include \"withholding information relating to the operation of the corporation\"","sentence":"Cf. Orchard, 590 F. Supp. at 1557 (tactics employed against a minority shareholder to effect a squeeze out and thus breaching the fiduciary duty owed such a shareholder may include \u201cwithholding information relating to the operation of the corporation\u201d); Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 1099, 1115 (1999) (\u201cdenying the minority access to corporate information [has] contributed to findings of breach of fiduciary duty in the close corporation context\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"762 A.2d 720, 720","parenthetical":"holding that, in certain situations, it is oppressive for majority shareholders \"to parse out the information or documents that the duly elected and constituted secretary\/treasurer has access to\"","sentence":"O\u2019Neal, 35 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 130. See also, Leech, 762 A.2d at 720 (holding that, in certain situations, it is oppressive for majority shareholders \u201cto parse out the information or documents that the duly elected and constituted secretary\/treasurer has access to\u201d); Miller, Note, 12 J.L. & Com. at 81 (arguing that \u201cwithholding information relevant to the operation of the corporation as to important corporate matters\u201d would indicate the existence of oppressive conduct)."},"case_id":277263,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The chance of a squeeze technique succeeding is usually improved if the squeeze remains in the dark about the affairs of the corporation and the actions of its directors and officers. The type of information withheld varies with the squeeze techniques being employed, but most commonly concerns the value of the enterprise and of an interest in it, the corporation's prospects for profitable operations in the future, the controlling shareholders' plans for the business, and any plans they may have for disposing of their interests in it. Since the public reporting and disclosure requirements of the federal securities law do not apply to close corporations, shareholders in a close corporation do not have access to sources of information available to securities holders in a public-issue corporation.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"12 J.L. & Com. 81, 81","parenthetical":"arguing that \"withholding information relevant to the operation of the corporation as to important corporate matters\" would indicate the existence of oppressive conduct","sentence":"O\u2019Neal, 35 Clev. St. L. Rev. at 130. See also, Leech, 762 A.2d at 720 (holding that, in certain situations, it is oppressive for majority shareholders \u201cto parse out the information or documents that the duly elected and constituted secretary\/treasurer has access to\u201d); Miller, Note, 12 J.L. & Com. at 81 (arguing that \u201cwithholding information relevant to the operation of the corporation as to important corporate matters\u201d would indicate the existence of oppressive conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"590 F. Supp. 1557, 1557","parenthetical":"tactics employed against a minority shareholder to effect a squeeze out and thus breaching the fiduciary duty owed such a shareholder may include \"withholding information relating to the operation of the corporation\"","sentence":"Cf. Orchard, 590 F. Supp. at 1557 (tactics employed against a minority shareholder to effect a squeeze out and thus breaching the fiduciary duty owed such a shareholder may include \u201cwithholding information relating to the operation of the corporation\u201d); Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 1099, 1115 (1999) (\u201cdenying the minority access to corporate information [has] contributed to findings of breach of fiduciary duty in the close corporation context\u201d)."},"case_id":277263,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because payments alone are insufficient to establish affirmative misconduct, the defendant's partial payments of attorneys' fees, likewise, are insufficient. Furthermore, failing to raise arguments in an administrative due process hearing does not constitute affirmative misconduct absent a showing, by the plaintiff, that the omission was anything more than \"ordinary negligence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"562 F.Supp. 4, 8-9","parenthetical":"declining to estop the government from raising arguments not included in a denial letter","sentence":"See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that a \u201cfailure to advise,\u201d even when the defendant has an \u201caffirmative obligation\u201d to do so, \u201cis not the same as engaging in \u2018affirmative misconduct\u2019 \u201d); see also American Sav. v. Bell, 562 F.Supp. 4, 8-9 (D.D.C.1981) (declining to estop the government from raising arguments not included in a denial letter)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"201 F.3d 990, 994","parenthetical":"holding that a \"failure to advise,\" even when the defendant has an \"affirmative obligation\" to do so, \"is not the same as engaging in 'affirmative misconduct' \"","sentence":"See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that a \u201cfailure to advise,\u201d even when the defendant has an \u201caffirmative obligation\u201d to do so, \u201cis not the same as engaging in \u2018affirmative misconduct\u2019 \u201d); see also American Sav. v. Bell, 562 F.Supp. 4, 8-9 (D.D.C.1981) (declining to estop the government from raising arguments not included in a denial letter)."},"case_id":3464349,"label":"b"}
{"context":"He concedes, for example, that the statute of limitations did not bar him from refiling those claims in state court, and in fact, the claims have been refiled. The Supreme Court has indicated that a remand of state claims originally removed from state court \"may best promote the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity\" even where the applicable statute of limitations has not expired, but it is clear that a district court retains the discretion to dismiss as well as to remand such claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"108 S.Ct. 621, 621","parenthetical":"\"petitioners concede, as they must, that a federal court has discretion to dismiss a removed ease involving pendent claims\"","sentence":"Id. at 353-54,108 S.Ct. at 621 (\u201cpetitioners concede, as they must, that a federal court has discretion to dismiss a removed ease involving pendent claims\u201d); see also Decatur Memorial Hosp. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir.1993) (removed state law claim could be dismissed without prejudice or remanded once federal claim had been resolved); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1406 (7th Cir.1989) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"990 F.2d 925, 927-28","parenthetical":"removed state law claim could be dismissed without prejudice or remanded once federal claim had been resolved","sentence":"Id. at 353-54,108 S.Ct. at 621 (\u201cpetitioners concede, as they must, that a federal court has discretion to dismiss a removed ease involving pendent claims\u201d); see also Decatur Memorial Hosp. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 925, 927-28 (7th Cir.1993) (removed state law claim could be dismissed without prejudice or remanded once federal claim had been resolved); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1406 (7th Cir.1989) (same)."},"case_id":336526,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. #49] (\"Plaintiff's Surreply\"), at 2-3. However, even assuming arguendo that the alteration of the records would suffice as an act of discrimination or harassment actionable under Title VII, and that the date of the. alteration could be established, it is insufficient to permit Williams to rely upon the continuing violation exception, because nothing prevented her from filing a charge of discrimination before discovering the alteration.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"988 F.2d 1425, 1432","parenthetical":"premise underlying the continuing violation doctrine is the equitable notion that the statute of limitations ought not to begin to run until facts supportive of the cause of action are of should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated","sentence":"See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1432 (5th Cir.1993) (premise underlying the continuing violation doctrine is the equitable notion that the statute of limitations ought not to begin to run until facts supportive of the cause of action are of should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated); see also Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cthe purpose of permitting a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action on the continuing violation theory is to permit the inclusion of acts whose character as discriminatory acts was not apparent at the time they occurred\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"42 F.3d 439, 446","parenthetical":"\"the purpose of permitting a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action on the continuing violation theory is to permit the inclusion of acts whose character as discriminatory acts was not apparent at the time they occurred\"","sentence":"See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1432 (5th Cir.1993) (premise underlying the continuing violation doctrine is the equitable notion that the statute of limitations ought not to begin to run until facts supportive of the cause of action are of should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated); see also Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 446 (7th Cir.1994) (\u201cthe purpose of permitting a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action on the continuing violation theory is to permit the inclusion of acts whose character as discriminatory acts was not apparent at the time they occurred\u201d)."},"case_id":841898,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Reasonable people could not disagree as to the meaning and effect of these provisions: they unambiguously state that if Robinson failed to pay its premiums by the end of the ten-day grace period, the Contract could be terminated as of the date the premiums were due. Further, even if Foundation had written internal policies that modified the Contract, binding precedent precludes these policies from modifying the unambiguous terms of the Contract.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"805 F.2d 960, 960","parenthetical":"explaining that Congress rejected the use of informal written agreements to modify an ERISA plan","sentence":"Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960 (explaining that Congress rejected the use of informal written agreements to modify an ERISA plan); see also Adams v. Thiokol Corp., 231 F.3d 837, 843 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Nachwalter); Smith v. Nat\u2019l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 36 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1994) (holding that \u201cany modification or amendment to an ERISA plan can be supplemented or applied only after the amendment has been appropriately adopted in a formal, complete, and written form\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"36 F.3d 1077, 1081","parenthetical":"holding that \"any modification or amendment to an ERISA plan can be supplemented or applied only after the amendment has been appropriately adopted in a formal, complete, and written form\"","sentence":"Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960 (explaining that Congress rejected the use of informal written agreements to modify an ERISA plan); see also Adams v. Thiokol Corp., 231 F.3d 837, 843 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Nachwalter); Smith v. Nat\u2019l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 36 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir.1994) (holding that \u201cany modification or amendment to an ERISA plan can be supplemented or applied only after the amendment has been appropriately adopted in a formal, complete, and written form\u201d)."},"case_id":1543741,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The petitioners contend that we lack jurisdiction because the government's notice of appeal was filed on the sixtieth day after entry of the order being appealed. That contention assumes that this appeal is governed by Fed. R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(B), which requires that any notice of appeal by the government be filed within 30 days after judgment in a criminal case.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"117 F.3d 471, 474","parenthetical":"holding that the \"appeal was timely filed, because Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a","sentence":"Instead, appeals in \u00a7 2255 proceedings are treated as civil in nature and are governed by Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B), which allows 60 days for filing the notice of appeal where the government is a party. See United States v. Brown, 117 F.3d 471, 474 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that the \"appeal was timely filed, because Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides inmates with sixty days to appeal the denial of a \u00a7 2255 motion''); United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir.2000) (observing that Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B) would apply to allow the government 60 days to appeal from the grant of a \u00a7 2255 motion) (dicta); see also United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., Inc., 501 F.2d 80, 81 (5th Cir.1974) (\"This Circuit has long taken the view that \u00a7 2255 proceedings are, like habeas matters, civil actions mainly standing on their own bottoms....\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"501 F.2d 80, 81","parenthetical":"\"This Circuit has long taken the view that SS 2255 proceedings are, like habeas matters, civil actions mainly standing on their own bottoms....\"","sentence":"Instead, appeals in \u00a7 2255 proceedings are treated as civil in nature and are governed by Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B), which allows 60 days for filing the notice of appeal where the government is a party. See United States v. Brown, 117 F.3d 471, 474 (11th Cir.1997) (holding that the \"appeal was timely filed, because Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides inmates with sixty days to appeal the denial of a \u00a7 2255 motion''); United States v. Phillips, 225 F.3d 1198, 1200 (11th Cir.2000) (observing that Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B) would apply to allow the government 60 days to appeal from the grant of a \u00a7 2255 motion) (dicta); see also United States v. Dunham Concrete Prods., Inc., 501 F.2d 80, 81 (5th Cir.1974) (\"This Circuit has long taken the view that \u00a7 2255 proceedings are, like habeas matters, civil actions mainly standing on their own bottoms....\u201d)."},"case_id":9248656,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Kansas Supreme Court rejected Torres's argument that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when it admitted the statements he made to law enforcement officers.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding district court did not violate Sixth Amendment by admitting defendant's out-of-court statement","sentence":"Torres, 121 P.3d at 438. We agree that no clear authority exists for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to \u201cconfront oneself\u2019 at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir .2006), cert. denied, \u2014U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1149, 166 L.Ed.2d 998 (2007) (holding district court did not violate Sixth Amendment by admitting defendant\u2019s out-of-court statement) (citing United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1354 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 786 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 676-77 (1st Cir.1978); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein\u2019s Federal Evidence \u00a7 802.05[3][d] at 802-25 (2d ed.2005) (explaining \u201ca party cannot seriously claim that his or her own statement should be excluded because it was not made under oath or subject to cross-examination\u201d)); United States v. Lafferty, 387 F.Supp.2d 500, 511 (W.D.Pa.2005) (\u201cInherent in Justice Scalia\u2019s analysis in the Crawford opinion was the idea that the right of confrontation exists as to accusations of third parties implicating a criminal defendant, not a criminal defendant implicating herself.\u201d); but see United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir.2005) (implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"409 F.3d 325, 338","parenthetical":"implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford","sentence":"Torres, 121 P.3d at 438. We agree that no clear authority exists for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to \u201cconfront oneself\u2019 at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir .2006), cert. denied, \u2014U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1149, 166 L.Ed.2d 998 (2007) (holding district court did not violate Sixth Amendment by admitting defendant\u2019s out-of-court statement) (citing United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1354 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 786 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 676-77 (1st Cir.1978); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein\u2019s Federal Evidence \u00a7 802.05[3][d] at 802-25 (2d ed.2005) (explaining \u201ca party cannot seriously claim that his or her own statement should be excluded because it was not made under oath or subject to cross-examination\u201d)); United States v. Lafferty, 387 F.Supp.2d 500, 511 (W.D.Pa.2005) (\u201cInherent in Justice Scalia\u2019s analysis in the Crawford opinion was the idea that the right of confrontation exists as to accusations of third parties implicating a criminal defendant, not a criminal defendant implicating herself.\u201d); but see United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir.2005) (implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford)."},"case_id":5537704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Kansas Supreme Court rejected Torres's argument that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when it admitted the statements he made to law enforcement officers.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding district court did not violate Sixth Amendment by admitting defendant's out-of-court statement","sentence":"Torres, 121 P.3d at 438. We agree that no clear authority exists for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to \u201cconfront oneself\u2019 at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir .2006), cert. denied, \u2014U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1149, 166 L.Ed.2d 998 (2007) (holding district court did not violate Sixth Amendment by admitting defendant\u2019s out-of-court statement) (citing United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1354 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 786 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 676-77 (1st Cir.1978); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein\u2019s Federal Evidence \u00a7 802.05[3][d] at 802-25 (2d ed.2005) (explaining \u201ca party cannot seriously claim that his or her own statement should be excluded because it was not made under oath or subject to cross-examination\u201d)); United States v. Lafferty, 387 F.Supp.2d 500, 511 (W.D.Pa.2005) (\u201cInherent in Justice Scalia\u2019s analysis in the Crawford opinion was the idea that the right of confrontation exists as to accusations of third parties implicating a criminal defendant, not a criminal defendant implicating herself.\u201d); but see United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir.2005) (implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"409 F.3d 325, 338","parenthetical":"implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford","sentence":"Torres, 121 P.3d at 438. We agree that no clear authority exists for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to \u201cconfront oneself\u2019 at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir .2006), cert. denied, \u2014U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1149, 166 L.Ed.2d 998 (2007) (holding district court did not violate Sixth Amendment by admitting defendant\u2019s out-of-court statement) (citing United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1354 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 786 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 676-77 (1st Cir.1978); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein\u2019s Federal Evidence \u00a7 802.05[3][d] at 802-25 (2d ed.2005) (explaining \u201ca party cannot seriously claim that his or her own statement should be excluded because it was not made under oath or subject to cross-examination\u201d)); United States v. Lafferty, 387 F.Supp.2d 500, 511 (W.D.Pa.2005) (\u201cInherent in Justice Scalia\u2019s analysis in the Crawford opinion was the idea that the right of confrontation exists as to accusations of third parties implicating a criminal defendant, not a criminal defendant implicating herself.\u201d); but see United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir.2005) (implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford)."},"case_id":5537704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Kansas Supreme Court rejected Torres's argument that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when it admitted the statements he made to law enforcement officers.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"387 F.Supp.2d 500, 511","parenthetical":"\"Inherent in Justice Scalia's analysis in the Crawford opinion was the idea that the right of confrontation exists as to accusations of third parties implicating a criminal defendant, not a criminal defendant implicating herself.\"","sentence":"Torres, 121 P.3d at 438. We agree that no clear authority exists for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to \u201cconfront oneself\u2019 at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir .2006), cert. denied, \u2014U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1149, 166 L.Ed.2d 998 (2007) (holding district court did not violate Sixth Amendment by admitting defendant\u2019s out-of-court statement) (citing United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1354 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 786 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 676-77 (1st Cir.1978); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein\u2019s Federal Evidence \u00a7 802.05[3][d] at 802-25 (2d ed.2005) (explaining \u201ca party cannot seriously claim that his or her own statement should be excluded because it was not made under oath or subject to cross-examination\u201d)); United States v. Lafferty, 387 F.Supp.2d 500, 511 (W.D.Pa.2005) (\u201cInherent in Justice Scalia\u2019s analysis in the Crawford opinion was the idea that the right of confrontation exists as to accusations of third parties implicating a criminal defendant, not a criminal defendant implicating herself.\u201d); but see United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir.2005) (implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"409 F.3d 325, 338","parenthetical":"implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford","sentence":"Torres, 121 P.3d at 438. We agree that no clear authority exists for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to \u201cconfront oneself\u2019 at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir .2006), cert. denied, \u2014U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 1149, 166 L.Ed.2d 998 (2007) (holding district court did not violate Sixth Amendment by admitting defendant\u2019s out-of-court statement) (citing United States v. Zizzo, 120 F.3d 1338, 1354 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 786 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Rios Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670, 676-77 (1st Cir.1978); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein\u2019s Federal Evidence \u00a7 802.05[3][d] at 802-25 (2d ed.2005) (explaining \u201ca party cannot seriously claim that his or her own statement should be excluded because it was not made under oath or subject to cross-examination\u201d)); United States v. Lafferty, 387 F.Supp.2d 500, 511 (W.D.Pa.2005) (\u201cInherent in Justice Scalia\u2019s analysis in the Crawford opinion was the idea that the right of confrontation exists as to accusations of third parties implicating a criminal defendant, not a criminal defendant implicating herself.\u201d); but see United States v. Gibson, 409 F.3d 325, 338 (6th Cir.2005) (implying admission of an out-of-court confession by defendant might raise confrontation problems under Crawford)."},"case_id":5537704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Though Mr. Meek refers to his gang tattoos, he does not allege any facts that would suggest similarities to other prisoners who were treated more favorably. The omission is fatal to the equal-protection claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"16 F.3d 367, 371","parenthetical":"concluding that a prisoner's equal-protection claim was frivolous because of the inability to allege similarities \"in every relevant respect\" to other inmates who were classified more favorably","sentence":"See Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir.1994) (concluding that a prisoner\u2019s equal-protection claim was frivolous because of the inability to allege similarities \u201cin every relevant respect\u201d to other inmates who were classified more favorably); see also Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1260-61 (10th Cir.2006) (a prisoner\u2019s equal-protection claim, based on a difference in the length of administrative detention, was frivolous because it was not plausible to suggest identical circumstances with other inmates who were treated more favorably)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"435 F.3d 1252, 1260-61","parenthetical":"a prisoner's equal-protection claim, based on a difference in the length of administrative detention, was frivolous because it was not plausible to suggest identical circumstances with other inmates who were treated more favorably","sentence":"See Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir.1994) (concluding that a prisoner\u2019s equal-protection claim was frivolous because of the inability to allege similarities \u201cin every relevant respect\u201d to other inmates who were classified more favorably); see also Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1260-61 (10th Cir.2006) (a prisoner\u2019s equal-protection claim, based on a difference in the length of administrative detention, was frivolous because it was not plausible to suggest identical circumstances with other inmates who were treated more favorably)."},"case_id":4176008,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, the defense did directly charge fabrication through its two witnesses and the nature of its cross-examination of Turner. It also impliedly charged that Turner had an improper motive that influenced him to fabricate. Onaiwu and the defendant testified that the defendant had left the table before Agent Turner asked for the heroin sample and that Onaiwu, not the defendant, had handed over the sample. Implied in this testimony was the suggestion that Agent Turner might have structured his testimony in order to convict defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"624 F.2d 384, 393","parenthetical":"attack on witnesses' credibility is an implicit charge of fabrication for purposes of Quinto test","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir.1980) (attack on witnesses\u2019 credibility is an implicit charge of fabrication for purposes of Quinto test)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"604 F.2d 304, 311","parenthetical":"impeachment of undercover operative as witness \"was rife with implications that his testimony was improperly motivated\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir.1979) (impeachment of undercover operative as witness \u201cwas rife with implications that his testimony was improperly motivated\u201d), cert. denied sub nom. Sarmiento v. United States, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S.Ct. 664, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980)."},"case_id":7857749,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, the defense did directly charge fabrication through its two witnesses and the nature of its cross-examination of Turner. It also impliedly charged that Turner had an improper motive that influenced him to fabricate. Onaiwu and the defendant testified that the defendant had left the table before Agent Turner asked for the heroin sample and that Onaiwu, not the defendant, had handed over the sample. Implied in this testimony was the suggestion that Agent Turner might have structured his testimony in order to convict defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"impeachment of undercover operative as witness \"was rife with implications that his testimony was improperly motivated\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir.1979) (impeachment of undercover operative as witness \u201cwas rife with implications that his testimony was improperly motivated\u201d), cert. denied sub nom. Sarmiento v. United States, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S.Ct. 664, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"624 F.2d 384, 393","parenthetical":"attack on witnesses' credibility is an implicit charge of fabrication for purposes of Quinto test","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir.1980) (attack on witnesses\u2019 credibility is an implicit charge of fabrication for purposes of Quinto test)."},"case_id":7857749,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, the defense did directly charge fabrication through its two witnesses and the nature of its cross-examination of Turner. It also impliedly charged that Turner had an improper motive that influenced him to fabricate. Onaiwu and the defendant testified that the defendant had left the table before Agent Turner asked for the heroin sample and that Onaiwu, not the defendant, had handed over the sample. Implied in this testimony was the suggestion that Agent Turner might have structured his testimony in order to convict defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"624 F.2d 384, 393","parenthetical":"attack on witnesses' credibility is an implicit charge of fabrication for purposes of Quinto test","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir.1980) (attack on witnesses\u2019 credibility is an implicit charge of fabrication for purposes of Quinto test)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"impeachment of undercover operative as witness \"was rife with implications that his testimony was improperly motivated\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir.1979) (impeachment of undercover operative as witness \u201cwas rife with implications that his testimony was improperly motivated\u201d), cert. denied sub nom. Sarmiento v. United States, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S.Ct. 664, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980)."},"case_id":7857749,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, the defense did directly charge fabrication through its two witnesses and the nature of its cross-examination of Turner. It also impliedly charged that Turner had an improper motive that influenced him to fabricate. Onaiwu and the defendant testified that the defendant had left the table before Agent Turner asked for the heroin sample and that Onaiwu, not the defendant, had handed over the sample. Implied in this testimony was the suggestion that Agent Turner might have structured his testimony in order to convict defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"impeachment of undercover operative as witness \"was rife with implications that his testimony was improperly motivated\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dominguez, 604 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir.1979) (impeachment of undercover operative as witness \u201cwas rife with implications that his testimony was improperly motivated\u201d), cert. denied sub nom. Sarmiento v. United States, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S.Ct. 664, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"624 F.2d 384, 393","parenthetical":"attack on witnesses' credibility is an implicit charge of fabrication for purposes of Quinto test","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Shulman, 624 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir.1980) (attack on witnesses\u2019 credibility is an implicit charge of fabrication for purposes of Quinto test)."},"case_id":7857749,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 F.2d 1493, 1498","parenthetical":"\"In determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law 'clearly established' when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"827 F.2d 836, 848","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"810 F.2d 1437, 1462","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"786 F.2d 268, 276","parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 U.S. 154, 154","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 F.2d 1493, 1498","parenthetical":"\"In determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law 'clearly established' when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"827 F.2d 836, 848","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"810 F.2d 1437, 1462","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"786 F.2d 268, 276","parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 S.Ct. 1694, 1694","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 F.2d 1493, 1498","parenthetical":"\"In determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law 'clearly established' when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"827 F.2d 836, 848","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"810 F.2d 1437, 1462","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"786 F.2d 268, 276","parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 569, 569","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 F.2d 1493, 1498","parenthetical":"\"In determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law 'clearly established' when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"827 F.2d 836, 848","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"810 F.2d 1437, 1462","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered 'clearly established,' at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"786 F.2d 268, 276","parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In sum, regardless of how DiMeglio characterizes his speech before the EBIA, it was not in 1990 (nor is it even now) clearly within the protected expression of a public employee under the First Amendment. Indeed, only infrequently will it be \"clearly established\" that a public employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the relevant inquiry requires a \"particularized balancing\" that is subtle, difficult to apply, and not yet well-defined.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"A constitutional rule that \"involv[es] the balancing of competing interests\" is \"so fact dependent that the 'law\" can rarely be considered 'clearly established.'\"","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1735, 1735","parenthetical":"\" '[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.'\" (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735","sentence":"Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. at 1691-92; Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 717 (4th Cir.1988); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. at 1694 (\u201c \u2018[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general standard against which all statements may be judged.\u2019\u201d (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569, 88 S.Ct. at 1735)); see also Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir.1992) (\u201cIn determining whether the law was clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require courts to balance competing interest may make it more difficult to find the law \u2018clearly established\u2019 when assessing claims of qualified immunity.\u201d); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848 (1st Cir.1987) (\u201c[Wjhen the law requires a balancing of competing interest, ... it may be unfair to charge an official with knowledge of the law in absence of a previously decided case with clearly analogous facts.\u201d) (citation omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir.) (\u201c[I]f the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established,\u2019 at least in the absence of closely corresponding factual and legal precedent.\u201d), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir.) (A constitutional rule that \u201cinvolv[es] the balancing of competing interests\u201d is \u201cso fact dependent that the \u2018law\u201d can rarely be considered \u2018clearly established.\u2019\u201d), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 848, 107 S.Ct. 172, 93 L.Ed.2d 109 (1986)."},"case_id":7414556,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Social Security Regulations regarding the evaluation of opinion evidence were amended effective March 27, 2017. Where, as here, the AO's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner, the reviewing court generally applies the law in effect at the time of the AO's decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ's decision despite subsequent amendment","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"With respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court's review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"case_id":12273811,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Social Security Regulations regarding the evaluation of opinion evidence were amended effective March 27, 2017. Where, as here, the AO's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner, the reviewing court generally applies the law in effect at the time of the AO's decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ's decision despite subsequent amendment","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2001 WL 1453802, at *58011","parenthetical":"\"With respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court's review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"case_id":12273811,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Social Security Regulations regarding the evaluation of opinion evidence were amended effective March 27, 2017. Where, as here, the AO's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner, the reviewing court generally applies the law in effect at the time of the AO's decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"366 F.3d 643, 647","parenthetical":"\"We apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner's decision became final.\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"With respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court's review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"case_id":12273811,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Social Security Regulations regarding the evaluation of opinion evidence were amended effective March 27, 2017. Where, as here, the AO's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner, the reviewing court generally applies the law in effect at the time of the AO's decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2001 WL 1453802, at *58011","parenthetical":"\"With respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court's review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"366 F.3d 643, 647","parenthetical":"\"We apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner's decision became final.\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"case_id":12273811,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Social Security Regulations regarding the evaluation of opinion evidence were amended effective March 27, 2017. Where, as here, the AO's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner, the reviewing court generally applies the law in effect at the time of the AO's decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"With respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court's review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"42 U.S.C. SS 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"case_id":12273811,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Social Security Regulations regarding the evaluation of opinion evidence were amended effective March 27, 2017. Where, as here, the AO's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner, the reviewing court generally applies the law in effect at the time of the AO's decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"42 U.S.C. SS 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2001 WL 1453802, at *58011","parenthetical":"\"With respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court's review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\"","sentence":"See Lowry v. Astrue, 474 Fed.Appx. 801, 805 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying version of regulation in effect at time of ALJ\u2019s decision despite subsequent amendment); Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 2004) (\u201cWe apply the rules that were in effect at the time the Commissioner\u2019s decision became final.\u201d); Spencer v. Colvin, No. 15-05925, 2016 WL 7046848, at *9 n.4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 1, 2016) (\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 405 does not contain any express authorization from Congress allowing the Commissioner to engage in retroactive rulemaking\u201d); cf. Revised Medical Criteria for Determination of Disability, Musculoskeletal System and Related Criteria, 66 Fed. Reg. 58010, 2001 WL 1453802, at *58011 (Nov. 19, 2001) (\u201cWith respect to claims in which we have made a final decision, and that are pending judicial review in Federal court, we expect that the court\u2019s review of the Commissioner's final decision would be made in accordance with the rules in effect at the time of the final decision.\u201d)."},"case_id":12273811,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For the reasons discussed above, I reject the rationale of those cases which hold that res judicata bars a subsequent action unless the debtor's disclosure statement and\/or plan specifically reserves the right to litigate that specific claim, and choose to follow those courts which hold that a subsequent action is not barred by a prior confirmation hearing under the doctrine of res judicata where the disclosure statement and plan contain a general reservation of the right to pursue preference actions post-confirmation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"168 B.R. 177, 183","parenthetical":"finding that res judicata did not bar unsecured creditor's objection to larger creditor's claim where neither the debtor's disclosure statement or plan contained any provision pertaining to the allowance or disallowance or suggesting or requiring that the action of any creditor be brought against any other, including defendant","sentence":"See Weidel, 208 B.R. at 853-54 (holding that res judicata did not bar debtors\u2019 objection to creditor\u2019s proof of claim where the plan expressly reserved the general right to assert post-confirmation objections to claims); see also Envirodyne Indus., Inc. v. Conn. Mutual Life Co. (In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc.), 174 B.R. 986, 991 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1994) (finding that debtor was not barred from bringing proceedings against petitioning bondholders under the doctrine of res ju-dicata based on debtor\u2019s failure to explicitly reveal its potential claims against such bondholders in its disclosure statement); In re Outdoor Sports Headquarters, Inc., 168 B.R. 177, 183 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1994) (finding that res judicata did not bar unsecured creditor\u2019s objection to larger creditor\u2019s claim where neither the debtor\u2019s disclosure statement or plan contained any provision pertaining to the allowance or disallowance or suggesting or requiring that the action of any creditor be brought against any other, including defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"208 B.R. 853, 853-54","parenthetical":"holding that res judicata did not bar debtors' objection to creditor's proof of claim where the plan expressly reserved the general right to assert post-confirmation objections to claims","sentence":"See Weidel, 208 B.R. at 853-54 (holding that res judicata did not bar debtors\u2019 objection to creditor\u2019s proof of claim where the plan expressly reserved the general right to assert post-confirmation objections to claims); see also Envirodyne Indus., Inc. v. Conn. Mutual Life Co. (In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc.), 174 B.R. 986, 991 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1994) (finding that debtor was not barred from bringing proceedings against petitioning bondholders under the doctrine of res ju-dicata based on debtor\u2019s failure to explicitly reveal its potential claims against such bondholders in its disclosure statement); In re Outdoor Sports Headquarters, Inc., 168 B.R. 177, 183 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1994) (finding that res judicata did not bar unsecured creditor\u2019s objection to larger creditor\u2019s claim where neither the debtor\u2019s disclosure statement or plan contained any provision pertaining to the allowance or disallowance or suggesting or requiring that the action of any creditor be brought against any other, including defendant)."},"case_id":9412155,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As for Fones' second point, that the amendment constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the \"plain language\" of the guideline, the problem is that our Chambers decision was based on the plain meaning of the term \"manager\" in U.S.S.G. SS 3Bl.l(b); Chambers did not say that the guideline was ambiguous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"956 F.2d 942, 942","parenthetical":"\"Given the plain meaning of the pre-amendment version ... we conclude that the amendment makes a substantive change in the law rather than a clarification of pre-existing law.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ruiz-Batista, 956 F.2d 351, 353 (1st Cir.) (\u201cTo clarify means to make clear, to free from ambiguity, and ... if there was no ambiguity, and the plain, original meaning was as [defendant] contends, the Commission could not change that meaning retroactively by using a magic word, clarification\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 105, 121 L.Ed.2d 64 (1992). It follows from Chambers, then, that the 1993 amendment to the commentary is contrary to the plain meaning of \u00a7 3Bl.l(b). See Mondaine, 956 F.2d at 942 (\u201cGiven the plain meaning of the pre-amendment version ... we conclude that the amendment makes a substantive change in the law rather than a clarification of pre-existing law.\u201d); cf. Prezioso, 989 F.2d at 54 (\u201cany amendment that is inconsistent with the clear meaning [of the guideline it interprets] results in a substantive change, regardless of the Sentencing Commission\u2019s characterization\u201d); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 854-55 (court should not give retroactive effect where \u201cthe text of the guideline will not support [the amendment\u2019s] interpretation\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"989 F.2d 54, 54","parenthetical":"\"any amendment that is inconsistent with the clear meaning [of the guideline it interprets] results in a substantive change, regardless of the Sentencing Commission's characterization\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ruiz-Batista, 956 F.2d 351, 353 (1st Cir.) (\u201cTo clarify means to make clear, to free from ambiguity, and ... if there was no ambiguity, and the plain, original meaning was as [defendant] contends, the Commission could not change that meaning retroactively by using a magic word, clarification\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 105, 121 L.Ed.2d 64 (1992). It follows from Chambers, then, that the 1993 amendment to the commentary is contrary to the plain meaning of \u00a7 3Bl.l(b). See Mondaine, 956 F.2d at 942 (\u201cGiven the plain meaning of the pre-amendment version ... we conclude that the amendment makes a substantive change in the law rather than a clarification of pre-existing law.\u201d); cf. Prezioso, 989 F.2d at 54 (\u201cany amendment that is inconsistent with the clear meaning [of the guideline it interprets] results in a substantive change, regardless of the Sentencing Commission\u2019s characterization\u201d); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 854-55 (court should not give retroactive effect where \u201cthe text of the guideline will not support [the amendment\u2019s] interpretation\u201d)."},"case_id":11321690,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As for Fones' second point, that the amendment constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the \"plain language\" of the guideline, the problem is that our Chambers decision was based on the plain meaning of the term \"manager\" in U.S.S.G. SS 3Bl.l(b); Chambers did not say that the guideline was ambiguous.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"956 F.2d 942, 942","parenthetical":"\"Given the plain meaning of the pre-amendment version ... we conclude that the amendment makes a substantive change in the law rather than a clarification of pre-existing law.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ruiz-Batista, 956 F.2d 351, 353 (1st Cir.) (\u201cTo clarify means to make clear, to free from ambiguity, and ... if there was no ambiguity, and the plain, original meaning was as [defendant] contends, the Commission could not change that meaning retroactively by using a magic word, clarification\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 105, 121 L.Ed.2d 64 (1992). It follows from Chambers, then, that the 1993 amendment to the commentary is contrary to the plain meaning of \u00a7 3Bl.l(b). See Mondaine, 956 F.2d at 942 (\u201cGiven the plain meaning of the pre-amendment version ... we conclude that the amendment makes a substantive change in the law rather than a clarification of pre-existing law.\u201d); cf. Prezioso, 989 F.2d at 54 (\u201cany amendment that is inconsistent with the clear meaning [of the guideline it interprets] results in a substantive change, regardless of the Sentencing Commission\u2019s characterization\u201d); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 854-55 (court should not give retroactive effect where \u201cthe text of the guideline will not support [the amendment\u2019s] interpretation\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"976 F.2d 854, 854-55","parenthetical":"court should not give retroactive effect where \"the text of the guideline will not support [the amendment's] interpretation\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ruiz-Batista, 956 F.2d 351, 353 (1st Cir.) (\u201cTo clarify means to make clear, to free from ambiguity, and ... if there was no ambiguity, and the plain, original meaning was as [defendant] contends, the Commission could not change that meaning retroactively by using a magic word, clarification\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 105, 121 L.Ed.2d 64 (1992). It follows from Chambers, then, that the 1993 amendment to the commentary is contrary to the plain meaning of \u00a7 3Bl.l(b). See Mondaine, 956 F.2d at 942 (\u201cGiven the plain meaning of the pre-amendment version ... we conclude that the amendment makes a substantive change in the law rather than a clarification of pre-existing law.\u201d); cf. Prezioso, 989 F.2d at 54 (\u201cany amendment that is inconsistent with the clear meaning [of the guideline it interprets] results in a substantive change, regardless of the Sentencing Commission\u2019s characterization\u201d); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 854-55 (court should not give retroactive effect where \u201cthe text of the guideline will not support [the amendment\u2019s] interpretation\u201d)."},"case_id":11321690,"label":"a"}
{"context":"ERISA's participation and vesting rules govern the nonforfeitability requirements of plans covered by ERISA. 29 U.S.C. SS 1053. ERISA exempts top hat plans from its nonforfeitability protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"898 F.Supp. 1016, 1016","parenthetical":"holding New York law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions, but ERISA statutes allow forfeiture of all deferred compensation benefits under noncompete forfeiture provisions in a top hat plan","sentence":"See Bigda, 898 F.Supp. at 1016 (holding New York law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions, but ERISA statutes allow forfeiture of all deferred compensation benefits under noncompete forfeiture provisions in a top hat plan); see also Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 678-79 (9th Cir.1983) (holding even though Idaho law does not permit the enforcement of noncompete clauses in employment contracts, ERISA statutes allow forfeiture of pension benefits in excess of ERISA\u2019s minimum vesting requirements in noncompete clauses), Clark, 816 F.2d at 481-82 (holding state law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions, but ERISA preempts state law with regard to those clauses in an ERISA plan as to pension benefits)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"816 F.2d 481, 481-82","parenthetical":"holding state law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions, but ERISA preempts state law with regard to those clauses in an ERISA plan as to pension benefits","sentence":"See Bigda, 898 F.Supp. at 1016 (holding New York law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions, but ERISA statutes allow forfeiture of all deferred compensation benefits under noncompete forfeiture provisions in a top hat plan); see also Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 678-79 (9th Cir.1983) (holding even though Idaho law does not permit the enforcement of noncompete clauses in employment contracts, ERISA statutes allow forfeiture of pension benefits in excess of ERISA\u2019s minimum vesting requirements in noncompete clauses), Clark, 816 F.2d at 481-82 (holding state law may prohibit noncompete forfeiture provisions, but ERISA preempts state law with regard to those clauses in an ERISA plan as to pension benefits)."},"case_id":8158922,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, in its briefing, Oceana does not present any argument or citation in support of its NEPA theory on Count III. In a case based solely on judicial review of agency action, the district court sits as an appellate tribunal and disposes of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"269 F.3d 1077, 1083","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal.\"","sentence":"See Locke, 831 F.Supp.2d at 106 (\u201cIn such a case, summary judgment merely serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.\u201d); see also Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.Cir.2001) (\u201c[W]hen a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal.\u201d); Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cThe entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law.\u201d). Thus, a plaintiffs failure to raise arguments or theories in its motion for summary judgment results in waiver of those arguments."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"831 F.Supp.2d 106, 106","parenthetical":"\"In such a case, summary judgment merely serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.\"","sentence":"See Locke, 831 F.Supp.2d at 106 (\u201cIn such a case, summary judgment merely serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.\u201d); see also Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.Cir.2001) (\u201c[W]hen a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal.\u201d); Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cThe entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law.\u201d). Thus, a plaintiffs failure to raise arguments or theories in its motion for summary judgment results in waiver of those arguments."},"case_id":4292760,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, in its briefing, Oceana does not present any argument or citation in support of its NEPA theory on Count III. In a case based solely on judicial review of agency action, the district court sits as an appellate tribunal and disposes of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"831 F.Supp.2d 106, 106","parenthetical":"\"In such a case, summary judgment merely serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.\"","sentence":"See Locke, 831 F.Supp.2d at 106 (\u201cIn such a case, summary judgment merely serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.\u201d); see also Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.Cir.2001) (\u201c[W]hen a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal.\u201d); Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cThe entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law.\u201d). Thus, a plaintiffs failure to raise arguments or theories in its motion for summary judgment results in waiver of those arguments."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"988 F.2d 1221, 1226","parenthetical":"\"The entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law.\"","sentence":"See Locke, 831 F.Supp.2d at 106 (\u201cIn such a case, summary judgment merely serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.\u201d); see also Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.Cir.2001) (\u201c[W]hen a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal.\u201d); Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cThe entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law.\u201d). Thus, a plaintiffs failure to raise arguments or theories in its motion for summary judgment results in waiver of those arguments."},"case_id":4292760,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, in its briefing, Oceana does not present any argument or citation in support of its NEPA theory on Count III. In a case based solely on judicial review of agency action, the district court sits as an appellate tribunal and disposes of the case on cross-motions for summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"413 F.3d 3, 20","parenthetical":"finding waiver in petitioner's failure to raise argument in its opening brief","sentence":"See EMILY\u2019S List v. FEC, 569 F.Supp.2d 18, 25 n. 6 (D.D.C.2008), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.2009); see also New York v. U.S. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 20 (D.C.Cir.2005) (per curiam) (finding waiver in petitioner\u2019s failure to raise argument in its opening brief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"831 F.Supp.2d 106, 106","parenthetical":"\"In such a case, summary judgment merely serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.\"","sentence":"See Locke, 831 F.Supp.2d at 106 (\u201cIn such a case, summary judgment merely serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.\u201d); see also Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C.Cir.2001) (\u201c[W]hen a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district judge sits as an appellate tribunal.\u201d); Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cThe entire case on review is a question of law, and only a question of law.\u201d). Thus, a plaintiffs failure to raise arguments or theories in its motion for summary judgment results in waiver of those arguments."},"case_id":4292760,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Dr. Hale utilized a method of analysis known as a \"psychological autopsy\" in forming his conclusions about Miller's sanity. Numerous courts have recognized experts' use of a psychological autopsy to determine an individual's manner of death -- typically to determine whether or why an individual committed suicide.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The psychological autopsy is a generally accepted methodology for trying to determine what led to a suicide.\"","sentence":"See Blanchard v. Eli Lilly & Co., 207 F.Supp.2d 308, 313 n. 2 (D.Vt.2002) (\u201cThe psychological autopsy is a generally accepted methodology for trying to determine what led to a suicide.\u201d); see also In re Neurontin Mktg., No. 04-CV-10981, 2009 WL 3756328, at *6 (D.Mass. Aug. 14, 2009) (collecting cases discussing use of psychological autopsy to determine cause of suicide)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2009 WL 3756328, at *6","parenthetical":"collecting cases discussing use of psychological autopsy to determine cause of suicide","sentence":"See Blanchard v. Eli Lilly & Co., 207 F.Supp.2d 308, 313 n. 2 (D.Vt.2002) (\u201cThe psychological autopsy is a generally accepted methodology for trying to determine what led to a suicide.\u201d); see also In re Neurontin Mktg., No. 04-CV-10981, 2009 WL 3756328, at *6 (D.Mass. Aug. 14, 2009) (collecting cases discussing use of psychological autopsy to determine cause of suicide)."},"case_id":4153037,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Butnaru opinion does not invalidate the statutory authorization of a partial affirmance. It addresses the limited control courts can exert over the agency's proceedings with respect to issues remanded.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"150 S.W.3d 476, 476","parenthetical":"affirming trial court's dismissal of appeal as moot and rejecting request to render decision agency \"should have\"","sentence":"Butnaru, 157 S.W.3d at 149 (trial court erred by requiring agency to conduct investigation on remand); McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 802 (trial court erred by directing agency to adopt proposal for decision); see also Pantera, 150 S.W.3d at 476 (affirming trial court\u2019s dismissal of appeal as moot and rejecting request to render decision agency \u201cshould have\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"157 S.W.3d 149, 149","parenthetical":"trial court erred by requiring agency to conduct investigation on remand","sentence":"Butnaru, 157 S.W.3d at 149 (trial court erred by requiring agency to conduct investigation on remand); McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 802 (trial court erred by directing agency to adopt proposal for decision); see also Pantera, 150 S.W.3d at 476 (affirming trial court\u2019s dismissal of appeal as moot and rejecting request to render decision agency \u201cshould have\u201d)."},"case_id":8217260,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Butnaru opinion does not invalidate the statutory authorization of a partial affirmance. It addresses the limited control courts can exert over the agency's proceedings with respect to issues remanded.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"150 S.W.3d 476, 476","parenthetical":"affirming trial court's dismissal of appeal as moot and rejecting request to render decision agency \"should have\"","sentence":"Butnaru, 157 S.W.3d at 149 (trial court erred by requiring agency to conduct investigation on remand); McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 802 (trial court erred by directing agency to adopt proposal for decision); see also Pantera, 150 S.W.3d at 476 (affirming trial court\u2019s dismissal of appeal as moot and rejecting request to render decision agency \u201cshould have\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"956 S.W.2d 802, 802","parenthetical":"trial court erred by directing agency to adopt proposal for decision","sentence":"Butnaru, 157 S.W.3d at 149 (trial court erred by requiring agency to conduct investigation on remand); McKillip, 956 S.W.2d at 802 (trial court erred by directing agency to adopt proposal for decision); see also Pantera, 150 S.W.3d at 476 (affirming trial court\u2019s dismissal of appeal as moot and rejecting request to render decision agency \u201cshould have\u201d)."},"case_id":8217260,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For any major capital project like this one, planning is complex and time-consuming, environmental and other reviews take time to complete, and funding takes time to secure, especially when the District and federal governments face fiscal constraints. Appellants do not identify any comparable project in the District or in other jurisdictions that moved more quickly, much less make any factual allegations reasonably suggesting that projects of this scale ordinarily get underway in substantially less than four years.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"381 F.3d 1367, 1367","parenthetical":"courts must consider whether the delay is disproportionate to the regulatory scheme from which it arises","sentence":"See Bass Enterprises Production Co., 381 F.3d at 1367 (courts must consider whether the delay is disproportionate to the regulatory scheme from which it arises). Moreover, this four-year delay is no longer than the delay found not to be extraordinary in other cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"271 F.3d 1099, 1099","parenthetical":"same for six-year delay in granting permit application for mining","sentence":"Cf. id. at 1366-67 (finding no taking despite 45-month delay in granting permit application for drilling); Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1099 (same for six-year delay in granting permit application for mining); see also Kirby Forest Industries, 467 U.S. at 6-8, 104 S.Ct. 2187 (no taking occurred until 1982 when government actually acquired forest land for a national park, even though government publicly announced its desire to create the national park in the mid-1960s, legislation directing the acquisition was passed in 1974, and the government filed a condemnation case in 1978)."},"case_id":7276187,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For any major capital project like this one, planning is complex and time-consuming, environmental and other reviews take time to complete, and funding takes time to secure, especially when the District and federal governments face fiscal constraints. Appellants do not identify any comparable project in the District or in other jurisdictions that moved more quickly, much less make any factual allegations reasonably suggesting that projects of this scale ordinarily get underway in substantially less than four years.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"467 U.S. 6, 6-8","parenthetical":"no taking occurred until 1982 when government actually acquired forest land for a national park, even though government publicly announced its desire to create the national park in the mid-1960s, legislation directing the acquisition was passed in 1974, and the government filed a condemnation case in 1978","sentence":"Cf. id. at 1366-67 (finding no taking despite 45-month delay in granting permit application for drilling); Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1099 (same for six-year delay in granting permit application for mining); see also Kirby Forest Industries, 467 U.S. at 6-8, 104 S.Ct. 2187 (no taking occurred until 1982 when government actually acquired forest land for a national park, even though government publicly announced its desire to create the national park in the mid-1960s, legislation directing the acquisition was passed in 1974, and the government filed a condemnation case in 1978)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"381 F.3d 1367, 1367","parenthetical":"courts must consider whether the delay is disproportionate to the regulatory scheme from which it arises","sentence":"See Bass Enterprises Production Co., 381 F.3d at 1367 (courts must consider whether the delay is disproportionate to the regulatory scheme from which it arises). Moreover, this four-year delay is no longer than the delay found not to be extraordinary in other cases."},"case_id":7276187,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For any major capital project like this one, planning is complex and time-consuming, environmental and other reviews take time to complete, and funding takes time to secure, especially when the District and federal governments face fiscal constraints. Appellants do not identify any comparable project in the District or in other jurisdictions that moved more quickly, much less make any factual allegations reasonably suggesting that projects of this scale ordinarily get underway in substantially less than four years.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no taking occurred until 1982 when government actually acquired forest land for a national park, even though government publicly announced its desire to create the national park in the mid-1960s, legislation directing the acquisition was passed in 1974, and the government filed a condemnation case in 1978","sentence":"Cf. id. at 1366-67 (finding no taking despite 45-month delay in granting permit application for drilling); Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1099 (same for six-year delay in granting permit application for mining); see also Kirby Forest Industries, 467 U.S. at 6-8, 104 S.Ct. 2187 (no taking occurred until 1982 when government actually acquired forest land for a national park, even though government publicly announced its desire to create the national park in the mid-1960s, legislation directing the acquisition was passed in 1974, and the government filed a condemnation case in 1978)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"381 F.3d 1367, 1367","parenthetical":"courts must consider whether the delay is disproportionate to the regulatory scheme from which it arises","sentence":"See Bass Enterprises Production Co., 381 F.3d at 1367 (courts must consider whether the delay is disproportionate to the regulatory scheme from which it arises). Moreover, this four-year delay is no longer than the delay found not to be extraordinary in other cases."},"case_id":7276187,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"939 F.2d 946, 952","parenthetical":"holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"559 F.2d 310, 330","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"case_id":772524,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"883 F.2d 977, 985","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"559 F.2d 310, 330","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"case_id":772524,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"559 F.2d 310, 330","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockholm Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"939 F.2d 946, 952","parenthetical":"holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockholm Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"case_id":772565,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"883 F.2d 977, 985","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockholm Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"559 F.2d 310, 330","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockholm Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"case_id":772565,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"559 F.2d 310, 330","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"939 F.2d 946, 952","parenthetical":"holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"case_id":772505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The analytical deficiencies of Plaintiffs statistics diminish the probative value of this evidence such that it cannot by itself support a claim of disparate treatment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"883 F.2d 977, 985","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"559 F.2d 310, 330","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria","sentence":"See Brown v. American Honda Co., 939 F.2d 946, 952 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiffs statistical evidence, which lacked specific analytical foundation and thus failed to show that employer maintained discriminatory intent, was insufficient to establish prima facie case or pretext); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 985 (11th Cir.1989) (holding that plaintiffs statistical evidence failed to establish prima facie case or pretext where evidence failed to make specific analytical comparisons); cf. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 330 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring, promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria)."},"case_id":772505,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The nature of an action to reform a deed is, therefore, qualitatively different from an action challenging title.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63","parenthetical":"recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed","sentence":"Compare McCormick, 37 A.3d at 298 (explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons), with Bourne, 540 A.2d at 361 (stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title). Consequently, we hold that RSA 477:27 does not authorize attorney\u2019s fees for an action seeking reformation of a deed. See Anderson v. Selby, 700 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 2005) (declining to award attorney\u2019s fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor); see also Civic Realty, Inc. v. Development, Inc., 641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"37 A.3d 298, 298","parenthetical":"explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons","sentence":"Compare McCormick, 37 A.3d at 298 (explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons), with Bourne, 540 A.2d at 361 (stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title). Consequently, we hold that RSA 477:27 does not authorize attorney\u2019s fees for an action seeking reformation of a deed. See Anderson v. Selby, 700 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 2005) (declining to award attorney\u2019s fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor); see also Civic Realty, Inc. v. Development, Inc., 641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed)."},"case_id":4343401,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The nature of an action to reform a deed is, therefore, qualitatively different from an action challenging title.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"540 A.2d 361, 361","parenthetical":"stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title","sentence":"Compare McCormick, 37 A.3d at 298 (explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons), with Bourne, 540 A.2d at 361 (stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title). Consequently, we hold that RSA 477:27 does not authorize attorney\u2019s fees for an action seeking reformation of a deed. See Anderson v. Selby, 700 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 2005) (declining to award attorney\u2019s fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor); see also Civic Realty, Inc. v. Development, Inc., 641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63","parenthetical":"recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed","sentence":"Compare McCormick, 37 A.3d at 298 (explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons), with Bourne, 540 A.2d at 361 (stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title). Consequently, we hold that RSA 477:27 does not authorize attorney\u2019s fees for an action seeking reformation of a deed. See Anderson v. Selby, 700 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 2005) (declining to award attorney\u2019s fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor); see also Civic Realty, Inc. v. Development, Inc., 641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed)."},"case_id":4343401,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The nature of an action to reform a deed is, therefore, qualitatively different from an action challenging title.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"700 N.W.2d 696, 702","parenthetical":"declining to award attorney's fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor","sentence":"Compare McCormick, 37 A.3d at 298 (explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons), with Bourne, 540 A.2d at 361 (stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title). Consequently, we hold that RSA 477:27 does not authorize attorney\u2019s fees for an action seeking reformation of a deed. See Anderson v. Selby, 700 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 2005) (declining to award attorney\u2019s fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor); see also Civic Realty, Inc. v. Development, Inc., 641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63","parenthetical":"recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed","sentence":"Compare McCormick, 37 A.3d at 298 (explaining that covenant of warranty is a promise to defend lawful claims by third persons), with Bourne, 540 A.2d at 361 (stating that reformation is limited to the original parties and their successors in title). Consequently, we hold that RSA 477:27 does not authorize attorney\u2019s fees for an action seeking reformation of a deed. See Anderson v. Selby, 700 N.W.2d 696, 702 (N.D. 2005) (declining to award attorney\u2019s fees under warranty deed in reformation action by grantor); see also Civic Realty, Inc. v. Development, Inc., 641 P.2d 1361, 1362-63 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing distinction between attack on title by third party and complaint alleging mutual mistake in deed)."},"case_id":4343401,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, the court is satisfied that the translated declarations are admissible for purposes of summary judgment despite the fact that the Navajo-speaking declar-ants signed a document presented solely in English. \"Nothing in SS 1746 requires that a non-English speaking affiant provide evidence that the declaration was translated into the affiant's native language before signing it. Moreover, ... such an argument would go to the weight of the declaration and not its admissibility.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"471 Fed.Appx. 615, 618-19","parenthetical":"\"There is no authority for Ahn's argument that Huh was required to use his native language of Korean in his declaration.\"","sentence":"Collazos-Cruz v. U.S., 117 F.3d 1420 (unpublished table opinion), 1997 WL 377037, at *3 (6th Cir. Jul. 3, 1997) (holding that a translated declaration was validly admitted at summary judgment despite the fact that there was no \u201cevidence that the declaration was translated to [the Spanish-speaking declar-ant] from English to Spanish\u201d); see also Ahn v. Hanil Dev., Inc., 471 Fed.Appx. 615, 618-19 (9th Cir. 2012) (\u201cThere is no authority for Ahn\u2019s argument that Huh was required to use his native language of Korean in his declaration.\u201d); Matsuda, 101 F.Supp.2d at 1323; Coach, Inc. v. Weng, No. 13 Civ. 445, 2014 WL 2604032, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 9, 2014) (unpublished); but see, e.g., Cruz v. Aramak Servs., Inc., 213 Fed.Appx. 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2007) (supplying a four-factor balancing test for determining whether a translator acted as a \u201cmere conduit\u201d for hearsay purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"1997 WL 377037, at *3","parenthetical":"holding that a translated declaration was validly admitted at summary judgment despite the fact that there was no \"evidence that the declaration was translated to [the Spanish-speaking declar-ant] from English to Spanish\"","sentence":"Collazos-Cruz v. U.S., 117 F.3d 1420 (unpublished table opinion), 1997 WL 377037, at *3 (6th Cir. Jul. 3, 1997) (holding that a translated declaration was validly admitted at summary judgment despite the fact that there was no \u201cevidence that the declaration was translated to [the Spanish-speaking declar-ant] from English to Spanish\u201d); see also Ahn v. Hanil Dev., Inc., 471 Fed.Appx. 615, 618-19 (9th Cir. 2012) (\u201cThere is no authority for Ahn\u2019s argument that Huh was required to use his native language of Korean in his declaration.\u201d); Matsuda, 101 F.Supp.2d at 1323; Coach, Inc. v. Weng, No. 13 Civ. 445, 2014 WL 2604032, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 9, 2014) (unpublished); but see, e.g., Cruz v. Aramak Servs., Inc., 213 Fed.Appx. 329, 334 (5th Cir. 2007) (supplying a four-factor balancing test for determining whether a translator acted as a \u201cmere conduit\u201d for hearsay purposes)."},"case_id":12278093,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A court is justified in presuming customer confusion particularly in the cases where a competitor had spent substantial funds in an effort to deceive customers and influence their purchasing decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 F.2d 294, 298","parenthetical":"plaintiff must \"demonstrate that a statistically significant part of the commercial audience holds the false belief allegedly communicated by the challenged advertisement, ... \"","sentence":"See, e.g., id., 926 F.2d at 140 (stating that plaintiff \u201cmust demonstrate that Dettra set out to intentionally deceive flag purchasers\u201d); see also Johnson & Johnson*Merck v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir.1992) (plaintiff must \u201cdemonstrate that a statistically significant part of the commercial audience holds the false belief allegedly communicated by the challenged advertisement, ... \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"926 F.2d 140, 140","parenthetical":"stating that plaintiff \"must demonstrate that Dettra set out to intentionally deceive flag purchasers\"","sentence":"See, e.g., id., 926 F.2d at 140 (stating that plaintiff \u201cmust demonstrate that Dettra set out to intentionally deceive flag purchasers\u201d); see also Johnson & Johnson*Merck v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir.1992) (plaintiff must \u201cdemonstrate that a statistically significant part of the commercial audience holds the false belief allegedly communicated by the challenged advertisement, ... \u201d)."},"case_id":7836387,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"The law is clear that, in order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner need only allege-not prove-reasonably specific, non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief.\" Id. at 715 n. 6 (emphasis in original). \"A hearing is not required on patently frivolous claims or those which are based upon unsupported generalizations. Nor is a hearing required where the petitioner's allegations are affirmatively contradicted in the record.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 F.3d 1225, 1238-39","parenthetical":"holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on SS 2255 petitioner's mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit","sentence":"Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir.1989) (citation omitted) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel failed to inform appellant of statutory parole consequences before entering a guilty plea because record did not conclusively show that appellant was entitled to no relief); see also Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1238-39 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on \u00a7 2255 petitioner\u2019s mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit); Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir.1991) (stating that a 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his claims \u201care merely conelusory allegations unsupported by specifics or contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible\u201d) (citations and internal quotations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"876 F.2d 1545, 1553","parenthetical":"remanding for evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel failed to inform appellant of statutory parole consequences before entering a guilty plea because record did not conclusively show that appellant was entitled to no relief","sentence":"Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir.1989) (citation omitted) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claim that counsel failed to inform appellant of statutory parole consequences before entering a guilty plea because record did not conclusively show that appellant was entitled to no relief); see also Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1238-39 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing based on \u00a7 2255 petitioner\u2019s mere eonclusory allegations in his affidavit); Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir.1991) (stating that a 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if his claims \u201care merely conelusory allegations unsupported by specifics or contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible\u201d) (citations and internal quotations omitted)."},"case_id":4074742,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted, Supervisor and Attorney both observed that LaMont smelled like alcohol, that his eyes were bloodshot and his face puffy, that his speech was slow, and that he appeared agitated. These circumstances, taken together, have been held to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion in the criminal context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27","parenthetical":"holding that \"the smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant's vehicle] was enough to generate\" reasonable suspicion","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \u201cred eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\u201d); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27, 259 P.3d 116 (holding that \u201cthe smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant\u2019s vehicle] was enough to generate\u201d reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14","parenthetical":"concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \"red eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \u201cred eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\u201d); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27, 259 P.3d 116 (holding that \u201cthe smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant\u2019s vehicle] was enough to generate\u201d reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":12347228,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As noted, Supervisor and Attorney both observed that LaMont smelled like alcohol, that his eyes were bloodshot and his face puffy, that his speech was slow, and that he appeared agitated. These circumstances, taken together, have been held to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion in the criminal context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14","parenthetical":"concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \"red eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \u201cred eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\u201d); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27, 259 P.3d 116 (holding that \u201cthe smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant\u2019s vehicle] was enough to generate\u201d reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"the smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant's vehicle] was enough to generate\" reasonable suspicion","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \u201cred eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\u201d); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27, 259 P.3d 116 (holding that \u201cthe smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant\u2019s vehicle] was enough to generate\u201d reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":12347228,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted, Supervisor and Attorney both observed that LaMont smelled like alcohol, that his eyes were bloodshot and his face puffy, that his speech was slow, and that he appeared agitated. These circumstances, taken together, have been held to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion in the criminal context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \"red eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \u201cred eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\u201d); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27, 259 P.3d 116 (holding that \u201cthe smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant\u2019s vehicle] was enough to generate\u201d reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27","parenthetical":"holding that \"the smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant's vehicle] was enough to generate\" reasonable suspicion","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \u201cred eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\u201d); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27, 259 P.3d 116 (holding that \u201cthe smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant\u2019s vehicle] was enough to generate\u201d reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":12347228,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As noted, Supervisor and Attorney both observed that LaMont smelled like alcohol, that his eyes were bloodshot and his face puffy, that his speech was slow, and that he appeared agitated. These circumstances, taken together, have been held to constitute reasonable articulable suspicion in the criminal context.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \"red eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \u201cred eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\u201d); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27, 259 P.3d 116 (holding that \u201cthe smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant\u2019s vehicle] was enough to generate\u201d reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"the smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant's vehicle] was enough to generate\" reasonable suspicion","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 2009 UT App 390, \u00b6 14, 222 P.3d 1198 (concluding that officers had reasonable suspicion where the defendant exhibited \u201cred eyes and slurred speech, was slow to respond ... and stumbled upon leaving the vehicle\u201d); see also State v. Morris, 2011 UT 40, \u00b6 27, 259 P.3d 116 (holding that \u201cthe smell of alcohol emanating from [the defendant\u2019s vehicle] was enough to generate\u201d reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":12347228,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Emphasis added.) The JNOV issues, which related to the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law to establish common law negligence and negligence per se, simply were not a basis for the relief granted by Judge Wimberly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 S.W.3d 595, 608","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.\"","sentence":"See MacLean \u00a7 50:5 author\u2019s cmts. (\u201cThe trial court must first decide whether to grant the motion-for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict, then whether to grant a new trial .... \u201d (emphasis added)); Bluff City Buiclc Co. v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 593, 323 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1959) (\u201cIn logic and reason [the motion for a JNOV] should be made before the motion for a new trial.\u201d); see also Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn.2013) (\u201c[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"129 S.W.3d 513, 520","parenthetical":"\"A ... motion for directed verdict provides a vehicle for deciding questions of law. The question presented is whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury to decide.\"","sentence":"See Burton v. Wairen Farmers Coop., 129 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Tenn. Ct.App.2002) (\u201cA ... motion for directed verdict provides a vehicle for deciding questions of law. The question presented is whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury to decide.\u201d). By declining to grant a JNOV and instead granting a new trial, Judge Wimberly implicitly, if not clearly, rejected the insufficiency of the evidence as a basis for directing a verdict in favor of the Defendant."},"case_id":6853814,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Emphasis added.) The JNOV issues, which related to the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law to establish common law negligence and negligence per se, simply were not a basis for the relief granted by Judge Wimberly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 S.W.3d 595, 608","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.\"","sentence":"See MacLean \u00a7 50:5 author\u2019s cmts. (\u201cThe trial court must first decide whether to grant the motion-for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict, then whether to grant a new trial .... \u201d (emphasis added)); Bluff City Buiclc Co. v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 593, 323 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1959) (\u201cIn logic and reason [the motion for a JNOV] should be made before the motion for a new trial.\u201d); see also Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn.2013) (\u201c[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In logic and reason [the motion for a JNOV] should be made before the motion for a new trial.\"","sentence":"See MacLean \u00a7 50:5 author\u2019s cmts. (\u201cThe trial court must first decide whether to grant the motion-for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict, then whether to grant a new trial .... \u201d (emphasis added)); Bluff City Buiclc Co. v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 593, 323 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1959) (\u201cIn logic and reason [the motion for a JNOV] should be made before the motion for a new trial.\u201d); see also Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn.2013) (\u201c[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.\u201d)."},"case_id":6853814,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Emphasis added.) The JNOV issues, which related to the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law to establish common law negligence and negligence per se, simply were not a basis for the relief granted by Judge Wimberly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"323 S.W.2d 1, 4","parenthetical":"\"In logic and reason [the motion for a JNOV] should be made before the motion for a new trial.\"","sentence":"See MacLean \u00a7 50:5 author\u2019s cmts. (\u201cThe trial court must first decide whether to grant the motion-for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict, then whether to grant a new trial .... \u201d (emphasis added)); Bluff City Buiclc Co. v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 593, 323 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1959) (\u201cIn logic and reason [the motion for a JNOV] should be made before the motion for a new trial.\u201d); see also Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn.2013) (\u201c[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 S.W.3d 595, 608","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.\"","sentence":"See MacLean \u00a7 50:5 author\u2019s cmts. (\u201cThe trial court must first decide whether to grant the motion-for judgment in accordance with the motion for a directed verdict, then whether to grant a new trial .... \u201d (emphasis added)); Bluff City Buiclc Co. v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 593, 323 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1959) (\u201cIn logic and reason [the motion for a JNOV] should be made before the motion for a new trial.\u201d); see also Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W.3d 595, 608 (Tenn.2013) (\u201c[W]hen construing orders and judgments, effect must be given to that which is clearly implied, as well as to that which is expressly stated.\u201d)."},"case_id":6853814,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"440 U.S. 648, 663","parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"434 U.S. 106, 109","parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"440 U.S. 648, 663","parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"440 U.S. 648, 663","parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"440 U.S. 648, 663","parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"368 F.3d 1152, 1152-54","parenthetical":"police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"434 U.S. 106, 109","parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"368 F.3d 1152, 1152-54","parenthetical":"police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"434 U.S. 106, 109","parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is ' reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to stop an automobile and to detain the driver of that automobile to check his or her license and registration where \"there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that\" the driver \"is unlicensed or the automobile is not registered.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"368 F.3d 1152, 1152-54","parenthetical":"police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database","sentence":"Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (holding only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at unbridled discretion of police officers); see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (no question that initially stopping respondent who was driving automobile with expired license tags in violation of state law was proper); Miguel, 368 F.3d at 1152-54 (police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle due to factually erroneous but reasonable and good faith belief registration had expired based on expiration date in computer database)."},"case_id":3792992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to Mr. Soto-Robledo, these factors deserved greater weight. But the district court has the discretion to balance mitigating factors, such as cultural assimilation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 F.3d 1167, 1167","parenthetical":"holding that a 57-month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable","sentence":"See United States v. Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885, 889-90 (10th Cir.2006) (holding that a 57-month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable, rejecting the defendant\u2019s effort to rebut the presumption of reasonableness based on evidence of cultural assimilation); see also Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d at 1167 (holding that a 57-month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"441 F.3d 885, 889-90","parenthetical":"holding that a 57-month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable, rejecting the defendant's effort to rebut the presumption of reasonableness based on evidence of cultural assimilation","sentence":"See United States v. Galarza-Payan, 441 F.3d 885, 889-90 (10th Cir.2006) (holding that a 57-month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable, rejecting the defendant\u2019s effort to rebut the presumption of reasonableness based on evidence of cultural assimilation); see also Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d at 1167 (holding that a 57-month sentence for illegal reentry was substantively reasonable)."},"case_id":4325106,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government acknowledges that the district judge failed to specifically indicate what testimony of Casanova it found to be false, but contends that it was clear that the district judge was referring to Casanova's testimony that he was not aware that Jones was a convicted felon. The district judge's statement that, \"I don't have any doubt that there was falsehood testified from the stand\" was sufficient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"931 F.2d 1216, 1218-19","parenthetical":"resentencing required where district court failed to make an independent factual finding that the defendant had committed perjury in his trial testimony and based the obstruction of justice adjustment entirely upon jury's verdict which did not establish that the defendant had lied","sentence":"See United States v. Davis, 938 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir.1991) (district judge\u2019s finding that the defendant \"attempted to mislead the jury as to his knowledge and participation\u201d in the crime was sufficient finding that defendant was less than truthful during his trial testimony); United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 n. 2 (7th Cir.1991) (district court\u2019s finding that defendant was \"not truthful on the witness stand\u201d was sufficient); see also United States v. Lozoya-Morales, 931 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (7th Cir.1991) (resentencing required where district court failed to make an independent factual finding that the defendant had committed perjury in his trial testimony and based the obstruction of justice adjustment entirely upon jury\u2019s verdict which did not establish that the defendant had lied)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"938 F.2d 744, 747","parenthetical":"district judge's finding that the defendant \"attempted to mislead the jury as to his knowledge and participation\" in the crime was sufficient finding that defendant was less than truthful during his trial testimony","sentence":"See United States v. Davis, 938 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir.1991) (district judge\u2019s finding that the defendant \"attempted to mislead the jury as to his knowledge and participation\u201d in the crime was sufficient finding that defendant was less than truthful during his trial testimony); United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 n. 2 (7th Cir.1991) (district court\u2019s finding that defendant was \"not truthful on the witness stand\u201d was sufficient); see also United States v. Lozoya-Morales, 931 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (7th Cir.1991) (resentencing required where district court failed to make an independent factual finding that the defendant had committed perjury in his trial testimony and based the obstruction of justice adjustment entirely upon jury\u2019s verdict which did not establish that the defendant had lied)."},"case_id":10515062,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government acknowledges that the district judge failed to specifically indicate what testimony of Casanova it found to be false, but contends that it was clear that the district judge was referring to Casanova's testimony that he was not aware that Jones was a convicted felon. The district judge's statement that, \"I don't have any doubt that there was falsehood testified from the stand\" was sufficient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"931 F.2d 1216, 1218-19","parenthetical":"resentencing required where district court failed to make an independent factual finding that the defendant had committed perjury in his trial testimony and based the obstruction of justice adjustment entirely upon jury's verdict which did not establish that the defendant had lied","sentence":"See United States v. Davis, 938 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir.1991) (district judge\u2019s finding that the defendant \"attempted to mislead the jury as to his knowledge and participation\u201d in the crime was sufficient finding that defendant was less than truthful during his trial testimony); United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 n. 2 (7th Cir.1991) (district court\u2019s finding that defendant was \"not truthful on the witness stand\u201d was sufficient); see also United States v. Lozoya-Morales, 931 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (7th Cir.1991) (resentencing required where district court failed to make an independent factual finding that the defendant had committed perjury in his trial testimony and based the obstruction of justice adjustment entirely upon jury\u2019s verdict which did not establish that the defendant had lied)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"district court's finding that defendant was \"not truthful on the witness stand\" was sufficient","sentence":"See United States v. Davis, 938 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir.1991) (district judge\u2019s finding that the defendant \"attempted to mislead the jury as to his knowledge and participation\u201d in the crime was sufficient finding that defendant was less than truthful during his trial testimony); United States v. Contreras, 937 F.2d 1191, 1194 n. 2 (7th Cir.1991) (district court\u2019s finding that defendant was \"not truthful on the witness stand\u201d was sufficient); see also United States v. Lozoya-Morales, 931 F.2d 1216, 1218-19 (7th Cir.1991) (resentencing required where district court failed to make an independent factual finding that the defendant had committed perjury in his trial testimony and based the obstruction of justice adjustment entirely upon jury\u2019s verdict which did not establish that the defendant had lied)."},"case_id":10515062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But while the Legislature may have -- given that an interlocutory appeal by the government in a criminal case is not an everyday occurrence -- intended for the Attorney General to decide whether to take an appeal, this does not mean that the Attorney General must personally sign the section 33(d)(2) certification. The Legislature has expressly authorized the Attorney General to delegate duties to Assistant Attorneys General.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"465 F.2d 187, 190","parenthetical":"\"Defendants' contention that the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution cannot be delegated authority by the United States Attorney to file the certificate lacks merit.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Kleve, 465 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1972) (\u201cDefendants\u2019 contention that the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution cannot be delegated authority by the United States Attorney to file the certificate lacks merit.\u201d) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3731); see also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that Assistant United States Attorney may file information requesting sentence enhancement based on prior conviction even though statute says that information must be filed by \u201cthe United States attorney\u201d); United States v. Hawthorne, 235 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Ryan v. Comm\u2019r, 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977) (\u201c[T]he statute has no requirement that the United States Attorney, rather than one of his assistants, personally sign the petition, although the statute does require that the United States Attorney must make the request."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"544 F.3d 1176, 1184","parenthetical":"holding that Assistant United States Attorney may file information requesting sentence enhancement based on prior conviction even though statute says that information must be filed by \"the United States attorney\"","sentence":"See United States v. Kleve, 465 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1972) (\u201cDefendants\u2019 contention that the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution cannot be delegated authority by the United States Attorney to file the certificate lacks merit.\u201d) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3731); see also United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that Assistant United States Attorney may file information requesting sentence enhancement based on prior conviction even though statute says that information must be filed by \u201cthe United States attorney\u201d); United States v. Hawthorne, 235 F.3d 400, 404 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); Ryan v. Comm\u2019r, 568 F.2d 531, 540 (7th Cir. 1977) (\u201c[T]he statute has no requirement that the United States Attorney, rather than one of his assistants, personally sign the petition, although the statute does require that the United States Attorney must make the request."},"case_id":3661768,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In order to establish that the privilege had been waived, NDC would have to demonstrate that AGG's attorneys revealed confidential client information in the course of their conversations with third parties. Upon such a showing, the Court would still retain discretion to determine whether any disclosures constituted partial waiver or whether it would be appropriate to impose full waiver as to all communications on the same subject matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"696 F.2d 1072, 1072","parenthetical":"distinguishing between clients' \"mere[ ] disclos[ure]\" of privileged communication and their \"making some use of it,\" the latter seemingly justifying the imposition of full waiver","sentence":"See Jones, 696 F.2d at 1072 (distinguishing between clients\u2019 \u201cmere[ ] disclos[ure]\u201d of privileged communication and their \u201cmaking some use of it,\u201d the latter seemingly justifying the imposition of full waiver); see also United States ex. rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F.Supp. 1243, 1252-53 (D.Md.1995) (applying subject matter waiver to hold that the defendant company waived attorney-client privilege as to in-house legal memoranda when the company disclosed otherwise confidential advice on the same matter to the government)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"886 F.Supp. 1243, 1252-53","parenthetical":"applying subject matter waiver to hold that the defendant company waived attorney-client privilege as to in-house legal memoranda when the company disclosed otherwise confidential advice on the same matter to the government","sentence":"See Jones, 696 F.2d at 1072 (distinguishing between clients\u2019 \u201cmere[ ] disclos[ure]\u201d of privileged communication and their \u201cmaking some use of it,\u201d the latter seemingly justifying the imposition of full waiver); see also United States ex. rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 886 F.Supp. 1243, 1252-53 (D.Md.1995) (applying subject matter waiver to hold that the defendant company waived attorney-client privilege as to in-house legal memoranda when the company disclosed otherwise confidential advice on the same matter to the government)."},"case_id":1068528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In disputes concerning military decisions, the plaintiff must \"overcome the strong, but re-buttable, presumption that administrators of the military, like other public officers, discharge them duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.\" This presumption, however, is not insurmountable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"376 F.2d 878, 882","parenthetical":"invalidating military decision to discharge, in part because of the military's failure to follow published procedures.","sentence":"See Doe, 132 F.3d at 1437 (holding that the plaintiff overcame the arbitrary and capricious standard in a military discharge case, where the relevant administrative board considered hearsay evidence without allowing the plaintiff rebuttal); see also Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878, 882 (Ct.Cl.1967) (invalidating military decision to discharge, in part because of the military\u2019s failure to follow published procedures.); Murphy, 993 F.2d at 873 (\u201cWhen the military is given unlimited discretion by Congress, [in personnel matters] it is nevertheless bound to follow its own procedural regulations if it chooses to implement some.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"132 F.3d 1437, 1437","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiff overcame the arbitrary and capricious standard in a military discharge case, where the relevant administrative board considered hearsay evidence without allowing the plaintiff rebuttal","sentence":"See Doe, 132 F.3d at 1437 (holding that the plaintiff overcame the arbitrary and capricious standard in a military discharge case, where the relevant administrative board considered hearsay evidence without allowing the plaintiff rebuttal); see also Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878, 882 (Ct.Cl.1967) (invalidating military decision to discharge, in part because of the military\u2019s failure to follow published procedures.); Murphy, 993 F.2d at 873 (\u201cWhen the military is given unlimited discretion by Congress, [in personnel matters] it is nevertheless bound to follow its own procedural regulations if it chooses to implement some.\u201d)."},"case_id":4126810,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In disputes concerning military decisions, the plaintiff must \"overcome the strong, but re-buttable, presumption that administrators of the military, like other public officers, discharge them duties correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.\" This presumption, however, is not insurmountable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"993 F.2d 873, 873","parenthetical":"\"When the military is given unlimited discretion by Congress, [in personnel matters] it is nevertheless bound to follow its own procedural regulations if it chooses to implement some.\"","sentence":"See Doe, 132 F.3d at 1437 (holding that the plaintiff overcame the arbitrary and capricious standard in a military discharge case, where the relevant administrative board considered hearsay evidence without allowing the plaintiff rebuttal); see also Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878, 882 (Ct.Cl.1967) (invalidating military decision to discharge, in part because of the military\u2019s failure to follow published procedures.); Murphy, 993 F.2d at 873 (\u201cWhen the military is given unlimited discretion by Congress, [in personnel matters] it is nevertheless bound to follow its own procedural regulations if it chooses to implement some.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"132 F.3d 1437, 1437","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiff overcame the arbitrary and capricious standard in a military discharge case, where the relevant administrative board considered hearsay evidence without allowing the plaintiff rebuttal","sentence":"See Doe, 132 F.3d at 1437 (holding that the plaintiff overcame the arbitrary and capricious standard in a military discharge case, where the relevant administrative board considered hearsay evidence without allowing the plaintiff rebuttal); see also Conn v. United States, 376 F.2d 878, 882 (Ct.Cl.1967) (invalidating military decision to discharge, in part because of the military\u2019s failure to follow published procedures.); Murphy, 993 F.2d at 873 (\u201cWhen the military is given unlimited discretion by Congress, [in personnel matters] it is nevertheless bound to follow its own procedural regulations if it chooses to implement some.\u201d)."},"case_id":4126810,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our ruling in Denno was based on a theme reiterated through much of our caselaw- -- in assessing whether a governmental decision maker is a final policy maker, we look to whether there is an actual \"opportunity\" for \"meaningful\" review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"335 F.3d 1326, 1351","parenthetical":"\"An official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\"","sentence":"See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that there must be an actual \u201copportunity\u201d for \u201cmeaningful administrative review\u201d before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority); Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401 (\u201cFinal policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir.2003) (Barkett, J., concurring) (\u201cAn official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\u201d) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cIf a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"230 F.3d 1275, 1295","parenthetical":"emphasizing that there must be an actual \"opportunity\" for \"meaningful administrative review\" before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority","sentence":"See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that there must be an actual \u201copportunity\u201d for \u201cmeaningful administrative review\u201d before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority); Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401 (\u201cFinal policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir.2003) (Barkett, J., concurring) (\u201cAn official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\u201d) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cIf a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\u201d)."},"case_id":9245081,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our ruling in Denno was based on a theme reiterated through much of our caselaw- -- in assessing whether a governmental decision maker is a final policy maker, we look to whether there is an actual \"opportunity\" for \"meaningful\" review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\"","sentence":"See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that there must be an actual \u201copportunity\u201d for \u201cmeaningful administrative review\u201d before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority); Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401 (\u201cFinal policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir.2003) (Barkett, J., concurring) (\u201cAn official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\u201d) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cIf a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"230 F.3d 1275, 1295","parenthetical":"emphasizing that there must be an actual \"opportunity\" for \"meaningful administrative review\" before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority","sentence":"See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that there must be an actual \u201copportunity\u201d for \u201cmeaningful administrative review\u201d before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority); Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401 (\u201cFinal policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir.2003) (Barkett, J., concurring) (\u201cAn official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\u201d) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cIf a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\u201d)."},"case_id":9245081,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our ruling in Denno was based on a theme reiterated through much of our caselaw- -- in assessing whether a governmental decision maker is a final policy maker, we look to whether there is an actual \"opportunity\" for \"meaningful\" review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 F.3d 1401, 1401","parenthetical":"\"Final policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\"","sentence":"See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that there must be an actual \u201copportunity\u201d for \u201cmeaningful administrative review\u201d before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority); Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401 (\u201cFinal policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir.2003) (Barkett, J., concurring) (\u201cAn official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\u201d) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cIf a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"335 F.3d 1326, 1351","parenthetical":"\"An official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\"","sentence":"See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that there must be an actual \u201copportunity\u201d for \u201cmeaningful administrative review\u201d before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority); Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401 (\u201cFinal policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir.2003) (Barkett, J., concurring) (\u201cAn official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\u201d) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cIf a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\u201d)."},"case_id":9245081,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our ruling in Denno was based on a theme reiterated through much of our caselaw- -- in assessing whether a governmental decision maker is a final policy maker, we look to whether there is an actual \"opportunity\" for \"meaningful\" review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\"","sentence":"See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that there must be an actual \u201copportunity\u201d for \u201cmeaningful administrative review\u201d before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority); Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401 (\u201cFinal policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir.2003) (Barkett, J., concurring) (\u201cAn official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\u201d) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cIf a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 F.3d 1401, 1401","parenthetical":"\"Final policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\"","sentence":"See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295 (11th Cir.2000) (emphasizing that there must be an actual \u201copportunity\u201d for \u201cmeaningful administrative review\u201d before we conclude that a governmental decision maker lacks final policymaking authority); Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401 (\u201cFinal policymaking authority over a particular subject area does not vest in an official whose decisions in the area are subject to meaningful administrative review.\u201d) (emphasis added); see also Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1351 (11th Cir.2003) (Barkett, J., concurring) (\u201cAn official must have discretion in a particular area of law in order to exercise final policymaking authority in that area -and may not be subject to significant review\u201d) (emphasis added); Bowen v. Watkins, 669 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cIf a higher official has the power to overrule a decision but as a practical matter never does so, the decision maker may represent the effective final authority,on the question.\u201d)."},"case_id":9245081,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Turning to Carmody's second theory on the pre-termination process, the later-added charge for failure to report a security breach, we also agree with Car-mody at the pleadings stage that this charge may have been sufficiently distinct from the original charges that he did not receive fair notice before the July 28 meeting that he faced this charge. Relying on a new charge without providing a meaningful opportunity to respond violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"179 F.3d 1368, 1376","parenthetical":"\"Procedural due process guarantees are not met if the employee has notice only of certain charges or portions of the evidence and the deciding official considers new and material information.\"","sentence":"S\u00e9e Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 384, 387 (7th Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer because employee was informed of one grievance before a pre-termination meeting but not another and arguably had no meaningful opportunity to respond to new charge); Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 743-44 (8th Cir.1987) (reversing judgment notwithstanding the verdict for employer because employee had notice of only some charges against him and was not \u201cgiven any opportunity to respond to the new charges before being fired\u201d); see also Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed.Cir.1999) (\u201cProcedural due process guarantees are not met if the employee has notice only of certain charges or portions of the evidence and the deciding official considers new and material information.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"142 F.3d 383, 384, 387","parenthetical":"reversing grant of summary judgment for employer because employee was informed of one grievance before a pre-termination meeting but not another and arguably had no meaningful opportunity to respond to new charge","sentence":"S\u00e9e Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 384, 387 (7th Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer because employee was informed of one grievance before a pre-termination meeting but not another and arguably had no meaningful opportunity to respond to new charge); Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 743-44 (8th Cir.1987) (reversing judgment notwithstanding the verdict for employer because employee had notice of only some charges against him and was not \u201cgiven any opportunity to respond to the new charges before being fired\u201d); see also Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed.Cir.1999) (\u201cProcedural due process guarantees are not met if the employee has notice only of certain charges or portions of the evidence and the deciding official considers new and material information.\u201d)."},"case_id":4180736,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Turning to Carmody's second theory on the pre-termination process, the later-added charge for failure to report a security breach, we also agree with Car-mody at the pleadings stage that this charge may have been sufficiently distinct from the original charges that he did not receive fair notice before the July 28 meeting that he faced this charge. Relying on a new charge without providing a meaningful opportunity to respond violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"179 F.3d 1368, 1376","parenthetical":"\"Procedural due process guarantees are not met if the employee has notice only of certain charges or portions of the evidence and the deciding official considers new and material information.\"","sentence":"S\u00e9e Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 384, 387 (7th Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer because employee was informed of one grievance before a pre-termination meeting but not another and arguably had no meaningful opportunity to respond to new charge); Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 743-44 (8th Cir.1987) (reversing judgment notwithstanding the verdict for employer because employee had notice of only some charges against him and was not \u201cgiven any opportunity to respond to the new charges before being fired\u201d); see also Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed.Cir.1999) (\u201cProcedural due process guarantees are not met if the employee has notice only of certain charges or portions of the evidence and the deciding official considers new and material information.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"826 F.2d 740, 743-44","parenthetical":"reversing judgment notwithstanding the verdict for employer because employee had notice of only some charges against him and was not \"given any opportunity to respond to the new charges before being fired\"","sentence":"S\u00e9e Staples v. City of Milwaukee, 142 F.3d 383, 384, 387 (7th Cir.1998) (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer because employee was informed of one grievance before a pre-termination meeting but not another and arguably had no meaningful opportunity to respond to new charge); Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 743-44 (8th Cir.1987) (reversing judgment notwithstanding the verdict for employer because employee had notice of only some charges against him and was not \u201cgiven any opportunity to respond to the new charges before being fired\u201d); see also Stone v. FDIC, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed.Cir.1999) (\u201cProcedural due process guarantees are not met if the employee has notice only of certain charges or portions of the evidence and the deciding official considers new and material information.\u201d)."},"case_id":4180736,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"610 F.2d 1157, 1164","parenthetical":"explaining that a trial judge who \"decides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\" and finding that \"the plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\" (emphases added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"10 Haw.App. 491, 495","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"878 P.2d 739, 742","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"610 F.2d 1157, 1164","parenthetical":"explaining that a trial judge who \"decides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\" and finding that \"the plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\" (emphases added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"10 Haw.App. 491, 495","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"878 P.2d 739, 742","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"610 F.2d 1157, 1164","parenthetical":"explaining that a trial judge who \"decides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\" and finding that \"the plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\" (emphases added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"571 N.E.2d 492, 496","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"571 N.E.2d 492, 496","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"10 Haw.App. 491, 495","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"571 N.E.2d 492, 496","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"878 P.2d 739, 742","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10","parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"571 N.E.2d 492, 496","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once the decision is made to modify or reverse an in limine ruling, the trial court must take such measures necessary and appropriate to prevent prejudice which might result from such action.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"571 N.E.2d 492, 496","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \"the trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State's violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\"","sentence":"See Marshall v. Osborn, 213 Ill.App.3d 134, 156 Ill.Dec. 708, 571 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1991) (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial court reversed its original in limine ruling in part because \u201cthe trial court made a conscientious effort to minimize any surprise or potential prejudice by offering to rule before plaintiffs presented their case and by giving them the opportunity to reopen their ease after the ruling (reversing the original determination]\u201d (emphasis added)); cf. Swietlowich v. Bucks County, 610 F.2d 1157, 1164 (3d Cir.1979) (explaining that a trial judge who \u201cdecides to change ... an earlier ruling ... must also take appropriate steps so that the parties are not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling\u201d and finding that \u201cthe plaintiff suffered no prejudice at trial ... since she was fully prepared to meet the limitations defense\u201d (emphases added)); State v. Dowsett, 10 Haw.App. 491, 495, 878 P.2d 739, 742 (1994) (\u201cWe hold, therefore, that before the court orders dismissal of a case because of the State\u2019s violation of HRPP Rule 16, it must consider whether less severe measures would rectify prejudice caused to the defendant by the violation.\u201d), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rogan, 91 Hawai'i 405, 423, n. 10, 984 P.2d 1231, 1249 n. 10 (1999)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"a"}
{"context":"York maintains that \"stronger instructions were called for.\" However, general instructions to disregard have been found sufficient to cure any error arising from jury arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"871 S.W.2d 188, 191-92","parenthetical":"instruction to \"Disregard the last statement\" was sufficient to cure any error in the State's jury argument","sentence":"See Jenkins v. State, 912 S.W.2d 793, 819-20 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (\u201cThe jury is so instructed\u201d was sufficient to cure any error in the State\u2019s jury argument); see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (instruction to \u201cDisregard the last statement\u201d was sufficient to cure any error in the State\u2019s jury argument); Dukes v. State, 289 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. refd) (defendant complained that instruction to \u201c[disregard that last statement\u201d was \u201c \u2018very generic,\u2019 did not instruct the jury that the argument was improper, and did not instruct the jury not to consider the improper argument for any purpose,\u201d but defendant had \u201crequested no such instruction,\u201d merely asking that the jury \u201cbe instructed to disregard it\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"912 S.W.2d 793, 819-20","parenthetical":"\"The jury is so instructed\" was sufficient to cure any error in the State's jury argument","sentence":"See Jenkins v. State, 912 S.W.2d 793, 819-20 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (\u201cThe jury is so instructed\u201d was sufficient to cure any error in the State\u2019s jury argument); see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (instruction to \u201cDisregard the last statement\u201d was sufficient to cure any error in the State\u2019s jury argument); Dukes v. State, 289 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. refd) (defendant complained that instruction to \u201c[disregard that last statement\u201d was \u201c \u2018very generic,\u2019 did not instruct the jury that the argument was improper, and did not instruct the jury not to consider the improper argument for any purpose,\u201d but defendant had \u201crequested no such instruction,\u201d merely asking that the jury \u201cbe instructed to disregard it\u201d)."},"case_id":8179062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"York maintains that \"stronger instructions were called for.\" However, general instructions to disregard have been found sufficient to cure any error arising from jury arguments.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"289 S.W.3d 444, 451","parenthetical":"defendant complained that instruction to \"[disregard that last statement\" was \" 'very generic,' did not instruct the jury that the argument was improper, and did not instruct the jury not to consider the improper argument for any purpose,\" but defendant had \"requested no such instruction,\" merely asking that the jury \"be instructed to disregard it\"","sentence":"See Jenkins v. State, 912 S.W.2d 793, 819-20 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (\u201cThe jury is so instructed\u201d was sufficient to cure any error in the State\u2019s jury argument); see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (instruction to \u201cDisregard the last statement\u201d was sufficient to cure any error in the State\u2019s jury argument); Dukes v. State, 289 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. refd) (defendant complained that instruction to \u201c[disregard that last statement\u201d was \u201c \u2018very generic,\u2019 did not instruct the jury that the argument was improper, and did not instruct the jury not to consider the improper argument for any purpose,\u201d but defendant had \u201crequested no such instruction,\u201d merely asking that the jury \u201cbe instructed to disregard it\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"912 S.W.2d 793, 819-20","parenthetical":"\"The jury is so instructed\" was sufficient to cure any error in the State's jury argument","sentence":"See Jenkins v. State, 912 S.W.2d 793, 819-20 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (\u201cThe jury is so instructed\u201d was sufficient to cure any error in the State\u2019s jury argument); see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 188, 191-92 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (instruction to \u201cDisregard the last statement\u201d was sufficient to cure any error in the State\u2019s jury argument); Dukes v. State, 289 S.W.3d 444, 451 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, pet. refd) (defendant complained that instruction to \u201c[disregard that last statement\u201d was \u201c \u2018very generic,\u2019 did not instruct the jury that the argument was improper, and did not instruct the jury not to consider the improper argument for any purpose,\u201d but defendant had \u201crequested no such instruction,\u201d merely asking that the jury \u201cbe instructed to disregard it\u201d)."},"case_id":8179062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"So it's very material in this case, lying to this Court under oath, about if he knew Shoo Boo.\" As this passage suggests, the most plausible reason for Brown to lie about knowing Shoo Boo was to try to avoid the obstruction of justice enhancement sought by the government, a different theory than the one ultimately adopted by the district court itself.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"959 F.2d 83, 87","parenthetical":"\"[Ljying for the purpose of obtaining a lighter sentence constitutes obstruction of justice within the meaning of section 3C1.1.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Flores, 959 F.2d 83, 87 (8th Cir. 1992) (\u201c[Ljying for the purpose of obtaining a lighter sentence constitutes obstruction of justice within the meaning of section 3C1.1.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2003) (\u201cWe have affirmed a district court\u2019s finding of perjury and subsequent application of sentence enhancements for obstruction of justice where the perjured testimony directly contravened testimony of other witnesses ....\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"321 F.3d 699, 703","parenthetical":"\"We have affirmed a district court's finding of perjury and subsequent application of sentence enhancements for obstruction of justice where the perjured testimony directly contravened testimony of other witnesses ....\"","sentence":"See United States v. Flores, 959 F.2d 83, 87 (8th Cir. 1992) (\u201c[Ljying for the purpose of obtaining a lighter sentence constitutes obstruction of justice within the meaning of section 3C1.1.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Kessler, 321 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.2003) (\u201cWe have affirmed a district court\u2019s finding of perjury and subsequent application of sentence enhancements for obstruction of justice where the perjured testimony directly contravened testimony of other witnesses ....\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":3117333,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit recently provided the following additional instruction for identifying a discretionary function: \"Cases in this circuit have consistently held that the FTCA applies to decisions by federal agencies at the 'operational' level, whereas decisions or omissions on the 'policy or planning' level are exempt under the statute's discretionary function exception.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"857 F.2d 1208, 1209","parenthetical":"agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government's sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42","parenthetical":"failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"case_id":11355530,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit recently provided the following additional instruction for identifying a discretionary function: \"Cases in this circuit have consistently held that the FTCA applies to decisions by federal agencies at the 'operational' level, whereas decisions or omissions on the 'policy or planning' level are exempt under the statute's discretionary function exception.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency's discretionary function","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"857 F.2d 1208, 1209","parenthetical":"agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government's sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"case_id":11355530,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit recently provided the following additional instruction for identifying a discretionary function: \"Cases in this circuit have consistently held that the FTCA applies to decisions by federal agencies at the 'operational' level, whereas decisions or omissions on the 'policy or planning' level are exempt under the statute's discretionary function exception.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"857 F.2d 1208, 1209","parenthetical":"agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government's sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"case_id":11355530,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit recently provided the following additional instruction for identifying a discretionary function: \"Cases in this circuit have consistently held that the FTCA applies to decisions by federal agencies at the 'operational' level, whereas decisions or omissions on the 'policy or planning' level are exempt under the statute's discretionary function exception.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"857 F.2d 1208, 1209","parenthetical":"agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government's sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"case_id":11355530,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit recently provided the following additional instruction for identifying a discretionary function: \"Cases in this circuit have consistently held that the FTCA applies to decisions by federal agencies at the 'operational' level, whereas decisions or omissions on the 'policy or planning' level are exempt under the statute's discretionary function exception.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"857 F.2d 1208, 1209","parenthetical":"agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government's sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"case_id":11355530,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Eighth Circuit recently provided the following additional instruction for identifying a discretionary function: \"Cases in this circuit have consistently held that the FTCA applies to decisions by federal agencies at the 'operational' level, whereas decisions or omissions on the 'policy or planning' level are exempt under the statute's discretionary function exception.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"857 F.2d 1208, 1209","parenthetical":"agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government's sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway","sentence":"Gleason v. United States, 857 F.2d 1208, 1209 (8th Cir.1988) (agency approval of plans for bridge was discretionary act when the government\u2019s sole concern was insuring a navigable waterway); see also E. Ritter & Co. v. Department of the Army, 874 F.2d 1236, 1240-42 (8th Cir.1989) (failure to maintain flood control ditch was ministerial and operational, not policy judgment); Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir.1988) (sufficiency of warning to purchasers of used jeeps was within agency\u2019s discretionary function); Bacon v. United States, 810 F.2d 827 (8th Cir.1987) (agency decision not to warn plaintiffs of dioxin contamination was within agency discretionary function); Mandel v. United States, 793 F.2d 964 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with its own safety regulations was not within discretionary function); Aslakson v. United States, 790 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.1986) (agency failure to comply with safety regulations it had adopted was not within discretionary function); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir.1985) (agency failure to enforce safety regulations contained in contract with contractor was not within discretionary function); see generally Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1483-86 (5th Cir.1989) (thorough review of discretionary function exception)."},"case_id":11355530,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In determining whether a product has obtained a secondary meaning, the Court looks to whether the descriptive term, \"although not inherently distinctive, comes through use to be uniquely associated with a single source ....\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"944 F.Supp. 227, 227","parenthetical":"rejecting claim of secondary meaning on motion for summary judgment","sentence":"See Bernard, 964 F.2d at 1343 (affirming district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment dismissing complaint, observing that plaintiff had failed to produce \u201cevidence that a significant number of prospective purchasers associate his ... trademark with his product.\u201d); see also Black & Decker Corp., 944 F.Supp. at 227 (rejecting claim of secondary meaning on motion for summary judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"964 F.2d 1343, 1343","parenthetical":"affirming district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing complaint, observing that plaintiff had failed to produce \"evidence that a significant number of prospective purchasers associate his ... trademark with his product.\"","sentence":"See Bernard, 964 F.2d at 1343 (affirming district court\u2019s grant of summary judgment dismissing complaint, observing that plaintiff had failed to produce \u201cevidence that a significant number of prospective purchasers associate his ... trademark with his product.\u201d); see also Black & Decker Corp., 944 F.Supp. at 227 (rejecting claim of secondary meaning on motion for summary judgment)."},"case_id":11682887,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Holdings is fully controlled (under any definition of the word) by Harvard. In determining who \"controls\" the Fund, however, we cannot rely on general usage but, rather, must apply the specific definition agreed upon by BTG and Holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a contract's terms will not \"be taken in their plain and ordinary sense\" if \"otherwise indicated by the contract\"","sentence":"See Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 730 N.E.2d 869, 871 (2000) (stating that a contract\u2019s terms will not \u201cbe taken in their plain and ordinary sense\u201d if \u201cotherwise indicated by the contract\u201d); see also Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (explaining that \u201cevery phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"every phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\"","sentence":"See Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 730 N.E.2d 869, 871 (2000) (stating that a contract\u2019s terms will not \u201cbe taken in their plain and ordinary sense\u201d if \u201cotherwise indicated by the contract\u201d); see also Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (explaining that \u201cevery phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\u201d)."},"case_id":6046658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Holdings is fully controlled (under any definition of the word) by Harvard. In determining who \"controls\" the Fund, however, we cannot rely on general usage but, rather, must apply the specific definition agreed upon by BTG and Holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that a contract's terms will not \"be taken in their plain and ordinary sense\" if \"otherwise indicated by the contract\"","sentence":"See Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 730 N.E.2d 869, 871 (2000) (stating that a contract\u2019s terms will not \u201cbe taken in their plain and ordinary sense\u201d if \u201cotherwise indicated by the contract\u201d); see also Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (explaining that \u201cevery phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"19 N.E.2d 800, 804","parenthetical":"explaining that \"every phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\"","sentence":"See Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 730 N.E.2d 869, 871 (2000) (stating that a contract\u2019s terms will not \u201cbe taken in their plain and ordinary sense\u201d if \u201cotherwise indicated by the contract\u201d); see also Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (explaining that \u201cevery phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\u201d)."},"case_id":6046658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Holdings is fully controlled (under any definition of the word) by Harvard. In determining who \"controls\" the Fund, however, we cannot rely on general usage but, rather, must apply the specific definition agreed upon by BTG and Holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"730 N.E.2d 869, 871","parenthetical":"stating that a contract's terms will not \"be taken in their plain and ordinary sense\" if \"otherwise indicated by the contract\"","sentence":"See Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 730 N.E.2d 869, 871 (2000) (stating that a contract\u2019s terms will not \u201cbe taken in their plain and ordinary sense\u201d if \u201cotherwise indicated by the contract\u201d); see also Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (explaining that \u201cevery phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"every phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\"","sentence":"See Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 730 N.E.2d 869, 871 (2000) (stating that a contract\u2019s terms will not \u201cbe taken in their plain and ordinary sense\u201d if \u201cotherwise indicated by the contract\u201d); see also Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (explaining that \u201cevery phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\u201d)."},"case_id":6046658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Holdings is fully controlled (under any definition of the word) by Harvard. In determining who \"controls\" the Fund, however, we cannot rely on general usage but, rather, must apply the specific definition agreed upon by BTG and Holdings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"730 N.E.2d 869, 871","parenthetical":"stating that a contract's terms will not \"be taken in their plain and ordinary sense\" if \"otherwise indicated by the contract\"","sentence":"See Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 730 N.E.2d 869, 871 (2000) (stating that a contract\u2019s terms will not \u201cbe taken in their plain and ordinary sense\u201d if \u201cotherwise indicated by the contract\u201d); see also Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (explaining that \u201cevery phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"19 N.E.2d 800, 804","parenthetical":"explaining that \"every phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\"","sentence":"See Rogaris v. Albert, 431 Mass. 833, 730 N.E.2d 869, 871 (2000) (stating that a contract\u2019s terms will not \u201cbe taken in their plain and ordinary sense\u201d if \u201cotherwise indicated by the contract\u201d); see also Charles I. Hosmer, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 302 Mass. 495, 19 N.E.2d 800, 804 (1939) (explaining that \u201cevery phrase and clause must be presumed to have been designedly employed\u201d)."},"case_id":6046658,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Paragraph (c)(1) begins with broad language: \"Notwithstanding any other section in this part.\" The introduction of a provision by the word \"notwithstanding\" means that the provision so introduced will prevail over any implicated section that conflicts with it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"508 U.S. 10, 18","parenthetical":"stating that the use of a \"notwithstanding\" clause \"clearly signals the drafter's intention that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\"","sentence":"See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (stating that the use of a \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d clause \u201cclearly signals the drafter\u2019s intention that the provisions of the \u2018notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\u201d); Lane v. West, 11 Vet.App. 412, 413 (1998) (per curiam order) (interpreting a clause beginning with \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d to exempt CUE motions from the general rule that this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals in which an NOD was filed on or after November 18, 1988); see also Stoll v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2005) (characterizing the language \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of law\u201d as a \u201cnullifying clause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 F.3d 1375, 1380","parenthetical":"characterizing the language \"[notwithstanding any other provision of law\" as a \"nullifying clause\"","sentence":"See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (stating that the use of a \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d clause \u201cclearly signals the drafter\u2019s intention that the provisions of the \u2018notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\u201d); Lane v. West, 11 Vet.App. 412, 413 (1998) (per curiam order) (interpreting a clause beginning with \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d to exempt CUE motions from the general rule that this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals in which an NOD was filed on or after November 18, 1988); see also Stoll v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2005) (characterizing the language \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of law\u201d as a \u201cnullifying clause\u201d)."},"case_id":12274814,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Paragraph (c)(1) begins with broad language: \"Notwithstanding any other section in this part.\" The introduction of a provision by the word \"notwithstanding\" means that the provision so introduced will prevail over any implicated section that conflicts with it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the use of a \"notwithstanding\" clause \"clearly signals the drafter's intention that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\"","sentence":"See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (stating that the use of a \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d clause \u201cclearly signals the drafter\u2019s intention that the provisions of the \u2018notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\u201d); Lane v. West, 11 Vet.App. 412, 413 (1998) (per curiam order) (interpreting a clause beginning with \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d to exempt CUE motions from the general rule that this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals in which an NOD was filed on or after November 18, 1988); see also Stoll v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2005) (characterizing the language \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of law\u201d as a \u201cnullifying clause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 F.3d 1375, 1380","parenthetical":"characterizing the language \"[notwithstanding any other provision of law\" as a \"nullifying clause\"","sentence":"See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (stating that the use of a \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d clause \u201cclearly signals the drafter\u2019s intention that the provisions of the \u2018notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\u201d); Lane v. West, 11 Vet.App. 412, 413 (1998) (per curiam order) (interpreting a clause beginning with \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d to exempt CUE motions from the general rule that this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals in which an NOD was filed on or after November 18, 1988); see also Stoll v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2005) (characterizing the language \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of law\u201d as a \u201cnullifying clause\u201d)."},"case_id":12274814,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Paragraph (c)(1) begins with broad language: \"Notwithstanding any other section in this part.\" The introduction of a provision by the word \"notwithstanding\" means that the provision so introduced will prevail over any implicated section that conflicts with it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the use of a \"notwithstanding\" clause \"clearly signals the drafter's intention that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\"","sentence":"See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (stating that the use of a \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d clause \u201cclearly signals the drafter\u2019s intention that the provisions of the \u2018notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\u201d); Lane v. West, 11 Vet.App. 412, 413 (1998) (per curiam order) (interpreting a clause beginning with \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d to exempt CUE motions from the general rule that this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals in which an NOD was filed on or after November 18, 1988); see also Stoll v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2005) (characterizing the language \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of law\u201d as a \u201cnullifying clause\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"401 F.3d 1375, 1380","parenthetical":"characterizing the language \"[notwithstanding any other provision of law\" as a \"nullifying clause\"","sentence":"See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 123 L.Ed.2d 572 (1993) (stating that the use of a \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d clause \u201cclearly signals the drafter\u2019s intention that the provisions of the \u2018notwithstanding1 section override conflicting provisions of any other section\u201d); Lane v. West, 11 Vet.App. 412, 413 (1998) (per curiam order) (interpreting a clause beginning with \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d to exempt CUE motions from the general rule that this Court has jurisdiction only over appeals in which an NOD was filed on or after November 18, 1988); see also Stoll v. Nicholson, 401 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed.Cir.2005) (characterizing the language \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of law\u201d as a \u201cnullifying clause\u201d)."},"case_id":12274814,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Further, the agency considered Cai's varying explanations for initially claiming that she had been persecuted on account of her religion--that she was embarrassed, had not eaten, was confused, and was nervous--and reasonably rejected them.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"an alien's mere recitation that he was nervous or felt pressured during an airport interview will not automatically prevent the IJ or BIA from relying on statements in such interviews when making adverse credibility determinations\"","sentence":"See Yun-Zui Guan, 432 F.3d at 397 n. 6 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that \u201can alien\u2019s mere recitation that he was nervous or felt pressured during an airport interview will not automatically prevent the IJ or BIA from relying on statements in such interviews when making adverse credibility determinations\u201d); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (under substantial evidence standard, agency need not credit an applicant\u2019s explanations unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"430 F.3d 77, 80-81","parenthetical":"under substantial evidence standard, agency need not credit an applicant's explanations unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so","sentence":"See Yun-Zui Guan, 432 F.3d at 397 n. 6 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that \u201can alien\u2019s mere recitation that he was nervous or felt pressured during an airport interview will not automatically prevent the IJ or BIA from relying on statements in such interviews when making adverse credibility determinations\u201d); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (under substantial evidence standard, agency need not credit an applicant\u2019s explanations unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so)."},"case_id":3637436,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As long as a law or regulation is rationally based, the mere failure of those who administer it to treat all persons who have violated it with complete equality does not of itself infringe the constitutional principle of equal protection. The equal protection clause prohibits selective enforcement which is \"deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"397 U.S. 471, 486-487","parenthetical":"\"the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.\"","sentence":"Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162-1163, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (\u201cthe Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.\u201d) The legitimate objective of maintaining an effective police force may require the discretion to make individual judgments, and the equal protection clause is no barrier to legitimate exercise of such discretion."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"673 F.2d 7, 9","parenthetical":"applying Batchelder and Oyler to uphold termination of public employee despite his allegation that others with similar offenses were not fired","sentence":"See also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (prosecutor\u2019s discretion presents no equal protection problem); Harrington v. United States, 673 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying Batchelder and Oyler to uphold termination of public employee despite his allegation that others with similar offenses were not fired)."},"case_id":107039,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As long as a law or regulation is rationally based, the mere failure of those who administer it to treat all persons who have violated it with complete equality does not of itself infringe the constitutional principle of equal protection. The equal protection clause prohibits selective enforcement which is \"deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162-1163","parenthetical":"\"the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.\"","sentence":"Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162-1163, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (\u201cthe Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.\u201d) The legitimate objective of maintaining an effective police force may require the discretion to make individual judgments, and the equal protection clause is no barrier to legitimate exercise of such discretion."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"673 F.2d 7, 9","parenthetical":"applying Batchelder and Oyler to uphold termination of public employee despite his allegation that others with similar offenses were not fired","sentence":"See also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (prosecutor\u2019s discretion presents no equal protection problem); Harrington v. United States, 673 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying Batchelder and Oyler to uphold termination of public employee despite his allegation that others with similar offenses were not fired)."},"case_id":107039,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As long as a law or regulation is rationally based, the mere failure of those who administer it to treat all persons who have violated it with complete equality does not of itself infringe the constitutional principle of equal protection. The equal protection clause prohibits selective enforcement which is \"deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.\"","sentence":"Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-487, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162-1163, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (\u201cthe Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.\u201d) The legitimate objective of maintaining an effective police force may require the discretion to make individual judgments, and the equal protection clause is no barrier to legitimate exercise of such discretion."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"673 F.2d 7, 9","parenthetical":"applying Batchelder and Oyler to uphold termination of public employee despite his allegation that others with similar offenses were not fired","sentence":"See also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (prosecutor\u2019s discretion presents no equal protection problem); Harrington v. United States, 673 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1982) (applying Batchelder and Oyler to uphold termination of public employee despite his allegation that others with similar offenses were not fired)."},"case_id":107039,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Plaintiff also contends that the FCIP'Employment Agreement and CBP Standards of Conduct do not give rise to a \"duty to cooperate,\" only a \"duty to answer.\" This contention is rejected outright, based on the clear language of these documents and the holdings in the cases cited in the text herein.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2011 WL 4479068, at *7","parenthetical":"refusal to answer questions in Kalkines interview equated with failure to cooperate in official investigation despite duty to do so, providing legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination of postal worker's employment","sentence":"See, e.g., Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1393 (public employee \u201ccan be removed for not replying if he is adequately informed both that he is subject to discharge for not answering and that his replies (and their fruits) cannot be employed against him in a criminal case.\u201d); cf. Butler v. Potter, 2011 WL 4479068, at *7 (refusal to answer questions in Kalkines interview equated with failure to cooperate in official investigation despite duty to do so, providing legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination of postal worker's employment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"473 F.2d 1393, 1393","parenthetical":"public employee \"can be removed for not replying if he is adequately informed both that he is subject to discharge for not answering and that his replies (and their fruits) cannot be employed against him in a criminal case.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Kalkines, 473 F.2d at 1393 (public employee \u201ccan be removed for not replying if he is adequately informed both that he is subject to discharge for not answering and that his replies (and their fruits) cannot be employed against him in a criminal case.\u201d); cf. Butler v. Potter, 2011 WL 4479068, at *7 (refusal to answer questions in Kalkines interview equated with failure to cooperate in official investigation despite duty to do so, providing legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination of postal worker's employment)."},"case_id":3836798,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Where removal proceedings are pending, such as in this case, further administrative relief is available and the termination of an alien's current status is an intermediate, nonfinal agency action.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"432 F.3d 193, 202","parenthetical":"holding agency action is final \"where there are no deportation proceedings pending in which the decision might be reopened or challenged\"","sentence":"See Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that termination of asylum is not final agency action because it is \u201conly an intermediate step in a multi-stage administrative process, succeeded (or accompanied) by removal proceedings\u201d); see also Cabaccang v. USCIS, 627 F.3d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.2010) (holding the district court did not have jurisdiction to review denial of adjustment of status where \u201cremoval proceedings are pending\u201d) (quoted by Qureshi 663 F.3d at 781); see also Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 202 (3rd Cir.2005) (holding agency action is final \u201cwhere there are no deportation proceedings pending in which the decision might be reopened or challenged\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"663 F.3d 778, 781","parenthetical":"holding that termination of asylum is not final agency action because it is \"only an intermediate step in a multi-stage administrative process, succeeded (or accompanied","sentence":"See Qureshi v. Holder, 663 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir.2011) (holding that termination of asylum is not final agency action because it is \u201conly an intermediate step in a multi-stage administrative process, succeeded (or accompanied) by removal proceedings\u201d); see also Cabaccang v. USCIS, 627 F.3d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir.2010) (holding the district court did not have jurisdiction to review denial of adjustment of status where \u201cremoval proceedings are pending\u201d) (quoted by Qureshi 663 F.3d at 781); see also Pinho v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 193, 202 (3rd Cir.2005) (holding agency action is final \u201cwhere there are no deportation proceedings pending in which the decision might be reopened or challenged\u201d)."},"case_id":3878035,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court's order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court's order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The United States Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the impact of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. Const., Art. IV, SS 1, on custody adjudications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 103, 109-115","parenthetical":"discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees","sentence":"See also Borys v. Borys, 76 N.J. 103, 109-115 (1978) (discussing judicial applications of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to custody decrees)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court's order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children","sentence":"See New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 67 S.Ct. 903, 91 L.Ed. 1133 (1947) (holding New York could lawfully modify a Florida custody decree because Florida court had right under Florida law to change the decree); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 73 S.Ct. 840, 97 L.Ed. 1221 (1953) (holding Ohio need not give full faith and credit to Wisconsin custody judgment because Wisconsin did not have personal jurisdiction over mother who was in Ohio with children at time process was served; Wisconsin had been matrimonial domicile and father had remained there); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 78 S.Ct. 963, 2 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1958) (holding North Carolina had authority to modify New York custody decree if the North Carolina court found changed circumstances, because New York decree was modifiable under New York law on showing of changed circumstances); Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 83 S.Ct. 273, 9 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962) (holding South Carolina not bound by Virginia court\u2019s order of dismissal after being informed of an agreement regarding custody, because Virginia law did not require that courts would be bound by agreements between parents with respect to custody of their children)."},"case_id":313242,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The trial court was authorized to correct the error by nunc pro tunc order.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"889 S.W.2d 306, 309","parenthetical":"\"nunc pro tunc orders may be used only to correct clerical errors in which no judicial reasoning contributed to their entry, and for some reason were not entered of record at the proper time\"","sentence":"See State v. Bates, 889 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (\u201cnunc pro tunc orders may be used only to correct clerical errors in which no judicial reasoning contributed to their entry, and for some reason were not entered of record at the proper time\u201d); see also Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 199, 202 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to have the court records accurately reflect the judgment actually rendered)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to have the court records accurately reflect the judgment actually rendered","sentence":"See State v. Bates, 889 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (\u201cnunc pro tunc orders may be used only to correct clerical errors in which no judicial reasoning contributed to their entry, and for some reason were not entered of record at the proper time\u201d); see also Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 199, 202 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (purpose of a nunc pro tunc order is to have the court records accurately reflect the judgment actually rendered)."},"case_id":8179062,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I informed Fallon that I suffered a workplace injury ... [and] that Hahn had told me ... that I was ineligible for FMLA leave\"). The chronology of these events seriously undercuts Matthys's ability to establish that her FMLA inquiries were the \"but for\" reason for her termination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2001 WL 40802, at *8","parenthetical":"\"the causal link between the protected activity and adverse employment action is demonstrated by showing that the employer would not have taken the adverse action 'but for' the employee's protected activity\"","sentence":"See also Sewall, 2001 WL 40802 at *8 (\u201cthe causal link between the protected activity and adverse employment action is demonstrated by showing that the employer would not have taken the adverse action \u2018but for\u2019 the employee\u2019s protected activity\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"537 F.3d 774, 774","parenthetical":"noting that a plaintiffs \"suspicious timing\" argument was undercut when the defendant employer had already begun disciplinary action prior to his alleged knowledge of the plaintiffs protected activity","sentence":"See Ridings, 537 F.3d at 774 (noting that a plaintiffs \u201csuspicious timing\u201d argument was undercut when the defendant employer had already begun disciplinary action prior to his alleged knowledge of the plaintiffs protected activity)."},"case_id":4257538,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Given these facts, we are satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Mr. Tolbert suffered serious bodily injury. He nearly lost consciousness, he indicated that he was in pain, and he suffered from an \"impairment of the function\" of his right leg.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"857 A.2d 451, 464","parenthetical":"victim did not describe pain as extreme, but a reasonable juror could infer from the nature of the injuries and the victim's reaction to them that the pain was extreme","sentence":"See Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 914, 918 (D.C.2000) (court upheld finding of serious bodily injury when victim was slashed across the face with a broken beer bottle and was never unconscious, but was \u201csemi-unconscious,\u201d \u201cin total shock,\u201d and \u201c[not] totally coherent\u201d); cf. Anderson v. United States, 857 A.2d 451, 464 (D.C.2004) (victim did not describe pain as extreme, but a reasonable juror could infer from the nature of the injuries and the victim\u2019s reaction to them that the pain was extreme)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"754 A.2d 912, 914, 918","parenthetical":"court upheld finding of serious bodily injury when victim was slashed across the face with a broken beer bottle and was never unconscious, but was \"semi-unconscious,\" \"in total shock,\" and \"[not] totally coherent\"","sentence":"See Gathy v. United States, 754 A.2d 912, 914, 918 (D.C.2000) (court upheld finding of serious bodily injury when victim was slashed across the face with a broken beer bottle and was never unconscious, but was \u201csemi-unconscious,\u201d \u201cin total shock,\u201d and \u201c[not] totally coherent\u201d); cf. Anderson v. United States, 857 A.2d 451, 464 (D.C.2004) (victim did not describe pain as extreme, but a reasonable juror could infer from the nature of the injuries and the victim\u2019s reaction to them that the pain was extreme)."},"case_id":8446889,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To be sure, Plaintiff must prove that his conduct was \"extreme and outrageous.\" However, after reviewing the evidence proffered, the court finds that there are sufficient facts which, if proven, would allow -- albeit not require -- a reasonable jury to conclude that Theroux's conduct crossed that boundary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"There is an issue for the jury if reasonable people could differ on whether the conduct is extreme and outrageous.\"","sentence":"See Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056-57 (1979) (\u201cThere is an issue for the jury if reasonable people could differ on whether the conduct is extreme and outrageous.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"196 F.Supp.2d 48, 72","parenthetical":"denying summary judgment where reasonable jury could conclude defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous","sentence":"See also Kibbe v. Potter, 196 F.Supp.2d 48, 72 (D.Mass.2002) (denying summary judgment where reasonable jury could conclude defendant\u2019s conduct was extreme and outrageous)."},"case_id":3701589,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To be sure, Plaintiff must prove that his conduct was \"extreme and outrageous.\" However, after reviewing the evidence proffered, the court finds that there are sufficient facts which, if proven, would allow -- albeit not require -- a reasonable jury to conclude that Theroux's conduct crossed that boundary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056-57","parenthetical":"\"There is an issue for the jury if reasonable people could differ on whether the conduct is extreme and outrageous.\"","sentence":"See Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056-57 (1979) (\u201cThere is an issue for the jury if reasonable people could differ on whether the conduct is extreme and outrageous.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"196 F.Supp.2d 48, 72","parenthetical":"denying summary judgment where reasonable jury could conclude defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous","sentence":"See also Kibbe v. Potter, 196 F.Supp.2d 48, 72 (D.Mass.2002) (denying summary judgment where reasonable jury could conclude defendant\u2019s conduct was extreme and outrageous)."},"case_id":3701589,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"724 N.E.2d 588, 591","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"807 P.2d 162, 165","parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"724 N.E.2d 588, 591","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"299 N.W.2d 421, 425","parenthetical":"warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"299 N.W.2d 421, 425","parenthetical":"warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"807 P.2d 162, 165","parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"299 N.W.2d 421, 425","parenthetical":"warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"724 N.E.2d 588, 591","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"807 P.2d 162, 165","parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 S.E.2d 680, 684","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"724 N.E.2d 588, 591","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 S.E.2d 680, 684","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 S.E.2d 680, 684","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"807 P.2d 162, 165","parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"724 N.E.2d 588, 591","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"807 P.2d 162, 165","parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"724 N.E.2d 588, 591","parenthetical":"warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"274 A.2d 500, 502","parenthetical":"warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"274 A.2d 500, 502","parenthetical":"warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"[S]everal state courts have held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by a search of the grounds or outbuildings within a residence's curtilage where a warrant authorizes a search of the residence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"274 A.2d 500, 502","parenthetical":"warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"807 P.2d 162, 165","parenthetical":"upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \"[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the 'curtilage' of that residence.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gorman, 104 F.3d 272, 275 (9th Cir.1996); see Nebraska v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d 421, 425 (Neb.1980) (warrant to search residence permitted search of calf shed 100 feet from the house on opposite side of chain link fence); State v. Trapper, 48 N.C.App. 481, 269 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C.App.1980) (warrant authorizing search of house trailer permitted search of tool shed 30 feet away); State v. Stewart, 129 Vt. 175, 274 A.2d 500, 502 (Vt.1971) (warrant to search house permitted search of a tree in the backyard because within the curtilage); see also Sowers v. Indiana, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind.2000) (warrant authorizing search of residence at a specific address also authorized search of a tent in the back yard); Kansas v. Basurto, 15 Kan.App.2d 264, 807 P.2d 162, 165 (1991) (upholding a search of a shed in the backyard of residence, observing \u201c[t]here appears to be little doubt that a search warrant which describes only the residence of a defendant will authorize the search of any vehicles or buildings within the \u2018curtilage\u2019 of that residence.\u201d)."},"case_id":9420629,"label":"a"}
{"context":". While Plaintiffs rely on case law supporting that district courts should freely grant leave to amend, these cases do not support Plaintiffs' argument here. The district court did grant Plaintiffs leave to amend, and did so more than once; further, the deadline to amend the pleadings passed several years pri- or to Plaintiffs' motion to vacate and amend.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"252 F.3d 1161, 1163","parenthetical":"a district court is not required to allow amendment of the pleadings if there has been undue delay or when amendment would result in undue prejudice to the opposing party","sentence":"See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (a district court is not required to allow amendment of the pleadings if there has been undue delay or when amendment would result in undue prejudice to the opposing party); see also Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.1999) (\u201cPrejudice and undue delay are inherent in an amendment asserted after the close of discovery and after dispositive motions have been filed, briefed, and decided.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"166 F.3d 1157, 1162","parenthetical":"\"Prejudice and undue delay are inherent in an amendment asserted after the close of discovery and after dispositive motions have been filed, briefed, and decided.\"","sentence":"See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (a district court is not required to allow amendment of the pleadings if there has been undue delay or when amendment would result in undue prejudice to the opposing party); see also Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir.1999) (\u201cPrejudice and undue delay are inherent in an amendment asserted after the close of discovery and after dispositive motions have been filed, briefed, and decided.\u201d)."},"case_id":6053664,"label":"a"}
{"context":"After reviewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the defendant intended to damage or destroy the telephone as opposed to acting with malice towards the victim.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"willfully driving a stolen scooter through a fence with knowledge that the scooter may be damaged was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of criminal mischief","sentence":"See Sanchez v. State, 909 So.2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (acting with malice toward the person of the owner of the property is not enough to support a conviction for criminal mischief); Insignares v. State, 847 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); In Interest of J.G., 655 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); cf. M.H. v. State, No. 3D05-1357, \u2014 So.2d -, 2006 WL 860974 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 5, 2006) (willfully driving a stolen scooter through a fence with knowledge that the scooter may be damaged was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of criminal mischief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"acting with malice toward the person of the owner of the property is not enough to support a conviction for criminal mischief","sentence":"See Sanchez v. State, 909 So.2d 981 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (acting with malice toward the person of the owner of the property is not enough to support a conviction for criminal mischief); Insignares v. State, 847 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); In Interest of J.G., 655 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); cf. M.H. v. State, No. 3D05-1357, \u2014 So.2d -, 2006 WL 860974 (Fla. 3d DCA Apr. 5, 2006) (willfully driving a stolen scooter through a fence with knowledge that the scooter may be damaged was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of criminal mischief)."},"case_id":8425519,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While we have implicitly held that whether political association is such an appropriate requirement is a question of fact, see id., there is no dispute in this case as to the nature of Ms. Barker's duties, and the district court resolved the issue as a matter of law in the face of such undisputed facts. We agree that such a resolution is appropriate in this case, and affirm the district court's conclusion that political association and allegiance were appropriate requirements for the performance of Ms. Barker's job as administrative assistant to the city manager.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"3 F.3d 214, 216","parenthetical":"noting that the confidential character of positions such as personal secretary or personal assistant makes political affiliation an appropriate job requirement","sentence":"See McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1556 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[W]ork-ers analogous to a cabinet secretary to a chief executive, along with the confidential advisors and administrative assistants of such executives and cabinet secretaries, are not entitled to First Amendment protection.\u201d); Smith v. Sushka, 117 F.3d 965, 971 (6th Cir.1997) (administrative assistant to county engineer); Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68-69 (2d Cir.1988) (confidential secretary to corrections official); see also Wilbur v. Mahan, 3 F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that the confidential character of positions such as personal secretary or personal assistant makes political affiliation an appropriate job requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"97 F.3d 1536, 1556","parenthetical":"\"[W]ork-ers analogous to a cabinet secretary to a chief executive, along with the confidential advisors and administrative assistants of such executives and cabinet secretaries, are not entitled to First Amendment protection.\"","sentence":"See McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1556 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[W]ork-ers analogous to a cabinet secretary to a chief executive, along with the confidential advisors and administrative assistants of such executives and cabinet secretaries, are not entitled to First Amendment protection.\u201d); Smith v. Sushka, 117 F.3d 965, 971 (6th Cir.1997) (administrative assistant to county engineer); Savage v. Gorski, 850 F.2d 64, 68-69 (2d Cir.1988) (confidential secretary to corrections official); see also Wilbur v. Mahan, 3 F.3d 214, 216 (7th Cir.1993) (noting that the confidential character of positions such as personal secretary or personal assistant makes political affiliation an appropriate job requirement)."},"case_id":11220312,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As to appellant's Apprendi-Blakely-Ring complaint, \"[t]he federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected the contention that Apprendi is violated when a trial court orders the cumulation of sentences which individually lie within the statutory range of punishment but for which the cumulative total exceeds the prescribed statutory maximum for any single offense.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"169 S.W.3d 328, 330","parenthetical":"holding that no Apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range","sentence":"Marrow v. State, 169 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed) (holding that no Apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range); see, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1253-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 925, 124 S.Ct. 330, 157 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003); U.S. v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 278-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 857, 124 S.Ct. 158, 157 L.Ed.2d 104 (2003); U.S. v. McWaine, 290 F.3d 269, 275-76 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 921, 123 S.Ct. 311, 154 L.Ed.2d 210 (2002); U.S. v. Feola, 275 F.3d 216, 218-20 & n. 1 (2d Cir.2001); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 120 S.Ct. at 2354 (\u201cThe sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts\u201d). Some Texas courts have reached the same conclusion but only in unpublished cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"530 U.S. 474, 474","parenthetical":"\"The sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts\"","sentence":"Marrow v. State, 169 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed) (holding that no Apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range); see, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1253-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 925, 124 S.Ct. 330, 157 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003); U.S. v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 278-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 857, 124 S.Ct. 158, 157 L.Ed.2d 104 (2003); U.S. v. McWaine, 290 F.3d 269, 275-76 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 921, 123 S.Ct. 311, 154 L.Ed.2d 210 (2002); U.S. v. Feola, 275 F.3d 216, 218-20 & n. 1 (2d Cir.2001); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 120 S.Ct. at 2354 (\u201cThe sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts\u201d). Some Texas courts have reached the same conclusion but only in unpublished cases."},"case_id":8912758,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As to appellant's Apprendi-Blakely-Ring complaint, \"[t]he federal appellate courts have uniformly rejected the contention that Apprendi is violated when a trial court orders the cumulation of sentences which individually lie within the statutory range of punishment but for which the cumulative total exceeds the prescribed statutory maximum for any single offense.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"169 S.W.3d 328, 330","parenthetical":"holding that no Apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range","sentence":"Marrow v. State, 169 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed) (holding that no Apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range); see, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1253-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 925, 124 S.Ct. 330, 157 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003); U.S. v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 278-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 857, 124 S.Ct. 158, 157 L.Ed.2d 104 (2003); U.S. v. McWaine, 290 F.3d 269, 275-76 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 921, 123 S.Ct. 311, 154 L.Ed.2d 210 (2002); U.S. v. Feola, 275 F.3d 216, 218-20 & n. 1 (2d Cir.2001); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 120 S.Ct. at 2354 (\u201cThe sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts\u201d). Some Texas courts have reached the same conclusion but only in unpublished cases."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"120 S.Ct. 2354, 2354","parenthetical":"\"The sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts\"","sentence":"Marrow v. State, 169 S.W.3d 328, 330 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed) (holding that no Apprendi violation shown when trial court cumulated sentences for aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child when appellant did not dispute that sentence for each count was within statutory range); see, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1253-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 925, 124 S.Ct. 330, 157 L.Ed.2d 225 (2003); U.S. v. Chorin, 322 F.3d 274, 278-79 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 857, 124 S.Ct. 158, 157 L.Ed.2d 104 (2003); U.S. v. McWaine, 290 F.3d 269, 275-76 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 921, 123 S.Ct. 311, 154 L.Ed.2d 210 (2002); U.S. v. Feola, 275 F.3d 216, 218-20 & n. 1 (2d Cir.2001); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 474, 120 S.Ct. at 2354 (\u201cThe sentences on counts 3 and 22 have no more relevance to our disposition than the dismissal of the remaining 18 counts\u201d). Some Texas courts have reached the same conclusion but only in unpublished cases."},"case_id":8912758,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the district court must determine \"whether the expert is qualified 'by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education' to render an opinion.\" Id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702). Second, the court \"must satisfy itself that the proposed expert testimony is both reliable and relevant, in that it will assist the trier of fact, before permitting a jury to assess such testimony.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"275 F.3d 969, 969","parenthetical":"noting that \"the district court had to undergo a two-step analysis\" in determining the admissibility of an expert's opinion","sentence":"United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1122 (10th Cir.2006); see also 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470 F.3d 985, 990 (10th Cir.2006) (applying \u201ca two-step analysis\u201d); Ralston, 275 F.3d at 969 (noting that \u201cthe district court had to undergo a two-step analysis\u201d in determining the admissibility of an expert\u2019s opinion); cf. N. Am. Specialty Ins. v. Britt Paulk Ins. Agency, Inc., 579 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir.2009) (focusing on the admissibility test\u2019s second part and recognizing this part itself has two distinct components \u2014 reliability, and relevancy, that is, the evidence \u201cmust be helpful to the jury\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"579 F.3d 1106, 1112","parenthetical":"focusing on the admissibility test's second part and recognizing this part itself has two distinct components -- reliability, and relevancy, that is, the evidence \"must be helpful to the jury\"","sentence":"United States v. Rodriguez-Felix, 450 F.3d 1117, 1122 (10th Cir.2006); see also 103 Investors I, L.P. v. Square D Co., 470 F.3d 985, 990 (10th Cir.2006) (applying \u201ca two-step analysis\u201d); Ralston, 275 F.3d at 969 (noting that \u201cthe district court had to undergo a two-step analysis\u201d in determining the admissibility of an expert\u2019s opinion); cf. N. Am. Specialty Ins. v. Britt Paulk Ins. Agency, Inc., 579 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir.2009) (focusing on the admissibility test\u2019s second part and recognizing this part itself has two distinct components \u2014 reliability, and relevancy, that is, the evidence \u201cmust be helpful to the jury\u201d)."},"case_id":3535875,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"395 U.S. 711, 725","parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 U.S. 357, 360-61","parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 U.S. 357, 360-61","parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 U.S. 357, 360-61","parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"395 U.S. 711, 725","parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"395 U.S. 711, 725","parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"395 U.S. 711, 725","parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 U.S. 21, 28-29","parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 U.S. 21, 28-29","parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"417 U.S. 21, 28-29","parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"395 U.S. 711, 725","parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"395 U.S. 711, 725","parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"395 U.S. 711, 725","parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"825 F.2d 3, 9","parenthetical":"federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"825 F.2d 3, 9","parenthetical":"federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"825 F.2d 3, 9","parenthetical":"federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"787 F.2d 124, 125","parenthetical":"due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"395 U.S. 711, 725","parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"787 F.2d 124, 125","parenthetical":"due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A truly vindictive prosecution is illegal because it violates due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"787 F.2d 124, 125","parenthetical":"due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge","sentence":"See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360-61, 54 L. Ed. 2d 604, 98 S. Ct. 663 (1978) (prosecutors may not act vindictively in the conduct of plea negotiations); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29, 40 L. Ed. 2d 628, 94 S. Ct. 2098 (1974) (bringing more serious charge following criminal defendant's invocation of right to trial de novo held per se unconstitutional); United States v. Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 9 (3d Cir. 1987) (federal prosecution may proceed if federal prosecutor did not participate in state prosecutor's allegedly vindictive action against defendant); and, United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124, 125 (3d Cir. 1986) (due process violated if prosecutor brings more serious charge against a defendant who successfully exercises right of appeal or to collaterally attack prior conviction on lesser charge); cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 23 L. Ed. 2d 656, 89 S. Ct. 2072 (1969) (vindictiveness may play no part in resentencing of criminal defendant who has successfully invoked right to appeal)."},"case_id":455048,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the context of a familial relationship that may trigger a disqualifying interest, the pivotal issue is not the degree of relationship to the board member, but, rather, \"the type of association the relative had with the interested organization and the amount of interest the relative had in the official's actions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"101 N.J.Super. 346, 351","parenthetical":"setting aside approval of variance application where board member's nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 N.J. 258, 258","parenthetical":"finding no disqualification because board member's brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother's employment status would have benefited from the board's decision","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"case_id":4036091,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the context of a familial relationship that may trigger a disqualifying interest, the pivotal issue is not the degree of relationship to the board member, but, rather, \"the type of association the relative had with the interested organization and the amount of interest the relative had in the official's actions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"101 N.J.Super. 346, 351","parenthetical":"setting aside approval of variance application where board member's nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no disqualification because board member's brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother's employment status would have benefited from the board's decision","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"case_id":4036091,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the context of a familial relationship that may trigger a disqualifying interest, the pivotal issue is not the degree of relationship to the board member, but, rather, \"the type of association the relative had with the interested organization and the amount of interest the relative had in the official's actions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32","parenthetical":"holding board member's wife's occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member's judgment","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"101 N.J.Super. 346, 351","parenthetical":"setting aside approval of variance application where board member's nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"case_id":4036091,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the context of a familial relationship that may trigger a disqualifying interest, the pivotal issue is not the degree of relationship to the board member, but, rather, \"the type of association the relative had with the interested organization and the amount of interest the relative had in the official's actions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding board member's wife's occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member's judgment","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"101 N.J.Super. 346, 351","parenthetical":"setting aside approval of variance application where board member's nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"case_id":4036091,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the context of a familial relationship that may trigger a disqualifying interest, the pivotal issue is not the degree of relationship to the board member, but, rather, \"the type of association the relative had with the interested organization and the amount of interest the relative had in the official's actions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"setting aside approval of variance application where board member's nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 N.J. 258, 258","parenthetical":"finding no disqualification because board member's brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother's employment status would have benefited from the board's decision","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"case_id":4036091,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the context of a familial relationship that may trigger a disqualifying interest, the pivotal issue is not the degree of relationship to the board member, but, rather, \"the type of association the relative had with the interested organization and the amount of interest the relative had in the official's actions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no disqualification because board member's brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother's employment status would have benefited from the board's decision","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"setting aside approval of variance application where board member's nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"case_id":4036091,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the context of a familial relationship that may trigger a disqualifying interest, the pivotal issue is not the degree of relationship to the board member, but, rather, \"the type of association the relative had with the interested organization and the amount of interest the relative had in the official's actions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32","parenthetical":"holding board member's wife's occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member's judgment","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"setting aside approval of variance application where board member's nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"case_id":4036091,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the context of a familial relationship that may trigger a disqualifying interest, the pivotal issue is not the degree of relationship to the board member, but, rather, \"the type of association the relative had with the interested organization and the amount of interest the relative had in the official's actions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"setting aside approval of variance application where board member's nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding board member's wife's occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member's judgment","sentence":"Kremer v. Plainfield, 101 N.J.Super. 346, 351, 244 A.2d 335 (Law Div.1968) (setting aside approval of variance application where board member\u2019s nephew was a partner in the law firm which represented the applicant before the board); see also Van Itallie, supra, 28 N.J. at 258, 146 A.2d 111 (finding no disqualification because board member\u2019s brother only held a low level position in a large corporation that could potentially benefit from the zoning decision and there was no evidence that the brother\u2019s employment status would have benefited from the board\u2019s decision); Petrick v. Planning Bd. of Jersey City, 287 N.J.Super. 325, 331-32, 671 A.2d 140 (App.Div. 1996) (holding board member\u2019s wife\u2019s occasional employment as an occupational therapist with hospital, whose application for a park ing garage was pending before the board, could not reasonably be viewed as improperly influencing board member\u2019s judgment)."},"case_id":4036091,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nor does it identify the persons within PCLU who most likely possessed responsive materials. A declaration lacking such basic facts does not satisfy an agency's burden to demonstrate the adequacy of its search.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"531 F.Supp.2d 118, 122","parenthetical":"finding the agency affidavit inadequate because it did \"not describe the filing systems searched, the search methods employed!,] and the search terms utilized\"","sentence":"See Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding agency affidavit inadequate because it merely identified the employees charged with carrying out the search and \u201cprovide[d] no information about the search strategies\u201d used); see also Bonaparte v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 531 F.Supp.2d 118, 122 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding the agency affidavit inadequate because it did \u201cnot describe the filing systems searched, the search methods employed!,] and the search terms utilized\u201d); Aguirre v. S.E.C., 551 F.Supp.2d 33, 61 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding the agency affidavit inadequate because \u201cit fail[ed] to describe in detail how each office conducted its search\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"508 F.3d 1108, 1122-23","parenthetical":"finding agency affidavit inadequate because it merely identified the employees charged with carrying out the search and \"provide[d] no information about the search strategies\" used","sentence":"See Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding agency affidavit inadequate because it merely identified the employees charged with carrying out the search and \u201cprovide[d] no information about the search strategies\u201d used); see also Bonaparte v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 531 F.Supp.2d 118, 122 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding the agency affidavit inadequate because it did \u201cnot describe the filing systems searched, the search methods employed!,] and the search terms utilized\u201d); Aguirre v. S.E.C., 551 F.Supp.2d 33, 61 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding the agency affidavit inadequate because \u201cit fail[ed] to describe in detail how each office conducted its search\u201d)."},"case_id":12268070,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor does it identify the persons within PCLU who most likely possessed responsive materials. A declaration lacking such basic facts does not satisfy an agency's burden to demonstrate the adequacy of its search.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"551 F.Supp.2d 33, 61","parenthetical":"finding the agency affidavit inadequate because \"it fail[ed] to describe in detail how each office conducted its search\"","sentence":"See Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding agency affidavit inadequate because it merely identified the employees charged with carrying out the search and \u201cprovide[d] no information about the search strategies\u201d used); see also Bonaparte v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 531 F.Supp.2d 118, 122 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding the agency affidavit inadequate because it did \u201cnot describe the filing systems searched, the search methods employed!,] and the search terms utilized\u201d); Aguirre v. S.E.C., 551 F.Supp.2d 33, 61 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding the agency affidavit inadequate because \u201cit fail[ed] to describe in detail how each office conducted its search\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"508 F.3d 1108, 1122-23","parenthetical":"finding agency affidavit inadequate because it merely identified the employees charged with carrying out the search and \"provide[d] no information about the search strategies\" used","sentence":"See Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding agency affidavit inadequate because it merely identified the employees charged with carrying out the search and \u201cprovide[d] no information about the search strategies\u201d used); see also Bonaparte v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 531 F.Supp.2d 118, 122 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding the agency affidavit inadequate because it did \u201cnot describe the filing systems searched, the search methods employed!,] and the search terms utilized\u201d); Aguirre v. S.E.C., 551 F.Supp.2d 33, 61 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding the agency affidavit inadequate because \u201cit fail[ed] to describe in detail how each office conducted its search\u201d)."},"case_id":12268070,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The debtor also argues that even if his plan did not expressly provide that claimants may not exercise their rights under section 1301(c), the confirmation order by itself precludes the relief requested by the movants.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in absence of specific plan provision barring relief from the chapter 13 co-debtor stay, creditor who did not object to plan did not forfeit right to relief under section 1301(c)(2","sentence":"But see In re Laska, 20 B.R. 675 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1982) (in absence of specific plan provision barring relief from the chapter 13 co-debtor stay, creditor who did not object to plan did not forfeit right to relief under section 1301(c)(2))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"after entry of confirmation order, only subsequent events may serve as basis for relief from stay under section 362(d","sentence":"Cf., e.g., In re Pizzulo, 33 B.R. 740 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1983) (after entry of confirmation order, only subsequent events may serve as basis for relief from stay under section 362(d))."},"case_id":6529926,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Absent the government, however, Intervenors must now, and for the first time, establish Article III standing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"476 U.S. 54, 68","parenthetical":"\"[A]n intervenor's right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\"","sentence":"See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (\u201c[A]n intervenor\u2019s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\u201d); see also Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1338 (\u201cAn interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"982 F.2d 1338, 1338","parenthetical":"\"An interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\"","sentence":"See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (\u201c[A]n intervenor\u2019s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\u201d); see also Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1338 (\u201cAn interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\u201d)."},"case_id":4088550,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Absent the government, however, Intervenors must now, and for the first time, establish Article III standing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"982 F.2d 1338, 1338","parenthetical":"\"An interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\"","sentence":"See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (\u201c[A]n intervenor\u2019s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\u201d); see also Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1338 (\u201cAn interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]n intervenor's right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\"","sentence":"See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (\u201c[A]n intervenor\u2019s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\u201d); see also Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1338 (\u201cAn interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\u201d)."},"case_id":4088550,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Absent the government, however, Intervenors must now, and for the first time, establish Article III standing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"982 F.2d 1338, 1338","parenthetical":"\"An interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\"","sentence":"See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (\u201c[A]n intervenor\u2019s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\u201d); see also Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1338 (\u201cAn interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A]n intervenor's right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\"","sentence":"See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (\u201c[A]n intervenor\u2019s right to continue a suit in the absence of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.\u201d); see also Didrickson, 982 F.2d at 1338 (\u201cAn interest strong enough to permit intervention is not necessarily a sufficient basis to pursue an appeal abandoned by the other parties.\u201d)."},"case_id":4088550,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 U.S. 251, 255","parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"357 U.S. 301, 313-14","parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 U.S. 251, 255","parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 U.S. 251, 255","parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 U.S. 251, 255","parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"354 U.S. 449, 455","parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 U.S. 251, 255","parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"384 U.S. 251, 255","parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"357 U.S. 301, 313-14","parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"354 U.S. 449, 455","parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"357 U.S. 301, 313-14","parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 3109, the federal \"knock and announce\" statute","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"354 U.S. 449, 455","parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It is clear that; as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not limited the use of the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\" provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\"","sentence":"See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255, 86 S.Ct. 1416, 16 L.Ed.2d 510 (1966) (noting that the Supreme Court \"in a number of areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained in violation of the accused\u2019s rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal rules of procedure.\"); see also Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14, 78 S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1958) (upholding suppression of evidence obtained in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 3109, the federal \u201cknock and announce\u201d statute); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957) (stating that suppression of statements obtained in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 5 would be proper if failure to arraign \"without unnecessary delay\u201d provided \"an opportunity for the extraction of a confession\u201d). Nor have we."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"However, Alabama courts have concluded that some matters are outside the general or common knowledge and, therefore, not appropriate for judicial notice. For example, our supreme court has refused to take judicial notice that an arsenal was a 'sole hub' for certain Army activities.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"885 So.2d 180, 183","parenthetical":"concluding that the trial court erred in determining the appropriate amount of damages when that determination was based in part on the judge's personal knowledge about fishing ponds","sentence":"See Westwind Techs., Inc. v. Jones, 925 So.2d 166, 171 (Ala. 2005) (\u2018Although the activities of Red-stone Arsenal in Madison County might well form a part of the common knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and intelligence in Madison County, whether Redstone Arsenal represents the \u201csole hub of procurement and acquisitions\u201d for the aviation branch of the United States Army would not be a matter susceptible of such common knowledge.\u2019); see also Argo v. Walston, 885 So.2d 180, 183 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (concluding that the trial court erred in determining the appropriate amount of damages when that determination was based in part on the judge\u2019s personal knowledge about fishing ponds)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"925 So.2d 166, 171","parenthetical":"'Although the activities of Red-stone Arsenal in Madison County might well form a part of the common knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and intelligence in Madison County, whether Redstone Arsenal represents the \"sole hub of procurement and acquisitions\" for the aviation branch of the United States Army would not be a matter susceptible of such common knowledge.'","sentence":"See Westwind Techs., Inc. v. Jones, 925 So.2d 166, 171 (Ala. 2005) (\u2018Although the activities of Red-stone Arsenal in Madison County might well form a part of the common knowledge of every person of ordinary understanding and intelligence in Madison County, whether Redstone Arsenal represents the \u201csole hub of procurement and acquisitions\u201d for the aviation branch of the United States Army would not be a matter susceptible of such common knowledge.\u2019); see also Argo v. Walston, 885 So.2d 180, 183 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (concluding that the trial court erred in determining the appropriate amount of damages when that determination was based in part on the judge\u2019s personal knowledge about fishing ponds)."},"case_id":12365974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Forfeiture of counsel has also been found in cases in which a defendant has threatened the life of his counsel or engaged in a pattern of threatening and abusive behavior.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"879 A.2d 246, 258","parenthetical":"holding \"that appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\"","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"335 F.3d 782, 785","parenthetical":"concluding that defendant's threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"case_id":7072111,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Forfeiture of counsel has also been found in cases in which a defendant has threatened the life of his counsel or engaged in a pattern of threatening and abusive behavior.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"53 F.3d 322, 325-26","parenthetical":"holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"879 A.2d 246, 258","parenthetical":"holding \"that appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\"","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"case_id":7072111,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Forfeiture of counsel has also been found in cases in which a defendant has threatened the life of his counsel or engaged in a pattern of threatening and abusive behavior.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"879 A.2d 246, 258","parenthetical":"holding \"that appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\"","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding \"that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\"","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"case_id":7072111,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Forfeiture of counsel has also been found in cases in which a defendant has threatened the life of his counsel or engaged in a pattern of threatening and abusive behavior.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53","parenthetical":"concluding \"that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\"","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"879 A.2d 246, 258","parenthetical":"holding \"that appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\"","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"case_id":7072111,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Forfeiture of counsel has also been found in cases in which a defendant has threatened the life of his counsel or engaged in a pattern of threatening and abusive behavior.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"35 S.W.3d 516, 550","parenthetical":"holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"879 A.2d 246, 258","parenthetical":"holding \"that appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\"","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Thomas, 879 A.2d 246, 258 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (holding \u201cthat appellant forfeited his right to counsel through his pattern of serious misconduct, abuse, threats, and utter failure to collaborate in his own defense\u201d); see United States v. Thompson, 335 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant\u2019s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney, threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions, and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1999) (concluding \u201cthat the defendant forfeited his right to counsel by his persistent pattern of threatening, abusive, obstreperous, and uncoop erative behavior with successive assigned counsel\u201d); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 550 (Tenn.2000) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys)."},"case_id":7072111,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition to the COMPAS risk assessment, the seriousness of the crime and Loomis's criminal history both bear a nexus to the sentence imposed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"270 Wis. 2d 535, \u00b6 46","parenthetical":"\"we require that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's component parts promote the sentencing objectives.\"","sentence":"See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, \u00b6 46 (\"we require that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's component parts promote the sentencing objectives.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"75 Wis. 2d 513, 519","parenthetical":"relevant sentencing factors include past record of criminal offenses, history of undesirable behavior patterns, and results of presentence investigation","sentence":"See also Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 519, 250 N.W.2d 7 (1977) (relevant sentencing factors include past record of criminal offenses, history of undesirable behavior patterns, and results of presentence investigation)."},"case_id":12172077,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition to the COMPAS risk assessment, the seriousness of the crime and Loomis's criminal history both bear a nexus to the sentence imposed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"270 Wis. 2d 535, \u00b6 46","parenthetical":"\"we require that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's component parts promote the sentencing objectives.\"","sentence":"See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, \u00b6 46 (\"we require that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's component parts promote the sentencing objectives.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"relevant sentencing factors include past record of criminal offenses, history of undesirable behavior patterns, and results of presentence investigation","sentence":"See also Harris v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 513, 519, 250 N.W.2d 7 (1977) (relevant sentencing factors include past record of criminal offenses, history of undesirable behavior patterns, and results of presentence investigation)."},"case_id":12172077,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the evidence used by defendants in support of Gamez's 2010 re-validation as a gang associate, a report of an interview with a confidential informant, had \"sufficient indicia of reliability,\" through corroboration or other means to meet the \"some evidence\" standard as required to satisfy due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"351 F.3d 1288, 1288","parenthetical":"explaining that due process gang validation claims are subject to the \"some evidence\" standard, and concluding that \"any of [ ] three pieces of evidence would have sufficed to support the validation because each has sufficient indicia of reliability\"","sentence":"See Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (explaining that due process gang validation claims are subject to the \u201csome evidence\u201d standard, and concluding that \u201cany of [ ] three pieces of evidence would have sufficed to support the validation because each has sufficient indicia of reliability\u201d); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir.1990) (discussing indicia of reliability); see also Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (discussing the \u201csome evidence\u201d requirement in the context of prison disciplinary segregation, and setting forth criteria to guide review of the determination of reliability of \u201can unidentified inmate informant\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"831 F.2d 183, 186-87","parenthetical":"discussing the \"some evidence\" requirement in the context of prison disciplinary segregation, and setting forth criteria to guide review of the determination of reliability of \"an unidentified inmate informant\"","sentence":"See Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (explaining that due process gang validation claims are subject to the \u201csome evidence\u201d standard, and concluding that \u201cany of [ ] three pieces of evidence would have sufficed to support the validation because each has sufficient indicia of reliability\u201d); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir.1990) (discussing indicia of reliability); see also Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183, 186-87 (9th Cir.1987) (per curiam) (discussing the \u201csome evidence\u201d requirement in the context of prison disciplinary segregation, and setting forth criteria to guide review of the determination of reliability of \u201can unidentified inmate informant\u201d)."},"case_id":4000101,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The record shows that the detainees have been visited by members of the International Red Cross and diplomats from their home countries, and have had limited opportunities to write to friends and family members. Family members have filed habeas petitions on the behalf of some detainees, and diplomats from several countries including Pakistan, Kuwait, Australia, and the United Kingdom have made inquiries into the status of the detainees and sought their release.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"215 F.Supp.2d 55, 57","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court would point out that the notion that these aliens could be held incommunicado from the rest of the world would appear to be inaccurate.\"","sentence":"Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55, 57 (D.D.C.2002) (\u201c[T]he Court would point out that the notion that these aliens could be held incommunicado from the rest of the world would appear to be inaccurate.\u201d); see also Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 279 (Father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as next friend of his son, who is detained at the Norfolk Naval Station Brig as an alleged enemy combatant captured during ongoing military operations in Afghanistan.). As noted by the District Court for the District of Columbia, \u201cthe government recognizes that these aliens fall within the protections of certain provisions of international law and that diplomatic channels remain an ongoing and viable means to address the claims raised by these aliens.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"296 F.3d 279, 279","parenthetical":"Father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as next friend of his son, who is detained at the Norfolk Naval Station Brig as an alleged enemy combatant captured during ongoing military operations in Afghanistan.","sentence":"Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55, 57 (D.D.C.2002) (\u201c[T]he Court would point out that the notion that these aliens could be held incommunicado from the rest of the world would appear to be inaccurate.\u201d); see also Hamdi II, 296 F.3d at 279 (Father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as next friend of his son, who is detained at the Norfolk Naval Station Brig as an alleged enemy combatant captured during ongoing military operations in Afghanistan.). As noted by the District Court for the District of Columbia, \u201cthe government recognizes that these aliens fall within the protections of certain provisions of international law and that diplomatic channels remain an ongoing and viable means to address the claims raised by these aliens.\u201d"},"case_id":11432999,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 Misc.2d 544, 545","parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"49 N.Y.2d 198, 200","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile the question whether the 'substantial pain' necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"49 N.Y.2d 198, 200","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile the question whether the 'substantial pain' necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 Misc.2d 544, 545","parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile the question whether the 'substantial pain' necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile the question whether the 'substantial pain' necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 Misc.2d 544, 545","parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile the question whether the 'substantial pain' necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile the question whether the 'substantial pain' necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 Misc.2d 544, 545","parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 N.Y.2d 895, 896","parenthetical":"\"Testimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either 'substantial pain' or 'impairment of a physical condition.' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"55 N.Y.2d 895, 896","parenthetical":"\"Testimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either 'substantial pain' or 'impairment of a physical condition.' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Testimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either 'substantial pain' or 'impairment of a physical condition.' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 Misc.2d 544, 545","parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Testimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either 'substantial pain' or 'impairment of a physical condition.' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 Misc.2d 544, 545","parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Testimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either 'substantial pain' or 'impairment of a physical condition.' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Testimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either 'substantial pain' or 'impairment of a physical condition.' \"","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 Misc.2d 544, 545","parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 Misc.2d 544, 545","parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 WL 3249438, at *2","parenthetical":"holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Physical injury is defined to include an \"impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.\" To that end, New York state courts have consistently stated that a certain level of harm is necessary before a defendant may be convicted of third-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law SS 120.00(1), and have dismissed cases that do not rise to that level.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2005 WL 3249438, at *2","parenthetical":"holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that under the New York Penal Law, \"minor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called 'technical assaults' are now covered by the offense of harassment,\" as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault","sentence":"See, e.g., Matter of Philip A., 49 N.Y.2d 198, 200, 424 N.Y.S.2d 418, 400 N.E.2d 358 (1980) (\u201c[Wjhile the question whether the \u2018substantial pain\u2019 necessary to establish assault in the third degree has been proved is generally a question for the trier of fact, ... there is an objective level ... below which the question is one of law, and the charge should be dismissed.\u201d); People v. Jimenez, 55 N.Y.2d 895, 896, 449 N.Y.S.2d 22, 433 N.E.2d 1270 (1982) (\u201cTestimony that the victim suffered a one centimeter cut above her lip, without more, was not adequate to prove that the victim suffered either \u2018substantial pain\u2019 or \u2018impairment of a physical condition.\u2019 \u201d) (internal citation omitted); People v. Toure, 10 Misc.3d 1054(A), 2005 WL 3249438 at *2 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.2005) (holding that defendant, in punching a police officer in the back and in causing the officer to fall to the ground by jumping on him, had not caused sufficient injury to warrant a third-degree assault charge); see also People v. Martini 62 Misc.2d 544, 545, 309 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.Crim.Ct.1970) (noting that under the New York Penal Law, \u201cminor assaul-tive conduct or petty batteries, i.e., so-called \u2018technical assaults\u2019 are now covered by the offense of harassment,\u201d as opposed to the offense of third-degree assault)."},"case_id":4139837,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In an informal agency review action, the appropriate standard for review is whether the agency's action was \"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,\" as specified in Section 706(2)(A).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"771 F.2d 699, 703","parenthetical":"an \"abuse of discretion\" is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts","sentence":"See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 824, 28 L.Ed.2d at 153; Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447, 456 (1974) (reviewing court will \u201cuphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency\u2019s path may reasonably be discerned\u201d); Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 809-10 (D.C.Cir.1987); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Dep\u2019t of Veterans Affairs, 736 F.Supp. 1148, 1154 (D.D.C.1990) (arbitrary and capricious standard presumes validity of agency action); see also United Telegraph Workers v. Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir.1985) (an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"419 U.S. 281, 285-86","parenthetical":"reviewing court will \"uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 824, 28 L.Ed.2d at 153; Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447, 456 (1974) (reviewing court will \u201cuphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency\u2019s path may reasonably be discerned\u201d); Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 809-10 (D.C.Cir.1987); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Dep\u2019t of Veterans Affairs, 736 F.Supp. 1148, 1154 (D.D.C.1990) (arbitrary and capricious standard presumes validity of agency action); see also United Telegraph Workers v. Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir.1985) (an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts)."},"case_id":7385252,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an informal agency review action, the appropriate standard for review is whether the agency's action was \"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,\" as specified in Section 706(2)(A).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"771 F.2d 699, 703","parenthetical":"an \"abuse of discretion\" is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts","sentence":"See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 824, 28 L.Ed.2d at 153; Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447, 456 (1974) (reviewing court will \u201cuphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency\u2019s path may reasonably be discerned\u201d); Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 809-10 (D.C.Cir.1987); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Dep\u2019t of Veterans Affairs, 736 F.Supp. 1148, 1154 (D.D.C.1990) (arbitrary and capricious standard presumes validity of agency action); see also United Telegraph Workers v. Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir.1985) (an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"95 S.Ct. 438, 442","parenthetical":"reviewing court will \"uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 824, 28 L.Ed.2d at 153; Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447, 456 (1974) (reviewing court will \u201cuphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency\u2019s path may reasonably be discerned\u201d); Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 809-10 (D.C.Cir.1987); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Dep\u2019t of Veterans Affairs, 736 F.Supp. 1148, 1154 (D.D.C.1990) (arbitrary and capricious standard presumes validity of agency action); see also United Telegraph Workers v. Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir.1985) (an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts)."},"case_id":7385252,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In an informal agency review action, the appropriate standard for review is whether the agency's action was \"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,\" as specified in Section 706(2)(A).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"771 F.2d 699, 703","parenthetical":"an \"abuse of discretion\" is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts","sentence":"See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 824, 28 L.Ed.2d at 153; Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447, 456 (1974) (reviewing court will \u201cuphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency\u2019s path may reasonably be discerned\u201d); Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 809-10 (D.C.Cir.1987); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Dep\u2019t of Veterans Affairs, 736 F.Supp. 1148, 1154 (D.D.C.1990) (arbitrary and capricious standard presumes validity of agency action); see also United Telegraph Workers v. Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir.1985) (an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"42 L.Ed.2d 447, 456","parenthetical":"reviewing court will \"uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91 S.Ct. at 824, 28 L.Ed.2d at 153; Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86, 95 S.Ct. 438, 442, 42 L.Ed.2d 447, 456 (1974) (reviewing court will \u201cuphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency\u2019s path may reasonably be discerned\u201d); Center for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 809-10 (D.C.Cir.1987); National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty v. Dep\u2019t of Veterans Affairs, 736 F.Supp. 1148, 1154 (D.D.C.1990) (arbitrary and capricious standard presumes validity of agency action); see also United Telegraph Workers v. Western Union Corp., 771 F.2d 699, 703 (3d Cir.1985) (an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d is a clear error of judgment, not simply a different result that can arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts)."},"case_id":7385252,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Hence, in only limited circumstances may bankruptcy courts defer to the doctrine of collateral estoppel and thereby ignore Congress' mandate to provide plenary review of dischargeability issues. Collateral estoppel applies in bankruptcy courts only if, inter alia, the first court has made specific, subordinate, factual findings on the identical dischargeability issue in question -- that is, an issue which encompasses the same prima facie elements as the bankruptcy issue -- and the facts supporting the court's findings are discernible from that court's record.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"722 F.2d 1256, 1256","parenthetical":"ruling that bankruptcy courts should not rely solely on state court judgments when determining the true nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes if so doing would prevent the bankruptcy courts from exercising their exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the debt is dischargeable","sentence":"In re Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 115 (5th Cir.1993); In re Shuler, 722 F.2d at 1256. See In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir.1984) (ruling that bankruptcy courts should not rely solely on state court judgments when determining the true nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes if so doing would prevent the bankruptcy courts from exercising their exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the debt is dischargeable); see also Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 561 (5th Cir.1989) (providing that although the doctrine of res judicata is generally applicable to bankruptcy courts, the contours of the doctrine are \u201cdifferent for bankruptcy courts ... because tasks which have been delegated to [bankruptcy courts] by Congress may not be interfered with by the decisions of other courts_ [Bankruptcy courts have a job to do and sometimes they must ignore res judicata in order to carry out Congress\u2019 mandate\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"887 F.2d 553, 561","parenthetical":"providing that although the doctrine of res judicata is generally applicable to bankruptcy courts, the contours of the doctrine are \"different for bankruptcy courts ... because tasks which have been delegated to [bankruptcy courts] by Congress may not be interfered with by the decisions of other courts_ [Bankruptcy courts have a job to do and sometimes they must ignore res judicata in order to carry out Congress' mandate\"","sentence":"In re Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 115 (5th Cir.1993); In re Shuler, 722 F.2d at 1256. See In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir.1984) (ruling that bankruptcy courts should not rely solely on state court judgments when determining the true nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes if so doing would prevent the bankruptcy courts from exercising their exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the debt is dischargeable); see also Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 561 (5th Cir.1989) (providing that although the doctrine of res judicata is generally applicable to bankruptcy courts, the contours of the doctrine are \u201cdifferent for bankruptcy courts ... because tasks which have been delegated to [bankruptcy courts] by Congress may not be interfered with by the decisions of other courts_ [Bankruptcy courts have a job to do and sometimes they must ignore res judicata in order to carry out Congress\u2019 mandate\u201d)."},"case_id":6526155,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Hence, in only limited circumstances may bankruptcy courts defer to the doctrine of collateral estoppel and thereby ignore Congress' mandate to provide plenary review of dischargeability issues. Collateral estoppel applies in bankruptcy courts only if, inter alia, the first court has made specific, subordinate, factual findings on the identical dischargeability issue in question -- that is, an issue which encompasses the same prima facie elements as the bankruptcy issue -- and the facts supporting the court's findings are discernible from that court's record.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ruling that bankruptcy courts should not rely solely on state court judgments when determining the true nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes if so doing would prevent the bankruptcy courts from exercising their exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the debt is dischargeable","sentence":"In re Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 115 (5th Cir.1993); In re Shuler, 722 F.2d at 1256. See In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir.1984) (ruling that bankruptcy courts should not rely solely on state court judgments when determining the true nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes if so doing would prevent the bankruptcy courts from exercising their exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the debt is dischargeable); see also Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 561 (5th Cir.1989) (providing that although the doctrine of res judicata is generally applicable to bankruptcy courts, the contours of the doctrine are \u201cdifferent for bankruptcy courts ... because tasks which have been delegated to [bankruptcy courts] by Congress may not be interfered with by the decisions of other courts_ [Bankruptcy courts have a job to do and sometimes they must ignore res judicata in order to carry out Congress\u2019 mandate\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"887 F.2d 553, 561","parenthetical":"providing that although the doctrine of res judicata is generally applicable to bankruptcy courts, the contours of the doctrine are \"different for bankruptcy courts ... because tasks which have been delegated to [bankruptcy courts] by Congress may not be interfered with by the decisions of other courts_ [Bankruptcy courts have a job to do and sometimes they must ignore res judicata in order to carry out Congress' mandate\"","sentence":"In re Davis, 3 F.3d 113, 115 (5th Cir.1993); In re Shuler, 722 F.2d at 1256. See In re Comer, 723 F.2d 737 (9th Cir.1984) (ruling that bankruptcy courts should not rely solely on state court judgments when determining the true nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes if so doing would prevent the bankruptcy courts from exercising their exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the debt is dischargeable); see also Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553, 561 (5th Cir.1989) (providing that although the doctrine of res judicata is generally applicable to bankruptcy courts, the contours of the doctrine are \u201cdifferent for bankruptcy courts ... because tasks which have been delegated to [bankruptcy courts] by Congress may not be interfered with by the decisions of other courts_ [Bankruptcy courts have a job to do and sometimes they must ignore res judicata in order to carry out Congress\u2019 mandate\u201d)."},"case_id":6526155,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Haskenhoff argues the vicarious liability standard did not replace, but rather supplemented, the direct negligence standard. Because the ICRA hostile-work-environment, claim is modeled after its Title VII counterpart, we consider federal law instructive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"772 N.W.2d 7, 7","parenthetical":"\"When interpreting discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act... .\"","sentence":"Boyle, 710 N.W.2d at 749-50 (recognizing that Title VII hostile-work-environment claim has the same elements as ICRA claim); see also DeBoom, 772 N.W.2d at 7 (\u201cWhen interpreting discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act... .\u201d)\u2022 Accordingly, we will review the development of these liability theories under federal caselaw and the interplay of those decisions with our court\u2019s precedents."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"710 N.W.2d 749, 749-50","parenthetical":"recognizing that Title VII hostile-work-environment claim has the same elements as ICRA claim","sentence":"Boyle, 710 N.W.2d at 749-50 (recognizing that Title VII hostile-work-environment claim has the same elements as ICRA claim); see also DeBoom, 772 N.W.2d at 7 (\u201cWhen interpreting discrimination claims under Iowa Code chapter 216, we turn to federal law, including Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act... .\u201d)\u2022 Accordingly, we will review the development of these liability theories under federal caselaw and the interplay of those decisions with our court\u2019s precedents."},"case_id":12334063,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"391 U.S. 367, 376","parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 297, 297-98","parenthetical":"emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678","parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 297, 297-98","parenthetical":"emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 297, 297-98","parenthetical":"emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 3071, 3071","parenthetical":"emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"391 U.S. 367, 376","parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678","parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 3071, 3071","parenthetical":"emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 S.Ct. 3071, 3071","parenthetical":"emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"391 U.S. 367, 376","parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"547 U.S. 66, 66","parenthetical":"\"If combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into 'speech' simply by talking about it.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678","parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"547 U.S. 66, 66","parenthetical":"\"If combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into 'speech' simply by talking about it.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, this mode of analysis is required by the Supreme Court, which, in the context of election-related burdens on free expression, has long advised against substituting the hard judgments common in ordinary litigation with litmus-paper tests. The Court also has repeatedly explained that non-expressive conduct does not acquire First Amendment protection whenever it is combined with another activity that involves protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"547 U.S. 66, 66","parenthetical":"\"If combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into 'speech' simply by talking about it.\"","sentence":"See, e.g, Clark, 468 U.S. at 297-98, 104 S.Ct. at 3071 (emphasizing that the activity of camping does not become speech protected by the First Amendment when demonstrators camp as part of a political demonstration); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66, 126 S.Ct. at 1311 (2006) (\u201cIf combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into \u2018speech\u2019 simply by talking about it.\u201d); see also United States v. O\u2019Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (\u201cWe cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled \u2018speech\u2019 whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.\u201d)."},"case_id":3709065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plainly, trial judges are in a better position than appellate court judges to determine what mechanism should be employed in a given case when deciding whether the requesting party has established that the need for the information outweighs the privacy rights of the non-party.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no reversible error where the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to ordering the disclosure of financial records because the relevancy of the requested documents was readily apparent and the personal right to privacy was not at issue","sentence":"See Eisner v. E-Commerce Coffee Club, 126 So.3d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (\u201cWe ... decline to adopt a per se rule requiring a trial court always to conduct an evidentia-ry hearing before ordering financial discovery from a party. Such a mandatory rule would be inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court\u2019s refusal to limit the discretion of trial courts with specific rules or formulas.\u201d) ; see also 2215 Venetian Court Bldg. 4, Inc. v. Harrison, 149 So.3d 1176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (finding no reversible error where the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to ordering the disclosure of financial records because the relevancy of the requested documents was readily apparent and the personal right to privacy was not at issue)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"126 So.3d 1261, 1263","parenthetical":"\"We ... decline to adopt a per se rule requiring a trial court always to conduct an evidentia-ry hearing before ordering financial discovery from a party. Such a mandatory rule would be inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court's refusal to limit the discretion of trial courts with specific rules or formulas.\"","sentence":"See Eisner v. E-Commerce Coffee Club, 126 So.3d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (\u201cWe ... decline to adopt a per se rule requiring a trial court always to conduct an evidentia-ry hearing before ordering financial discovery from a party. Such a mandatory rule would be inconsistent with the Florida Supreme Court\u2019s refusal to limit the discretion of trial courts with specific rules or formulas.\u201d) ; see also 2215 Venetian Court Bldg. 4, Inc. v. Harrison, 149 So.3d 1176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (finding no reversible error where the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to ordering the disclosure of financial records because the relevancy of the requested documents was readily apparent and the personal right to privacy was not at issue)."},"case_id":6892132,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendant objects to the clerical nature of certain tasks performed by paralegals Sue Wolsfeld, Patti Sullivan, and Dania Richardson, all of which were billed at a $95.00 hourly rate. Clerical tasks should not be billed at senior associate or paralegal rates.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"49 F.3d 939, 942","parenthetical":"holding that it is not appropriate to allow \"the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\"","sentence":"See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-88, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that \u201cpurely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\u201d); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that it is not appropriate to allow \u201cthe wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\u201d). Plaintiffs offer no explanation for why Sears should pay these fees and do not suggest that they constitute paralegal work."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"491 U.S. 274, 285-88","parenthetical":"holding that \"purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\"","sentence":"See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-88, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that \u201cpurely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\u201d); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that it is not appropriate to allow \u201cthe wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\u201d). Plaintiffs offer no explanation for why Sears should pay these fees and do not suggest that they constitute paralegal work."},"case_id":9050595,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendant objects to the clerical nature of certain tasks performed by paralegals Sue Wolsfeld, Patti Sullivan, and Dania Richardson, all of which were billed at a $95.00 hourly rate. Clerical tasks should not be billed at senior associate or paralegal rates.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"49 F.3d 939, 942","parenthetical":"holding that it is not appropriate to allow \"the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\"","sentence":"See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-88, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that \u201cpurely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\u201d); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that it is not appropriate to allow \u201cthe wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\u201d). Plaintiffs offer no explanation for why Sears should pay these fees and do not suggest that they constitute paralegal work."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\"","sentence":"See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-88, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that \u201cpurely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\u201d); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that it is not appropriate to allow \u201cthe wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\u201d). Plaintiffs offer no explanation for why Sears should pay these fees and do not suggest that they constitute paralegal work."},"case_id":9050595,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendant objects to the clerical nature of certain tasks performed by paralegals Sue Wolsfeld, Patti Sullivan, and Dania Richardson, all of which were billed at a $95.00 hourly rate. Clerical tasks should not be billed at senior associate or paralegal rates.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"purely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\"","sentence":"See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-88, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that \u201cpurely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\u201d); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that it is not appropriate to allow \u201cthe wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\u201d). Plaintiffs offer no explanation for why Sears should pay these fees and do not suggest that they constitute paralegal work."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"49 F.3d 939, 942","parenthetical":"holding that it is not appropriate to allow \"the wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\"","sentence":"See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285-88, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989) (holding that \u201cpurely clerical or secretarial tasks should not be billed at a paralegal rate, regardless of who performs them\u201d); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939, 942 (3d Cir.1995) (holding that it is not appropriate to allow \u201cthe wasteful use of highly skilled and highly priced talent for matters easily delegable to nonprofessionals\u201d). Plaintiffs offer no explanation for why Sears should pay these fees and do not suggest that they constitute paralegal work."},"case_id":9050595,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nothing in the A\/O Agreement clarifies what date the A\/O Agreement intended to use as the benchmark -- the date of the PECO Agreement with its Exhibit A or the date of the A\/O Agreement with its Attachment 1(a). Consequently, the district court properly found that the A\/O Agreement was ambiguous and submitted the question to the jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"846 S.W.2d 546, 546","parenthetical":"\"When the contract contains an ambiguity, its interpretation becomes a question of fact based on the intention of the parties to it.\"","sentence":"See Watkins, 689 F.2d at 538 (\u201c[Ojnee the contract is found to be ambiguous, the determination of the parties\u2019 intent through the extrinsic evidence is a question of fact.\u201d); see also Staff Indus., 846 S.W.2d at 546 (\u201cWhen the contract contains an ambiguity, its interpretation becomes a question of fact based on the intention of the parties to it.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"689 F.2d 538, 538","parenthetical":"\"[Ojnee the contract is found to be ambiguous, the determination of the parties' intent through the extrinsic evidence is a question of fact.\"","sentence":"See Watkins, 689 F.2d at 538 (\u201c[Ojnee the contract is found to be ambiguous, the determination of the parties\u2019 intent through the extrinsic evidence is a question of fact.\u201d); see also Staff Indus., 846 S.W.2d at 546 (\u201cWhen the contract contains an ambiguity, its interpretation becomes a question of fact based on the intention of the parties to it.\u201d)."},"case_id":7413454,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, this appeal is before us for the second time. When Hercules initially sought to appeal from the order dismissing with prejudice Count XI of its complaint, we held that the question whether Hercules had alleged facts sufficient to state a claim of fraudulent inducement and to avoid arbitration was not ripe for review, because an order staying litigation pending arbitration is not immediately appealable; we expressly reserved the merits of that question for possible resolution in the event of an appeal from a final decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered","sentence":"See Haynes v. Kuder, supra note 6, 591 A.2d at 1287 n. 1 (\u201cTo challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\u201d); cf. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269,-, 111 S.Ct. 648, 652, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) (under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered). We therefore proceed to consider the merits of that challenge."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\"","sentence":"See Haynes v. Kuder, supra note 6, 591 A.2d at 1287 n. 1 (\u201cTo challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\u201d); cf. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269,-, 111 S.Ct. 648, 652, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) (under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered). We therefore proceed to consider the merits of that challenge."},"case_id":11743005,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, this appeal is before us for the second time. When Hercules initially sought to appeal from the order dismissing with prejudice Count XI of its complaint, we held that the question whether Hercules had alleged facts sufficient to state a claim of fraudulent inducement and to avoid arbitration was not ripe for review, because an order staying litigation pending arbitration is not immediately appealable; we expressly reserved the merits of that question for possible resolution in the event of an appeal from a final decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\"","sentence":"See Haynes v. Kuder, supra note 6, 591 A.2d at 1287 n. 1 (\u201cTo challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\u201d); cf. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269,-, 111 S.Ct. 648, 652, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) (under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered). We therefore proceed to consider the merits of that challenge."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 648, 652","parenthetical":"under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered","sentence":"See Haynes v. Kuder, supra note 6, 591 A.2d at 1287 n. 1 (\u201cTo challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\u201d); cf. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269,-, 111 S.Ct. 648, 652, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) (under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered). We therefore proceed to consider the merits of that challenge."},"case_id":11743005,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, this appeal is before us for the second time. When Hercules initially sought to appeal from the order dismissing with prejudice Count XI of its complaint, we held that the question whether Hercules had alleged facts sufficient to state a claim of fraudulent inducement and to avoid arbitration was not ripe for review, because an order staying litigation pending arbitration is not immediately appealable; we expressly reserved the merits of that question for possible resolution in the event of an appeal from a final decision.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered","sentence":"See Haynes v. Kuder, supra note 6, 591 A.2d at 1287 n. 1 (\u201cTo challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\u201d); cf. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269,-, 111 S.Ct. 648, 652, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) (under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered). We therefore proceed to consider the merits of that challenge."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"To challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\"","sentence":"See Haynes v. Kuder, supra note 6, 591 A.2d at 1287 n. 1 (\u201cTo challenge the ... order compelling arbitration, appellant properly appeals from the ... order ... confirming the eventual arbitration decision.\u201d); cf. FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269,-, 111 S.Ct. 648, 652, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) (under federal law, premature appeal from order that lacked finality automatically ripens once final judgment is entered). We therefore proceed to consider the merits of that challenge."},"case_id":11743005,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A showing of irreparable injury is not invariably required where a statute or ordinance authorizes a governmental entity to seek relief to prevent harm to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"injunctive relief proper for violation of town's regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"case_id":8469322,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A showing of irreparable injury is not invariably required where a statute or ordinance authorizes a governmental entity to seek relief to prevent harm to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"injunctive relief proper for violation of town's regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"case_id":8469322,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A showing of irreparable injury is not invariably required where a statute or ordinance authorizes a governmental entity to seek relief to prevent harm to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"injunctive relief proper for violation of town's regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"case_id":8469322,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A showing of irreparable injury is not invariably required where a statute or ordinance authorizes a governmental entity to seek relief to prevent harm to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"injunctive relief proper for violation of town's regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"case_id":8469322,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A showing of irreparable injury is not invariably required where a statute or ordinance authorizes a governmental entity to seek relief to prevent harm to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"injunctive relief proper for violation of town's regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"case_id":8469322,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A showing of irreparable injury is not invariably required where a statute or ordinance authorizes a governmental entity to seek relief to prevent harm to the public.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"injunctive relief proper for violation of town's regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm","sentence":"See Kourlis v. District Court, 930 P.2d 1329 (Colo.1997)(where statute empowered commissioner of agriculture to enforce its provisions and obtain recourse in courts to enjoin violations, commissioner was not required to prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of remedy at law when seeking either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief); Lloyd A Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep\u2019t of Health Air Pollution Variance Board, 191 Colo. 463, 553 P.2d 800 (1976)(state agency did not have to show irreparable injury before obtaining injunction to prevent violation of air quality standards); see also Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 479 A.2d 187 (1984)(injunctive relief proper for violation of town\u2019s regulations regarding protection of its water supply, even absent a showing of present harm)."},"case_id":8469322,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In contrast, a waiver of a statutory right may be valid even if it is not knowingly made.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"804 F.2d 413, 414-15","parenthetical":"prisoner's waiver of rights, contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, SS 2, Art. IV(e","sentence":"See also Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413, 414-15 (7th Cir.1986) (prisoner\u2019s waiver of rights, contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, \u00a7 2, Art. IV(e), 18 U.S.C.App., need not be knowing and intelligent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"915 F.2d 1150, 1151","parenthetical":"defendant waives statutory right to have ten days to inspect his presentence investigation report before his sentencing if he participates in sentencing earlier without an objection","sentence":"See United States v. Busche, 915 F.2d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant waives statutory right to have ten days to inspect his presentence investigation report before his sentencing if he participates in sentencing earlier without an objection). Accord United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 1590, 118 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992); United States v. Blythe, 944 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir.1991)."},"case_id":10509679,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In contrast, a waiver of a statutory right may be valid even if it is not knowingly made.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"804 F.2d 413, 414-15","parenthetical":"prisoner's waiver of rights, contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, SS 2, Art. IV(e","sentence":"See also Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413, 414-15 (7th Cir.1986) (prisoner\u2019s waiver of rights, contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, \u00a7 2, Art. IV(e), 18 U.S.C.App., need not be knowing and intelligent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"945 F.2d 1387, 1404","parenthetical":"defendant waives statutory right to have ten days to inspect his presentence investigation report before his sentencing if he participates in sentencing earlier without an objection","sentence":"See United States v. Busche, 915 F.2d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant waives statutory right to have ten days to inspect his presentence investigation report before his sentencing if he participates in sentencing earlier without an objection). Accord United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 1590, 118 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992); United States v. Blythe, 944 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir.1991)."},"case_id":10509679,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In contrast, a waiver of a statutory right may be valid even if it is not knowingly made.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"804 F.2d 413, 414-15","parenthetical":"prisoner's waiver of rights, contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, SS 2, Art. IV(e","sentence":"See also Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413, 414-15 (7th Cir.1986) (prisoner\u2019s waiver of rights, contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, \u00a7 2, Art. IV(e), 18 U.S.C.App., need not be knowing and intelligent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant waives statutory right to have ten days to inspect his presentence investigation report before his sentencing if he participates in sentencing earlier without an objection","sentence":"See United States v. Busche, 915 F.2d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant waives statutory right to have ten days to inspect his presentence investigation report before his sentencing if he participates in sentencing earlier without an objection). Accord United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 1590, 118 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992); United States v. Blythe, 944 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir.1991)."},"case_id":10509679,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In contrast, a waiver of a statutory right may be valid even if it is not knowingly made.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"804 F.2d 413, 414-15","parenthetical":"prisoner's waiver of rights, contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, SS 2, Art. IV(e","sentence":"See also Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413, 414-15 (7th Cir.1986) (prisoner\u2019s waiver of rights, contained in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, \u00a7 2, Art. IV(e), 18 U.S.C.App., need not be knowing and intelligent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant waives statutory right to have ten days to inspect his presentence investigation report before his sentencing if he participates in sentencing earlier without an objection","sentence":"See United States v. Busche, 915 F.2d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir.1990) (defendant waives statutory right to have ten days to inspect his presentence investigation report before his sentencing if he participates in sentencing earlier without an objection). Accord United States v. Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 1590, 118 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992); United States v. Blythe, 944 F.2d 356, 360 (7th Cir.1991)."},"case_id":10509679,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is indisputable, however, that Maryland precedent does not support this position. In Maryland, claims may \"arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions even if they involve different harms or different theories or measures of relief.\" Anyanwutaku v. Fleet Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"268 F.Supp.2d 576, 584","parenthetical":"\"When claims arise out of a single nucleus of operative fact (or out of the same 'transaction'","sentence":"Group, Inc., 85 F.Supp.2d 566, 571 (D.Md.2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 24(2) cmt. c (1982)). See Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Department Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 328 (4th Cir.2007) (plaintiffs decision not to seek actual damages in the first suit did not alter the court\u2019s \u201cconclusion that the claims in [his] cases were identical\u201d); See also Reeves v. St. Mary\u2019s County Comm\u2019rs, 268 F.Supp.2d 576, 584 (D.Md.2003) (\u201cWhen claims arise out of a single nucleus of operative fact (or out of the same \u2018transaction\u2019), they will be barred even if they involve different harms or different legal theories.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"85 F.Supp.2d 566, 571","parenthetical":"plaintiffs decision not to seek actual damages in the first suit did not alter the court's \"conclusion that the claims in [his] cases were identical\"","sentence":"Group, Inc., 85 F.Supp.2d 566, 571 (D.Md.2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 24(2) cmt. c (1982)). See Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Department Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 328 (4th Cir.2007) (plaintiffs decision not to seek actual damages in the first suit did not alter the court\u2019s \u201cconclusion that the claims in [his] cases were identical\u201d); See also Reeves v. St. Mary\u2019s County Comm\u2019rs, 268 F.Supp.2d 576, 584 (D.Md.2003) (\u201cWhen claims arise out of a single nucleus of operative fact (or out of the same \u2018transaction\u2019), they will be barred even if they involve different harms or different legal theories.\u201d)."},"case_id":4209693,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is indisputable, however, that Maryland precedent does not support this position. In Maryland, claims may \"arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions even if they involve different harms or different theories or measures of relief.\" Anyanwutaku v. Fleet Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"268 F.Supp.2d 576, 584","parenthetical":"\"When claims arise out of a single nucleus of operative fact (or out of the same 'transaction'","sentence":"Group, Inc., 85 F.Supp.2d 566, 571 (D.Md.2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 24(2) cmt. c (1982)). See Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Department Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 328 (4th Cir.2007) (plaintiffs decision not to seek actual damages in the first suit did not alter the court\u2019s \u201cconclusion that the claims in [his] cases were identical\u201d); See also Reeves v. St. Mary\u2019s County Comm\u2019rs, 268 F.Supp.2d 576, 584 (D.Md.2003) (\u201cWhen claims arise out of a single nucleus of operative fact (or out of the same \u2018transaction\u2019), they will be barred even if they involve different harms or different legal theories.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"506 F.3d 315, 328","parenthetical":"plaintiffs decision not to seek actual damages in the first suit did not alter the court's \"conclusion that the claims in [his] cases were identical\"","sentence":"Group, Inc., 85 F.Supp.2d 566, 571 (D.Md.2000) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments \u00a7 24(2) cmt. c (1982)). See Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Department Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 328 (4th Cir.2007) (plaintiffs decision not to seek actual damages in the first suit did not alter the court\u2019s \u201cconclusion that the claims in [his] cases were identical\u201d); See also Reeves v. St. Mary\u2019s County Comm\u2019rs, 268 F.Supp.2d 576, 584 (D.Md.2003) (\u201cWhen claims arise out of a single nucleus of operative fact (or out of the same \u2018transaction\u2019), they will be barred even if they involve different harms or different legal theories.\u201d)."},"case_id":4209693,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"396 U.S. 41, 43","parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"396 U.S. 41, 43","parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"396 U.S. 41, 43","parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"90 S.Ct. 206, 207","parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"90 S.Ct. 206, 207","parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"90 S.Ct. 206, 207","parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As a general rule, a statutory change will not moot a dispute unless it cures the problems that led to the suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%","sentence":"See Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U.S. 41, 43, 90 S.Ct. 206, 207, 24 L.Ed.2d 209 (1969) (challenge to requirement that candidates obtain signatures of more than 1% of eligible voters not mooted by amendment reducing requirement from 7% to 4%); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256 n. 2, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 2405 n. 2, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (repeal of statute does not moot dispute where relevant provision reenacted in new statute)."},"case_id":5656730,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consistent with this basic understanding, the Supreme Court has held that benefits vest even if subject to a condition subsequent and that the terms of the condition are enforceable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 F.3d 1378, 1378","parenthetical":"\"The Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\" (citing Nachman","sentence":"See Nachman, 446 U.S. at 378, 100 S.Ct. 1723 (\u201c[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\u201d); see also Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378 (\u201cThe Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\u201d (citing Nachman)); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"446 U.S. 378, 378","parenthetical":"\"[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\"","sentence":"See Nachman, 446 U.S. at 378, 100 S.Ct. 1723 (\u201c[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\u201d); see also Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378 (\u201cThe Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\u201d (citing Nachman)); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\u201d)."},"case_id":5878428,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consistent with this basic understanding, the Supreme Court has held that benefits vest even if subject to a condition subsequent and that the terms of the condition are enforceable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"93 F.3d 243, 250","parenthetical":"\"[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Nachman, 446 U.S. at 378, 100 S.Ct. 1723 (\u201c[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\u201d); see also Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378 (\u201cThe Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\u201d (citing Nachman)); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"446 U.S. 378, 378","parenthetical":"\"[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\"","sentence":"See Nachman, 446 U.S. at 378, 100 S.Ct. 1723 (\u201c[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\u201d); see also Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378 (\u201cThe Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\u201d (citing Nachman)); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\u201d)."},"case_id":5878428,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consistent with this basic understanding, the Supreme Court has held that benefits vest even if subject to a condition subsequent and that the terms of the condition are enforceable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 F.3d 1378, 1378","parenthetical":"\"The Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\" (citing Nachman","sentence":"See Nachman, 446 U.S. at 378, 100 S.Ct. 1723 (\u201c[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\u201d); see also Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378 (\u201cThe Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\u201d (citing Nachman)); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\"","sentence":"See Nachman, 446 U.S. at 378, 100 S.Ct. 1723 (\u201c[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\u201d); see also Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378 (\u201cThe Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\u201d (citing Nachman)); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\u201d)."},"case_id":5878428,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consistent with this basic understanding, the Supreme Court has held that benefits vest even if subject to a condition subsequent and that the terms of the condition are enforceable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"93 F.3d 243, 250","parenthetical":"\"[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\"","sentence":"See Nachman, 446 U.S. at 378, 100 S.Ct. 1723 (\u201c[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\u201d); see also Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378 (\u201cThe Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\u201d (citing Nachman)); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\"","sentence":"See Nachman, 446 U.S. at 378, 100 S.Ct. 1723 (\u201c[E]ven if the actual realization of expected benefits might depend on the sufficiency of plan assets, they were nonetheless considered vested.\u201d); see also Modzelewski, 14 F.3d at 1378 (\u201cThe Supreme Court ... has noted that vested pension rights may still be subject to certain conditions subsequent.\u201d (citing Nachman)); Helwig v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 93 F.3d 243, 250 (6th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Ejmployers may modify or terminate vested rights where their power [to] do so was an explicit part of the agreement between the parties.\u201d)."},"case_id":5878428,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A statement is not defamatory if it is a statement of opinion because \"expressions of opinion are generally protected under Section 11, Article I of the Ohio Constitution....\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"649 N.E.2d 184, 184","parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation complaint for failure to state a claim","sentence":"Vail, 649 N.E.2d at 184. Whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of fact or opinion is a question of law that may be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Id. (reversing dismissal of defamation complaint for failure to state a claim); see also SPX Corp. v. Doe, 253 F.Supp.2d 974, 978 (N.D.Ohio 2003) (explaining that because the privilege accorded opinions presents a legal question \u201cit is appropriate to decide these issue in the context of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"253 F.Supp.2d 974, 978","parenthetical":"explaining that because the privilege accorded opinions presents a legal question \"it is appropriate to decide these issue in the context of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)\"","sentence":"Vail, 649 N.E.2d at 184. Whether an alleged defamatory statement is one of fact or opinion is a question of law that may be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Id. (reversing dismissal of defamation complaint for failure to state a claim); see also SPX Corp. v. Doe, 253 F.Supp.2d 974, 978 (N.D.Ohio 2003) (explaining that because the privilege accorded opinions presents a legal question \u201cit is appropriate to decide these issue in the context of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)\u201d)."},"case_id":4261315,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Particularly egregious here is the fact that respondent agreed to the alternates sitting in the jury room, and participating if necessary, and only attempted to withdraw his consent when it became apparent that he was losing jurors that he considered favorable to his side. A party cannot acquiesce or agree to a procedure and then complain about the ruling when things appear to turn to his disadvantage.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"995 F.2d 638, 645-46","parenthetical":"holding that, although the trial court violated Federal Rule 47(b","sentence":"See Smith v. Gulf Oil Co., 995 F.2d 638, 645-46 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that, although the trial court violated Federal Rule 47(b), waiver principles apply in the alternate juror context); cf. United States v. Cencer, 90 F.3d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a defendant waives his right to object to a post-submission substitution of an alternate juror when he voluntarily agreed to the procedure); United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that \u201c[wjhere the defendant knowingly consents to the addition of an alternate juror, as was obviously the case here, he waives any challenge to that procedure on appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"90 F.3d 1103, 1109","parenthetical":"holding that a defendant waives his right to object to a post-submission substitution of an alternate juror when he voluntarily agreed to the procedure","sentence":"See Smith v. Gulf Oil Co., 995 F.2d 638, 645-46 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that, although the trial court violated Federal Rule 47(b), waiver principles apply in the alternate juror context); cf. United States v. Cencer, 90 F.3d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a defendant waives his right to object to a post-submission substitution of an alternate juror when he voluntarily agreed to the procedure); United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that \u201c[wjhere the defendant knowingly consents to the addition of an alternate juror, as was obviously the case here, he waives any challenge to that procedure on appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":3696701,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Particularly egregious here is the fact that respondent agreed to the alternates sitting in the jury room, and participating if necessary, and only attempted to withdraw his consent when it became apparent that he was losing jurors that he considered favorable to his side. A party cannot acquiesce or agree to a procedure and then complain about the ruling when things appear to turn to his disadvantage.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"823 F.2d 446, 448","parenthetical":"holding that \"[wjhere the defendant knowingly consents to the addition of an alternate juror, as was obviously the case here, he waives any challenge to that procedure on appeal.\"","sentence":"See Smith v. Gulf Oil Co., 995 F.2d 638, 645-46 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that, although the trial court violated Federal Rule 47(b), waiver principles apply in the alternate juror context); cf. United States v. Cencer, 90 F.3d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a defendant waives his right to object to a post-submission substitution of an alternate juror when he voluntarily agreed to the procedure); United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that \u201c[wjhere the defendant knowingly consents to the addition of an alternate juror, as was obviously the case here, he waives any challenge to that procedure on appeal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"995 F.2d 638, 645-46","parenthetical":"holding that, although the trial court violated Federal Rule 47(b","sentence":"See Smith v. Gulf Oil Co., 995 F.2d 638, 645-46 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that, although the trial court violated Federal Rule 47(b), waiver principles apply in the alternate juror context); cf. United States v. Cencer, 90 F.3d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a defendant waives his right to object to a post-submission substitution of an alternate juror when he voluntarily agreed to the procedure); United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir.1987) (holding that \u201c[wjhere the defendant knowingly consents to the addition of an alternate juror, as was obviously the case here, he waives any challenge to that procedure on appeal.\u201d)."},"case_id":3696701,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Had Congress wished to afford derivative work status to works involving changes in medium alone, one would expect to see references to, for example, \"hardcover,\" \"softcover,\" \"VHS,\" and \"CD.\" Moreover, under the Copyright Act, changes in medium generally do not involve sufficient originality to justify copyright protection.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"536 F.2d 486, 491","parenthetical":"\"to support a copyright there must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation to a different medium\"","sentence":"See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.1976) (\u201cto support a copyright there must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation to a different medium\u201d); see also id. (quoting 1 Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Copyright \u00a7 20.2, at 94 (1975)) (\u201c \u2018the mere reproduction of a work of art in a different medium should not constitute the required originality for the reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any particular medium\u2019 \u201d; plastic recreation of sculpture originally copyrighted in metal not a derivative work); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir.1980) (plastic recreation of Disney figurines not a derivative work); Past Pluto Prods. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F.Supp. 1435, 1443 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (remodeling of the Statute of Liberty \u00e1s a foam hat not a derivative work)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"627 F.Supp. 1435, 1443","parenthetical":"remodeling of the Statute of Liberty as a foam hat not a derivative work","sentence":"See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir.1976) (\u201cto support a copyright there must be at least some substantial variation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the translation to a different medium\u201d); see also id. (quoting 1 Melville B. Nimmer, The Law of Copyright \u00a7 20.2, at 94 (1975)) (\u201c \u2018the mere reproduction of a work of art in a different medium should not constitute the required originality for the reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any particular medium\u2019 \u201d; plastic recreation of sculpture originally copyrighted in metal not a derivative work); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir.1980) (plastic recreation of Disney figurines not a derivative work); Past Pluto Prods. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F.Supp. 1435, 1443 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (remodeling of the Statute of Liberty \u00e1s a foam hat not a derivative work)."},"case_id":4216000,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P27 However, we apply our Supreme Court's recent articulation of the ER 404(b) evidence admission requirements in Foxhoven, which states that where such evidence is admitted, a limiting instruction \"must be given to the jury.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 Wn.2d 864, 864","parenthetical":"noting that because the trial court repeatedly gave a limiting instruction to the jury at the conclusion of trial and before each witness in question testified, the record failed to support a contention that the jury used the ER 404(b","sentence":"See, e.g., Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d at 175; Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 864 (noting that because the trial court repeatedly gave a limiting instruction to the jury at the conclusion of trial and before each witness in question testified, the record failed to support a contention that the jury used the ER 404(b) evidence for an improper purpose, as the limiting instruction was given clearly and repeatedly and a jury is presumed to follow the trial court\u2019s instructions); see also Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 860 n.18 (citing State v. Brown, 113 Wn.2d 520, 529, 782 P.2d 1013, 787 P.2d 906 (1989), for the proposition that the trial court should explain the purpose of the evidence and give a cautionary instruction to consider it for no other purpose); Brown, 113 Wn.2d at 529 (citing Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d at 362 (citing State v. Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367, 378-79, 218 P.2d 300 (1950))); Goebel, 36 Wn.2d at 379 (\u201cthe court should state to the jury whatever it determines is the purpose (or purposes) for which the evidence is admissible; and it should also be the court\u2019s duty to give the cautionary instruction that such evidence is to be considered for no other purpose or purposes\u201d); State v. Whalon, 1 Wn. App. 785, 794, 464 P.2d 730 (citing Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367), review denied, 78 Wn.2d 992 (1970)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"36 Wn.2d 379, 379","parenthetical":"\"the court should state to the jury whatever it determines is the purpose (or purposes","sentence":"See, e.g., Foxhoven, 161 Wn.2d at 175; Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 864 (noting that because the trial court repeatedly gave a limiting instruction to the jury at the conclusion of trial and before each witness in question testified, the record failed to support a contention that the jury used the ER 404(b) evidence for an improper purpose, as the limiting instruction was given clearly and repeatedly and a jury is presumed to follow the trial court\u2019s instructions); see also Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 860 n.18 (citing State v. Brown, 113 Wn.2d 520, 529, 782 P.2d 1013, 787 P.2d 906 (1989), for the proposition that the trial court should explain the purpose of the evidence and give a cautionary instruction to consider it for no other purpose); Brown, 113 Wn.2d at 529 (citing Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d at 362 (citing State v. Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367, 378-79, 218 P.2d 300 (1950))); Goebel, 36 Wn.2d at 379 (\u201cthe court should state to the jury whatever it determines is the purpose (or purposes) for which the evidence is admissible; and it should also be the court\u2019s duty to give the cautionary instruction that such evidence is to be considered for no other purpose or purposes\u201d); State v. Whalon, 1 Wn. App. 785, 794, 464 P.2d 730 (citing Goebel, 36 Wn.2d 367), review denied, 78 Wn.2d 992 (1970)."},"case_id":5751411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Bejarano was released from prison on November 26, 2013, but his petition is not moot.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671","parenthetical":"\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\"","sentence":"See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\u201d); see also United States v. Camargo, 119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"523 U.S. 1, 8","parenthetical":"\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\"","sentence":"See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\u201d); see also United States v. Camargo, 119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\u201d)."},"case_id":4069368,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bejarano was released from prison on November 26, 2013, but his petition is not moot.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671","parenthetical":"\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\"","sentence":"See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\u201d); see also United States v. Camargo, 119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\"","sentence":"See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\u201d); see also United States v. Camargo, 119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\u201d)."},"case_id":4069368,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bejarano was released from prison on November 26, 2013, but his petition is not moot.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\"","sentence":"See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\u201d); see also United States v. Camargo, 119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671","parenthetical":"\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\"","sentence":"See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (\"In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences ....\u201d); see also United States v. Camargo, 119 Fed.Appx. 670, 671 (5th Cir.2005) (per curiam) (unpublished) (\"Because [defendant] is still serving his term of supervised release, the case-or-controversy requirement is met here and the case is not moot.\u201d)."},"case_id":4069368,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Pa. R.Crim. P. 1410. The enactment of amended Rule 1410 has spawned a series of problems regarding those issues that are not typically raised before or during a trial, including a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing cases that hold that \"a defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 468 Pa.Super. 385, 683 A.2d 1236 (1996) (listing cases that hold that \u201ca defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court's alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure)."},"case_id":11864212,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Pa. R.Crim. P. 1410. The enactment of amended Rule 1410 has spawned a series of problems regarding those issues that are not typically raised before or during a trial, including a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court's alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing cases that hold that \"a defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 468 Pa.Super. 385, 683 A.2d 1236 (1996) (listing cases that hold that \u201ca defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\u201d)."},"case_id":11864212,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Pa. R.Crim. P. 1410. The enactment of amended Rule 1410 has spawned a series of problems regarding those issues that are not typically raised before or during a trial, including a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing cases that hold that \"a defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 468 Pa.Super. 385, 683 A.2d 1236 (1996) (listing cases that hold that \u201ca defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure)."},"case_id":11864212,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Pa. R.Crim. P. 1410. The enactment of amended Rule 1410 has spawned a series of problems regarding those issues that are not typically raised before or during a trial, including a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing cases that hold that \"a defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 468 Pa.Super. 385, 683 A.2d 1236 (1996) (listing cases that hold that \u201ca defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure)."},"case_id":11864212,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Pa. R.Crim. P. 1410. The enactment of amended Rule 1410 has spawned a series of problems regarding those issues that are not typically raised before or during a trial, including a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing cases that hold that \"a defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 468 Pa.Super. 385, 683 A.2d 1236 (1996) (listing cases that hold that \u201ca defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court's alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure)."},"case_id":11864212,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Pa. R.Crim. P. 1410. The enactment of amended Rule 1410 has spawned a series of problems regarding those issues that are not typically raised before or during a trial, including a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing cases that hold that \"a defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 468 Pa.Super. 385, 683 A.2d 1236 (1996) (listing cases that hold that \u201ca defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court's alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure)."},"case_id":11864212,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Pa. R.Crim. P. 1410. The enactment of amended Rule 1410 has spawned a series of problems regarding those issues that are not typically raised before or during a trial, including a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing cases that hold that \"a defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 468 Pa.Super. 385, 683 A.2d 1236 (1996) (listing cases that hold that \u201ca defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\u201d)."},"case_id":11864212,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Pa. R.Crim. P. 1410. The enactment of amended Rule 1410 has spawned a series of problems regarding those issues that are not typically raised before or during a trial, including a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Egan, 451 Pa.Super. 219, 679 A.2d 237 (1996) (specific discretionary sentencing claim involving trial court\u2019s alleged failure to state reasons for the sentence on the record may be addressed for the first time by appellate court); Commonwealth v. Jarvis, 444 Pa.Super. 295, 663 A.2d 790 (1995) (general claim regarding discretionary aspects of sentence must be made to the trial court in the first instance despite amendments to post-trial criminal procedure)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing cases that hold that \"a defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Clinton, 468 Pa.Super. 385, 683 A.2d 1236 (1996) (listing cases that hold that \u201ca defendant must always file a post7sentence motion in order to preserve a claim assailing a verdict as against the weight' of the evidence\u201d)."},"case_id":11864212,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To the extent counsel is raising an Eighth Amendment challenge to AvaroReyes's sentence, we conclude that the argument fails.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2 F.3d 827, 828-29","parenthetical":"finding 151-month sentence for conspiring to distribute phencyclidine not \"excessive\"","sentence":"See United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 679 (8th Cir.2003) (Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to crime); cf. id. at 676, 679-80 (imposition of mandatory life sentence for conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine was not cruel and unusual punishment under Eighth Amendment); United States v. Jones, 2 F.3d 827, 828-29 (8th Cir.1993) (finding 151-month sentence for conspiring to distribute phencyclidine not \u201cexcessive\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"340 F.3d 672, 679","parenthetical":"Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to crime","sentence":"See United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 679 (8th Cir.2003) (Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to crime); cf. id. at 676, 679-80 (imposition of mandatory life sentence for conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine was not cruel and unusual punishment under Eighth Amendment); United States v. Jones, 2 F.3d 827, 828-29 (8th Cir.1993) (finding 151-month sentence for conspiring to distribute phencyclidine not \u201cexcessive\u201d)."},"case_id":59982,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence supports the agency's adverse credibility determination based on Singh's prior dishonesty under oath. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA's determination that Singh lacked an excusable justification for his false statements regarding his family's presence and activities in the U.S. because he did not make the statements while fleeing persecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"196 F.3d 951, 955-56","parenthetical":"\"a genuine refugee escaping persecution may lie about his citizenship to immigration officials in order to flee his place of persecution or secure entry into the United States\"","sentence":"See Singh, 643 F.3d at 1181 (upholding agency\u2019s adverse credibility finding based on petitioner\u2019s lies to immigration authorities that were \u201ccompletely unrelated to escaping immediate danger or gaining entry into the United States\u201d); cf. Akinmade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951, 955-56 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201ca genuine refugee escaping persecution may lie about his citizenship to immigration officials in order to flee his place of persecution or secure entry into the United States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"643 F.3d 1181, 1181","parenthetical":"upholding agency's adverse credibility finding based on petitioner's lies to immigration authorities that were \"completely unrelated to escaping immediate danger or gaining entry into the United States\"","sentence":"See Singh, 643 F.3d at 1181 (upholding agency\u2019s adverse credibility finding based on petitioner\u2019s lies to immigration authorities that were \u201ccompletely unrelated to escaping immediate danger or gaining entry into the United States\u201d); cf. Akinmade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951, 955-56 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201ca genuine refugee escaping persecution may lie about his citizenship to immigration officials in order to flee his place of persecution or secure entry into the United States\u201d)."},"case_id":6056243,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, since domestic law sets the standards for the TVPA, secondary or indirect theories of liability recognized by U.S. law are available for claims brought under the TVPA. The TVPA contemplates liability against those who did not \"personally execute the torture or extrajudicial killing.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"416 F.3d 1248, 1248","parenthetical":"\"[T]he [TVPA] reaches those who ordered, abetted, or assisted in the wrongful act.\"","sentence":"See Mohamad, 566 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1709 (emphasis added); Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1248 (\u201c[T]he [TVPA] reaches those who ordered, abetted, or assisted in the wrongful act.\u201d); see also Chowdhury, 746 F.3d at 52 (noting that agency law \u201ccan provide a theory- of tort liability if a defendant did not personally torture the victim\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"746 F.3d 52, 52","parenthetical":"noting that agency law \"can provide a theory- of tort liability if a defendant did not personally torture the victim\"","sentence":"See Mohamad, 566 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1709 (emphasis added); Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1248 (\u201c[T]he [TVPA] reaches those who ordered, abetted, or assisted in the wrongful act.\u201d); see also Chowdhury, 746 F.3d at 52 (noting that agency law \u201ccan provide a theory- of tort liability if a defendant did not personally torture the victim\u201d)."},"case_id":6053664,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Having carefully reviewed the record, we are satisfied that this is one of the very few cases in which the trial court could determine, based on a defendant's past proven criminal record, that he should be under correctional supervision for the remainder of his life. When a trial judge finds, based upon substantial evidence, that a person will remain a danger to the community for the remainder of his or her life, a sentence of ninety-seven years with with thirty-two years suspended is not clearly mistaken.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"689 P.2d 1133, 1143-44","parenthetical":"approving a composite sentence of fifty-three years of imprisonment for a defendant with a serious criminal record convicted of particularly heinous offenses","sentence":"See Post v. State, 580 P.2d 304, 308-09 (Alaska 1978); Wortham v. State, 689 P.2d 1133, 1143-44 (Alaska App.1984) (approving a composite sentence of fifty-three years of imprisonment for a defendant with a serious criminal record convicted of particularly heinous offenses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"688 P.2d 600, 600","parenthetical":"approving a forty-year sentence but finding the sentence should not be consecutive to a prior felony sentence","sentence":"But see Larson, 688 P.2d at 600 (approving a forty-year sentence but finding the sentence should not be consecutive to a prior felony sentence); Nix, 653 P.2d at 1101 (reducing composite sentence to forty years for a repeat felony offender convicted of several serious crimes)."},"case_id":10397320,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Having carefully reviewed the record, we are satisfied that this is one of the very few cases in which the trial court could determine, based on a defendant's past proven criminal record, that he should be under correctional supervision for the remainder of his life. When a trial judge finds, based upon substantial evidence, that a person will remain a danger to the community for the remainder of his or her life, a sentence of ninety-seven years with with thirty-two years suspended is not clearly mistaken.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"653 P.2d 1101, 1101","parenthetical":"reducing composite sentence to forty years for a repeat felony offender convicted of several serious crimes","sentence":"But see Larson, 688 P.2d at 600 (approving a forty-year sentence but finding the sentence should not be consecutive to a prior felony sentence); Nix, 653 P.2d at 1101 (reducing composite sentence to forty years for a repeat felony offender convicted of several serious crimes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"689 P.2d 1133, 1143-44","parenthetical":"approving a composite sentence of fifty-three years of imprisonment for a defendant with a serious criminal record convicted of particularly heinous offenses","sentence":"See Post v. State, 580 P.2d 304, 308-09 (Alaska 1978); Wortham v. State, 689 P.2d 1133, 1143-44 (Alaska App.1984) (approving a composite sentence of fifty-three years of imprisonment for a defendant with a serious criminal record convicted of particularly heinous offenses)."},"case_id":10397320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs allegation is true, accrual of his claims would be postponed by the accrual suspension rule. The District Court, however, issued its Opinion on June 29, 1990.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"560 F.3d 1311, 1314-15","parenthetical":"\"[A] plaintiffs ignorance of a claim that he should have been aware of is not enough to suspend the accrual of a claim.\"","sentence":"See Ingram v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (Fed.Cir.2009) (\u201c[A] plaintiffs ignorance of a claim that he should have been aware of is not enough to suspend the accrual of a claim.\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Catawba Indian Tribe, 982 F.2d at 1572 (holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations); Young, 529 F.3d at 1385 (It is a \u201cPlaintiffs knowledge of the facts of the claim that determines the accrual date,\u201d not the discovery of a legal theory.)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"982 F.2d 1572, 1572","parenthetical":"holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations","sentence":"See Ingram v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (Fed.Cir.2009) (\u201c[A] plaintiffs ignorance of a claim that he should have been aware of is not enough to suspend the accrual of a claim.\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Catawba Indian Tribe, 982 F.2d at 1572 (holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations); Young, 529 F.3d at 1385 (It is a \u201cPlaintiffs knowledge of the facts of the claim that determines the accrual date,\u201d not the discovery of a legal theory.)."},"case_id":4098414,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiffs allegation is true, accrual of his claims would be postponed by the accrual suspension rule. The District Court, however, issued its Opinion on June 29, 1990.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"560 F.3d 1311, 1314-15","parenthetical":"\"[A] plaintiffs ignorance of a claim that he should have been aware of is not enough to suspend the accrual of a claim.\"","sentence":"See Ingram v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (Fed.Cir.2009) (\u201c[A] plaintiffs ignorance of a claim that he should have been aware of is not enough to suspend the accrual of a claim.\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Catawba Indian Tribe, 982 F.2d at 1572 (holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations); Young, 529 F.3d at 1385 (It is a \u201cPlaintiffs knowledge of the facts of the claim that determines the accrual date,\u201d not the discovery of a legal theory.)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"529 F.3d 1385, 1385","parenthetical":"It is a \"Plaintiffs knowledge of the facts of the claim that determines the accrual date,\" not the discovery of a legal theory.","sentence":"See Ingram v. United States, 560 F.3d 1311, 1314-15 (Fed.Cir.2009) (\u201c[A] plaintiffs ignorance of a claim that he should have been aware of is not enough to suspend the accrual of a claim.\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Catawba Indian Tribe, 982 F.2d at 1572 (holding that ignorance or misunderstanding of the law would not toll the running of the statute of limitations); Young, 529 F.3d at 1385 (It is a \u201cPlaintiffs knowledge of the facts of the claim that determines the accrual date,\u201d not the discovery of a legal theory.)."},"case_id":4098414,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The efficiency of the warden's response may have come at the expense of reasonableness. Is it rational that an effort to remove all \"obscene\" materials from the library would result in the expunging of William Styron's Sophie's Choice, Gore Vidal's Myra Breckin-ridge, and a number of works by John Updike?","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080","parenthetical":"striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\"","sentence":"See Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080 (W.D.Wis.2000) (striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo\u2019s Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\u201d); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"413 U.S. 49, 63","parenthetical":"noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\"","sentence":"See Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080 (W.D.Wis.2000) (striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo\u2019s Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\u201d); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\u201d)."},"case_id":9107187,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The efficiency of the warden's response may have come at the expense of reasonableness. Is it rational that an effort to remove all \"obscene\" materials from the library would result in the expunging of William Styron's Sophie's Choice, Gore Vidal's Myra Breckin-ridge, and a number of works by John Updike?","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080","parenthetical":"striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\"","sentence":"See Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080 (W.D.Wis.2000) (striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo\u2019s Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\u201d); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\"","sentence":"See Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080 (W.D.Wis.2000) (striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo\u2019s Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\u201d); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\u201d)."},"case_id":9107187,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The efficiency of the warden's response may have come at the expense of reasonableness. Is it rational that an effort to remove all \"obscene\" materials from the library would result in the expunging of William Styron's Sophie's Choice, Gore Vidal's Myra Breckin-ridge, and a number of works by John Updike?","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\"","sentence":"See Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080 (W.D.Wis.2000) (striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo\u2019s Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\u201d); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080","parenthetical":"striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\"","sentence":"See Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F.Supp.2d 1068, 1080 (W.D.Wis.2000) (striking a state prison regulation where prison administrators classified a book containing photographs of Michelangelo\u2019s Sistine Chapel masterpiece as \"pornography\u201d); see also Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973) (noting the \"well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and the arts lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop character\u201d)."},"case_id":9107187,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Instead, a plaintiff must set forth factual allegations of fraudulent intent in connection with the specific transfer sought to be avoided and must show some direct connection between a defendant and a debt- or's fraudulent Ponzi scheme.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"286 B.R. 490, 490","parenthetical":"\"the proper focus of a fraudulent transfer inquiry is on the transfer itself, not the overall business practices of the Debtor\"","sentence":"See Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. at 490 (\u201cthe proper focus of a fraudulent transfer inquiry is on the transfer itself, not the overall business practices of the Debtor\u201d); Balaber-Strauss, 256 B.R. at 680 (a trustee cannot base a fraudulent transfer claim on the theory that, because Debtor operated a Ponzi scheme, all transfers made by Debt- or qualify as actual or constructively fraudulent transfers); see also Sharp Int\u2019l, 403 F.3d at 56 (affirming the dismissal of an intentional fraudulent conveyance complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the fraud alleged in the complaint relates to the manner in which the debtor obtained new funding from other creditors, not the debtor\u2019s subsequent payment of part of the proceeds to the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"403 F.3d 56, 56","parenthetical":"affirming the dismissal of an intentional fraudulent conveyance complaint under Rule 12(b)(6","sentence":"See Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. at 490 (\u201cthe proper focus of a fraudulent transfer inquiry is on the transfer itself, not the overall business practices of the Debtor\u201d); Balaber-Strauss, 256 B.R. at 680 (a trustee cannot base a fraudulent transfer claim on the theory that, because Debtor operated a Ponzi scheme, all transfers made by Debt- or qualify as actual or constructively fraudulent transfers); see also Sharp Int\u2019l, 403 F.3d at 56 (affirming the dismissal of an intentional fraudulent conveyance complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the fraud alleged in the complaint relates to the manner in which the debtor obtained new funding from other creditors, not the debtor\u2019s subsequent payment of part of the proceeds to the defendant)."},"case_id":4135605,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Instead, a plaintiff must set forth factual allegations of fraudulent intent in connection with the specific transfer sought to be avoided and must show some direct connection between a defendant and a debt- or's fraudulent Ponzi scheme.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"403 F.3d 56, 56","parenthetical":"affirming the dismissal of an intentional fraudulent conveyance complaint under Rule 12(b)(6","sentence":"See Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. at 490 (\u201cthe proper focus of a fraudulent transfer inquiry is on the transfer itself, not the overall business practices of the Debtor\u201d); Balaber-Strauss, 256 B.R. at 680 (a trustee cannot base a fraudulent transfer claim on the theory that, because Debtor operated a Ponzi scheme, all transfers made by Debt- or qualify as actual or constructively fraudulent transfers); see also Sharp Int\u2019l, 403 F.3d at 56 (affirming the dismissal of an intentional fraudulent conveyance complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the fraud alleged in the complaint relates to the manner in which the debtor obtained new funding from other creditors, not the debtor\u2019s subsequent payment of part of the proceeds to the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"256 B.R. 680, 680","parenthetical":"a trustee cannot base a fraudulent transfer claim on the theory that, because Debtor operated a Ponzi scheme, all transfers made by Debt- or qualify as actual or constructively fraudulent transfers","sentence":"See Carrozzella & Richardson, 286 B.R. at 490 (\u201cthe proper focus of a fraudulent transfer inquiry is on the transfer itself, not the overall business practices of the Debtor\u201d); Balaber-Strauss, 256 B.R. at 680 (a trustee cannot base a fraudulent transfer claim on the theory that, because Debtor operated a Ponzi scheme, all transfers made by Debt- or qualify as actual or constructively fraudulent transfers); see also Sharp Int\u2019l, 403 F.3d at 56 (affirming the dismissal of an intentional fraudulent conveyance complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the fraud alleged in the complaint relates to the manner in which the debtor obtained new funding from other creditors, not the debtor\u2019s subsequent payment of part of the proceeds to the defendant)."},"case_id":4135605,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs also point to record evidence that the bank holding company defendants and their subsidiaries shared common officers and directors (Decl. of Joseph S. Tusa, Dec. 20, 2006, Ex. 1; Decl. of Joseph S. Tusa, Mar. 2, 2007, Exs. Y, PP), but this Resnick factor, without more than otherwise indicated in the instant case, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish alter ego liability of a parent corporation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"280 F.3d 224, 235","parenthetical":"\"[Corporate ownership of a subsidiary and overlapping offices and directorates are not, without more, sufficient to impose liability on the parent for conduct of the subsidiary!.]\"","sentence":"See Greene v. Long Island R.R. Co., 280 F.3d 224, 235 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[Corporate ownership of a subsidiary and overlapping offices and directorates are not, without more, sufficient to impose liability on the parent for conduct of the subsidiary!.]\u201d); see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F.Supp.2d 513, 538 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that ownership and overlapping directors are insufficient, standing alone to pierce the corporate veil); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 342 F.Supp.2d 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (\u201cCourts have held, however, that factors such as sole ownership, overlapping directors, consolidated financial statements, and reference to the subsidiary as a department are insufficient to establish the type of day-to-day control necessary to disregard corporate separateness.\u201d); Allied Programs Corp. v. Puritan Ins. Co., 592 F.Supp. 1274, 1277 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (\u201c \u2018It is well settled that there must be complete domination and control before the parent\u2019s corporate veil can be pierced. Stock control, interlocking directors and officers, and the like, are in and of themselves insufficient.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Musman v. Modem Deb. Inc., 50 A.D.2d 761, 377 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (N.Y.App.Div.1975)). The facts which plaintiffs claim indicate excessive control and domination in the instant case \u2014 controlling ownership interest in subsidiaries, reporting of consolidated results of such subsidiaries in public filings, and overlapping directors and officers between parent and subsidiary corporations \u2014 are commonplace as generally-accepted corporate form, and are insufficient without more, as a matter of law, to eviscerate the presumption of corporate separateness."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"587 F.Supp.2d 513, 538","parenthetical":"holding that ownership and overlapping directors are insufficient, standing alone to pierce the corporate veil","sentence":"See Greene v. Long Island R.R. Co., 280 F.3d 224, 235 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[Corporate ownership of a subsidiary and overlapping offices and directorates are not, without more, sufficient to impose liability on the parent for conduct of the subsidiary!.]\u201d); see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F.Supp.2d 513, 538 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that ownership and overlapping directors are insufficient, standing alone to pierce the corporate veil); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 342 F.Supp.2d 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (\u201cCourts have held, however, that factors such as sole ownership, overlapping directors, consolidated financial statements, and reference to the subsidiary as a department are insufficient to establish the type of day-to-day control necessary to disregard corporate separateness.\u201d); Allied Programs Corp. v. Puritan Ins. Co., 592 F.Supp. 1274, 1277 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (\u201c \u2018It is well settled that there must be complete domination and control before the parent\u2019s corporate veil can be pierced. Stock control, interlocking directors and officers, and the like, are in and of themselves insufficient.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Musman v. Modem Deb. Inc., 50 A.D.2d 761, 377 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (N.Y.App.Div.1975)). The facts which plaintiffs claim indicate excessive control and domination in the instant case \u2014 controlling ownership interest in subsidiaries, reporting of consolidated results of such subsidiaries in public filings, and overlapping directors and officers between parent and subsidiary corporations \u2014 are commonplace as generally-accepted corporate form, and are insufficient without more, as a matter of law, to eviscerate the presumption of corporate separateness."},"case_id":3800460,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs also point to record evidence that the bank holding company defendants and their subsidiaries shared common officers and directors (Decl. of Joseph S. Tusa, Dec. 20, 2006, Ex. 1; Decl. of Joseph S. Tusa, Mar. 2, 2007, Exs. Y, PP), but this Resnick factor, without more than otherwise indicated in the instant case, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish alter ego liability of a parent corporation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"280 F.3d 224, 235","parenthetical":"\"[Corporate ownership of a subsidiary and overlapping offices and directorates are not, without more, sufficient to impose liability on the parent for conduct of the subsidiary!.]\"","sentence":"See Greene v. Long Island R.R. Co., 280 F.3d 224, 235 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[Corporate ownership of a subsidiary and overlapping offices and directorates are not, without more, sufficient to impose liability on the parent for conduct of the subsidiary!.]\u201d); see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F.Supp.2d 513, 538 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that ownership and overlapping directors are insufficient, standing alone to pierce the corporate veil); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 342 F.Supp.2d 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (\u201cCourts have held, however, that factors such as sole ownership, overlapping directors, consolidated financial statements, and reference to the subsidiary as a department are insufficient to establish the type of day-to-day control necessary to disregard corporate separateness.\u201d); Allied Programs Corp. v. Puritan Ins. Co., 592 F.Supp. 1274, 1277 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (\u201c \u2018It is well settled that there must be complete domination and control before the parent\u2019s corporate veil can be pierced. Stock control, interlocking directors and officers, and the like, are in and of themselves insufficient.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Musman v. Modem Deb. Inc., 50 A.D.2d 761, 377 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (N.Y.App.Div.1975)). The facts which plaintiffs claim indicate excessive control and domination in the instant case \u2014 controlling ownership interest in subsidiaries, reporting of consolidated results of such subsidiaries in public filings, and overlapping directors and officers between parent and subsidiary corporations \u2014 are commonplace as generally-accepted corporate form, and are insufficient without more, as a matter of law, to eviscerate the presumption of corporate separateness."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"342 F.Supp.2d 207, 216","parenthetical":"\"Courts have held, however, that factors such as sole ownership, overlapping directors, consolidated financial statements, and reference to the subsidiary as a department are insufficient to establish the type of day-to-day control necessary to disregard corporate separateness.\"","sentence":"See Greene v. Long Island R.R. Co., 280 F.3d 224, 235 (2d Cir.2002) (\u201c[Corporate ownership of a subsidiary and overlapping offices and directorates are not, without more, sufficient to impose liability on the parent for conduct of the subsidiary!.]\u201d); see also In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 587 F.Supp.2d 513, 538 (S.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that ownership and overlapping directors are insufficient, standing alone to pierce the corporate veil); In re Ski Train Fire in Kaprun, Austria on Nov. 11, 2000, 342 F.Supp.2d 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y.2004) (\u201cCourts have held, however, that factors such as sole ownership, overlapping directors, consolidated financial statements, and reference to the subsidiary as a department are insufficient to establish the type of day-to-day control necessary to disregard corporate separateness.\u201d); Allied Programs Corp. v. Puritan Ins. Co., 592 F.Supp. 1274, 1277 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (\u201c \u2018It is well settled that there must be complete domination and control before the parent\u2019s corporate veil can be pierced. Stock control, interlocking directors and officers, and the like, are in and of themselves insufficient.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Musman v. Modem Deb. Inc., 50 A.D.2d 761, 377 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (N.Y.App.Div.1975)). The facts which plaintiffs claim indicate excessive control and domination in the instant case \u2014 controlling ownership interest in subsidiaries, reporting of consolidated results of such subsidiaries in public filings, and overlapping directors and officers between parent and subsidiary corporations \u2014 are commonplace as generally-accepted corporate form, and are insufficient without more, as a matter of law, to eviscerate the presumption of corporate separateness."},"case_id":3800460,"label":"a"}
{"context":". For the argument that reliance on IRS rulings and audits constitutes reasonable cause, see H.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 F.2d 228, 234","parenthetical":"taxpayer cannot establish reasonable cause based upon purported reliance on advice from IRS","sentence":"Fort Flowers Found., Inc. v. Comm\u2019r, 72 T.C. 399, 410-11 (1979) (tax exempt organization had reasonable cause not to file return because of IRS audit findings); Gilmore v. United States, 443 F.Supp. 91, 98-99 (D.Md.1977) (employer had reasonable cause not to file returns under FICA and FUTA because of previous IRS audit determinations); cf. Posey v. United States, 449 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir.1971) (taxpayer cannot establish reasonable cause based upon purported reliance on advice from IRS); United States v. Red Stripe, Inc., 792 F.Supp. 1338, 1345 (E.D.N.Y.1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"72 T.C. 399, 410-11","parenthetical":"tax exempt organization had reasonable cause not to file return because of IRS audit findings","sentence":"Fort Flowers Found., Inc. v. Comm\u2019r, 72 T.C. 399, 410-11 (1979) (tax exempt organization had reasonable cause not to file return because of IRS audit findings); Gilmore v. United States, 443 F.Supp. 91, 98-99 (D.Md.1977) (employer had reasonable cause not to file returns under FICA and FUTA because of previous IRS audit determinations); cf. Posey v. United States, 449 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir.1971) (taxpayer cannot establish reasonable cause based upon purported reliance on advice from IRS); United States v. Red Stripe, Inc., 792 F.Supp. 1338, 1345 (E.D.N.Y.1992)."},"case_id":3736140,"label":"b"}
{"context":". For the argument that reliance on IRS rulings and audits constitutes reasonable cause, see H.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"443 F.Supp. 91, 98-99","parenthetical":"employer had reasonable cause not to file returns under FICA and FUTA because of previous IRS audit determinations","sentence":"Fort Flowers Found., Inc. v. Comm\u2019r, 72 T.C. 399, 410-11 (1979) (tax exempt organization had reasonable cause not to file return because of IRS audit findings); Gilmore v. United States, 443 F.Supp. 91, 98-99 (D.Md.1977) (employer had reasonable cause not to file returns under FICA and FUTA because of previous IRS audit determinations); cf. Posey v. United States, 449 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir.1971) (taxpayer cannot establish reasonable cause based upon purported reliance on advice from IRS); United States v. Red Stripe, Inc., 792 F.Supp. 1338, 1345 (E.D.N.Y.1992)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"449 F.2d 228, 234","parenthetical":"taxpayer cannot establish reasonable cause based upon purported reliance on advice from IRS","sentence":"Fort Flowers Found., Inc. v. Comm\u2019r, 72 T.C. 399, 410-11 (1979) (tax exempt organization had reasonable cause not to file return because of IRS audit findings); Gilmore v. United States, 443 F.Supp. 91, 98-99 (D.Md.1977) (employer had reasonable cause not to file returns under FICA and FUTA because of previous IRS audit determinations); cf. Posey v. United States, 449 F.2d 228, 234 (5th Cir.1971) (taxpayer cannot establish reasonable cause based upon purported reliance on advice from IRS); United States v. Red Stripe, Inc., 792 F.Supp. 1338, 1345 (E.D.N.Y.1992)."},"case_id":3736140,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There must be a reasonable probability that the disclosure of evidence would have changed result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, however.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the prosecutor's failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material","sentence":"Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Jean v. Rice, 945 F.2d 82 (4th Cir.1991) (concluding that the failure to turn over audio tapes and accompanying records of hypnosis session is a Brady violation); McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.1988) (finding that the prosecutor\u2019s failure to turn over exculpatory identification evidence created a reasonable probability that outcome would have been different where no physical evidence linked defendant to crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 109 S.Ct. 1172, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989); see also Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407 (4th Cir.1991) (finding the exculpatory evidence was not material), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1110, 112 S.Ct. 1211, 117 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992); United States v. Curtis, 931 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 881, 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 186 (1991); United U.S. v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir.1990) (same); Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490 (4th Cir.1989) (determining that the refusal to allow defense counsel to view crime scene was not prejudicial under Bagley), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2220, 109 L.Ed.2d 545 (1990); United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that, although the government has a duty to make good faith effort to discover and disclose alleged Brady material, a failure to abide by this requirement will not require reversal where defendant unable to show information sought was material), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990)."},"case_id":11190384,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Next, the Circuit found that the care of mentally disabled patients was \"neither traditionally nor exclusively reserved to the state.\" And, this Court finds Sybalski highly persuasive in terms of our issues, and particularly as to the historical perspective of medical treatment and care rendered by nursing homes.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"499 F.2d 761, 765","parenthetical":"noting that the government, under New York Social Services Law SS 395, is responsible for the welfare of children, and thus any delegation to a private actor regarding the custody of children was found to be a public function","sentence":"See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d at 756 (finding that a hospital acting in its capacity as a private provider of medical care was not a state actor); Hogan v. A.O. Fox Mem\u2019l Hosp., 346 Fed.Appx. 627, 629 (2d Cir.2009) (after Sybalski, the Court determined that the conduct of the defendants, a private hospital and physician, could not be fairly attributable to the State); cf. Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir.1974) (noting that the government, under New York Social Services Law \u00a7 395, is responsible for the welfare of children, and thus any delegation to a private actor regarding the custody of children was found to be a public function)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"235 F.3d 756, 756","parenthetical":"finding that a hospital acting in its capacity as a private provider of medical care was not a state actor","sentence":"See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d at 756 (finding that a hospital acting in its capacity as a private provider of medical care was not a state actor); Hogan v. A.O. Fox Mem\u2019l Hosp., 346 Fed.Appx. 627, 629 (2d Cir.2009) (after Sybalski, the Court determined that the conduct of the defendants, a private hospital and physician, could not be fairly attributable to the State); cf. Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir.1974) (noting that the government, under New York Social Services Law \u00a7 395, is responsible for the welfare of children, and thus any delegation to a private actor regarding the custody of children was found to be a public function)."},"case_id":4188924,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Next, the Circuit found that the care of mentally disabled patients was \"neither traditionally nor exclusively reserved to the state.\" And, this Court finds Sybalski highly persuasive in terms of our issues, and particularly as to the historical perspective of medical treatment and care rendered by nursing homes.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"499 F.2d 761, 765","parenthetical":"noting that the government, under New York Social Services Law SS 395, is responsible for the welfare of children, and thus any delegation to a private actor regarding the custody of children was found to be a public function","sentence":"See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d at 756 (finding that a hospital acting in its capacity as a private provider of medical care was not a state actor); Hogan v. A.O. Fox Mem\u2019l Hosp., 346 Fed.Appx. 627, 629 (2d Cir.2009) (after Sybalski, the Court determined that the conduct of the defendants, a private hospital and physician, could not be fairly attributable to the State); cf. Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir.1974) (noting that the government, under New York Social Services Law \u00a7 395, is responsible for the welfare of children, and thus any delegation to a private actor regarding the custody of children was found to be a public function)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"346 Fed.Appx. 627, 629","parenthetical":"after Sybalski, the Court determined that the conduct of the defendants, a private hospital and physician, could not be fairly attributable to the State","sentence":"See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d at 756 (finding that a hospital acting in its capacity as a private provider of medical care was not a state actor); Hogan v. A.O. Fox Mem\u2019l Hosp., 346 Fed.Appx. 627, 629 (2d Cir.2009) (after Sybalski, the Court determined that the conduct of the defendants, a private hospital and physician, could not be fairly attributable to the State); cf. Perez v. Sugarman, 499 F.2d 761, 765 (2d Cir.1974) (noting that the government, under New York Social Services Law \u00a7 395, is responsible for the welfare of children, and thus any delegation to a private actor regarding the custody of children was found to be a public function)."},"case_id":4188924,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To determine whether a defect is too trivial to be negligent, the court should consider the \"time, place, and circumstances\" of the injury, in addition to dimensions and appearance of the defect.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \"presented a trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \u201cthat triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\u201d); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156 (NY.App.Div.2000) (holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \u201cpresented a trap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \"that triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\"","sentence":"Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \u201cthat triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\u201d); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156 (NY.App.Div.2000) (holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \u201cpresented a trap for the unwary\u201d)."},"case_id":990950,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To determine whether a defect is too trivial to be negligent, the court should consider the \"time, place, and circumstances\" of the injury, in addition to dimensions and appearance of the defect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \"that triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\"","sentence":"Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \u201cthat triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\u201d); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156 (NY.App.Div.2000) (holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \u201cpresented a trap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \"presented a trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \u201cthat triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\u201d); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156 (NY.App.Div.2000) (holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \u201cpresented a trap for the unwary\u201d)."},"case_id":990950,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To determine whether a defect is too trivial to be negligent, the court should consider the \"time, place, and circumstances\" of the injury, in addition to dimensions and appearance of the defect.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \"presented a trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \u201cthat triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\u201d); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156 (NY.App.Div.2000) (holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \u201cpresented a trap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403","parenthetical":"holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \"that triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\"","sentence":"Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \u201cthat triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\u201d); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156 (NY.App.Div.2000) (holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \u201cpresented a trap for the unwary\u201d)."},"case_id":990950,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To determine whether a defect is too trivial to be negligent, the court should consider the \"time, place, and circumstances\" of the injury, in addition to dimensions and appearance of the defect.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403","parenthetical":"holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \"that triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\"","sentence":"Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \u201cthat triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\u201d); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156 (NY.App.Div.2000) (holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \u201cpresented a trap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \"presented a trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"Trincere, 665 N.Y.S.2d 615, 688 N.E.2d at 490. In some instances, however, \u201cthe trivial nature of the defect may loom larger than another element\u201d and therefore \u201c[n]ot every injury allegedly caused by an elevated brick or slab need be submitted to a jury.\u201d Id.; see Nathan v. City of New Rochelle, 282 A.D.2d 585, 723 N.Y.S.2d 402, 403 (N.Y.App.Div.2001) (holding that a one-inch height difference created by a crack in a sidewalk is not actionable, and that plaintiffs assertions \u201cthat triable issues of fact were raised by the time, place, and circumstances of the accident are without merit\u201d); but see Sanna v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 271 A.D.2d 595, 706 N.Y.S.2d 156 (NY.App.Div.2000) (holding that, although the alleged defect was only one-half inch deep, plaintiffs raised triable issue of fact as to whether the color of the carpet and poor lighting in the room \u201cpresented a trap for the unwary\u201d)."},"case_id":990950,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have previously applied a rule similar to the federal rule, though without the explanation we provide here as to why the same rule should apply.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"49 V.I. 297, 309","parenthetical":"implying that a contempt order is final by declining to grant mandamus because the petitioner could obtain relief by refusing to comply with a court order, standing in contempt, and immediately appealing the contempt citation","sentence":"See In re People of the V.I., 49 V.I. 297, 309 (V.I. 2007) (implying that a contempt order is final by declining to grant mandamus because the petitioner could obtain relief by refusing to comply with a court order, standing in contempt, and immediately appealing the contempt citation) (citing In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 288 F.3d 83, 91 (3d Cir. 2002)); see also In re Najawicz, 52 V.I. 311, 326-27 (V.I. 2009) (deciding that because a show cause order was not an order of contempt, it lacked the finality necessary for appellate review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"52 V.I. 311, 326-27","parenthetical":"deciding that because a show cause order was not an order of contempt, it lacked the finality necessary for appellate review","sentence":"See In re People of the V.I., 49 V.I. 297, 309 (V.I. 2007) (implying that a contempt order is final by declining to grant mandamus because the petitioner could obtain relief by refusing to comply with a court order, standing in contempt, and immediately appealing the contempt citation) (citing In re Flat Glass Antitrust Lit., 288 F.3d 83, 91 (3d Cir. 2002)); see also In re Najawicz, 52 V.I. 311, 326-27 (V.I. 2009) (deciding that because a show cause order was not an order of contempt, it lacked the finality necessary for appellate review)."},"case_id":3661280,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Common experience dictates that precautions are necessary to use a handgun properly. The recklessness involved in pointing the weapon at another human being under these circumstances, whether it is defective or not, excuses the manufacturer as the struggle was an independent superseding cause.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"743 F.2d 1205, 1205","parenthetical":"criminal misuse of handguns not a foreseeable consequence of gun manufacturing","sentence":"See Eichstedt v. Lakefield Arms Ltd., 849 F.Supp. 1287, 1292 (E.D.Wis.1994) (even if rifle was defective and unreasonably dangerous, intentional reckless actions of individual in aiming and pulling trigger of allegedly unloaded weapon at another person was a superseding cause of gunshot injury); cf. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1205 (criminal misuse of handguns not a foreseeable consequence of gun manufacturing)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"849 F.Supp. 1287, 1292","parenthetical":"even if rifle was defective and unreasonably dangerous, intentional reckless actions of individual in aiming and pulling trigger of allegedly unloaded weapon at another person was a superseding cause of gunshot injury","sentence":"See Eichstedt v. Lakefield Arms Ltd., 849 F.Supp. 1287, 1292 (E.D.Wis.1994) (even if rifle was defective and unreasonably dangerous, intentional reckless actions of individual in aiming and pulling trigger of allegedly unloaded weapon at another person was a superseding cause of gunshot injury); cf. Martin, 743 F.2d at 1205 (criminal misuse of handguns not a foreseeable consequence of gun manufacturing)."},"case_id":1373400,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellants' suit challenges the validity and authority of public officers. We agree with the Commissioner that appellants have no standing to pursue the declaratory and injunctive relief they seek.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 S.W.2d 73, 74-75","parenthetical":"concluding taxpayer suit to contest legality of police chiefs appointment on grounds of illegal public expenditures could only be brought in quo warranto","sentence":"See Lewis, 641 S.W.2d at 394; Hamman v. Hayes, 391 S.W.2d 73, 74-75 (Tex.App.Beaumont 1965, writ ref'd) (concluding taxpayer suit to contest legality of police chiefs appointment on grounds of illegal public expenditures could only be brought in quo warranto)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that where defendant is at least de facto officer, quo warranto, rather than injunction, is exclusive remedy","sentence":"See also Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263, 269-70 (Tex.1922) (concluding that where defendant is at least de facto officer, quo warranto, rather than injunction, is exclusive remedy)."},"case_id":8424033,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellants' suit challenges the validity and authority of public officers. We agree with the Commissioner that appellants have no standing to pursue the declaratory and injunctive relief they seek.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"247 S.W. 263, 269-70","parenthetical":"concluding that where defendant is at least de facto officer, quo warranto, rather than injunction, is exclusive remedy","sentence":"See also Williams v. Castleman, 112 Tex. 193, 247 S.W. 263, 269-70 (Tex.1922) (concluding that where defendant is at least de facto officer, quo warranto, rather than injunction, is exclusive remedy)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 S.W.2d 73, 74-75","parenthetical":"concluding taxpayer suit to contest legality of police chiefs appointment on grounds of illegal public expenditures could only be brought in quo warranto","sentence":"See Lewis, 641 S.W.2d at 394; Hamman v. Hayes, 391 S.W.2d 73, 74-75 (Tex.App.Beaumont 1965, writ ref'd) (concluding taxpayer suit to contest legality of police chiefs appointment on grounds of illegal public expenditures could only be brought in quo warranto)."},"case_id":8424033,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even though the Court finds that Plaintiff is not likely to succeed on the merits of a claim under the Lanham Act due to insufficient evidence of the likelihood of confusion, Plaintiff can demonstrate success on the merits under Florida law, \"notwithstanding the absence of ... confusion as to the source of goods or services,\" if Plaintiff makes a showing that there \"[1] exists a likelihood of injury to business reputation or [2] of dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, trade name, label or form of advertisement of the prior user____\" Fla.Stat. SS 495.141. Since the Court has already found that Plaintiffs \"A B\" mark is not similar to Defendant's corporate name, \"A-B Distributors,\" that it is not a distinctive mark, and that extensive third party usage has rendered the mark a weak one (see discussion infra), Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the dilution prong, [2], of the statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"889 F.2d 1018, 1024","parenthetical":"anti-dilution statute's purpose is to prevent the weakening of a distinctive trademark and to \"protect[ ] the owners of such strong, distinctive marks from the diminution of consumer goodwill by competitors or non-competitors\"","sentence":"See Amstar, 615 F.2d at 265 (applying same analysis to similar anti-dilution statute under Georgia law); see also Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College District, 889 F.2d 1018, 1024 (11th Cir.1989) (anti-dilution statute\u2019s purpose is to prevent the weakening of a distinctive trademark and to \u201cprotect[ ] the owners of such strong, distinctive marks from the diminution of consumer goodwill by competitors or non-competitors\u201d) (emphasis added); accord Freedom Savings and Loan Ass\u2019n, 757 F.2d at 1186. Nor does the Court find that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence for the Court to find that it will succeed on the merits of a claim of a likelihood of injury to its business reputation."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"615 F.2d 265, 265","parenthetical":"applying same analysis to similar anti-dilution statute under Georgia law","sentence":"See Amstar, 615 F.2d at 265 (applying same analysis to similar anti-dilution statute under Georgia law); see also Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College District, 889 F.2d 1018, 1024 (11th Cir.1989) (anti-dilution statute\u2019s purpose is to prevent the weakening of a distinctive trademark and to \u201cprotect[ ] the owners of such strong, distinctive marks from the diminution of consumer goodwill by competitors or non-competitors\u201d) (emphasis added); accord Freedom Savings and Loan Ass\u2019n, 757 F.2d at 1186. Nor does the Court find that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence for the Court to find that it will succeed on the merits of a claim of a likelihood of injury to its business reputation."},"case_id":646096,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RSA 510:4, I (1983). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the scope of RSA 510:4 is as broad as is consistent with the statutory language and the dictates of due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"130 N.H. 166, 171","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \"to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"682 F.2d 33, 33","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 seeks \"to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"case_id":7846283,"label":"a"}
{"context":"RSA 510:4, I (1983). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the scope of RSA 510:4 is as broad as is consistent with the statutory language and the dictates of due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 seeks \"to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"130 N.H. 166, 171","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \"to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"case_id":7846283,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RSA 510:4, I (1983). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the scope of RSA 510:4 is as broad as is consistent with the statutory language and the dictates of due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 seeks \"to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"130 N.H. 166, 171","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \"to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"case_id":7846283,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RSA 510:4, I (1983). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the scope of RSA 510:4 is as broad as is consistent with the statutory language and the dictates of due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 seeks \"to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"130 N.H. 166, 171","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \"to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"case_id":7846283,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RSA 510:4, I (1983). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the scope of RSA 510:4 is as broad as is consistent with the statutory language and the dictates of due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"536 A.2d 740, 742","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \"to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"682 F.2d 33, 33","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 seeks \"to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"case_id":7846283,"label":"a"}
{"context":"RSA 510:4, I (1983). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the scope of RSA 510:4 is as broad as is consistent with the statutory language and the dictates of due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 seeks \"to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"536 A.2d 740, 742","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \"to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"case_id":7846283,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RSA 510:4, I (1983). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the scope of RSA 510:4 is as broad as is consistent with the statutory language and the dictates of due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 seeks \"to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"536 A.2d 740, 742","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \"to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"case_id":7846283,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RSA 510:4, I (1983). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has determined that the scope of RSA 510:4 is as broad as is consistent with the statutory language and the dictates of due process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"536 A.2d 740, 742","parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \"to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"RSA 510:4 seeks \"to extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\"","sentence":"See Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740, 742 (1987) (RSA 510:4 provides jurisdiction \u201cto the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow.\u201d); see also Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 522, 529 A.2d 956, 958 (1987); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 682 F.2d 33, 33 (1st Cir.1982), rev\u2019d on other grounds 465 U.S. 770, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (RSA 510:4 seeks \u201cto extend jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent permitted under the federal constitution\u201d)."},"case_id":7846283,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Wachovia's reliance on the \"as is\" provision of the sales contract in support of its motion to dismiss is misplaced. The inclusion of an \"as is\" clause in a contract for the sale of residential real property does not waive the duty imposed upon a seller under Johnson.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[W]e discern no 'as is' contractual exception to the duty imposed on the seller herein by the Johnson decision.\"","sentence":"Syvrud v. Today Real Estate, Inc., 858 So.2d 1125, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (\u201cAn \u2018as is\u2019 clause in a contract for the sale of residential real property does not waive the duty imposed by Johnson v. Davis to disclose hidden defects in the property.\u201d); Levy v. Creative Constr. Servs. of Broward,, Inc., 566 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (\u201c[W]e discern no \u2018as is\u2019 contractual exception to the duty imposed on the seller herein by the Johnson decision.\u201d); Rayner, 504 So.2d at 1364 (\u201c[W]e note that generally, an \u201cas is\u201d clause in a contract for sale of real property cannot be relied upon to bar a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent nondisclosure.\u201d); see also Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision in Contract for Sale of Realty by Which Purchaser Agrees to Take Property \u201cAs Is\u201d or in Its Existing Condition, 8 A.L.R. 5th 312 \u00a7 2a (\u201c[I]t has generally been held or recognized that an \u201cas is\u201d provision in a contract for the sale of realty does not bar a vendee\u2019s claim based on allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t has generally been held or recognized that an \"as is\" provision in a contract for the sale of realty does not bar a vendee's claim based on allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.\"","sentence":"Syvrud v. Today Real Estate, Inc., 858 So.2d 1125, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (\u201cAn \u2018as is\u2019 clause in a contract for the sale of residential real property does not waive the duty imposed by Johnson v. Davis to disclose hidden defects in the property.\u201d); Levy v. Creative Constr. Servs. of Broward,, Inc., 566 So.2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (\u201c[W]e discern no \u2018as is\u2019 contractual exception to the duty imposed on the seller herein by the Johnson decision.\u201d); Rayner, 504 So.2d at 1364 (\u201c[W]e note that generally, an \u201cas is\u201d clause in a contract for sale of real property cannot be relied upon to bar a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent nondisclosure.\u201d); see also Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision in Contract for Sale of Realty by Which Purchaser Agrees to Take Property \u201cAs Is\u201d or in Its Existing Condition, 8 A.L.R. 5th 312 \u00a7 2a (\u201c[I]t has generally been held or recognized that an \u201cas is\u201d provision in a contract for the sale of realty does not bar a vendee\u2019s claim based on allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.\u201d)."},"case_id":9028459,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, the state offered to prove that Clavijo had made the phone call as a preliminary step to executing the robbery through the information conveyed by the business associate. Thus, the testimony as to how the police obtained the telephone number that linked Clavijo to the robbery was inadmissible hearsay.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"775 So.2d 263, 274","parenthetical":"\"When the only possible relevance of an out-of-court statement is directed to the truth of the matters stated by a declarant, the subject matter is classic hearsay even though the proponent of such evidence seeks to clothe such hearsay under a non-hearsay label.\"","sentence":"See Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263, 274 (Fla.2000) (\u201cWhen the only possible relevance of an out-of-court statement is directed to the truth of the matters stated by a declarant, the subject matter is classic hearsay even though the proponent of such evidence seeks to clothe such hearsay under a non-hearsay label.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"769 So.2d 496, 498","parenthetical":"\"Where the implication from in-court testimony is that a non-testifying witness has made an out-of-court statement offered to prove the defendant's guilt, the testimony is not admissible.\"","sentence":"See also Schaffer v. State, 769 So.2d 496, 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (\u201cWhere the implication from in-court testimony is that a non-testifying witness has made an out-of-court statement offered to prove the defendant\u2019s guilt, the testimony is not admissible.\u201d)."},"case_id":9500618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Questions arising out of transactions, including coal mining leases, on the. Navajo and Hopi reservations and on the tribes' joint land have been extensively litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"537 U.S. 493, 493-513","parenthetical":"rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86","parenthetical":"describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"case_id":9174678,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Questions arising out of transactions, including coal mining leases, on the. Navajo and Hopi reservations and on the tribes' joint land have been extensively litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76","parenthetical":"describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"537 U.S. 493, 493-513","parenthetical":"rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"case_id":9174678,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Questions arising out of transactions, including coal mining leases, on the. Navajo and Hopi reservations and on the tribes' joint land have been extensively litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86","parenthetical":"describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"case_id":9174678,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Questions arising out of transactions, including coal mining leases, on the. Navajo and Hopi reservations and on the tribes' joint land have been extensively litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76","parenthetical":"describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"case_id":9174678,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Questions arising out of transactions, including coal mining leases, on the. Navajo and Hopi reservations and on the tribes' joint land have been extensively litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86","parenthetical":"describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"373 F.3d 945, 946","parenthetical":"holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"case_id":9174678,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Questions arising out of transactions, including coal mining leases, on the. Navajo and Hopi reservations and on the tribes' joint land have been extensively litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"373 F.3d 945, 946","parenthetical":"holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76","parenthetical":"describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody","sentence":"See, e.g., Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493-513, 123 S.Ct. 1079 (rejecting claim by Navajo Nation that the Secretary of the Interior breached fiduciary duties owed to the Nation by approving the coal leases); Peabody Coal Co. v. Navajo Nation, 373 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enforce arbitration settlement agreement about lease royalty rates); see also Clinton v. Babbitt, 180 F.3d 1081, 1083-86 (9th Cir.1999) (describing the lengthy dispute between Navajo and Hopi Nations over joint use land in Arizona); Navajo Nation v. Peabody Holding Co., 209 F.Supp.2d 269, 275-76 (D.D.C.2002) (describing history of amendments to the leases in a RICO suit by the tribe against Peabody)."},"case_id":9174678,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Generally, we review a district court's decision to refuse application of the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the deferential clearly erroneous standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 F.3d 1147, 1172","parenthetical":"\"Whether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir.2005) (\u201cWhether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\u201d); accord United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1145 (10th Cir.2005); cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (\u2018Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder\u2019s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"470 U.S. 564, 574","parenthetical":"'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir.2005) (\u201cWhether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\u201d); accord United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1145 (10th Cir.2005); cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (\u2018Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder\u2019s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\u201d)."},"case_id":3736231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Generally, we review a district court's decision to refuse application of the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the deferential clearly erroneous standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 F.3d 1147, 1172","parenthetical":"\"Whether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir.2005) (\u201cWhether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\u201d); accord United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1145 (10th Cir.2005); cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (\u2018Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder\u2019s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir.2005) (\u201cWhether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\u201d); accord United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1145 (10th Cir.2005); cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (\u2018Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder\u2019s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\u201d)."},"case_id":3736231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Generally, we review a district court's decision to refuse application of the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under the deferential clearly erroneous standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 F.3d 1147, 1172","parenthetical":"\"Whether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir.2005) (\u201cWhether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\u201d); accord United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1145 (10th Cir.2005); cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (\u2018Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder\u2019s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"'Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1172 (10th Cir.2005) (\u201cWhether the facts of a particular case warrant a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact that we review under the clearly erroneous standard.\u201d); accord United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1145 (10th Cir.2005); cf. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (\u2018Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder\u2019s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.\u201d)."},"case_id":3736231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The remaining counts upon which defendants were convicted involve allegations of wire fraud (Count VI), interstate transportation of the proceeds of fraud (Count VIII), and mail fraud (Count IX). The mail and wire fraud counts require the government to prove that the defendants did the alleged act (mailed or wired the proceeds of fraud) in furtherance of the bank fraud scheme.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"347 U.S. 1, 8-9","parenthetical":"distinguishing between causing the use of the mails and finding the mailing to be in furtherance of the scheme","sentence":"See also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954) (distinguishing between causing the use of the mails and finding the mailing to be in furtherance of the scheme)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69","parenthetical":"mail fraud conviction requires proof of a scheme to defraud, the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme, and causation of the use of the mails","sentence":"United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69 (11th Cir.1984) (mail fraud conviction requires proof of a scheme to defraud, the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme, and causation of the use of the mails)."},"case_id":11676954,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The remaining counts upon which defendants were convicted involve allegations of wire fraud (Count VI), interstate transportation of the proceeds of fraud (Count VIII), and mail fraud (Count IX). The mail and wire fraud counts require the government to prove that the defendants did the alleged act (mailed or wired the proceeds of fraud) in furtherance of the bank fraud scheme.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing between causing the use of the mails and finding the mailing to be in furtherance of the scheme","sentence":"See also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954) (distinguishing between causing the use of the mails and finding the mailing to be in furtherance of the scheme)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69","parenthetical":"mail fraud conviction requires proof of a scheme to defraud, the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme, and causation of the use of the mails","sentence":"United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69 (11th Cir.1984) (mail fraud conviction requires proof of a scheme to defraud, the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme, and causation of the use of the mails)."},"case_id":11676954,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The remaining counts upon which defendants were convicted involve allegations of wire fraud (Count VI), interstate transportation of the proceeds of fraud (Count VIII), and mail fraud (Count IX). The mail and wire fraud counts require the government to prove that the defendants did the alleged act (mailed or wired the proceeds of fraud) in furtherance of the bank fraud scheme.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69","parenthetical":"mail fraud conviction requires proof of a scheme to defraud, the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme, and causation of the use of the mails","sentence":"United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1568-69 (11th Cir.1984) (mail fraud conviction requires proof of a scheme to defraud, the use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme, and causation of the use of the mails)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing between causing the use of the mails and finding the mailing to be in furtherance of the scheme","sentence":"See also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954) (distinguishing between causing the use of the mails and finding the mailing to be in furtherance of the scheme)."},"case_id":11676954,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Virginia courts must consider a communication in its particular context when determining whether a speaker's words constitute a true threat. In view of this requirement, the proscription against threats of bodily harm complies with Watts and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"382 F.3d 447, 451-52","parenthetical":"apply ing Watts factors to determine whether appellant's statements constituted \"true threat\"","sentence":"See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708, 89 S.Ct. at 1401 (considering context in which threat was made, conditional nature of statement, and reaction of the listeners to determine whether defendant\u2019s statements were a \u201ctrue threat\u201d); see also United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 451-52 (4th Cir.2004) (apply ing Watts factors to determine whether appellant\u2019s statements constituted \u201ctrue threat\u201d); United States v. Cooper, 865 F.2d 88, 85 (4th Cir.1989) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"394 U.S. 708, 708","parenthetical":"considering context in which threat was made, conditional nature of statement, and reaction of the listeners to determine whether defendant's statements were a \"true threat\"","sentence":"See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708, 89 S.Ct. at 1401 (considering context in which threat was made, conditional nature of statement, and reaction of the listeners to determine whether defendant\u2019s statements were a \u201ctrue threat\u201d); see also United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 451-52 (4th Cir.2004) (apply ing Watts factors to determine whether appellant\u2019s statements constituted \u201ctrue threat\u201d); United States v. Cooper, 865 F.2d 88, 85 (4th Cir.1989) (same)."},"case_id":3067981,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Virginia courts must consider a communication in its particular context when determining whether a speaker's words constitute a true threat. In view of this requirement, the proscription against threats of bodily harm complies with Watts and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"382 F.3d 447, 451-52","parenthetical":"apply ing Watts factors to determine whether appellant's statements constituted \"true threat\"","sentence":"See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708, 89 S.Ct. at 1401 (considering context in which threat was made, conditional nature of statement, and reaction of the listeners to determine whether defendant\u2019s statements were a \u201ctrue threat\u201d); see also United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 451-52 (4th Cir.2004) (apply ing Watts factors to determine whether appellant\u2019s statements constituted \u201ctrue threat\u201d); United States v. Cooper, 865 F.2d 88, 85 (4th Cir.1989) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1401, 1401","parenthetical":"considering context in which threat was made, conditional nature of statement, and reaction of the listeners to determine whether defendant's statements were a \"true threat\"","sentence":"See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708, 89 S.Ct. at 1401 (considering context in which threat was made, conditional nature of statement, and reaction of the listeners to determine whether defendant\u2019s statements were a \u201ctrue threat\u201d); see also United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 451-52 (4th Cir.2004) (apply ing Watts factors to determine whether appellant\u2019s statements constituted \u201ctrue threat\u201d); United States v. Cooper, 865 F.2d 88, 85 (4th Cir.1989) (same)."},"case_id":3067981,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Rather, the government must set forth \"something in the record [to] suggest[ ] that the district court would have imposed the same or a greater sentence.\" Moreover, the comments of the sentencing judge here that \"the defendant and his family enjoyed a lavish lifestyle at the expense of many unsuspecting victims\" and that \"a sentence in the middle range of the Guidelines would sufficiently punish the defendant and deter others from committing like or similar crimes\" are insufficient to say with fair assurance that the statutory Booker error was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"409 F.3d 1274, 1277","parenthetical":"holding statutory error harmless where district court imposed the highest available sentence under guidelines range and considered sentencing to the statutory maximum","sentence":"Id. at 749-50 (holding statutory Booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines); see also United States v. Cain, 433 F.3d 1345, 1348-49 (11th Cir.2005) (concluding that constitutional error was not harmless because district court did not state that it would have imposed the same or higher sentence if it had the discretion to do so, even though it sentenced defendant to the \u201chigh end\u201d the guidelines range and stated that the sentence was \u201cappropriate\u201d); cf. United States v. Gallegos-Aguero, 409 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (holding statutory error harmless where district court imposed the highest available sentence under guidelines range and considered sentencing to the statutory maximum); United States v. Mejia-Giovani, 416 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.2005) (finding that district court\u2019s express statements that the defendant might not benefit under an advisory system with the court\u2019s warning that defendant was at risk for an upward departure made statutory error harmless)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"433 F.3d 1345, 1348-49","parenthetical":"concluding that constitutional error was not harmless because district court did not state that it would have imposed the same or higher sentence if it had the discretion to do so, even though it sentenced defendant to the \"high end\" the guidelines range and stated that the sentence was \"appropriate\"","sentence":"Id. at 749-50 (holding statutory Booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines); see also United States v. Cain, 433 F.3d 1345, 1348-49 (11th Cir.2005) (concluding that constitutional error was not harmless because district court did not state that it would have imposed the same or higher sentence if it had the discretion to do so, even though it sentenced defendant to the \u201chigh end\u201d the guidelines range and stated that the sentence was \u201cappropriate\u201d); cf. United States v. Gallegos-Aguero, 409 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (holding statutory error harmless where district court imposed the highest available sentence under guidelines range and considered sentencing to the statutory maximum); United States v. Mejia-Giovani, 416 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.2005) (finding that district court\u2019s express statements that the defendant might not benefit under an advisory system with the court\u2019s warning that defendant was at risk for an upward departure made statutory error harmless)."},"case_id":5640861,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Rather, the government must set forth \"something in the record [to] suggest[ ] that the district court would have imposed the same or a greater sentence.\" Moreover, the comments of the sentencing judge here that \"the defendant and his family enjoyed a lavish lifestyle at the expense of many unsuspecting victims\" and that \"a sentence in the middle range of the Guidelines would sufficiently punish the defendant and deter others from committing like or similar crimes\" are insufficient to say with fair assurance that the statutory Booker error was harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that district court's express statements that the defendant might not benefit under an advisory system with the court's warning that defendant was at risk for an upward departure made statutory error harmless","sentence":"Id. at 749-50 (holding statutory Booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines); see also United States v. Cain, 433 F.3d 1345, 1348-49 (11th Cir.2005) (concluding that constitutional error was not harmless because district court did not state that it would have imposed the same or higher sentence if it had the discretion to do so, even though it sentenced defendant to the \u201chigh end\u201d the guidelines range and stated that the sentence was \u201cappropriate\u201d); cf. United States v. Gallegos-Aguero, 409 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (holding statutory error harmless where district court imposed the highest available sentence under guidelines range and considered sentencing to the statutory maximum); United States v. Mejia-Giovani, 416 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.2005) (finding that district court\u2019s express statements that the defendant might not benefit under an advisory system with the court\u2019s warning that defendant was at risk for an upward departure made statutory error harmless)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"433 F.3d 1345, 1348-49","parenthetical":"concluding that constitutional error was not harmless because district court did not state that it would have imposed the same or higher sentence if it had the discretion to do so, even though it sentenced defendant to the \"high end\" the guidelines range and stated that the sentence was \"appropriate\"","sentence":"Id. at 749-50 (holding statutory Booker error was not harmless where district court imposed sentence in middle of guidelines range and there were no statements in the record reflecting that the court would have imposed the same or greater sentence under advisory guidelines); see also United States v. Cain, 433 F.3d 1345, 1348-49 (11th Cir.2005) (concluding that constitutional error was not harmless because district court did not state that it would have imposed the same or higher sentence if it had the discretion to do so, even though it sentenced defendant to the \u201chigh end\u201d the guidelines range and stated that the sentence was \u201cappropriate\u201d); cf. United States v. Gallegos-Aguero, 409 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir.2005) (holding statutory error harmless where district court imposed the highest available sentence under guidelines range and considered sentencing to the statutory maximum); United States v. Mejia-Giovani, 416 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir.2005) (finding that district court\u2019s express statements that the defendant might not benefit under an advisory system with the court\u2019s warning that defendant was at risk for an upward departure made statutory error harmless)."},"case_id":5640861,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Aplt. App. at 357. None of the other circumstances surrounding her confession, including Owens' admonishment, \"[D]on't lie to me,\" id. at 359, indicates that her confession was involuntary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"121 F.3d 486, 494","parenthetical":"holding that officer's encouragement \"to tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\"","sentence":"See Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that officer\u2019s encouragement \u201cto tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\u201d); cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36, 38, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967) (indicating that suspect\u2019s confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect\u2019s ear and another officer said, \u201cIf you don\u2019t tell the truth I am going to kill you\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"389 U.S. 35, 36, 38","parenthetical":"indicating that suspect's confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect's ear and another officer said, \"If you don't tell the truth I am going to kill you\"","sentence":"See Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that officer\u2019s encouragement \u201cto tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\u201d); cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36, 38, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967) (indicating that suspect\u2019s confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect\u2019s ear and another officer said, \u201cIf you don\u2019t tell the truth I am going to kill you\u201d)."},"case_id":3644178,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Aplt. App. at 357. None of the other circumstances surrounding her confession, including Owens' admonishment, \"[D]on't lie to me,\" id. at 359, indicates that her confession was involuntary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"121 F.3d 486, 494","parenthetical":"holding that officer's encouragement \"to tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\"","sentence":"See Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that officer\u2019s encouragement \u201cto tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\u201d); cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36, 38, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967) (indicating that suspect\u2019s confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect\u2019s ear and another officer said, \u201cIf you don\u2019t tell the truth I am going to kill you\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"indicating that suspect's confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect's ear and another officer said, \"If you don't tell the truth I am going to kill you\"","sentence":"See Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that officer\u2019s encouragement \u201cto tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\u201d); cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36, 38, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967) (indicating that suspect\u2019s confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect\u2019s ear and another officer said, \u201cIf you don\u2019t tell the truth I am going to kill you\u201d)."},"case_id":3644178,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Aplt. App. at 357. None of the other circumstances surrounding her confession, including Owens' admonishment, \"[D]on't lie to me,\" id. at 359, indicates that her confession was involuntary.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"indicating that suspect's confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect's ear and another officer said, \"If you don't tell the truth I am going to kill you\"","sentence":"See Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that officer\u2019s encouragement \u201cto tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\u201d); cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36, 38, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967) (indicating that suspect\u2019s confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect\u2019s ear and another officer said, \u201cIf you don\u2019t tell the truth I am going to kill you\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"121 F.3d 486, 494","parenthetical":"holding that officer's encouragement \"to tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\"","sentence":"See Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 494 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that officer\u2019s encouragement \u201cto tell the truth ... did not amount to coercion\u201d); cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36, 38, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967) (indicating that suspect\u2019s confession was involuntary where officer fired rifle next to suspect\u2019s ear and another officer said, \u201cIf you don\u2019t tell the truth I am going to kill you\u201d)."},"case_id":3644178,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This court, however, respects and reviews carefully the guidance offered by other federal courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he decisions of other regional circuits are persuasive authority and instructive.\"","sentence":"See Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.2009) (\u201c[T]he decisions of other regional circuits are persuasive authority and instructive.\u201d); see also Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 589, 609 n. 31 (2009); Hutchens v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 553, 563 n. 12 (2009); CNG Transmission Mgmt. VEBA v. United States, 84 Fed.Cl. 327, 336-37 (2008) (\u201c[T]his court looks to the regional circuit courts of appeal for persuasive authority.\u201d), aff'd, 588 F.3d 1376 (Fed.Cir.2009), reh\u2019g en banc denied (Fed.Cir.2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"84 Fed.Cl. 327, 336-37","parenthetical":"\"[T]his court looks to the regional circuit courts of appeal for persuasive authority.\"","sentence":"See Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.2009) (\u201c[T]he decisions of other regional circuits are persuasive authority and instructive.\u201d); see also Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 589, 609 n. 31 (2009); Hutchens v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 553, 563 n. 12 (2009); CNG Transmission Mgmt. VEBA v. United States, 84 Fed.Cl. 327, 336-37 (2008) (\u201c[T]his court looks to the regional circuit courts of appeal for persuasive authority.\u201d), aff'd, 588 F.3d 1376 (Fed.Cir.2009), reh\u2019g en banc denied (Fed.Cir.2010)."},"case_id":4089814,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This court, however, respects and reviews carefully the guidance offered by other federal courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]his court looks to the regional circuit courts of appeal for persuasive authority.\"","sentence":"See Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.2009) (\u201c[T]he decisions of other regional circuits are persuasive authority and instructive.\u201d); see also Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 589, 609 n. 31 (2009); Hutchens v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 553, 563 n. 12 (2009); CNG Transmission Mgmt. VEBA v. United States, 84 Fed.Cl. 327, 336-37 (2008) (\u201c[T]his court looks to the regional circuit courts of appeal for persuasive authority.\u201d), aff'd, 588 F.3d 1376 (Fed.Cir.2009), reh\u2019g en banc denied (Fed.Cir.2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he decisions of other regional circuits are persuasive authority and instructive.\"","sentence":"See Bank of Guam v. United States, 578 F.3d 1318, 1326 n. 4 (Fed.Cir.2009) (\u201c[T]he decisions of other regional circuits are persuasive authority and instructive.\u201d); see also Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 589, 609 n. 31 (2009); Hutchens v. United States, 89 Fed.Cl. 553, 563 n. 12 (2009); CNG Transmission Mgmt. VEBA v. United States, 84 Fed.Cl. 327, 336-37 (2008) (\u201c[T]his court looks to the regional circuit courts of appeal for persuasive authority.\u201d), aff'd, 588 F.3d 1376 (Fed.Cir.2009), reh\u2019g en banc denied (Fed.Cir.2010)."},"case_id":4089814,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"740 F.2d 1298, 1303","parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"809 F.2d 429, 445, 446","parenthetical":"prosecutor's claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \"placed him in the inappropriate role of a witness\"","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"809 F.2d 429, 445, 446","parenthetical":"prosecutor's claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \"placed him in the inappropriate role of a witness\"","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"809 F.2d 429, 445, 446","parenthetical":"prosecutor's claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \"placed him in the inappropriate role of a witness\"","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"809 F.2d 429, 445, 446","parenthetical":"prosecutor's claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \"placed him in the inappropriate role of a witness\"","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"740 F.2d 1298, 1303","parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"747 F.2d 930, 942","parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"747 F.2d 930, 942","parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"747 F.2d 930, 942","parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"747 F.2d 930, 942","parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"740 F.2d 1298, 1303","parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"740 F.2d 1298, 1303","parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"740 F.2d 1298, 1303","parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In particular, we observe that there was no evidence backing the prosecutor's comments that the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and jeopardizing their careers. Even setting aside DiLoreto's strong condemnation of extra-record vouching, we would disapprove of these portions of the prosecutorial argument, as it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to invoke his or her oath of office as a means of defending the credibility of government witnesses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving of a prosecutor's suggestion that he might be \"personally disadvantaged\" if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement","sentence":"See also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1303 (3d Cir.1984), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Pflaumer, 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 3550, 87 L.Ed.2d 673 (1985) (disapproving of a prosecutor\u2019s suggestion that he might be \u201cpersonally disadvantaged\u201d if it were determined that a government witness had disregarded the truthful testimony proviso of his plea agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor's integrity in maintaining prosecution","sentence":"United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 445, 446 (7th Cir.1987) (Flaum, J., concurring) (prosecutor\u2019s claim that his oath of office prevented him from offering perjured testimony \u201cplaced him in the inappropriate role of a witness\u201d); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 942 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 906, 105 S.Ct. 3531, 87 L.Ed.2d 655 (1985) (prosecutor\u2019s insinuation that he only prosecuted the guilty was improper, albeit fair reply to defense attacks on the prosecutor\u2019s integrity in maintaining prosecution)."},"case_id":10539848,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Jackson's main contention is that the IRS abated his tax liabilities.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"794 F.2d 1575, 1577","parenthetical":"noting that a compromise is \"within the discretion of the agency conducting the litigation\"","sentence":"United States v. Forma, 784 F.Supp. 1132, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1992); see also Slovacek v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 828, 833 (1998) (agreeing with Forma); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 36 Fed.Cl. 313, 321 (1996) (agreeing with Forma); Brubaker v. United States, 342 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir.1965) (determining that excess tax \u201cliabilities cannot be compromised by the Attorney General or the [DOJ] unless and until the Commissioner refers [the matter] to the [DOJ] for prosecution or defense\u201d); cf. Bergh v. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 794 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1986) (noting that a compromise is \u201cwithin the discretion of the agency conducting the litigation\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"342 F.2d 655, 662","parenthetical":"determining that excess tax \"liabilities cannot be compromised by the Attorney General or the [DOJ] unless and until the Commissioner refers [the matter] to the [DOJ] for prosecution or defense\"","sentence":"United States v. Forma, 784 F.Supp. 1132, 1139 (S.D.N.Y.1992); see also Slovacek v. United States, 40 Fed.Cl. 828, 833 (1998) (agreeing with Forma); Int'l Paper Co. v. United States, 36 Fed.Cl. 313, 321 (1996) (agreeing with Forma); Brubaker v. United States, 342 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir.1965) (determining that excess tax \u201cliabilities cannot be compromised by the Attorney General or the [DOJ] unless and until the Commissioner refers [the matter] to the [DOJ] for prosecution or defense\u201d); cf. Bergh v. Dep\u2019t of Transp., 794 F.2d 1575, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1986) (noting that a compromise is \u201cwithin the discretion of the agency conducting the litigation\u201d)."},"case_id":3587927,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The public records concerning the property on which the failed cattle operation was rooted, as well as the property itself, are in Bryan County. The overwhelming amount of documentary and testimonial evidence has close physical proximity not to this Court, which is situated approximately 350 miles from Bryan County, but to the Oklahoma state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"753 F.2d 1338, 1340","parenthetical":"noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \"are equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\"","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 820, 820","parenthetical":"finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"case_id":11645973,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The public records concerning the property on which the failed cattle operation was rooted, as well as the property itself, are in Bryan County. The overwhelming amount of documentary and testimonial evidence has close physical proximity not to this Court, which is situated approximately 350 miles from Bryan County, but to the Oklahoma state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \"are equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\"","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 820, 820","parenthetical":"finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"case_id":11645973,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The public records concerning the property on which the failed cattle operation was rooted, as well as the property itself, are in Bryan County. The overwhelming amount of documentary and testimonial evidence has close physical proximity not to this Court, which is situated approximately 350 miles from Bryan County, but to the Oklahoma state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 820, 820","parenthetical":"finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \"are equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\"","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"case_id":11645973,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The public records concerning the property on which the failed cattle operation was rooted, as well as the property itself, are in Bryan County. The overwhelming amount of documentary and testimonial evidence has close physical proximity not to this Court, which is situated approximately 350 miles from Bryan County, but to the Oklahoma state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \"are equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\"","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"424 U.S. 820, 820","parenthetical":"finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"case_id":11645973,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The public records concerning the property on which the failed cattle operation was rooted, as well as the property itself, are in Bryan County. The overwhelming amount of documentary and testimonial evidence has close physical proximity not to this Court, which is situated approximately 350 miles from Bryan County, but to the Oklahoma state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 S.Ct. 1247, 1247","parenthetical":"finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"753 F.2d 1338, 1340","parenthetical":"noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \"are equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\"","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"case_id":11645973,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The public records concerning the property on which the failed cattle operation was rooted, as well as the property itself, are in Bryan County. The overwhelming amount of documentary and testimonial evidence has close physical proximity not to this Court, which is situated approximately 350 miles from Bryan County, but to the Oklahoma state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \"are equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\"","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 S.Ct. 1247, 1247","parenthetical":"finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"case_id":11645973,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The public records concerning the property on which the failed cattle operation was rooted, as well as the property itself, are in Bryan County. The overwhelming amount of documentary and testimonial evidence has close physical proximity not to this Court, which is situated approximately 350 miles from Bryan County, but to the Oklahoma state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \"are equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\"","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 S.Ct. 1247, 1247","parenthetical":"finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"case_id":11645973,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The public records concerning the property on which the failed cattle operation was rooted, as well as the property itself, are in Bryan County. The overwhelming amount of documentary and testimonial evidence has close physical proximity not to this Court, which is situated approximately 350 miles from Bryan County, but to the Oklahoma state court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 S.Ct. 1247, 1247","parenthetical":"finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \"are equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\"","sentence":"See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820, 96 S.Ct. at 1247 (finding significant a 300-mile distance between the state and federal courts at issue); cf. Signad, Inc. v. City of Sugar Land, 753 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir.) (noting, in reversing exercise of abstention by a district court, that the federal court and state court at issue \u201care equidistant from ... where the dispute arose\u201d), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822, 106 S.Ct. 75, 88 L.Ed.2d 61 (1985)."},"case_id":11645973,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Officer Golden was entitled to rely on the description in combination with other clues: the precise number of robbers, the immediacy of the robbery, the suspects' close proximity to the crime scene, the direction in which the men were headed, and the dearth of others in the critical two-block area. The totality of the circumstances supported a logical inference that the appellant and his companion were the robbers.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"317 F.3d 31, 31","parenthetical":"\"The two men were not only in the right place at the right time, but also fit the suspects' descriptions.\"","sentence":"See Lee, 317 F.3d at 31 (\u201cThe two men were not only in the right place at the right time, but also fit the suspects\u2019 descriptions.\u201d); see also United States v. Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir.2011) (concluding that reasonable suspicion existed to detain the only person walking at 3:30 a.m. in the vicinity of a reported murder where that person fit the general description of the suspect)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"666 F.3d 20, 28-29","parenthetical":"concluding that reasonable suspicion existed to detain the only person walking at 3:30 a.m. in the vicinity of a reported murder where that person fit the general description of the suspect","sentence":"See Lee, 317 F.3d at 31 (\u201cThe two men were not only in the right place at the right time, but also fit the suspects\u2019 descriptions.\u201d); see also United States v. Pontoo, 666 F.3d 20, 28-29 (1st Cir.2011) (concluding that reasonable suspicion existed to detain the only person walking at 3:30 a.m. in the vicinity of a reported murder where that person fit the general description of the suspect)."},"case_id":4183440,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Once challenged, the burden of establishing a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction typically rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. However, where it is asserted that jurisdiction is lacking because of mootness, courts have placed the initial burden of demonstrating mootness on the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"79 F.3d 3, 6","parenthetical":"plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\"","sentence":"See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness); but see Video Tutorial Services, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 79 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir.1996) (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"440 U.S. 625, 631","parenthetical":"case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness","sentence":"See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness); but see Video Tutorial Services, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 79 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir.1996) (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review\u201d)."},"case_id":11684403,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once challenged, the burden of establishing a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction typically rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. However, where it is asserted that jurisdiction is lacking because of mootness, courts have placed the initial burden of demonstrating mootness on the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"79 F.3d 3, 6","parenthetical":"plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\"","sentence":"See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness); but see Video Tutorial Services, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 79 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir.1996) (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness","sentence":"See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness); but see Video Tutorial Services, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 79 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir.1996) (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review\u201d)."},"case_id":11684403,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Once challenged, the burden of establishing a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction typically rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. However, where it is asserted that jurisdiction is lacking because of mootness, courts have placed the initial burden of demonstrating mootness on the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness","sentence":"See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness); but see Video Tutorial Services, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 79 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir.1996) (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"79 F.3d 3, 6","parenthetical":"plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \"capable of repetition, yet evading review\"","sentence":"See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (case was dismissed where defendants had met their burden of demonstrating mootness); but see Video Tutorial Services, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 79 F.3d 3, 6 (2d Cir.1996) (plaintiff bears burden of demonstrating that action which is otherwise moot falls under the mootness exception for cases that are \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review\u201d)."},"case_id":11684403,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, the Turek panel affirmed the usefulness of Walton insofar as it found that an excessive force claim can be premised on handcuffing, i.e., the right not to be handcuffed in an objectively unreasonable manner was clearly established.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"411 F.3d 775, 775","parenthetical":"recog nizing Walton as \"holding that an excessive force claim may be based on officers' handcuffing an arrestee unnecessarily tightly\"","sentence":"See id; St. John, 411 F.3d at 775 (recog nizing Walton as \u201cholding that an excessive force claim may be based on officers\u2019 handcuffing an arrestee unnecessarily tightly\u201d); Solomon, 389 F.3d at 173 (same); Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Walton for having \u201carticulated a clearly established right to be free from specific types of non-deadly excessive force, such as handcuffing an individual too tightly\u201d); Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir.2001) (same); see also Burchett, 310 F.3d at 944 (\u201cThe right to be free from \u2018excessively forceful handcuffing\u2019 is a clearly established right for qualified immunity purposes\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"310 F.3d 944, 944","parenthetical":"\"The right to be free from 'excessively forceful handcuffing' is a clearly established right for qualified immunity purposes\"","sentence":"See id; St. John, 411 F.3d at 775 (recog nizing Walton as \u201cholding that an excessive force claim may be based on officers\u2019 handcuffing an arrestee unnecessarily tightly\u201d); Solomon, 389 F.3d at 173 (same); Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Walton for having \u201carticulated a clearly established right to be free from specific types of non-deadly excessive force, such as handcuffing an individual too tightly\u201d); Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir.2001) (same); see also Burchett, 310 F.3d at 944 (\u201cThe right to be free from \u2018excessively forceful handcuffing\u2019 is a clearly established right for qualified immunity purposes\u201d)."},"case_id":3331449,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, even if he had, the fact remains that Thorn was arrested. Thus, he has failed to demonstrate that the information provided by the police blotters was false, let alone demonstrate the other elements required for a viable defamation claim under Louisiana state law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"830 So.2d 1037, 1045","parenthetical":"concluding report of the plaintiffs arrest was neither false nor defamatory","sentence":"See Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552, 559 (La. 1997) (\u201cFour elements are necessary to establish a defamation cause of action: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d); see also Lee v. Pennington, 830 So.2d 1037, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding report of the plaintiffs arrest was neither false nor defamatory)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"703 So.2d 552, 559","parenthetical":"\"Four elements are necessary to establish a defamation cause of action: (1","sentence":"See Trentecosta v. Beck, 703 So.2d 552, 559 (La. 1997) (\u201cFour elements are necessary to establish a defamation cause of action: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d); see also Lee v. Pennington, 830 So.2d 1037, 1045 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding report of the plaintiffs arrest was neither false nor defamatory)."},"case_id":12404198,"label":"b"}
{"context":". As to his 24 month sentence, Defendant suggests the district court erred in declining to depart downward from the guideline range based on Agent Chard's alleged Miranda violation. Because the district court recognized its authority to grant a downward departure at the sentencing hearing, we lack jurisdiction to review its decision to deny Defendant's motion for such departure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"383 F.3d 638, 644","parenthetical":"expressing \"serious doubts about whether police misconduct that did not have any effect on the nature of the offense or the individual offender would ever be a permissible ground for departure\"","sentence":"See United States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1111-1115 (10th Cir.2007) (\"This court may review a denial of a downward departure only if the denial is based on the sentencing court's interpretation of the Guidelines as depriving it of the legal authority to grant the departure.\"); see also United States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir.2004) (expressing \"serious doubts about whether police misconduct that did not have any effect on the nature of the offense or the individual offender would ever be a permissible ground for departure\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"473 F.3d 1109, 1111-1115","parenthetical":"\"This court may review a denial of a downward departure only if the denial is based on the sentencing court's interpretation of the Guidelines as depriving it of the legal authority to grant the departure.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1111-1115 (10th Cir.2007) (\"This court may review a denial of a downward departure only if the denial is based on the sentencing court's interpretation of the Guidelines as depriving it of the legal authority to grant the departure.\"); see also United States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638, 644 (7th Cir.2004) (expressing \"serious doubts about whether police misconduct that did not have any effect on the nature of the offense or the individual offender would ever be a permissible ground for departure\u201d)."},"case_id":3782403,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 52 If Officer Craft did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to detain Appellant at the conclusion of the traffic stop, he certainly did not gain any additional insights to arrive at such a conclusion during this extremely brief consensual encounter. If he did have reasonable suspicion, then he was obligated to act on it before telling Appellant he could leave.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"392 U.S. 20, 20","parenthetical":"recognizing the need for police officers to take swift action based upon on-the-spot observations that lead to reasonable suspicion","sentence":"Johnson, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (stating that once reasonable suspicion is aroused, police officers must be positioned to act instantly on that suspicion); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (recognizing the need for police officers to take swift action based upon on-the-spot observations that lead to reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"129 S.Ct. 786, 786","parenthetical":"stating that once reasonable suspicion is aroused, police officers must be positioned to act instantly on that suspicion","sentence":"Johnson, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (stating that once reasonable suspicion is aroused, police officers must be positioned to act instantly on that suspicion); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (recognizing the need for police officers to take swift action based upon on-the-spot observations that lead to reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":4053927,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 52 If Officer Craft did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to detain Appellant at the conclusion of the traffic stop, he certainly did not gain any additional insights to arrive at such a conclusion during this extremely brief consensual encounter. If he did have reasonable suspicion, then he was obligated to act on it before telling Appellant he could leave.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"129 S.Ct. 786, 786","parenthetical":"stating that once reasonable suspicion is aroused, police officers must be positioned to act instantly on that suspicion","sentence":"Johnson, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (stating that once reasonable suspicion is aroused, police officers must be positioned to act instantly on that suspicion); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (recognizing the need for police officers to take swift action based upon on-the-spot observations that lead to reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing the need for police officers to take swift action based upon on-the-spot observations that lead to reasonable suspicion","sentence":"Johnson, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (stating that once reasonable suspicion is aroused, police officers must be positioned to act instantly on that suspicion); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (recognizing the need for police officers to take swift action based upon on-the-spot observations that lead to reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":4053927,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This determination compels our resolution of the question of jurisdiction: because the NYSE's alleged violations of the federal securities laws and its improper interpretation of those laws underlie D'Alessio's state law claims, the federal issue is substantial. \"[U]pon [the federal statute's] construction the vindication of rights and definition of relationships created by federal law depends.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"482 U.S. 395, 395","parenthetical":"federal question jurisdiction did not lie under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where the resolution of the plaintiffs' breach of an individual employment contract claims \"[did] not substantially depend[ ] upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement\"","sentence":"W. 14th St. Commercial Corp., 815 F.2d at 193, 196 (\u201carising under\u201d jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \u201cencompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\u201d); see also Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 395, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (federal question jurisdiction did not lie under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where the resolution of the plaintiffs\u2019 breach of an individual employment contract claims \u201c[did] not substantially depend[ ] upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement\u201d); Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1212 (\u201c[Although [plaintiffs] theories are posited as state law claims, they are founded on the defendants\u2019 conduct in suspending trading and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined by federal law.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"815 F.2d 193, 193, 196","parenthetical":"\"arising under\" jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \"encompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\"","sentence":"W. 14th St. Commercial Corp., 815 F.2d at 193, 196 (\u201carising under\u201d jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \u201cencompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\u201d); see also Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 395, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (federal question jurisdiction did not lie under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where the resolution of the plaintiffs\u2019 breach of an individual employment contract claims \u201c[did] not substantially depend[ ] upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement\u201d); Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1212 (\u201c[Although [plaintiffs] theories are posited as state law claims, they are founded on the defendants\u2019 conduct in suspending trading and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined by federal law.\u201d)."},"case_id":11080438,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This determination compels our resolution of the question of jurisdiction: because the NYSE's alleged violations of the federal securities laws and its improper interpretation of those laws underlie D'Alessio's state law claims, the federal issue is substantial. \"[U]pon [the federal statute's] construction the vindication of rights and definition of relationships created by federal law depends.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"federal question jurisdiction did not lie under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where the resolution of the plaintiffs' breach of an individual employment contract claims \"[did] not substantially depend[ ] upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement\"","sentence":"W. 14th St. Commercial Corp., 815 F.2d at 193, 196 (\u201carising under\u201d jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \u201cencompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\u201d); see also Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 395, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (federal question jurisdiction did not lie under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where the resolution of the plaintiffs\u2019 breach of an individual employment contract claims \u201c[did] not substantially depend[ ] upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement\u201d); Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1212 (\u201c[Although [plaintiffs] theories are posited as state law claims, they are founded on the defendants\u2019 conduct in suspending trading and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined by federal law.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"815 F.2d 193, 193, 196","parenthetical":"\"arising under\" jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \"encompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\"","sentence":"W. 14th St. Commercial Corp., 815 F.2d at 193, 196 (\u201carising under\u201d jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \u201cencompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\u201d); see also Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 395, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (federal question jurisdiction did not lie under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where the resolution of the plaintiffs\u2019 breach of an individual employment contract claims \u201c[did] not substantially depend[ ] upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement\u201d); Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1212 (\u201c[Although [plaintiffs] theories are posited as state law claims, they are founded on the defendants\u2019 conduct in suspending trading and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined by federal law.\u201d)."},"case_id":11080438,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This determination compels our resolution of the question of jurisdiction: because the NYSE's alleged violations of the federal securities laws and its improper interpretation of those laws underlie D'Alessio's state law claims, the federal issue is substantial. \"[U]pon [the federal statute's] construction the vindication of rights and definition of relationships created by federal law depends.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"815 F.2d 193, 193, 196","parenthetical":"\"arising under\" jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \"encompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\"","sentence":"W. 14th St. Commercial Corp., 815 F.2d at 193, 196 (\u201carising under\u201d jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \u201cencompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\u201d); see also Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 395, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (federal question jurisdiction did not lie under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where the resolution of the plaintiffs\u2019 breach of an individual employment contract claims \u201c[did] not substantially depend[ ] upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement\u201d); Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1212 (\u201c[Although [plaintiffs] theories are posited as state law claims, they are founded on the defendants\u2019 conduct in suspending trading and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined by federal law.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"159 F.3d 1212, 1212","parenthetical":"\"[Although [plaintiffs] theories are posited as state law claims, they are founded on the defendants' conduct in suspending trading and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined by federal law.\"","sentence":"W. 14th St. Commercial Corp., 815 F.2d at 193, 196 (\u201carising under\u201d jurisdiction established where plaintiffs state law claims \u201cencompass a substantial federal question under the Condominium and Cooperative Abuse Relief Act\u201d); see also Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 395, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (federal question jurisdiction did not lie under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act where the resolution of the plaintiffs\u2019 breach of an individual employment contract claims \u201c[did] not substantially depend[ ] upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement\u201d); Sparta Surgical Corp., 159 F.3d at 1212 (\u201c[Although [plaintiffs] theories are posited as state law claims, they are founded on the defendants\u2019 conduct in suspending trading and de-listing the offering, the propriety of which must be exclusively determined by federal law.\u201d)."},"case_id":11080438,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83","parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83","parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 Conn. App. 386, 402","parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83","parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 Conn. App. 386, 402","parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 Conn. App. 386, 402","parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 Conn. App. 386, 402","parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83","parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83","parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83","parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although a trial court may elect to do so, it is not necessary for it to repeatedly instruct the jury on the same element, here, specific intent, for different crimes charged. As long as the jury has been fully instructed once, it is not reasonably possible that a jury is misled because it was not repeatedly instructed on that same element.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \"[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Millan, 290 Conn. 816, 824-25 n.7, 966 A.2d 699 (2009) (trial court\u2019s incorporation by reference of its earlier instruction regarding element of crime, as well as its highlighting of similarity of elements between counts, reasonably would have led jury to conclude that element applied to both counts); State v. Padua, 73 Conn. App. 386, 402, 808 A.2d 361 (2002) (\u201c[b]ecause the jury was fully instructed on the sale of a controlled substance in count one, we conclude that it is not reasonably possible that the jury was misled by not being repeatedly instructed on that same element in counts four and five\u201d), rev\u2019d in part on other grounds, 273 Conn. 138, 869 A.2d 192 (2005); cf. State v. DeBarros, 58 Conn. App. 673, 682-83, 755 A.2d 303 (where trial court repeatedly referenced improper jury instruction, \u201c[i]t is reasonably possible that the jury was misled because the probable effect of the improper charge was that it guided the jury to an incorrect verdict\u201d), cert. denied, 254 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 756 (2000)."},"case_id":4147345,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \"sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610","parenthetical":"holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \"sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"187 A.D.2d 384, 385","parenthetical":"holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \"identifiable fund\" and thus \"a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \"identifiable fund\" and thus \"a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \"sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712","parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712","parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610","parenthetical":"holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \"sufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"187 A.D.2d 384, 385","parenthetical":"holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \"identifiable fund\" and thus \"a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712","parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712","parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \"identifiable fund\" and thus \"a proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712","parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That determination often turns on whether the money alleged to have been converted was contained in a segregated fund of some sort. See, e.g., Mfrs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712","parenthetical":"\"Money, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\"","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes","sentence":"Hanover Tr. Co. v. Chem. Bank, 160 A.D.2d 113, 559 N.Y.S.2d 704, 712 (1990) (\u201cMoney, specifically identifiable and segregated, can be the subject of a conversion action.\u201d); see also Thys v. Fortis Sec. LLC, 74 A.D.3d 546, 903 N.Y.S.2d 368, 369 (2010) (\u201cAn action for conversion of money may be made out where there is a specific, identifiable fund and an obligation to return or otherwise treat in a particular manner the specific fund in question.\u201d (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Sperrazza v. Kail, 267 A.D.2d 692, 699 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (1999) (holding that contents of joint bank accounts, which had been withdrawn in their entirety by one of cotenant without consent of the other eotenant, were \u201csufficiently identifiable to be the subject of a claim for conversion\u201d); Bankers Tr. Co. v. Cerrato, Sweeney, Cohn, Stahl & Vaccaro, 187 A.D.2d 384, 385, 590 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1992) (holding that proceeds of a litigation settlement were an \u201cidentifiable fund\u201d and thus \u201ca proper subject of a misappropriation and conversion claim\u201d); Brennan\u2019s Bus Serv., Inc. v. Brennan, 107 A.D.2d 858, 484 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1985) (affirming conversion judgment in favor of plaintiff where defendant withdrew corporate funds invested in certificates of deposit and spent it for non-corporate purposes)."},"case_id":12269335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"ORDERED that Gary M. Anderson is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia with reinstatement subject to a fitness requirement and the right to petition for reinstatement after five years or when reinstated in the state of Maryland, whichever occurs first.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"990 A.2d 483, 487-88","parenthetical":"explaining that the presumption of identical discipline in D.C. Bar R. XI, SS 11 (c) will prevail except in \"rare\" cases","sentence":"See In re Maignan, 988 A.2d 493, 495 (D.C. 2010) (setting forth the functionally equivalent discipline for an indefinite suspension without a required minimum period of suspension); see also In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483, 487-88 (D.C. 2010) (explaining that the presumption of identical discipline in D.C. Bar R. XI, \u00a7 11 (c) will prevail except in \u201crare\u201d cases); In re Cole, 809 A.2d 1226, 1227 n.3 (D.C. 2002) (explaining that in unopposed reciprocal matters the \u201cimposition of identical discipline should be close to automatic\u201d). For purposes of eligibility to petition for reinstatement, the suspension will not begin to run until such time as respondent files a D.C. Bar R. XI, \u00a7 14. (g) affidavit."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"988 A.2d 493, 495","parenthetical":"setting forth the functionally equivalent discipline for an indefinite suspension without a required minimum period of suspension","sentence":"See In re Maignan, 988 A.2d 493, 495 (D.C. 2010) (setting forth the functionally equivalent discipline for an indefinite suspension without a required minimum period of suspension); see also In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483, 487-88 (D.C. 2010) (explaining that the presumption of identical discipline in D.C. Bar R. XI, \u00a7 11 (c) will prevail except in \u201crare\u201d cases); In re Cole, 809 A.2d 1226, 1227 n.3 (D.C. 2002) (explaining that in unopposed reciprocal matters the \u201cimposition of identical discipline should be close to automatic\u201d). For purposes of eligibility to petition for reinstatement, the suspension will not begin to run until such time as respondent files a D.C. Bar R. XI, \u00a7 14. (g) affidavit."},"case_id":12320797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"ORDERED that Gary M. Anderson is hereby indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in the District of Columbia with reinstatement subject to a fitness requirement and the right to petition for reinstatement after five years or when reinstated in the state of Maryland, whichever occurs first.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that in unopposed reciprocal matters the \"imposition of identical discipline should be close to automatic\"","sentence":"See In re Maignan, 988 A.2d 493, 495 (D.C. 2010) (setting forth the functionally equivalent discipline for an indefinite suspension without a required minimum period of suspension); see also In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483, 487-88 (D.C. 2010) (explaining that the presumption of identical discipline in D.C. Bar R. XI, \u00a7 11 (c) will prevail except in \u201crare\u201d cases); In re Cole, 809 A.2d 1226, 1227 n.3 (D.C. 2002) (explaining that in unopposed reciprocal matters the \u201cimposition of identical discipline should be close to automatic\u201d). For purposes of eligibility to petition for reinstatement, the suspension will not begin to run until such time as respondent files a D.C. Bar R. XI, \u00a7 14. (g) affidavit."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"988 A.2d 493, 495","parenthetical":"setting forth the functionally equivalent discipline for an indefinite suspension without a required minimum period of suspension","sentence":"See In re Maignan, 988 A.2d 493, 495 (D.C. 2010) (setting forth the functionally equivalent discipline for an indefinite suspension without a required minimum period of suspension); see also In re Sibley, 990 A.2d 483, 487-88 (D.C. 2010) (explaining that the presumption of identical discipline in D.C. Bar R. XI, \u00a7 11 (c) will prevail except in \u201crare\u201d cases); In re Cole, 809 A.2d 1226, 1227 n.3 (D.C. 2002) (explaining that in unopposed reciprocal matters the \u201cimposition of identical discipline should be close to automatic\u201d). For purposes of eligibility to petition for reinstatement, the suspension will not begin to run until such time as respondent files a D.C. Bar R. XI, \u00a7 14. (g) affidavit."},"case_id":12320797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"four-day lapse -- suicide in direct response to serious injury","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"four-day lapse -- suicide in direct response to serious injury","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"four-day lapse -- suicide in direct response to serious injury","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"four-day lapse -- suicide in direct response to serious injury","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The suicide cases, allowing recovery, reviewed in preparation of my earlier opinion denying summary judgment, uniformly involve cases in which there exists the possibility of finding a strong, direct link between the suicide and the wrongful act of the defendant.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury","sentence":"E. g., Fuller v. Preis, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263 (Ct.App.1974) (seven-month lapse marked by repeated medical treatment for symptoms resulting from the wrongful act); Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 131 N.J.Super. 403, 330 A.2d 56 (1974) (four-day lapse \u2014 suicide in direct response to serious injury); Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059 (Mass.1978) (two-month lapse with direct connection between mental illness relapse, accident, and eventual suicide); Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 519 S.W.2d 170 (Ct.App.Tex.1975) (thirty-four-month lapse marked by continuing psychological instability immediately and directly related to injury); cf. McMahon v. City of New York, 16 Misc.2d 143, 141 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Court 1955) (six-month lapse, during which plaintiff returned to work, found to preclude wrongful death claim)."},"case_id":5581674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We now turn to the government's arguments on appeal. The government asserts, \"The best and most direct evidence of the Maoists['] intent is their own words.\" Gov't Br. at 20. We agree with that statement, as far as it goes, as it recognizes the difficulty in gathering evidence of motivation in asylum cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494","parenthetical":"noting that, in ascertaining motive, the agency may evaluate \"statements or actions by the perpetrators\"","sentence":"See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812 (refusing to require an asylum applicant \u201cto provide direct proof of his persecutor\u2019s motives\u201d); see also In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494 (B.I.A.1996) (noting that, in ascertaining motive, the agency may evaluate \u201cstatements or actions by the perpetrators\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"502 U.S. 483, 483","parenthetical":"refusing to require an asylum applicant \"to provide direct proof of his persecutor's motives\"","sentence":"See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812 (refusing to require an asylum applicant \u201cto provide direct proof of his persecutor\u2019s motives\u201d); see also In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494 (B.I.A.1996) (noting that, in ascertaining motive, the agency may evaluate \u201cstatements or actions by the perpetrators\u201d)."},"case_id":4151386,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We now turn to the government's arguments on appeal. The government asserts, \"The best and most direct evidence of the Maoists['] intent is their own words.\" Gov't Br. at 20. We agree with that statement, as far as it goes, as it recognizes the difficulty in gathering evidence of motivation in asylum cases.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494","parenthetical":"noting that, in ascertaining motive, the agency may evaluate \"statements or actions by the perpetrators\"","sentence":"See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812 (refusing to require an asylum applicant \u201cto provide direct proof of his persecutor\u2019s motives\u201d); see also In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494 (B.I.A.1996) (noting that, in ascertaining motive, the agency may evaluate \u201cstatements or actions by the perpetrators\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to require an asylum applicant \"to provide direct proof of his persecutor's motives\"","sentence":"See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. 812 (refusing to require an asylum applicant \u201cto provide direct proof of his persecutor\u2019s motives\u201d); see also In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 494 (B.I.A.1996) (noting that, in ascertaining motive, the agency may evaluate \u201cstatements or actions by the perpetrators\u201d)."},"case_id":4151386,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As we have recognized in previous cases, rule 65B was fashioned to prevent abuse of the judicial process by prisoners who \"burden the courts and frustrate the ends of justice\" by filing multiple habeas petitions for claims which could have been brought in a single petition.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"886 P.2d 60, 60","parenthetical":"concluding that rule 65B(b)(7) is intended to prevent abuse by prisoners through filing of successive writs","sentence":"See Wright, 886 P.2d at 60 (concluding that rule 65B(b)(7) is intended to prevent abuse by prisoners through filing of successive writs); see also Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1990) (\u201cRule 65B(i)(2) is designed to prevent successive petitions for a writ based on identical grounds, a potential abuse of the judicial system.\u201d); Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036 (\u201cThe law can and does protect itself against vexatious and abusive successive petitions for writs.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"789 P.2d 710, 712","parenthetical":"\"Rule 65B(i)(2) is designed to prevent successive petitions for a writ based on identical grounds, a potential abuse of the judicial system.\"","sentence":"See Wright, 886 P.2d at 60 (concluding that rule 65B(b)(7) is intended to prevent abuse by prisoners through filing of successive writs); see also Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1990) (\u201cRule 65B(i)(2) is designed to prevent successive petitions for a writ based on identical grounds, a potential abuse of the judicial system.\u201d); Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036 (\u201cThe law can and does protect itself against vexatious and abusive successive petitions for writs.\u201d)."},"case_id":11833943,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As we have recognized in previous cases, rule 65B was fashioned to prevent abuse of the judicial process by prisoners who \"burden the courts and frustrate the ends of justice\" by filing multiple habeas petitions for claims which could have been brought in a single petition.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"777 P.2d 1036, 1036","parenthetical":"\"The law can and does protect itself against vexatious and abusive successive petitions for writs.\"","sentence":"See Wright, 886 P.2d at 60 (concluding that rule 65B(b)(7) is intended to prevent abuse by prisoners through filing of successive writs); see also Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1990) (\u201cRule 65B(i)(2) is designed to prevent successive petitions for a writ based on identical grounds, a potential abuse of the judicial system.\u201d); Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036 (\u201cThe law can and does protect itself against vexatious and abusive successive petitions for writs.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"886 P.2d 60, 60","parenthetical":"concluding that rule 65B(b)(7) is intended to prevent abuse by prisoners through filing of successive writs","sentence":"See Wright, 886 P.2d at 60 (concluding that rule 65B(b)(7) is intended to prevent abuse by prisoners through filing of successive writs); see also Candelario v. Cook, 789 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1990) (\u201cRule 65B(i)(2) is designed to prevent successive petitions for a writ based on identical grounds, a potential abuse of the judicial system.\u201d); Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1036 (\u201cThe law can and does protect itself against vexatious and abusive successive petitions for writs.\u201d)."},"case_id":11833943,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The law has long recognized that failure to follow a party's precautionary steps or procedures is not necessarily failure to exercise ordinary care.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"737 P.2d 1106, 1111","parenthetical":"internal rules of brokerage firm relevant to standard of care for breach of fiduciary duty, but not determinative of the standard of care","sentence":"57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence \u00a7 187 at 239 (1998) (failure to follow company rule does not constitute negligence per se; jury may consider rule, but rule does not set standard of conduct establishing what law requires of a reasonable person under the circumstances); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 165 (2000) (defendant\u2019s rules or practices are evidence bearing on the reasonable care issue, but do not ordinarily count as the standard of care; limiting instruction may be required, advising jury that rules cannot set a higher duty than is required by law); 1 J.D. Lee and Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law \u00a7 3.29 (1996) (\u201cCompany rules are generally admissible but not conclusive on the question of the standard of care.\u201d); Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 737 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Colo.1987) (internal rules of brokerage firm relevant to standard of care for breach of fiduciary duty, but not determinative of the standard of care); Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483, 591 N.Y.S.2d 974, 606 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 n. 3 (1992) (defendant\u2019s company manual did not create a separate duty of care; where internal rules require a standard that transcends reasonable care, breach of rules cannot be considered evidence of negligence); cf. Boutilier v. Chrysler Ins. Co., No. 8:99-cv-2270-T-26MAP, 2001 WL 220159, at * 1, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5526, at *4 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 31, 2001) (in negligence action, mere fact that defendant has internal corporate poli cy does not create a legal duty or cause a breach of that duty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2001 WL 220159, at * 1","parenthetical":"in negligence action, mere fact that defendant has internal corporate poli cy does not create a legal duty or cause a breach of that duty","sentence":"57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence \u00a7 187 at 239 (1998) (failure to follow company rule does not constitute negligence per se; jury may consider rule, but rule does not set standard of conduct establishing what law requires of a reasonable person under the circumstances); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 165 (2000) (defendant\u2019s rules or practices are evidence bearing on the reasonable care issue, but do not ordinarily count as the standard of care; limiting instruction may be required, advising jury that rules cannot set a higher duty than is required by law); 1 J.D. Lee and Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law \u00a7 3.29 (1996) (\u201cCompany rules are generally admissible but not conclusive on the question of the standard of care.\u201d); Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 737 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Colo.1987) (internal rules of brokerage firm relevant to standard of care for breach of fiduciary duty, but not determinative of the standard of care); Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483, 591 N.Y.S.2d 974, 606 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 n. 3 (1992) (defendant\u2019s company manual did not create a separate duty of care; where internal rules require a standard that transcends reasonable care, breach of rules cannot be considered evidence of negligence); cf. Boutilier v. Chrysler Ins. Co., No. 8:99-cv-2270-T-26MAP, 2001 WL 220159, at * 1, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5526, at *4 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 31, 2001) (in negligence action, mere fact that defendant has internal corporate poli cy does not create a legal duty or cause a breach of that duty)."},"case_id":11443240,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The law has long recognized that failure to follow a party's precautionary steps or procedures is not necessarily failure to exercise ordinary care.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5526, at *4","parenthetical":"in negligence action, mere fact that defendant has internal corporate poli cy does not create a legal duty or cause a breach of that duty","sentence":"57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence \u00a7 187 at 239 (1998) (failure to follow company rule does not constitute negligence per se; jury may consider rule, but rule does not set standard of conduct establishing what law requires of a reasonable person under the circumstances); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 165 (2000) (defendant\u2019s rules or practices are evidence bearing on the reasonable care issue, but do not ordinarily count as the standard of care; limiting instruction may be required, advising jury that rules cannot set a higher duty than is required by law); 1 J.D. Lee and Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law \u00a7 3.29 (1996) (\u201cCompany rules are generally admissible but not conclusive on the question of the standard of care.\u201d); Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 737 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Colo.1987) (internal rules of brokerage firm relevant to standard of care for breach of fiduciary duty, but not determinative of the standard of care); Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483, 591 N.Y.S.2d 974, 606 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 n. 3 (1992) (defendant\u2019s company manual did not create a separate duty of care; where internal rules require a standard that transcends reasonable care, breach of rules cannot be considered evidence of negligence); cf. Boutilier v. Chrysler Ins. Co., No. 8:99-cv-2270-T-26MAP, 2001 WL 220159, at * 1, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5526, at *4 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 31, 2001) (in negligence action, mere fact that defendant has internal corporate poli cy does not create a legal duty or cause a breach of that duty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"737 P.2d 1106, 1111","parenthetical":"internal rules of brokerage firm relevant to standard of care for breach of fiduciary duty, but not determinative of the standard of care","sentence":"57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence \u00a7 187 at 239 (1998) (failure to follow company rule does not constitute negligence per se; jury may consider rule, but rule does not set standard of conduct establishing what law requires of a reasonable person under the circumstances); 1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts \u00a7 165 (2000) (defendant\u2019s rules or practices are evidence bearing on the reasonable care issue, but do not ordinarily count as the standard of care; limiting instruction may be required, advising jury that rules cannot set a higher duty than is required by law); 1 J.D. Lee and Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law \u00a7 3.29 (1996) (\u201cCompany rules are generally admissible but not conclusive on the question of the standard of care.\u201d); Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 737 P.2d 1106, 1111 (Colo.1987) (internal rules of brokerage firm relevant to standard of care for breach of fiduciary duty, but not determinative of the standard of care); Sherman v. Robinson, 80 N.Y.2d 483, 591 N.Y.S.2d 974, 606 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 n. 3 (1992) (defendant\u2019s company manual did not create a separate duty of care; where internal rules require a standard that transcends reasonable care, breach of rules cannot be considered evidence of negligence); cf. Boutilier v. Chrysler Ins. Co., No. 8:99-cv-2270-T-26MAP, 2001 WL 220159, at * 1, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5526, at *4 (M.D.Fla. Jan. 31, 2001) (in negligence action, mere fact that defendant has internal corporate poli cy does not create a legal duty or cause a breach of that duty)."},"case_id":11443240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For the foregoing reasons the petition for review is GRANTED in part. This panel retains jurisdiction to rule, if necessary, upon the issue of Mustafaj's removability.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"15 F.3d 19, 21-22","parenthetical":"retaining jurisdiction while remanding to the district court for supplementation of the record","sentence":"See Shi Liang Lin v. DOJ, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir.2005) (retaining jurisdiction to decide issues on appeal following remand to the BIA); cf. United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir.1994) (retaining jurisdiction while remanding to the district court for supplementation of the record)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"416 F.3d 184, 192","parenthetical":"retaining jurisdiction to decide issues on appeal following remand to the BIA","sentence":"See Shi Liang Lin v. DOJ, 416 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir.2005) (retaining jurisdiction to decide issues on appeal following remand to the BIA); cf. United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 21-22 (2d Cir.1994) (retaining jurisdiction while remanding to the district court for supplementation of the record)."},"case_id":3408285,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The majority has not taken notice of certain exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine that have developed in a recent line of cases. This court has held that discharge of an at-will employee is actionable if the employee is discharged for exercising a statutorily protected right.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to OSHA would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under Occupational Safety and Health Act","sentence":"See also Macken v. Lord Corp., supra (suggesting that Pennsylvania courts would recognize wrongful discharge claim based upon discharge in retaliation for filing workers\u2019 compensation claim); Sorge v. Wright\u2019s Knitwear Corp., 832 F.Supp. 118 (E.D.Pa.1993) (under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to OSHA would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under Occupational Safety and Health Act); Kilpatrick v. Delaware County S.P.C.A, 632 F.Supp. 542 (E.D.Pa.1986) (under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under or related to Occupational Safety and Health Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discharge for collecting partial unemployment compensation based on previous full-time job while employed part-time by K Mart would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation","sentence":"Raykovitz v. K Mart Corp., 445 Pa.Super. 378, 665 A.2d 833 (1995) (discharge for collecting partial unemployment compensation based on previous full-time job while employed part-time by K Mart would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation); Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, supra (constructive discharge for filing unemployment compensation claim during periods when employer offered no work to employee would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation)."},"case_id":7859284,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The majority has not taken notice of certain exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine that have developed in a recent line of cases. This court has held that discharge of an at-will employee is actionable if the employee is discharged for exercising a statutorily protected right.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discharge for collecting partial unemployment compensation based on previous full-time job while employed part-time by K Mart would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation","sentence":"Raykovitz v. K Mart Corp., 445 Pa.Super. 378, 665 A.2d 833 (1995) (discharge for collecting partial unemployment compensation based on previous full-time job while employed part-time by K Mart would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation); Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, supra (constructive discharge for filing unemployment compensation claim during periods when employer offered no work to employee would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under or related to Occupational Safety and Health Act","sentence":"See also Macken v. Lord Corp., supra (suggesting that Pennsylvania courts would recognize wrongful discharge claim based upon discharge in retaliation for filing workers\u2019 compensation claim); Sorge v. Wright\u2019s Knitwear Corp., 832 F.Supp. 118 (E.D.Pa.1993) (under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to OSHA would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under Occupational Safety and Health Act); Kilpatrick v. Delaware County S.P.C.A, 632 F.Supp. 542 (E.D.Pa.1986) (under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under or related to Occupational Safety and Health Act)."},"case_id":7859284,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority has not taken notice of certain exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine that have developed in a recent line of cases. This court has held that discharge of an at-will employee is actionable if the employee is discharged for exercising a statutorily protected right.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discharge for collecting partial unemployment compensation based on previous full-time job while employed part-time by K Mart would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation","sentence":"Raykovitz v. K Mart Corp., 445 Pa.Super. 378, 665 A.2d 833 (1995) (discharge for collecting partial unemployment compensation based on previous full-time job while employed part-time by K Mart would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation); Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, supra (constructive discharge for filing unemployment compensation claim during periods when employer offered no work to employee would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to OSHA would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under Occupational Safety and Health Act","sentence":"See also Macken v. Lord Corp., supra (suggesting that Pennsylvania courts would recognize wrongful discharge claim based upon discharge in retaliation for filing workers\u2019 compensation claim); Sorge v. Wright\u2019s Knitwear Corp., 832 F.Supp. 118 (E.D.Pa.1993) (under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to OSHA would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under Occupational Safety and Health Act); Kilpatrick v. Delaware County S.P.C.A, 632 F.Supp. 542 (E.D.Pa.1986) (under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under or related to Occupational Safety and Health Act)."},"case_id":7859284,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority has not taken notice of certain exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine that have developed in a recent line of cases. This court has held that discharge of an at-will employee is actionable if the employee is discharged for exercising a statutorily protected right.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under or related to Occupational Safety and Health Act","sentence":"See also Macken v. Lord Corp., supra (suggesting that Pennsylvania courts would recognize wrongful discharge claim based upon discharge in retaliation for filing workers\u2019 compensation claim); Sorge v. Wright\u2019s Knitwear Corp., 832 F.Supp. 118 (E.D.Pa.1993) (under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to OSHA would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under Occupational Safety and Health Act); Kilpatrick v. Delaware County S.P.C.A, 632 F.Supp. 542 (E.D.Pa.1986) (under Pennsylvania law, discharge for reporting safety violations to Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture would violate public policy embodied in federal statute protecting employees who voluntarily file complaints under or related to Occupational Safety and Health Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discharge for collecting partial unemployment compensation based on previous full-time job while employed part-time by K Mart would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation","sentence":"Raykovitz v. K Mart Corp., 445 Pa.Super. 378, 665 A.2d 833 (1995) (discharge for collecting partial unemployment compensation based on previous full-time job while employed part-time by K Mart would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation); Highhouse v. Avery Transportation, supra (constructive discharge for filing unemployment compensation claim during periods when employer offered no work to employee would violate public policy embodied in statute rendering void any agreement by employee to waive, release or commute rights to unemployment compensation)."},"case_id":7859284,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Third, it is apparent that the Strattons were represented by counsel throughout the state court proceedings, and that their constitutional rights were protected. Fourth, any claim against the judicial defendants would certainly be subject to dismissal based on the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of SS 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity","sentence":"See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (explaining that \u201cit is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself\u2019); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.1976) (affirming dismissal of \u00a7 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself'","sentence":"See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (explaining that \u201cit is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself\u2019); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.1976) (affirming dismissal of \u00a7 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity)."},"case_id":5713015,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Third, it is apparent that the Strattons were represented by counsel throughout the state court proceedings, and that their constitutional rights were protected. Fourth, any claim against the judicial defendants would certainly be subject to dismissal based on the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of SS 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity","sentence":"See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (explaining that \u201cit is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself\u2019); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.1976) (affirming dismissal of \u00a7 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself'","sentence":"See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (explaining that \u201cit is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself\u2019); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.1976) (affirming dismissal of \u00a7 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity)."},"case_id":5713015,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Third, it is apparent that the Strattons were represented by counsel throughout the state court proceedings, and that their constitutional rights were protected. Fourth, any claim against the judicial defendants would certainly be subject to dismissal based on the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of SS 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity","sentence":"See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (explaining that \u201cit is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself\u2019); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.1976) (affirming dismissal of \u00a7 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself'","sentence":"See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (explaining that \u201cit is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself\u2019); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.1976) (affirming dismissal of \u00a7 1983 claim on basis of judicial immunity)."},"case_id":5713015,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Parks's complaint makes numerous references to the judicial proceedings in Pennsylvania state court that resulted in the razing of the family home. Although the record of those proceedings was not attached to the complaint, this Court can, and will, take judicial notice of the publicly available opinions rendered by the state courts in those proceedings, as they provide the relevant background to the present suit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"780 F.2d 691, 697","parenthetical":"\"[T]he official record of the parallel state case is a proper object for judicial notice.\"","sentence":"See McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir.2009) (explaining that the \u201ccourt may take judicial notice of a prior judicial opinion\u201d); see also Lumen Const. v. Brant Const., 780 F.2d 691, 697 (7th Cir.1985) (\u201c[T]he official record of the parallel state case is a proper object for judicial notice.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"577 F.3d 521, 526","parenthetical":"explaining that the \"court may take judicial notice of a prior judicial opinion\"","sentence":"See McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir.2009) (explaining that the \u201ccourt may take judicial notice of a prior judicial opinion\u201d); see also Lumen Const. v. Brant Const., 780 F.2d 691, 697 (7th Cir.1985) (\u201c[T]he official record of the parallel state case is a proper object for judicial notice.\u201d)."},"case_id":3935664,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, the Court concludes that a genuine issue of material fact exists, and summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"124 F.3d 130, 130","parenthetical":"\"Here, a reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence, that [defendants] violated the plaintiffs' clearly established constitutional rights by conspiring to fabricate and forward to prosecutors a known false confession almost certain to influence a jury's verdict.\"","sentence":"See Ricciuti 124 F.3d at 130 (\u201cHere, a reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence, that [defendants] violated the plaintiffs\u2019 clearly established constitutional rights by conspiring to fabricate and forward to prosecutors a known false confession almost certain to influence a jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d); see also Jocks, 316 F.3d at 138 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where plaintiff testified that statement written by defendant was false, and defendant testified that statement was verbatim and accurate, because, \u201c[although there was certainly not overwhelming evidence of falsification, a reasonable jury would be entitled to credit [plaintiffs] testimony and reject [defendant\u2019s]\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"316 F.3d 138, 138","parenthetical":"holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where plaintiff testified that statement written by defendant was false, and defendant testified that statement was verbatim and accurate, because, \"[although there was certainly not overwhelming evidence of falsification, a reasonable jury would be entitled to credit [plaintiffs] testimony and reject [defendant's]\"","sentence":"See Ricciuti 124 F.3d at 130 (\u201cHere, a reasonable jury could find, based on the evidence, that [defendants] violated the plaintiffs\u2019 clearly established constitutional rights by conspiring to fabricate and forward to prosecutors a known false confession almost certain to influence a jury\u2019s verdict.\u201d); see also Jocks, 316 F.3d at 138 (holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where plaintiff testified that statement written by defendant was false, and defendant testified that statement was verbatim and accurate, because, \u201c[although there was certainly not overwhelming evidence of falsification, a reasonable jury would be entitled to credit [plaintiffs] testimony and reject [defendant\u2019s]\u201d)."},"case_id":4279500,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"53 F.3d 1118, 1125","parenthetical":"holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"130 F.3d 76, 83","parenthetical":"\"[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 F.3d 800, 810","parenthetical":"\"Following the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"53 F.3d 1118, 1125","parenthetical":"holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"53 F.3d 1118, 1125","parenthetical":"holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 F.3d 1041, 1051","parenthetical":"\"[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 F.3d 1108, 1114","parenthetical":"\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"53 F.3d 1118, 1125","parenthetical":"holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"870 F.2d 786, 790","parenthetical":"employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"53 F.3d 1118, 1125","parenthetical":"holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"870 F.2d 786, 790","parenthetical":"employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"130 F.3d 76, 83","parenthetical":"\"[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 F.3d 800, 810","parenthetical":"\"Following the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"870 F.2d 786, 790","parenthetical":"employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 F.3d 1041, 1051","parenthetical":"\"[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"870 F.2d 786, 790","parenthetical":"employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Boeing is not required to create positions merely to accommodate Aldrich. This is not required by the ADA.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"870 F.2d 786, 790","parenthetical":"employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 F.3d 1108, 1114","parenthetical":"\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\"","sentence":"See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.1995) (holding transfer to another job that would violate seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement unreasonable); see also Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir.1997) (\u201c[A]n accommodation to one employee which violates the seniority rights of other employees in a collective bargaining agreement simply is not reasonable.\u201d); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir.1997) (\u201cFollowing the other circuits which have considered this issue, we hold that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (\u201c[T|he ADA does not require disabled individuals to be accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority rights of other employees.\"); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir.1995) (\"The ADA does not require that [the employer] take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement.\u201d); cf. Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir.1989) (employer \"not required [under Rehabilitation Act] to accommodate plaintiff further by placing him in a different position since to do so would violate the rights of other employees under the collective bargaining agreement\"); Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir.1987) (duty to reassign under Rehabilitation Act \"would not defeat the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement unless it could be shown that the agreement had the effect or the intent of discrimination\u201d). But see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 894-897 (D.C.Cir.) (holding terms of collective bargaining agreement only a factor in weighing reasonableness of accommodation), reh'g en banc granted and judgment vacated, 124 F.3d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1997)."},"case_id":11824201,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is not immediately apparent that such further action would be required here. Some courts have required perfection under state law for liens involving specifically designated property, though these courts were not confronted with judgments involving ERISA-regulated pension benefits.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"72 F.Supp.2d 952, 960","parenthetical":"requiring that judgment lien be recorded in case of real property where state law so required","sentence":"See Miller v. Conte, 72 F.Supp.2d 952, 960 (N.D.Ind.1999) (requiring that judgment lien be recorded in case of real property where state law so required); Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. Connolly, 887 F.Supp. 337, 344 (D.Mass.1994) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"821 F.Supp. 1185, 1185","parenthetical":"\"In order to perfect a judgment lien in Texas on personal property [to satisfy a money judgment], a form of execution such as garnishment is required\"","sentence":"See also Palandjoglou, 821 F.Supp. at 1185 (\u201cIn order to perfect a judgment lien in Texas on personal property [to satisfy a money judgment], a form of execution such as garnishment is required\u201d) (internal quotation and citation omitted)."},"case_id":9477753,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, the court notes that he complained of disability discrimination in a May 5, 2004 e-mail to Sommers, Howard, and Pike, in which he characterized Defendant's attempt to change his work schedule as evidence that Defendant was not accommodating his disability. (5\/5\/04 E-mail.) Even the shorter time period between Plaintiffs May 5, 2004 complaint of disability discrimination and his June 25 termination is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish causation, however: \"[Sjuspicious timing alone rarely is sufficient to create a triable issue\" of fact on summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"253 F.3d 943, 952-53","parenthetical":"six-week gap between filing of EEOC charge and termination insufficient to establish retaliation and therefore affirming award summary judgment for defendant","sentence":"See EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir.2001) (en banc) (six-week gap between filing of EEOC charge and termination insufficient to establish retaliation and therefore affirming award summary judgment for defendant); Jasmantas v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 139 F.3d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir.1998) (one-month between employee\u2019s filing of EEOC charge and her discharge insufficient to link filing of charge to termination without other evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"366 F.3d 496, 506","parenthetical":"\"By itself, temporal proximity would not normally create an issue of material fact as to causation .... \"","sentence":"Tomanovich, 457 F.3d at 665 (quoting Moser, 406 F.3d at 905); Buie v. Quad\/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 506 (7th Cir.2004) (\u201cBy itself, temporal proximity would not normally create an issue of material fact as to causation .... \u201d)."},"case_id":5607197,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the court notes that he complained of disability discrimination in a May 5, 2004 e-mail to Sommers, Howard, and Pike, in which he characterized Defendant's attempt to change his work schedule as evidence that Defendant was not accommodating his disability. (5\/5\/04 E-mail.) Even the shorter time period between Plaintiffs May 5, 2004 complaint of disability discrimination and his June 25 termination is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish causation, however: \"[Sjuspicious timing alone rarely is sufficient to create a triable issue\" of fact on summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"139 F.3d 1155, 1158","parenthetical":"one-month between employee's filing of EEOC charge and her discharge insufficient to link filing of charge to termination without other evidence","sentence":"See EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir.2001) (en banc) (six-week gap between filing of EEOC charge and termination insufficient to establish retaliation and therefore affirming award summary judgment for defendant); Jasmantas v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 139 F.3d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir.1998) (one-month between employee\u2019s filing of EEOC charge and her discharge insufficient to link filing of charge to termination without other evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"366 F.3d 496, 506","parenthetical":"\"By itself, temporal proximity would not normally create an issue of material fact as to causation .... \"","sentence":"Tomanovich, 457 F.3d at 665 (quoting Moser, 406 F.3d at 905); Buie v. Quad\/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 506 (7th Cir.2004) (\u201cBy itself, temporal proximity would not normally create an issue of material fact as to causation .... \u201d)."},"case_id":5607197,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the court notes that he complained of disability discrimination in a May 5, 2004 e-mail to Sommers, Howard, and Pike, in which he characterized Defendant's attempt to change his work schedule as evidence that Defendant was not accommodating his disability. (5\/5\/04 E-mail.) Even the shorter time period between Plaintiffs May 5, 2004 complaint of disability discrimination and his June 25 termination is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish causation, however: \"[Sjuspicious timing alone rarely is sufficient to create a triable issue\" of fact on summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"166 F.3d 887, 893","parenthetical":"temporal proximity of one day between any employee's protected activity and termination sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment","sentence":"Cf. King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir.1999) (temporal proximity of one day between any employee\u2019s protected activity and termination sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"366 F.3d 496, 506","parenthetical":"\"By itself, temporal proximity would not normally create an issue of material fact as to causation .... \"","sentence":"Tomanovich, 457 F.3d at 665 (quoting Moser, 406 F.3d at 905); Buie v. Quad\/Graphics, Inc., 366 F.3d 496, 506 (7th Cir.2004) (\u201cBy itself, temporal proximity would not normally create an issue of material fact as to causation .... \u201d)."},"case_id":5607197,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the court notes that he complained of disability discrimination in a May 5, 2004 e-mail to Sommers, Howard, and Pike, in which he characterized Defendant's attempt to change his work schedule as evidence that Defendant was not accommodating his disability. (5\/5\/04 E-mail.) Even the shorter time period between Plaintiffs May 5, 2004 complaint of disability discrimination and his June 25 termination is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish causation, however: \"[Sjuspicious timing alone rarely is sufficient to create a triable issue\" of fact on summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"166 F.3d 887, 893","parenthetical":"temporal proximity of one day between any employee's protected activity and termination sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment","sentence":"Cf. King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir.1999) (temporal proximity of one day between any employee\u2019s protected activity and termination sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"253 F.3d 943, 952-53","parenthetical":"six-week gap between filing of EEOC charge and termination insufficient to establish retaliation and therefore affirming award summary judgment for defendant","sentence":"See EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir.2001) (en banc) (six-week gap between filing of EEOC charge and termination insufficient to establish retaliation and therefore affirming award summary judgment for defendant); Jasmantas v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 139 F.3d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir.1998) (one-month between employee\u2019s filing of EEOC charge and her discharge insufficient to link filing of charge to termination without other evidence)."},"case_id":5607197,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the court notes that he complained of disability discrimination in a May 5, 2004 e-mail to Sommers, Howard, and Pike, in which he characterized Defendant's attempt to change his work schedule as evidence that Defendant was not accommodating his disability. (5\/5\/04 E-mail.) Even the shorter time period between Plaintiffs May 5, 2004 complaint of disability discrimination and his June 25 termination is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish causation, however: \"[Sjuspicious timing alone rarely is sufficient to create a triable issue\" of fact on summary judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"139 F.3d 1155, 1158","parenthetical":"one-month between employee's filing of EEOC charge and her discharge insufficient to link filing of charge to termination without other evidence","sentence":"See EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., 253 F.3d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir.2001) (en banc) (six-week gap between filing of EEOC charge and termination insufficient to establish retaliation and therefore affirming award summary judgment for defendant); Jasmantas v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 139 F.3d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir.1998) (one-month between employee\u2019s filing of EEOC charge and her discharge insufficient to link filing of charge to termination without other evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"166 F.3d 887, 893","parenthetical":"temporal proximity of one day between any employee's protected activity and termination sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment","sentence":"Cf. King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir.1999) (temporal proximity of one day between any employee\u2019s protected activity and termination sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment)."},"case_id":5607197,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The wholesale price of a kilogram of heroin in the eight years between 2000 and 2008 appears to have ranged from $60,000 to roughly $100,000. We assume that district judges in this circuit, who handle large numbers of wholesale-quantity drug cases each year, are familiar with these prices and require no further evidence unless the point is challenged. In short, because Nino admitted trafficking in a quantity of heroin with a wholesale value at least in the high six figures, that admission by itself provided a sufficient factual basis to support a preponderance finding that the proceeds realized by the conspiracy were at least $100,000.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"836 F.2d 129, 130","parenthetical":"recognizing forfeiture liability among criminal confederates to be joint and several","sentence":"See United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d at 48 (holding that forfeiture calculation is not \u201cexact science\u201d and that district court \u201cmay make reasonable extrapolations\u201d from evidence); see also United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir.1988) (recognizing forfeiture liability among criminal confederates to be joint and several)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"639 F.3d 48, 48","parenthetical":"holding that forfeiture calculation is not \"exact science\" and that district court \"may make reasonable extrapolations\" from evidence","sentence":"See United States v. Treacy, 639 F.3d at 48 (holding that forfeiture calculation is not \u201cexact science\u201d and that district court \u201cmay make reasonable extrapolations\u201d from evidence); see also United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir.1988) (recognizing forfeiture liability among criminal confederates to be joint and several)."},"case_id":3622709,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, Buyer does not appear to contest that point. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Buyer could not have justifiably relied on Seller's alleged misrepresentation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"866 P.2d 1382, 1382","parenthetical":"a party has no right to rely on a misrepresentation if it has \"access to information that was equally available to both parties and would have led to the true facts\"","sentence":"M.D.C.\/Wood, 866 P.2d at 1382 (a party has no right to rely on a misrepresentation if it has \"access to information that was equally available to both parties and would have led to the true facts\"); Nielson v. Scott, 53 P.3d 777, 780 (Colo.App.2002) (where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the truth or was put on inquiry notice, he could not justifiably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation); see Brush Creek Airport, L.L.C., v. Avion Park, L.L.C., 57 P.3d 738, 749 (Colo.App.2002) (the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation where it was on inquiry notice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"57 P.3d 738, 749","parenthetical":"the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation where it was on inquiry notice","sentence":"M.D.C.\/Wood, 866 P.2d at 1382 (a party has no right to rely on a misrepresentation if it has \"access to information that was equally available to both parties and would have led to the true facts\"); Nielson v. Scott, 53 P.3d 777, 780 (Colo.App.2002) (where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the truth or was put on inquiry notice, he could not justifiably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation); see Brush Creek Airport, L.L.C., v. Avion Park, L.L.C., 57 P.3d 738, 749 (Colo.App.2002) (the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation where it was on inquiry notice)."},"case_id":6990718,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, Buyer does not appear to contest that point. Therefore, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Buyer could not have justifiably relied on Seller's alleged misrepresentation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"53 P.3d 777, 780","parenthetical":"where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the truth or was put on inquiry notice, he could not justifiably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation","sentence":"M.D.C.\/Wood, 866 P.2d at 1382 (a party has no right to rely on a misrepresentation if it has \"access to information that was equally available to both parties and would have led to the true facts\"); Nielson v. Scott, 53 P.3d 777, 780 (Colo.App.2002) (where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the truth or was put on inquiry notice, he could not justifiably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation); see Brush Creek Airport, L.L.C., v. Avion Park, L.L.C., 57 P.3d 738, 749 (Colo.App.2002) (the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation where it was on inquiry notice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"57 P.3d 738, 749","parenthetical":"the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation where it was on inquiry notice","sentence":"M.D.C.\/Wood, 866 P.2d at 1382 (a party has no right to rely on a misrepresentation if it has \"access to information that was equally available to both parties and would have led to the true facts\"); Nielson v. Scott, 53 P.3d 777, 780 (Colo.App.2002) (where the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the truth or was put on inquiry notice, he could not justifiably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation); see Brush Creek Airport, L.L.C., v. Avion Park, L.L.C., 57 P.3d 738, 749 (Colo.App.2002) (the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the defendant's misrepresentation where it was on inquiry notice)."},"case_id":6990718,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Because of inadequate briefing by the parties on this issue, we do not address whether a Heck bar properly applies to a person formerly in custody, even if the person could have practicably sought habeas relief. We simply note that the binding precedent from the Supreme Court and in this Circuit does not clearly impose a \"practicable diligence\" requirement for former prisoners.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"702 F.3d 429, 436","parenthetical":"declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a SS 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\"","sentence":"But see Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir.2012) (declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a \u00a7 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\u201d); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir.2006) (finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"523 U.S. 21, 21","parenthetical":"noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\" for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible","sentence":"See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\u201d for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible); Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (noting that \"courts have taken a keen interest\u201d in whether \"a prisoner could have filed a habeas\u201d petition, but not imposing a practicable-diligence requirement)."},"case_id":3986850,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Because of inadequate briefing by the parties on this issue, we do not address whether a Heck bar properly applies to a person formerly in custody, even if the person could have practicably sought habeas relief. We simply note that the binding precedent from the Supreme Court and in this Circuit does not clearly impose a \"practicable diligence\" requirement for former prisoners.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"523 U.S. 21, 21","parenthetical":"noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\" for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible","sentence":"See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\u201d for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible); Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (noting that \"courts have taken a keen interest\u201d in whether \"a prisoner could have filed a habeas\u201d petition, but not imposing a practicable-diligence requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"442 F.3d 697, 705","parenthetical":"finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\"","sentence":"But see Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir.2012) (declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a \u00a7 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\u201d); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir.2006) (finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\u201d)."},"case_id":3986850,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Because of inadequate briefing by the parties on this issue, we do not address whether a Heck bar properly applies to a person formerly in custody, even if the person could have practicably sought habeas relief. We simply note that the binding precedent from the Supreme Court and in this Circuit does not clearly impose a \"practicable diligence\" requirement for former prisoners.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"702 F.3d 429, 436","parenthetical":"declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a SS 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\"","sentence":"But see Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir.2012) (declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a \u00a7 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\u201d); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir.2006) (finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\" for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible","sentence":"See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\u201d for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible); Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (noting that \"courts have taken a keen interest\u201d in whether \"a prisoner could have filed a habeas\u201d petition, but not imposing a practicable-diligence requirement)."},"case_id":3986850,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Because of inadequate briefing by the parties on this issue, we do not address whether a Heck bar properly applies to a person formerly in custody, even if the person could have practicably sought habeas relief. We simply note that the binding precedent from the Supreme Court and in this Circuit does not clearly impose a \"practicable diligence\" requirement for former prisoners.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"442 F.3d 697, 705","parenthetical":"finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\"","sentence":"But see Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir.2012) (declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a \u00a7 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\u201d); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir.2006) (finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\" for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible","sentence":"See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\u201d for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible); Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (noting that \"courts have taken a keen interest\u201d in whether \"a prisoner could have filed a habeas\u201d petition, but not imposing a practicable-diligence requirement)."},"case_id":3986850,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Because of inadequate briefing by the parties on this issue, we do not address whether a Heck bar properly applies to a person formerly in custody, even if the person could have practicably sought habeas relief. We simply note that the binding precedent from the Supreme Court and in this Circuit does not clearly impose a \"practicable diligence\" requirement for former prisoners.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"535 F.3d 268, 268","parenthetical":"noting that \"courts have taken a keen interest\" in whether \"a prisoner could have filed a habeas\" petition, but not imposing a practicable-diligence requirement","sentence":"See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\u201d for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible); Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (noting that \"courts have taken a keen interest\u201d in whether \"a prisoner could have filed a habeas\u201d petition, but not imposing a practicable-diligence requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"702 F.3d 429, 436","parenthetical":"declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a SS 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\"","sentence":"But see Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir.2012) (declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a \u00a7 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\u201d); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir.2006) (finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\u201d)."},"case_id":3986850,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Because of inadequate briefing by the parties on this issue, we do not address whether a Heck bar properly applies to a person formerly in custody, even if the person could have practicably sought habeas relief. We simply note that the binding precedent from the Supreme Court and in this Circuit does not clearly impose a \"practicable diligence\" requirement for former prisoners.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"535 F.3d 268, 268","parenthetical":"noting that \"courts have taken a keen interest\" in whether \"a prisoner could have filed a habeas\" petition, but not imposing a practicable-diligence requirement","sentence":"See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 21, 118 S.Ct. 978 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that Heck should not bar a claim if it would be \"impossible as a matter of law\u201d for a person to satisfy the favorable-termination requirement, without specifying whether it should apply if habeas relief was ever possible); Wilson, 535 F.3d at 268 (noting that \"courts have taken a keen interest\u201d in whether \"a prisoner could have filed a habeas\u201d petition, but not imposing a practicable-diligence requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"442 F.3d 697, 705","parenthetical":"finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\"","sentence":"But see Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir.2012) (declining to permit \"a plaintiff who ignored his opportunity to seek collateral relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to bring a \u00a7 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available\u201d); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 705 (9th Cir.2006) (finding Heck applicable, despite the legal impossibility of pursuing habeas relief, because \"failure timely to achieve habeas relief is self-imposed\u201d)."},"case_id":3986850,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, \"[b]efore certifying a defendant class, the court must carefully examine the impact of such certification on the rights of unnamed class members.\" Certification of this defendant class as to all claims except the SS 12(2) claim, which is addressed below, would not adversely impact the rights of the class members.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"89 F.R.D. 104, 109-14","parenthetical":"certifying defendant class under SS 11 of the 1933 Act","sentence":"See Akerman, 609 F.Supp. at 375 (\u201cth[e] determination ... depends on the nature of the various claims and the statutory scheme of remedies\u201d); see also In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 109-14 (N.D.Cal.1981) (certifying defendant class under \u00a7 11 of the 1933 Act); In re Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 302-06 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"609 F.Supp. 375, 375","parenthetical":"\"th[e] determination ... depends on the nature of the various claims and the statutory scheme of remedies\"","sentence":"See Akerman, 609 F.Supp. at 375 (\u201cth[e] determination ... depends on the nature of the various claims and the statutory scheme of remedies\u201d); see also In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 109-14 (N.D.Cal.1981) (certifying defendant class under \u00a7 11 of the 1933 Act); In re Gap Stores, 79 F.R.D. at 302-06 (same)."},"case_id":7851369,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff argued it was not required as a matter of law to exhaust its appellate remedies or continue the prophylactic, and potentially frivolous, subsequent lawsuits against the nursing homes to perfect its legal malpractice claim. Rather, plaintiff contended, it only was required to take reasonable steps to avoid the consequences of its former attorney's tortious conduct before it sued the attorney for malpractice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"183 N.J. 440, 440","parenthetical":"finding that unlike the plaintiff in Spaulding, Mrs. Bueehel was not confronted with a \"litigation catastrophe\" that required her to accept a lesser settlement and pursue the perceived difference in future litigation because the trial court had not decided her motion to vacate the first settlement agreement","sentence":"Cf. Puder, supra, 183 N.J. at 440, 874 A.2d 534 (finding that unlike the plaintiff in Spaulding, Mrs. Bueehel was not confronted with a \u201clitigation catastrophe\u201d that required her to accept a lesser settlement and pursue the perceived difference in future litigation because the trial court had not decided her motion to vacate the first settlement agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"229 N.J.Super. 430, 444","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiffs inadequate settlement of his underlying claim at trial was a reasonable mitigation of damages in the professional malpractice action against his treating physician for failing to appear in court, as promised, because the plaintiff and his attorney were threatened with a \"litigation catastrophe\"","sentence":"See Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J.Super. 430, 444, 551 A.2d 1022 (App.Div.1988) (holding that the plaintiffs inadequate settlement of his underlying claim at trial was a reasonable mitigation of damages in the professional malpractice action against his treating physician for failing to appear in court, as promised, because the plaintiff and his attorney were threatened with a \u201clitigation catastrophe\u201d); see also Covino v. Peck, 233 N.J.Super. 612, 619, 559 A.2d 868 (App.Div.1989) (holding that a client\u2019s legal malpractice action instituted after his attorney failed to file suit in New Jersey within the statute of limitations was a reasonable response to a \u201clegal catastrophe\u201d and was not barred by the doctrine of mitigation of damages although the client could have filed suit against one of the underlying tortfeasors in Mississippi, which had a longer statute of limitations; the client was not required to litigate in an inconvenient forum in an attempt to extricate the defendant from his own wrongful act)."},"case_id":4020704,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff argued it was not required as a matter of law to exhaust its appellate remedies or continue the prophylactic, and potentially frivolous, subsequent lawsuits against the nursing homes to perfect its legal malpractice claim. Rather, plaintiff contended, it only was required to take reasonable steps to avoid the consequences of its former attorney's tortious conduct before it sued the attorney for malpractice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"229 N.J.Super. 430, 444","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiffs inadequate settlement of his underlying claim at trial was a reasonable mitigation of damages in the professional malpractice action against his treating physician for failing to appear in court, as promised, because the plaintiff and his attorney were threatened with a \"litigation catastrophe\"","sentence":"See Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J.Super. 430, 444, 551 A.2d 1022 (App.Div.1988) (holding that the plaintiffs inadequate settlement of his underlying claim at trial was a reasonable mitigation of damages in the professional malpractice action against his treating physician for failing to appear in court, as promised, because the plaintiff and his attorney were threatened with a \u201clitigation catastrophe\u201d); see also Covino v. Peck, 233 N.J.Super. 612, 619, 559 A.2d 868 (App.Div.1989) (holding that a client\u2019s legal malpractice action instituted after his attorney failed to file suit in New Jersey within the statute of limitations was a reasonable response to a \u201clegal catastrophe\u201d and was not barred by the doctrine of mitigation of damages although the client could have filed suit against one of the underlying tortfeasors in Mississippi, which had a longer statute of limitations; the client was not required to litigate in an inconvenient forum in an attempt to extricate the defendant from his own wrongful act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that unlike the plaintiff in Spaulding, Mrs. Bueehel was not confronted with a \"litigation catastrophe\" that required her to accept a lesser settlement and pursue the perceived difference in future litigation because the trial court had not decided her motion to vacate the first settlement agreement","sentence":"Cf. Puder, supra, 183 N.J. at 440, 874 A.2d 534 (finding that unlike the plaintiff in Spaulding, Mrs. Bueehel was not confronted with a \u201clitigation catastrophe\u201d that required her to accept a lesser settlement and pursue the perceived difference in future litigation because the trial court had not decided her motion to vacate the first settlement agreement)."},"case_id":4020704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiff argued it was not required as a matter of law to exhaust its appellate remedies or continue the prophylactic, and potentially frivolous, subsequent lawsuits against the nursing homes to perfect its legal malpractice claim. Rather, plaintiff contended, it only was required to take reasonable steps to avoid the consequences of its former attorney's tortious conduct before it sued the attorney for malpractice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"183 N.J. 440, 440","parenthetical":"finding that unlike the plaintiff in Spaulding, Mrs. Bueehel was not confronted with a \"litigation catastrophe\" that required her to accept a lesser settlement and pursue the perceived difference in future litigation because the trial court had not decided her motion to vacate the first settlement agreement","sentence":"Cf. Puder, supra, 183 N.J. at 440, 874 A.2d 534 (finding that unlike the plaintiff in Spaulding, Mrs. Bueehel was not confronted with a \u201clitigation catastrophe\u201d that required her to accept a lesser settlement and pursue the perceived difference in future litigation because the trial court had not decided her motion to vacate the first settlement agreement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiffs inadequate settlement of his underlying claim at trial was a reasonable mitigation of damages in the professional malpractice action against his treating physician for failing to appear in court, as promised, because the plaintiff and his attorney were threatened with a \"litigation catastrophe\"","sentence":"See Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J.Super. 430, 444, 551 A.2d 1022 (App.Div.1988) (holding that the plaintiffs inadequate settlement of his underlying claim at trial was a reasonable mitigation of damages in the professional malpractice action against his treating physician for failing to appear in court, as promised, because the plaintiff and his attorney were threatened with a \u201clitigation catastrophe\u201d); see also Covino v. Peck, 233 N.J.Super. 612, 619, 559 A.2d 868 (App.Div.1989) (holding that a client\u2019s legal malpractice action instituted after his attorney failed to file suit in New Jersey within the statute of limitations was a reasonable response to a \u201clegal catastrophe\u201d and was not barred by the doctrine of mitigation of damages although the client could have filed suit against one of the underlying tortfeasors in Mississippi, which had a longer statute of limitations; the client was not required to litigate in an inconvenient forum in an attempt to extricate the defendant from his own wrongful act)."},"case_id":4020704,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiff argued it was not required as a matter of law to exhaust its appellate remedies or continue the prophylactic, and potentially frivolous, subsequent lawsuits against the nursing homes to perfect its legal malpractice claim. Rather, plaintiff contended, it only was required to take reasonable steps to avoid the consequences of its former attorney's tortious conduct before it sued the attorney for malpractice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiffs inadequate settlement of his underlying claim at trial was a reasonable mitigation of damages in the professional malpractice action against his treating physician for failing to appear in court, as promised, because the plaintiff and his attorney were threatened with a \"litigation catastrophe\"","sentence":"See Spaulding v. Hussain, 229 N.J.Super. 430, 444, 551 A.2d 1022 (App.Div.1988) (holding that the plaintiffs inadequate settlement of his underlying claim at trial was a reasonable mitigation of damages in the professional malpractice action against his treating physician for failing to appear in court, as promised, because the plaintiff and his attorney were threatened with a \u201clitigation catastrophe\u201d); see also Covino v. Peck, 233 N.J.Super. 612, 619, 559 A.2d 868 (App.Div.1989) (holding that a client\u2019s legal malpractice action instituted after his attorney failed to file suit in New Jersey within the statute of limitations was a reasonable response to a \u201clegal catastrophe\u201d and was not barred by the doctrine of mitigation of damages although the client could have filed suit against one of the underlying tortfeasors in Mississippi, which had a longer statute of limitations; the client was not required to litigate in an inconvenient forum in an attempt to extricate the defendant from his own wrongful act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that unlike the plaintiff in Spaulding, Mrs. Bueehel was not confronted with a \"litigation catastrophe\" that required her to accept a lesser settlement and pursue the perceived difference in future litigation because the trial court had not decided her motion to vacate the first settlement agreement","sentence":"Cf. Puder, supra, 183 N.J. at 440, 874 A.2d 534 (finding that unlike the plaintiff in Spaulding, Mrs. Bueehel was not confronted with a \u201clitigation catastrophe\u201d that required her to accept a lesser settlement and pursue the perceived difference in future litigation because the trial court had not decided her motion to vacate the first settlement agreement)."},"case_id":4020704,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A parole revocation in itself implies a failure of the parolee to satisfy the obligations of conditional liberty; it has a far greater bearing on future administrative or judicial decisions than denial of early eligibility, especially since the latter denial may reflect a judgment on the seriousness of the underlying crime rather than about rehabilitative progress or suitability for parole.\" A decision now cannot affect this sentence, but we do not know that its result may not affect the commencement date of later from-and-after sentences\").","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"455 U.S. 624, 631-634","parenthetical":"parolees discharged from custody by the time the appeal was argued so questions of validity of pairole revocation held moot","sentence":"Contrast Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631-634 (1982) (parolees discharged from custody by the time the appeal was argued so questions of validity of pair\u00f3le revocation held moot)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"46 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479-480","parenthetical":"recognizing in a probation revocation case that a revocation in a person's record \"may have future administrative or judicial consequences,\" but deciding to pretermit a mootness question on the grounds that it had not been developed in the argument and the defendant had diligently pursued his claims","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. Christian, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479-480 (1999), S.C., 429 Mass. 1022 (1999) (recognizing in a probation revocation case that a revocation in a person\u2019s record \u201cmay have future administrative or judicial consequences,\u201d but deciding to pretermit a mootness question on the grounds that it had not been developed in the argument and the defendant had diligently pursued his claims)."},"case_id":235550,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A parole revocation in itself implies a failure of the parolee to satisfy the obligations of conditional liberty; it has a far greater bearing on future administrative or judicial decisions than denial of early eligibility, especially since the latter denial may reflect a judgment on the seriousness of the underlying crime rather than about rehabilitative progress or suitability for parole.\" A decision now cannot affect this sentence, but we do not know that its result may not affect the commencement date of later from-and-after sentences\").","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing in a probation revocation case that a revocation in a person's record \"may have future administrative or judicial consequences,\" but deciding to pretermit a mootness question on the grounds that it had not been developed in the argument and the defendant had diligently pursued his claims","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. Christian, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479-480 (1999), S.C., 429 Mass. 1022 (1999) (recognizing in a probation revocation case that a revocation in a person\u2019s record \u201cmay have future administrative or judicial consequences,\u201d but deciding to pretermit a mootness question on the grounds that it had not been developed in the argument and the defendant had diligently pursued his claims)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"455 U.S. 624, 631-634","parenthetical":"parolees discharged from custody by the time the appeal was argued so questions of validity of pairole revocation held moot","sentence":"Contrast Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631-634 (1982) (parolees discharged from custody by the time the appeal was argued so questions of validity of pair\u00f3le revocation held moot)."},"case_id":235550,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"164 N.J. 46, 46","parenthetical":"finding \"that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85","parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"164 N.J. 46, 46","parenthetical":"finding \"that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"164 N.J. 46, 46","parenthetical":"finding \"that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"164 N.J. 46, 46","parenthetical":"finding \"that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85","parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding \"that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding \"that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding \"that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding \"that defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant's efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State's jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85","parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"115 N.J. 320, 320","parenthetical":"considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"115 N.J. 320, 320","parenthetical":"considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"115 N.J. 320, 320","parenthetical":"considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"115 N.J. 320, 320","parenthetical":"considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85","parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85","parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90","parenthetical":"recognizing that the defendant \"not only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90","parenthetical":"recognizing that the defendant \"not only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90","parenthetical":"recognizing that the defendant \"not only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90","parenthetical":"recognizing that the defendant \"not only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85","parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that the defendant \"not only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that the defendant \"not only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that the defendant \"not only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Mere \"random\" and \"attenuated contacts\" with New Jersey are insufficient. Plaintiffs rely on the fact that C & F was a facet of Fairfax's consolidated financial statements in arguing that an attack on one entity was an attack on another or all. But they also recognize that harm to C & F was a byproduct and \"cascading effect\" of Fairfax's injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that the defendant \"not only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\"","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife's custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home","sentence":"See Blakey, supra, 164 N.J. at 46, 751 A.2d 538 (finding \u201cthat defendants who published defamatory electronic messages, with knowledge that the messages would be published in New Jersey and could influence a claimant\u2019s efforts to seek a remedy under New Jersey\u2019s Law Against Discrimination, may properly be subject to the State\u2019s jurisdiction\u201d); Lebel, supra, 115 N.J. at 320, 558 A.2d 1252 (considering that the defendant actively solicited the business of a New Jersey plaintiff); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 395 N.J.Super. 380, 389-90, 928 A.2d 948 (App. Div. 2007) (recognizing that the defendant \u201cnot only knew that plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, he knew the municipality in which they resided and made specific disparaging references to that municipality in many of his postings\u201d); cf. Matsumoto v. Matsumoto, 335 N.J.Super. 174, 180-85, 762 A.2d 224 (App. Div.) (holding there was no personal jurisdiction over a foreign national who helped her son in an out-of-state conspiracy to violate his former wife\u2019s custody rights under their New Jersey divorce decree, even if she had retained title to the New Jersey marital home), aff'd in part, mod. in part on other grounds, 171 N.J. 110, 792 A.2d 1222 (2000)."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"RCW 13.34.020. Tragically, parents sometimes inflict upon their own children not only neglect but verbal, physical, and sexual abuses that defy detailed description here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 U.S. 193, 193","parenthetical":"father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"152 Wn.2d 22, 25","parenthetical":"parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"case_id":4021555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RCW 13.34.020. Tragically, parents sometimes inflict upon their own children not only neglect but verbal, physical, and sexual abuses that defy detailed description here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 U.S. 193, 193","parenthetical":"father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"case_id":4021555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RCW 13.34.020. Tragically, parents sometimes inflict upon their own children not only neglect but verbal, physical, and sexual abuses that defy detailed description here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 U.S. 193, 193","parenthetical":"father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 Wn.2d 266, 274","parenthetical":"describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"case_id":4021555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RCW 13.34.020. Tragically, parents sometimes inflict upon their own children not only neglect but verbal, physical, and sexual abuses that defy detailed description here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 U.S. 193, 193","parenthetical":"father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"case_id":4021555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"RCW 13.34.020. Tragically, parents sometimes inflict upon their own children not only neglect but verbal, physical, and sexual abuses that defy detailed description here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 Wash. 446, 456-57","parenthetical":"evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 U.S. 193, 193","parenthetical":"father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"case_id":4021555,"label":"a"}
{"context":"RCW 13.34.020. Tragically, parents sometimes inflict upon their own children not only neglect but verbal, physical, and sexual abuses that defy detailed description here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"489 U.S. 193, 193","parenthetical":"father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lorenz, 152 Wn.2d 22, 25, 93 P.3d 133 (2004) (parent raped and molested five year old child to produce pornography); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 274, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (describing father who mistreated wolf-dog hybrids and punished son by throwing him into their pen); State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 456-57, 258 P. 508 (1927) (evidence suggested that a father murdered his daughter when she attempted to extricate herself from an incestuous relationship with him); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193 (father beat his four year old son so severely as to put him in a coma and cause tremendous brain damage)."},"case_id":4021555,"label":"b"}
{"context":"K.S.A. 21~3401(a). Intent and premeditation are necessary elements of that offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"295 Kan. 929, 937","parenthetical":"noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"271 Kan. 843, 847-48","parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"case_id":12417082,"label":"b"}
{"context":"K.S.A. 21~3401(a). Intent and premeditation are necessary elements of that offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"271 Kan. 843, 847-48","parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"case_id":12417082,"label":"a"}
{"context":"K.S.A. 21~3401(a). Intent and premeditation are necessary elements of that offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"271 Kan. 843, 847-48","parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"267 Kan. 314, 328","parenthetical":"premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused's acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"case_id":12417082,"label":"a"}
{"context":"K.S.A. 21~3401(a). Intent and premeditation are necessary elements of that offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused's acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"271 Kan. 843, 847-48","parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"case_id":12417082,"label":"b"}
{"context":"K.S.A. 21~3401(a). Intent and premeditation are necessary elements of that offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"295 Kan. 929, 937","parenthetical":"noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"case_id":12417082,"label":"a"}
{"context":"K.S.A. 21~3401(a). Intent and premeditation are necessary elements of that offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"case_id":12417082,"label":"b"}
{"context":"K.S.A. 21~3401(a). Intent and premeditation are necessary elements of that offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"267 Kan. 314, 328","parenthetical":"premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused's acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"case_id":12417082,"label":"b"}
{"context":"K.S.A. 21~3401(a). Intent and premeditation are necessary elements of that offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused's acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder","sentence":"See State v. Wimbley, 271 Kan. 843, 847-48, 26 P.3d 657 (2001) (sufficient evidence to support premeditated first-degree murder conviction requires proof of intent to kill victim and premeditation); see also K.S.A. 21-3201(a) (criminal intent, established by proof of intentional conduct, essential element of every crime under Kansas Criminal Code unless statute otherwise specifies); State v Phillips, 295 Kan. 929, 937, 287 P.3d 245 (2012) (noting intentional second-degree murder differs from intentional first-degree murder by lacking element of premeditation); State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 328, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (premeditation is state of mind relating to reasons and motives for accused\u2019s acts and is necessary element of premeditated first-degree murder)."},"case_id":12417082,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, we affirm the district court's conclusion that Arce's confinement did not \"present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Arce's] ... sentence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"112 F.3d 703, 708","parenthetical":"fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \"inmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\"","sentence":"Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \u201cinmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\u201d); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest), cert. denied, \u2014\u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 436 and 441 (periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest); Gill v. Pact Organization, 1997 WL 539948, at *10 (S.D.N.Y."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest","sentence":"Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \u201cinmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\u201d); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest), cert. denied, \u2014\u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 436 and 441 (periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest); Gill v. Pact Organization, 1997 WL 539948, at *10 (S.D.N.Y."},"case_id":11835046,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, we affirm the district court's conclusion that Arce's confinement did not \"present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Arce's] ... sentence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"111 F.3d 460, 463","parenthetical":"holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest","sentence":"Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \u201cinmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\u201d); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest), cert. denied, \u2014\u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 436 and 441 (periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest); Gill v. Pact Organization, 1997 WL 539948, at *10 (S.D.N.Y."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest","sentence":"Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \u201cinmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\u201d); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest), cert. denied, \u2014\u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 436 and 441 (periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest); Gill v. Pact Organization, 1997 WL 539948, at *10 (S.D.N.Y."},"case_id":11835046,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, we affirm the district court's conclusion that Arce's confinement did not \"present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Arce's] ... sentence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest","sentence":"Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \u201cinmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\u201d); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest), cert. denied, \u2014\u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 436 and 441 (periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest); Gill v. Pact Organization, 1997 WL 539948, at *10 (S.D.N.Y."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest","sentence":"Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \u201cinmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\u201d); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest), cert. denied, \u2014\u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 436 and 441 (periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest); Gill v. Pact Organization, 1997 WL 539948, at *10 (S.D.N.Y."},"case_id":11835046,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In sum, we affirm the district court's conclusion that Arce's confinement did not \"present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Arce's] ... sentence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest","sentence":"Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \u201cinmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\u201d); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest), cert. denied, \u2014\u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 436 and 441 (periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest); Gill v. Pact Organization, 1997 WL 539948, at *10 (S.D.N.Y."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest","sentence":"Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485, 115 S.Ct. at 2301; Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708. (3d Cir.1997) (fifteen months of administrative segregation not atypical when \u201cinmates in a myriad of circumstances [would] find themselves exposed to the [same], conditions to which [the inmate] was subjected\u201d); Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that 117 days in administrative segregation due to lack of bed space did not implicate a state-created liberty interest), cert. denied, \u2014\u2014 U.S.-, 118 S.Ct. 136, 139 L.Ed.2d 84 (1997); see Cody, 895 F.Supp. at 436 and 441 (periodic deprivation of outdoor exercise over the span of several months did not implicate state-created liberty interest); Gill v. Pact Organization, 1997 WL 539948, at *10 (S.D.N.Y."},"case_id":11835046,"label":"a"}
{"context":"34 Mental illnesses fall within the ordinary meaning of the term \"mental condition.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2012 CO 21, \u00b6 28","parenthetical":"when a defendant's expert intends to testify that a defendant possesses a learning disorder, the requirements of section 16-8-107(@B","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108, 1112 (Colo.App.2003) (concluding that a mental illness listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000) was a mental condition triggering section 16-8-107(8)(b)); see also In re People v. Wilburn, 2012 CO 21, \u00b6 28, 272 P.3d 1078 (when a defendant's expert intends to testify that a defendant possesses a learning disorder, the requirements of section 16-8-107(@B)(b) are triggered)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"78 P.3d 1108, 1112","parenthetical":"concluding that a mental illness listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108, 1112 (Colo.App.2003) (concluding that a mental illness listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000) was a mental condition triggering section 16-8-107(8)(b)); see also In re People v. Wilburn, 2012 CO 21, \u00b6 28, 272 P.3d 1078 (when a defendant's expert intends to testify that a defendant possesses a learning disorder, the requirements of section 16-8-107(@B)(b) are triggered)."},"case_id":6973406,"label":"b"}
{"context":"34 Mental illnesses fall within the ordinary meaning of the term \"mental condition.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"when a defendant's expert intends to testify that a defendant possesses a learning disorder, the requirements of section 16-8-107(@B","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108, 1112 (Colo.App.2003) (concluding that a mental illness listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000) was a mental condition triggering section 16-8-107(8)(b)); see also In re People v. Wilburn, 2012 CO 21, \u00b6 28, 272 P.3d 1078 (when a defendant's expert intends to testify that a defendant possesses a learning disorder, the requirements of section 16-8-107(@B)(b) are triggered)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"78 P.3d 1108, 1112","parenthetical":"concluding that a mental illness listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000","sentence":"See, e.g., People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108, 1112 (Colo.App.2003) (concluding that a mental illness listed in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. 2000) was a mental condition triggering section 16-8-107(8)(b)); see also In re People v. Wilburn, 2012 CO 21, \u00b6 28, 272 P.3d 1078 (when a defendant's expert intends to testify that a defendant possesses a learning disorder, the requirements of section 16-8-107(@B)(b) are triggered)."},"case_id":6973406,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The State maintains that regardless of the validity of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the trial court should not call a witness to the stand for the singular purpose of exercising this right in the jury's presence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"66 F.3d 68, 70","parenthetical":"holding that Sixth Amendment only requires that witness be brought to court, not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that \"[i]t is irrelevant whether the witness's refusal is grounded in a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, an invalid privilege, or something else entirely\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 70 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that Sixth Amendment only requires that witness be brought to court, not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that \u201c[i]t is irrelevant whether the witness\u2019s refusal is grounded in a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, an invalid privilege, or something else entirely\u201d); see also Martin v. U.S., 756 A.2d 901, 905 (D.C.2000) (recognizing that policy reasons undergirding assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege outside jury\u2019s presence apply even if privilege is invalid). Those courts that require the assertion of the privilege outside the jury\u2019s presence adhere to this practice as a means of preventing the jury from drawing any improper inferences from the witness\u2019 decision to exercise his constitutional privilege."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"756 A.2d 901, 905","parenthetical":"recognizing that policy reasons undergirding assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege outside jury's presence apply even if privilege is invalid","sentence":"See U.S. v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 70 (5th Cir.1995) (holding that Sixth Amendment only requires that witness be brought to court, not that he be required to take witness stand after refusing to testify and observing that \u201c[i]t is irrelevant whether the witness\u2019s refusal is grounded in a valid Fifth Amendment privilege, an invalid privilege, or something else entirely\u201d); see also Martin v. U.S., 756 A.2d 901, 905 (D.C.2000) (recognizing that policy reasons undergirding assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege outside jury\u2019s presence apply even if privilege is invalid). Those courts that require the assertion of the privilege outside the jury\u2019s presence adhere to this practice as a means of preventing the jury from drawing any improper inferences from the witness\u2019 decision to exercise his constitutional privilege."},"case_id":8370656,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on the above, we conclude that a claimant is entitled to the presumption so long as he or she provides evidence establishing a prima facie case of a work-related injury.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"830 A.2d 870, 870-71","parenthetical":"explaining that the presumption applies where the claimant establishes a prima facie case","sentence":"Georgetown Univ. I, supra, 830 A.2d at 870-71 (explaining that the presumption applies where the claimant establishes a prima facie case); see Prima Facie Evidence, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, at 877 (10th Ed. 2014) (defining prima facie evidence as \u201c[ejvidence that will establish a fact or sustain in a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced). And that, it is not appropriate for the ALJ to weigh the evidence or make credibility findings at this initial stage in assessing whether a claimant has established a pri-ma facie case of a work-related injury."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"867 A.2d 213, 218-19","parenthetical":"credibility findings and weighing of the evidence are not appropriate in determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case for a directed verdict","sentence":"See, e.g., Burke v. Scaggs, 867 A.2d 213, 218-19 (D.C. 2005) (credibility findings and weighing of the evidence are not appropriate in determining whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case for a directed verdict)."},"case_id":12318597,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Further, the juxtaposition of the crucifix with Wdiitney's strangled and bound body could have been seen as providing religious overtones to the murder. Inclusion of the crucifix would have run the risk of affecting one or more jurors in an unpredictable, but unfairly prejudicial way.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"establishing a per se rale against religious invocations in prosecutorial closing arguments in capital cases","sentence":"See Taylor v. State, 640 So.2d 1127, 1135 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (videotape of victim\u2019s home that included panning shots of a crucifix on the wall \u201cinvite[d] an emotional response\u201d); cf. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (1991) (establishing a per se rale against religious invocations in prosecutorial closing arguments in capital cases)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"640 So.2d 1127, 1135","parenthetical":"videotape of victim's home that included panning shots of a crucifix on the wall \"invite[d] an emotional response\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. State, 640 So.2d 1127, 1135 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (videotape of victim\u2019s home that included panning shots of a crucifix on the wall \u201cinvite[d] an emotional response\u201d); cf. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (1991) (establishing a per se rale against religious invocations in prosecutorial closing arguments in capital cases)."},"case_id":9192080,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, the juxtaposition of the crucifix with Wdiitney's strangled and bound body could have been seen as providing religious overtones to the murder. Inclusion of the crucifix would have run the risk of affecting one or more jurors in an unpredictable, but unfairly prejudicial way.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"599 A.2d 630, 644","parenthetical":"establishing a per se rale against religious invocations in prosecutorial closing arguments in capital cases","sentence":"See Taylor v. State, 640 So.2d 1127, 1135 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (videotape of victim\u2019s home that included panning shots of a crucifix on the wall \u201cinvite[d] an emotional response\u201d); cf. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (1991) (establishing a per se rale against religious invocations in prosecutorial closing arguments in capital cases)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"640 So.2d 1127, 1135","parenthetical":"videotape of victim's home that included panning shots of a crucifix on the wall \"invite[d] an emotional response\"","sentence":"See Taylor v. State, 640 So.2d 1127, 1135 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (videotape of victim\u2019s home that included panning shots of a crucifix on the wall \u201cinvite[d] an emotional response\u201d); cf. Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (1991) (establishing a per se rale against religious invocations in prosecutorial closing arguments in capital cases)."},"case_id":9192080,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, the correct inquiry is not whether it was impossible for Plaintiff to bring suit, but whether it was impossible for [the decedent] or his successor in interest to bring suit.\"). Thus, RCHSD's cases discussing representative class standing and assignment-based rights to bring claims under the UCL are inapplicable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"46 Cal.4th 969, 977-80","parenthetical":"holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action","sentence":"See Arias v. Super. Ct. 46 Cal.4th 969, 977-80, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009) (holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action); see also In re WellPoint, Inc. v. Out-of-Network \u201cUCR\u201d Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements","sentence":"See Arias v. Super. Ct. 46 Cal.4th 969, 977-80, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009) (holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action); see also In re WellPoint, Inc. v. Out-of-Network \u201cUCR\u201d Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements)."},"case_id":12266898,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, the correct inquiry is not whether it was impossible for Plaintiff to bring suit, but whether it was impossible for [the decedent] or his successor in interest to bring suit.\"). Thus, RCHSD's cases discussing representative class standing and assignment-based rights to bring claims under the UCL are inapplicable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action","sentence":"See Arias v. Super. Ct. 46 Cal.4th 969, 977-80, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009) (holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action); see also In re WellPoint, Inc. v. Out-of-Network \u201cUCR\u201d Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements","sentence":"See Arias v. Super. Ct. 46 Cal.4th 969, 977-80, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009) (holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action); see also In re WellPoint, Inc. v. Out-of-Network \u201cUCR\u201d Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements)."},"case_id":12266898,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, the correct inquiry is not whether it was impossible for Plaintiff to bring suit, but whether it was impossible for [the decedent] or his successor in interest to bring suit.\"). Thus, RCHSD's cases discussing representative class standing and assignment-based rights to bring claims under the UCL are inapplicable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action","sentence":"See Arias v. Super. Ct. 46 Cal.4th 969, 977-80, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009) (holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action); see also In re WellPoint, Inc. v. Out-of-Network \u201cUCR\u201d Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements","sentence":"See Arias v. Super. Ct. 46 Cal.4th 969, 977-80, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 209 P.3d 923 (2009) (holding that a private party could pursue a representative action on behalf of others under the UCL only if the party met the requirements for a class action); see also In re WellPoint, Inc. v. Out-of-Network \u201cUCR\u201d Rates Litig., 903 F.Supp.2d 880, 898 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that plaintiffs could only pursue UCL claims via assignment if they satisfied class action requirements)."},"case_id":12266898,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to exhibit RRR where it ordered defendants to redact Thorns's prior offenses from the exhibit immediately upon Thorns's objection and before entering the exhibit into evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"328 F.3d 1028, 1032","parenthetical":"\"To reverse on the basis of an evidentiary ruling, this Court must conclude both that the district court abused its discretion and that the error was prejudicial.\"","sentence":"See McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cTo reverse on the basis of an evidentiary ruling, this Court must conclude both that the district court abused its discretion and that the error was prejudicial.\u201d); see also United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir.1978) (no abuse of discretion for not giving a limiting instruction where no party asked for one)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"586 F.2d 1312, 1315","parenthetical":"no abuse of discretion for not giving a limiting instruction where no party asked for one","sentence":"See McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 328 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir.2003) (\u201cTo reverse on the basis of an evidentiary ruling, this Court must conclude both that the district court abused its discretion and that the error was prejudicial.\u201d); see also United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir.1978) (no abuse of discretion for not giving a limiting instruction where no party asked for one)."},"case_id":5742361,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, the record indicates that Taylor has served three prior prison terms; that he was on misdemeanor probation when he committed the present felony offense; and that he previously violated a misdemeanor probation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 F.3d 769, 769","parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner's prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence","sentence":"See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the petitioner \u201ccommitted most of his crimes while on probation or parole\u201d). As such, \u201c[o]ne in [Taylor\u2019s] position has been both graphically informed of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.\u201d Rum-mel, 445 U.S. at 278, 100 S.Ct. 1133; see also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 769 (noting that the petitioner\u2019s prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"538 U.S. 12, 12","parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner \"committed most of his crimes while on probation or parole\"","sentence":"See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the petitioner \u201ccommitted most of his crimes while on probation or parole\u201d). As such, \u201c[o]ne in [Taylor\u2019s] position has been both graphically informed of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.\u201d Rum-mel, 445 U.S. at 278, 100 S.Ct. 1133; see also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 769 (noting that the petitioner\u2019s prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence)."},"case_id":3675365,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the record indicates that Taylor has served three prior prison terms; that he was on misdemeanor probation when he committed the present felony offense; and that he previously violated a misdemeanor probation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 F.3d 769, 769","parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner's prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence","sentence":"See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the petitioner \u201ccommitted most of his crimes while on probation or parole\u201d). As such, \u201c[o]ne in [Taylor\u2019s] position has been both graphically informed of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.\u201d Rum-mel, 445 U.S. at 278, 100 S.Ct. 1133; see also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 769 (noting that the petitioner\u2019s prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner \"committed most of his crimes while on probation or parole\"","sentence":"See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the petitioner \u201ccommitted most of his crimes while on probation or parole\u201d). As such, \u201c[o]ne in [Taylor\u2019s] position has been both graphically informed of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.\u201d Rum-mel, 445 U.S. at 278, 100 S.Ct. 1133; see also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 769 (noting that the petitioner\u2019s prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence)."},"case_id":3675365,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the record indicates that Taylor has served three prior prison terms; that he was on misdemeanor probation when he committed the present felony offense; and that he previously violated a misdemeanor probation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 F.3d 769, 769","parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner's prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence","sentence":"See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the petitioner \u201ccommitted most of his crimes while on probation or parole\u201d). As such, \u201c[o]ne in [Taylor\u2019s] position has been both graphically informed of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.\u201d Rum-mel, 445 U.S. at 278, 100 S.Ct. 1133; see also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 769 (noting that the petitioner\u2019s prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"445 U.S. 278, 278","parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner \"committed most of his crimes while on probation or parole\"","sentence":"See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the petitioner \u201ccommitted most of his crimes while on probation or parole\u201d). As such, \u201c[o]ne in [Taylor\u2019s] position has been both graphically informed of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.\u201d Rum-mel, 445 U.S. at 278, 100 S.Ct. 1133; see also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 769 (noting that the petitioner\u2019s prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence)."},"case_id":3675365,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition, the record indicates that Taylor has served three prior prison terms; that he was on misdemeanor probation when he committed the present felony offense; and that he previously violated a misdemeanor probation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"365 F.3d 769, 769","parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner's prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence","sentence":"See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the petitioner \u201ccommitted most of his crimes while on probation or parole\u201d). As such, \u201c[o]ne in [Taylor\u2019s] position has been both graphically informed of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.\u201d Rum-mel, 445 U.S. at 278, 100 S.Ct. 1133; see also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 769 (noting that the petitioner\u2019s prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the petitioner \"committed most of his crimes while on probation or parole\"","sentence":"See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 12, 123 S.Ct. 1179 (noting that the petitioner \u201ccommitted most of his crimes while on probation or parole\u201d). As such, \u201c[o]ne in [Taylor\u2019s] position has been both graphically informed of the consequences of lawlessness and given an opportunity to reform, all to no avail.\u201d Rum-mel, 445 U.S. at 278, 100 S.Ct. 1133; see also Ramirez, 365 F.3d at 769 (noting that the petitioner\u2019s prior incarceration included only a single, one-year jail sentence)."},"case_id":3675365,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It bears noting that this Court is cognizant of the growing concern in other jurisdictions with reliance on eyewitness identification testimony, the growing body of scientific and psychological studies regarding the questionable accuracy of the accounts of eyewitnesses, and the efforts made to prevent a miscarriage of justice. However, in this case, that issue was not raised before the trial justice and is not properly before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897, 907-16 (2015) (updating model instructions on eyewitness identifications to include several \"generally accepted principles\u201d, holding modified by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 32 N.E.3d 873, 877 (2015) (requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\u201d)); see also State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (2012) (deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury\u2019s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\u201d); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919, 920-21 (overturning longstanding precedent on evaluating trustworthiness of identification evidence; specifying many more variables that courts must consider beyond the five Neil v. Biggers factors, and clarifying when identifications are deemed admissible)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury's attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897, 907-16 (2015) (updating model instructions on eyewitness identifications to include several \"generally accepted principles\u201d, holding modified by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 32 N.E.3d 873, 877 (2015) (requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\u201d)); see also State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (2012) (deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury\u2019s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\u201d); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919, 920-21 (overturning longstanding precedent on evaluating trustworthiness of identification evidence; specifying many more variables that courts must consider beyond the five Neil v. Biggers factors, and clarifying when identifications are deemed admissible)."},"case_id":6827328,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It bears noting that this Court is cognizant of the growing concern in other jurisdictions with reliance on eyewitness identification testimony, the growing body of scientific and psychological studies regarding the questionable accuracy of the accounts of eyewitnesses, and the efforts made to prevent a miscarriage of justice. However, in this case, that issue was not raised before the trial justice and is not properly before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39","parenthetical":"deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury's attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897, 907-16 (2015) (updating model instructions on eyewitness identifications to include several \"generally accepted principles\u201d, holding modified by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 32 N.E.3d 873, 877 (2015) (requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\u201d)); see also State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (2012) (deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury\u2019s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\u201d); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919, 920-21 (overturning longstanding precedent on evaluating trustworthiness of identification evidence; specifying many more variables that courts must consider beyond the five Neil v. Biggers factors, and clarifying when identifications are deemed admissible)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897, 907-16 (2015) (updating model instructions on eyewitness identifications to include several \"generally accepted principles\u201d, holding modified by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 32 N.E.3d 873, 877 (2015) (requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\u201d)); see also State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (2012) (deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury\u2019s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\u201d); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919, 920-21 (overturning longstanding precedent on evaluating trustworthiness of identification evidence; specifying many more variables that courts must consider beyond the five Neil v. Biggers factors, and clarifying when identifications are deemed admissible)."},"case_id":6827328,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It bears noting that this Court is cognizant of the growing concern in other jurisdictions with reliance on eyewitness identification testimony, the growing body of scientific and psychological studies regarding the questionable accuracy of the accounts of eyewitnesses, and the efforts made to prevent a miscarriage of justice. However, in this case, that issue was not raised before the trial justice and is not properly before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury's attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897, 907-16 (2015) (updating model instructions on eyewitness identifications to include several \"generally accepted principles\u201d, holding modified by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 32 N.E.3d 873, 877 (2015) (requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\u201d)); see also State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (2012) (deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury\u2019s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\u201d); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919, 920-21 (overturning longstanding precedent on evaluating trustworthiness of identification evidence; specifying many more variables that courts must consider beyond the five Neil v. Biggers factors, and clarifying when identifications are deemed admissible)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"32 N.E.3d 873, 877","parenthetical":"requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897, 907-16 (2015) (updating model instructions on eyewitness identifications to include several \"generally accepted principles\u201d, holding modified by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 32 N.E.3d 873, 877 (2015) (requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\u201d)); see also State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (2012) (deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury\u2019s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\u201d); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919, 920-21 (overturning longstanding precedent on evaluating trustworthiness of identification evidence; specifying many more variables that courts must consider beyond the five Neil v. Biggers factors, and clarifying when identifications are deemed admissible)."},"case_id":6827328,"label":"b"}
{"context":". It bears noting that this Court is cognizant of the growing concern in other jurisdictions with reliance on eyewitness identification testimony, the growing body of scientific and psychological studies regarding the questionable accuracy of the accounts of eyewitnesses, and the efforts made to prevent a miscarriage of justice. However, in this case, that issue was not raised before the trial justice and is not properly before us.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"32 N.E.3d 873, 877","parenthetical":"requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897, 907-16 (2015) (updating model instructions on eyewitness identifications to include several \"generally accepted principles\u201d, holding modified by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 32 N.E.3d 873, 877 (2015) (requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\u201d)); see also State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (2012) (deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury\u2019s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\u201d); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919, 920-21 (overturning longstanding precedent on evaluating trustworthiness of identification evidence; specifying many more variables that courts must consider beyond the five Neil v. Biggers factors, and clarifying when identifications are deemed admissible)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39","parenthetical":"deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury's attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 22 N.E.3d 897, 907-16 (2015) (updating model instructions on eyewitness identifications to include several \"generally accepted principles\u201d, holding modified by Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 32 N.E.3d 873, 877 (2015) (requiring that \"a cross-racial instruction should always be included when giving the model eyewitness identification instruction, unless the parties agree that there was no cross-racial identification\u201d)); see also State v. Cabagbag, 127 Hawaii 302, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038-39 (2012) (deciding that \"when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to focus the jury\u2019s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification\u201d); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919, 920-21 (overturning longstanding precedent on evaluating trustworthiness of identification evidence; specifying many more variables that courts must consider beyond the five Neil v. Biggers factors, and clarifying when identifications are deemed admissible)."},"case_id":6827328,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Or put another way, the conduct at issue is not nearly identical when the difference between the plaintiffs conduct and that of those alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in treatment received from the employer. See Wyvill v. United Cos.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"212 F.3d 296, 304-05","parenthetical":"requiring the plaintiff to show that the company treated others differently in \"nearly identical circumstances\" and finding that \"the striking differences between the two men's situations more than account for the different treatment they received\"","sentence":"Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 304-05 (5th Cir.2000) (requiring the plaintiff to show that the company treated others differently in \u201cnearly identical circumstances\u201d and finding that \u201cthe striking differences between the two men\u2019s situations more than account for the different treatment they received\u201d); see also Polanco v. City of Austin, Tex., 78 F.3d 968, 977 (5th Cir.1996) (where jury had to reject the employer\u2019s contention that two employees were not similarly situated, the \u201cevidence had to contradict the legitimacy of the [employer\u2019s] explanation that the differences between [the two employees] justified\u201d the difference in treatment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"78 F.3d 968, 977","parenthetical":"where jury had to reject the employer's contention that two employees were not similarly situated, the \"evidence had to contradict the legitimacy of the [employer's] explanation that the differences between [the two employees] justified\" the difference in treatment","sentence":"Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 304-05 (5th Cir.2000) (requiring the plaintiff to show that the company treated others differently in \u201cnearly identical circumstances\u201d and finding that \u201cthe striking differences between the two men\u2019s situations more than account for the different treatment they received\u201d); see also Polanco v. City of Austin, Tex., 78 F.3d 968, 977 (5th Cir.1996) (where jury had to reject the employer\u2019s contention that two employees were not similarly situated, the \u201cevidence had to contradict the legitimacy of the [employer\u2019s] explanation that the differences between [the two employees] justified\u201d the difference in treatment)."},"case_id":9462683,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"Persecution on account of ... political opinion ... is persecution on account of the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's.\" To qualify for withholding of removal based on persecution by a guerilla group on account of a political opinion, Sanchez must establish that the guerillas persecuted her or will seek to persecute her in the future because of her actual or imputed political opinion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Purely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on account of political opinion,\" but mixed-motive persecution may qualify if one of the motives is political.","sentence":"See id. at 483, 112 S.Ct. at 816 (finding that persecution due to a refusal to join forces with the guerillas is not persecution on account of a political opinion); see also Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir.2000) (\u201cPurely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on account of political opinion,\u201d but mixed-motive persecution may qualify if one of the motives is political.) (persuasive authority); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494-95 (3d Cir.2001) (finding that evidence consistent with acts of private violence or that merely shows that an individual has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution on a statutorily protected ground) (persuasive authority)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 816, 816","parenthetical":"finding that persecution due to a refusal to join forces with the guerillas is not persecution on account of a political opinion","sentence":"See id. at 483, 112 S.Ct. at 816 (finding that persecution due to a refusal to join forces with the guerillas is not persecution on account of a political opinion); see also Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir.2000) (\u201cPurely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on account of political opinion,\u201d but mixed-motive persecution may qualify if one of the motives is political.) (persuasive authority); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494-95 (3d Cir.2001) (finding that evidence consistent with acts of private violence or that merely shows that an individual has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution on a statutorily protected ground) (persuasive authority)."},"case_id":9188622,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"Persecution on account of ... political opinion ... is persecution on account of the victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's.\" To qualify for withholding of removal based on persecution by a guerilla group on account of a political opinion, Sanchez must establish that the guerillas persecuted her or will seek to persecute her in the future because of her actual or imputed political opinion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"242 F.3d 477, 494-95","parenthetical":"finding that evidence consistent with acts of private violence or that merely shows that an individual has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution on a statutorily protected ground","sentence":"See id. at 483, 112 S.Ct. at 816 (finding that persecution due to a refusal to join forces with the guerillas is not persecution on account of a political opinion); see also Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir.2000) (\u201cPurely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on account of political opinion,\u201d but mixed-motive persecution may qualify if one of the motives is political.) (persuasive authority); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494-95 (3d Cir.2001) (finding that evidence consistent with acts of private violence or that merely shows that an individual has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution on a statutorily protected ground) (persuasive authority)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"112 S.Ct. 816, 816","parenthetical":"finding that persecution due to a refusal to join forces with the guerillas is not persecution on account of a political opinion","sentence":"See id. at 483, 112 S.Ct. at 816 (finding that persecution due to a refusal to join forces with the guerillas is not persecution on account of a political opinion); see also Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n.3 (9th Cir.2000) (\u201cPurely personal retribution is, of course, not persecution on account of political opinion,\u201d but mixed-motive persecution may qualify if one of the motives is political.) (persuasive authority); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494-95 (3d Cir.2001) (finding that evidence consistent with acts of private violence or that merely shows that an individual has been the victim of criminal activity does not constitute evidence of persecution on a statutorily protected ground) (persuasive authority)."},"case_id":9188622,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs contend that the FVEC violates their right to equal protection because it gives fewer benefits to Filipino veterans than to veterans of the United States Armed Forces. But our circuit, as well as one of our sister circuits, has already held that the disparity in benefits created by SS 107 of title 38, established by the Surplus Appropriation Rescission Acts, does not require strict scrutiny because it is based on status as a territory and not on the basis of race, nationality, or alienage and is constitutional under rational basis review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 F.3d 1356, 1360-62","parenthetical":"holding that the \"broad powers of Congress under the Territory Clause are inconsistent with the application of heightened judicial scrutiny\" and finding several potential rational bases, including conserving finances, to support the law","sentence":"See Besinga v. United States, 14 F.3d 1356, 1360-62 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that the \u201cbroad powers of Congress under the Territory Clause are inconsistent with the application of heightened judicial scrutiny\u201d and finding several potential rational bases, including conserving finances, to support the law); see also Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d 1154, 1160-62 (D.C.Cir.1991) (rejecting an argument that strict scrutiny should apply because Filipino veterans are an insular minority and finding that limiting tax-funded social-welfare programs to United States veterans is a rational basis for the law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"928 F.2d 1154, 1160-62","parenthetical":"rejecting an argument that strict scrutiny should apply because Filipino veterans are an insular minority and finding that limiting tax-funded social-welfare programs to United States veterans is a rational basis for the law","sentence":"See Besinga v. United States, 14 F.3d 1356, 1360-62 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that the \u201cbroad powers of Congress under the Territory Clause are inconsistent with the application of heightened judicial scrutiny\u201d and finding several potential rational bases, including conserving finances, to support the law); see also Quiban v. Veterans Admin., 928 F.2d 1154, 1160-62 (D.C.Cir.1991) (rejecting an argument that strict scrutiny should apply because Filipino veterans are an insular minority and finding that limiting tax-funded social-welfare programs to United States veterans is a rational basis for the law)."},"case_id":3662442,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Unlike the circumstances in Adamson, the present record thus fails to reveal that the defendant appreciated and understood the full consequences of breaching the plea bargain and thereby deliberately chose to upset the finality of his convictions and sentences when he decided not to abide by the terms of the agreement. Adamson therefore provides no authority for vacating the defendant's guilty pleas and sentences and exposing him to a second prosecution for the crimes originally charged by the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a defendant's unilateral breach of a plea bargain may constitute \"cause\" for setting aside his agreement with the state and returning the parties to their pre-plea positions in cases in which he or she has not yet been sentenced on his guilty plea and jeopardy has therefore not yet attached","sentence":"See Dyer v. State, 34 P.3d 652 653-54 (Okla.Crim.App.2001) (distinguishing Adamson because \u201c[t]he state merely stated that [defendant] could then be charged with perjury\u201d if he breached his plea bargain, and \u201c[n]o | oother possible results of a breach were discussed.\u201d); cf. State v. Nall, 379 So.2d 731 (La.1980)(a defendant\u2019s unilateral breach of a plea bargain may constitute \u201ccause\u201d for setting aside his agreement with the state and returning the parties to their pre-plea positions in cases in which he or she has not yet been sentenced on his guilty plea and jeopardy has therefore not yet attached); State v. Kelly, 96-0903 (La.App. 5th Cir.11\/12\/97), 704 So.2d 800, writ denied, 97-3104 (La.4\/9\/98), 717 So.2d 1142 (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"34 P.3d 652, 653-54","parenthetical":"distinguishing Adamson because \"[t]he state merely stated that [defendant] could then be charged with perjury\" if he breached his plea bargain, and \"[n]o | oother possible results of a breach were discussed.\"","sentence":"See Dyer v. State, 34 P.3d 652 653-54 (Okla.Crim.App.2001) (distinguishing Adamson because \u201c[t]he state merely stated that [defendant] could then be charged with perjury\u201d if he breached his plea bargain, and \u201c[n]o | oother possible results of a breach were discussed.\u201d); cf. State v. Nall, 379 So.2d 731 (La.1980)(a defendant\u2019s unilateral breach of a plea bargain may constitute \u201ccause\u201d for setting aside his agreement with the state and returning the parties to their pre-plea positions in cases in which he or she has not yet been sentenced on his guilty plea and jeopardy has therefore not yet attached); State v. Kelly, 96-0903 (La.App. 5th Cir.11\/12\/97), 704 So.2d 800, writ denied, 97-3104 (La.4\/9\/98), 717 So.2d 1142 (same)."},"case_id":9150523,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, when an employee occupies a position for which political loyalty is a legitimate criterion, the nature of the position itself weights the balance in favor of the government.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"483 U.S. 378, 388","parenthetical":"stating that whether the statement \"has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\" is a \"pertinent consideration\" in the Pickering balance","sentence":"See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (stating that whether the statement \u201chas a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\u201d is a \u201cpertinent consideration\u201d in the Pickering balance); see also McEvoy, 124 F.3d at 103 (noting that an employee\u2019s role as a policymaker normally weighs \u201cheavily\u201d on the government\u2019s side of the Pickering balance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"124 F.3d 103, 103","parenthetical":"noting that an employee's role as a policymaker normally weighs \"heavily\" on the government's side of the Pickering balance","sentence":"See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (stating that whether the statement \u201chas a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\u201d is a \u201cpertinent consideration\u201d in the Pickering balance); see also McEvoy, 124 F.3d at 103 (noting that an employee\u2019s role as a policymaker normally weighs \u201cheavily\u201d on the government\u2019s side of the Pickering balance)."},"case_id":9433255,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Accordingly, when an employee occupies a position for which political loyalty is a legitimate criterion, the nature of the position itself weights the balance in favor of the government.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"124 F.3d 103, 103","parenthetical":"noting that an employee's role as a policymaker normally weighs \"heavily\" on the government's side of the Pickering balance","sentence":"See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (stating that whether the statement \u201chas a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\u201d is a \u201cpertinent consideration\u201d in the Pickering balance); see also McEvoy, 124 F.3d at 103 (noting that an employee\u2019s role as a policymaker normally weighs \u201cheavily\u201d on the government\u2019s side of the Pickering balance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that whether the statement \"has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\" is a \"pertinent consideration\" in the Pickering balance","sentence":"See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (stating that whether the statement \u201chas a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\u201d is a \u201cpertinent consideration\u201d in the Pickering balance); see also McEvoy, 124 F.3d at 103 (noting that an employee\u2019s role as a policymaker normally weighs \u201cheavily\u201d on the government\u2019s side of the Pickering balance)."},"case_id":9433255,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Accordingly, when an employee occupies a position for which political loyalty is a legitimate criterion, the nature of the position itself weights the balance in favor of the government.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that whether the statement \"has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\" is a \"pertinent consideration\" in the Pickering balance","sentence":"See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (stating that whether the statement \u201chas a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\u201d is a \u201cpertinent consideration\u201d in the Pickering balance); see also McEvoy, 124 F.3d at 103 (noting that an employee\u2019s role as a policymaker normally weighs \u201cheavily\u201d on the government\u2019s side of the Pickering balance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"124 F.3d 103, 103","parenthetical":"noting that an employee's role as a policymaker normally weighs \"heavily\" on the government's side of the Pickering balance","sentence":"See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) (stating that whether the statement \u201chas a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary\u201d is a \u201cpertinent consideration\u201d in the Pickering balance); see also McEvoy, 124 F.3d at 103 (noting that an employee\u2019s role as a policymaker normally weighs \u201cheavily\u201d on the government\u2019s side of the Pickering balance)."},"case_id":9433255,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We disagree. Our research has uncovered several cases in which the Commonwealth had sought to enjoin future conduct based on past acts. See Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Nat'l Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where petitioner entered into a consent decree with Commonwealth in action arising under the Law and admitted to participating in vehicle odometer rollback scheme, State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons was not precluded from revoking petitioner's salesperson's license or imposing civil penalty","sentence":"Leasing Co., 102 Pa.Cmwlth. 623, 519 A.2d 1050 (1986) (where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company); see also Frishman v. Dep\u2019t of State, Bureau of Prof. and Occupational Affairs, 140 Pa. Cmwlth. 455, 592 A.2d 1389 (1991) (where petitioner entered into a consent decree with Commonwealth in action arising under the Law and admitted to participating in vehicle odometer rollback scheme, State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons was not precluded from revoking petitioner\u2019s salesperson\u2019s license or imposing civil penalty); Commonwealth by Preate v. Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Ass\u2019n, Inc., 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 572 A.2d 256 (1990) (Commonwealth\u2019s complaint alleged that association held itself out to be a charitable organization and solicited contributions for itself and other entities); Northview Motors, Inc. v. Commonwealth by Zimmerman, 128 Pa. Cmwlth. 54, 562 A.2d 977 (1989) (evidence was sufficient to support restitution award to consumers who were damaged by auto dealer that violated Law by misleading consumers about the price and quality of the vehicles); Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Society of the 28th Div., A.E.F."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company","sentence":"Leasing Co., 102 Pa.Cmwlth. 623, 519 A.2d 1050 (1986) (where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company); see also Frishman v. Dep\u2019t of State, Bureau of Prof. and Occupational Affairs, 140 Pa. Cmwlth. 455, 592 A.2d 1389 (1991) (where petitioner entered into a consent decree with Commonwealth in action arising under the Law and admitted to participating in vehicle odometer rollback scheme, State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons was not precluded from revoking petitioner\u2019s salesperson\u2019s license or imposing civil penalty); Commonwealth by Preate v. Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Ass\u2019n, Inc., 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 572 A.2d 256 (1990) (Commonwealth\u2019s complaint alleged that association held itself out to be a charitable organization and solicited contributions for itself and other entities); Northview Motors, Inc. v. Commonwealth by Zimmerman, 128 Pa. Cmwlth. 54, 562 A.2d 977 (1989) (evidence was sufficient to support restitution award to consumers who were damaged by auto dealer that violated Law by misleading consumers about the price and quality of the vehicles); Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Society of the 28th Div., A.E.F."},"case_id":9262309,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We disagree. Our research has uncovered several cases in which the Commonwealth had sought to enjoin future conduct based on past acts. See Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Nat'l Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Commonwealth's complaint alleged that association held itself out to be a charitable organization and solicited contributions for itself and other entities","sentence":"Leasing Co., 102 Pa.Cmwlth. 623, 519 A.2d 1050 (1986) (where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company); see also Frishman v. Dep\u2019t of State, Bureau of Prof. and Occupational Affairs, 140 Pa. Cmwlth. 455, 592 A.2d 1389 (1991) (where petitioner entered into a consent decree with Commonwealth in action arising under the Law and admitted to participating in vehicle odometer rollback scheme, State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons was not precluded from revoking petitioner\u2019s salesperson\u2019s license or imposing civil penalty); Commonwealth by Preate v. Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Ass\u2019n, Inc., 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 572 A.2d 256 (1990) (Commonwealth\u2019s complaint alleged that association held itself out to be a charitable organization and solicited contributions for itself and other entities); Northview Motors, Inc. v. Commonwealth by Zimmerman, 128 Pa. Cmwlth. 54, 562 A.2d 977 (1989) (evidence was sufficient to support restitution award to consumers who were damaged by auto dealer that violated Law by misleading consumers about the price and quality of the vehicles); Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Society of the 28th Div., A.E.F."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company","sentence":"Leasing Co., 102 Pa.Cmwlth. 623, 519 A.2d 1050 (1986) (where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company); see also Frishman v. Dep\u2019t of State, Bureau of Prof. and Occupational Affairs, 140 Pa. Cmwlth. 455, 592 A.2d 1389 (1991) (where petitioner entered into a consent decree with Commonwealth in action arising under the Law and admitted to participating in vehicle odometer rollback scheme, State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons was not precluded from revoking petitioner\u2019s salesperson\u2019s license or imposing civil penalty); Commonwealth by Preate v. Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Ass\u2019n, Inc., 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 572 A.2d 256 (1990) (Commonwealth\u2019s complaint alleged that association held itself out to be a charitable organization and solicited contributions for itself and other entities); Northview Motors, Inc. v. Commonwealth by Zimmerman, 128 Pa. Cmwlth. 54, 562 A.2d 977 (1989) (evidence was sufficient to support restitution award to consumers who were damaged by auto dealer that violated Law by misleading consumers about the price and quality of the vehicles); Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Society of the 28th Div., A.E.F."},"case_id":9262309,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We disagree. Our research has uncovered several cases in which the Commonwealth had sought to enjoin future conduct based on past acts. See Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Nat'l Apt.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company","sentence":"Leasing Co., 102 Pa.Cmwlth. 623, 519 A.2d 1050 (1986) (where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company); see also Frishman v. Dep\u2019t of State, Bureau of Prof. and Occupational Affairs, 140 Pa. Cmwlth. 455, 592 A.2d 1389 (1991) (where petitioner entered into a consent decree with Commonwealth in action arising under the Law and admitted to participating in vehicle odometer rollback scheme, State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons was not precluded from revoking petitioner\u2019s salesperson\u2019s license or imposing civil penalty); Commonwealth by Preate v. Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Ass\u2019n, Inc., 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 572 A.2d 256 (1990) (Commonwealth\u2019s complaint alleged that association held itself out to be a charitable organization and solicited contributions for itself and other entities); Northview Motors, Inc. v. Commonwealth by Zimmerman, 128 Pa. Cmwlth. 54, 562 A.2d 977 (1989) (evidence was sufficient to support restitution award to consumers who were damaged by auto dealer that violated Law by misleading consumers about the price and quality of the vehicles); Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Society of the 28th Div., A.E.F."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence was sufficient to support restitution award to consumers who were damaged by auto dealer that violated Law by misleading consumers about the price and quality of the vehicles","sentence":"Leasing Co., 102 Pa.Cmwlth. 623, 519 A.2d 1050 (1986) (where Commonwealth alleged that apartment leasing company wrongfully withheld security deposits, it was sufficient that Commonwealth believe that a violation of Law occurred in order to set forth cause of action against company); see also Frishman v. Dep\u2019t of State, Bureau of Prof. and Occupational Affairs, 140 Pa. Cmwlth. 455, 592 A.2d 1389 (1991) (where petitioner entered into a consent decree with Commonwealth in action arising under the Law and admitted to participating in vehicle odometer rollback scheme, State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons was not precluded from revoking petitioner\u2019s salesperson\u2019s license or imposing civil penalty); Commonwealth by Preate v. Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Ass\u2019n, Inc., 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 186, 572 A.2d 256 (1990) (Commonwealth\u2019s complaint alleged that association held itself out to be a charitable organization and solicited contributions for itself and other entities); Northview Motors, Inc. v. Commonwealth by Zimmerman, 128 Pa. Cmwlth. 54, 562 A.2d 977 (1989) (evidence was sufficient to support restitution award to consumers who were damaged by auto dealer that violated Law by misleading consumers about the price and quality of the vehicles); Commonwealth by Zimmerman v. Society of the 28th Div., A.E.F."},"case_id":9262309,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 N.Y.2d 827, 829","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 N.Y.2d 827, 829","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 N.Y.2d 827, 829","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"451 N.E.2d 488, 489","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"451 N.E.2d 488, 489","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court has found no New York Court of Appeals decision directly addressing the question of whether an insured may recover punitive damages in such circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55","parenthetical":"punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \"an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\"","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"451 N.E.2d 488, 489","parenthetical":"assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case","sentence":"See Dano v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 827, 829, 464 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742, 451 N.E.2d 488, 489 (1983) (assuming availability of remedy but dismissing claim because general business practice not supportable on facts of case); Hubbell v. Trans World Life Ins. Co. of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 899, 901, 430 N.Y.S.2d 589, 590, 408 N.E.2d 918, 919 (1980) (same); Halpin v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 48 N.Y.2d 906, 908, 425 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49, 401 N.E.2d 171 (1979) (same); cf. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 427, 437-39, 334 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608-10, 285 N.E.2d 849, 854-55 (1972) (punitive damages may be recovered for breach of insurance contract upon \u201can extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract\u201d)."},"case_id":10511737,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Record on Appeal does not contain the court's responses to the inquiries. Therefore, we assume the court correctly advised the jury it should not consider insurance in its deliberations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"voir dire question on whether any members of the venire believed damages should be limited in order to reduce insurance rates was inherently prejudicial","sentence":"State v. Vanderhorst, 257 S.C. 114, 184 S.E. (2d) 540 (1971) (where the trial judge\u2019s instructions are not printed in the record, the appellate court must presume the judge correctly charged the jury); see also Dunn v. Charleston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 S.C. 43, 426 S.E. (2d) 756 (1993) (voir dire question on whether any members of the venire believed damages should be limited in order to reduce insurance rates was inherently prejudicial); cf. Landry v. Hilton Head Plantation Property Owners Ass\u2019n, Inc., 452 S.E. (2d) 619 (S.C. Ct. 1994) (Davis Adv."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the trial judge's instructions are not printed in the record, the appellate court must presume the judge correctly charged the jury","sentence":"State v. Vanderhorst, 257 S.C. 114, 184 S.E. (2d) 540 (1971) (where the trial judge\u2019s instructions are not printed in the record, the appellate court must presume the judge correctly charged the jury); see also Dunn v. Charleston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 S.C. 43, 426 S.E. (2d) 756 (1993) (voir dire question on whether any members of the venire believed damages should be limited in order to reduce insurance rates was inherently prejudicial); cf. Landry v. Hilton Head Plantation Property Owners Ass\u2019n, Inc., 452 S.E. (2d) 619 (S.C. Ct. 1994) (Davis Adv."},"case_id":903294,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, these cases do not stand for the proposition that \"individuals have standing to bring claims against all facilities in a nationwide chain, even if the individuals did not visit every facility.\" (Pls.' Mem. at 22.) Indeed, only one of the cases cited by Plaintiffs, Celano v. Marriott Int'l, even involved a nationwide chain, and there the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to sue twenty-six golf courses around the country because the plaintiffs alleged that they had actually been deterred from play ing at these courses.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2008 WL 239306, at *7","parenthetical":"\"All three plaintiffs have attempted to arrange tee times at numerous Marriott courses, but have been unable to play because Marriott advised them that it did not provide accessible carts.\"","sentence":"No. 05-4004, 2008 WL 239306, at *7 (ND.Cal. Jan. 28, 2008) (\u201cAll three plaintiffs have attempted to arrange tee times at numerous Marriott courses, but have been unable to play because Marriott advised them that it did not provide accessible carts.\u201d); see also Bacon v. City of Richmond, 386 F.Supp.2d 700, 705 (E.D.Va.2005) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to obtain relief against all facilities within a school district, not just against the four schools that they attended, because \u201c[ejach plaintiff has expressed a well-founded interest in attending events at facilities other than the four schools mentioned\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"386 F.Supp.2d 700, 705","parenthetical":"holding that plaintiffs had standing to obtain relief against all facilities within a school district, not just against the four schools that they attended, because \"[ejach plaintiff has expressed a well-founded interest in attending events at facilities other than the four schools mentioned\"","sentence":"No. 05-4004, 2008 WL 239306, at *7 (ND.Cal. Jan. 28, 2008) (\u201cAll three plaintiffs have attempted to arrange tee times at numerous Marriott courses, but have been unable to play because Marriott advised them that it did not provide accessible carts.\u201d); see also Bacon v. City of Richmond, 386 F.Supp.2d 700, 705 (E.D.Va.2005) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to obtain relief against all facilities within a school district, not just against the four schools that they attended, because \u201c[ejach plaintiff has expressed a well-founded interest in attending events at facilities other than the four schools mentioned\u201d)."},"case_id":4195284,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In these circumstances, and against this legislative framework, we think there are at least two sound reasons for not inferring a congressional intention to dedicate two forums to the task of assessing alleged \"mistakes of fact\" relating to an employee's testimony before the ALJ. First, where newly discovered evidence of fraud implicates the evidentiary basis for an employee's compensation claim, the LHWCA discloses a decided preference for utilizing the DOL's in-house expertise in resolving the dispute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"970 F.2d 161, 162","parenthetical":"\"the benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\" under the LHWCA only after \"claim determination\" is complete","sentence":"See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46, 52 S.Ct. 285, 290, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (the LHWCA provides \u201ca prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\u201d) (emphasis added); cf. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Vahalik, 970 F.2d 161, 162 (6th Cir.1992) (\u201cthe benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\u201d under the LHWCA only after \u201cclaim determination\u201d is complete)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"285 U.S. 22, 46","parenthetical":"the LHWCA provides \"a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46, 52 S.Ct. 285, 290, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (the LHWCA provides \u201ca prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\u201d) (emphasis added); cf. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Vahalik, 970 F.2d 161, 162 (6th Cir.1992) (\u201cthe benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\u201d under the LHWCA only after \u201cclaim determination\u201d is complete)."},"case_id":11312211,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In these circumstances, and against this legislative framework, we think there are at least two sound reasons for not inferring a congressional intention to dedicate two forums to the task of assessing alleged \"mistakes of fact\" relating to an employee's testimony before the ALJ. First, where newly discovered evidence of fraud implicates the evidentiary basis for an employee's compensation claim, the LHWCA discloses a decided preference for utilizing the DOL's in-house expertise in resolving the dispute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"52 S.Ct. 285, 290","parenthetical":"the LHWCA provides \"a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46, 52 S.Ct. 285, 290, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (the LHWCA provides \u201ca prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\u201d) (emphasis added); cf. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Vahalik, 970 F.2d 161, 162 (6th Cir.1992) (\u201cthe benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\u201d under the LHWCA only after \u201cclaim determination\u201d is complete)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"970 F.2d 161, 162","parenthetical":"\"the benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\" under the LHWCA only after \"claim determination\" is complete","sentence":"See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46, 52 S.Ct. 285, 290, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (the LHWCA provides \u201ca prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\u201d) (emphasis added); cf. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Vahalik, 970 F.2d 161, 162 (6th Cir.1992) (\u201cthe benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\u201d under the LHWCA only after \u201cclaim determination\u201d is complete)."},"case_id":11312211,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In these circumstances, and against this legislative framework, we think there are at least two sound reasons for not inferring a congressional intention to dedicate two forums to the task of assessing alleged \"mistakes of fact\" relating to an employee's testimony before the ALJ. First, where newly discovered evidence of fraud implicates the evidentiary basis for an employee's compensation claim, the LHWCA discloses a decided preference for utilizing the DOL's in-house expertise in resolving the dispute.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"970 F.2d 161, 162","parenthetical":"\"the benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\" under the LHWCA only after \"claim determination\" is complete","sentence":"See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46, 52 S.Ct. 285, 290, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (the LHWCA provides \u201ca prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\u201d) (emphasis added); cf. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Vahalik, 970 F.2d 161, 162 (6th Cir.1992) (\u201cthe benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\u201d under the LHWCA only after \u201cclaim determination\u201d is complete)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the LHWCA provides \"a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46, 52 S.Ct. 285, 290, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932) (the LHWCA provides \u201ca prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task\u201d) (emphasis added); cf. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Vahalik, 970 F.2d 161, 162 (6th Cir.1992) (\u201cthe benefits of agency expertise become irrelevant\u201d under the LHWCA only after \u201cclaim determination\u201d is complete)."},"case_id":11312211,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Both parties agree the court erred in accepting Appellant's plea to the firearm charge in Appellant's absence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"304 S.C. 433, 434-35","parenthetical":"finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"case_id":4080386,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Both parties agree the court erred in accepting Appellant's plea to the firearm charge in Appellant's absence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"405 S.E.2d 391, 392","parenthetical":"finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"case_id":4080386,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Both parties agree the court erred in accepting Appellant's plea to the firearm charge in Appellant's absence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"304 S.C. 433, 434-35","parenthetical":"finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"case_id":4080386,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Both parties agree the court erred in accepting Appellant's plea to the firearm charge in Appellant's absence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"405 S.E.2d 391, 392","parenthetical":"finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"case_id":4080386,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Both parties agree the court erred in accepting Appellant's plea to the firearm charge in Appellant's absence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"304 S.C. 433, 434-35","parenthetical":"finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"case_id":4080386,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Both parties agree the court erred in accepting Appellant's plea to the firearm charge in Appellant's absence.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"405 S.E.2d 391, 392","parenthetical":"finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege","sentence":"See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (stating that such a plea is void because it is not an intentional relinquishment of a known constitutional right or privilege); cf. Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433, 434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) (finding that a defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary when the trial court did not discuss the maximum allowable sentences for the crimes with the defendant)."},"case_id":4080386,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Had Nationwide wanted to reduce the amount of interest accruing on the judgment, it could have paid its $100,000 policy limits immediately after the judgment was entered and before any substantial amount of interest had accrued.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"311 Ga.App. 495, 497","parenthetical":"holding that a judgment debtor may abate the accrual of interest by paying amount owed, and may abate the accrual of interest during appeal by complying with O.C.G.A. SS 9-11-67 by \"depositing with the court all or any part of such sum ... to be held by the clerk of the court, subject to withdrawal, in whole or in part, at any time thereafter upon order of the court, upon posting of sufficient security\"","sentence":"See JTH Tax, Inc. v. Flowers, 311 Ga.App. 495, 497, 716 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2011) (holding that a judgment debtor may abate the accrual of interest by paying amount owed, and may abate the accrual of interest during appeal by complying with O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-11-67 by \"depositing with the court all or any part of such sum ... to be held by the clerk of the court, subject to withdrawal, in whole or in part, at any time thereafter upon order of the court, upon posting of sufficient security\u201d); Threatt v. Forsyth Cnty., 250 Ga. App. 838, 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001) (\u201cThreatt I\"); Threatt, 585 S.E.2d at 163; see also United States v. Midwest Constr. Co., 619 F.2d 349, 353-354 (5th Cir.1980) (construing similar FRCP 67 to require, that in order to stop accrual of interest defendant must make money available to plaintiff without imposing conditions on its acceptance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"619 F.2d 349, 353-354","parenthetical":"construing similar FRCP 67 to require, that in order to stop accrual of interest defendant must make money available to plaintiff without imposing conditions on its acceptance","sentence":"See JTH Tax, Inc. v. Flowers, 311 Ga.App. 495, 497, 716 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2011) (holding that a judgment debtor may abate the accrual of interest by paying amount owed, and may abate the accrual of interest during appeal by complying with O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-11-67 by \"depositing with the court all or any part of such sum ... to be held by the clerk of the court, subject to withdrawal, in whole or in part, at any time thereafter upon order of the court, upon posting of sufficient security\u201d); Threatt v. Forsyth Cnty., 250 Ga. App. 838, 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001) (\u201cThreatt I\"); Threatt, 585 S.E.2d at 163; see also United States v. Midwest Constr. Co., 619 F.2d 349, 353-354 (5th Cir.1980) (construing similar FRCP 67 to require, that in order to stop accrual of interest defendant must make money available to plaintiff without imposing conditions on its acceptance)."},"case_id":12141584,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Had Nationwide wanted to reduce the amount of interest accruing on the judgment, it could have paid its $100,000 policy limits immediately after the judgment was entered and before any substantial amount of interest had accrued.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"716 S.E.2d 559, 561","parenthetical":"holding that a judgment debtor may abate the accrual of interest by paying amount owed, and may abate the accrual of interest during appeal by complying with O.C.G.A. SS 9-11-67 by \"depositing with the court all or any part of such sum ... to be held by the clerk of the court, subject to withdrawal, in whole or in part, at any time thereafter upon order of the court, upon posting of sufficient security\"","sentence":"See JTH Tax, Inc. v. Flowers, 311 Ga.App. 495, 497, 716 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2011) (holding that a judgment debtor may abate the accrual of interest by paying amount owed, and may abate the accrual of interest during appeal by complying with O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-11-67 by \"depositing with the court all or any part of such sum ... to be held by the clerk of the court, subject to withdrawal, in whole or in part, at any time thereafter upon order of the court, upon posting of sufficient security\u201d); Threatt v. Forsyth Cnty., 250 Ga. App. 838, 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001) (\u201cThreatt I\"); Threatt, 585 S.E.2d at 163; see also United States v. Midwest Constr. Co., 619 F.2d 349, 353-354 (5th Cir.1980) (construing similar FRCP 67 to require, that in order to stop accrual of interest defendant must make money available to plaintiff without imposing conditions on its acceptance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"619 F.2d 349, 353-354","parenthetical":"construing similar FRCP 67 to require, that in order to stop accrual of interest defendant must make money available to plaintiff without imposing conditions on its acceptance","sentence":"See JTH Tax, Inc. v. Flowers, 311 Ga.App. 495, 497, 716 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2011) (holding that a judgment debtor may abate the accrual of interest by paying amount owed, and may abate the accrual of interest during appeal by complying with O.C.G.A. \u00a7 9-11-67 by \"depositing with the court all or any part of such sum ... to be held by the clerk of the court, subject to withdrawal, in whole or in part, at any time thereafter upon order of the court, upon posting of sufficient security\u201d); Threatt v. Forsyth Cnty., 250 Ga. App. 838, 552 S.E.2d 123 (2001) (\u201cThreatt I\"); Threatt, 585 S.E.2d at 163; see also United States v. Midwest Constr. Co., 619 F.2d 349, 353-354 (5th Cir.1980) (construing similar FRCP 67 to require, that in order to stop accrual of interest defendant must make money available to plaintiff without imposing conditions on its acceptance)."},"case_id":12141584,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Gallo is correct that this court is the appropriate forum in which to request attorney fees incurred in proceedings before this court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"808 F.2d 1468, 1468","parenthetical":"\"[W]hen attorney fees and expenses are authorized in connection with an appeal, the amount of the award for such fees and expenses shall be determined by this court.\"","sentence":"See Phillips, 924 F.2d at 1581 (\u201cWe conclude that a request for attorney fees under the Back Pay Act for services rendered in judicial proceedings must, as in the case of an EAJA request, be directed to this court.\u201d); see also Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1468 (\u201c[W]hen attorney fees and expenses are authorized in connection with an appeal, the amount of the award for such fees and expenses shall be determined by this court.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"924 F.2d 1581, 1581","parenthetical":"\"We conclude that a request for attorney fees under the Back Pay Act for services rendered in judicial proceedings must, as in the case of an EAJA request, be directed to this court.\"","sentence":"See Phillips, 924 F.2d at 1581 (\u201cWe conclude that a request for attorney fees under the Back Pay Act for services rendered in judicial proceedings must, as in the case of an EAJA request, be directed to this court.\u201d); see also Gavette, 808 F.2d at 1468 (\u201c[W]hen attorney fees and expenses are authorized in connection with an appeal, the amount of the award for such fees and expenses shall be determined by this court.\u201d)."},"case_id":4070716,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Fines, participation in alternative programs, and terms of probation constitute \"punishment[s], penalties], or restraint[s] on the alien's liberty\" under the plain language of SS 1101 (a)(48)(ii).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"503 F.3d 45, 49","parenthetical":"restitution payments are \"plainly a punishment or penalty\" where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment","sentence":"See Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62 (BIA 2008) (finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under \u00a7 1101(a)(48)(A)); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234 (BIA 2002) (examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \u201cthat a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien\u2019s guilt or innocence if probation is violated\u201d and that \u201ca subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\u201d); see also De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (restitution payments are \u201cplainly a punishment or penalty\u201d where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment); Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005) (participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (term of probation is a penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62","parenthetical":"finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under SS 1101(a)(48)(A","sentence":"See Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62 (BIA 2008) (finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under \u00a7 1101(a)(48)(A)); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234 (BIA 2002) (examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \u201cthat a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien\u2019s guilt or innocence if probation is violated\u201d and that \u201ca subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\u201d); see also De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (restitution payments are \u201cplainly a punishment or penalty\u201d where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment); Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005) (participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (term of probation is a penalty)."},"case_id":12276221,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Fines, participation in alternative programs, and terms of probation constitute \"punishment[s], penalties], or restraint[s] on the alien's liberty\" under the plain language of SS 1101 (a)(48)(ii).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62","parenthetical":"finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under SS 1101(a)(48)(A","sentence":"See Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62 (BIA 2008) (finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under \u00a7 1101(a)(48)(A)); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234 (BIA 2002) (examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \u201cthat a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien\u2019s guilt or innocence if probation is violated\u201d and that \u201ca subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\u201d); see also De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (restitution payments are \u201cplainly a punishment or penalty\u201d where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment); Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005) (participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (term of probation is a penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"399 F.3d 728, 734-35","parenthetical":"participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction","sentence":"See Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62 (BIA 2008) (finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under \u00a7 1101(a)(48)(A)); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234 (BIA 2002) (examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \u201cthat a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien\u2019s guilt or innocence if probation is violated\u201d and that \u201ca subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\u201d); see also De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (restitution payments are \u201cplainly a punishment or penalty\u201d where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment); Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005) (participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (term of probation is a penalty)."},"case_id":12276221,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Fines, participation in alternative programs, and terms of probation constitute \"punishment[s], penalties], or restraint[s] on the alien's liberty\" under the plain language of SS 1101 (a)(48)(ii).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"503 F.3d 45, 49","parenthetical":"restitution payments are \"plainly a punishment or penalty\" where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment","sentence":"See Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62 (BIA 2008) (finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under \u00a7 1101(a)(48)(A)); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234 (BIA 2002) (examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \u201cthat a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien\u2019s guilt or innocence if probation is violated\u201d and that \u201ca subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\u201d); see also De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (restitution payments are \u201cplainly a punishment or penalty\u201d where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment); Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005) (participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (term of probation is a penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234","parenthetical":"examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \"that a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien's guilt or innocence if probation is violated\" and that \"a subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\"","sentence":"See Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62 (BIA 2008) (finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under \u00a7 1101(a)(48)(A)); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234 (BIA 2002) (examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \u201cthat a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien\u2019s guilt or innocence if probation is violated\u201d and that \u201ca subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\u201d); see also De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (restitution payments are \u201cplainly a punishment or penalty\u201d where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment); Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005) (participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (term of probation is a penalty)."},"case_id":12276221,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Fines, participation in alternative programs, and terms of probation constitute \"punishment[s], penalties], or restraint[s] on the alien's liberty\" under the plain language of SS 1101 (a)(48)(ii).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234","parenthetical":"examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \"that a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien's guilt or innocence if probation is violated\" and that \"a subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\"","sentence":"See Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62 (BIA 2008) (finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under \u00a7 1101(a)(48)(A)); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234 (BIA 2002) (examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \u201cthat a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien\u2019s guilt or innocence if probation is violated\u201d and that \u201ca subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\u201d); see also De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (restitution payments are \u201cplainly a punishment or penalty\u201d where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment); Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005) (participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (term of probation is a penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"399 F.3d 728, 734-35","parenthetical":"participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction","sentence":"See Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459, 460-62 (BIA 2008) (finding that costs and surcharges in the criminal sentencing context constitute penalties for purposes of establishing a conviction under \u00a7 1101(a)(48)(A)); In re Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223, 228, 234 (BIA 2002) (examining legislative history, noting that Congress indicated \u201cthat a conviction occurs upon a finding or confession of guilt, before the term of probation begins, regardless of whether the state requires further proceedings to determine the alien\u2019s guilt or innocence if probation is violated\u201d and that \u201ca subsequent dismissal of charges based solely on rehabilitative goals does not vitiate the original admission of guilt\u201d); see also De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (restitution payments are \u201cplainly a punishment or penalty\u201d where failure to make them could ripen into a guilty plea and lead to further punishment); Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005) (participation in state youthful offender trainee program constitutes a penalty for purposes of immigration conviction); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 2003) (term of probation is a penalty)."},"case_id":12276221,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the present situation, the question for decision is whether under c. 210, SS 8, as it read prior to the 1958 amendment, the two Flemings adopted in California, can be included within the term \"issue\" as used by the testator in his will, interpreted and construed in accordance with Massachusetts law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"257 Mass. 72, 80","parenthetical":"\"The question is not one of the legal effect of the adoption under the laws of the State of . . . [California], but of the meaning of . . . [the testatrix's] will under the laws of this Commonwealth.\"","sentence":"See Hutchins v. Browne, 253 Mass. 55, 58-59; Bundy v. United States Trust Co. 257 Mass. 72, 80 (\u201cThe question is not one of the legal effect of the adoption under the laws of the State of . . . [California], but of the meaning of . . . [the testatrix\u2019s] will under the laws of this Commonwealth.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"49 Cal. 2d 120, 142","parenthetical":"indicating that the California court would apply Massachusetts law in this case","sentence":"See also Estate of Stanford, 49 Cal. 2d 120, 142 (indicating that the California court would apply Massachusetts law in this case), and In re Cheney\u2019s Estate, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 704 (Spec. Term), where a New York court applied Massachusetts law to a child adopted in Georgia."},"case_id":3868330,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Assuming that this was the court's theory, any error in the court's remarks was harmless, because the theory was not communicated to the jury. Certainly we agree that it would be error to instruct the jury that notice to one conspirator that his conduct is illegal -- or notice to the conspiracy generally -- is, in itself, notice to all members of the conspiracy sufficient to overcome everyone's Cheek defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"340 F.2d 193, 197-98","parenthetical":"where statute required proof of defendant's specific knowledge that drug was illegally imported, it was plain error to instruct jury that knowledge of any alleged co-conspirator was imputed to all members of conspiracy, thus permitting jury to impute one conspirator's knowledge regarding illegal importation to his co-conspirators, without proof that other conspirators actually knew drug was imported illegally","sentence":"See Jefferson v. United States, 340 F.2d 193, 197-98 (9th Cir.1965) (where statute required proof of defendant\u2019s specific knowledge that drug was illegally imported, it was plain error to instruct jury that knowledge of any alleged co-conspirator was imputed to all members of conspiracy, thus permitting jury to impute one conspirator\u2019s knowledge regarding illegal importation to his co-conspirators, without proof that other conspirators actually knew drug was imported illegally); see also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202, 111 S.Ct. at 610 (\u201cif the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge requirement of the wilfulness requirement\u201d) (emphasis ours)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"498 U.S. 202, 202","parenthetical":"\"if the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge requirement of the wilfulness requirement\"","sentence":"See Jefferson v. United States, 340 F.2d 193, 197-98 (9th Cir.1965) (where statute required proof of defendant\u2019s specific knowledge that drug was illegally imported, it was plain error to instruct jury that knowledge of any alleged co-conspirator was imputed to all members of conspiracy, thus permitting jury to impute one conspirator\u2019s knowledge regarding illegal importation to his co-conspirators, without proof that other conspirators actually knew drug was imported illegally); see also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202, 111 S.Ct. at 610 (\u201cif the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge requirement of the wilfulness requirement\u201d) (emphasis ours)."},"case_id":3628394,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Assuming that this was the court's theory, any error in the court's remarks was harmless, because the theory was not communicated to the jury. Certainly we agree that it would be error to instruct the jury that notice to one conspirator that his conduct is illegal -- or notice to the conspiracy generally -- is, in itself, notice to all members of the conspiracy sufficient to overcome everyone's Cheek defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"340 F.2d 193, 197-98","parenthetical":"where statute required proof of defendant's specific knowledge that drug was illegally imported, it was plain error to instruct jury that knowledge of any alleged co-conspirator was imputed to all members of conspiracy, thus permitting jury to impute one conspirator's knowledge regarding illegal importation to his co-conspirators, without proof that other conspirators actually knew drug was imported illegally","sentence":"See Jefferson v. United States, 340 F.2d 193, 197-98 (9th Cir.1965) (where statute required proof of defendant\u2019s specific knowledge that drug was illegally imported, it was plain error to instruct jury that knowledge of any alleged co-conspirator was imputed to all members of conspiracy, thus permitting jury to impute one conspirator\u2019s knowledge regarding illegal importation to his co-conspirators, without proof that other conspirators actually knew drug was imported illegally); see also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202, 111 S.Ct. at 610 (\u201cif the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge requirement of the wilfulness requirement\u201d) (emphasis ours)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"111 S.Ct. 610, 610","parenthetical":"\"if the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge requirement of the wilfulness requirement\"","sentence":"See Jefferson v. United States, 340 F.2d 193, 197-98 (9th Cir.1965) (where statute required proof of defendant\u2019s specific knowledge that drug was illegally imported, it was plain error to instruct jury that knowledge of any alleged co-conspirator was imputed to all members of conspiracy, thus permitting jury to impute one conspirator\u2019s knowledge regarding illegal importation to his co-conspirators, without proof that other conspirators actually knew drug was imported illegally); see also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202, 111 S.Ct. at 610 (\u201cif the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge requirement of the wilfulness requirement\u201d) (emphasis ours)."},"case_id":3628394,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We also note that although HSAA is not identical to CERCLA, it mirrors CERCLA in many respects. It therefore seems inconsistent to consider the Insurers' federal preemption claims, while at the same time abstaining from the related state law preemption claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that Pullman abstention is proper if the state constitution provides greater protections than exist under the federal Constitution, even if the state and federal provisions at issue are mirror images of each other","sentence":"But see Fields v. Rockdale County, 785 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.1986) (finding that Pullman abstention is proper if the state constitution provides greater protections than exist under the federal Constitution, even if the state and federal provisions at issue are mirror images of each other)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"400 U.S. 433, 439","parenthetical":"holding that Pullman abstention should not be invoked to avoid interpreting state law constitutional questions when the provision of the state constitution at issue mirrors a provision of the federal constitution","sentence":"Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (holding that Pullman abstention should not be invoked to avoid interpreting state law constitutional questions when the provision of the state constitution at issue mirrors a provision of the federal constitution)."},"case_id":9466419,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We also note that although HSAA is not identical to CERCLA, it mirrors CERCLA in many respects. It therefore seems inconsistent to consider the Insurers' federal preemption claims, while at the same time abstaining from the related state law preemption claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that Pullman abstention is proper if the state constitution provides greater protections than exist under the federal Constitution, even if the state and federal provisions at issue are mirror images of each other","sentence":"But see Fields v. Rockdale County, 785 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.1986) (finding that Pullman abstention is proper if the state constitution provides greater protections than exist under the federal Constitution, even if the state and federal provisions at issue are mirror images of each other)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that Pullman abstention should not be invoked to avoid interpreting state law constitutional questions when the provision of the state constitution at issue mirrors a provision of the federal constitution","sentence":"Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (holding that Pullman abstention should not be invoked to avoid interpreting state law constitutional questions when the provision of the state constitution at issue mirrors a provision of the federal constitution)."},"case_id":9466419,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We also note that although HSAA is not identical to CERCLA, it mirrors CERCLA in many respects. It therefore seems inconsistent to consider the Insurers' federal preemption claims, while at the same time abstaining from the related state law preemption claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that Pullman abstention is proper if the state constitution provides greater protections than exist under the federal Constitution, even if the state and federal provisions at issue are mirror images of each other","sentence":"But see Fields v. Rockdale County, 785 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.1986) (finding that Pullman abstention is proper if the state constitution provides greater protections than exist under the federal Constitution, even if the state and federal provisions at issue are mirror images of each other)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that Pullman abstention should not be invoked to avoid interpreting state law constitutional questions when the provision of the state constitution at issue mirrors a provision of the federal constitution","sentence":"Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (holding that Pullman abstention should not be invoked to avoid interpreting state law constitutional questions when the provision of the state constitution at issue mirrors a provision of the federal constitution)."},"case_id":9466419,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, the District Court sentenced Thomas to imprisonment for 292 months-52 months more than the applicable maximum. It is beyond cavil that imprisonment for an additional 52 months beyond the penalty authorized by Congress, as a direct result of the error of using a drug quantity neither charged nor found by the jury, constitutes prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"143 F.3d 662, 675-76","parenthetical":"holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendant's base offense level pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines affected his substantial rights, even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level","sentence":"See Promise, 255 F.3d at 160 (holding that a sentence to a term of imprisonment ten years greater than the applicable maximum affected the defendant\u2019s \u201csubstantial rights\u201d); cf. United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendant\u2019s base offense level pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines affected his substantial rights, even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level); Gore, 154 F.3d at 47-48 (holding that the \u201cstigma\u201d associated with a second conviction along with an extra $50 special assessment constitutes prejudice sufficient to affect \u201csubstantial rights,\u201d even if the second conviction does not result in any additional time in prison)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"255 F.3d 160, 160","parenthetical":"holding that a sentence to a term of imprisonment ten years greater than the applicable maximum affected the defendant's \"substantial rights\"","sentence":"See Promise, 255 F.3d at 160 (holding that a sentence to a term of imprisonment ten years greater than the applicable maximum affected the defendant\u2019s \u201csubstantial rights\u201d); cf. United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendant\u2019s base offense level pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines affected his substantial rights, even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level); Gore, 154 F.3d at 47-48 (holding that the \u201cstigma\u201d associated with a second conviction along with an extra $50 special assessment constitutes prejudice sufficient to affect \u201csubstantial rights,\u201d even if the second conviction does not result in any additional time in prison)."},"case_id":9457987,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, the District Court sentenced Thomas to imprisonment for 292 months-52 months more than the applicable maximum. It is beyond cavil that imprisonment for an additional 52 months beyond the penalty authorized by Congress, as a direct result of the error of using a drug quantity neither charged nor found by the jury, constitutes prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"255 F.3d 160, 160","parenthetical":"holding that a sentence to a term of imprisonment ten years greater than the applicable maximum affected the defendant's \"substantial rights\"","sentence":"See Promise, 255 F.3d at 160 (holding that a sentence to a term of imprisonment ten years greater than the applicable maximum affected the defendant\u2019s \u201csubstantial rights\u201d); cf. United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendant\u2019s base offense level pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines affected his substantial rights, even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level); Gore, 154 F.3d at 47-48 (holding that the \u201cstigma\u201d associated with a second conviction along with an extra $50 special assessment constitutes prejudice sufficient to affect \u201csubstantial rights,\u201d even if the second conviction does not result in any additional time in prison)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"154 F.3d 47, 47-48","parenthetical":"holding that the \"stigma\" associated with a second conviction along with an extra $50 special assessment constitutes prejudice sufficient to affect \"substantial rights,\" even if the second conviction does not result in any additional time in prison","sentence":"See Promise, 255 F.3d at 160 (holding that a sentence to a term of imprisonment ten years greater than the applicable maximum affected the defendant\u2019s \u201csubstantial rights\u201d); cf. United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 675-76 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that arithmetical error that resulted in an increase to a defendant\u2019s base offense level pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines affected his substantial rights, even though the resulting sentence was within the range for the correct offense level); Gore, 154 F.3d at 47-48 (holding that the \u201cstigma\u201d associated with a second conviction along with an extra $50 special assessment constitutes prejudice sufficient to affect \u201csubstantial rights,\u201d even if the second conviction does not result in any additional time in prison)."},"case_id":9457987,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Immediately prior to his appointment to the OFP directorship, Ortiz, concededly a \"political activist,\" served for three years as City assemblyman, a position which would have brought all City ordinances within his constructive knowledge.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"891 F.2d 1087, 1091","parenthetical":"reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct","sentence":"See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 781, 793 n. 25, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1986) (same); cf. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d Cir.1989) (reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances","sentence":"See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 781, 793 n. 25, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1986) (same); cf. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d Cir.1989) (reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct)."},"case_id":1793413,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Immediately prior to his appointment to the OFP directorship, Ortiz, concededly a \"political activist,\" served for three years as City assemblyman, a position which would have brought all City ordinances within his constructive knowledge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances","sentence":"See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 781, 793 n. 25, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1986) (same); cf. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d Cir.1989) (reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"891 F.2d 1087, 1091","parenthetical":"reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct","sentence":"See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 781, 793 n. 25, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1986) (same); cf. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d Cir.1989) (reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct)."},"case_id":1793413,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Immediately prior to his appointment to the OFP directorship, Ortiz, concededly a \"political activist,\" served for three years as City assemblyman, a position which would have brought all City ordinances within his constructive knowledge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances","sentence":"See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 781, 793 n. 25, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1986) (same); cf. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d Cir.1989) (reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"891 F.2d 1087, 1091","parenthetical":"reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct","sentence":"See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 781, 793 n. 25, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982) (noting that all persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of duly enacted statutes\/ordinances); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328, 331 (3d Cir.1986) (same); cf. Good v. Dauphin County Social Servs. for Children and Youth, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091 (3d Cir.1989) (reasonably competent government officials should know laws governing their conduct)."},"case_id":1793413,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Because Gerald waived his right to complain of error in the exclusion of evidence he would have introduced despite the bankruptcy proceeding, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in determining that it could not act on the motion due to the bankruptcy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upheld trial court's modification of child support despite the petition for bankruptcy filed by the noncustodial parent","sentence":"But see Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934 (Ind.Ct.App. 3 Dist.1984) (upheld trial court\u2019s modification of child support despite the petition for bankruptcy filed by the noncustodial parent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an action for modification of child support order is not exempt from the automatic stay and thus was not permitted","sentence":"See e.g., In re Stringer, 847 F.2d 549 (9 Cir.1988) (an action for modification of child support order is not exempt from the automatic stay and thus was not permitted); Broussard v. Norris, 470 So.2d 399 (La.Ct.App. 3 Cir.1985) (order to increase child support remanded for determination of facts after the termination of bankruptcy proceeding)."},"case_id":11319934,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Because Gerald waived his right to complain of error in the exclusion of evidence he would have introduced despite the bankruptcy proceeding, we need not decide whether the trial court erred in determining that it could not act on the motion due to the bankruptcy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upheld trial court's modification of child support despite the petition for bankruptcy filed by the noncustodial parent","sentence":"But see Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934 (Ind.Ct.App. 3 Dist.1984) (upheld trial court\u2019s modification of child support despite the petition for bankruptcy filed by the noncustodial parent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"order to increase child support remanded for determination of facts after the termination of bankruptcy proceeding","sentence":"See e.g., In re Stringer, 847 F.2d 549 (9 Cir.1988) (an action for modification of child support order is not exempt from the automatic stay and thus was not permitted); Broussard v. Norris, 470 So.2d 399 (La.Ct.App. 3 Cir.1985) (order to increase child support remanded for determination of facts after the termination of bankruptcy proceeding)."},"case_id":11319934,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, the petition cannot be viewed as conferring jurisdiction on the trial court. Rather, the statutory scheme supports the conclusion that the trial court acquires jurisdiction upon the detained person's provisional acceptance by an evaluation and treatment facility.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"115 Wn.2d 33, 33","parenthetical":"\"[T]he 72-hour period begins upon a facility's immediate provisional acceptance of a petition and person for detention.\"","sentence":"See Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 25 (\u201cThe parties agree that the trial court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this case up until the 72-hour period expired.\u201d); see also RCW 71.05.170; Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 33 (\u201c[T]he 72-hour period begins upon a facility\u2019s immediate provisional acceptance of a petition and person for detention.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"115 Wn.2d 25, 25","parenthetical":"\"The parties agree that the trial court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this case up until the 72-hour period expired.\"","sentence":"See Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 25 (\u201cThe parties agree that the trial court had both personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this case up until the 72-hour period expired.\u201d); see also RCW 71.05.170; Swanson, 115 Wn.2d at 33 (\u201c[T]he 72-hour period begins upon a facility\u2019s immediate provisional acceptance of a petition and person for detention.\u201d)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We now turn to the remaining Bendectin factors. Factors one and two direct that the petitioners have no other adequate means to obtain relief and that irreparable harm will occur if the petition is denied. We have held that \"class certification is clearly reviewable on direct appeal once a final disposition of the case has been reached.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"5 F.3d 154, 159","parenthetical":"refusing to issue writ to vacate district court order certifying class under Rule 23(b","sentence":"In re NLO, 5 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir.1993)(refusing to issue writ to vacate district court order certifying class under Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring claims)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"not- withstanding that certification of large class may force defendant to settle despite meritorious defense, courts of appeals have correctly held that orders granting class certification are interlocutory","sentence":"See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)(not- withstanding that certification of large class may force defendant to settle despite meritorious defense, courts of appeals have correctly held that orders granting class certification are interlocutory)(dicta)."},"case_id":772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We now turn to the remaining Bendectin factors. Factors one and two direct that the petitioners have no other adequate means to obtain relief and that irreparable harm will occur if the petition is denied. We have held that \"class certification is clearly reviewable on direct appeal once a final disposition of the case has been reached.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"5 F.3d 154, 159","parenthetical":"refusing to issue writ to vacate district court order certifying class under Rule 23(b","sentence":"In re NLO, 5 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir.1993)(refusing to issue writ to vacate district court order certifying class under Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring claims)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"not- withstanding that certification of large class may force defendant to settle despite meritorious defense, courts of appeals have correctly held that orders granting class certification are interlocutory","sentence":"See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)(not- withstanding that certification of large class may force defendant to settle despite meritorious defense, courts of appeals have correctly held that orders granting class certification are interlocutory)(dicta)."},"case_id":772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We now turn to the remaining Bendectin factors. Factors one and two direct that the petitioners have no other adequate means to obtain relief and that irreparable harm will occur if the petition is denied. We have held that \"class certification is clearly reviewable on direct appeal once a final disposition of the case has been reached.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"5 F.3d 154, 159","parenthetical":"refusing to issue writ to vacate district court order certifying class under Rule 23(b","sentence":"In re NLO, 5 F.3d 154, 159 (6th Cir.1993)(refusing to issue writ to vacate district court order certifying class under Rule 23(b)(2) for medical monitoring claims)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"not- withstanding that certification of large class may force defendant to settle despite meritorious defense, courts of appeals have correctly held that orders granting class certification are interlocutory","sentence":"See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)(not- withstanding that certification of large class may force defendant to settle despite meritorious defense, courts of appeals have correctly held that orders granting class certification are interlocutory)(dicta)."},"case_id":772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, although plaintiff maintains that by this language, the Fifth Circuit has limited Eleventh Amendment immunity to situations in which a plaintiff seeks to compel an official to affirmatively act (as opposed to refrain from acting), this court, like defendants, views the statement merely as an acknowledgment of the context in which Pennhurst was decided. Here, in contrast to Word of Faith, defendant Stringer is sued only in his official capacity, and it cannot reasonably be contended, nor is it contended, that he lacks authority under state law to take the challenged actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"765 F.2d 517, 525","parenthetical":"referencing Pennhurst's \" 'ultra vires' exception to eleventh amendment immunity, and concluding that a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts 'without any authority whatever' \"","sentence":"See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102, 104 S.Ct. 900 (explaining that \u201ca state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts \u2018without any authority whatever\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted); see also Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir.1985) (referencing Pennhurst\u2019s \u201c \u2018ultra vires\u2019 exception to eleventh amendment immunity, and concluding that a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts \u2018without any authority whatever\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pennhurst)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"465 U.S. 102, 102","parenthetical":"explaining that \"a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts 'without any authority whatever' \"","sentence":"See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102, 104 S.Ct. 900 (explaining that \u201ca state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts \u2018without any authority whatever\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted); see also Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir.1985) (referencing Pennhurst\u2019s \u201c \u2018ultra vires\u2019 exception to eleventh amendment immunity, and concluding that a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts \u2018without any authority whatever\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pennhurst)."},"case_id":8934764,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, although plaintiff maintains that by this language, the Fifth Circuit has limited Eleventh Amendment immunity to situations in which a plaintiff seeks to compel an official to affirmatively act (as opposed to refrain from acting), this court, like defendants, views the statement merely as an acknowledgment of the context in which Pennhurst was decided. Here, in contrast to Word of Faith, defendant Stringer is sued only in his official capacity, and it cannot reasonably be contended, nor is it contended, that he lacks authority under state law to take the challenged actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"765 F.2d 517, 525","parenthetical":"referencing Pennhurst's \" 'ultra vires' exception to eleventh amendment immunity, and concluding that a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts 'without any authority whatever' \"","sentence":"See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102, 104 S.Ct. 900 (explaining that \u201ca state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts \u2018without any authority whatever\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted); see also Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir.1985) (referencing Pennhurst\u2019s \u201c \u2018ultra vires\u2019 exception to eleventh amendment immunity, and concluding that a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts \u2018without any authority whatever\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pennhurst)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that \"a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts 'without any authority whatever' \"","sentence":"See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102, 104 S.Ct. 900 (explaining that \u201ca state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts \u2018without any authority whatever\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted); see also Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 525 (5th Cir.1985) (referencing Pennhurst\u2019s \u201c \u2018ultra vires\u2019 exception to eleventh amendment immunity, and concluding that a state officer may be said to act ultra vires only when he acts \u2018without any authority whatever\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pennhurst)."},"case_id":8934764,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. 1; Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. 6.) This amount is neither apologetically large nor astonishingly small.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1987 WL 4847, at *1","parenthetical":"finding inadvertent disclosure where plaintiff disclosed six privileged documents when it produced 7864 total pages of documents","sentence":"See Wunderlic-Malec II, 2007 WL 3086006, at *3 (stating that 11,167 pages of documents was \u201ca relatively large number\u201d); see Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 117 (stating that review and production of 25,000 documents was an \u201cadmittedly large number\u201d); see also Harris Corp. v. Amperex Elec. Corp., No. 86-6338, 1987 WL 4847, at *1 (N.D.I11. May 15, 1987) (finding inadvertent disclosure where plaintiff disclosed six privileged documents when it produced 7864 total pages of documents)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2007 WL 3086006, at *3","parenthetical":"stating that 11,167 pages of documents was \"a relatively large number\"","sentence":"See Wunderlic-Malec II, 2007 WL 3086006, at *3 (stating that 11,167 pages of documents was \u201ca relatively large number\u201d); see Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 117 (stating that review and production of 25,000 documents was an \u201cadmittedly large number\u201d); see also Harris Corp. v. Amperex Elec. Corp., No. 86-6338, 1987 WL 4847, at *1 (N.D.I11. May 15, 1987) (finding inadvertent disclosure where plaintiff disclosed six privileged documents when it produced 7864 total pages of documents)."},"case_id":4245377,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. 1; Pis.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. 6.) This amount is neither apologetically large nor astonishingly small.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1987 WL 4847, at *1","parenthetical":"finding inadvertent disclosure where plaintiff disclosed six privileged documents when it produced 7864 total pages of documents","sentence":"See Wunderlic-Malec II, 2007 WL 3086006, at *3 (stating that 11,167 pages of documents was \u201ca relatively large number\u201d); see Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 117 (stating that review and production of 25,000 documents was an \u201cadmittedly large number\u201d); see also Harris Corp. v. Amperex Elec. Corp., No. 86-6338, 1987 WL 4847, at *1 (N.D.I11. May 15, 1987) (finding inadvertent disclosure where plaintiff disclosed six privileged documents when it produced 7864 total pages of documents)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"169 F.R.D. 117, 117","parenthetical":"stating that review and production of 25,000 documents was an \"admittedly large number\"","sentence":"See Wunderlic-Malec II, 2007 WL 3086006, at *3 (stating that 11,167 pages of documents was \u201ca relatively large number\u201d); see Harmony Gold, 169 F.R.D. at 117 (stating that review and production of 25,000 documents was an \u201cadmittedly large number\u201d); see also Harris Corp. v. Amperex Elec. Corp., No. 86-6338, 1987 WL 4847, at *1 (N.D.I11. May 15, 1987) (finding inadvertent disclosure where plaintiff disclosed six privileged documents when it produced 7864 total pages of documents)."},"case_id":4245377,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court therefore remands this matter to the Commission to reexamine its decision in light of its own precedent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"805 F.2d 176, 184","parenthetical":"noting that agencies must provide an \"explicit! ] and rational! ]\" justification for departing from their precedents","sentence":"See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 184 (6th Cir.1986) (noting that agencies must provide an \u201cexplicit! ] and rational! ]\u201d justification for departing from their precedents); see also Leeco, Inc. v. Hays, 965 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C.Cir.1992) (\u201cIt is especially important in cases where the agency has take a sharp turn from prior holdings that its actions be supported by reasoned decision-making.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"965 F.2d 1081, 1085","parenthetical":"\"It is especially important in cases where the agency has take a sharp turn from prior holdings that its actions be supported by reasoned decision-making.\"","sentence":"See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 184 (6th Cir.1986) (noting that agencies must provide an \u201cexplicit! ] and rational! ]\u201d justification for departing from their precedents); see also Leeco, Inc. v. Hays, 965 F.2d 1081, 1085 (D.C.Cir.1992) (\u201cIt is especially important in cases where the agency has take a sharp turn from prior holdings that its actions be supported by reasoned decision-making.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":4225131,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Federal courts have not consistently found the Adam Walsh Amendments' pretrial prohibition on firearm possession unconstitutional, as the dissent suggests. See dissent at 169-70. In some cases the dissent relies on, the courts considered only the Adam Walsh Amendments' curfew, home detention, or home monitoring requirements.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"611 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974","parenthetical":"expressly declining to consider the defendant's challenge to the firearm restriction","sentence":"United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 356-57 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971,974 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (expressly declining to consider the defendant\u2019s challenge to the firearm restriction); United States v. Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1074,1075-76 (D. Neb. 2009); see also United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596-98 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (declaring all the pretrial release restrictions facially invalid, but primarily discussing the curfew)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596-98","parenthetical":"declaring all the pretrial release restrictions facially invalid, but primarily discussing the curfew","sentence":"United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 356-57 (N.D.N.Y. 2011); United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d 971,974 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (expressly declining to consider the defendant\u2019s challenge to the firearm restriction); United States v. Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1074,1075-76 (D. Neb. 2009); see also United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 596-98 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (declaring all the pretrial release restrictions facially invalid, but primarily discussing the curfew)."},"case_id":4033677,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions adopting the employer-independent contractor analogy also agree that the test for the existence of a franchisor's duty of care to its franchisee's employee is the extent of the franchisor's control of the daily operation of the business.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 N.E.2d 555, 555","parenthetical":"Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee's employee depends on \"the degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\"","sentence":"See Coty, 58 Ill.App.3d at 242, 15 Ill.Dec. at 690, 373 N.E.2d at 1375 (The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \u201ccan be applied to the franchise cases.\u201d); see also Wise, 555 P.Supp. at 995 (\u201cControl\u201d is a decisive factor in employer-independent contractor cases and thus in franchisor-injured franchisee\u2019s employee cases.); Steveco, 450 N.E.2d at 555 (Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee\u2019s employee depends on \u201cthe degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"58 Ill.App.3d 242, 242","parenthetical":"The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \"can be applied to the franchise cases.\"","sentence":"See Coty, 58 Ill.App.3d at 242, 15 Ill.Dec. at 690, 373 N.E.2d at 1375 (The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \u201ccan be applied to the franchise cases.\u201d); see also Wise, 555 P.Supp. at 995 (\u201cControl\u201d is a decisive factor in employer-independent contractor cases and thus in franchisor-injured franchisee\u2019s employee cases.); Steveco, 450 N.E.2d at 555 (Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee\u2019s employee depends on \u201cthe degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\u201d)."},"case_id":10742454,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions adopting the employer-independent contractor analogy also agree that the test for the existence of a franchisor's duty of care to its franchisee's employee is the extent of the franchisor's control of the daily operation of the business.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"15 Ill.Dec. 690, 690","parenthetical":"The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \"can be applied to the franchise cases.\"","sentence":"See Coty, 58 Ill.App.3d at 242, 15 Ill.Dec. at 690, 373 N.E.2d at 1375 (The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \u201ccan be applied to the franchise cases.\u201d); see also Wise, 555 P.Supp. at 995 (\u201cControl\u201d is a decisive factor in employer-independent contractor cases and thus in franchisor-injured franchisee\u2019s employee cases.); Steveco, 450 N.E.2d at 555 (Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee\u2019s employee depends on \u201cthe degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 N.E.2d 555, 555","parenthetical":"Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee's employee depends on \"the degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\"","sentence":"See Coty, 58 Ill.App.3d at 242, 15 Ill.Dec. at 690, 373 N.E.2d at 1375 (The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \u201ccan be applied to the franchise cases.\u201d); see also Wise, 555 P.Supp. at 995 (\u201cControl\u201d is a decisive factor in employer-independent contractor cases and thus in franchisor-injured franchisee\u2019s employee cases.); Steveco, 450 N.E.2d at 555 (Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee\u2019s employee depends on \u201cthe degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\u201d)."},"case_id":10742454,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other jurisdictions adopting the employer-independent contractor analogy also agree that the test for the existence of a franchisor's duty of care to its franchisee's employee is the extent of the franchisor's control of the daily operation of the business.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"450 N.E.2d 555, 555","parenthetical":"Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee's employee depends on \"the degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\"","sentence":"See Coty, 58 Ill.App.3d at 242, 15 Ill.Dec. at 690, 373 N.E.2d at 1375 (The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \u201ccan be applied to the franchise cases.\u201d); see also Wise, 555 P.Supp. at 995 (\u201cControl\u201d is a decisive factor in employer-independent contractor cases and thus in franchisor-injured franchisee\u2019s employee cases.); Steveco, 450 N.E.2d at 555 (Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee\u2019s employee depends on \u201cthe degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"373 N.E.2d 1375, 1375","parenthetical":"The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \"can be applied to the franchise cases.\"","sentence":"See Coty, 58 Ill.App.3d at 242, 15 Ill.Dec. at 690, 373 N.E.2d at 1375 (The general control rationale of employer-independent contractor eases \u201ccan be applied to the franchise cases.\u201d); see also Wise, 555 P.Supp. at 995 (\u201cControl\u201d is a decisive factor in employer-independent contractor cases and thus in franchisor-injured franchisee\u2019s employee cases.); Steveco, 450 N.E.2d at 555 (Whether franchisor owed an independent duty to the franchisee\u2019s employee depends on \u201cthe degree of control or direction the franchisor retained.\u201d)."},"case_id":10742454,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The bad faith tort is grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in all contracts, supplemented by the idea that insurance contracts have special characteristics that warrant heightened liability for breach of that covenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\"","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the unique \"public interest\" character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":10507344,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The bad faith tort is grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in all contracts, supplemented by the idea that insurance contracts have special characteristics that warrant heightened liability for breach of that covenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the unique \"public interest\" character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"307 N.W.2d 256, 261","parenthetical":"\"The heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\"","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":10507344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The bad faith tort is grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in all contracts, supplemented by the idea that insurance contracts have special characteristics that warrant heightened liability for breach of that covenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75","parenthetical":"noting the unique \"public interest\" character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\"","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":10507344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The bad faith tort is grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in all contracts, supplemented by the idea that insurance contracts have special characteristics that warrant heightened liability for breach of that covenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75","parenthetical":"noting the unique \"public interest\" character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"307 N.W.2d 256, 261","parenthetical":"\"The heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\"","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":10507344,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The bad faith tort is grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in all contracts, supplemented by the idea that insurance contracts have special characteristics that warrant heightened liability for breach of that covenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the unique \"public interest\" character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranmsh v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\"","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranmsh v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":3817060,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The bad faith tort is grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in all contracts, supplemented by the idea that insurance contracts have special characteristics that warrant heightened liability for breach of that covenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"307 N.W.2d 256, 261","parenthetical":"\"The heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\"","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranmsh v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the unique \"public interest\" character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranmsh v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":3817060,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The bad faith tort is grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in all contracts, supplemented by the idea that insurance contracts have special characteristics that warrant heightened liability for breach of that covenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\"","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranmsh v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75","parenthetical":"noting the unique \"public interest\" character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranmsh v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":3817060,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The bad faith tort is grounded on the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in all contracts, supplemented by the idea that insurance contracts have special characteristics that warrant heightened liability for breach of that covenant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75","parenthetical":"noting the unique \"public interest\" character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranmsh v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"307 N.W.2d 256, 261","parenthetical":"\"The heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\"","sentence":"See Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (1991) (noting the unique \u201cpublic interest\u201d character of the insurance industry, the fact that an insured seeks to protect against loss rather than gain commercial advantage, and the unequal bargaining power of insurers and insureds); see also Kranmsh v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis.2d 56, 307 N.W.2d 256, 261 (1981) (\u201cThe heart of the [bad faith] tort ... is the fiduciary relationship between the insurer and the insured and the insurer\u2019s breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implicit in every contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":3817060,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But Shipp's proffered growth rates stemmed from AHC's prior increases in sales in these two markets, and Shipp detailed the differences between the growth rates for the two markets and the method he had used to accommodate them. Shipp's growth rates accorded with AHC's trending sales and the overall hat market.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"651 S.W.2d 260, 262","parenthetical":"stating that \"in calculating the loss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered\"","sentence":"See White v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex.1983) (stating that \u201cin calculating the loss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered\u201d); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08","parenthetical":"including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis","sentence":"See White v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 651 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex.1983) (stating that \u201cin calculating the loss in profits, the normal increase in the business which might have been expected in the light of past developments and existing conditions may be considered\u201d); Sw. Battery Corp., 181 Tex. at 427, 115 S.W.2d at 1099 (same); see also Fleming Mfg. Co. v. Capitol Brick, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex.App.-Austin 1987, writ,ref'd n.r.e.) (including analysis of sales projections derived from past sales in lost-profits analysis)."},"case_id":6767865,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, based on the law as outlined above, we find while silence or acquiescence may be used as a factor in determining a landowner's intent, it alone is not sufficient to establish the unequivocal and positive intent necessary for an offer to dedicate to the public use.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"66 S.W.3d 554, 554","parenthetical":"stating that the intention to dedicate must be shown by something more than an omission or failure to act or acquiescence on the part of the owner and that there must be evidence of additional factors that imply a donative intention when considered in light of the owner's acquiescence in the public's use of the roadway","sentence":"See Bell v. Tycer, 97 So.2d 448, 450 (La.App. 1st Cir.1957) (finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use); see also Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d at 554 (stating that the intention to dedicate must be shown by something more than an omission or failure to act or acquiescence on the part of the owner and that there must be evidence of additional factors that imply a donative intention when considered in light of the owner\u2019s acquiescence in the public\u2019s use of the roadway); Carlson v. Burkhart, 271 Kan. 856, 27 P.3d 27, 32 (2001) (stating that acquiescence of the property owners to use by some members of the public does not conclusively establish its dedication for public use and mere permission on the part of the owner to the public to use the land as a way, without more, will not constitute an intention to dedicate). Rather, other significant factors, such as a recorded map or plat or maintenance by the public authorities must be present in order to establish the landowner\u2019s intent."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"97 So.2d 448, 450","parenthetical":"finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use","sentence":"See Bell v. Tycer, 97 So.2d 448, 450 (La.App. 1st Cir.1957) (finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use); see also Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d at 554 (stating that the intention to dedicate must be shown by something more than an omission or failure to act or acquiescence on the part of the owner and that there must be evidence of additional factors that imply a donative intention when considered in light of the owner\u2019s acquiescence in the public\u2019s use of the roadway); Carlson v. Burkhart, 271 Kan. 856, 27 P.3d 27, 32 (2001) (stating that acquiescence of the property owners to use by some members of the public does not conclusively establish its dedication for public use and mere permission on the part of the owner to the public to use the land as a way, without more, will not constitute an intention to dedicate). Rather, other significant factors, such as a recorded map or plat or maintenance by the public authorities must be present in order to establish the landowner\u2019s intent."},"case_id":9337388,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, based on the law as outlined above, we find while silence or acquiescence may be used as a factor in determining a landowner's intent, it alone is not sufficient to establish the unequivocal and positive intent necessary for an offer to dedicate to the public use.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"97 So.2d 448, 450","parenthetical":"finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use","sentence":"See Bell v. Tycer, 97 So.2d 448, 450 (La.App. 1st Cir.1957) (finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use); see also Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d at 554 (stating that the intention to dedicate must be shown by something more than an omission or failure to act or acquiescence on the part of the owner and that there must be evidence of additional factors that imply a donative intention when considered in light of the owner\u2019s acquiescence in the public\u2019s use of the roadway); Carlson v. Burkhart, 271 Kan. 856, 27 P.3d 27, 32 (2001) (stating that acquiescence of the property owners to use by some members of the public does not conclusively establish its dedication for public use and mere permission on the part of the owner to the public to use the land as a way, without more, will not constitute an intention to dedicate). Rather, other significant factors, such as a recorded map or plat or maintenance by the public authorities must be present in order to establish the landowner\u2019s intent."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that acquiescence of the property owners to use by some members of the public does not conclusively establish its dedication for public use and mere permission on the part of the owner to the public to use the land as a way, without more, will not constitute an intention to dedicate","sentence":"See Bell v. Tycer, 97 So.2d 448, 450 (La.App. 1st Cir.1957) (finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use); see also Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d at 554 (stating that the intention to dedicate must be shown by something more than an omission or failure to act or acquiescence on the part of the owner and that there must be evidence of additional factors that imply a donative intention when considered in light of the owner\u2019s acquiescence in the public\u2019s use of the roadway); Carlson v. Burkhart, 271 Kan. 856, 27 P.3d 27, 32 (2001) (stating that acquiescence of the property owners to use by some members of the public does not conclusively establish its dedication for public use and mere permission on the part of the owner to the public to use the land as a way, without more, will not constitute an intention to dedicate). Rather, other significant factors, such as a recorded map or plat or maintenance by the public authorities must be present in order to establish the landowner\u2019s intent."},"case_id":9337388,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, based on the law as outlined above, we find while silence or acquiescence may be used as a factor in determining a landowner's intent, it alone is not sufficient to establish the unequivocal and positive intent necessary for an offer to dedicate to the public use.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"97 So.2d 448, 450","parenthetical":"finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use","sentence":"See Bell v. Tycer, 97 So.2d 448, 450 (La.App. 1st Cir.1957) (finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use); see also Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d at 554 (stating that the intention to dedicate must be shown by something more than an omission or failure to act or acquiescence on the part of the owner and that there must be evidence of additional factors that imply a donative intention when considered in light of the owner\u2019s acquiescence in the public\u2019s use of the roadway); Carlson v. Burkhart, 271 Kan. 856, 27 P.3d 27, 32 (2001) (stating that acquiescence of the property owners to use by some members of the public does not conclusively establish its dedication for public use and mere permission on the part of the owner to the public to use the land as a way, without more, will not constitute an intention to dedicate). Rather, other significant factors, such as a recorded map or plat or maintenance by the public authorities must be present in order to establish the landowner\u2019s intent."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"27 P.3d 27, 32","parenthetical":"stating that acquiescence of the property owners to use by some members of the public does not conclusively establish its dedication for public use and mere permission on the part of the owner to the public to use the land as a way, without more, will not constitute an intention to dedicate","sentence":"See Bell v. Tycer, 97 So.2d 448, 450 (La.App. 1st Cir.1957) (finding silence and failure to protest does not in law amount to an assent to a dedication to public use); see also Hatton v. Grigar, 66 S.W.3d at 554 (stating that the intention to dedicate must be shown by something more than an omission or failure to act or acquiescence on the part of the owner and that there must be evidence of additional factors that imply a donative intention when considered in light of the owner\u2019s acquiescence in the public\u2019s use of the roadway); Carlson v. Burkhart, 271 Kan. 856, 27 P.3d 27, 32 (2001) (stating that acquiescence of the property owners to use by some members of the public does not conclusively establish its dedication for public use and mere permission on the part of the owner to the public to use the land as a way, without more, will not constitute an intention to dedicate). Rather, other significant factors, such as a recorded map or plat or maintenance by the public authorities must be present in order to establish the landowner\u2019s intent."},"case_id":9337388,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"525 U.S. 113, 116-19","parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"414 U.S. 218, 234-35","parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"414 U.S. 218, 234-35","parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"414 U.S. 218, 234-35","parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"414 U.S. 218, 234-35","parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"414 U.S. 218, 234-35","parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"414 U.S. 218, 234-35","parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"525 U.S. 113, 116-19","parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"525 U.S. 113, 116-19","parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"525 U.S. 113, 116-19","parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"525 U.S. 113, 116-19","parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"525 U.S. 113, 116-19","parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer's search of the defendant's vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule's underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the \"search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest\" exception to the warrant requirement, a law enforcement officer may conduct a full search of an arres-tee's person incident to a lawful custodial arrest.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \"need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\"","sentence":"United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (explaining that the reasoning behind this exception is the \u201cneed to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody [and] ... the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use. at trial\u201d). Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980), the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule also permits an officer to conduct a full search of an arrestee\u2019s person before he is placed under lawful custodial arrest as long as \u201cthe formal arrest follow[s] quickly on the heels of the challenged search of ... [his person]\u201d and the fruits of that search are not necessary to sustain probable cause to arrest him."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest","sentence":"Cf. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 116-19, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (holding that the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to an officer\u2019s search of the defendant\u2019s vehicle where the officer, while subsequently arresting the defendant for drug-law violations based upon that search, never actually arrested the defendant for the speeding violation, which gave the officer the probable cause to arrest the defendant before the search, but, rather, only issued a citation, and reasoning that the rule\u2019s underlying twin rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation were only minimally present and not present at all, respectively, in the context of a traffic citation); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 110 S.Ct. 1288, 108 L.Ed.2d 464 (1990) (holding that the seareh-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest rule does not apply to a warrantless search that provides the probable cause for the subsequent arrest because one cannot justify the arrest by the search and then simultaneously justify the search by the arrest)."},"case_id":3439231,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Where ere the agency's fact-finding process was sufficiently flawed, this court may vacate and remand for new findings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"417 F.3d 272, 272","parenthetical":"identifying \"significant error\" in BIA's failure to consider background materials 'that corroborated petitioner's subjective fear of persecution","sentence":"See Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 128-29 (2d Cir.2004) (remanding where \u201cboth the BIA and the IJ overlooked potentially significant evidence supporting [petitioner\u2019s] applications for asylum\u201d); see also Yan Chen, 417 F.3d at 272 (identifying \u201csignificant error\u201d in BIA\u2019s failure to consider background materials 'that corroborated petitioner\u2019s subjective fear of persecution). While the agency is not required to \u201cparse or refute\u201d each piece of evidence, Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006), there must be some indication that the evidence has been considered, Anderson v. McElroy, 953 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir.1992) (\u201c[W]e cannot assume that the BIA considered factors it failed to mention in its decision.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"359 F.3d 121, 128-29","parenthetical":"remanding where \"both the BIA and the IJ overlooked potentially significant evidence supporting [petitioner's] applications for asylum\"","sentence":"See Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 128-29 (2d Cir.2004) (remanding where \u201cboth the BIA and the IJ overlooked potentially significant evidence supporting [petitioner\u2019s] applications for asylum\u201d); see also Yan Chen, 417 F.3d at 272 (identifying \u201csignificant error\u201d in BIA\u2019s failure to consider background materials 'that corroborated petitioner\u2019s subjective fear of persecution). While the agency is not required to \u201cparse or refute\u201d each piece of evidence, Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006), there must be some indication that the evidence has been considered, Anderson v. McElroy, 953 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir.1992) (\u201c[W]e cannot assume that the BIA considered factors it failed to mention in its decision.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted)."},"case_id":4289974,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, we do not find merit in the claim that the DOT lacked the authority to subject a certificate to a reversionary interest. We have previously upheld the imposition of a condition on an air carrier's permit that restricted the carrier's future operating authority.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings","sentence":"See Dan-Air Servs., Ltd. v. CAB, 475 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.) (affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 271, 46 L.Ed.2d 253 (1975)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued","sentence":"See Dan-Air Servs., Ltd. v. CAB, 475 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.) (affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 271, 46 L.Ed.2d 253 (1975)."},"case_id":3817059,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, we do not find merit in the claim that the DOT lacked the authority to subject a certificate to a reversionary interest. We have previously upheld the imposition of a condition on an air carrier's permit that restricted the carrier's future operating authority.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued","sentence":"See Dan-Air Servs., Ltd. v. CAB, 475 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.) (affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 271, 46 L.Ed.2d 253 (1975)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings","sentence":"See Dan-Air Servs., Ltd. v. CAB, 475 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.) (affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 271, 46 L.Ed.2d 253 (1975)."},"case_id":3817059,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, we do not find merit in the claim that the DOT lacked the authority to subject a certificate to a reversionary interest. We have previously upheld the imposition of a condition on an air carrier's permit that restricted the carrier's future operating authority.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings","sentence":"See Dan-Air Servs., Ltd. v. CAB, 475 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.) (affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 271, 46 L.Ed.2d 253 (1975)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued","sentence":"See Dan-Air Servs., Ltd. v. CAB, 475 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.) (affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 271, 46 L.Ed.2d 253 (1975)."},"case_id":3817059,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, we do not find merit in the claim that the DOT lacked the authority to subject a certificate to a reversionary interest. We have previously upheld the imposition of a condition on an air carrier's permit that restricted the carrier's future operating authority.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings","sentence":"See Dan-Air Servs., Ltd. v. CAB, 475 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.) (affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 271, 46 L.Ed.2d 253 (1975)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued","sentence":"See Dan-Air Servs., Ltd. v. CAB, 475 F.2d 408 (D.C.Cir.1973) (affirming implementation of condition requiring foreign air carriers to file for advance approval of all passenger charter flights approximately two years after permits were issued); see also Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 n. 45 (D.C.Cir.) (affirming FCC grant of T.V. license conditioned on outcome of other proceedings), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 423 U.S. 926, 96 S.Ct. 271, 46 L.Ed.2d 253 (1975)."},"case_id":3817059,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bernesser contends that he was convicted upon an improper amendment to the indictment because the perjury count in the indictment referred to the \"second phase\" of the Shea Stadium job and the evidence at trial regarding the rigged bidding concerned \"Phase Three\" of the project.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"361 U.S. 212, 217","parenthetical":"where \"new basis for conviction\" added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory","sentence":"See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (where \u201cnew basis for conviction\u201d added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory); see also United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1988) (constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"858 F.2d 94, 98","parenthetical":"constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment","sentence":"See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (where \u201cnew basis for conviction\u201d added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory); see also United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1988) (constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment)."},"case_id":10537147,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Bernesser contends that he was convicted upon an improper amendment to the indictment because the perjury count in the indictment referred to the \"second phase\" of the Shea Stadium job and the evidence at trial regarding the rigged bidding concerned \"Phase Three\" of the project.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"80 S.Ct. 270, 273","parenthetical":"where \"new basis for conviction\" added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory","sentence":"See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (where \u201cnew basis for conviction\u201d added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory); see also United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1988) (constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"858 F.2d 94, 98","parenthetical":"constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment","sentence":"See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (where \u201cnew basis for conviction\u201d added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory); see also United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1988) (constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment)."},"case_id":10537147,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Bernesser contends that he was convicted upon an improper amendment to the indictment because the perjury count in the indictment referred to the \"second phase\" of the Shea Stadium job and the evidence at trial regarding the rigged bidding concerned \"Phase Three\" of the project.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"858 F.2d 94, 98","parenthetical":"constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment","sentence":"See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (where \u201cnew basis for conviction\u201d added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory); see also United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1988) (constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where \"new basis for conviction\" added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory","sentence":"See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (where \u201cnew basis for conviction\u201d added by theory not presented in indictment, cannot assume jury convicted on original indictment theory); see also United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir.1988) (constructive amendment of indictment is per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment)."},"case_id":10537147,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, as to Horner's Fourth Amendment claims against John Does 14 through 17 involving the June 3, 2013, incident, we conclude that the complaint, liberally construed, sufficiently alleged that these defendants unlawfully searched the identified premises.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"605 S.W.2d 789, 790","parenthetical":"for res judicata to apply, there must be identities of: thing sued for, cause of action, parties, and quality of person for or against whom claim is made","sentence":"See Norval v. Whitesell, 605 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Mo.1980) (en banc) (for res judicata to apply, there must be identities of: thing sued for, cause of action, parties, and quality of person for or against whom claim is made); see also Estate of Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1995) (\u201c[A]n action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity of the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"56 F.3d 35, 37","parenthetical":"\"[A]n action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity of the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery.\"","sentence":"See Norval v. Whitesell, 605 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Mo.1980) (en banc) (for res judicata to apply, there must be identities of: thing sued for, cause of action, parties, and quality of person for or against whom claim is made); see also Estate of Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1995) (\u201c[A]n action may proceed against a party whose name is unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity of the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery.\u201d)."},"case_id":4344326,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The unfairness in this procurement occurred when the Air Force, realizing that Centex believed it could not do a CAIV tradeoff in the evaluation phase, failed to advise Centex of the Government's different interpretation and awarded to Scott, which had submitted its proposal on that basis. The traditional remedy for a procurement error of this kind is not a directed award, but a recompetition with all players enjoying an equal playing field in a way that the Government obtains its true best value at a benefit to the taxpayers.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"55 Fed.Cl. 334, 334","parenthetical":"ordering termination of awarded contract and allowing the Government to resolicit bids","sentence":"United Payors, 55 Fed.Cl. at 334 (ordering termination of awarded contract and allowing the Government to resolicit bids); cf. ATA Defense Indus., Inc. v. United States, 38 Fed.Cl. 489, 509 (1997) (enjoining continued performance of a legally defective procurement and authorizing reprocurement in a flexible manner so as to avoid harm to military readiness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"38 Fed.Cl. 489, 509","parenthetical":"enjoining continued performance of a legally defective procurement and authorizing reprocurement in a flexible manner so as to avoid harm to military readiness","sentence":"United Payors, 55 Fed.Cl. at 334 (ordering termination of awarded contract and allowing the Government to resolicit bids); cf. ATA Defense Indus., Inc. v. United States, 38 Fed.Cl. 489, 509 (1997) (enjoining continued performance of a legally defective procurement and authorizing reprocurement in a flexible manner so as to avoid harm to military readiness)."},"case_id":1200856,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Smith also attempts to ground her negligence claim in alleged violations of FBI Informant Guidelines and Department of Justice Confidential Informant Policies. But Smith cites no support for the proposition that violations of internal federal guidelines and policies can give rise to a Georgia negligence claim, and indeed the law is to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"460 F.3d 1318, 1327","parenthetical":"\"Violating an internal policy or procedure does not create a cause of action under the FTCA against the government unless the challenged conduct is independently tortious under applicable state law.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006) (\u201cViolating an internal policy or procedure does not create a cause of action under the FTCA against the government unless the challenged conduct is independently tortious under applicable state law.\u201d); cf. Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that \u201cthe fact that a federal employee has failed to perform duties imposed by federal law is insufficient by itself to render the federal government liable under ' the FTCA\u201d and that \u201ca state tort cause of action is a sine qua non of FTCA jurisdiction\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"781 F.3d 1315, 1324","parenthetical":"noting that \"the fact that a federal employee has failed to perform duties imposed by federal law is insufficient by itself to render the federal government liable under ' the FTCA\" and that \"a state tort cause of action is a sine qua non of FTCA jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006) (\u201cViolating an internal policy or procedure does not create a cause of action under the FTCA against the government unless the challenged conduct is independently tortious under applicable state law.\u201d); cf. Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1324 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that \u201cthe fact that a federal employee has failed to perform duties imposed by federal law is insufficient by itself to render the federal government liable under ' the FTCA\u201d and that \u201ca state tort cause of action is a sine qua non of FTCA jurisdiction\u201d)."},"case_id":12267257,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 317, 326","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"483 U.S. 1, 11","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 317, 326","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 317, 326","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"537 U.S. 101, 112-13","parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 317, 326","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 317, 326","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 317, 326","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"483 U.S. 1, 11","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"537 U.S. 101, 112-13","parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"483 U.S. 1, 11","parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"537 U.S. 101, 112-13","parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant and the State are now returned to status quo ante, and the State may seek to try Appellant for the capital crime of first-degree murder. Thus, no jeopardy attached to the proceeding or the verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted","sentence":"See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted); see also Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1,11,107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding double jeopardy did not prohibit capital prosecution of defendant who pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against co-defendants but violated plea agreement by refusing to testify at retrial, and state properly sought new indictment for capital murder resulting in death sentence imposed at trial for first-degree murder); Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 112-13, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) (holding that where penalty phase jury deadlocked on sentence, and trial court imposed default life sentence required by state law, but conviction was later reversed, neither double jeopardy nor due process barred new trial for capital murder with exposure to death penalty)."},"case_id":7039697,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With respect to the mother's cohabitation, the trial court reasoned that it does not allow unmarried men and women to cohabitate in the presence of the child and therefore Moses' relationship with her partner is meretricious per se. However, Georgia's appellate courts have held that a parent's cohabitation with someone, regardless of that person's gender, is not a basis for denying custody or visitation absent evidence that the child was harmed or exposed to inappropriate conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"199 Ga. App. 132, 133","parenthetical":"affirming the trial court's finding that there was no change in material circumstances even though both parents were involved in meretricious relationships, because there was no evidence that the child had been exposed to inappropriate conduct","sentence":"See, e.g., Hayes v. Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132, 133 (404 SE2d 276) (1991) (affirming the trial court\u2019s finding that there was no change in material circumstances even though both parents were involved in meretricious relationships, because there was no evidence that the child had been exposed to inappropriate conduct); Livesay v. Hilley, 190 Ga. App. 655, 656-657 (2) (379 SE2d 557) (1989) (mother\u2019s cohabitation provides no basis for a change in custody absent evidence of harm to the child); see also Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 274 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (551 SE2d 721) (2001) (wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed an order which prohibited contact between the children and their father\u2019s live-in girlfriend, because there was no evidence that the children had been exposed to inappropriate conduct or had been adversely affected by the relationship)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"274 Ga. 183, 184","parenthetical":"wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed an order which prohibited contact between the children and their father's live-in girlfriend, because there was no evidence that the children had been exposed to inappropriate conduct or had been adversely affected by the relationship","sentence":"See, e.g., Hayes v. Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132, 133 (404 SE2d 276) (1991) (affirming the trial court\u2019s finding that there was no change in material circumstances even though both parents were involved in meretricious relationships, because there was no evidence that the child had been exposed to inappropriate conduct); Livesay v. Hilley, 190 Ga. App. 655, 656-657 (2) (379 SE2d 557) (1989) (mother\u2019s cohabitation provides no basis for a change in custody absent evidence of harm to the child); see also Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 274 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (551 SE2d 721) (2001) (wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed an order which prohibited contact between the children and their father\u2019s live-in girlfriend, because there was no evidence that the children had been exposed to inappropriate conduct or had been adversely affected by the relationship)."},"case_id":3911180,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With respect to the mother's cohabitation, the trial court reasoned that it does not allow unmarried men and women to cohabitate in the presence of the child and therefore Moses' relationship with her partner is meretricious per se. However, Georgia's appellate courts have held that a parent's cohabitation with someone, regardless of that person's gender, is not a basis for denying custody or visitation absent evidence that the child was harmed or exposed to inappropriate conduct.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"190 Ga. App. 655, 656-657","parenthetical":"mother's cohabitation provides no basis for a change in custody absent evidence of harm to the child","sentence":"See, e.g., Hayes v. Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132, 133 (404 SE2d 276) (1991) (affirming the trial court\u2019s finding that there was no change in material circumstances even though both parents were involved in meretricious relationships, because there was no evidence that the child had been exposed to inappropriate conduct); Livesay v. Hilley, 190 Ga. App. 655, 656-657 (2) (379 SE2d 557) (1989) (mother\u2019s cohabitation provides no basis for a change in custody absent evidence of harm to the child); see also Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 274 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (551 SE2d 721) (2001) (wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed an order which prohibited contact between the children and their father\u2019s live-in girlfriend, because there was no evidence that the children had been exposed to inappropriate conduct or had been adversely affected by the relationship)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"274 Ga. 183, 184","parenthetical":"wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed an order which prohibited contact between the children and their father's live-in girlfriend, because there was no evidence that the children had been exposed to inappropriate conduct or had been adversely affected by the relationship","sentence":"See, e.g., Hayes v. Hayes, 199 Ga. App. 132, 133 (404 SE2d 276) (1991) (affirming the trial court\u2019s finding that there was no change in material circumstances even though both parents were involved in meretricious relationships, because there was no evidence that the child had been exposed to inappropriate conduct); Livesay v. Hilley, 190 Ga. App. 655, 656-657 (2) (379 SE2d 557) (1989) (mother\u2019s cohabitation provides no basis for a change in custody absent evidence of harm to the child); see also Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 274 Ga. 183, 184 (1) (551 SE2d 721) (2001) (wherein the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed an order which prohibited contact between the children and their father\u2019s live-in girlfriend, because there was no evidence that the children had been exposed to inappropriate conduct or had been adversely affected by the relationship)."},"case_id":3911180,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, Mr. Baney does not challenge the Board's determination that collateral estoppel bars his leave-related claims. We agree with the Board that Mr. Baney's claims are barred by collateral estoppel because they challenge the same issues that Mr. Baney actually litigated and that were necessary to the decisions in previous proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008","sentence":"See, e.g., Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that Mr. Baney\u2019s challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that Mr. Baney's challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision","sentence":"See, e.g., Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that Mr. Baney\u2019s challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision)."},"case_id":4177035,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, Mr. Baney does not challenge the Board's determination that collateral estoppel bars his leave-related claims. We agree with the Board that Mr. Baney's claims are barred by collateral estoppel because they challenge the same issues that Mr. Baney actually litigated and that were necessary to the decisions in previous proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that Mr. Baney's challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision","sentence":"See, e.g., Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that Mr. Baney\u2019s challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days","sentence":"See, e.g., Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 409 Fed.Appx. 319 (Fed.Cir.2010) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with eleven and a half hours of AWOL in November 2008); Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 263 Fed.Appx. 892 (Fed.Cir.2008) (finding no USERRA violation for charging Mr. Baney with 23 days of leave while on active military duty for 30 days); see also Baney v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 327 Fed.Appx. 895 (Fed.Cir.2009) (holding that Mr. Baney\u2019s challenge to being charged with 208 hours of annual leave while on active military duty for 30 days was barred by the res judicata effects of our 2008 decision)."},"case_id":4177035,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In view of the medical evidence that the veteran suffered rectal bleeding in 1988 and the veteran's assertions that he had suffered from a similar condition immediately after service and had received medical treatment for that condition in 1948 and subsequently, the veteran reasonably raised to VA and the BVA a claim for service connection for that condition and the Board should have adjudicated that claim or remanded it to the Regional Office (RO) for further development.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1 Vet.App. 324, 326","parenthetical":"BVA required to review all issues \"reasonably raised from a liberal reading\" of \"all documents or oral testimony submitted pri- or to the BVA decision\"","sentence":"See EF v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991) (BVA required to review all issues \u201creasonably raised from a liberal reading\u201d of \u201call documents or oral testimony submitted pri- or to the BVA decision\u201d); 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 19.9 (1992) (remand for further development); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 394 (1993) (BVA may be required to remand reasonably raised claim for adjudication by RO in first instance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"4 Vet.App. 384, 394","parenthetical":"BVA may be required to remand reasonably raised claim for adjudication by RO in first instance","sentence":"See EF v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 324, 326 (1991) (BVA required to review all issues \u201creasonably raised from a liberal reading\u201d of \u201call documents or oral testimony submitted pri- or to the BVA decision\u201d); 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 19.9 (1992) (remand for further development); see also Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.App. 384, 394 (1993) (BVA may be required to remand reasonably raised claim for adjudication by RO in first instance)."},"case_id":6443990,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"A Rule 11 error affects substantial rights only where the defendant shows a reasonable probability that but for the error, [s]he would not have entered a guilty plea.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"449 F.3d 898, 903-04","parenthetical":"concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement","sentence":"United States v. Gray, 581 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see United States v. Gillen, 449 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (\u201cAnd even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\u201d the warning contained in the plea agreement \u201ctends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"542 U.S. 74, 85","parenthetical":"\"And even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\" the warning contained in the plea agreement \"tends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gray, 581 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see United States v. Gillen, 449 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (\u201cAnd even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\u201d the warning contained in the plea agreement \u201ctends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\u201d)."},"case_id":12392260,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"A Rule 11 error affects substantial rights only where the defendant shows a reasonable probability that but for the error, [s]he would not have entered a guilty plea.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"449 F.3d 898, 903-04","parenthetical":"concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement","sentence":"United States v. Gray, 581 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see United States v. Gillen, 449 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (\u201cAnd even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\u201d the warning contained in the plea agreement \u201ctends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"And even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\" the warning contained in the plea agreement \"tends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gray, 581 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see United States v. Gillen, 449 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (\u201cAnd even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\u201d the warning contained in the plea agreement \u201ctends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\u201d)."},"case_id":12392260,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"A Rule 11 error affects substantial rights only where the defendant shows a reasonable probability that but for the error, [s]he would not have entered a guilty plea.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"449 F.3d 898, 903-04","parenthetical":"concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement","sentence":"United States v. Gray, 581 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see United States v. Gillen, 449 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (\u201cAnd even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\u201d the warning contained in the plea agreement \u201ctends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"And even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\" the warning contained in the plea agreement \"tends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\"","sentence":"United States v. Gray, 581 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see United States v. Gillen, 449 F.3d 898, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that error in failure to give Rule 11 warning verbatim was harmless when agreement contained warning'and defendant affirmed that he understood the agreement); see also United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 85, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (\u201cAnd even if there were reason to think the warning from the bench could have mattered,\u201d the warning contained in the plea agreement \u201ctends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here.\u201d)."},"case_id":12392260,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In Geraghty, which was argued and decided contemporaneously with Roper, the Court specifically reserved the question whether a named plaintiff who settles his individual claim after denial of class certification may, consistent with Article III, appeal from the adverse ruling on class certification.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"945 F.2d 1188, 1191","parenthetical":"noting that the \"'procedural right' recognized in Geraghty, to appeal a certification denial ... may be released as part of a plaintiff's voluntary settlement.\"","sentence":"See also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188, 1191 (D.C.Cir.1991) (noting that the \u201c\u2018procedural right\u2019 recognized in Geraghty, to appeal a certification denial ... may be released as part of a plaintiff's voluntary settlement.\u201d) (footnote omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"named plaintiff's acceptance of tender and consent to an entry of judgment in his favor \"given without reservation of a right to appeal, bars a subsequent appeal of the order denying class certification\"","sentence":"Compare Shores v. Sklar, 885 F.2d 760 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045, 110 S.Ct. 843, 107 L.Ed.2d 838 (1990) (named plaintiff's acceptance of tender and consent to an entry of judgment in his favor \"given without reservation of a right to appeal, bars a subsequent appeal of the order denying class certification\") with Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1984) (holding that where plaintiff had expressly attempted to retain the right to appeal from the denial of class certification, his appeal from denial of class certification was not moot)."},"case_id":10517674,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In Geraghty, which was argued and decided contemporaneously with Roper, the Court specifically reserved the question whether a named plaintiff who settles his individual claim after denial of class certification may, consistent with Article III, appeal from the adverse ruling on class certification.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"named plaintiff's acceptance of tender and consent to an entry of judgment in his favor \"given without reservation of a right to appeal, bars a subsequent appeal of the order denying class certification\"","sentence":"Compare Shores v. Sklar, 885 F.2d 760 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045, 110 S.Ct. 843, 107 L.Ed.2d 838 (1990) (named plaintiff's acceptance of tender and consent to an entry of judgment in his favor \"given without reservation of a right to appeal, bars a subsequent appeal of the order denying class certification\") with Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1984) (holding that where plaintiff had expressly attempted to retain the right to appeal from the denial of class certification, his appeal from denial of class certification was not moot)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"945 F.2d 1188, 1191","parenthetical":"noting that the \"'procedural right' recognized in Geraghty, to appeal a certification denial ... may be released as part of a plaintiff's voluntary settlement.\"","sentence":"See also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188, 1191 (D.C.Cir.1991) (noting that the \u201c\u2018procedural right\u2019 recognized in Geraghty, to appeal a certification denial ... may be released as part of a plaintiff's voluntary settlement.\u201d) (footnote omitted)."},"case_id":10517674,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In Geraghty, which was argued and decided contemporaneously with Roper, the Court specifically reserved the question whether a named plaintiff who settles his individual claim after denial of class certification may, consistent with Article III, appeal from the adverse ruling on class certification.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"named plaintiff's acceptance of tender and consent to an entry of judgment in his favor \"given without reservation of a right to appeal, bars a subsequent appeal of the order denying class certification\"","sentence":"Compare Shores v. Sklar, 885 F.2d 760 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1045, 110 S.Ct. 843, 107 L.Ed.2d 838 (1990) (named plaintiff's acceptance of tender and consent to an entry of judgment in his favor \"given without reservation of a right to appeal, bars a subsequent appeal of the order denying class certification\") with Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1984) (holding that where plaintiff had expressly attempted to retain the right to appeal from the denial of class certification, his appeal from denial of class certification was not moot)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"945 F.2d 1188, 1191","parenthetical":"noting that the \"'procedural right' recognized in Geraghty, to appeal a certification denial ... may be released as part of a plaintiff's voluntary settlement.\"","sentence":"See also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188, 1191 (D.C.Cir.1991) (noting that the \u201c\u2018procedural right\u2019 recognized in Geraghty, to appeal a certification denial ... may be released as part of a plaintiff's voluntary settlement.\u201d) (footnote omitted)."},"case_id":10517674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Brown, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant's previous confession during the course of his illegal detention, believed incorrectly by him to be admissible, \"bolstered the pressures for him to give the second [confession], or at least vitiated any incentive on his part to avoid self-incrimination.\" As in Brown, the detectives crossed the Rubicon once Det. Mitchell spotted and Antone confessed to that cocaine.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"236 F.3d 662, 678","parenthetical":"analogizing Brown, and holding that signing a consent form is not an intervening act if drugs were found and admitted to earlier","sentence":"United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 678 (11th Cir.2000) (analogizing Brown, and holding that signing a consent form is not an intervening act if drugs were found and admitted to earlier); see Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 684 (similar); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1457 (10th Cir.1989) (similar); see also United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir.2004) (signing consent form in and of itself cannot constitute an intervening act); cf. United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir.1990) (signing consent form was an intervening act sufficient to dissipate the taint associated with illegal entry in part because agents did not seize any evidence until after the defendant consented to the search)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"387 F.3d 1060, 1074","parenthetical":"signing consent form in and of itself cannot constitute an intervening act","sentence":"United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 678 (11th Cir.2000) (analogizing Brown, and holding that signing a consent form is not an intervening act if drugs were found and admitted to earlier); see Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 684 (similar); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1457 (10th Cir.1989) (similar); see also United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir.2004) (signing consent form in and of itself cannot constitute an intervening act); cf. United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir.1990) (signing consent form was an intervening act sufficient to dissipate the taint associated with illegal entry in part because agents did not seize any evidence until after the defendant consented to the search)."},"case_id":5880328,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Brown, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant's previous confession during the course of his illegal detention, believed incorrectly by him to be admissible, \"bolstered the pressures for him to give the second [confession], or at least vitiated any incentive on his part to avoid self-incrimination.\" As in Brown, the detectives crossed the Rubicon once Det. Mitchell spotted and Antone confessed to that cocaine.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"236 F.3d 662, 678","parenthetical":"analogizing Brown, and holding that signing a consent form is not an intervening act if drugs were found and admitted to earlier","sentence":"United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 678 (11th Cir.2000) (analogizing Brown, and holding that signing a consent form is not an intervening act if drugs were found and admitted to earlier); see Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 684 (similar); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1457 (10th Cir.1989) (similar); see also United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir.2004) (signing consent form in and of itself cannot constitute an intervening act); cf. United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir.1990) (signing consent form was an intervening act sufficient to dissipate the taint associated with illegal entry in part because agents did not seize any evidence until after the defendant consented to the search)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"921 F.2d 442, 447","parenthetical":"signing consent form was an intervening act sufficient to dissipate the taint associated with illegal entry in part because agents did not seize any evidence until after the defendant consented to the search","sentence":"United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 678 (11th Cir.2000) (analogizing Brown, and holding that signing a consent form is not an intervening act if drugs were found and admitted to earlier); see Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 684 (similar); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1457 (10th Cir.1989) (similar); see also United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir.2004) (signing consent form in and of itself cannot constitute an intervening act); cf. United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir.1990) (signing consent form was an intervening act sufficient to dissipate the taint associated with illegal entry in part because agents did not seize any evidence until after the defendant consented to the search)."},"case_id":5880328,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Brown, the Supreme Court noted that the defendant's previous confession during the course of his illegal detention, believed incorrectly by him to be admissible, \"bolstered the pressures for him to give the second [confession], or at least vitiated any incentive on his part to avoid self-incrimination.\" As in Brown, the detectives crossed the Rubicon once Det. Mitchell spotted and Antone confessed to that cocaine.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"387 F.3d 1060, 1074","parenthetical":"signing consent form in and of itself cannot constitute an intervening act","sentence":"United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 678 (11th Cir.2000) (analogizing Brown, and holding that signing a consent form is not an intervening act if drugs were found and admitted to earlier); see Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 684 (similar); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1457 (10th Cir.1989) (similar); see also United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir.2004) (signing consent form in and of itself cannot constitute an intervening act); cf. United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir.1990) (signing consent form was an intervening act sufficient to dissipate the taint associated with illegal entry in part because agents did not seize any evidence until after the defendant consented to the search)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"921 F.2d 442, 447","parenthetical":"signing consent form was an intervening act sufficient to dissipate the taint associated with illegal entry in part because agents did not seize any evidence until after the defendant consented to the search","sentence":"United States v. Santa, 236 F.3d 662, 678 (11th Cir.2000) (analogizing Brown, and holding that signing a consent form is not an intervening act if drugs were found and admitted to earlier); see Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d at 684 (similar); United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1457 (10th Cir.1989) (similar); see also United States v. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir.2004) (signing consent form in and of itself cannot constitute an intervening act); cf. United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 447 (2d Cir.1990) (signing consent form was an intervening act sufficient to dissipate the taint associated with illegal entry in part because agents did not seize any evidence until after the defendant consented to the search)."},"case_id":5880328,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because ditches are important, so too are the rights attendant upon a ditch easement. The holder of a ditch easement has the right to inspect, operate, maintain, and repair the ditch.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1 Colo. 551, 555","parenthetical":"\"It may be said, that all lands are held in subordination to the dominant right of others, who must necessarily pass over them to obtain a supply of water to irrigate their own lands....\"","sentence":"Osborn & Caywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 383 (Colo.App.1983) (\"[The owner of the easement, or dominant estate, may do whatever is reasonably necessary to permit full use and enjoyment of the easement including the exercise of rights of ingress and egress for maintenance, operation, and repair.\"); see also Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 555 (1872) (\"It may be said, that all lands are held in subordination to the dominant right of others, who must necessarily pass over them to obtain a supply of water to irrigate their own lands....\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"673 P.2d 380, 383","parenthetical":"\"[The owner of the easement, or dominant estate, may do whatever is reasonably necessary to permit full use and enjoyment of the easement including the exercise of rights of ingress and egress for maintenance, operation, and repair.\"","sentence":"Osborn & Caywood Ditch Co. v. Green, 673 P.2d 380, 383 (Colo.App.1983) (\"[The owner of the easement, or dominant estate, may do whatever is reasonably necessary to permit full use and enjoyment of the easement including the exercise of rights of ingress and egress for maintenance, operation, and repair.\"); see also Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551, 555 (1872) (\"It may be said, that all lands are held in subordination to the dominant right of others, who must necessarily pass over them to obtain a supply of water to irrigate their own lands....\")."},"case_id":9454280,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed McCoy's action because McCoy failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Caccio-la's conduct was arbitrary, capricious, or did not advance a legitimate correctional goal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"627 F.3d 338, 341-42","parenthetical":"although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief","sentence":"See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir.2012) (setting forth the elements of a \u00a7 1983 retaliation claim in the prison context); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201cThe plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of - legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains.\u201d); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15","parenthetical":"setting forth the elements of a SS 1983 retaliation claim in the prison context","sentence":"See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir.2012) (setting forth the elements of a \u00a7 1983 retaliation claim in the prison context); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201cThe plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of - legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains.\u201d); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief)."},"case_id":4320770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly dismissed McCoy's action because McCoy failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Caccio-la's conduct was arbitrary, capricious, or did not advance a legitimate correctional goal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"627 F.3d 338, 341-42","parenthetical":"although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief","sentence":"See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir.2012) (setting forth the elements of a \u00a7 1983 retaliation claim in the prison context); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201cThe plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of - legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains.\u201d); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"65 F.3d 802, 806","parenthetical":"\"The plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of - legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains.\"","sentence":"See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir.2012) (setting forth the elements of a \u00a7 1983 retaliation claim in the prison context); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201cThe plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of - legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains.\u201d); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir.2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief)."},"case_id":4320770,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In that regard, the court is not entirely convinced that the filing of Donaldson's January 9, 2004, Rule 702 challenge to Mr. Burton's opinions, standing alone, \"substantially justified\" or provided adequate reason for another expert report. Moreover, notwithstanding Donaldson's arguments about potential harm from an eleventh hour revision to an expert's report, it is clear in this case that Donaldson has found and used an expert to challenge the revised report, and the parties have rehearsed their jury arguments regarding the precise issues raised by the revised report.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"144 F.R.D. 353, 353-54","parenthetical":"considering, inter alia, the opposing party's need for time to prepare for the testimony and whether a continuance would be useful","sentence":"See FIRE, 220 F.3d at 902-03 (failure to meet a disclosure deadline may be excused if the failure was \u201charmless\u201d); cf. Jochims, 144 F.R.D. at 353-54 (considering, inter alia, the opposing party\u2019s need for time to prepare for the testimony and whether a continuance would be useful). Ultimately, the court concludes that the parties\u2019 arguments for and against admissibility of the March 1, 2004, report present jury questions concerning the weight to be given that report."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"220 F.3d 902, 902-03","parenthetical":"failure to meet a disclosure deadline may be excused if the failure was \"harmless\"","sentence":"See FIRE, 220 F.3d at 902-03 (failure to meet a disclosure deadline may be excused if the failure was \u201charmless\u201d); cf. Jochims, 144 F.R.D. at 353-54 (considering, inter alia, the opposing party\u2019s need for time to prepare for the testimony and whether a continuance would be useful). Ultimately, the court concludes that the parties\u2019 arguments for and against admissibility of the March 1, 2004, report present jury questions concerning the weight to be given that report."},"case_id":9249621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence also does not support the ALJ's finding that Owens' medication is not indicative of Owens' limitations. Moreover, the ALJ's observations at the hearing and Owens' daily activities do not necessarily support a finding that she is not disabled.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"765 F.2d 870, 872","parenthetical":"holding that ALJ may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimant's pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimant's pain","sentence":"See Perminter v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (holding that ALJ may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimant\u2019s pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimant\u2019s pain); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that claimant\u2019s testimony about her daily activities does not detract from her credibility about pain or being disabled unless the activities consume a substantial part of her day)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"260 F.3d 1044, 1049-50","parenthetical":"stating that claimant's testimony about her daily activities does not detract from her credibility about pain or being disabled unless the activities consume a substantial part of her day","sentence":"See Perminter v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (holding that ALJ may not base adverse credibility finding on his perceptions of claimant\u2019s pain at the hearing where record shows objective evidence of claimant\u2019s pain); see also Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that claimant\u2019s testimony about her daily activities does not detract from her credibility about pain or being disabled unless the activities consume a substantial part of her day)."},"case_id":1055554,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our decision to exclude interviews with news reporters not only conforms to the purpose and policy of the absolute privilege, but is in line with other jurisdictions who have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"judicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\"","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"case_id":11563374,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our decision to exclude interviews with news reporters not only conforms to the purpose and policy of the absolute privilege, but is in line with other jurisdictions who have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"judicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\"","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"case_id":11563374,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our decision to exclude interviews with news reporters not only conforms to the purpose and policy of the absolute privilege, but is in line with other jurisdictions who have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"245 Iowa 593, 593","parenthetical":"absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"judicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\"","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"case_id":11563374,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our decision to exclude interviews with news reporters not only conforms to the purpose and policy of the absolute privilege, but is in line with other jurisdictions who have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"judicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\"","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 N.W.2d 227, 227","parenthetical":"absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"case_id":11563374,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our decision to exclude interviews with news reporters not only conforms to the purpose and policy of the absolute privilege, but is in line with other jurisdictions who have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"378 A.2d 927, 930","parenthetical":"\"judicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\"","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"case_id":11563374,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Our decision to exclude interviews with news reporters not only conforms to the purpose and policy of the absolute privilege, but is in line with other jurisdictions who have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"378 A.2d 927, 930","parenthetical":"\"judicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\"","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"case_id":11563374,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our decision to exclude interviews with news reporters not only conforms to the purpose and policy of the absolute privilege, but is in line with other jurisdictions who have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"378 A.2d 927, 930","parenthetical":"\"judicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\"","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"245 Iowa 593, 593","parenthetical":"absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"case_id":11563374,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our decision to exclude interviews with news reporters not only conforms to the purpose and policy of the absolute privilege, but is in line with other jurisdictions who have considered the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"378 A.2d 927, 930","parenthetical":"\"judicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\"","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 N.W.2d 227, 227","parenthetical":"absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting","sentence":"See Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (1962) (the \u201cabsolute privilege will not attach to counsel\u2019s extrajudicial publications, related to the litigation, which are made outside the purview of the judicial proceeding\u201d (citations omitted)); Barto v. Felix, 250 Pa.Super. 262, 378 A.2d 927, 930 (1977) (\u201cjudicial immunity does not protect the public defender in this case, for the remarks made by him at the press conference were not made at a judicial proceeding ... [these are not the] activities which judicial immunity was designed to protect\u201d); see also Soliz v. Williams, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 184 (1999) (judge who made defamatory comments during settlement conference was immune, but was liable for false statements to journalists which made plaintiff appear to be a liar as these comments were not made within recognized judicial functions); Mills, 245 Iowa at 593, 63 N.W.2d at 227 (absolute privilege not extended to mayor for defamatory comments made at city council meeting)."},"case_id":11563374,"label":"a"}
{"context":"7-Eleven responds that the sale-for-resale exemption does not require that the reseller actually collect sales tax on the taxable item, analogizing to resale transactions between contractors and the federal government.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"519 S.W.2d 106, 110-11","parenthetical":"holding that contractor who transferred title of items to federal government could claim sale-for-resale exemption even though ultimate resale would not actually be taxed, based on constitutional prohibition against states taxing federal government","sentence":"See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Calvert, 519 S.W.2d 106, 110-11 (Tex.1975) (holding that contractor who transferred title of items to federal government could claim sale-for-resale exemption even though ultimate resale would not actually be taxed, based on constitutional prohibition against states taxing federal government); see also Raytheon E-Systems, 101 S.W.3d at 568, 570 (applying Day & Zimmermann analysis to contractor\u2019s purchase of tangible overhead materials allocated as indirect costs to contracts with federal government and holding that purchase qualified for sale-for-resale exemption)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"101 S.W.3d 568, 568, 570","parenthetical":"applying Day & Zimmermann analysis to contractor's purchase of tangible overhead materials allocated as indirect costs to contracts with federal government and holding that purchase qualified for sale-for-resale exemption","sentence":"See Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Calvert, 519 S.W.2d 106, 110-11 (Tex.1975) (holding that contractor who transferred title of items to federal government could claim sale-for-resale exemption even though ultimate resale would not actually be taxed, based on constitutional prohibition against states taxing federal government); see also Raytheon E-Systems, 101 S.W.3d at 568, 570 (applying Day & Zimmermann analysis to contractor\u2019s purchase of tangible overhead materials allocated as indirect costs to contracts with federal government and holding that purchase qualified for sale-for-resale exemption)."},"case_id":7325436,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On appeal, a court reviews the decision whether to award sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"236 B.R. 510, 518","parenthetical":"\"The standard of review concerning a Bankruptcy Court's denial of sanctions is abuse of discretion.\"","sentence":"LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C.Cir.1998) (section 1927); In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 518 (D.D.C.1999) (\u201cThe standard of review concerning a Bankruptcy Court\u2019s denial of sanctions is abuse of discretion.\u201d); see also In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir.1996) (district court reviews a bankruptcy court\u2019s sanctions decision under a \u201cclear abuse of discretion\u201d standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"103 F.3d 472, 478","parenthetical":"district court reviews a bankruptcy court's sanctions decision under a \"clear abuse of discretion\" standard","sentence":"LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C.Cir.1998) (section 1927); In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 518 (D.D.C.1999) (\u201cThe standard of review concerning a Bankruptcy Court\u2019s denial of sanctions is abuse of discretion.\u201d); see also In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir.1996) (district court reviews a bankruptcy court\u2019s sanctions decision under a \u201cclear abuse of discretion\u201d standard)."},"case_id":5731042,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Unfortunate as the circumstances described by the court are, they are not \"extraordinary.\" They are the common collateral damage of imprisonment and are far enough removed from those circumstances that existing case law has found exceptional that we must conclude that the district court acted outside of permissible limits in granting the downward departure for family circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"161 F.3d 763, 763","parenthetical":"vacating a downward departure where the defendant's three children were minors and depended on his financial support to maintain their standard of living","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1992) (upholding departure where the defendant was solely responsible for the upbringing of four young children, including an infant); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1991) (upholding departure where the defendant worked at two jobs to support his wife, two children, grandmother, and a disabled father, who depended on the defendant\u2019s physical strength \u201cto help him get in and out of his wheelchair\u201d); see also Faria, 161 F.3d at 763 (vacating a downward departure where the defendant\u2019s three children were minors and depended on his financial support to maintain their standard of living); United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1035 (2d Cir.1997) (upholding downward departure where the defendant was primarily responsible for supporting a wife and two children and where the defendant\u2019s wife spoke little English and had a limited earning capacity), reh\u2019g en banc denied, 128 F.3d 788, 788 (2d Cir.1997) (in banc) (per curiam) (\u201c[T]he court regards the panel decision as limited to its precise facts and not an invitation to district judges to depart downward in the absence of truly exceptional family circumstances.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"964 F.2d 124, 129","parenthetical":"upholding departure where the defendant was solely responsible for the upbringing of four young children, including an infant","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1992) (upholding departure where the defendant was solely responsible for the upbringing of four young children, including an infant); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1991) (upholding departure where the defendant worked at two jobs to support his wife, two children, grandmother, and a disabled father, who depended on the defendant\u2019s physical strength \u201cto help him get in and out of his wheelchair\u201d); see also Faria, 161 F.3d at 763 (vacating a downward departure where the defendant\u2019s three children were minors and depended on his financial support to maintain their standard of living); United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1035 (2d Cir.1997) (upholding downward departure where the defendant was primarily responsible for supporting a wife and two children and where the defendant\u2019s wife spoke little English and had a limited earning capacity), reh\u2019g en banc denied, 128 F.3d 788, 788 (2d Cir.1997) (in banc) (per curiam) (\u201c[T]he court regards the panel decision as limited to its precise facts and not an invitation to district judges to depart downward in the absence of truly exceptional family circumstances.\u201d)."},"case_id":9111305,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Unfortunate as the circumstances described by the court are, they are not \"extraordinary.\" They are the common collateral damage of imprisonment and are far enough removed from those circumstances that existing case law has found exceptional that we must conclude that the district court acted outside of permissible limits in granting the downward departure for family circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"933 F.2d 1117, 1122","parenthetical":"upholding departure where the defendant worked at two jobs to support his wife, two children, grandmother, and a disabled father, who depended on the defendant's physical strength \"to help him get in and out of his wheelchair\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1992) (upholding departure where the defendant was solely responsible for the upbringing of four young children, including an infant); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1991) (upholding departure where the defendant worked at two jobs to support his wife, two children, grandmother, and a disabled father, who depended on the defendant\u2019s physical strength \u201cto help him get in and out of his wheelchair\u201d); see also Faria, 161 F.3d at 763 (vacating a downward departure where the defendant\u2019s three children were minors and depended on his financial support to maintain their standard of living); United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1035 (2d Cir.1997) (upholding downward departure where the defendant was primarily responsible for supporting a wife and two children and where the defendant\u2019s wife spoke little English and had a limited earning capacity), reh\u2019g en banc denied, 128 F.3d 788, 788 (2d Cir.1997) (in banc) (per curiam) (\u201c[T]he court regards the panel decision as limited to its precise facts and not an invitation to district judges to depart downward in the absence of truly exceptional family circumstances.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"161 F.3d 763, 763","parenthetical":"vacating a downward departure where the defendant's three children were minors and depended on his financial support to maintain their standard of living","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir.1992) (upholding departure where the defendant was solely responsible for the upbringing of four young children, including an infant); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1991) (upholding departure where the defendant worked at two jobs to support his wife, two children, grandmother, and a disabled father, who depended on the defendant\u2019s physical strength \u201cto help him get in and out of his wheelchair\u201d); see also Faria, 161 F.3d at 763 (vacating a downward departure where the defendant\u2019s three children were minors and depended on his financial support to maintain their standard of living); United States v. Galante, 111 F.3d 1029, 1035 (2d Cir.1997) (upholding downward departure where the defendant was primarily responsible for supporting a wife and two children and where the defendant\u2019s wife spoke little English and had a limited earning capacity), reh\u2019g en banc denied, 128 F.3d 788, 788 (2d Cir.1997) (in banc) (per curiam) (\u201c[T]he court regards the panel decision as limited to its precise facts and not an invitation to district judges to depart downward in the absence of truly exceptional family circumstances.\u201d)."},"case_id":9111305,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most federal loan programs for medical education require that the debtor show that it would be unconscionable for the bankruptcy court to not discharge their medical school loans. Courts have rarely reached that conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"it was not unconscionable to hold student debt in excess of $100,000 non dischargeable where neither doctor nor his dependents had any health problems and the doctor earned around $80,000 per year","sentence":"See In re Dillingham, 104 B.R. 505 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (it was not unconscionable to hold student debt in excess of $100,000 non dischargeable where neither doctor nor his dependents had any health problems and the doctor earned around $80,000 per year); but see In re Matthews, 150 B.R. 11 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992) (it would be unconscionable to hold entire amount of nearly $380,000 (including treble damages and interest) non-disehargeable even though doctor earned $85,000 per year, where doctor had attempted to substitute service in one medically underserved area for another; therefore half of the debt would be discharged); cf. In re Malloy, 144 B.R. 38 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1992) (it would be unconscionable not to discharge student loans of $90,-000 for a failed medical student who appeared incapable of earning more than a subsistence level of pay)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"it would be unconscionable to hold entire amount of nearly $380,000 (including treble damages and interest","sentence":"See In re Dillingham, 104 B.R. 505 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (it was not unconscionable to hold student debt in excess of $100,000 non dischargeable where neither doctor nor his dependents had any health problems and the doctor earned around $80,000 per year); but see In re Matthews, 150 B.R. 11 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992) (it would be unconscionable to hold entire amount of nearly $380,000 (including treble damages and interest) non-disehargeable even though doctor earned $85,000 per year, where doctor had attempted to substitute service in one medically underserved area for another; therefore half of the debt would be discharged); cf. In re Malloy, 144 B.R. 38 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1992) (it would be unconscionable not to discharge student loans of $90,-000 for a failed medical student who appeared incapable of earning more than a subsistence level of pay)."},"case_id":6532784,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Most federal loan programs for medical education require that the debtor show that it would be unconscionable for the bankruptcy court to not discharge their medical school loans. Courts have rarely reached that conclusion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"it was not unconscionable to hold student debt in excess of $100,000 non dischargeable where neither doctor nor his dependents had any health problems and the doctor earned around $80,000 per year","sentence":"See In re Dillingham, 104 B.R. 505 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (it was not unconscionable to hold student debt in excess of $100,000 non dischargeable where neither doctor nor his dependents had any health problems and the doctor earned around $80,000 per year); but see In re Matthews, 150 B.R. 11 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992) (it would be unconscionable to hold entire amount of nearly $380,000 (including treble damages and interest) non-disehargeable even though doctor earned $85,000 per year, where doctor had attempted to substitute service in one medically underserved area for another; therefore half of the debt would be discharged); cf. In re Malloy, 144 B.R. 38 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1992) (it would be unconscionable not to discharge student loans of $90,-000 for a failed medical student who appeared incapable of earning more than a subsistence level of pay)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"it would be unconscionable not to discharge student loans of $90,-000 for a failed medical student who appeared incapable of earning more than a subsistence level of pay","sentence":"See In re Dillingham, 104 B.R. 505 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1989) (it was not unconscionable to hold student debt in excess of $100,000 non dischargeable where neither doctor nor his dependents had any health problems and the doctor earned around $80,000 per year); but see In re Matthews, 150 B.R. 11 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1992) (it would be unconscionable to hold entire amount of nearly $380,000 (including treble damages and interest) non-disehargeable even though doctor earned $85,000 per year, where doctor had attempted to substitute service in one medically underserved area for another; therefore half of the debt would be discharged); cf. In re Malloy, 144 B.R. 38 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1992) (it would be unconscionable not to discharge student loans of $90,-000 for a failed medical student who appeared incapable of earning more than a subsistence level of pay)."},"case_id":6532784,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It has long been held that, in a jury trial, private, intentional communications and\/or contacts between jurors and witnesses are generally improper, and convictions in such cases are subject to reversal unless the contacts are proven to be nonprejudicial to the defendant. Such contacts raise fundamental concerns on whether the jury would reach their verdict based solely upon the evidence presented at trial or whether it would be improperly influenced by the inappropriate contacts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"13 L.Ed.2d 429, 429","parenthetical":"stating, \"The requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\"","sentence":"See Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 85 S.Ct. at 549, 13 L.Ed.2d at 429 (stating, \u201cThe requirement that a jury\u2019s verdict \u2018must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial\u2019 goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\u201d)(referencing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765, 49 S.Ct. 471, 476, 73 L.Ed. 938, 946 (1929)); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907)(\u201cThe theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"205 U.S. 454, 462","parenthetical":"\"The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\"","sentence":"See Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 85 S.Ct. at 549, 13 L.Ed.2d at 429 (stating, \u201cThe requirement that a jury\u2019s verdict \u2018must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial\u2019 goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\u201d)(referencing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765, 49 S.Ct. 471, 476, 73 L.Ed. 938, 946 (1929)); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907)(\u201cThe theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\u201d)."},"case_id":297682,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It has long been held that, in a jury trial, private, intentional communications and\/or contacts between jurors and witnesses are generally improper, and convictions in such cases are subject to reversal unless the contacts are proven to be nonprejudicial to the defendant. Such contacts raise fundamental concerns on whether the jury would reach their verdict based solely upon the evidence presented at trial or whether it would be improperly influenced by the inappropriate contacts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"27 S.Ct. 556, 558","parenthetical":"\"The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\"","sentence":"See Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 85 S.Ct. at 549, 13 L.Ed.2d at 429 (stating, \u201cThe requirement that a jury\u2019s verdict \u2018must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial\u2019 goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\u201d)(referencing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765, 49 S.Ct. 471, 476, 73 L.Ed. 938, 946 (1929)); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907)(\u201cThe theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"13 L.Ed.2d 429, 429","parenthetical":"stating, \"The requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\"","sentence":"See Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 85 S.Ct. at 549, 13 L.Ed.2d at 429 (stating, \u201cThe requirement that a jury\u2019s verdict \u2018must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial\u2019 goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\u201d)(referencing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765, 49 S.Ct. 471, 476, 73 L.Ed. 938, 946 (1929)); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907)(\u201cThe theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\u201d)."},"case_id":297682,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It has long been held that, in a jury trial, private, intentional communications and\/or contacts between jurors and witnesses are generally improper, and convictions in such cases are subject to reversal unless the contacts are proven to be nonprejudicial to the defendant. Such contacts raise fundamental concerns on whether the jury would reach their verdict based solely upon the evidence presented at trial or whether it would be improperly influenced by the inappropriate contacts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\"","sentence":"See Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 85 S.Ct. at 549, 13 L.Ed.2d at 429 (stating, \u201cThe requirement that a jury\u2019s verdict \u2018must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial\u2019 goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\u201d)(referencing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765, 49 S.Ct. 471, 476, 73 L.Ed. 938, 946 (1929)); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907)(\u201cThe theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"13 L.Ed.2d 429, 429","parenthetical":"stating, \"The requirement that a jury's verdict 'must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial' goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\"","sentence":"See Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 85 S.Ct. at 549, 13 L.Ed.2d at 429 (stating, \u201cThe requirement that a jury\u2019s verdict \u2018must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial\u2019 goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury\u201d)(referencing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765, 49 S.Ct. 471, 476, 73 L.Ed. 938, 946 (1929)); see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 558, 51 L.Ed. 879 (1907)(\u201cThe theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print\u201d)."},"case_id":297682,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This court agrees with the conclusion of the Illinois Supreme Court that the prosecutor's comment was not directed at Albanese's silence. Rather, the comment concerned only his lack of remorse for crimes of which he had already been convicted; after the jury had found Albanese guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he was obviously no longer entitled to be presumed innocent.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"973 F.2d 1354, 1362-63","parenthetical":"rejecting argument that Sentencing Guideline SS 3E1.1 which permits reduction in sentence for \"acceptance of responsibility\" penalizes defendants for exercising their right to jury trial and their right against self incrimination","sentence":"People v. Morgan, 59 Ill.2d 276, 319 N.E.2d 764 (1974); United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362-63 (7th Cir.1992) (rejecting argument that Sentencing Guideline \u00a7 3E1.1 which permits reduction in sentence for \u201cacceptance of responsibility\u201d penalizes defendants for exercising their right to jury trial and their right against self incrimination), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 113 S.Ct. 1026 (1993); see also United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 776 (7th Cir.1993) (noting trial court\u2019s consideration of defendant\u2019s \u201cutter lack of remorse\u201d in determining appropriate sentence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"988 F.2d 750, 776","parenthetical":"noting trial court's consideration of defendant's \"utter lack of remorse\" in determining appropriate sentence","sentence":"People v. Morgan, 59 Ill.2d 276, 319 N.E.2d 764 (1974); United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362-63 (7th Cir.1992) (rejecting argument that Sentencing Guideline \u00a7 3E1.1 which permits reduction in sentence for \u201cacceptance of responsibility\u201d penalizes defendants for exercising their right to jury trial and their right against self incrimination), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 113 S.Ct. 1026 (1993); see also United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 776 (7th Cir.1993) (noting trial court\u2019s consideration of defendant\u2019s \u201cutter lack of remorse\u201d in determining appropriate sentence)."},"case_id":7406184,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This court agrees with the conclusion of the Illinois Supreme Court that the prosecutor's comment was not directed at Albanese's silence. Rather, the comment concerned only his lack of remorse for crimes of which he had already been convicted; after the jury had found Albanese guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he was obviously no longer entitled to be presumed innocent.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting argument that Sentencing Guideline SS 3E1.1 which permits reduction in sentence for \"acceptance of responsibility\" penalizes defendants for exercising their right to jury trial and their right against self incrimination","sentence":"People v. Morgan, 59 Ill.2d 276, 319 N.E.2d 764 (1974); United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362-63 (7th Cir.1992) (rejecting argument that Sentencing Guideline \u00a7 3E1.1 which permits reduction in sentence for \u201cacceptance of responsibility\u201d penalizes defendants for exercising their right to jury trial and their right against self incrimination), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 113 S.Ct. 1026 (1993); see also United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 776 (7th Cir.1993) (noting trial court\u2019s consideration of defendant\u2019s \u201cutter lack of remorse\u201d in determining appropriate sentence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"988 F.2d 750, 776","parenthetical":"noting trial court's consideration of defendant's \"utter lack of remorse\" in determining appropriate sentence","sentence":"People v. Morgan, 59 Ill.2d 276, 319 N.E.2d 764 (1974); United States v. Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1362-63 (7th Cir.1992) (rejecting argument that Sentencing Guideline \u00a7 3E1.1 which permits reduction in sentence for \u201cacceptance of responsibility\u201d penalizes defendants for exercising their right to jury trial and their right against self incrimination), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 113 S.Ct. 1026 (1993); see also United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 776 (7th Cir.1993) (noting trial court\u2019s consideration of defendant\u2019s \u201cutter lack of remorse\u201d in determining appropriate sentence)."},"case_id":7406184,"label":"a"}
{"context":". A number of the cases have also specifically distinguished Wright on this basis.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"270 N.W.2d 125, 132","parenthetical":"section of act seeking to limit res ipsa loquitor doctrine by requiring expert testimony or admission of fault in order to impose liability unconstitutionally invades judicial power to establish rules of procedure regarding admissibility of evidence","sentence":"But cf. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132 (N.D.1978) (section of act seeking to limit res ipsa loquitor doctrine by requiring expert testimony or admission of fault in order to impose liability unconstitutionally invades judicial power to establish rules of procedure regarding admissibility of evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"404 N.E.2d 598, 598","parenthetical":"rule is for admission rather than exclusion of evidence and does not usurp judicial authority to rule upon admissibility of evidence since courts have previously sanctioned admission of medical expert opinion","sentence":"E.g., Attorney General v. Johnson, 385 A.2d at 66-67; Prendergast, 256 N.W.2d at 666 (\"the medical review panel in the Illinois case was not a panel to provide evidence but was a panel to decide the controversy\u201d); see also Redish, supra note 3, at 794; cf. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d at 598 (rule is for admission rather than exclusion of evidence and does not usurp judicial authority to rule upon admissibility of evidence since courts have previously sanctioned admission of medical expert opinion)."},"case_id":11336212,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"77 F.3d 1210, 1213","parenthetical":"\"Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81","parenthetical":"\"[A]bsent clear error, 'an agency's credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.' \"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81","parenthetical":"\"[A]bsent clear error, 'an agency's credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.' \"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"5 F.3d 923, 928","parenthetical":"\"When findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB's findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81","parenthetical":"\"[A]bsent clear error, 'an agency's credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.' \"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"761 F.2d 657, 661","parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"77 F.3d 1210, 1213","parenthetical":"\"Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"275 F.3d 1106, 1112","parenthetical":"\"[A]bsent clear error, 'an agency's credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.' \"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"5 F.3d 923, 928","parenthetical":"\"When findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB's findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"275 F.3d 1106, 1112","parenthetical":"\"[A]bsent clear error, 'an agency's credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.' \"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"275 F.3d 1106, 1112","parenthetical":"\"[A]bsent clear error, 'an agency's credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.' \"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"761 F.2d 657, 661","parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"77 F.3d 1210, 1213","parenthetical":"\"Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 F.2d 394, 414","parenthetical":"\"Credibility determinations within the agency's sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"b"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 F.2d 394, 414","parenthetical":"\"Credibility determinations within the agency's sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"5 F.3d 923, 928","parenthetical":"\"When findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB's findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"a"}
{"context":"See Notes of Toepfer, AR 684; Toepfer Statement, AR 22 (\"The Second Engineer stated they had been having problems with the incinerator and it had not always worked properly.\"); Eckard Statement, AR 15 (\"We asked the Chief Engineer if the Incinerator was working and he stated that he did not think it had been working.\"); AR 15-16 (noting that Pabillar also \"stated that the incinerator had not been working until it was fixed prior to arriving to the U.S.\"). Plaintiffs do not argue that these crew members had any motive to lie, and the Court can credit these statements.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"761 F.2d 657, 661","parenthetical":"\"[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"466 F.2d 394, 414","parenthetical":"\"Credibility determinations within the agency's sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\"","sentence":"Bean Dredging, LLC v. United States, 773 F.Supp.2d 63, 81 (D.D.C.2011) (\u201c[A]bsent clear error, \u2018an agency\u2019s credibility decision normally enjoys almost overwhelming deference.\u2019 \u201d), quoting Sasol N. Am. Inc. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.2002); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm\u2019n, 466 F.2d 394, 414 (D.C.Cir.1972) (\u201cCredibility determinations within the agency\u2019s sphere of expertise are peculiarly within its province, and courts will upset them only if made irrationally.\u201d); see also Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th Cir.1995) (\u201cCredibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.\u201d), (citation omitted); NLRB v. McCullough Envtl. Serv., Inc., 5 F.3d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1993) (\u201cWhen findings of fact rest upon credibility determinations, we defer to the NLRB\u2019s findings and will overturn them only in rare circumstances.\u201d); DeSarno v. Dep\u2019t of Commerce, 761 F.2d 657, 661 (Fed.Cir. 1985) (\u201c[T]his Court cannot substitute a contrary credibility determination based on a cold paper record.\u201d)."},"case_id":4231924,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Hunt, Transcontinental's expert, acknowledged that differential diagnosis was used to treat Crump. Although Hunt would have reached different conclusions regarding Crump's infection, he stated that he agreed with the treatment methodology Daller employed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"923 S.W.2d 557, 557","parenthetical":"noting that the Robinson reliability inquiry focuses \"solely on the underlying principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate\"","sentence":"See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 (noting that the Robinson reliability inquiry focuses \u201csolely on the underlying principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate\u201d); cf. TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex.2010) (\u201cRather than focus entirely on the reliability of the underlying technique used to generate the challenged opinion, as in Robinson, we have found it appropriate ... [to] determine whether there are any significant analytical gaps in the expert\u2019s opinion that undermine its reliability.\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"306 S.W.3d 230, 235","parenthetical":"\"Rather than focus entirely on the reliability of the underlying technique used to generate the challenged opinion, as in Robinson, we have found it appropriate ... [to] determine whether there are any significant analytical gaps in the expert's opinion that undermine its reliability.\"","sentence":"See Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 (noting that the Robinson reliability inquiry focuses \u201csolely on the underlying principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate\u201d); cf. TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex.2010) (\u201cRather than focus entirely on the reliability of the underlying technique used to generate the challenged opinion, as in Robinson, we have found it appropriate ... [to] determine whether there are any significant analytical gaps in the expert\u2019s opinion that undermine its reliability.\u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":7320767,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, the totality of the circumstances includes conduct directed not at the plaintiff. Rather, the inquiry concerns the nature of the workplace environment, \"and whatever the contours of one's environment, they surely may exceed the individual dynamic between the complainant and [the alleged wrongdoer].\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that in reviewing hostile environment cases \"[a]ll the circumstances are examined ... [and] [e]videnee of a general atmosphere of hostility toward those of the plaintiffs gender is considered in the examination of all the circumstances\"","sentence":"Id. at 184. See also EEOC v. Fairbrook Medical Clinic, P.A., 609 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir.2010); Jennings v. University of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir.2007) (en banc) (noting that in reviewing hostile environment cases \u201c[a]ll the circumstances are examined ... [and] [e]videnee of a general atmosphere of hostility toward those of the plaintiffs gender is considered in the examination of all the circumstances\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"510 U.S. 23, 23","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.\"","sentence":"See also Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367 (\u201c[Wjhether an environment is \u2018hostile\u2019 or \u2018abusive\u2019 can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.\u201d)."},"case_id":3749874,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, the totality of the circumstances includes conduct directed not at the plaintiff. Rather, the inquiry concerns the nature of the workplace environment, \"and whatever the contours of one's environment, they surely may exceed the individual dynamic between the complainant and [the alleged wrongdoer].\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that in reviewing hostile environment cases \"[a]ll the circumstances are examined ... [and] [e]videnee of a general atmosphere of hostility toward those of the plaintiffs gender is considered in the examination of all the circumstances\"","sentence":"Id. at 184. See also EEOC v. Fairbrook Medical Clinic, P.A., 609 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir.2010); Jennings v. University of North Carolina, 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir.2007) (en banc) (noting that in reviewing hostile environment cases \u201c[a]ll the circumstances are examined ... [and] [e]videnee of a general atmosphere of hostility toward those of the plaintiffs gender is considered in the examination of all the circumstances\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Wjhether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.\"","sentence":"See also Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367 (\u201c[Wjhether an environment is \u2018hostile\u2019 or \u2018abusive\u2019 can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.\u201d)."},"case_id":3749874,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, whether the term \"firearm\" when used in a statute without being defined is to be given its traditional meaning or a more expansive meaning depends upon the purpose and policy underlying the particular statute. When the statute is designed not only to deter physical harm, but also to deter a broader range of conduct that produces fear of physical harm, a more expansive definition of \"firearm\" is required in order to effectuate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 Va. App. 774, 777-78","parenthetical":"possession of a \"sawed-off shotgun\" includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"221 Va. 198, 198","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"case_id":2320888,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, whether the term \"firearm\" when used in a statute without being defined is to be given its traditional meaning or a more expansive meaning depends upon the purpose and policy underlying the particular statute. When the statute is designed not only to deter physical harm, but also to deter a broader range of conduct that produces fear of physical harm, a more expansive definition of \"firearm\" is required in order to effectuate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"418 S.E.2d 727, 729","parenthetical":"possession of a \"sawed-off shotgun\" includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"221 Va. 198, 198","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"case_id":2320888,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, whether the term \"firearm\" when used in a statute without being defined is to be given its traditional meaning or a more expansive meaning depends upon the purpose and policy underlying the particular statute. When the statute is designed not only to deter physical harm, but also to deter a broader range of conduct that produces fear of physical harm, a more expansive definition of \"firearm\" is required in order to effectuate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"221 Va. 198, 198","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"15 Va. App. 196, 200-01","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \" 'any object' that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\"","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"case_id":2320888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, whether the term \"firearm\" when used in a statute without being defined is to be given its traditional meaning or a more expansive meaning depends upon the purpose and policy underlying the particular statute. When the statute is designed not only to deter physical harm, but also to deter a broader range of conduct that produces fear of physical harm, a more expansive definition of \"firearm\" is required in order to effectuate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"421 S.E.2d 894, 897","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \" 'any object' that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\"","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"221 Va. 198, 198","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"case_id":2320888,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, whether the term \"firearm\" when used in a statute without being defined is to be given its traditional meaning or a more expansive meaning depends upon the purpose and policy underlying the particular statute. When the statute is designed not only to deter physical harm, but also to deter a broader range of conduct that produces fear of physical harm, a more expansive definition of \"firearm\" is required in order to effectuate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 S.E.2d 357, 357","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 Va. App. 774, 777-78","parenthetical":"possession of a \"sawed-off shotgun\" includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"case_id":2320888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, whether the term \"firearm\" when used in a statute without being defined is to be given its traditional meaning or a more expansive meaning depends upon the purpose and policy underlying the particular statute. When the statute is designed not only to deter physical harm, but also to deter a broader range of conduct that produces fear of physical harm, a more expansive definition of \"firearm\" is required in order to effectuate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"418 S.E.2d 727, 729","parenthetical":"possession of a \"sawed-off shotgun\" includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 S.E.2d 357, 357","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"case_id":2320888,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, whether the term \"firearm\" when used in a statute without being defined is to be given its traditional meaning or a more expansive meaning depends upon the purpose and policy underlying the particular statute. When the statute is designed not only to deter physical harm, but also to deter a broader range of conduct that produces fear of physical harm, a more expansive definition of \"firearm\" is required in order to effectuate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 S.E.2d 357, 357","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"15 Va. App. 196, 200-01","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \" 'any object' that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\"","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"case_id":2320888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, whether the term \"firearm\" when used in a statute without being defined is to be given its traditional meaning or a more expansive meaning depends upon the purpose and policy underlying the particular statute. When the statute is designed not only to deter physical harm, but also to deter a broader range of conduct that produces fear of physical harm, a more expansive definition of \"firearm\" is required in order to effectuate that purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 S.E.2d 357, 357","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"421 S.E.2d 894, 897","parenthetical":"\"firearm\" under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \" 'any object' that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\"","sentence":"See Holloman, 221 Va. at 198, 269 S.E.2d at 357 (\u201cfirearm\u201d includes BB guns where statute prohibits the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony); see also Code \u00a7 18.2-282 (\u201cfirearm\u201d expressly includes BB guns in statute proscribing the brandishing of a firearm or other weapon similar in appearance); see also Rogers v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 774, 777-78, 418 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1992) (possession of a \u201csawed-off shotgun\u201d includes inoperable shotgun because the purpose of the statute includes preventing the fear of harm engendered by display of such a weapon). On the other hand, when a statute is designed only to proscribe the act of possessing a firearm or the conduct of a felon in order to reduce a real threat of harm to the public, a narrower, more traditional definition of \u201cfirearm\u201d is required. See Timmons v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 196, 200-01, 421 S.E.2d 894, 897 (1992) (\u201cfirearm\u201d under statute penalizing the possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine does not include \u201c \u2018any object\u2019 that [appears to have] capability of firing a projectile, even if it lacks that capability\u201d)."},"case_id":2320888,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"331 Md. 651, 691","parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"331 Md. 651, 691","parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"b"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"b"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"As [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court's action was wrong.\"","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"328 Md. 95, 99-100","parenthetical":"where party acquiesces in court's ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"b"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"328 Md. 95, 99-100","parenthetical":"where party acquiesces in court's ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where party acquiesces in court's ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where party acquiesces in court's ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where party acquiesces in court's ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"b"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where party acquiesces in court's ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where party acquiesces in court's ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"182 Md.App. 135, 135","parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"He merely stated: \"Thank you, Judge.\" Under these circumstances, appellant's contention on appeal that the court erred in sua sponte advising the jury to reconsider its verdicts is not preserved, and he is not entitled to relief on this ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where party acquiesces in court's ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling","sentence":"See Gilliam v. State, 331 Md. 651, 691, 629 A.2d 685 (1993) (\u201cAs [defendant] did not object to the course of action ... taken by the court, and apparently indicated his agreement with it, he cannot now be heard to complain that the court\u2019s action was wrong.\u201d), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1077, 114 S.Ct. 891, 127 L.Ed.2d 84 (1994); Watkins v. State, 328 Md. 95, 99-100, 613 A.2d 379 (1992) (where party acquiesces in court\u2019s ruling, there is no basis for appeal of that ruling), overruled on other grounds, Calloway v. State, 414 Md. 616, 996 A.2d 869 (2010)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\"","sentence":"See also Tate, 182 Md.App. at 135, 957 A.2d 640 (\u201cThe defendant may not stand mute and later complain about the verdicts he did nothing to cure at the only time a cure was still possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":12314276,"label":"a"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"85 Idaho 317, 324","parenthetical":"\"Under certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.\"","sentence":"Rosenberry v. Clark, 85 Idaho 317, 324, 379 P.2d 638, 642 (1963) (\u201cUnder certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.\u201d); Reynolds Irr."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"b"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"85 Idaho 317, 324","parenthetical":"\"Under certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.\"","sentence":"Rosenberry v. Clark, 85 Idaho 317, 324, 379 P.2d 638, 642 (1963) (\u201cUnder certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.\u201d); Reynolds Irr."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"a"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"379 P.2d 638, 642","parenthetical":"\"Under certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.\"","sentence":"Rosenberry v. Clark, 85 Idaho 317, 324, 379 P.2d 638, 642 (1963) (\u201cUnder certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.\u201d); Reynolds Irr."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"a"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"379 P.2d 638, 642","parenthetical":"\"Under certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.\"","sentence":"Rosenberry v. Clark, 85 Idaho 317, 324, 379 P.2d 638, 642 (1963) (\u201cUnder certain conditions parol evidence may be introduced to show the true consideration, or want of consideration for a promissory note or other instrument.\u201d); Reynolds Irr."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"a"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"oral evidence offered to show what the \"other valuable considerations\" were should have been admitted","sentence":"Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the \u201cother valuable considerations\u201d were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \u201cother considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"b"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"oral evidence offered to show what the \"other valuable considerations\" were should have been admitted","sentence":"Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the \u201cother valuable considerations\u201d were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \u201cother considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"a"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"oral evidence offered to show what the \"other valuable considerations\" were should have been admitted","sentence":"Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the \u201cother valuable considerations\u201d were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \u201cother considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"a"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"oral evidence offered to show what the \"other valuable considerations\" were should have been admitted","sentence":"Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the \u201cother valuable considerations\u201d were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \u201cother considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"b"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \"other considerations\"","sentence":"Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the \u201cother valuable considerations\u201d were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \u201cother considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"b"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \"other considerations\"","sentence":"Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the \u201cother valuable considerations\u201d were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \u201cother considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"a"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \"other considerations\"","sentence":"Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the \u201cother valuable considerations\u201d were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \u201cother considerations\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"a"}
{"context":"From its earliest days this Court has held that where, as here, the consideration clause merely recites a vague phrase such as \"for value received\" or \"for one dollar and other valuable considerations,\" parol evidence is admissible to show the true consideration for the conveyance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence","sentence":"See also Vanoski v. Thomson, 114 Idaho 381, 757 P.2d 244 (Ct.App.1988), petition for review denied (1988) (where the recital in a deed is merely a receipt or acknowledgment of payment, it is susceptible to explanation or contradiction by parol evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \"other considerations\"","sentence":"Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 206 P.2d 774 (1949) (oral evidence offered to show what the \u201cother valuable considerations\u201d were should have been admitted); Boise Valley Construction Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384, 105 P. 1070 (1909) (parol evidence was admissible to explain what was meant by \u201cother considerations\u201d)."},"case_id":4412336,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs fifth claim alleges that Nuti unlawfully arrested Plaintiff even though he knew that Plaintiff had never pointed a gun at him or at the ground. Taking the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, Nuti is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"266 F.3d 959, 964","parenthetical":"\"A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under SS 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.\"","sentence":"See Dubner v. City of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (\u201cA claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under \u00a7 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.\u201d); cf. Awabdy v. City of Ade lanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (\u201cAmong the ways that a plaintiff can rebut a prima fade finding of probable cause is by showing that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"368 F.3d 1062, 1067","parenthetical":"\"Among the ways that a plaintiff can rebut a prima fade finding of probable cause is by showing that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.\"","sentence":"See Dubner v. City of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (\u201cA claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under \u00a7 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.\u201d); cf. Awabdy v. City of Ade lanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (\u201cAmong the ways that a plaintiff can rebut a prima fade finding of probable cause is by showing that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corruption, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad faith.\u201d)."},"case_id":12136890,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The BIA abused its discretion by miseharacterizing the declaration Guerra Bautista included with his June 21, 2007, motion to reopen, erroneously finding that the declaration was unsigned and unsworn.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"486 F.3d 1079, 1087","parenthetical":"an alien's declaration submitted with a motion to reopen must be accepted as true unless inherently unbelievable","sentence":"See Konstantinova v. INS, 195 F.3d 528, 529 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe BIA abuses its discretion when it ... distorts or disregards important aspects of the alien\u2019s claim.\u201d); see also Chaidez v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir.2007) (an alien\u2019s declaration submitted with a motion to reopen must be accepted as true unless inherently unbelievable)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 F.3d 528, 529","parenthetical":"\"The BIA abuses its discretion when it ... distorts or disregards important aspects of the alien's claim.\"","sentence":"See Konstantinova v. INS, 195 F.3d 528, 529 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe BIA abuses its discretion when it ... distorts or disregards important aspects of the alien\u2019s claim.\u201d); see also Chaidez v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir.2007) (an alien\u2019s declaration submitted with a motion to reopen must be accepted as true unless inherently unbelievable)."},"case_id":4119388,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, the plain language of the statute requires that the person seeking protection under FMLA be unable to perform the functions of her position. 29 U.S.C. SS 2612(a)(1)(D). Consistent with this, courts have focused on the ability to work in determining whether a person is incapacitated for the purposes of the FMLA. However, plaintiffs \"mild to moderate impairment\" did not prevent her from going to work and she was able to perform all of her job functions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"124 F.3d 699, 699","parenthetical":"finding plaintiff who suffered stress from managing father's probate estate could still perform the activities of daily living was actually able to work was not incapacitated for the purposes of FMLA","sentence":"See Murray, 124 F.3d at 699 (finding plaintiff who suffered stress from managing father\u2019s probate estate could still perform the activities of daily living was actually able to work was not incapacitated for the purposes of FMLA); see also Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F.Supp. 102, 106 (D.R..I.1997) (finding plaintiff was not incapacitated where plaintiff could still perform the functions and duties of his job)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"963 F.Supp. 102, 106","parenthetical":"finding plaintiff was not incapacitated where plaintiff could still perform the functions and duties of his job","sentence":"See Murray, 124 F.3d at 699 (finding plaintiff who suffered stress from managing father\u2019s probate estate could still perform the activities of daily living was actually able to work was not incapacitated for the purposes of FMLA); see also Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F.Supp. 102, 106 (D.R..I.1997) (finding plaintiff was not incapacitated where plaintiff could still perform the functions and duties of his job)."},"case_id":11496709,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our cases have suggested that expert testimony is ordinarily required to rebut a defendant physician's claim asserting the therapeutic privilege exception.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"79 Hawai'i 383, 383","parenthetical":"\"expert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\"","sentence":"See Bernard I, 79 Hawai'i at 383, 903 P.2d at 688 (\u201cexpert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\u201d); cf. Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 485, 904 P.2d at 499 (noting that, \u201cbarring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician\u2019s duty to disclose is applicable,\u201d expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"79 Hawai'i 485, 485","parenthetical":"noting that, \"barring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician's duty to disclose is applicable,\" expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment","sentence":"See Bernard I, 79 Hawai'i at 383, 903 P.2d at 688 (\u201cexpert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\u201d); cf. Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 485, 904 P.2d at 499 (noting that, \u201cbarring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician\u2019s duty to disclose is applicable,\u201d expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our cases have suggested that expert testimony is ordinarily required to rebut a defendant physician's claim asserting the therapeutic privilege exception.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"79 Hawai'i 383, 383","parenthetical":"\"expert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\"","sentence":"See Bernard I, 79 Hawai'i at 383, 903 P.2d at 688 (\u201cexpert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\u201d); cf. Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 485, 904 P.2d at 499 (noting that, \u201cbarring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician\u2019s duty to disclose is applicable,\u201d expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"904 P.2d 499, 499","parenthetical":"noting that, \"barring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician's duty to disclose is applicable,\" expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment","sentence":"See Bernard I, 79 Hawai'i at 383, 903 P.2d at 688 (\u201cexpert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\u201d); cf. Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 485, 904 P.2d at 499 (noting that, \u201cbarring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician\u2019s duty to disclose is applicable,\u201d expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our cases have suggested that expert testimony is ordinarily required to rebut a defendant physician's claim asserting the therapeutic privilege exception.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"903 P.2d 688, 688","parenthetical":"\"expert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\"","sentence":"See Bernard I, 79 Hawai'i at 383, 903 P.2d at 688 (\u201cexpert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\u201d); cf. Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 485, 904 P.2d at 499 (noting that, \u201cbarring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician\u2019s duty to disclose is applicable,\u201d expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"79 Hawai'i 485, 485","parenthetical":"noting that, \"barring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician's duty to disclose is applicable,\" expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment","sentence":"See Bernard I, 79 Hawai'i at 383, 903 P.2d at 688 (\u201cexpert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\u201d); cf. Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 485, 904 P.2d at 499 (noting that, \u201cbarring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician\u2019s duty to disclose is applicable,\u201d expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Our cases have suggested that expert testimony is ordinarily required to rebut a defendant physician's claim asserting the therapeutic privilege exception.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"904 P.2d 499, 499","parenthetical":"noting that, \"barring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician's duty to disclose is applicable,\" expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment","sentence":"See Bernard I, 79 Hawai'i at 383, 903 P.2d at 688 (\u201cexpert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\u201d); cf. Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 485, 904 P.2d at 499 (noting that, \u201cbarring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician\u2019s duty to disclose is applicable,\u201d expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"903 P.2d 688, 688","parenthetical":"\"expert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\"","sentence":"See Bernard I, 79 Hawai'i at 383, 903 P.2d at 688 (\u201cexpert testimony as to the proper medical standards of disclosure will be required where a physician justifies his or her nondisclosure of risks to a patient on the basis of the therapeutic privilege exception\u201d); cf. Carr, 79 Hawai'i at 485, 904 P.2d at 499 (noting that, \u201cbarring situations where the therapeutic privilege exception to the physician\u2019s duty to disclose is applicable,\u201d expert testimony is not needed to resolve the question of what an individual patient reasonably needs to hear in order to make an informed choice regarding the proposed medical treatment)."},"case_id":12264367,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An attorney's failure to name a department's municipality in a complaint has no effect on the department's status as a non-person for purposes of a civil rights action. To the contrary, governmental subunits lack the capacity to be sued regardless of whether their accompanying municipalities participate in the lawsuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"advising pro se plaintiff who sued police department without naming municipality as a defendant that \"[p]laintiff should be aware that a police department is not a 'person' subject to suit under SS 1983\"","sentence":"See James, 2006 WL 3733024, at *3 n. 2 (advising pro se plaintiff who sued police department without naming municipality as a defendant that \u201c[p]laintiff should be aware that a police department is not a \u2018person\u2019 subject to suit under \u00a7 1983\u201d); see also Richardson v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. Civ. A. 3:07-0304, 2007 WL 1464582, at *2 (M.D.Tenn. May 15, 2007) (observing that a county sheriffs department could not be sued under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding the county\u2019s non-participation in the lawsuit); Shimer v. Shingobee Island Water & Sewer Comm\u2019n, No. Civ. A. 02-953, 2003 WL 1610788, at *4 (D.Minn. Mar.18, 2003) (\u201c[A]bsent specific statutory authority, ... subordinate [governmental] entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2007 WL 1464582, at *2","parenthetical":"observing that a county sheriffs department could not be sued under SS 1983 notwithstanding the county's non-participation in the lawsuit","sentence":"See James, 2006 WL 3733024, at *3 n. 2 (advising pro se plaintiff who sued police department without naming municipality as a defendant that \u201c[p]laintiff should be aware that a police department is not a \u2018person\u2019 subject to suit under \u00a7 1983\u201d); see also Richardson v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. Civ. A. 3:07-0304, 2007 WL 1464582, at *2 (M.D.Tenn. May 15, 2007) (observing that a county sheriffs department could not be sued under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding the county\u2019s non-participation in the lawsuit); Shimer v. Shingobee Island Water & Sewer Comm\u2019n, No. Civ. A. 02-953, 2003 WL 1610788, at *4 (D.Minn. Mar.18, 2003) (\u201c[A]bsent specific statutory authority, ... subordinate [governmental] entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.\u201d)."},"case_id":3565027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An attorney's failure to name a department's municipality in a complaint has no effect on the department's status as a non-person for purposes of a civil rights action. To the contrary, governmental subunits lack the capacity to be sued regardless of whether their accompanying municipalities participate in the lawsuit.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"advising pro se plaintiff who sued police department without naming municipality as a defendant that \"[p]laintiff should be aware that a police department is not a 'person' subject to suit under SS 1983\"","sentence":"See James, 2006 WL 3733024, at *3 n. 2 (advising pro se plaintiff who sued police department without naming municipality as a defendant that \u201c[p]laintiff should be aware that a police department is not a \u2018person\u2019 subject to suit under \u00a7 1983\u201d); see also Richardson v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. Civ. A. 3:07-0304, 2007 WL 1464582, at *2 (M.D.Tenn. May 15, 2007) (observing that a county sheriffs department could not be sued under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding the county\u2019s non-participation in the lawsuit); Shimer v. Shingobee Island Water & Sewer Comm\u2019n, No. Civ. A. 02-953, 2003 WL 1610788, at *4 (D.Minn. Mar.18, 2003) (\u201c[A]bsent specific statutory authority, ... subordinate [governmental] entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2003 WL 1610788, at *4","parenthetical":"\"[A]bsent specific statutory authority, ... subordinate [governmental] entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.\"","sentence":"See James, 2006 WL 3733024, at *3 n. 2 (advising pro se plaintiff who sued police department without naming municipality as a defendant that \u201c[p]laintiff should be aware that a police department is not a \u2018person\u2019 subject to suit under \u00a7 1983\u201d); see also Richardson v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. Civ. A. 3:07-0304, 2007 WL 1464582, at *2 (M.D.Tenn. May 15, 2007) (observing that a county sheriffs department could not be sued under \u00a7 1983 notwithstanding the county\u2019s non-participation in the lawsuit); Shimer v. Shingobee Island Water & Sewer Comm\u2019n, No. Civ. A. 02-953, 2003 WL 1610788, at *4 (D.Minn. Mar.18, 2003) (\u201c[A]bsent specific statutory authority, ... subordinate [governmental] entities do not have the capacity to sue or be sued.\u201d)."},"case_id":3565027,"label":"a"}
{"context":"While KE.W's beliefs and mental illness certainly give rise to the potential of harm to others, in order to support commitment, the threat of harm must be substantial and based on actual dangerous behavior manifested by some overt act or threats in the past.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"827 S.W.2d 622, 622","parenthetical":"holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of \"potential danger\" to others insufficient to support commitment","sentence":"See J.M., 178 S.W.3d at 196; L.C.F., 96 S.W.3d at 657 (holding that \u201can opinion of a \u2018potential danger\u2019 to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard\u201d); C.O., 65 S.W.3d at 181-82 (holding that \u201c[b]are psychiatric expert opinion of a potential danger to others is insufficient to support a commitment\u201d and there must be facts in record to justify conclusion that appellant was likely to cause serious harm); see also Broussard, 827 S.W.2d at 622 (holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of \u201cpotential danger\u201d to others insufficient to support commitment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"96 S.W.3d 657, 657","parenthetical":"holding that \"an opinion of a 'potential danger' to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard\"","sentence":"See J.M., 178 S.W.3d at 196; L.C.F., 96 S.W.3d at 657 (holding that \u201can opinion of a \u2018potential danger\u2019 to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard\u201d); C.O., 65 S.W.3d at 181-82 (holding that \u201c[b]are psychiatric expert opinion of a potential danger to others is insufficient to support a commitment\u201d and there must be facts in record to justify conclusion that appellant was likely to cause serious harm); see also Broussard, 827 S.W.2d at 622 (holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of \u201cpotential danger\u201d to others insufficient to support commitment)."},"case_id":8164128,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While KE.W's beliefs and mental illness certainly give rise to the potential of harm to others, in order to support commitment, the threat of harm must be substantial and based on actual dangerous behavior manifested by some overt act or threats in the past.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"65 S.W.3d 181, 181-82","parenthetical":"holding that \"[b]are psychiatric expert opinion of a potential danger to others is insufficient to support a commitment\" and there must be facts in record to justify conclusion that appellant was likely to cause serious harm","sentence":"See J.M., 178 S.W.3d at 196; L.C.F., 96 S.W.3d at 657 (holding that \u201can opinion of a \u2018potential danger\u2019 to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard\u201d); C.O., 65 S.W.3d at 181-82 (holding that \u201c[b]are psychiatric expert opinion of a potential danger to others is insufficient to support a commitment\u201d and there must be facts in record to justify conclusion that appellant was likely to cause serious harm); see also Broussard, 827 S.W.2d at 622 (holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of \u201cpotential danger\u201d to others insufficient to support commitment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"827 S.W.2d 622, 622","parenthetical":"holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of \"potential danger\" to others insufficient to support commitment","sentence":"See J.M., 178 S.W.3d at 196; L.C.F., 96 S.W.3d at 657 (holding that \u201can opinion of a \u2018potential danger\u2019 to others is not sufficient to support a commitment under this standard\u201d); C.O., 65 S.W.3d at 181-82 (holding that \u201c[b]are psychiatric expert opinion of a potential danger to others is insufficient to support a commitment\u201d and there must be facts in record to justify conclusion that appellant was likely to cause serious harm); see also Broussard, 827 S.W.2d at 622 (holding that bare psychiatric expert opinion of \u201cpotential danger\u201d to others insufficient to support commitment)."},"case_id":8164128,"label":"a"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"457 U.S. 440, 454","parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 567, 579-80","parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"b"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 567, 579-80","parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534","parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"a"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 567, 579-80","parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"b"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51","parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"457 U.S. 440, 454","parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"a"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534","parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51","parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"b"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51","parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"b"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"457 U.S. 440, 454","parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"a"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534","parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"b"}
{"context":"MSES's system, though inefficient, appears facially to be neutral. The percentages of referred and unreferred applicants equalled the overall racial percentages in the 211 and 311 pool: The same is true for out-of-code referral (which slightly favored black applicants). Of course, facial neutrality at the bottom line cannot immunize an agency or employer from proved acts of discrimination against an individual; but, at the same time, we cannot infer discrimination against an individual from statistics displaying neutrality toward the group.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Proof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\"","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related","sentence":"Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2950-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978) (\u201cProof that [a] work force was racially balanced or that it contained a disproportionately high percentage of minority employees is not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent when that issue is yet to be decided\u201d); cf. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 454, 102 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (Racially balanced promotions at the bottomline did not relieve an employer from the requirement that it show that a written screening test, determining the eligible candidates for promotion and disproportionately disqualifying blacks, was sufficiently job-related)."},"case_id":10539989,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Clayton's initial arguments, which essentially contend that the Form 1040X cannot give rise to legal liability for filing a false tax return, have no merit. We have rejected similar arguments brought under Levy that certain schedules appended to tax returns could not give rise to legal liability for filing a false tax return.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"676 F.2d 1060, 1063-64","parenthetical":"holding that a false Schedule C is an \"integral\" part of a tax return and is incorporated therein by reference, thus giving rise to liability under SS 7206(1","sentence":"United States v. Damon, 676 F.2d 1060, 1063-64 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that a false Schedule C is an \u201cintegral\u201d part of a tax return and is incorporated therein by reference, thus giving rise to liability under \u00a7 7206(1)); United States v. Taylor, 574 F.2d 232, 237 (5th Cir.1978) (same as to Schedules E and F). Also, as we previously discussed, filing a false claim for the refund of taxes may give rise to legal liability for filing a false tax return, and the mere use of the correct legal procedure will not preclude liability."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"405 F.3d 1116, 1116","parenthetical":"stating that the defendant \"cannot disguise his knowing disregard of well-established legal principles and duties as a good faith procedural effort to evade those principles and duties\"","sentence":"See Ambort, 405 F.3d at 1116 (stating that the defendant \u201ccannot disguise his knowing disregard of well-established legal principles and duties as a good faith procedural effort to evade those principles and duties\u201d)."},"case_id":6045911,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the lower court's finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor's lien exceeded the value of the property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"278 F. 749, 750","parenthetical":"describing how the \"petitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\"","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"278 F. 749, 750","parenthetical":"describing how the \"petitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\"","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 N.W. 851, 852-53","parenthetical":"affirming the lower court's finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor's lien exceeded the value of the property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"278 F. 749, 750","parenthetical":"describing how the \"petitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\"","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2012 WL 4900561, at *7","parenthetical":"distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \"two different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\"","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the lower court's finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor's lien exceeded the value of the property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 F.2d 645, 646-47","parenthetical":"discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \"lien\" on the debtors' property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 N.W. 851, 852-53","parenthetical":"affirming the lower court's finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor's lien exceeded the value of the property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 F.2d 645, 646-47","parenthetical":"discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \"lien\" on the debtors' property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 F.2d 645, 646-47","parenthetical":"discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \"lien\" on the debtors' property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2012 WL 4900561, at *7","parenthetical":"distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \"two different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\"","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the lower court's finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor's lien exceeded the value of the property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"30 B.R. 36, 37","parenthetical":"addressing avoidance of an \"execution lien\" on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 N.W. 851, 852-53","parenthetical":"affirming the lower court's finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor's lien exceeded the value of the property","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"30 B.R. 36, 37","parenthetical":"addressing avoidance of an \"execution lien\" on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is a possessory lien attaching to the seized personal property to pay the judgment debt. The conception of the execution levy as a possessory lien is consistent with case law in Michigan which repeatedly refers to the execution by levy as an \"execution lien.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2012 WL 4900561, at *7","parenthetical":"distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \"two different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\"","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"30 B.R. 36, 37","parenthetical":"addressing avoidance of an \"execution lien\" on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper","sentence":"See In re Ann Arbor Mach. Co., 278 F. 749, 750 (E.D.Mich.1922) (describing how the \u201cpetitioner obtained a writ of execution upon said judgment, and said execution was, on the same day, levied by the sheriff ... upon certain personal property belonging to the bankrupt, by seizure thereof under such writ of execution, which then and thereby became a lien on such property\u201d); Williams v. Banana Distrib. Co., 59 F.2d 645, 646-47 (6th Cir.1932) (discussing a series of cases decided by the Michigan Supreme Court involving priority among creditors, and referring to seizing creditors as having a \u201clien\u201d on the debtors\u2019 property); Berry v. Pattison (In re Berry), 30 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr.E.D.Mich. 1983) (addressing avoidance of an \u201cexecution lien\u201d on a camper that arose when a sheriff executed on a judgment and seized the camper); see also Stack v. Olmsted, 127 Mich. 359, 86 N.W. 851, 852-53 (1901) (affirming the lower court\u2019s finding that a sheriff who executed on property had no interest in the seized property because a secured creditor\u2019s lien exceeded the value of the property); Kelly v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 307220, 2012 WL 4900561, at *7 (Mich.Ct.App. Oct. 16, 2012) (distinguishing between execution liens and judgment hens as \u201ctwo different mechanisms by which a judgment creditor can attempt collection on a judgment by going after real property\u201d) (quotation marks and citation omitted)."},"case_id":4196870,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Given the arguments presented to us, we do not decide whether, in some other circumstances, an order to pay restitution may itself be a restraint on liberty sufficient to constitute custody within the meaning of the habeas statutes that would allow relief from the restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"580 F.3d 1136, 1139","parenthetical":"\" '[T]he payment of restitution or a fine, absent more, is not the sort of significant restraint on liberty contemplated in the custody requirement of the federal habeas statutes.' \"","sentence":"But see Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir.2009) (\" '[T]he payment of restitution or a fine, absent more, is not the sort of significant restraint on liberty contemplated in the custody requirement of the federal habeas statutes.\u2019 \u201d); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624-25 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (no custody where petitioner suffered fine and revocation of driver\u2019s license); Spring v. Caldwell, 692 F.2d 994, 996-99 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe hold that an arrest warrant issued for willful refusal to pay a fine does not amount to custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2241 and 2254 in habeas cases challenging the constitutionality of a statute that only imposes a fine.\u201d). We also express no opinion on the availability of other writs, such as a writ of coram nobis, to bring collateral attacks against restitution orders."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"339 F.3d 84, 87","parenthetical":"\"Whether a fine or restitution order could ever be such a restraint on the liberty of a petitioner as to amount to custody is a question we need not reach today ....\"","sentence":"See Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir.2003) (\"Whether a fine or restitution order could ever be such a restraint on the liberty of a petitioner as to amount to custody is a question we need not reach today ....\u201d)"},"case_id":3521141,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Given the arguments presented to us, we do not decide whether, in some other circumstances, an order to pay restitution may itself be a restraint on liberty sufficient to constitute custody within the meaning of the habeas statutes that would allow relief from the restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"434 F.2d 623, 624-25","parenthetical":"no custody where petitioner suffered fine and revocation of driver's license","sentence":"But see Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir.2009) (\" '[T]he payment of restitution or a fine, absent more, is not the sort of significant restraint on liberty contemplated in the custody requirement of the federal habeas statutes.\u2019 \u201d); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624-25 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (no custody where petitioner suffered fine and revocation of driver\u2019s license); Spring v. Caldwell, 692 F.2d 994, 996-99 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe hold that an arrest warrant issued for willful refusal to pay a fine does not amount to custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2241 and 2254 in habeas cases challenging the constitutionality of a statute that only imposes a fine.\u201d). We also express no opinion on the availability of other writs, such as a writ of coram nobis, to bring collateral attacks against restitution orders."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"339 F.3d 84, 87","parenthetical":"\"Whether a fine or restitution order could ever be such a restraint on the liberty of a petitioner as to amount to custody is a question we need not reach today ....\"","sentence":"See Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir.2003) (\"Whether a fine or restitution order could ever be such a restraint on the liberty of a petitioner as to amount to custody is a question we need not reach today ....\u201d)"},"case_id":3521141,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Given the arguments presented to us, we do not decide whether, in some other circumstances, an order to pay restitution may itself be a restraint on liberty sufficient to constitute custody within the meaning of the habeas statutes that would allow relief from the restitution order.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"692 F.2d 994, 996-99","parenthetical":"\"We hold that an arrest warrant issued for willful refusal to pay a fine does not amount to custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. SSSS 2241 and 2254 in habeas cases challenging the constitutionality of a statute that only imposes a fine.\"","sentence":"But see Mays v. Dinwiddie, 580 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir.2009) (\" '[T]he payment of restitution or a fine, absent more, is not the sort of significant restraint on liberty contemplated in the custody requirement of the federal habeas statutes.\u2019 \u201d); Westberry v. Keith, 434 F.2d 623, 624-25 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (no custody where petitioner suffered fine and revocation of driver\u2019s license); Spring v. Caldwell, 692 F.2d 994, 996-99 (5th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe hold that an arrest warrant issued for willful refusal to pay a fine does not amount to custody within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2241 and 2254 in habeas cases challenging the constitutionality of a statute that only imposes a fine.\u201d). We also express no opinion on the availability of other writs, such as a writ of coram nobis, to bring collateral attacks against restitution orders."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"339 F.3d 84, 87","parenthetical":"\"Whether a fine or restitution order could ever be such a restraint on the liberty of a petitioner as to amount to custody is a question we need not reach today ....\"","sentence":"See Kaminski v. United States, 339 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir.2003) (\"Whether a fine or restitution order could ever be such a restraint on the liberty of a petitioner as to amount to custody is a question we need not reach today ....\u201d)"},"case_id":3521141,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Powell, therefore, does not establish any irreconcilable conflict embedded within state case law, much less one that might allow us to disregard Jones and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \"rejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\"","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"referencing \"obvious subterfuge\" as an example of \"extreme circumstances\" that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"case_id":4148279,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Powell, therefore, does not establish any irreconcilable conflict embedded within state case law, much less one that might allow us to disregard Jones and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"referencing \"obvious subterfuge\" as an example of \"extreme circumstances\" that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \"rejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\"","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"case_id":4148279,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Powell, therefore, does not establish any irreconcilable conflict embedded within state case law, much less one that might allow us to disregard Jones and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"referencing \"obvious subterfuge\" as an example of \"extreme circumstances\" that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \"rejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\"","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"case_id":4148279,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Powell, therefore, does not establish any irreconcilable conflict embedded within state case law, much less one that might allow us to disregard Jones and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"referencing \"obvious subterfuge\" as an example of \"extreme circumstances\" that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \"rejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\"","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"case_id":4148279,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Powell, therefore, does not establish any irreconcilable conflict embedded within state case law, much less one that might allow us to disregard Jones and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \"rejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\"","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"referencing \"obvious subterfuge\" as an example of \"extreme circumstances\" that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"case_id":4148279,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Powell, therefore, does not establish any irreconcilable conflict embedded within state case law, much less one that might allow us to disregard Jones and its progeny.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"referencing \"obvious subterfuge\" as an example of \"extreme circumstances\" that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \"rejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\"","sentence":"See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (referencing \u201cobvious subterfuge\u201d as an example of \u201cextreme circumstances\u201d that may warrant setting aside state court exposition of state law); see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 89 n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (in discrediting a subterfuge-type argument, the Supreme Court \u201crejected] the view that anything in the Due Process Clause bars States from making changes in their criminal law that have the effect of making it easier for the prosecution to obtain convictions\u201d)."},"case_id":4148279,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Lesa Morse was handcuffed by Sergeant Cloutier due to concerns about officer safety after she began yelling and did not obey commands to hang up the phone. See Bate-man Narrative Report, Docket No. 136-3, at 2. Again, cases suggest that such a use of force was at least arguably reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"185 F.3d 579, 591-92","parenthetical":"observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"550 U.S. 609, 614","parenthetical":"\"[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\" while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"case_id":4027645,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Lesa Morse was handcuffed by Sergeant Cloutier due to concerns about officer safety after she began yelling and did not obey commands to hang up the phone. See Bate-man Narrative Report, Docket No. 136-3, at 2. Again, cases suggest that such a use of force was at least arguably reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\" while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"185 F.3d 579, 591-92","parenthetical":"observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"case_id":4027645,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Lesa Morse was handcuffed by Sergeant Cloutier due to concerns about officer safety after she began yelling and did not obey commands to hang up the phone. See Bate-man Narrative Report, Docket No. 136-3, at 2. Again, cases suggest that such a use of force was at least arguably reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"185 F.3d 579, 591-92","parenthetical":"observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\" while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"case_id":4027645,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Lesa Morse was handcuffed by Sergeant Cloutier due to concerns about officer safety after she began yelling and did not obey commands to hang up the phone. See Bate-man Narrative Report, Docket No. 136-3, at 2. Again, cases suggest that such a use of force was at least arguably reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"185 F.3d 579, 591-92","parenthetical":"observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"452 U.S. 692, 705","parenthetical":"holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"case_id":4027645,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Lesa Morse was handcuffed by Sergeant Cloutier due to concerns about officer safety after she began yelling and did not obey commands to hang up the phone. See Bate-man Narrative Report, Docket No. 136-3, at 2. Again, cases suggest that such a use of force was at least arguably reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"185 F.3d 579, 591-92","parenthetical":"observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"case_id":4027645,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Lesa Morse was handcuffed by Sergeant Cloutier due to concerns about officer safety after she began yelling and did not obey commands to hang up the phone. See Bate-man Narrative Report, Docket No. 136-3, at 2. Again, cases suggest that such a use of force was at least arguably reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"185 F.3d 579, 591-92","parenthetical":"observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence","sentence":"See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 591-92 (6th Cir.1999) (observing that officers may detain innocent occupants with handcuffs during arrest of criminal suspect in a home where the officers feared for their personal safety); cf. Los Angeles County, California v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 614, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 167 L.Ed.2d 974 (2007) (\u201c[O]fficers may take reasonable action to secure the premises and to ensure their own safety\u201d while executing a search warrant, including holding innocent occupants at gunpoint); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (holding that it is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to detain occupants of a residence while executing a search warrant of the residence)."},"case_id":4027645,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even if Costa Rica had jurisdiction over this matter, Del Monte again would be left with \"no remedy at all\" if Costa Rican courts could not enjoin Dole's activities in the United States and Honduras, where Dole grows its pineapples. In contrast, it is well-established that a United States district court is the proper jurisdiction to \"award relief to an American corporation against acts of trademark infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"344 U.S. 280, 281","parenthetical":"enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant's assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations","sentence":"Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952), 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed. 319 (enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant\u2019s assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations); see also American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass\u2019n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.1983) (holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation\u2019s Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation's Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia","sentence":"Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952), 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed. 319 (enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant\u2019s assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations); see also American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass\u2019n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.1983) (holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation\u2019s Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia)."},"case_id":11114881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even if Costa Rica had jurisdiction over this matter, Del Monte again would be left with \"no remedy at all\" if Costa Rican courts could not enjoin Dole's activities in the United States and Honduras, where Dole grows its pineapples. In contrast, it is well-established that a United States district court is the proper jurisdiction to \"award relief to an American corporation against acts of trademark infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation's Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia","sentence":"Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952), 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed. 319 (enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant\u2019s assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations); see also American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass\u2019n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.1983) (holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation\u2019s Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant's assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations","sentence":"Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952), 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed. 319 (enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant\u2019s assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations); see also American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass\u2019n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.1983) (holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation\u2019s Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia)."},"case_id":11114881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even if Costa Rica had jurisdiction over this matter, Del Monte again would be left with \"no remedy at all\" if Costa Rican courts could not enjoin Dole's activities in the United States and Honduras, where Dole grows its pineapples. In contrast, it is well-established that a United States district court is the proper jurisdiction to \"award relief to an American corporation against acts of trademark infringement and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant's assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations","sentence":"Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952), 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed. 319 (enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant\u2019s assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations); see also American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass\u2019n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.1983) (holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation\u2019s Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation's Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia","sentence":"Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952), 73 S.Ct. 252, 97 L.Ed. 319 (enjoining, under Lanham Act, defendant\u2019s assembly of counterfeit watches in Mexico that were later sold or transferred to United States where parties were American corporations); see also American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass\u2019n, 701 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.1983) (holding denial of foinom non conveniens motion proper where American corporation sought to enjoin another American corporation\u2019s Lan-ham Act violations in Saudi Arabia)."},"case_id":11114881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Regarding her subjective understanding, this Court notes that the threat to strike or even smash Ms. Beal took place in late 2002. Although Ms. Beal testified she began to steal from her teller drawer as early as January 2003, the embezzlement of $47,000.00 did not begin until April 29, 2003, and continued through June 2, 2003. This Court cannot conclude Ms. Beal began stealing money from Union Trust in the spring of 2003 because her husband had physically threatened her once in late 2002.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"139 F.3d 291, 300","parenthetical":"downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"24 F.3d 432, 439","parenthetical":"the relationship between the threats and the crime was \"close enough\" to establish a \"causal nexus\"","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"case_id":1543776,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Regarding her subjective understanding, this Court notes that the threat to strike or even smash Ms. Beal took place in late 2002. Although Ms. Beal testified she began to steal from her teller drawer as early as January 2003, the embezzlement of $47,000.00 did not begin until April 29, 2003, and continued through June 2, 2003. This Court cannot conclude Ms. Beal began stealing money from Union Trust in the spring of 2003 because her husband had physically threatened her once in late 2002.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"24 F.3d 432, 439","parenthetical":"the relationship between the threats and the crime was \"close enough\" to establish a \"causal nexus\"","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"case_id":1543776,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Regarding her subjective understanding, this Court notes that the threat to strike or even smash Ms. Beal took place in late 2002. Although Ms. Beal testified she began to steal from her teller drawer as early as January 2003, the embezzlement of $47,000.00 did not begin until April 29, 2003, and continued through June 2, 2003. This Court cannot conclude Ms. Beal began stealing money from Union Trust in the spring of 2003 because her husband had physically threatened her once in late 2002.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"24 F.3d 432, 439","parenthetical":"the relationship between the threats and the crime was \"close enough\" to establish a \"causal nexus\"","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"case_id":1543776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Regarding her subjective understanding, this Court notes that the threat to strike or even smash Ms. Beal took place in late 2002. Although Ms. Beal testified she began to steal from her teller drawer as early as January 2003, the embezzlement of $47,000.00 did not begin until April 29, 2003, and continued through June 2, 2003. This Court cannot conclude Ms. Beal began stealing money from Union Trust in the spring of 2003 because her husband had physically threatened her once in late 2002.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"24 F.3d 432, 439","parenthetical":"the relationship between the threats and the crime was \"close enough\" to establish a \"causal nexus\"","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"case_id":1543776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Regarding her subjective understanding, this Court notes that the threat to strike or even smash Ms. Beal took place in late 2002. Although Ms. Beal testified she began to steal from her teller drawer as early as January 2003, the embezzlement of $47,000.00 did not begin until April 29, 2003, and continued through June 2, 2003. This Court cannot conclude Ms. Beal began stealing money from Union Trust in the spring of 2003 because her husband had physically threatened her once in late 2002.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"24 F.3d 432, 439","parenthetical":"the relationship between the threats and the crime was \"close enough\" to establish a \"causal nexus\"","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"73 F.3d 444, 448-49","parenthetical":"a \"lingering threat of future harm\" is insufficient for a duress defense","sentence":"See United States v. Anderson, 139 F.3d 291, 300 (1st Cir.1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 866, 119 S.Ct. 158, 142 L.Ed.2d 129 (1998)(downward departure denied because coercive effect of past physical violence was not present during relevant time period); United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448-49 (1st Cir.l996)(a \u201clingering threat of future harm\u201d is insufficient for a duress defense); but see United States v. Amor, 24 F.3d 432, 439 (2d Cir.1994)(the relationship between the threats and the crime was \u201cclose enough\u201d to establish a \u201ccausal nexus\u201d)."},"case_id":1543776,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Given its conclusion that Smith was responsible for over 8.4 kilograms of cocaine base, it is plain that the 2012 district court would have found Smith responsible for a disqualifying amount of cocaine base-- more than 840 grams -- had it expressly followed the 2008 resentencing court. While we must nonetheless review the 2012 district court's drug calculation for clear error, its alleged failure to follow the law of the case is, by itself, harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 U.S. 193, 203","parenthetical":"district court's error is harmless if it \"[does] not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed\"","sentence":"See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (district court\u2019s error is harmless if it \u201c[does] not affect the district court\u2019s selection of the sentence imposed\u201d); cf. United States v. Thompson, 994 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cBecause the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"994 F.2d 864, 868","parenthetical":"\"Because the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (district court\u2019s error is harmless if it \u201c[does] not affect the district court\u2019s selection of the sentence imposed\u201d); cf. United States v. Thompson, 994 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cBecause the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\u201d)."},"case_id":4324084,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Given its conclusion that Smith was responsible for over 8.4 kilograms of cocaine base, it is plain that the 2012 district court would have found Smith responsible for a disqualifying amount of cocaine base-- more than 840 grams -- had it expressly followed the 2008 resentencing court. While we must nonetheless review the 2012 district court's drug calculation for clear error, its alleged failure to follow the law of the case is, by itself, harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"district court's error is harmless if it \"[does] not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed\"","sentence":"See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (district court\u2019s error is harmless if it \u201c[does] not affect the district court\u2019s selection of the sentence imposed\u201d); cf. United States v. Thompson, 994 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cBecause the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"994 F.2d 864, 868","parenthetical":"\"Because the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (district court\u2019s error is harmless if it \u201c[does] not affect the district court\u2019s selection of the sentence imposed\u201d); cf. United States v. Thompson, 994 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cBecause the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\u201d)."},"case_id":4324084,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Given its conclusion that Smith was responsible for over 8.4 kilograms of cocaine base, it is plain that the 2012 district court would have found Smith responsible for a disqualifying amount of cocaine base-- more than 840 grams -- had it expressly followed the 2008 resentencing court. While we must nonetheless review the 2012 district court's drug calculation for clear error, its alleged failure to follow the law of the case is, by itself, harmless.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"994 F.2d 864, 868","parenthetical":"\"Because the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\"","sentence":"See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (district court\u2019s error is harmless if it \u201c[does] not affect the district court\u2019s selection of the sentence imposed\u201d); cf. United States v. Thompson, 994 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cBecause the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"district court's error is harmless if it \"[does] not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed\"","sentence":"See Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992) (district court\u2019s error is harmless if it \u201c[does] not affect the district court\u2019s selection of the sentence imposed\u201d); cf. United States v. Thompson, 994 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C.Cir.1993) (\u201cBecause the judge made it clear he would impose the same sentence under either criminal history category, it would be futile to remand for resentencing and we are not required to do so.\u201d)."},"case_id":4324084,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A district court has \"significant discretionary authority\" to set and enforce deadlines in cases, particularly in light of concerns regarding case or docket management. In analogous circumstances, the First Circuit has held that there should be \"substantial and convincing evidence\" to allow a belated attempt to amend, particularly when a matter has been briefed and is pending before the court.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 F.3d 7, 12","parenthetical":"upholding denial of motion to amend complaint where opposing party had moved for summary judgment","sentence":"Steir v. Girl Scouts of USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.2004) (upholding denial of motion to amend complaint where opposing party had moved for summary judgment); see also Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 231 (1st Cir.2005) (same, where motion to amend was made two years after filing of complaint and after summary judgment motion was fully briefed by both parties)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"412 F.3d 215, 231","parenthetical":"same, where motion to amend was made two years after filing of complaint and after summary judgment motion was fully briefed by both parties","sentence":"Steir v. Girl Scouts of USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir.2004) (upholding denial of motion to amend complaint where opposing party had moved for summary judgment); see also Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 412 F.3d 215, 231 (1st Cir.2005) (same, where motion to amend was made two years after filing of complaint and after summary judgment motion was fully briefed by both parties)."},"case_id":4290338,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"9 Va.App. 477, 477","parenthetical":"the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"389 S.E.2d 182, 182","parenthetical":"the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"9 Va.App. 477, 477","parenthetical":"the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, she also testified she regularly met with angry clients in \"low-class areas\" and was an experienced social worker. Beginning with Hagood, the types of precipitating events that give rise to purely psychological compensable injuries are consistently described as shocking, frightening, traumatic, catastrophic and unexpected.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"389 S.E.2d 182, 182","parenthetical":"the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient","sentence":"See Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (electric flash and noise similar to a shotgun blast deemed sufficient); see also Daniel Const. Co. v. Tolley, 24 Va.App. 70, 480 S.E.2d 145 (1997) (the explosion of 100 pounds of dynamite without warning while the employee was unloading concrete in a mine shaft nearby deemed sufficient); Hercules, Inc. v. Gunther, 13 Va.App. 357, 412 S.E.2d 185 (1991) (an explosion that killed two people and threw the employee in the air deemed sufficient); Dunn, 9 Va.App. at 477, 389 S.E.2d at 182 (the death of a severely burned patient cared for by an EMT deemed insufficient)."},"case_id":356916,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Barrett needed to prove that pepper spray was applied \"maliciously and sadistically to cause harm\" rather than in a \"good-faith effort\" to gain his compliance. The videorecording of the cell extraction confirms that pepper spray was used only because Barrett-who was in need of prompt medical attention after overdosing-refused to leave his cell.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"744 F.2d 1260, 1270","parenthetical":"explaining that mace is appropriately used when \"reasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\"","sentence":"See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir.1984) (explaining that mace is appropriately used when \u201creasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events). And in his own testimony, Barrett backed away from his allegation that he was struck by a \u201cprojectile.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"550 U.S. 372, 378-81","parenthetical":"explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events","sentence":"See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir.1984) (explaining that mace is appropriately used when \u201creasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events). And in his own testimony, Barrett backed away from his allegation that he was struck by a \u201cprojectile.\u201d"},"case_id":4161933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Barrett needed to prove that pepper spray was applied \"maliciously and sadistically to cause harm\" rather than in a \"good-faith effort\" to gain his compliance. The videorecording of the cell extraction confirms that pepper spray was used only because Barrett-who was in need of prompt medical attention after overdosing-refused to leave his cell.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"744 F.2d 1260, 1270","parenthetical":"explaining that mace is appropriately used when \"reasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\"","sentence":"See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir.1984) (explaining that mace is appropriately used when \u201creasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events). And in his own testimony, Barrett backed away from his allegation that he was struck by a \u201cprojectile.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events","sentence":"See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir.1984) (explaining that mace is appropriately used when \u201creasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events). And in his own testimony, Barrett backed away from his allegation that he was struck by a \u201cprojectile.\u201d"},"case_id":4161933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Barrett needed to prove that pepper spray was applied \"maliciously and sadistically to cause harm\" rather than in a \"good-faith effort\" to gain his compliance. The videorecording of the cell extraction confirms that pepper spray was used only because Barrett-who was in need of prompt medical attention after overdosing-refused to leave his cell.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events","sentence":"See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir.1984) (explaining that mace is appropriately used when \u201creasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events). And in his own testimony, Barrett backed away from his allegation that he was struck by a \u201cprojectile.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"744 F.2d 1260, 1270","parenthetical":"explaining that mace is appropriately used when \"reasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\"","sentence":"See Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1270 (7th Cir.1984) (explaining that mace is appropriately used when \u201creasonably necessary to ... subdue recalcitrant prisoners\u201d); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-81, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (explaining that granting judgment for defendant is appropriate where video discredits plaintiffs version of events). And in his own testimony, Barrett backed away from his allegation that he was struck by a \u201cprojectile.\u201d"},"case_id":4161933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have found that class action claims under the TCPA represent the superior remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"109 F.3d 338, 344","parenthetical":"policy at core of class action mechanism is to overcome problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for individuals to bring solo actions to protect their rights","sentence":"See Sadowski, 2008 WL 2224892, at *5 (superiority requirement is satisfied in junk fax cases in consumer actions involving small individual claims because each member s damages too insignificant to provide incentive to pursue claims individually); Blitz, 677 S.E.2d at 10 (small claims courts cannot per se be superior venue for violations of the TCPA because they lack authority to grant injunctions); see also Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (policy at core of class action mechanism is to overcome problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for individuals to bring solo actions to protect their rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2008 WL 2224892, at *5","parenthetical":"superiority requirement is satisfied in junk fax cases in consumer actions involving small individual claims because each member s damages too insignificant to provide incentive to pursue claims individually","sentence":"See Sadowski, 2008 WL 2224892, at *5 (superiority requirement is satisfied in junk fax cases in consumer actions involving small individual claims because each member s damages too insignificant to provide incentive to pursue claims individually); Blitz, 677 S.E.2d at 10 (small claims courts cannot per se be superior venue for violations of the TCPA because they lack authority to grant injunctions); see also Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (policy at core of class action mechanism is to overcome problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for individuals to bring solo actions to protect their rights)."},"case_id":4365138,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other courts have found that class action claims under the TCPA represent the superior remedy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"677 S.E.2d 10, 10","parenthetical":"small claims courts cannot per se be superior venue for violations of the TCPA because they lack authority to grant injunctions","sentence":"See Sadowski, 2008 WL 2224892, at *5 (superiority requirement is satisfied in junk fax cases in consumer actions involving small individual claims because each member s damages too insignificant to provide incentive to pursue claims individually); Blitz, 677 S.E.2d at 10 (small claims courts cannot per se be superior venue for violations of the TCPA because they lack authority to grant injunctions); see also Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (policy at core of class action mechanism is to overcome problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for individuals to bring solo actions to protect their rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"109 F.3d 338, 344","parenthetical":"policy at core of class action mechanism is to overcome problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for individuals to bring solo actions to protect their rights","sentence":"See Sadowski, 2008 WL 2224892, at *5 (superiority requirement is satisfied in junk fax cases in consumer actions involving small individual claims because each member s damages too insignificant to provide incentive to pursue claims individually); Blitz, 677 S.E.2d at 10 (small claims courts cannot per se be superior venue for violations of the TCPA because they lack authority to grant injunctions); see also Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (policy at core of class action mechanism is to overcome problem that small recoveries do not provide incentive for individuals to bring solo actions to protect their rights)."},"case_id":4365138,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Were we to conclude that a nominal damage award in a civil rights action based on a nonpecuniary deprivation represents mere de minimis success, we would rule out fee shifting under section 1988 notwithstanding that the claimant recovers an enforceable judgment on a significant constitutional claim. We find no warrant in Supreme Court caselaw for doing so.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \"actual\" injury","sentence":"See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \u201cabsolute,\u201d and \u201cbecause of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\u201d); see also Stachu-ra, 477 U.S. at 380 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11 (nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \u201cactual\u201d injury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"435 U.S. 266, 266","parenthetical":"procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \"absolute,\" and \"because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\"","sentence":"See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \u201cabsolute,\u201d and \u201cbecause of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\u201d); see also Stachu-ra, 477 U.S. at 380 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11 (nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \u201cactual\u201d injury)."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Were we to conclude that a nominal damage award in a civil rights action based on a nonpecuniary deprivation represents mere de minimis success, we would rule out fee shifting under section 1988 notwithstanding that the claimant recovers an enforceable judgment on a significant constitutional claim. We find no warrant in Supreme Court caselaw for doing so.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"435 U.S. 266, 266","parenthetical":"procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \"absolute,\" and \"because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\"","sentence":"See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \u201cabsolute,\u201d and \u201cbecause of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\u201d); see also Stachu-ra, 477 U.S. at 380 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11 (nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \u201cactual\u201d injury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \"actual\" injury","sentence":"See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \u201cabsolute,\u201d and \u201cbecause of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\u201d); see also Stachu-ra, 477 U.S. at 380 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11 (nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \u201cactual\u201d injury)."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Were we to conclude that a nominal damage award in a civil rights action based on a nonpecuniary deprivation represents mere de minimis success, we would rule out fee shifting under section 1988 notwithstanding that the claimant recovers an enforceable judgment on a significant constitutional claim. We find no warrant in Supreme Court caselaw for doing so.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 1054, 1054","parenthetical":"procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \"absolute,\" and \"because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\"","sentence":"See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \u201cabsolute,\u201d and \u201cbecause of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\u201d); see also Stachu-ra, 477 U.S. at 380 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11 (nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \u201cactual\u201d injury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \"actual\" injury","sentence":"See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \u201cabsolute,\u201d and \u201cbecause of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\u201d); see also Stachu-ra, 477 U.S. at 380 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11 (nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \u201cactual\u201d injury)."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Were we to conclude that a nominal damage award in a civil rights action based on a nonpecuniary deprivation represents mere de minimis success, we would rule out fee shifting under section 1988 notwithstanding that the claimant recovers an enforceable judgment on a significant constitutional claim. We find no warrant in Supreme Court caselaw for doing so.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \"actual\" injury","sentence":"See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \u201cabsolute,\u201d and \u201cbecause of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\u201d); see also Stachu-ra, 477 U.S. at 380 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11 (nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \u201cactual\u201d injury)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 1054, 1054","parenthetical":"procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \"absolute,\" and \"because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\"","sentence":"See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (procedural due process deprivation is actionable without proof of injury because the right to procedural due process is \u201cabsolute,\u201d and \u201cbecause of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed.\u201d); see also Stachu-ra, 477 U.S. at 380 n. 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2544 n. 11 (nominal damage award appropriate to vindicate rights whose infringement causes no \u201cactual\u201d injury)."},"case_id":1871505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 462, 469","parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"505 U.S. 788, 798","parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"case_id":12263766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"505 U.S. 788, 798","parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"case_id":12263766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"505 U.S. 788, 798","parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"case_id":12263766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"505 U.S. 798, 798","parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"505 U.S. 788, 798","parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"case_id":12263766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"505 U.S. 788, 798","parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"case_id":12263766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 462, 469","parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"case_id":12263766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"case_id":12263766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"case_id":12263766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"505 U.S. 798, 798","parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"case_id":12263766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"case_id":12263766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 462, 469","parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"case_id":12263766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"case_id":12263766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"case_id":12263766,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"505 U.S. 798, 798","parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"case_id":12263766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But the submission of the report did not change the legal situation, because the FMCSA maintained dis cretion over whether or not to begin issuing permits to Mexico-domiciled carriers.\" In the few cases in which the United States, Supreme Court has addressed informational reports, it has found that those, informational .reports are not final agency actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment","sentence":"In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), the Supreme, Court held that the Secretary of Commerce\u2019s census-data report (which was submitted to the President , for later use in reapportionment) was not a final agency action, because the Secretary\u2019s., report \u201ccarrie[d] no direct consequences for the reapportionment, [and] it serve[d] more like a tentative recommendation than a final and binding determination.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the Secretary of Defense's base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \" 'carried] no direct consequences' for base closings\" (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767","sentence":"Id.; see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469, 114 S.Ct. 1719, 128 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (finding that the Secretary of Defense\u2019s base-closure recommendation was not a final agency action, because the report \u201c \u2018carried] no direct consequences\u2019 for base closings\u201d (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 798, 112 S.Ct. 2767))."},"case_id":12263766,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But as Srivastava acknowledges it was Bram and not Newman who executed the probable cause affidavit. In addition, Newman's interviewing of Bram is the sort of preliminary pre-prosecution activity that directly relates to the advocate's role and warrants absolute immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor's effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"121 F.3d 251, 257","parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"case_id":662305,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But as Srivastava acknowledges it was Bram and not Newman who executed the probable cause affidavit. In addition, Newman's interviewing of Bram is the sort of preliminary pre-prosecution activity that directly relates to the advocate's role and warrants absolute immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor's effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"808 F.2d 1228, 1238","parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor \"even if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\"","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"case_id":662305,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But as Srivastava acknowledges it was Bram and not Newman who executed the probable cause affidavit. In addition, Newman's interviewing of Bram is the sort of preliminary pre-prosecution activity that directly relates to the advocate's role and warrants absolute immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"121 F.3d 251, 257","parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor's effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"case_id":662305,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But as Srivastava acknowledges it was Bram and not Newman who executed the probable cause affidavit. In addition, Newman's interviewing of Bram is the sort of preliminary pre-prosecution activity that directly relates to the advocate's role and warrants absolute immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor's effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"808 F.2d 1228, 1238","parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor \"even if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\"","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"case_id":662305,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But as Srivastava acknowledges it was Bram and not Newman who executed the probable cause affidavit. In addition, Newman's interviewing of Bram is the sort of preliminary pre-prosecution activity that directly relates to the advocate's role and warrants absolute immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"217 F.3d 476, 476","parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"121 F.3d 251, 257","parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"case_id":662305,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But as Srivastava acknowledges it was Bram and not Newman who executed the probable cause affidavit. In addition, Newman's interviewing of Bram is the sort of preliminary pre-prosecution activity that directly relates to the advocate's role and warrants absolute immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"808 F.2d 1228, 1238","parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor \"even if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\"","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"217 F.3d 476, 476","parenthetical":"absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence","sentence":"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 n.32, 96 S.Ct. 984 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor\u2019s effort to control presentation of witness testimony by delaying police interrogation of that witness on unrelated matter until after testimony); Anderson, 217 F.3d at 476 (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who suggested police hold plaintiff for lineup in order to create more evidence); see also Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir.1997) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor who willfully submitted incomplete and inadequate assessment of case that provided basis for decision to prosecute); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (absolute immunity shields prosecutor \u201ceven if he initiates charges maliciously, unreasonably, without probable cause, or even on the basis of false testimony or evidence.\u201d). We conclude that Newman is absolutely immune from Srivastava\u2019s damages claim."},"case_id":662305,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Using similar reasoning, other courts have concluded that expert opinions addressing ultimate issues are excluded when couched as legal conclusions because such beliefs by expert witnesses \"tend to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness[,]\" and create the danger that jurors may turn to the expert for guidance on applicable law rather than the judge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"846 F.2d 135, 140","parenthetical":"\"The problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\"","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expert opinion that defendant's conduct was \"deadly force\" and \"unjustified\" was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"case_id":5545427,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 17 Using similar reasoning, other courts have concluded that expert opinions addressing ultimate issues are excluded when couched as legal conclusions because such beliefs by expert witnesses \"tend to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness[,]\" and create the danger that jurors may turn to the expert for guidance on applicable law rather than the judge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expert not permitted to use the word \"negligent\" but instead was permitted to opine that defendant's conduct fell below the standard of care","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"846 F.2d 135, 140","parenthetical":"\"The problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\"","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"case_id":5545427,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Using similar reasoning, other courts have concluded that expert opinions addressing ultimate issues are excluded when couched as legal conclusions because such beliefs by expert witnesses \"tend to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness[,]\" and create the danger that jurors may turn to the expert for guidance on applicable law rather than the judge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"846 F.2d 135, 140","parenthetical":"\"The problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\"","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"case_id":5545427,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Using similar reasoning, other courts have concluded that expert opinions addressing ultimate issues are excluded when couched as legal conclusions because such beliefs by expert witnesses \"tend to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness[,]\" and create the danger that jurors may turn to the expert for guidance on applicable law rather than the judge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\"","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expert opinion that defendant's conduct was \"deadly force\" and \"unjustified\" was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"case_id":5545427,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 17 Using similar reasoning, other courts have concluded that expert opinions addressing ultimate issues are excluded when couched as legal conclusions because such beliefs by expert witnesses \"tend to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness[,]\" and create the danger that jurors may turn to the expert for guidance on applicable law rather than the judge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\"","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expert not permitted to use the word \"negligent\" but instead was permitted to opine that defendant's conduct fell below the standard of care","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"case_id":5545427,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 17 Using similar reasoning, other courts have concluded that expert opinions addressing ultimate issues are excluded when couched as legal conclusions because such beliefs by expert witnesses \"tend to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness[,]\" and create the danger that jurors may turn to the expert for guidance on applicable law rather than the judge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness' unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\"","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria","sentence":"Id.; see United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1988) (\u201cThe problem with testimony containing a legal conclusion is in conveying the witness\u2019 unexpressed, and perhaps erroneous, legal standards to the jury.\u201d) (citation omitted), rev\u2019d in part on reh\u2019g on other ground, 856 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1988); see also Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992) (expert opinion that defendant\u2019s conduct was \u201cdeadly force\u201d and \u201cunjustified\u201d was inadmissible because it merely expressed a legal conclusion and told jury what result to reach); Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hospital, 744 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir.1984) (expert not permitted to use the word \u201cnegligent\u201d but instead was permitted to opine that defendant\u2019s conduct fell below the standard of care); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir.1981) (expert testimony regarding lack of adequate warnings for product defect claim was properly excluded because the questions were too broad and not phrased in terms of adequately explored legal criteria)."},"case_id":5545427,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"282 Kan. 201, 211","parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"269 Kan. 633, 642-44","parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to magician creating \" 'big puff of smoke' \" to divert juiy's attention from acceptable argument","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to magician creating \" 'big puff of smoke' \" to divert juiy's attention from acceptable argument","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"282 Kan. 201, 211","parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"256 Kan. 703, 718","parenthetical":"prosecutor's description of defense counsel's argument as \" 'smoke and mirrors' \" not error","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"282 Kan. 201, 211","parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"282 Kan. 201, 211","parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's description of defense counsel's argument as \" 'smoke and mirrors' \" not error","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"282 Kan. 201, 211","parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"269 Kan. 633, 642-44","parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to magician creating \" 'big puff of smoke' \" to divert juiy's attention from acceptable argument","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to magician creating \" 'big puff of smoke' \" to divert juiy's attention from acceptable argument","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"256 Kan. 703, 718","parenthetical":"prosecutor's description of defense counsel's argument as \" 'smoke and mirrors' \" not error","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's description of defense counsel's argument as \" 'smoke and mirrors' \" not error","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"comparing defendant to \"man behind the curtain\" in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"269 Kan. 633, 642-44","parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to magician creating \" 'big puff of smoke' \" to divert juiy's attention from acceptable argument","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to magician creating \" 'big puff of smoke' \" to divert juiy's attention from acceptable argument","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"256 Kan. 703, 718","parenthetical":"prosecutor's description of defense counsel's argument as \" 'smoke and mirrors' \" not error","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Within sensible limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise theatrical.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's description of defense counsel's argument as \" 'smoke and mirrors' \" not error","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper","sentence":"See State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 211, 145 P.3d 1 (2006) (comparing defendant to \u201cman behind the curtain\u201d in The Wizard of Oz did not exceed bounds of legitimate rhetoric when responsive to defense argument questioning thoroughness of police investigation of murder); see also State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 642-44, 8 P.3d 712 (2000) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to magician creating \u201c \u2018big puff of smoke\u2019 \u201d to divert juiy\u2019s attention from acceptable argument); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 718, 887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor\u2019s description of defense counsel\u2019s argument as \u201c \u2018smoke and mirrors\u2019 \u201d not error); but see State v. Greer, No. 89,004, 2003 WL 23018227, at *3-4 (Kan. App. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (prosecutor\u2019s comparison of defendant to Jack Nicholson character in The Shining improper), rev. denied 277 Kan. 926 (2004); accord United States v. Kincannon, 567 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2009) (dicta suggesting comparison of defendant to The Godfather s Michael Corleone \u201cwould be utterly unmoored from the record\u201d); but see State v. Blanks, 479 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa App. 1991) (error for prosecutor to reference Gorillas in the Mist to illustrate point during closing argument; racial overtones, closeness of movie\u2019s plot to circumstances surrounding alleged crime unfairly prejudicial; \u201c[b]y his allusion, the prosecutor brought before the jurors a myriad of other factors not previously present\u201d)."},"case_id":12417267,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(Citation omitted.) Although, \"where the principal thief is unknown, there is no burden on the state of proving that such thief was not the defendant,\" where direct and uncontested evidence identifies the defendant as the original thief, the defendant cannot be convicted of theft by receiving. Id.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"153 Ga. App. 204, 205","parenthetical":"State produced circumstantial evidence from which guilt of either theft by taking or receiving could be inferred","sentence":"Cf. Duke v. State, 153 Ga. App. 204, 205 (264 SE2d 721) (1980) (State produced circumstantial evidence from which guilt of either theft by taking or receiving could be inferred)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"150 Ga. App. 760, 761","parenthetical":"State proved conclusively by direct evidence from an accomplice that defendant committed theft by taking the property","sentence":"S eeDyerv. State, 150 Ga. App. 760, 761 (258 SE2d 620) (1979) (State proved conclusively by direct evidence from an accomplice that defendant committed theft by taking the property), overruled on other grounds, Redding v. State, 192 Ga. App. 325 (384 SE2d 910) (1989)."},"case_id":850870,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(Citation omitted.) Although, \"where the principal thief is unknown, there is no burden on the state of proving that such thief was not the defendant,\" where direct and uncontested evidence identifies the defendant as the original thief, the defendant cannot be convicted of theft by receiving. Id.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"State proved conclusively by direct evidence from an accomplice that defendant committed theft by taking the property","sentence":"S eeDyerv. State, 150 Ga. App. 760, 761 (258 SE2d 620) (1979) (State proved conclusively by direct evidence from an accomplice that defendant committed theft by taking the property), overruled on other grounds, Redding v. State, 192 Ga. App. 325 (384 SE2d 910) (1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"153 Ga. App. 204, 205","parenthetical":"State produced circumstantial evidence from which guilt of either theft by taking or receiving could be inferred","sentence":"Cf. Duke v. State, 153 Ga. App. 204, 205 (264 SE2d 721) (1980) (State produced circumstantial evidence from which guilt of either theft by taking or receiving could be inferred)."},"case_id":850870,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With one exception, plaintiffs' allegations of misrepresentations and omissions in paragraphs 73 and 74 are, in essence, merely conclusory assertions that defendants' statements quoted in paragraphs 18 through 72 of the complaint are false; plaintiffs do little more than assert that the quotations were misrepresentations. Vague and conclusory allegations that the defendant's representations were not true, however, are insufficient for 9(b) purposes.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"717 F.2d 96, 98","parenthetical":"assertion of inadequate loan loss reserves deficient where complaint is silent about the method of estimating reserves or the manner in which that method departed from reasonable accounting practices","sentence":"See Akerman, 751 F.Supp. at 13 (plaintiff must offer more than simple allegations that each quoted passage was a misrepresentation or omission of material fact); Loan, 717 F.Supp. at 967; Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469-70 (2d Cir.1978); Abrahamson, No. 86-1677; cf. Christidis v. First Pennsylvania Mortgage Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir.1983) (assertion of inadequate loan loss reserves deficient where complaint is silent about the method of estimating reserves or the manner in which that method departed from reasonable accounting practices)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"751 F.Supp. 13, 13","parenthetical":"plaintiff must offer more than simple allegations that each quoted passage was a misrepresentation or omission of material fact","sentence":"See Akerman, 751 F.Supp. at 13 (plaintiff must offer more than simple allegations that each quoted passage was a misrepresentation or omission of material fact); Loan, 717 F.Supp. at 967; Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 469-70 (2d Cir.1978); Abrahamson, No. 86-1677; cf. Christidis v. First Pennsylvania Mortgage Trust, 717 F.2d 96, 98 (3d Cir.1983) (assertion of inadequate loan loss reserves deficient where complaint is silent about the method of estimating reserves or the manner in which that method departed from reasonable accounting practices)."},"case_id":5874421,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There are three requirements for finding a violation of the First Amendment. The speech at issue must be protected speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"'[T]he freedom of speech' referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment","sentence":"See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) (defamation under certain circumstances is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942) (\u201cfighting words\u201d are not protected by the First Amendment); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, -382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992) (\u201c\u2018[T]he freedom of speech\u2019 referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.\u201d); United States v. Alvarez, \u2014 U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012) (plurality opinion)."},"case_id":4182364,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the trial court correctly determined that the judgments were fully satisfied without payment of such interest. Indeed, the generally accepted rule is that interest ceases to accrue on funds deposited by a stakeholder in an interpleader action during the time the funds are on deposit with the court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statute allowing judgment creditors to receive interest does not apply to a judgment determining the right to funds interpled into court","sentence":"See Canal Insurance Co. v. Pizer, 183 Ariz. 162, 901 P.2d 1192 (1995)(pre-judgment interest); Williams v. Gilmore, 51 Cal.App.2d 684, 125 P.2d 539 (1942)(post-judgment interest); An-not., Allowance of Interest on Interpleaded or Impleaded Disputed Funds, 15 A.L.R.2d 473 (1951)(noting general view that stakeholder \u201cis not chargeable with interest after the deposit of [disputed] funds into the court\u201d); see also Ritter v. Wysowatcky, 32 Colo.App. 410, 514 P.2d 333 (1973)(statute allowing judgment creditors to receive interest do\u00e9s not apply to a judgment determining the right to funds interpled into court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting general view that stakeholder \"is not chargeable with interest after the deposit of [disputed] funds into the court\"","sentence":"See Canal Insurance Co. v. Pizer, 183 Ariz. 162, 901 P.2d 1192 (1995)(pre-judgment interest); Williams v. Gilmore, 51 Cal.App.2d 684, 125 P.2d 539 (1942)(post-judgment interest); An-not., Allowance of Interest on Interpleaded or Impleaded Disputed Funds, 15 A.L.R.2d 473 (1951)(noting general view that stakeholder \u201cis not chargeable with interest after the deposit of [disputed] funds into the court\u201d); see also Ritter v. Wysowatcky, 32 Colo.App. 410, 514 P.2d 333 (1973)(statute allowing judgment creditors to receive interest do\u00e9s not apply to a judgment determining the right to funds interpled into court)."},"case_id":11564306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, the trial court correctly determined that the judgments were fully satisfied without payment of such interest. Indeed, the generally accepted rule is that interest ceases to accrue on funds deposited by a stakeholder in an interpleader action during the time the funds are on deposit with the court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statute allowing judgment creditors to receive interest does not apply to a judgment determining the right to funds interpled into court","sentence":"See Canal Insurance Co. v. Pizer, 183 Ariz. 162, 901 P.2d 1192 (1995)(pre-judgment interest); Williams v. Gilmore, 51 Cal.App.2d 684, 125 P.2d 539 (1942)(post-judgment interest); An-not., Allowance of Interest on Interpleaded or Impleaded Disputed Funds, 15 A.L.R.2d 473 (1951)(noting general view that stakeholder \u201cis not chargeable with interest after the deposit of [disputed] funds into the court\u201d); see also Ritter v. Wysowatcky, 32 Colo.App. 410, 514 P.2d 333 (1973)(statute allowing judgment creditors to receive interest do\u00e9s not apply to a judgment determining the right to funds interpled into court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting general view that stakeholder \"is not chargeable with interest after the deposit of [disputed] funds into the court\"","sentence":"See Canal Insurance Co. v. Pizer, 183 Ariz. 162, 901 P.2d 1192 (1995)(pre-judgment interest); Williams v. Gilmore, 51 Cal.App.2d 684, 125 P.2d 539 (1942)(post-judgment interest); An-not., Allowance of Interest on Interpleaded or Impleaded Disputed Funds, 15 A.L.R.2d 473 (1951)(noting general view that stakeholder \u201cis not chargeable with interest after the deposit of [disputed] funds into the court\u201d); see also Ritter v. Wysowatcky, 32 Colo.App. 410, 514 P.2d 333 (1973)(statute allowing judgment creditors to receive interest do\u00e9s not apply to a judgment determining the right to funds interpled into court)."},"case_id":11564306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"458 So.2d 850, 851","parenthetical":"\"Because Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"case_id":7490900,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 So.2d 478, 480","parenthetical":"plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \"bound by his contract\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"case_id":7490900,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"458 So.2d 850, 851","parenthetical":"\"Because Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"case_id":7490900,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 So.2d 478, 480","parenthetical":"plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \"bound by his contract\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"case_id":7490900,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"411 So.2d 297, 298-99","parenthetical":"defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \"waived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"458 So.2d 850, 851","parenthetical":"\"Because Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"case_id":7490900,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"411 So.2d 297, 298-99","parenthetical":"defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \"waived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 So.2d 478, 480","parenthetical":"plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \"bound by his contract\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"case_id":7490900,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \"waived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"458 So.2d 850, 851","parenthetical":"\"Because Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"case_id":7490900,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In many other contexts as well, this court and others have upheld otherwise arguably defective sentences when they have been voluntarily accepted by the defendant as part of a mutually advantageous agreement with the state.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \"waived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 So.2d 478, 480","parenthetical":"plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \"bound by his contract\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 522 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (denial of motion to correct allegedly illegal sentences affirmed as part of negotiated plea), review denied, 531 So.2d 1353 (Fla.1988); Preston v. State, 411 So.2d 297, 298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (defendant who should have been sentenced as a youthful offender but was placed on probation \u201cwaived his right to question the legality of a probation which he has enjoyed and violated\u201d), petition for review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1982); Smith v. State, 345 So.2d 1080, 1082 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (sixteen-year-old defendant estopped from challenging probation after violation when she had given a false age and was sentenced as an adult; \u201c[s]he accepted the benefits of probation and had one of the counts against her dropped as part of the plea negotiations\u201d), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 678 (Fla.1977); see also Johnson v. State, 458 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (\u201cBecause Johnson was bound by her contract, we affirm the sentence.\u201d); Bell v. State, 453 So.2d 478, 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (plea bargains are encouraged and defendant \u201cbound by his contract\u201d)."},"case_id":7490900,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This circuit has awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 in a number of marine insurance contract disputes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"855 F.2d 819, 819-20","parenthetical":"awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract","sentence":"See Windward Traders, 855 F.2d at 819-20 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); Steel-met, 842 F.2d at 1245 (same); Stuyvesant, 286 F.2d at 604 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 625.08 (now codified as \u00a7 627.428) where a vessel charterer prevailed against the vessel owner\u2019s insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); see also Blasser Bros., 628 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute\u2019s procedures); American E. Dev\u2019t Corp. v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 608 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.1979) (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"628 F.2d 386, 386","parenthetical":"rejecting an attorney's fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute's procedures","sentence":"See Windward Traders, 855 F.2d at 819-20 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); Steel-met, 842 F.2d at 1245 (same); Stuyvesant, 286 F.2d at 604 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 625.08 (now codified as \u00a7 627.428) where a vessel charterer prevailed against the vessel owner\u2019s insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); see also Blasser Bros., 628 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute\u2019s procedures); American E. Dev\u2019t Corp. v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 608 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.1979) (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case)."},"case_id":11244245,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This circuit has awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 in a number of marine insurance contract disputes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"608 F.2d 123, 125-26","parenthetical":"rejecting an attorney's fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case","sentence":"See Windward Traders, 855 F.2d at 819-20 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); Steel-met, 842 F.2d at 1245 (same); Stuyvesant, 286 F.2d at 604 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 625.08 (now codified as \u00a7 627.428) where a vessel charterer prevailed against the vessel owner\u2019s insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); see also Blasser Bros., 628 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute\u2019s procedures); American E. Dev\u2019t Corp. v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 608 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.1979) (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"855 F.2d 819, 819-20","parenthetical":"awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract","sentence":"See Windward Traders, 855 F.2d at 819-20 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); Steel-met, 842 F.2d at 1245 (same); Stuyvesant, 286 F.2d at 604 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 625.08 (now codified as \u00a7 627.428) where a vessel charterer prevailed against the vessel owner\u2019s insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); see also Blasser Bros., 628 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute\u2019s procedures); American E. Dev\u2019t Corp. v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 608 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.1979) (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case)."},"case_id":11244245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This circuit has awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 in a number of marine insurance contract disputes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"628 F.2d 386, 386","parenthetical":"rejecting an attorney's fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute's procedures","sentence":"See Windward Traders, 855 F.2d at 819-20 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); Steel-met, 842 F.2d at 1245 (same); Stuyvesant, 286 F.2d at 604 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 625.08 (now codified as \u00a7 627.428) where a vessel charterer prevailed against the vessel owner\u2019s insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); see also Blasser Bros., 628 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute\u2019s procedures); American E. Dev\u2019t Corp. v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 608 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.1979) (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"286 F.2d 604, 604","parenthetical":"awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 625.08 (now codified as SS 627.428","sentence":"See Windward Traders, 855 F.2d at 819-20 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); Steel-met, 842 F.2d at 1245 (same); Stuyvesant, 286 F.2d at 604 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 625.08 (now codified as \u00a7 627.428) where a vessel charterer prevailed against the vessel owner\u2019s insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); see also Blasser Bros., 628 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute\u2019s procedures); American E. Dev\u2019t Corp. v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 608 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.1979) (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case)."},"case_id":11244245,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This circuit has awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 in a number of marine insurance contract disputes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"286 F.2d 604, 604","parenthetical":"awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 625.08 (now codified as SS 627.428","sentence":"See Windward Traders, 855 F.2d at 819-20 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); Steel-met, 842 F.2d at 1245 (same); Stuyvesant, 286 F.2d at 604 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 625.08 (now codified as \u00a7 627.428) where a vessel charterer prevailed against the vessel owner\u2019s insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); see also Blasser Bros., 628 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute\u2019s procedures); American E. Dev\u2019t Corp. v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 608 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.1979) (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"608 F.2d 123, 125-26","parenthetical":"rejecting an attorney's fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. SS 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case","sentence":"See Windward Traders, 855 F.2d at 819-20 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where a vessel owner prevailed against his insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); Steel-met, 842 F.2d at 1245 (same); Stuyvesant, 286 F.2d at 604 (awarding attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 625.08 (now codified as \u00a7 627.428) where a vessel charterer prevailed against the vessel owner\u2019s insurers to recover under a marine insurance contract); see also Blasser Bros., 628 F.2d at 386 (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 where the vessel owner failed to follow the statute\u2019s procedures); American E. Dev\u2019t Corp. v. Everglades Marina, Inc., 608 F.2d 123, 125-26 (5th Cir.1979) (rejecting an attorney\u2019s fees award pursuant to Fla. Stat. \u00a7 627.428 because the statute did not permit an award of fees when an injured third party beneficiary brought the case)."},"case_id":11244245,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 812, 812-13","parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"532 U.S. 769, 772","parenthetical":"so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 812, 812-13","parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 812, 812-13","parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"277 F.3d 558, 565","parenthetical":"even if stop is pretext for search, officer's subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 812, 812-13","parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"171 F.3d 721, 724-25","parenthetical":"officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 812, 812-13","parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 812, 812-13","parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 812, 812-13","parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"517 U.S. 812, 812-13","parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"532 U.S. 769, 772","parenthetical":"so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"277 F.3d 558, 565","parenthetical":"even if stop is pretext for search, officer's subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"171 F.3d 721, 724-25","parenthetical":"officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"a"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"b"}
{"context":". The government relies on Whren for the proposition that so long as there is probable cause to arrest, it does not matter what the officer's true motivation is.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance","sentence":"See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (ulterior, even pretextual motives do not invalidate stop of vehicle and arrest for traffic offense based on probable cause to believe violation of law has occurred); see also Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (so long as arrest is supported by probable cause Fourth Amendment not violated even if officer had pretextual subjective motive for stopping driver for speeding); United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d 558, 565 (D.C.Cir.2002) (even if stop is pretext for search, officer\u2019s subjective intent is irrelevant so long as there was probable cause to believe driver had committed traffic violation); United States v. Dhinsa, 171 F.3d 721, 724-25 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 897, 122 S.Ct. 219, 151 L.Ed.2d 156 (2001) (officer's use of traffic violation as pretext to stop car in order to obtain evidence of more serious crime is of no constitutional significance)."},"case_id":9111991,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Since Kalina, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity when they swear to facts underlying a charging document. \"[I]n personally attesting, '[the prosecutor in Kalina] performed an act that any competent witness might have performed,' and was thus not entitled to absolute immunity.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"175 F.3d 760, 760","parenthetical":"where prosecutor signs and submits affidavit in support of arrest warrant, he acts as a witness, \"[ljike the prosecutor in Kalina,\" and is not entitled to absolute immunity","sentence":"Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-30, 118 S.Ct. 502); see id. (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 131, 118 S.Ct. 502) (\u201c[T]he only function that [the prosecutor] performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness.\u201d); Morley, 175 F.3d at 760 (where prosecutor signs and submits affidavit in support of arrest warrant, he acts as a witness, \u201c[ljike the prosecutor in Kalina,\u201d and is not entitled to absolute immunity); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (like complaining witness, police officer swearing to affidavit in support of warrant not afforded absolute immunity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"475 U.S. 340, 340-41","parenthetical":"like complaining witness, police officer swearing to affidavit in support of warrant not afforded absolute immunity","sentence":"Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-30, 118 S.Ct. 502); see id. (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 131, 118 S.Ct. 502) (\u201c[T]he only function that [the prosecutor] performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness.\u201d); Morley, 175 F.3d at 760 (where prosecutor signs and submits affidavit in support of arrest warrant, he acts as a witness, \u201c[ljike the prosecutor in Kalina,\u201d and is not entitled to absolute immunity); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (like complaining witness, police officer swearing to affidavit in support of warrant not afforded absolute immunity)."},"case_id":3469161,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Since Kalina, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that prosecutors are not entitled to absolute immunity when they swear to facts underlying a charging document. \"[I]n personally attesting, '[the prosecutor in Kalina] performed an act that any competent witness might have performed,' and was thus not entitled to absolute immunity.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"like complaining witness, police officer swearing to affidavit in support of warrant not afforded absolute immunity","sentence":"Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-30, 118 S.Ct. 502); see id. (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 131, 118 S.Ct. 502) (\u201c[T]he only function that [the prosecutor] performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness.\u201d); Morley, 175 F.3d at 760 (where prosecutor signs and submits affidavit in support of arrest warrant, he acts as a witness, \u201c[ljike the prosecutor in Kalina,\u201d and is not entitled to absolute immunity); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (like complaining witness, police officer swearing to affidavit in support of warrant not afforded absolute immunity)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"175 F.3d 760, 760","parenthetical":"where prosecutor signs and submits affidavit in support of arrest warrant, he acts as a witness, \"[ljike the prosecutor in Kalina,\" and is not entitled to absolute immunity","sentence":"Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-30, 118 S.Ct. 502); see id. (quoting Kalina, 522 U.S. at 131, 118 S.Ct. 502) (\u201c[T]he only function that [the prosecutor] performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness.\u201d); Morley, 175 F.3d at 760 (where prosecutor signs and submits affidavit in support of arrest warrant, he acts as a witness, \u201c[ljike the prosecutor in Kalina,\u201d and is not entitled to absolute immunity); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (like complaining witness, police officer swearing to affidavit in support of warrant not afforded absolute immunity)."},"case_id":3469161,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"330 U.S. 395, 401","parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"481 U.S. 429, 434","parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"330 U.S. 395, 401","parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845","parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"330 U.S. 395, 401","parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"67 S.Ct. 775, 779","parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"481 U.S. 429, 434","parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845","parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"67 S.Ct. 775, 779","parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"67 S.Ct. 775, 779","parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"481 U.S. 429, 434","parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845","parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Norris-LaGuardia Act achieved protection of these rights by divesting federal courts of the equitable power to issue injunctions or temporary restraining orders except in those situations specifically enumerated in SS 4 of the Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \"limitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\"","sentence":"See 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 104 (1992); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. United States Bay Counties Dist. Council of Carpenters of United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 330 U.S. 395, 401, 67 S.Ct. 775, 779, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947) (The NorrisLaGuardia Act places a \u201climitation upon the jurisdiction and authority of courts of the United States in labor disputes\u201d); see also Burlington N. R.R. v. Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 434, 107 S.Ct. 1841, 1845, 95 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) (\u201cIn the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress divested federal courts of the power to enjoin secondary picketing in railway labor disputes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3893843,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For essentially the reasons provided by the District Court, we affirm the dismissal of McKeon's claims alleging malicious prosecution and false arrest against Daley in his individual capacity, her claims against Daley in his official capacity, and her claims against the County of Herkimer. Even presuming that Daley gave Ahern the expired subpoena, we agree with the District Court's conclusion that McKeon failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Daley's alleged violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. As the District Court indicated, McKeon recognized the subpoena was \"expired\" be fore she agreed to accompany Ahern; she consulted with her attorney before agreeing to accompany Ahern to Daley's office; and she received the benefit of her attorney's presence and advice at Daley's office.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"916 F.2d 814, 819","parenthetical":"listing factors to determine whether a reasonable person, in light of all the circumstances, would feel that he was not free to leave","sentence":"See United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 819 (2d Cir.1990) (listing factors to determine whether a reasonable person, in light of all the circumstances, would feel that he was not free to leave); cf. United States v. Waksal, 709 F.2d 653, 660 (11th Cir.1983) (finding violation of Fourth Amendment rights when officers retained suspect\u2019s airline ticket and driver\u2019s license and gave no indication that suspect was free to leave, to refuse consent to a search, or to contact an attorney)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"709 F.2d 653, 660","parenthetical":"finding violation of Fourth Amendment rights when officers retained suspect's airline ticket and driver's license and gave no indication that suspect was free to leave, to refuse consent to a search, or to contact an attorney","sentence":"See United States v. Lee, 916 F.2d 814, 819 (2d Cir.1990) (listing factors to determine whether a reasonable person, in light of all the circumstances, would feel that he was not free to leave); cf. United States v. Waksal, 709 F.2d 653, 660 (11th Cir.1983) (finding violation of Fourth Amendment rights when officers retained suspect\u2019s airline ticket and driver\u2019s license and gave no indication that suspect was free to leave, to refuse consent to a search, or to contact an attorney)."},"case_id":147827,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Barksdale and Lozano, for example, fall in this category. But reliance on state law duties seems inappropriate, as we observed in Baskin and as indicated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"489 U.S. 189, 189","parenthetical":"\"A State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not 'all common-law duties owed by government actors were ... constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.' \"","sentence":"See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189, 109 S.Ct. at 998 (\u201cA State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not \u2018all common-law duties owed by government actors were ... constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u2019 \u201d); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334, 106 S.Ct. 662, 667, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (\u201cJailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law ... but ... we reject the contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept.\u201d); Davis v. Scherer (rejecting breach of state law duties as a basis to deny qualified immunity under section 1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\"","sentence":"See also Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 n. 8 (5th Cir.1987) (\u201c... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\u201d)."},"case_id":1527625,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Barksdale and Lozano, for example, fall in this category. But reliance on state law duties seems inappropriate, as we observed in Baskin and as indicated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\"","sentence":"See also Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 n. 8 (5th Cir.1987) (\u201c... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"109 S.Ct. 998, 998","parenthetical":"\"A State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not 'all common-law duties owed by government actors were ... constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.' \"","sentence":"See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189, 109 S.Ct. at 998 (\u201cA State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not \u2018all common-law duties owed by government actors were ... constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u2019 \u201d); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334, 106 S.Ct. 662, 667, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (\u201cJailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law ... but ... we reject the contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept.\u201d); Davis v. Scherer (rejecting breach of state law duties as a basis to deny qualified immunity under section 1983)."},"case_id":1527625,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Barksdale and Lozano, for example, fall in this category. But reliance on state law duties seems inappropriate, as we observed in Baskin and as indicated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"474 U.S. 327, 334","parenthetical":"\"Jailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law ... but ... we reject the contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept.\"","sentence":"See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189, 109 S.Ct. at 998 (\u201cA State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not \u2018all common-law duties owed by government actors were ... constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u2019 \u201d); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334, 106 S.Ct. 662, 667, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (\u201cJailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law ... but ... we reject the contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept.\u201d); Davis v. Scherer (rejecting breach of state law duties as a basis to deny qualified immunity under section 1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\"","sentence":"See also Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 n. 8 (5th Cir.1987) (\u201c... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\u201d)."},"case_id":1527625,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Barksdale and Lozano, for example, fall in this category. But reliance on state law duties seems inappropriate, as we observed in Baskin and as indicated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\"","sentence":"See also Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 n. 8 (5th Cir.1987) (\u201c... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"106 S.Ct. 662, 667","parenthetical":"\"Jailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law ... but ... we reject the contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept.\"","sentence":"See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189, 109 S.Ct. at 998 (\u201cA State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not \u2018all common-law duties owed by government actors were ... constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u2019 \u201d); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334, 106 S.Ct. 662, 667, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (\u201cJailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law ... but ... we reject the contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept.\u201d); Davis v. Scherer (rejecting breach of state law duties as a basis to deny qualified immunity under section 1983)."},"case_id":1527625,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Barksdale and Lozano, for example, fall in this category. But reliance on state law duties seems inappropriate, as we observed in Baskin and as indicated by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\"","sentence":"See also Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 n. 8 (5th Cir.1987) (\u201c... recent Supreme Court decisions call into question the proposition that a breach of duties imposed by state law can form the basis of an action under section 1983\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Jailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law ... but ... we reject the contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept.\"","sentence":"See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189, 109 S.Ct. at 998 (\u201cA State may, through its courts and legislatures, impose such affirmative duties of care and protection upon its agents as it wishes. But not \u2018all common-law duties owed by government actors were ... constitutionalized by the Fourteenth Amendment.\u2019 \u201d); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334, 106 S.Ct. 662, 667, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (\u201cJailers may owe a special duty of care to those in their custody under state tort law ... but ... we reject the contention that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces such a tort law concept.\u201d); Davis v. Scherer (rejecting breach of state law duties as a basis to deny qualified immunity under section 1983)."},"case_id":1527625,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Union members are considered to be in privity with their union for purposes of res judicata. See Adams v. Pension Ben.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Courts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\"","sentence":"Guar. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 n. 8 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201cCourts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\u201d); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the arbitration\u2019s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\u201d); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (\u201c[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.\u201d (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep\u2019t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that union members\u2019 \u201cinterests [are] adequately represented\u201d by the union); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1268 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cFederal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"214 F.3d 275, 285-86","parenthetical":"recognizing that union members' \"interests [are] adequately represented\" by the union","sentence":"Guar. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 n. 8 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201cCourts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\u201d); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the arbitration\u2019s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\u201d); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (\u201c[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.\u201d (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep\u2019t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that union members\u2019 \u201cinterests [are] adequately represented\u201d by the union); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1268 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cFederal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\u201d)."},"case_id":4226327,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Union members are considered to be in privity with their union for purposes of res judicata. See Adams v. Pension Ben.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"908 F.2d 1262, 1268","parenthetical":"\"Federal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\"","sentence":"Guar. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 n. 8 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201cCourts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\u201d); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the arbitration\u2019s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\u201d); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (\u201c[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.\u201d (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep\u2019t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that union members\u2019 \u201cinterests [are] adequately represented\u201d by the union); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1268 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cFederal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Courts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\"","sentence":"Guar. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 n. 8 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201cCourts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\u201d); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the arbitration\u2019s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\u201d); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (\u201c[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.\u201d (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep\u2019t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that union members\u2019 \u201cinterests [are] adequately represented\u201d by the union); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1268 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cFederal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\u201d)."},"case_id":4226327,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Union members are considered to be in privity with their union for purposes of res judicata. See Adams v. Pension Ben.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Plaintiff's contention that the arbitration's findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\"","sentence":"Guar. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 n. 8 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201cCourts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\u201d); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the arbitration\u2019s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\u201d); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (\u201c[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.\u201d (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep\u2019t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that union members\u2019 \u201cinterests [are] adequately represented\u201d by the union); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1268 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cFederal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"214 F.3d 275, 285-86","parenthetical":"recognizing that union members' \"interests [are] adequately represented\" by the union","sentence":"Guar. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 n. 8 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201cCourts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\u201d); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the arbitration\u2019s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\u201d); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (\u201c[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.\u201d (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep\u2019t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that union members\u2019 \u201cinterests [are] adequately represented\u201d by the union); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1268 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cFederal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\u201d)."},"case_id":4226327,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Union members are considered to be in privity with their union for purposes of res judicata. See Adams v. Pension Ben.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Plaintiff's contention that the arbitration's findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\"","sentence":"Guar. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 n. 8 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201cCourts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\u201d); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the arbitration\u2019s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\u201d); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (\u201c[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.\u201d (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep\u2019t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that union members\u2019 \u201cinterests [are] adequately represented\u201d by the union); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1268 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cFederal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"908 F.2d 1262, 1268","parenthetical":"\"Federal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\"","sentence":"Guar. Corp., 332 F.Supp.2d 231, 239 n. 8 (D.D.C.2004) (\u201cCourts have recognized that unions are in privity with their membership for the purposes of res judicata.\u201d); Heade v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 09-02460, 2010 WL 938462, at *2 n. 2 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2010) (\u201cPlaintiff\u2019s contention that the arbitration\u2019s findings do not bar her claim because she was not a party to that proceeding is also without merit .... [since] she was in privity with her union.\u201d); see also Hitchens v. County of Montgomery, 98 Fed.Appx. 106, 114 (3d Cir.2004) (\u201c[C]ourts have held union members to be in privity with the union and have held-that a decision against a union can bind union members in a subsequent action.\u201d (citing Handley v. Phillips, 715 F.Supp. 657, 666-67 (M.D.Pa.1989); Stokes v. Bd. of Tr. of Temple Univ., 683 F.Supp. 498, 502 (E.D.Pa.1988)); Monahan v. Dep\u2019t. of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 285-86 (2d Cir.2000) (recognizing that union members\u2019 \u201cinterests [are] adequately represented\u201d by the union); Meza v. Gen. Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262, 1268 (5th Cir.1990) (\u201cFederal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions ... can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union____\u201d)."},"case_id":4226327,"label":"a"}
{"context":"If the cireumstances warrant, however, a court will stay its case pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"89 F.R.D. 158, 158","parenthetical":"federal district court declined to stay proceedings despite the pendency of a state court action in the same case because it was not clear whether the state court would have jurisdiction over the case","sentence":"But see Adolph Coors, 89 F.R.D. at 158 (federal district court declined to stay proceedings despite the pendency of a state court action in the same case because it was not clear whether the state court would have jurisdiction over the case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"593 F.2d 857, 864","parenthetical":"trial court had authority to stay adjudication of employment claims pending arbitration of contract claims which would be of valuable assistance to the court","sentence":"Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Calif, 593 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir.1979) (trial court had authority to stay adjudication of employment claims pending arbitration of contract claims which would be of valuable assistance to the court); Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 44 Misc.2d 872, 255 N.Y.S2d 361, 364-66 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1964) (state trial court had authority to stay proceedings until determination of two pending federal court actions on related issues)."},"case_id":9169330,"label":"b"}
{"context":"If the cireumstances warrant, however, a court will stay its case pending resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"89 F.R.D. 158, 158","parenthetical":"federal district court declined to stay proceedings despite the pendency of a state court action in the same case because it was not clear whether the state court would have jurisdiction over the case","sentence":"But see Adolph Coors, 89 F.R.D. at 158 (federal district court declined to stay proceedings despite the pendency of a state court action in the same case because it was not clear whether the state court would have jurisdiction over the case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"state trial court had authority to stay proceedings until determination of two pending federal court actions on related issues","sentence":"Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Calif, 593 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir.1979) (trial court had authority to stay adjudication of employment claims pending arbitration of contract claims which would be of valuable assistance to the court); Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lloyd's Underwriters, 44 Misc.2d 872, 255 N.Y.S2d 361, 364-66 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1964) (state trial court had authority to stay proceedings until determination of two pending federal court actions on related issues)."},"case_id":9169330,"label":"b"}
{"context":"And, we cannot say that the trial court's assessment of the probative value of the conviction for impeachment purposes was so off the mark as to have rendered defendant's trial unfair. Although the dissent viewed the conviction as only \"theoretically\" speaking to credibility, it is at least as probative of credibility as prior convictions used in numerous other proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97","parenthetical":"affirming State's use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \"clearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 147, 147","parenthetical":"noting the \"widespread belief that conviction for crime has 'probative value' with respect to the credibility of a witness\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"case_id":4082526,"label":"a"}
{"context":"And, we cannot say that the trial court's assessment of the probative value of the conviction for impeachment purposes was so off the mark as to have rendered defendant's trial unfair. Although the dissent viewed the conviction as only \"theoretically\" speaking to credibility, it is at least as probative of credibility as prior convictions used in numerous other proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"widespread belief that conviction for crime has 'probative value' with respect to the credibility of a witness\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97","parenthetical":"affirming State's use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \"clearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"case_id":4082526,"label":"b"}
{"context":"And, we cannot say that the trial court's assessment of the probative value of the conviction for impeachment purposes was so off the mark as to have rendered defendant's trial unfair. Although the dissent viewed the conviction as only \"theoretically\" speaking to credibility, it is at least as probative of credibility as prior convictions used in numerous other proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming State's use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \"clearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 147, 147","parenthetical":"noting the \"widespread belief that conviction for crime has 'probative value' with respect to the credibility of a witness\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"case_id":4082526,"label":"a"}
{"context":"And, we cannot say that the trial court's assessment of the probative value of the conviction for impeachment purposes was so off the mark as to have rendered defendant's trial unfair. Although the dissent viewed the conviction as only \"theoretically\" speaking to credibility, it is at least as probative of credibility as prior convictions used in numerous other proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming State's use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \"clearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"widespread belief that conviction for crime has 'probative value' with respect to the credibility of a witness\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"case_id":4082526,"label":"a"}
{"context":"And, we cannot say that the trial court's assessment of the probative value of the conviction for impeachment purposes was so off the mark as to have rendered defendant's trial unfair. Although the dissent viewed the conviction as only \"theoretically\" speaking to credibility, it is at least as probative of credibility as prior convictions used in numerous other proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 147, 147","parenthetical":"noting the \"widespread belief that conviction for crime has 'probative value' with respect to the credibility of a witness\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming State's use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \"clearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"case_id":4082526,"label":"b"}
{"context":"And, we cannot say that the trial court's assessment of the probative value of the conviction for impeachment purposes was so off the mark as to have rendered defendant's trial unfair. Although the dissent viewed the conviction as only \"theoretically\" speaking to credibility, it is at least as probative of credibility as prior convictions used in numerous other proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"widespread belief that conviction for crime has 'probative value' with respect to the credibility of a witness\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming State's use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \"clearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"case_id":4082526,"label":"b"}
{"context":"And, we cannot say that the trial court's assessment of the probative value of the conviction for impeachment purposes was so off the mark as to have rendered defendant's trial unfair. Although the dissent viewed the conviction as only \"theoretically\" speaking to credibility, it is at least as probative of credibility as prior convictions used in numerous other proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"76 N.J. 147, 147","parenthetical":"noting the \"widespread belief that conviction for crime has 'probative value' with respect to the credibility of a witness\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming State's use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \"clearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"case_id":4082526,"label":"b"}
{"context":"And, we cannot say that the trial court's assessment of the probative value of the conviction for impeachment purposes was so off the mark as to have rendered defendant's trial unfair. Although the dissent viewed the conviction as only \"theoretically\" speaking to credibility, it is at least as probative of credibility as prior convictions used in numerous other proceedings.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"widespread belief that conviction for crime has 'probative value' with respect to the credibility of a witness\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming State's use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \"clearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\"","sentence":"See, e.g., State v. Lagares, 247 N.J.Super. 392, 396-97, 589 A.2d 630 (App.Div.1991) (affirming State\u2019s use of seven-year-old conviction for possession of marijuana as \u201cclearly havi'ing] a bearing on ... credibility\u201d), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 127 N.J. 20, 601 A.2d 698 (1992); see also Slate v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130,145, 228 A.2d 682 (1967) (Weintraub, C.J., concurring) (noting the \u201cwidespread belief that conviction for crime has \u2018probative value\u2019 with respect to the credibility of a witness\u201d), overruled on other grounds by Sands, supra, 76 N.J. at 147, 386 A.2d 378."},"case_id":4082526,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, at the time Berman commenced the action, his cause of action had not accrued. This renders his claim fatally defective.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"178 So.2d 747, 748","parenthetical":"\"If a plaintiff has no valid cause of action on the facts existing at the time of' filing suit, the defect cannot ordinarily be remedied by the accrual of one while the suit is pending.\"","sentence":"See Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade County, 178 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), cert. dismissed, 192 So.2d 499 (Fla.1966)(\u201cIf a plaintiff has no valid cause of action on the facts existing at the time of' filing suit, the defect cannot ordinarily be remedied by the accrual of one while the suit is pending.\u201d); see also Rolling Oaks Homeowner\u2019s Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Dade County, 492 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.l987)(same); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)(stating the general rule that a \u201cplaintiff may not be permitted to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begun, by amendment of his pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating the general rule that a \"plaintiff may not be permitted to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begun, by amendment of his pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights\"","sentence":"See Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade County, 178 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), cert. dismissed, 192 So.2d 499 (Fla.1966)(\u201cIf a plaintiff has no valid cause of action on the facts existing at the time of' filing suit, the defect cannot ordinarily be remedied by the accrual of one while the suit is pending.\u201d); see also Rolling Oaks Homeowner\u2019s Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Dade County, 492 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.l987)(same); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)(stating the general rule that a \u201cplaintiff may not be permitted to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begun, by amendment of his pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights\u201d)."},"case_id":7424992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, at the time Berman commenced the action, his cause of action had not accrued. This renders his claim fatally defective.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If a plaintiff has no valid cause of action on the facts existing at the time of' filing suit, the defect cannot ordinarily be remedied by the accrual of one while the suit is pending.\"","sentence":"See Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade County, 178 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), cert. dismissed, 192 So.2d 499 (Fla.1966)(\u201cIf a plaintiff has no valid cause of action on the facts existing at the time of' filing suit, the defect cannot ordinarily be remedied by the accrual of one while the suit is pending.\u201d); see also Rolling Oaks Homeowner\u2019s Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Dade County, 492 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.l987)(same); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)(stating the general rule that a \u201cplaintiff may not be permitted to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begun, by amendment of his pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating the general rule that a \"plaintiff may not be permitted to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begun, by amendment of his pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights\"","sentence":"See Hasam Realty Corp. v. Dade County, 178 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), cert. dismissed, 192 So.2d 499 (Fla.1966)(\u201cIf a plaintiff has no valid cause of action on the facts existing at the time of' filing suit, the defect cannot ordinarily be remedied by the accrual of one while the suit is pending.\u201d); see also Rolling Oaks Homeowner\u2019s Ass\u2019n, Inc. v. Dade County, 492 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 503 So.2d 328 (Fla.l987)(same); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star Co., 316 So.2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)(stating the general rule that a \u201cplaintiff may not be permitted to cure the defect of non-existence of a cause of action when suit was begun, by amendment of his pleadings to cover subsequently accruing rights\u201d)."},"case_id":7424992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77","parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59","parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77","parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77","parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77","parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77","parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77","parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"10 Wn. App. 874, 884","parenthetical":"testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \"rea sonable medical certainty\" and would only testify as to the \"more probable than not\" cause of death, satisfied the standard","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \"rea sonable medical certainty\" and would only testify as to the \"more probable than not\" cause of death, satisfied the standard","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77","parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59","parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"10 Wn. App. 874, 884","parenthetical":"testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \"rea sonable medical certainty\" and would only testify as to the \"more probable than not\" cause of death, satisfied the standard","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \"rea sonable medical certainty\" and would only testify as to the \"more probable than not\" cause of death, satisfied the standard","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59","parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant's diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \"reasonable medical certainty\" because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"10 Wn. App. 874, 884","parenthetical":"testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \"rea sonable medical certainty\" and would only testify as to the \"more probable than not\" cause of death, satisfied the standard","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Twining, the Court observed that \"[e]xpert opinion testimony concerning a person's mental status is not admissible unless the expert holds his or her opinion with reasonable medical and psychological certainty.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \"rea sonable medical certainty\" and would only testify as to the \"more probable than not\" cause of death, satisfied the standard","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"delineating an expert's qualifications as a criterion separate from \"reasonable medical certainty\" in evaluating the admissibility of the expert's testimony","sentence":"See id. at 891-93 (equating \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d with \u201cmore likely than not\u201d); State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 74, 76-77, 538 P.2d 873 (1975), review denied, 86 Wn.2d 1009 (1976) (delineating an expert\u2019s qualifications as a criterion separate from \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d in evaluating the admissibility of the expert\u2019s testimony); see also State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726, 756-59, 466 P.2d 120 (1970), judgment vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 937, 92 S. Ct. 2865, 33 L. Ed. 2d 756 (1972) (testimony of two psychiatrists regarding defendant\u2019s diminished capacity as a result of intoxication was properly excluded as lacking in \u201creasonable medical certainty\u201d because the psychiatrists did not examine defendant within the relevant time period and did not know what kinds, amounts, or intervals of drugs defendant allegedly consumed); State v. Terry, 10 Wn. App. 874, 884, 520 P.2d 1397 (1974) (testimony of pathologist, who exhibited confusion concerning the meaning of \u201crea sonable medical certainty\u201d and would only testify as to the \u201cmore probable than not\u201d cause of death, satisfied the standard)."},"case_id":1681782,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts have declined to recognize a state evidentiary privilege when doing so would impose a substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy, particularly when a plaintiff would be precluded from pursuing his federal claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"493 U.S. 182, 193, 202","parenthetical":"refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"case_id":3781354,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts have declined to recognize a state evidentiary privilege when doing so would impose a substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy, particularly when a plaintiff would be precluded from pursuing his federal claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"case_id":3781354,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts have declined to recognize a state evidentiary privilege when doing so would impose a substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy, particularly when a plaintiff would be precluded from pursuing his federal claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"case_id":3781354,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts have declined to recognize a state evidentiary privilege when doing so would impose a substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy, particularly when a plaintiff would be precluded from pursuing his federal claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"664 F.2d 1059, 1059","parenthetical":"holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"case_id":3781354,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts have declined to recognize a state evidentiary privilege when doing so would impose a substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy, particularly when a plaintiff would be precluded from pursuing his federal claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government's interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"case_id":3781354,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts have declined to recognize a state evidentiary privilege when doing so would impose a substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy, particularly when a plaintiff would be precluded from pursuing his federal claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute","sentence":"See Univ. of Penn. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193, 202, 110 S.Ct. 577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (refusing to create a new common-law privilege protecting records relating to the peer review process in a Title VII action, finding the records should be produced in part because it was the very peer review process itself that was at issue); Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1059 (holding that the state privilege should not apply when the peer review records sought directly related to the allegations challenging the peer review process); Accreditation Ass\u2019n for Ambulatory Health Care, Inc. v. United States, 2004 WL 783106 (N.D.Ill.2004) (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege because, inter alia, the Government\u2019s interest in accessing the information to investigate alleged health care fraud outweighed the policy underlying the peer-review privilege); State of Ill., 148 F.R.D. 587 (refusing to recognize the Illinois Medical Studies Act evidentiary privilege in a federal civil rights case because doing so would thwart the purpose of the underlying federal statute); but see Freeman v. J.W. Fairman, Jr., 917 F.Supp. 586 (N.D.Ill.1996) (recognizing the state-law privilege because there was no federal claim to which the records sought would be relevant)."},"case_id":3781354,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This provision leaves no room in Florida for a purely prospective application of a judicial determination that a given search or seizure is constitutionally unreasonable. Once it is decided, as by Payton, that this is the case, the Florida courts are mandated to reject any evidence thus secured.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"constitutional principle applies . . . regardless of the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.\"","sentence":"See Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905 (Fla.1979) (exclusionary rule applicable in probation proceeding only because of Florida constitutional provision); see also, Odom v. State, 403 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1981) (\u201cconstitutional principle applies . . . regardless of the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"exclusionary rule applicable in probation proceeding only because of Florida constitutional provision","sentence":"See Grubbs v. State, 373 So.2d 905 (Fla.1979) (exclusionary rule applicable in probation proceeding only because of Florida constitutional provision); see also, Odom v. State, 403 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1981) (\u201cconstitutional principle applies . . . regardless of the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.\u201d)"},"case_id":9553312,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Guzzino mistakenly argues that the Northern District of Indiana has jurisdiction because his custodian is the United States Attorney General. But Guzzino did not name the Attorney General as a respondent, and, in any event, the Attorney General would not be a proper respondent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"24 F.3d 500, 507","parenthetical":"concluding that prison wardens, not individuals who merely have power to release a prisoner (including an attorney general","sentence":"See Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 507 (3d Cir.1994) (concluding that prison wardens, not individuals who merely have power to release a prisoner (including an attorney general), are custodians for habeas corpus purposes because they have \u201cday-to-day control over the prisoner and ... can produce the actual body\u201d); see also Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 190 (7th Cir.1996) (concluding that if a petitioner under \u00a7 2254 is in prison, then the warden of the prison is the proper respondent, not a state\u2019s attorney general)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"97 F.3d 189, 190","parenthetical":"concluding that if a petitioner under SS 2254 is in prison, then the warden of the prison is the proper respondent, not a state's attorney general","sentence":"See Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 507 (3d Cir.1994) (concluding that prison wardens, not individuals who merely have power to release a prisoner (including an attorney general), are custodians for habeas corpus purposes because they have \u201cday-to-day control over the prisoner and ... can produce the actual body\u201d); see also Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 190 (7th Cir.1996) (concluding that if a petitioner under \u00a7 2254 is in prison, then the warden of the prison is the proper respondent, not a state\u2019s attorney general)."},"case_id":160437,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, in a decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, a Montana district court refused to hold Cable News Network (\"CNN\") liable for secretly filming an investigative search of plaintiffs' property conducted by law enforcement agents who had consented to CNN's presence. Instead, the recordings were made for the purpose of producing a news story and for the defendants' commercial gain.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"121 F.3d 467, 467","parenthetical":"upholding summary judgment on an eavesdropping claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendants had taped the conversation at issue \"or the specific purpose\" of committing the torts alleged","sentence":"Berger, 1996 WL 390528 at *3; aff'd, Berger, 129 F.3d at 516 (\u201cwe hold the media appellees not liable under the Federal Wiretap Act\u201d); see also Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 467 (upholding summary judgment on an eavesdropping claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendants had taped the conversation at issue \u201cor the specific purpose\u201d of committing the torts alleged)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"129 F.3d 516, 516","parenthetical":"\"we hold the media appellees not liable under the Federal Wiretap Act\"","sentence":"Berger, 1996 WL 390528 at *3; aff'd, Berger, 129 F.3d at 516 (\u201cwe hold the media appellees not liable under the Federal Wiretap Act\u201d); see also Deteresa, 121 F.3d at 467 (upholding summary judgment on an eavesdropping claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendants had taped the conversation at issue \u201cor the specific purpose\u201d of committing the torts alleged)."},"case_id":9083021,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consequently, we do not weigh the interests of granting and denying immediate appellate review in each and every case. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the general purposes of the final judgment rule, we determine whether an order is appealable as a general or categorical matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"527 U.S. 198, 206","parenthetical":"\"[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\"","sentence":"See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 206, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999) (\u201c[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\u201d); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (\u201c[T]he issue of appeal-ability under \u00a7 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, by a prompt appellate court decision.\u201d (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)); see also In re Carco Elec., 536 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir.2008) (\u201c[T]he Supreme Court\u2019s statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a \u2018case-by-case\u2019 basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"536 F.3d 211, 213","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Supreme Court's statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a 'case-by-case' basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\"","sentence":"See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 206, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999) (\u201c[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\u201d); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (\u201c[T]he issue of appeal-ability under \u00a7 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, by a prompt appellate court decision.\u201d (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)); see also In re Carco Elec., 536 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir.2008) (\u201c[T]he Supreme Court\u2019s statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a \u2018case-by-case\u2019 basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\u201d)."},"case_id":3646441,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Consequently, we do not weigh the interests of granting and denying immediate appellate review in each and every case. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the general purposes of the final judgment rule, we determine whether an order is appealable as a general or categorical matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"536 F.3d 211, 213","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Supreme Court's statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a 'case-by-case' basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\"","sentence":"See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 206, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999) (\u201c[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\u201d); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (\u201c[T]he issue of appeal-ability under \u00a7 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, by a prompt appellate court decision.\u201d (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)); see also In re Carco Elec., 536 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir.2008) (\u201c[T]he Supreme Court\u2019s statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a \u2018case-by-case\u2019 basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\"","sentence":"See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 206, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999) (\u201c[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\u201d); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (\u201c[T]he issue of appeal-ability under \u00a7 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, by a prompt appellate court decision.\u201d (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)); see also In re Carco Elec., 536 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir.2008) (\u201c[T]he Supreme Court\u2019s statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a \u2018case-by-case\u2019 basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\u201d)."},"case_id":3646441,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consequently, we do not weigh the interests of granting and denying immediate appellate review in each and every case. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the general purposes of the final judgment rule, we determine whether an order is appealable as a general or categorical matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"536 F.3d 211, 213","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Supreme Court's statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a 'case-by-case' basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\"","sentence":"See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 206, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999) (\u201c[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\u201d); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (\u201c[T]he issue of appeal-ability under \u00a7 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, by a prompt appellate court decision.\u201d (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)); see also In re Carco Elec., 536 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir.2008) (\u201c[T]he Supreme Court\u2019s statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a \u2018case-by-case\u2019 basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\"","sentence":"See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 206, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999) (\u201c[WJe have consistently eschewed a case-by-case approach to deciding whether an order is sufficiently collateral.\u201d); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 868, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (\u201c[T]he issue of appeal-ability under \u00a7 1291 is to be determined for the entire category to which a claim belongs, without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustice averted, by a prompt appellate court decision.\u201d (quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted)); see also In re Carco Elec., 536 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir.2008) (\u201c[T]he Supreme Court\u2019s statement in Cunningham that we should not apply the collateral order doctrine on a \u2018case-by-case\u2019 basis indicates that we should not attempt to carve out individualized, case-specific exceptions to the general rule that discovery orders are not immediately appealable.\u201d)."},"case_id":3646441,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Here, the commissioner found that wife deposited $20,500 from an inheritance into the account on March 25, 1991. The evidence established that no withdrawals were made from the account after wife deposited the inheritance money.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter","sentence":"See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C.App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit); cf. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.App. 394, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit","sentence":"See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C.App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit); cf. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.App. 394, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter)."},"case_id":1264457,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Here, the commissioner found that wife deposited $20,500 from an inheritance into the account on March 25, 1991. The evidence established that no withdrawals were made from the account after wife deposited the inheritance money.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit","sentence":"See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C.App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit); cf. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.App. 394, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"499 P.2d 231, 237","parenthetical":"separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter","sentence":"See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C.App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit); cf. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.App. 394, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter)."},"case_id":1264457,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, the commissioner found that wife deposited $20,500 from an inheritance into the account on March 25, 1991. The evidence established that no withdrawals were made from the account after wife deposited the inheritance money.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"324 S.E.2d 287, 289","parenthetical":"separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit","sentence":"See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C.App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit); cf. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.App. 394, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter","sentence":"See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C.App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit); cf. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.App. 394, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter)."},"case_id":1264457,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, the commissioner found that wife deposited $20,500 from an inheritance into the account on March 25, 1991. The evidence established that no withdrawals were made from the account after wife deposited the inheritance money.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"499 P.2d 231, 237","parenthetical":"separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter","sentence":"See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C.App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit); cf. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.App. 394, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"324 S.E.2d 287, 289","parenthetical":"separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit","sentence":"See Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C.App. 332, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was retraceable where no withdrawals were made after deposit and balance never fell below amount of deposit); cf. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wash.App. 394, 499 P.2d 231, 237 (1972) (separate property deposited into marital bank account was community property where party failed to establish character of funds withdrawn thereafter)."},"case_id":1264457,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the United States Constitution prohibits the federal government from commandeering a state legislature or a state executive and making them foot soldiers in the creation and enforcement of federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"92 Minn. L. Rev. 75, 75-76","parenthetical":"arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution","sentence":"See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384, 138 L.Ed.2d 914, 944 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-83, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2430-32, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 153-55 (1992) (invalidating environmental law provision that commandeered state legislature); see also Mazzone, 92 Minn. L. Rev. at 75-76 (arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"521 U.S. 898, 935","parenthetical":"invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law","sentence":"See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384, 138 L.Ed.2d 914, 944 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-83, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2430-32, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 153-55 (1992) (invalidating environmental law provision that commandeered state legislature); see also Mazzone, 92 Minn. L. Rev. at 75-76 (arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution)."},"case_id":7068387,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the United States Constitution prohibits the federal government from commandeering a state legislature or a state executive and making them foot soldiers in the creation and enforcement of federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384","parenthetical":"invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law","sentence":"See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384, 138 L.Ed.2d 914, 944 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-83, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2430-32, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 153-55 (1992) (invalidating environmental law provision that commandeered state legislature); see also Mazzone, 92 Minn. L. Rev. at 75-76 (arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"92 Minn. L. Rev. 75, 75-76","parenthetical":"arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution","sentence":"See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384, 138 L.Ed.2d 914, 944 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-83, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2430-32, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 153-55 (1992) (invalidating environmental law provision that commandeered state legislature); see also Mazzone, 92 Minn. L. Rev. at 75-76 (arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution)."},"case_id":7068387,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the United States Constitution prohibits the federal government from commandeering a state legislature or a state executive and making them foot soldiers in the creation and enforcement of federal law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"138 L.Ed.2d 914, 944","parenthetical":"invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law","sentence":"See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384, 138 L.Ed.2d 914, 944 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-83, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2430-32, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 153-55 (1992) (invalidating environmental law provision that commandeered state legislature); see also Mazzone, 92 Minn. L. Rev. at 75-76 (arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"92 Minn. L. Rev. 75, 75-76","parenthetical":"arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution","sentence":"See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2384, 138 L.Ed.2d 914, 944 (1997) (invalidating provisions of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because United States Constitution prohibits requiring state executive officials from enforcing federal law); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 180-83, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2430-32, 120 L.Ed.2d 120, 153-55 (1992) (invalidating environmental law provision that commandeered state legislature); see also Mazzone, 92 Minn. L. Rev. at 75-76 (arguing consolidation of constitutional law fails to respect the importance placed upon state courts by the United States Constitution)."},"case_id":7068387,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other cases make clear that trips within a single state are made in interstate commerce when they are part of \"a practical continuity of movement of the goods\" in interstate commerce.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"938 F.2d 181, 181-82","parenthetical":"involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"317 U.S. 568, 568","parenthetical":"involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"case_id":3781177,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other cases make clear that trips within a single state are made in interstate commerce when they are part of \"a practical continuity of movement of the goods\" in interstate commerce.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"involving oil company's transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"317 U.S. 568, 568","parenthetical":"involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"case_id":3781177,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other cases make clear that trips within a single state are made in interstate commerce when they are part of \"a practical continuity of movement of the goods\" in interstate commerce.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"317 U.S. 568, 568","parenthetical":"involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"case_id":3781177,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other cases make clear that trips within a single state are made in interstate commerce when they are part of \"a practical continuity of movement of the goods\" in interstate commerce.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"63 S.Ct. 335, 335","parenthetical":"involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"938 F.2d 181, 181-82","parenthetical":"involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"case_id":3781177,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other cases make clear that trips within a single state are made in interstate commerce when they are part of \"a practical continuity of movement of the goods\" in interstate commerce.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"63 S.Ct. 335, 335","parenthetical":"involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"involving oil company's transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"case_id":3781177,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other cases make clear that trips within a single state are made in interstate commerce when they are part of \"a practical continuity of movement of the goods\" in interstate commerce.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"63 S.Ct. 335, 335","parenthetical":"involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state","sentence":"Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. at 568, 63 S.Ct. at 335 (involving wholesale distributor of paper products made outside the state but transported only to customers within the state); see also Baez, 938 F.2d at 181-82 (involving armored trucks delivering to Florida banks checks and other instruments bound for banks outside Florida); Galbreath v. Gulf Oil Corp., 413 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1969) (involving oil company\u2019s transport within Georgia of petroleum products originating from refineries in Texas and Mississippi); Opelika Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Goldberg, 299 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1962) (involving wholesale soft drink distributor transporting drinks bottled in Georgia from Alabama warehouse to Alabama customers and returning empty bottles to Alabama warehouse, where other trucks took them back to Georgia)."},"case_id":3781177,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although Massachusetts has yet to define what conduct constitutes \"more than a minor or insignificant business relationship,\" the Supreme Judicial Court, the Appeals Court and the federal courts have tended to find such a relationship where the defendant played an active role in the underlying transaction.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"433 Mass. 14, 14-15","parenthetical":"holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor's inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim","sentence":"Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor\u2019s inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48 (1980) (holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered); Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F.Sup. 927, 933 (D.Mass. 1987) (holding that the owner could maintain a 93A claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the third-party beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor); contrast Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, Inc., 388 Mass. 320, 324 (1983) (holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Sup. 435, 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93A action against a prior owner of the land, who was not the seller, because there was no business connection between the two parties); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, 893-94 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that an abutter could not bring a 93A claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"388 Mass. 320, 324","parenthetical":"holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot","sentence":"Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor\u2019s inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48 (1980) (holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered); Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F.Sup. 927, 933 (D.Mass. 1987) (holding that the owner could maintain a 93A claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the third-party beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor); contrast Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, Inc., 388 Mass. 320, 324 (1983) (holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Sup. 435, 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93A action against a prior owner of the land, who was not the seller, because there was no business connection between the two parties); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, 893-94 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that an abutter could not bring a 93A claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant)."},"case_id":3622959,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although Massachusetts has yet to define what conduct constitutes \"more than a minor or insignificant business relationship,\" the Supreme Judicial Court, the Appeals Court and the federal courts have tended to find such a relationship where the defendant played an active role in the underlying transaction.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"57 Mass.App.Ct. 125, 125","parenthetical":"holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue","sentence":"Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor\u2019s inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48 (1980) (holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered); Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F.Sup. 927, 933 (D.Mass. 1987) (holding that the owner could maintain a 93A claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the third-party beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor); contrast Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, Inc., 388 Mass. 320, 324 (1983) (holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Sup. 435, 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93A action against a prior owner of the land, who was not the seller, because there was no business connection between the two parties); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, 893-94 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that an abutter could not bring a 93A claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"388 Mass. 320, 324","parenthetical":"holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot","sentence":"Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor\u2019s inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48 (1980) (holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered); Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F.Sup. 927, 933 (D.Mass. 1987) (holding that the owner could maintain a 93A claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the third-party beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor); contrast Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, Inc., 388 Mass. 320, 324 (1983) (holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Sup. 435, 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93A action against a prior owner of the land, who was not the seller, because there was no business connection between the two parties); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, 893-94 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that an abutter could not bring a 93A claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant)."},"case_id":3622959,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although Massachusetts has yet to define what conduct constitutes \"more than a minor or insignificant business relationship,\" the Supreme Judicial Court, the Appeals Court and the federal courts have tended to find such a relationship where the defendant played an active role in the underlying transaction.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"388 Mass. 320, 324","parenthetical":"holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot","sentence":"Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor\u2019s inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48 (1980) (holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered); Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F.Sup. 927, 933 (D.Mass. 1987) (holding that the owner could maintain a 93A claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the third-party beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor); contrast Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, Inc., 388 Mass. 320, 324 (1983) (holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Sup. 435, 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93A action against a prior owner of the land, who was not the seller, because there was no business connection between the two parties); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, 893-94 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that an abutter could not bring a 93A claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"38 Mass.App.Ct. 551, 551","parenthetical":"holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff","sentence":"Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor\u2019s inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48 (1980) (holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered); Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F.Sup. 927, 933 (D.Mass. 1987) (holding that the owner could maintain a 93A claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the third-party beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor); contrast Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, Inc., 388 Mass. 320, 324 (1983) (holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Sup. 435, 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93A action against a prior owner of the land, who was not the seller, because there was no business connection between the two parties); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, 893-94 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that an abutter could not bring a 93A claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant)."},"case_id":3622959,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although Massachusetts has yet to define what conduct constitutes \"more than a minor or insignificant business relationship,\" the Supreme Judicial Court, the Appeals Court and the federal courts have tended to find such a relationship where the defendant played an active role in the underlying transaction.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48","parenthetical":"holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered","sentence":"Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor\u2019s inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48 (1980) (holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered); Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F.Sup. 927, 933 (D.Mass. 1987) (holding that the owner could maintain a 93A claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the third-party beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor); contrast Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, Inc., 388 Mass. 320, 324 (1983) (holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Sup. 435, 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93A action against a prior owner of the land, who was not the seller, because there was no business connection between the two parties); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, 893-94 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that an abutter could not bring a 93A claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"388 Mass. 320, 324","parenthetical":"holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot","sentence":"Compare Kattar, 433 Mass. at 14-15 (holding that despite the absence of a contractual relationship and no formal authority over the mortgagor, since the defendant was a member of the mortgagor\u2019s inner circle, the mortgagee could sustain his 93A claim); Reisman, 57 Mass.App.Ct. at 125 (holding that the shareholders could bring a 93A claim against an accounting firm that actively participated in the transaction at issue); Standard Register, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 551 (holding that the purchaser could sustain a 93A claim against the president and vice-president of a manufacturing company because they took an active role in the dealings with the plaintiff); Mongeau v. Boutelle, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 246, 247-48 (1980) (holding that the purchaser could bring a 93A claim against the real estate broker because the broker misinformed the plaintiff as to the acreage of the parcel and failed to disclose that the property was encumbered); Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F.Sup. 927, 933 (D.Mass. 1987) (holding that the owner could maintain a 93A claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the third-party beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor); contrast Nei v. Boston Survey Consultants, Inc., 388 Mass. 320, 324 (1983) (holding that the purchaser of the land could not maintain a 93A claim against the surveyor where the surveyor did not participate in the negotiations or in the signing of any of the documents, and did not misrepresent the size of the lot); John Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 775 F.Sup. 435, 440 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93A action against a prior owner of the land, who was not the seller, because there was no business connection between the two parties); Cash Energy, Inc. v. Weiner, 768 F.Sup. 892, 893-94 (D.Mass. 1991) (holding that an abutter could not bring a 93A claim because there was no business relationship with the defendant)."},"case_id":3622959,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent Plaintiff seeks back pay from Defendants in their official capacities, the Eleventh Amendment bars her claim. An award of back pay is \"retroactive relief' and \"would constitute the payment of money damages from the state treasury in a suit against state officials.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"904 F.2d 661, 669","parenthetical":"noting that absent abrogation, retroactive payment of salary and benefits is not prospective injunctive relief and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment","sentence":"Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 669 (11th Cir.1990) (noting that absent abrogation, retroactive payment of salary and benefits is not prospective injunctive relief and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also Cobb v. Alabama, 10-CV-502-MHT, 2011 WL 3666696, at *3 (M.D.Ala. Aug. 22, 2011) (refusing an award of back pay on an official capacity claim), Earl v. Dupree, 98-0898 CB-L, 2001 WL 36152178, *2 (S.D.Ala. Feb. 21, 2001) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2011 WL 3666696, at *3","parenthetical":"refusing an award of back pay on an official capacity claim","sentence":"Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 669 (11th Cir.1990) (noting that absent abrogation, retroactive payment of salary and benefits is not prospective injunctive relief and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also Cobb v. Alabama, 10-CV-502-MHT, 2011 WL 3666696, at *3 (M.D.Ala. Aug. 22, 2011) (refusing an award of back pay on an official capacity claim), Earl v. Dupree, 98-0898 CB-L, 2001 WL 36152178, *2 (S.D.Ala. Feb. 21, 2001) (same)."},"case_id":4232615,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Section 287.250.4 gives the Commission \"considerable discretion in determining an employee's average weekly wage\" when there are exceptional facts present. Oberley at 958. While the statute does not specifically define \"exceptional facts,\" we note that Missouri courts have upheld the application of the provision when circumstances prevented the Commission from using other statutory formulas to fairly and justly calculate a weekly wage.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"916 S.W.2d 439, 441","parenthetical":"intermittent and part-time nature of an employee's work was deemed an exceptional fact that warranted application of SS 287.250.4","sentence":"See Id. at 957-58 (exceptional fact existed when president and sole shareholder of S corporation received both wages and payments for personal expenses); Ash v. Ahal Contracting Co., 916 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Mo.App.1996) (intermittent and part-time nature of an employee\u2019s work was deemed an exceptional fact that warranted application of \u00a7 287.250.4); but see Thompson, 58 S.W.3d at 661-62 (no exceptional fact existed when parties disputed whether to include income from separate job, not the calculation of the award itself)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"58 S.W.3d 661, 661-62","parenthetical":"no exceptional fact existed when parties disputed whether to include income from separate job, not the calculation of the award itself","sentence":"See Id. at 957-58 (exceptional fact existed when president and sole shareholder of S corporation received both wages and payments for personal expenses); Ash v. Ahal Contracting Co., 916 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Mo.App.1996) (intermittent and part-time nature of an employee\u2019s work was deemed an exceptional fact that warranted application of \u00a7 287.250.4); but see Thompson, 58 S.W.3d at 661-62 (no exceptional fact existed when parties disputed whether to include income from separate job, not the calculation of the award itself)."},"case_id":9358745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, the defendant used the very instrumentality that he was not lawfully allowed to possess to injure his alleged assailant. This opinion does not, however, comment on any right the defendant may have to assert a justification defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"74 So.3d 527, 527","parenthetical":"explaining that when \"a defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity or was in a place where he did not have a right to be at the time he was attacked, the common law duty to retreat still applies\"","sentence":"See Marrero v. State, 516 So.2d 1052, 1054 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (stating \u201cthe defendant may very well be excused from his assault upon his assailant by reason of duress or self-defense without being excused from his possession of the firearm\u201d); see also Dorsey, 74 So.3d at 527 (explaining that when \u201ca defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity or was in a place where he did not have a right to be at the time he was attacked, the common law duty to retreat still applies\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating \"the defendant may very well be excused from his assault upon his assailant by reason of duress or self-defense without being excused from his possession of the firearm\"","sentence":"See Marrero v. State, 516 So.2d 1052, 1054 n. 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (stating \u201cthe defendant may very well be excused from his assault upon his assailant by reason of duress or self-defense without being excused from his possession of the firearm\u201d); see also Dorsey, 74 So.3d at 527 (explaining that when \u201ca defendant was engaged in an unlawful activity or was in a place where he did not have a right to be at the time he was attacked, the common law duty to retreat still applies\u201d)."},"case_id":7008214,"label":"b"}
{"context":"After close examination of the sentencing hearing transcript, we find that the Fcmfan error in this case was prejudicial to Walters. The Fanfan error affected the sentence Walters received because the mandatory nature of the Guidelines at the time of his sentencing forced the district court to impose at least the minimum 15-month term for count 1, in addition to the statutorily mandated 60-month consecutive sentence on count 2, where the court indicated that Walters's total imposed sentence of 75 months seemed too harsh.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"402 F.3d 521, 521","parenthetical":"noting that \"the standard for determining whether an error affects substantial rights\" is that \"the error 'must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings' \"","sentence":"See Mares, 402 F.3d at 521 (noting that \u201cthe standard for determining whether an error affects substantial rights\u201d is that \u201cthe error \u2018must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Ola-no, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770); see also Pineiro, 410 F.3d at 286 (explaining the standard as \u201cthe district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the error\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"410 F.3d 286, 286","parenthetical":"explaining the standard as \"the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the error\"","sentence":"See Mares, 402 F.3d at 521 (noting that \u201cthe standard for determining whether an error affects substantial rights\u201d is that \u201cthe error \u2018must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Ola-no, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770); see also Pineiro, 410 F.3d at 286 (explaining the standard as \u201cthe district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the error\u201d)."},"case_id":8934487,"label":"a"}
{"context":". It is also apparent, however, that the right of publicity does not fit neatly into the category of tort-based lawsuits from which Congress sought to immunize interactive service providers, i.e., dissemination of damaging information via the internet.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"129 F.3d 328, 328","parenthetical":"involving negligence action against AOL alleging unreasonable delay in removing defamatory content","sentence":"See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328 (involving negligence action against AOL alleging unreasonable delay in removing defamatory content); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983 (involving defamation and negligence claims against AOL); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C.1998) (involving defamation claim); see also Gucci, 135 F.Supp.2d at 417 (stating that the legislative history reflects only that section 230(c) \u201cimmunizes ISPs from defamation and other, non-intellectual property, state law claims arising from third-party content\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"135 F.Supp.2d 417, 417","parenthetical":"stating that the legislative history reflects only that section 230(c) \"immunizes ISPs from defamation and other, non-intellectual property, state law claims arising from third-party content\"","sentence":"See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328 (involving negligence action against AOL alleging unreasonable delay in removing defamatory content); Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983 (involving defamation and negligence claims against AOL); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 44, 46 (D.D.C.1998) (involving defamation claim); see also Gucci, 135 F.Supp.2d at 417 (stating that the legislative history reflects only that section 230(c) \u201cimmunizes ISPs from defamation and other, non-intellectual property, state law claims arising from third-party content\u201d)."},"case_id":3350357,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"357 S.E.2d 452, 454","parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12","parenthetical":"employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"b"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12","parenthetical":"employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"357 S.E.2d 452, 454","parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"505 N.E.2d 314, 318","parenthetical":"employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"357 S.E.2d 452, 454","parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"505 N.E.2d 314, 318","parenthetical":"employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"b"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"491 A.2d 1268, 1268","parenthetical":"employee's continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"491 A.2d 1268, 1268","parenthetical":"employee's continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"357 S.E.2d 452, 454","parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30","parenthetical":"employee's retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Based on the Court's conclusion that the jury's verdict was justified under the theory of promissory estoppel, a theory on which the jury was instructed, the Court need not decide the merits of plaintiff's contention that he need not show any particular reliance. The Court notes, however, that there is a persuasive line of cases holding that when an employer promulgates an employee handbook that would indicate an intent to be bound by the provisions contained therein, an enforceable unilateral contract is formed, even when the employee does not provide additional consideration beyond continuing to perform his duties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30","parenthetical":"employee's retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"357 S.E.2d 452, 454","parenthetical":"\"[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\"","sentence":"Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 130 N.H. 730, 547 A.2d 260, 264 (1988); see also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 115 Ill.2d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 8, 12, 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1987) (employee's continued work constitutes consideration for promises in policy statement when promise is clear, policy statement is disseminated to employee in a manner such that employee is aware of contents and reasonably believes it to be an offer, and employee continues work after learning of policy statement); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 (employee\u2019s continued services are sufficient acceptance and consideration for promise in employment manual, and reliance on such promise is to be presumed); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629-30 (Minn.1983) (employee\u2019s retention of employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes acceptance of offer of unilateral contract); cf. Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (\u201c[hjaving announced the policy, presumably with a view to obtaining the benefit of improved employee attitudes and behavior and improved quality of the work force, the employer may not treat its promise as illusory\u201d) (internal citation and quotation omitted)."},"case_id":7653217,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, in this situation, Aetna made a factual determination that certain diagnostic testing and IVIG treatments were not medically necessary. \"[F]actual determinations made by [an] administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion.\" Meditrust Fin. Servs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"147 F.3d 395, 395","parenthetical":"holding that an administrator's findings of fact should always be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, based on the record before the administrator","sentence":"Corp., 168 F.3d at 213); Vercher, 379 F.3d at 226 (noting \u201cthat even where the plan does not expressly give the administrator discretionary authority, \u2018for factual determinations under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of review is the appropriate standard\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.\/Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 453, 116 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991)); Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir.1994) (commenting that \u201cdistrict courts in the Fifth Circuit review under an abuse of discretion standard a plan administrator\u2019s factual determinations ... \u201d); see also Schadler, 147 F.3d at 395 (holding that an administrator\u2019s findings of fact should always be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, based on the record before the administrator)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"379 F.3d 226, 226","parenthetical":"noting \"that even where the plan does not expressly give the administrator discretionary authority, 'for factual determinations under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of review is the appropriate standard' \"","sentence":"Corp., 168 F.3d at 213); Vercher, 379 F.3d at 226 (noting \u201cthat even where the plan does not expressly give the administrator discretionary authority, \u2018for factual determinations under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of review is the appropriate standard\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.\/Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 453, 116 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991)); Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir.1994) (commenting that \u201cdistrict courts in the Fifth Circuit review under an abuse of discretion standard a plan administrator\u2019s factual determinations ... \u201d); see also Schadler, 147 F.3d at 395 (holding that an administrator\u2019s findings of fact should always be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, based on the record before the administrator)."},"case_id":3221976,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, in this situation, Aetna made a factual determination that certain diagnostic testing and IVIG treatments were not medically necessary. \"[F]actual determinations made by [an] administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion.\" Meditrust Fin. Servs.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"39 F.3d 594, 598","parenthetical":"commenting that \"district courts in the Fifth Circuit review under an abuse of discretion standard a plan administrator's factual determinations ... \"","sentence":"Corp., 168 F.3d at 213); Vercher, 379 F.3d at 226 (noting \u201cthat even where the plan does not expressly give the administrator discretionary authority, \u2018for factual determinations under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of review is the appropriate standard\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.\/Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 453, 116 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991)); Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir.1994) (commenting that \u201cdistrict courts in the Fifth Circuit review under an abuse of discretion standard a plan administrator\u2019s factual determinations ... \u201d); see also Schadler, 147 F.3d at 395 (holding that an administrator\u2019s findings of fact should always be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, based on the record before the administrator)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"147 F.3d 395, 395","parenthetical":"holding that an administrator's findings of fact should always be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, based on the record before the administrator","sentence":"Corp., 168 F.3d at 213); Vercher, 379 F.3d at 226 (noting \u201cthat even where the plan does not expressly give the administrator discretionary authority, \u2018for factual determinations under ERISA plans, the abuse of discretion standard of review is the appropriate standard\u2019 \u201d) (quoting Pierre v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.\/Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 932 F.2d 1552, 1562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 453, 116 L.Ed.2d 470 (1991)); Sweatman v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir.1994) (commenting that \u201cdistrict courts in the Fifth Circuit review under an abuse of discretion standard a plan administrator\u2019s factual determinations ... \u201d); see also Schadler, 147 F.3d at 395 (holding that an administrator\u2019s findings of fact should always be reviewed for an abuse of discretion, based on the record before the administrator)."},"case_id":3221976,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 F.2d 1252, 1258","parenthetical":"although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\" to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"949 F.2d 737, 749","parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"953 F.2d 127, 131-32","parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"949 F.2d 737, 749","parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"949 F.2d 737, 749","parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"949 F.2d 737, 749","parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"951 F.2d 876, 878","parenthetical":"nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"949 F.2d 737, 749","parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"949 F.2d 737, 749","parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"927 F.2d 14, 20","parenthetical":"informant's presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"949 F.2d 737, 749","parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 977, 981","parenthetical":"two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25","parenthetical":"although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"949 F.2d 737, 749","parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 F.2d 1252, 1258","parenthetical":"although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\" to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"953 F.2d 127, 131-32","parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"951 F.2d 876, 878","parenthetical":"nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"927 F.2d 14, 20","parenthetical":"informant's presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 977, 981","parenthetical":"two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25","parenthetical":"although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"960 F.2d 1252, 1258","parenthetical":"although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\" to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"953 F.2d 127, 131-32","parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"951 F.2d 876, 878","parenthetical":"nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"927 F.2d 14, 20","parenthetical":"informant's presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 977, 981","parenthetical":"two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The federal courts also recognize the distinction and have strongly upheld the informant's privilege.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"nondisclosure of informant's identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25","parenthetical":"although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld","sentence":"See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 749 (5th Cir.1991) (nondisclosure of informant\u2019s identity upheld because he was neither a witness nor participant), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2945, 119 L.Ed.2d 569 (1992); United States v. Bowser, 941 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Singh, 922 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2066, 114 L.Ed.2d 471, and cert. denied sub nom., Khanna v. U.S., \u2022\u2014\u2022 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 260, 116 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991); United States v. Martinez, 922 F.2d 914, 921 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18, 19 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1258 (4th Cir.1992) (although informant observed all crucial events and was characterized as a \"supporting player\u201d to the investigators, nondisclosure of his identity was upheld); United States v. Mabry, 953 F.2d 127, 131-32 (4th Cir.1991) (informer's identity could not be disclosed even though he introduced defendant to the agent who purchased the cocaine), cert, denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1951, 118 L.Ed.2d 555 (1992); United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991) (nondisclosure upheld where informant made controlled purchases of cocaine from defendant); United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490-91 (11th Cir.) (although informant's participation was \"substantial,\" nondisclosure was affirmed), cert, denied, -\u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d 262, and cert. denied sub nom., Palacio v. U.S.,-U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 398, 116 L.Ed.2d 347-48, and cert. denied sub nom., Palma-Rodriguez v. U.S., \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 403, 116 L.Ed.2d 352 (1991), and cert. denied sub nom., Rogue v. U.S., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 112 S.Ct. 905, 116 L.Ed.2d 806 (1992); United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 20 (1st Cir.1991) (informant\u2019s presence during prior drug transactions was insufficient to defeat the privilege); United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir.1990) (purchased small quantities from defendant; nondisclosure affirmed); United States v. Alexander, 761 F.2d 1294, 1303 (9th Cir. 1985) (one informant visited defendant's ranch; nondisclosure upheld); United States v. Brinkman, 739 F.2d 977, 981 (4th Cir.1984) (two important discussions between defendant and informant were insufficient to require disclosure of informant's identity); United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir.1982) (informer was participant in drug transaction, but not integral; nondisclosure enforced), cert. denied sub nom., Gavin v. U.S., 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3542, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392, and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 127, 78 L.Ed.2d 124 (1983); United States v. Ward, 722 F.Supp. 1523, 1524-25 (S.D.Ohio 1989) (although informant was directly involved, because life was threatened nondisclosure was upheld); but see United States v. Palacios, 763 F.Supp. 380, 381 (N.D. Ill.1991) (disclosure of identity ordered because of informant\u2019s direct participation)."},"case_id":404772,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In assessing the validity of appellant's claim, we must first address the reach of the Second Amendment. \"It is settled law ... that the Second Amendment applies only to limitations the federal government seeks to impose on this right.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment and applies it against state and local governments","sentence":"But see Nordyke v. King, No. 07-15763, 2009 WL 1036086 (9th Cir. Apr.20, 2009) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment and applies it against state and local governments)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"408 F.3d 75, 84","parenthetical":"holding that the Second Amendment imposes a limitation on only federal, not state, legislative efforts.","sentence":"See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the Second Amendment imposes a limitation on only federal, not state, legislative efforts.); State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai\u2019i 143, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (1996) (stating that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution)."},"case_id":7083779,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In assessing the validity of appellant's claim, we must first address the reach of the Second Amendment. \"It is settled law ... that the Second Amendment applies only to limitations the federal government seeks to impose on this right.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"920 P.2d 357, 360","parenthetical":"stating that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution","sentence":"See also, Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 84 (2d Cir.2005) (holding that the Second Amendment imposes a limitation on only federal, not state, legislative efforts.); State v. Mendoza, 82 Hawai\u2019i 143, 920 P.2d 357, 360 (1996) (stating that the Second Amendment does not apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment and applies it against state and local governments","sentence":"But see Nordyke v. King, No. 07-15763, 2009 WL 1036086 (9th Cir. Apr.20, 2009) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment and applies it against state and local governments)."},"case_id":7083779,"label":"a"}
{"context":"XI. Courts have held this immunity to extend to \"state agents and state instrumentalities.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 178, 187","parenthetical":"finding that the Ex parte Young exception \"does not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\"","sentence":"District Court Opinion, 675 F.Supp.2d at 679. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \u201cinapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\u201d); see also Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 187 (4th Cir.2002) (finding that the Ex parte Young exception \u201cdoes not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"675 F.Supp.2d 679, 679","parenthetical":"holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \"inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\"","sentence":"District Court Opinion, 675 F.Supp.2d at 679. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \u201cinapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\u201d); see also Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 187 (4th Cir.2002) (finding that the Ex parte Young exception \u201cdoes not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\u201d)."},"case_id":4201634,"label":"b"}
{"context":"XI. Courts have held this immunity to extend to \"state agents and state instrumentalities.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"465 U.S. 89, 106","parenthetical":"holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \"inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\"","sentence":"District Court Opinion, 675 F.Supp.2d at 679. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \u201cinapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\u201d); see also Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 187 (4th Cir.2002) (finding that the Ex parte Young exception \u201cdoes not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 178, 187","parenthetical":"finding that the Ex parte Young exception \"does not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\"","sentence":"District Court Opinion, 675 F.Supp.2d at 679. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \u201cinapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\u201d); see also Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 187 (4th Cir.2002) (finding that the Ex parte Young exception \u201cdoes not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\u201d)."},"case_id":4201634,"label":"a"}
{"context":"XI. Courts have held this immunity to extend to \"state agents and state instrumentalities.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \"inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\"","sentence":"District Court Opinion, 675 F.Supp.2d at 679. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \u201cinapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\u201d); see also Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 187 (4th Cir.2002) (finding that the Ex parte Young exception \u201cdoes not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 178, 187","parenthetical":"finding that the Ex parte Young exception \"does not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\"","sentence":"District Court Opinion, 675 F.Supp.2d at 679. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \u201cinapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\u201d); see also Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 187 (4th Cir.2002) (finding that the Ex parte Young exception \u201cdoes not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\u201d)."},"case_id":4201634,"label":"a"}
{"context":"XI. Courts have held this immunity to extend to \"state agents and state instrumentalities.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \"inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\"","sentence":"District Court Opinion, 675 F.Supp.2d at 679. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \u201cinapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\u201d); see also Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 187 (4th Cir.2002) (finding that the Ex parte Young exception \u201cdoes not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"290 F.3d 178, 187","parenthetical":"finding that the Ex parte Young exception \"does not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\"","sentence":"District Court Opinion, 675 F.Supp.2d at 679. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (holding an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity \u201cinapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state law\u201d); see also Antrican v. Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 187 (4th Cir.2002) (finding that the Ex parte Young exception \u201cdoes not apply to actions against State officials seeking to compel their compliance with State law\u201d)."},"case_id":4201634,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This holding is entirely consistent with the conventional interpretation accepted by local courts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"265 F.2d 575, 576-77","parenthetical":"concluding that contingencies that defeat a contract rather than complete its performance are within the statute","sentence":"See Cooper, 365 A.2d at 629 (holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statute\u2019s coverage); see also Farrow, 663 F.2d at 207 n. 29 (noting this distinction in the conventional view); cf. Coan v. Orsinger, 265 F.2d 575, 576-77 (D.C.Cir.1959) (concluding that contingencies that defeat a contract rather than complete its performance are within the statute)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"365 A.2d 629, 629","parenthetical":"holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statute's coverage","sentence":"See Cooper, 365 A.2d at 629 (holding that contracts for an indefinite period are excluded from the statute\u2019s coverage); see also Farrow, 663 F.2d at 207 n. 29 (noting this distinction in the conventional view); cf. Coan v. Orsinger, 265 F.2d 575, 576-77 (D.C.Cir.1959) (concluding that contingencies that defeat a contract rather than complete its performance are within the statute)."},"case_id":4330492,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet as these sources themselves emphasize, many so-called plus factors simply \"demonstrate that a given market is chronically noncompetitive,\" without helping to explain whether agreement or conscious parallelism is the cause. To be sure, providing this evidence demonstrates that plaintiffs' claim is not economically implausible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"475 U.S. 587, 587","parenthetical":"\"[I]f the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense[, plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.\"","sentence":"See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (\u201c[I]f the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense[, plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.\u201d). But such evidence does not by itself suggest that defendants\u2019 conduct shows agreement."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"295 F.3d 651, 658","parenthetical":"distinguishing \"evidence of noncompetitive behavior\" from \"evidence that the structure of the market was conducive to such behavior\"","sentence":"See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360-61; see also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir.2002) (Posner, J.) (distinguishing \u201cevidence of noncompetitive behavior\u201d from \u201cevidence that the structure of the market was conducive to such behavior\u201d)."},"case_id":4030147,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet as these sources themselves emphasize, many so-called plus factors simply \"demonstrate that a given market is chronically noncompetitive,\" without helping to explain whether agreement or conscious parallelism is the cause. To be sure, providing this evidence demonstrates that plaintiffs' claim is not economically implausible.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]f the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense[, plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.\"","sentence":"See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (\u201c[I]f the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense[, plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.\u201d). But such evidence does not by itself suggest that defendants\u2019 conduct shows agreement."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"295 F.3d 651, 658","parenthetical":"distinguishing \"evidence of noncompetitive behavior\" from \"evidence that the structure of the market was conducive to such behavior\"","sentence":"See Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360-61; see also In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 658 (7th Cir.2002) (Posner, J.) (distinguishing \u201cevidence of noncompetitive behavior\u201d from \u201cevidence that the structure of the market was conducive to such behavior\u201d)."},"case_id":4030147,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Facts discovered as a result of such an encounter may provide probable cause to support a custodial arrest. The defendant's conduct during the Terry stop and the discovery of the vial indicated that his prior activities were more than merely \"suspicious.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant's suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape","sentence":"See Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660 (Ind.1987) (defendant\u2019s suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape); State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La. 1983) (police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant\u2019s purse); see also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981) (officer\u2019s observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search); United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1981) (probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer's observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search","sentence":"See Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660 (Ind.1987) (defendant\u2019s suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape); State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La. 1983) (police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant\u2019s purse); see also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981) (officer\u2019s observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search); United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1981) (probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency)."},"case_id":10396075,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Facts discovered as a result of such an encounter may provide probable cause to support a custodial arrest. The defendant's conduct during the Terry stop and the discovery of the vial indicated that his prior activities were more than merely \"suspicious.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency","sentence":"See Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660 (Ind.1987) (defendant\u2019s suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape); State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La. 1983) (police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant\u2019s purse); see also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981) (officer\u2019s observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search); United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1981) (probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"defendant's suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape","sentence":"See Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660 (Ind.1987) (defendant\u2019s suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape); State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La. 1983) (police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant\u2019s purse); see also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981) (officer\u2019s observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search); United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1981) (probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency)."},"case_id":10396075,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Facts discovered as a result of such an encounter may provide probable cause to support a custodial arrest. The defendant's conduct during the Terry stop and the discovery of the vial indicated that his prior activities were more than merely \"suspicious.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"officer's observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search","sentence":"See Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660 (Ind.1987) (defendant\u2019s suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape); State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La. 1983) (police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant\u2019s purse); see also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981) (officer\u2019s observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search); United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1981) (probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant's purse","sentence":"See Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660 (Ind.1987) (defendant\u2019s suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape); State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La. 1983) (police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant\u2019s purse); see also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981) (officer\u2019s observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search); United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1981) (probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency)."},"case_id":10396075,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Facts discovered as a result of such an encounter may provide probable cause to support a custodial arrest. The defendant's conduct during the Terry stop and the discovery of the vial indicated that his prior activities were more than merely \"suspicious.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency","sentence":"See Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660 (Ind.1987) (defendant\u2019s suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape); State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La. 1983) (police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant\u2019s purse); see also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981) (officer\u2019s observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search); United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1981) (probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant's purse","sentence":"See Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660 (Ind.1987) (defendant\u2019s suspicious actions provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to open two small packages wrapped in duct tape); State v. Buckley, 426 So.2d 103 (La. 1983) (police observation of a suspicious transfer provided them with probable cause to search defendant\u2019s purse); see also United States v. Green, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981) (officer\u2019s observation of a suspicious transfer involving currency and a concealed object provided probable cause to search); United States v. White, 655 F.2d 1302 (D.C.Cir.1981) (probable cause to search found where, in a high narcotics area, police observed a transaction involving a small object and currency)."},"case_id":10396075,"label":"b"}
{"context":". Federal habeas petitioners are also required to fact plead their claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"512 U.S. 849, 856","parenthetical":"\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\" (citing 28 U.S.C. SS 2254 Rule 2(c)","sentence":"See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\u201d (citing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 Rule 2(c))); see also Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 808-13 (11th Cir.2011) (comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"646 F.3d 785, 808-13","parenthetical":"comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings","sentence":"See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\u201d (citing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 Rule 2(c))); see also Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 808-13 (11th Cir.2011) (comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings)."},"case_id":6050449,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Federal habeas petitioners are also required to fact plead their claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"114 S.Ct. 2568, 2572","parenthetical":"\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\" (citing 28 U.S.C. SS 2254 Rule 2(c)","sentence":"See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\u201d (citing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 Rule 2(c))); see also Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 808-13 (11th Cir.2011) (comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"646 F.3d 785, 808-13","parenthetical":"comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings","sentence":"See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\u201d (citing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 Rule 2(c))); see also Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 808-13 (11th Cir.2011) (comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings)."},"case_id":6050449,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Federal habeas petitioners are also required to fact plead their claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\" (citing 28 U.S.C. SS 2254 Rule 2(c)","sentence":"See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\u201d (citing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 Rule 2(c))); see also Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 808-13 (11th Cir.2011) (comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"646 F.3d 785, 808-13","parenthetical":"comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings","sentence":"See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 2572, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (\"Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements____\u201d (citing 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254 Rule 2(c))); see also Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 808-13 (11th Cir.2011) (comparing Alabama's post-conviction scheme to the federal rules governing habeas proceedings)."},"case_id":6050449,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"531 U.S. 24, 24, 27","parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 U.S. 30, 37","parenthetical":"\"[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of [the United States'] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"503 U.S. 30, 37","parenthetical":"\"[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of [the United States'] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"531 U.S. 24, 24, 27","parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of [the United States'] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of [the United States'] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"531 U.S. 24, 24, 27","parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of [the United States'] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the 'unequivocal expression' of elimination of [the United States'] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"501 U.S. 470, 470","parenthetical":"equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"531 U.S. 24, 24, 27","parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"501 U.S. 470, 470","parenthetical":"equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"531 U.S. 24, 24, 27","parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This argument fails for three reasons. First, when clarity in the text of a law is required, legislative history by definition cannot supply it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"requiring a \"clear statement\" to extend \"federal criminal jurisdiction\" to an area \"traditionally policed by the States\"","sentence":"See United States v. Nordic Village, 503 U.S. 30, 37, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992) (\u201c[Ljegisla-tive history has no bearing on the ambiguity point [because] ... the \u2018unequivocal expression\u2019 of elimination of [the United States\u2019] sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text.\u201d); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989) (\u201c[E]vi-dence of congressional intent must be both unequivocal and textual\u201d to provide the clarity necessary to abrogate a State\u2019s Eleventh Amendment immunity; \u201c[l]egis-lative history generally will be irrelevant.\u201d) (emphasis added); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. 2395 (equating the dear-statement rule applied in the sovereign immunity context with the clear-statement rule applied in the context of Commerce Clause, legislation that would alter the federal-state balance); see also Cleveland, 531 U.S. at 24, 27, 121 S.Ct. 365 (requiring a \u201cclear statement\u201d to extend \u201cfederal criminal jurisdiction\u201d to an area \u201ctraditionally policed by the States\u201d)."},"case_id":9296026,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 6. Had Bailey not raised the issue, however, this Court would be required to address the appealability of the circuit court's order on our own initiative.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"512 So.2d 897, 899","parenthetical":"noticing \"plain error in the improvident granting of [the] judgment,\" the supreme court dismissed the appeal sua sponte for improper Rule 54(b","sentence":"See Williams v. Delta Reg\u2019l Med. Ctr., 740 So.2d 284, 285(\u00b6 5) (Miss.1999) (although a party fails to raise the issue as to whether the circuit court\u2019s order is appealable, the appellate court \u201cmust address this question on [its] own initiative\u201d); see also Cox v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 512 So.2d 897, 899 (Miss.1987) (noticing \u201cplain error in the improvident granting of [the] judgment,\u201d the supreme court dismissed the appeal sua sponte for improper Rule 54(b) certification)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"740 So.2d 284, 285","parenthetical":"although a party fails to raise the issue as to whether the circuit court's order is appealable, the appellate court \"must address this question on [its] own initiative\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Delta Reg\u2019l Med. Ctr., 740 So.2d 284, 285(\u00b6 5) (Miss.1999) (although a party fails to raise the issue as to whether the circuit court\u2019s order is appealable, the appellate court \u201cmust address this question on [its] own initiative\u201d); see also Cox v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Friedrichs, Inc., 512 So.2d 897, 899 (Miss.1987) (noticing \u201cplain error in the improvident granting of [the] judgment,\u201d the supreme court dismissed the appeal sua sponte for improper Rule 54(b) certification)."},"case_id":7026372,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This makes no sense, and it would render the entitlement to sue an empty one. We decline to read the entitlement provision in this manner.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"833 U.S. 18, 27","parenthetical":"\"No rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Brown, 833 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (\u201cNo rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\u201d); see also Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C.1991) (\u201cCourts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"589 A.2d 1258, 1266","parenthetical":"\"Courts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Brown, 833 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (\u201cNo rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\u201d); see also Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C.1991) (\u201cCourts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\u201d)."},"case_id":6904145,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This makes no sense, and it would render the entitlement to sue an empty one. We decline to read the entitlement provision in this manner.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"No rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Brown, 833 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (\u201cNo rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\u201d); see also Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C.1991) (\u201cCourts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"589 A.2d 1258, 1266","parenthetical":"\"Courts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Brown, 833 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (\u201cNo rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\u201d); see also Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C.1991) (\u201cCourts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\u201d)."},"case_id":6904145,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This makes no sense, and it would render the entitlement to sue an empty one. We decline to read the entitlement provision in this manner.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"589 A.2d 1258, 1266","parenthetical":"\"Courts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Brown, 833 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (\u201cNo rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\u201d); see also Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C.1991) (\u201cCourts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"No rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Brown, 833 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948) (\u201cNo rule of [statutory] construction necessitates our acceptance. of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.\u201d); see also Abdulshakur v. District of Columbia, 589 A.2d 1258, 1266 (D.C.1991) (\u201cCourts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results.\u201d)."},"case_id":6904145,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Trial Tr. 605-07, ECF 356. Smiths' ongoing questions as to the effectiveness of its own internal dual tower alternating regenerative drying system further suggests that such solution was \"inventive\" as it yielded somewhat \"unexpected\" results in that it appears to have yielded a far longer desiccant life than Smiths anticipated.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"149 F.3d 1350, 1355","parenthetical":"stating that the \"objective evidence of nonobviousness includes ... unexpected results created by the claimed invention, [and] unexpected properties of the claimed invention\"","sentence":"See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (\"The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.\u201d); cf. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.Cir.1998) (stating that the \u201cobjective evidence of nonobviousness includes ... unexpected results created by the claimed invention, [and] unexpected properties of the claimed invention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"550 U.S. 416, 416","parenthetical":"\"The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.\"","sentence":"See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (\"The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.\u201d); cf. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.Cir.1998) (stating that the \u201cobjective evidence of nonobviousness includes ... unexpected results created by the claimed invention, [and] unexpected properties of the claimed invention\u201d)."},"case_id":3829013,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Trial Tr. 605-07, ECF 356. Smiths' ongoing questions as to the effectiveness of its own internal dual tower alternating regenerative drying system further suggests that such solution was \"inventive\" as it yielded somewhat \"unexpected\" results in that it appears to have yielded a far longer desiccant life than Smiths anticipated.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"149 F.3d 1350, 1355","parenthetical":"stating that the \"objective evidence of nonobviousness includes ... unexpected results created by the claimed invention, [and] unexpected properties of the claimed invention\"","sentence":"See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (\"The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.\u201d); cf. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.Cir.1998) (stating that the \u201cobjective evidence of nonobviousness includes ... unexpected results created by the claimed invention, [and] unexpected properties of the claimed invention\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.\"","sentence":"See KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (\"The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.\u201d); cf. In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.Cir.1998) (stating that the \u201cobjective evidence of nonobviousness includes ... unexpected results created by the claimed invention, [and] unexpected properties of the claimed invention\u201d)."},"case_id":3829013,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Pond's first explanation is foreclosed by our prior decisions. He cannot rely on the district court's opinion to identify deficiencies in his complaint, and it is not an abuse of discretion for a court to refuse leave to amend on this basis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"747 F.3d 444, 444-45","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion when a district court refused to allow a post-judgment amendment based on the plaintiffs' argument that \"they had no way of knowing that [a- letter] would factor heavily in the district court's decision\"","sentence":"See Kuyat, 747 F.3d at 444-45 (finding no abuse of discretion when a district court refused to allow a post-judgment amendment based on the plaintiffs\u2019 argument that \u201cthey had no way of knowing that [a- letter] would factor heavily in the district court\u2019s decision\u201d); Leisure Caviar, 616 F.3d at 616-17 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion when a district court denied the plaintiffs request to \u201creopen the case by amending their complaint to take account of the court\u2019s decision\u201d); see also Ricker, 534 Fed.Appx. at 501 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion for denying a post-judgment motion to amend when the plaintiff claimed he was \u201cunaware\u201d of the defects in the complaint and deserved an opportunity to correct them)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"534 Fed.Appx. 501, 501","parenthetical":"refusing to find an abuse of discretion for denying a post-judgment motion to amend when the plaintiff claimed he was \"unaware\" of the defects in the complaint and deserved an opportunity to correct them","sentence":"See Kuyat, 747 F.3d at 444-45 (finding no abuse of discretion when a district court refused to allow a post-judgment amendment based on the plaintiffs\u2019 argument that \u201cthey had no way of knowing that [a- letter] would factor heavily in the district court\u2019s decision\u201d); Leisure Caviar, 616 F.3d at 616-17 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion when a district court denied the plaintiffs request to \u201creopen the case by amending their complaint to take account of the court\u2019s decision\u201d); see also Ricker, 534 Fed.Appx. at 501 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion for denying a post-judgment motion to amend when the plaintiff claimed he was \u201cunaware\u201d of the defects in the complaint and deserved an opportunity to correct them)."},"case_id":12391885,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Pond's first explanation is foreclosed by our prior decisions. He cannot rely on the district court's opinion to identify deficiencies in his complaint, and it is not an abuse of discretion for a court to refuse leave to amend on this basis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"616 F.3d 616, 616-17","parenthetical":"refusing to find an abuse of discretion when a district court denied the plaintiffs request to \"reopen the case by amending their complaint to take account of the court's decision\"","sentence":"See Kuyat, 747 F.3d at 444-45 (finding no abuse of discretion when a district court refused to allow a post-judgment amendment based on the plaintiffs\u2019 argument that \u201cthey had no way of knowing that [a- letter] would factor heavily in the district court\u2019s decision\u201d); Leisure Caviar, 616 F.3d at 616-17 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion when a district court denied the plaintiffs request to \u201creopen the case by amending their complaint to take account of the court\u2019s decision\u201d); see also Ricker, 534 Fed.Appx. at 501 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion for denying a post-judgment motion to amend when the plaintiff claimed he was \u201cunaware\u201d of the defects in the complaint and deserved an opportunity to correct them)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"534 Fed.Appx. 501, 501","parenthetical":"refusing to find an abuse of discretion for denying a post-judgment motion to amend when the plaintiff claimed he was \"unaware\" of the defects in the complaint and deserved an opportunity to correct them","sentence":"See Kuyat, 747 F.3d at 444-45 (finding no abuse of discretion when a district court refused to allow a post-judgment amendment based on the plaintiffs\u2019 argument that \u201cthey had no way of knowing that [a- letter] would factor heavily in the district court\u2019s decision\u201d); Leisure Caviar, 616 F.3d at 616-17 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion when a district court denied the plaintiffs request to \u201creopen the case by amending their complaint to take account of the court\u2019s decision\u201d); see also Ricker, 534 Fed.Appx. at 501 (refusing to find an abuse of discretion for denying a post-judgment motion to amend when the plaintiff claimed he was \u201cunaware\u201d of the defects in the complaint and deserved an opportunity to correct them)."},"case_id":12391885,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Whether the failure resulted from excusable neglect depends on the nature of the omission itself, both in terms of cause and culpability. Consequently, until the reason for the omission is determined to be sufficiently blameless, the consequences of the failure, such as the effect on the parties or the impact on the judicial system, are not relevant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"839 F.2d 220, 221","parenthetical":"no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"845 F.2d 57, 60","parenthetical":"\"The court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\"","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"case_id":6527745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Whether the failure resulted from excusable neglect depends on the nature of the omission itself, both in terms of cause and culpability. Consequently, until the reason for the omission is determined to be sufficiently blameless, the consequences of the failure, such as the effect on the parties or the impact on the judicial system, are not relevant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"767 F.2d 814, 819","parenthetical":"The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"839 F.2d 220, 221","parenthetical":"no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"case_id":6527745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Whether the failure resulted from excusable neglect depends on the nature of the omission itself, both in terms of cause and culpability. Consequently, until the reason for the omission is determined to be sufficiently blameless, the consequences of the failure, such as the effect on the parties or the impact on the judicial system, are not relevant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"839 F.2d 220, 221","parenthetical":"no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"case_id":6527745,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Whether the failure resulted from excusable neglect depends on the nature of the omission itself, both in terms of cause and culpability. Consequently, until the reason for the omission is determined to be sufficiently blameless, the consequences of the failure, such as the effect on the parties or the impact on the judicial system, are not relevant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"839 F.2d 220, 221","parenthetical":"no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"case_id":6527745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Whether the failure resulted from excusable neglect depends on the nature of the omission itself, both in terms of cause and culpability. Consequently, until the reason for the omission is determined to be sufficiently blameless, the consequences of the failure, such as the effect on the parties or the impact on the judicial system, are not relevant.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"839 F.2d 220, 221","parenthetical":"no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles","sentence":"In re Vertientes, Ltd., 845 F.2d 57, 60 (CA3 1988) (\u201cThe court has no discretion to grant an extension simply because no prejudice would result, or for any other equitable reason\u201d); In re South Atlantic Financial Corp., 767 F.2d 814, 819 (CA11 1985) (The focus of the Rule is on the omission and the reasons therefor rather than on the effect on others), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1015, 106 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed.2d 311 (1986); see also Maressa v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 220, 221 (CA4 1988) (no exception to claim filing deadlines based on general equitable principles)."},"case_id":6527745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"In deciding cases . . . [j]urors are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experiences, but rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive at an intelligent and correct conclusion. . . . Therefore, it is entirely proper for counsel to appeal to a jury's common sense in closing remarks.\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"53 Conn. App. 269, 281","parenthetical":"prosecutor's remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors' common knowledge","sentence":"State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutor\u2019s remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors\u2019 common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that \u201c \u2018gasoline is heavier than air\u2019 \u201d not improper because \u201cmost people would know\u201d that fact)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"259 Conn. 716, n.22","parenthetical":"remark that \" 'gasoline is heavier than air' \" not improper because \"most people would know\" that fact","sentence":"State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutor\u2019s remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors\u2019 common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that \u201c \u2018gasoline is heavier than air\u2019 \u201d not improper because \u201cmost people would know\u201d that fact)."},"case_id":2636136,"label":"a"}
{"context":"\"In deciding cases . . . [j]urors are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experiences, but rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive at an intelligent and correct conclusion. . . . Therefore, it is entirely proper for counsel to appeal to a jury's common sense in closing remarks.\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"259 Conn. 716, n.22","parenthetical":"remark that \" 'gasoline is heavier than air' \" not improper because \"most people would know\" that fact","sentence":"State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutor\u2019s remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors\u2019 common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that \u201c \u2018gasoline is heavier than air\u2019 \u201d not improper because \u201cmost people would know\u201d that fact)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors' common knowledge","sentence":"State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutor\u2019s remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors\u2019 common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that \u201c \u2018gasoline is heavier than air\u2019 \u201d not improper because \u201cmost people would know\u201d that fact)."},"case_id":2636136,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"In deciding cases . . . [j]urors are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experiences, but rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive at an intelligent and correct conclusion. . . . Therefore, it is entirely proper for counsel to appeal to a jury's common sense in closing remarks.\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"259 Conn. 716, n.22","parenthetical":"remark that \" 'gasoline is heavier than air' \" not improper because \"most people would know\" that fact","sentence":"State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutor\u2019s remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors\u2019 common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that \u201c \u2018gasoline is heavier than air\u2019 \u201d not improper because \u201cmost people would know\u201d that fact)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors' common knowledge","sentence":"State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutor\u2019s remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors\u2019 common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that \u201c \u2018gasoline is heavier than air\u2019 \u201d not improper because \u201cmost people would know\u201d that fact)."},"case_id":2636136,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"In deciding cases . . . [j]urors are not expected to lay aside matters of common knowledge or their own observations and experiences, but rather, to apply them to the facts as presented to arrive at an intelligent and correct conclusion. . . . Therefore, it is entirely proper for counsel to appeal to a jury's common sense in closing remarks.\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"259 Conn. 716, n.22","parenthetical":"remark that \" 'gasoline is heavier than air' \" not improper because \"most people would know\" that fact","sentence":"State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutor\u2019s remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors\u2019 common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that \u201c \u2018gasoline is heavier than air\u2019 \u201d not improper because \u201cmost people would know\u201d that fact)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prosecutor's remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors' common knowledge","sentence":"State v. Rolli, 53 Conn. App. 269, 281, 729 A.2d 245 (prosecutor\u2019s remarks about driving time on Interstate 95 from West Haven to New Haven permissible appeal to jurors\u2019 common knowledge), cert. denied, 249 Conn. 926, 733 A.2d 850 (1999); see also State v. Singh, supra, 259 Conn. 716 n.22 (remark that \u201c \u2018gasoline is heavier than air\u2019 \u201d not improper because \u201cmost people would know\u201d that fact)."},"case_id":2636136,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defenses at 4-5; Def.'s Post-Trial Brief at 2-7, 13.) The burden is on Northam to establish non-conformity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming","sentence":"Weir v. Crown Equipment Corp., 217 F.3d 453, 466 (7th Cir.2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the def\u00e9ndant to establish its elements); see also Abatron, Inc. v. Fulton Contracting Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 692, 125 Ill.Dec. 158, 530 N.E.2d 76, 81 (1988) (court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming). ' The evidence is evaluated in light of that burden."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"217 F.3d 453, 466","parenthetical":"when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the defendant to establish its elements","sentence":"Weir v. Crown Equipment Corp., 217 F.3d 453, 466 (7th Cir.2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the def\u00e9ndant to establish its elements); see also Abatron, Inc. v. Fulton Contracting Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 692, 125 Ill.Dec. 158, 530 N.E.2d 76, 81 (1988) (court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming). ' The evidence is evaluated in light of that burden."},"case_id":9238115,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defenses at 4-5; Def.'s Post-Trial Brief at 2-7, 13.) The burden is on Northam to establish non-conformity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming","sentence":"Weir v. Crown Equipment Corp., 217 F.3d 453, 466 (7th Cir.2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the def\u00e9ndant to establish its elements); see also Abatron, Inc. v. Fulton Contracting Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 692, 125 Ill.Dec. 158, 530 N.E.2d 76, 81 (1988) (court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming). ' The evidence is evaluated in light of that burden."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"217 F.3d 453, 466","parenthetical":"when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the defendant to establish its elements","sentence":"Weir v. Crown Equipment Corp., 217 F.3d 453, 466 (7th Cir.2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the def\u00e9ndant to establish its elements); see also Abatron, Inc. v. Fulton Contracting Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 692, 125 Ill.Dec. 158, 530 N.E.2d 76, 81 (1988) (court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming). ' The evidence is evaluated in light of that burden."},"case_id":9238115,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defenses at 4-5; Def.'s Post-Trial Brief at 2-7, 13.) The burden is on Northam to establish non-conformity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"217 F.3d 453, 466","parenthetical":"when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the defendant to establish its elements","sentence":"Weir v. Crown Equipment Corp., 217 F.3d 453, 466 (7th Cir.2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the def\u00e9ndant to establish its elements); see also Abatron, Inc. v. Fulton Contracting Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 692, 125 Ill.Dec. 158, 530 N.E.2d 76, 81 (1988) (court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming). ' The evidence is evaluated in light of that burden."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"530 N.E.2d 76, 81","parenthetical":"court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming","sentence":"Weir v. Crown Equipment Corp., 217 F.3d 453, 466 (7th Cir.2000) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (when an affirmative defense is raised, the burden is on the def\u00e9ndant to establish its elements); see also Abatron, Inc. v. Fulton Contracting Co., 175 Ill.App.3d 692, 125 Ill.Dec. 158, 530 N.E.2d 76, 81 (1988) (court held that the buyer did not sustain its burden of proving the product was nonconforming). ' The evidence is evaluated in light of that burden."},"case_id":9238115,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Baranda concedes, as he must, that he could not collaterally attack his prior conviction as the district court allowed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"36 F.3d 875, 885","parenthetical":"holding that a defendant cannot collaterally challenge a prior conviction used to calculate criminal history points","sentence":"See United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 885 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a defendant cannot collaterally challenge a prior conviction used to calculate criminal history points); see also Clawson v. United States, 52 F.3d 806, 807 (9th Cir.1995) (concluding that a defendant has \u201cno constitutional right to collaterally attack the validity of a state conviction in a federal sentencing hearing on any basis other than denial of the right to counsel.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"52 F.3d 806, 807","parenthetical":"concluding that a defendant has \"no constitutional right to collaterally attack the validity of a state conviction in a federal sentencing hearing on any basis other than denial of the right to counsel.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 885 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a defendant cannot collaterally challenge a prior conviction used to calculate criminal history points); see also Clawson v. United States, 52 F.3d 806, 807 (9th Cir.1995) (concluding that a defendant has \u201cno constitutional right to collaterally attack the validity of a state conviction in a federal sentencing hearing on any basis other than denial of the right to counsel.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":1280427,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This result is not inconsistent with the federal court decisions cited by Pretty Products in its memorandum contra. While CERCLA does contain express provisions preserving additional liability under state law, see 42 U.S.C. SS 9614(a), 42 U.S.C. SS 9607(e), and 42 U.S.C. SS 9652(d), these general provisions must be read in the context of the specific provision granting contribution immunity to settling parties. 42 U.S.C. SS 9613(f). Thus, because virtually every case cited by Pretty Products occurred outside the context of a settlement between the government and various potentially responsible parties, the decisions do not consider the effect of SS 9613(f) and are inapposite.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement, with no consideration of SS 9613(f","sentence":"See Boone v. DuBose, 718 F.Supp. 479 (M.D.La.1988) (involving motion to remand, not judicially approved CERCLA settlement); Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham, 715 F.Supp. 701 (E.D.Pa.1989) (occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement, with no consideration of \u00a7 9613(f)); United States v. Moore, 703 F.Supp. 460 (E.D.Va.1988) (occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement); Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D.Va.1986) (occurring before operation of SARA amendments and outside the context of a judicially approved settlement); but see Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F.Supp. 626, 639 (D.N.J.1990) (finding that \u201cCERCLA does not restrict the right to common law indemnification\u201d in the context of a judicially approved settlement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"730 F.Supp. 626, 639","parenthetical":"finding that \"CERCLA does not restrict the right to common law indemnification\" in the context of a judicially approved settlement","sentence":"See Boone v. DuBose, 718 F.Supp. 479 (M.D.La.1988) (involving motion to remand, not judicially approved CERCLA settlement); Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham, 715 F.Supp. 701 (E.D.Pa.1989) (occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement, with no consideration of \u00a7 9613(f)); United States v. Moore, 703 F.Supp. 460 (E.D.Va.1988) (occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement); Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D.Va.1986) (occurring before operation of SARA amendments and outside the context of a judicially approved settlement); but see Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F.Supp. 626, 639 (D.N.J.1990) (finding that \u201cCERCLA does not restrict the right to common law indemnification\u201d in the context of a judicially approved settlement)."},"case_id":7413130,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This result is not inconsistent with the federal court decisions cited by Pretty Products in its memorandum contra. While CERCLA does contain express provisions preserving additional liability under state law, see 42 U.S.C. SS 9614(a), 42 U.S.C. SS 9607(e), and 42 U.S.C. SS 9652(d), these general provisions must be read in the context of the specific provision granting contribution immunity to settling parties. 42 U.S.C. SS 9613(f). Thus, because virtually every case cited by Pretty Products occurred outside the context of a settlement between the government and various potentially responsible parties, the decisions do not consider the effect of SS 9613(f) and are inapposite.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"730 F.Supp. 626, 639","parenthetical":"finding that \"CERCLA does not restrict the right to common law indemnification\" in the context of a judicially approved settlement","sentence":"See Boone v. DuBose, 718 F.Supp. 479 (M.D.La.1988) (involving motion to remand, not judicially approved CERCLA settlement); Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham, 715 F.Supp. 701 (E.D.Pa.1989) (occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement, with no consideration of \u00a7 9613(f)); United States v. Moore, 703 F.Supp. 460 (E.D.Va.1988) (occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement); Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D.Va.1986) (occurring before operation of SARA amendments and outside the context of a judicially approved settlement); but see Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F.Supp. 626, 639 (D.N.J.1990) (finding that \u201cCERCLA does not restrict the right to common law indemnification\u201d in the context of a judicially approved settlement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"occurring before operation of SARA amendments and outside the context of a judicially approved settlement","sentence":"See Boone v. DuBose, 718 F.Supp. 479 (M.D.La.1988) (involving motion to remand, not judicially approved CERCLA settlement); Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. Cockerham, 715 F.Supp. 701 (E.D.Pa.1989) (occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement, with no consideration of \u00a7 9613(f)); United States v. Moore, 703 F.Supp. 460 (E.D.Va.1988) (occurring outside the context of a judicially approved settlement); Allied Towing Corp. v. Great Eastern Petroleum Corp., 642 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D.Va.1986) (occurring before operation of SARA amendments and outside the context of a judicially approved settlement); but see Allied Corp. v. Frola, 730 F.Supp. 626, 639 (D.N.J.1990) (finding that \u201cCERCLA does not restrict the right to common law indemnification\u201d in the context of a judicially approved settlement)."},"case_id":7413130,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defense counsel agreed that the prosecutor could \"make a statement on opening ... [that] the evidence will show [defendant] knew he was not to escape or knew he was on some sort of notice,\" but objected to \"quoting the statement of the [ALJ].\" The court overruled defendant's objection, stating that the tape concerned the knowledge of defendant and merely duplicated the warrant which committed defendant to prison. We therefore hold that the tape was offered to prove notice to defendant and was not hearsay.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the thing asserted and to prove the existence of notice, no abuse of discretion in its admission","sentence":"See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo.1984)(where evidence offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the thing asserted and to prove the existence of notice, no abuse of discretion in its admission); see also Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972)(where testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, but solely to prove notice, which is a state of mind, hearsay rule does not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, but solely to prove notice, which is a state of mind, hearsay rule does not apply","sentence":"See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo.1984)(where evidence offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the thing asserted and to prove the existence of notice, no abuse of discretion in its admission); see also Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972)(where testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, but solely to prove notice, which is a state of mind, hearsay rule does not apply)."},"case_id":9100075,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defense counsel agreed that the prosecutor could \"make a statement on opening ... [that] the evidence will show [defendant] knew he was not to escape or knew he was on some sort of notice,\" but objected to \"quoting the statement of the [ALJ].\" The court overruled defendant's objection, stating that the tape concerned the knowledge of defendant and merely duplicated the warrant which committed defendant to prison. We therefore hold that the tape was offered to prove notice to defendant and was not hearsay.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, but solely to prove notice, which is a state of mind, hearsay rule does not apply","sentence":"See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo.1984)(where evidence offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the thing asserted and to prove the existence of notice, no abuse of discretion in its admission); see also Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972)(where testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, but solely to prove notice, which is a state of mind, hearsay rule does not apply)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the thing asserted and to prove the existence of notice, no abuse of discretion in its admission","sentence":"See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo.1984)(where evidence offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the thing asserted and to prove the existence of notice, no abuse of discretion in its admission); see also Player v. Thompson, 259 S.C. 600, 193 S.E.2d 531 (1972)(where testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, but solely to prove notice, which is a state of mind, hearsay rule does not apply)."},"case_id":9100075,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In making such an argument, the parties betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of civil judgments. The courts have made amply clear that judgments are public property, and -- once entered -- cannot be bought and sold, vacated and modified, for the convenience of the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"11 F.3d 385, 385","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile this Court has encouraged the parties to settle cases before the filing of a decision that is not reviewable as of right, once such a decision has been rendered we decline to allow them to dictate, by purchase and sale, whether the precedent it sets will remain in existence.\"","sentence":"See Yanakas, 11 F.3d at 385 (\u201c[Wjhile this Court has encouraged the parties to settle cases before the filing of a decision that is not reviewable as of right, once such a decision has been rendered we decline to allow them to dictate, by purchase and sale, whether the precedent it sets will remain in existence.\u201d) The courts have undeniably been more flexible where vacatur would bring an end to the tortured history of a litigation, opening a door to settlement by relieving some party from having to fight an undesirable ruling on appeal. Here, however, there exists no such competing interest."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 U.S. 25, 25","parenthetical":"equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \"the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\"","sentence":"See Major League Baseball Properties, 150 F.3d at 151 (\u201c[Wjhen a judgment is mooted by settlement, vacatur is usually not justified because the social value in preserving precedents is not outweighed by equitable considerations.\u201d); see also U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25, 115 S.Ct. 386 (equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \u201cthe losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\u201d)"},"case_id":167415,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In making such an argument, the parties betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of civil judgments. The courts have made amply clear that judgments are public property, and -- once entered -- cannot be bought and sold, vacated and modified, for the convenience of the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"11 F.3d 385, 385","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhile this Court has encouraged the parties to settle cases before the filing of a decision that is not reviewable as of right, once such a decision has been rendered we decline to allow them to dictate, by purchase and sale, whether the precedent it sets will remain in existence.\"","sentence":"See Yanakas, 11 F.3d at 385 (\u201c[Wjhile this Court has encouraged the parties to settle cases before the filing of a decision that is not reviewable as of right, once such a decision has been rendered we decline to allow them to dictate, by purchase and sale, whether the precedent it sets will remain in existence.\u201d) The courts have undeniably been more flexible where vacatur would bring an end to the tortured history of a litigation, opening a door to settlement by relieving some party from having to fight an undesirable ruling on appeal. Here, however, there exists no such competing interest."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \"the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\"","sentence":"See Major League Baseball Properties, 150 F.3d at 151 (\u201c[Wjhen a judgment is mooted by settlement, vacatur is usually not justified because the social value in preserving precedents is not outweighed by equitable considerations.\u201d); see also U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25, 115 S.Ct. 386 (equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \u201cthe losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\u201d)"},"case_id":167415,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In making such an argument, the parties betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of civil judgments. The courts have made amply clear that judgments are public property, and -- once entered -- cannot be bought and sold, vacated and modified, for the convenience of the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"150 F.3d 151, 151","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen a judgment is mooted by settlement, vacatur is usually not justified because the social value in preserving precedents is not outweighed by equitable considerations.\"","sentence":"See Major League Baseball Properties, 150 F.3d at 151 (\u201c[Wjhen a judgment is mooted by settlement, vacatur is usually not justified because the social value in preserving precedents is not outweighed by equitable considerations.\u201d); see also U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25, 115 S.Ct. 386 (equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \u201cthe losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 U.S. 25, 25","parenthetical":"equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \"the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\"","sentence":"See Major League Baseball Properties, 150 F.3d at 151 (\u201c[Wjhen a judgment is mooted by settlement, vacatur is usually not justified because the social value in preserving precedents is not outweighed by equitable considerations.\u201d); see also U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25, 115 S.Ct. 386 (equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \u201cthe losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\u201d)"},"case_id":167415,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In making such an argument, the parties betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of civil judgments. The courts have made amply clear that judgments are public property, and -- once entered -- cannot be bought and sold, vacated and modified, for the convenience of the parties.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"150 F.3d 151, 151","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhen a judgment is mooted by settlement, vacatur is usually not justified because the social value in preserving precedents is not outweighed by equitable considerations.\"","sentence":"See Major League Baseball Properties, 150 F.3d at 151 (\u201c[Wjhen a judgment is mooted by settlement, vacatur is usually not justified because the social value in preserving precedents is not outweighed by equitable considerations.\u201d); see also U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25, 115 S.Ct. 386 (equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \u201cthe losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \"the losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\"","sentence":"See Major League Baseball Properties, 150 F.3d at 151 (\u201c[Wjhen a judgment is mooted by settlement, vacatur is usually not justified because the social value in preserving precedents is not outweighed by equitable considerations.\u201d); see also U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 25, 115 S.Ct. 386 (equitable rationale does not justify vacatur if judgment mooted by settlement because by settling \u201cthe losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal or certiorari, thereby surrendering his claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur. The judgment is not unreviewable, but simply unreviewed by his own choice.\u201d)"},"case_id":167415,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Contrary to Tapia's contention, the IJ did not violate her due process rights by admitting her statements to immigration officials in the Form 1-213, Record of Inadmissible Alien, and a transcript of her sworn interview.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"588 F.2d 1274, 1278","parenthetical":"\"the bare assertion that a statement is involuntary is insufficient\" to prove coercion","sentence":"See Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir.1979) (\u201cthe bare assertion that a statement is involuntary is insufficient\u201d to prove coercion); see also Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201cThe burden of establishing a basis for exclusion of evidence from a government record falls on the opponent of the evidence, who must come forward with enough negative factors to persuade the court not to admit it.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"45 F.3d 308, 310","parenthetical":"\"The burden of establishing a basis for exclusion of evidence from a government record falls on the opponent of the evidence, who must come forward with enough negative factors to persuade the court not to admit it.\"","sentence":"See Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir.1979) (\u201cthe bare assertion that a statement is involuntary is insufficient\u201d to prove coercion); see also Espinoza v. INS, 45 F.3d 308, 310 (9th Cir.1995) (\u201cThe burden of establishing a basis for exclusion of evidence from a government record falls on the opponent of the evidence, who must come forward with enough negative factors to persuade the court not to admit it.\u201d)."},"case_id":3581742,"label":"a"}
{"context":"1. Based on the material inconsistencies between Reddy's asylum application and his testimony, his failure to produce corroborating evidence, his non-responsiveness, and his testimony concerning events not included in his asylum application, there was substantial evidence supporting the adverse credibility determination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"257 F.3d 1038, 1045","parenthetical":"\"The Board had reason to question [Reddy's] credibility, it supplied specific reasons that related to the basis for his claim, and he failed to produce non-duplicative, material, easily available corroborating evidence and gave no explanation for such failure.\"","sentence":"See Chebchoub v. I.N.S., 257 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe Board had reason to question [Reddy\u2019s] credibility, it supplied specific reasons that related to the basis for his claim, and he failed to produce non-duplicative, material, easily available corroborating evidence and gave no explanation for such failure.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Alvarez-Santos v. I.N.S., 332 F.3d 1245, 1254 (9th Cir.2003) (concluding that adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence because of a \u201cmajor inconsistency.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"332 F.3d 1245, 1254","parenthetical":"concluding that adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence because of a \"major inconsistency.\"","sentence":"See Chebchoub v. I.N.S., 257 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir.2001) (\u201cThe Board had reason to question [Reddy\u2019s] credibility, it supplied specific reasons that related to the basis for his claim, and he failed to produce non-duplicative, material, easily available corroborating evidence and gave no explanation for such failure.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also Alvarez-Santos v. I.N.S., 332 F.3d 1245, 1254 (9th Cir.2003) (concluding that adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence because of a \u201cmajor inconsistency.\u201d)."},"case_id":3592234,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553","parenthetical":"holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee's status","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee's status","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232","parenthetical":"holding that \"the docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\"","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"the docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\"","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553","parenthetical":"holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee's status","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee's status","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232","parenthetical":"holding that \"the docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\"","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"the docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\"","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553","parenthetical":"holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee's status","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee's status","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232","parenthetical":"holding that \"the docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\"","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"the docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\"","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553","parenthetical":"holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee's status","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee's status","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232","parenthetical":"holding that \"the docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\"","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a number of district courts, have held that the required use of accrued benefits to cover partial day absences from work does not violate the salary basis test.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that \"the docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\"","sentence":"Barner v. City of Novato, 17 F.3d 1256, 1261-62 (9th Cir.1994); Aaron v. City of Wichita, 54 F.3d 652, 658 (10th Cir.); Bennett v. City of Albuquerque, No. 94-2094, 1995 WL 230315 (10th Cir. Apr.18, 1995), (holding that absent a specific policy to reduce the amount of pay, as opposed to reductions in accrued benefits, the salary basis concept is not violated), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 965, 116 S.Ct. 419, 133 L.Ed.2d 336 (1995); see also Kuchinskas v. Broward County, 840 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (S.D.Fla.l993)(holding that leave banks do not constitute salary and that any reduction to leave banks would not negate an exempt employee\u2019s status), aff'd, 86 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir.1996), petition for cert, filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3342 (Oct. 22, 1996) (No. 96-652); International Ass\u2019n of Fire Fighters, Alexandria Local 2141 v. City of Alexandria, 720 F.Supp. 1230, 1232 (E.D.Va.l989)(holding that \u201cthe docking of leave or accrued compensatory time for absences of less than an entire day [does not] defeat salaried status\u201d), affd without opinion, 912 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1990)."},"case_id":226654,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Contrary to the suggestion in appellant's brief, nothing in this holding suggests that we would sustain a finding that a defendant who was \"under the influence\" was in physical control of her vehicle if the evidence was merely that she ''possessed] keys to a vehicle in her vicinity\" or was \"waiting outside near [the] vehicle with keys in [her] pocket waiting for a taxi [she had] called to take [her] home[.]\" But, as some courts have found, \"an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"535 P.2d 1023, 1024","parenthetical":"acknowledging that \"[t]he danger is less than where an intoxicated person is actually driving a vehicle,\" but reasoning that there still \"is a legitimate inference to be drawn that he placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at any time started the automobile and driven away\"","sentence":"Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla.Crim.App.1975) (emphasis added) (acknowledging that \"[t]he danger is less than where an intoxicated person is actually driving a vehicle,\u201d but reasoning that there still \u201cis a legitimate inference to be drawn that he placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at any time started the automobile and driven away\u201d); see also City of Naperville v. Watson, 175 Ill.2d 399, 222 IIl.Dec. 421, 677 N.E.2d 955, 958-59 (1997) (\u201cA person may embark upon an evening of drinking with the intention of sleeping in his or her car, but the actual decision whether to do so will be made at a time when the person\u2019s judgment is impaired by alcohol.\u201d); Thorne v. Contee, 80 Md.App. 481, 565 A.2d 102, 107 (Md.Ct."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A person may embark upon an evening of drinking with the intention of sleeping in his or her car, but the actual decision whether to do so will be made at a time when the person's judgment is impaired by alcohol.\"","sentence":"Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla.Crim.App.1975) (emphasis added) (acknowledging that \"[t]he danger is less than where an intoxicated person is actually driving a vehicle,\u201d but reasoning that there still \u201cis a legitimate inference to be drawn that he placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at any time started the automobile and driven away\u201d); see also City of Naperville v. Watson, 175 Ill.2d 399, 222 IIl.Dec. 421, 677 N.E.2d 955, 958-59 (1997) (\u201cA person may embark upon an evening of drinking with the intention of sleeping in his or her car, but the actual decision whether to do so will be made at a time when the person\u2019s judgment is impaired by alcohol.\u201d); Thorne v. Contee, 80 Md.App. 481, 565 A.2d 102, 107 (Md.Ct."},"case_id":6821256,"label":"a"}
{"context":". Contrary to the suggestion in appellant's brief, nothing in this holding suggests that we would sustain a finding that a defendant who was \"under the influence\" was in physical control of her vehicle if the evidence was merely that she ''possessed] keys to a vehicle in her vicinity\" or was \"waiting outside near [the] vehicle with keys in [her] pocket waiting for a taxi [she had] called to take [her] home[.]\" But, as some courts have found, \"an intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"677 N.E.2d 955, 958-59","parenthetical":"\"A person may embark upon an evening of drinking with the intention of sleeping in his or her car, but the actual decision whether to do so will be made at a time when the person's judgment is impaired by alcohol.\"","sentence":"Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla.Crim.App.1975) (emphasis added) (acknowledging that \"[t]he danger is less than where an intoxicated person is actually driving a vehicle,\u201d but reasoning that there still \u201cis a legitimate inference to be drawn that he placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at any time started the automobile and driven away\u201d); see also City of Naperville v. Watson, 175 Ill.2d 399, 222 IIl.Dec. 421, 677 N.E.2d 955, 958-59 (1997) (\u201cA person may embark upon an evening of drinking with the intention of sleeping in his or her car, but the actual decision whether to do so will be made at a time when the person\u2019s judgment is impaired by alcohol.\u201d); Thorne v. Contee, 80 Md.App. 481, 565 A.2d 102, 107 (Md.Ct."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"535 P.2d 1023, 1024","parenthetical":"acknowledging that \"[t]he danger is less than where an intoxicated person is actually driving a vehicle,\" but reasoning that there still \"is a legitimate inference to be drawn that he placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at any time started the automobile and driven away\"","sentence":"Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Okla.Crim.App.1975) (emphasis added) (acknowledging that \"[t]he danger is less than where an intoxicated person is actually driving a vehicle,\u201d but reasoning that there still \u201cis a legitimate inference to be drawn that he placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at any time started the automobile and driven away\u201d); see also City of Naperville v. Watson, 175 Ill.2d 399, 222 IIl.Dec. 421, 677 N.E.2d 955, 958-59 (1997) (\u201cA person may embark upon an evening of drinking with the intention of sleeping in his or her car, but the actual decision whether to do so will be made at a time when the person\u2019s judgment is impaired by alcohol.\u201d); Thorne v. Contee, 80 Md.App. 481, 565 A.2d 102, 107 (Md.Ct."},"case_id":6821256,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, as Cheung points out, pre-1871 decisions did refer to Indian nations as non-sovereign, or at least as less than fully sovereign.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Indian \"rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831); see also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U.S. 548, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) (Indian \u201crights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\u201d); but see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) (describing Indian nations as \u201cdistinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing Indian nations as \"distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831); see also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U.S. 548, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) (Indian \u201crights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\u201d); but see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) (describing Indian nations as \u201cdistinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\u201d)."},"case_id":8944462,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, as Cheung points out, pre-1871 decisions did refer to Indian nations as non-sovereign, or at least as less than fully sovereign.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"21 U.S. 548, 574","parenthetical":"Indian \"rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831); see also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U.S. 548, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) (Indian \u201crights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\u201d); but see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) (describing Indian nations as \u201cdistinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing Indian nations as \"distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831); see also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U.S. 548, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) (Indian \u201crights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\u201d); but see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) (describing Indian nations as \u201cdistinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\u201d)."},"case_id":8944462,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Second, as Cheung points out, pre-1871 decisions did refer to Indian nations as non-sovereign, or at least as less than fully sovereign.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"describing Indian nations as \"distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831); see also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U.S. 548, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) (Indian \u201crights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\u201d); but see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) (describing Indian nations as \u201cdistinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Indian \"rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L.Ed. 25 (1831); see also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 21 U.S. 548, 574, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) (Indian \u201crights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished\u201d); but see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 8 L.Ed. 483 (1832) (describing Indian nations as \u201cdistinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil\u201d)."},"case_id":8944462,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Oh this point, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained: \"Redaction of personal information, however, does not divest the privileged status of confidential records. Redaction is merely a tool that a court may use to safeguard the personal, identifying information within confidential records that have become subject to disclosure either by waiver or by an exception.\" Roe, 912 N.E,2d at 71. And other than a desire to prove their claim with additional, duplicative information, Plaintiffs have offered no reason, such as a competing right, which compels production of any information in the records.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32","parenthetical":"allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to proffer a defense","sentence":"See Milstead v. Smith, 2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32, 883 N.W.2d 711, 723 (allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to proffer a defense); Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, 883 N.W.2d 725 (holding the same); see also Novotny v. Sacred Heart Health Servs., 2016 S.D. 75, 887 N.W.2d 83 (rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege","sentence":"See Milstead v. Smith, 2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32, 883 N.W.2d 711, 723 (allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to proffer a defense); Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, 883 N.W.2d 725 (holding the same); see also Novotny v. Sacred Heart Health Servs., 2016 S.D. 75, 887 N.W.2d 83 (rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege)."},"case_id":12152029,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Oh this point, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained: \"Redaction of personal information, however, does not divest the privileged status of confidential records. Redaction is merely a tool that a court may use to safeguard the personal, identifying information within confidential records that have become subject to disclosure either by waiver or by an exception.\" Roe, 912 N.E,2d at 71. And other than a desire to prove their claim with additional, duplicative information, Plaintiffs have offered no reason, such as a competing right, which compels production of any information in the records.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege","sentence":"See Milstead v. Smith, 2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32, 883 N.W.2d 711, 723 (allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to proffer a defense); Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, 883 N.W.2d 725 (holding the same); see also Novotny v. Sacred Heart Health Servs., 2016 S.D. 75, 887 N.W.2d 83 (rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32","parenthetical":"allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to proffer a defense","sentence":"See Milstead v. Smith, 2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32, 883 N.W.2d 711, 723 (allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to proffer a defense); Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, 883 N.W.2d 725 (holding the same); see also Novotny v. Sacred Heart Health Servs., 2016 S.D. 75, 887 N.W.2d 83 (rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege)."},"case_id":12152029,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Oh this point, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained: \"Redaction of personal information, however, does not divest the privileged status of confidential records. Redaction is merely a tool that a court may use to safeguard the personal, identifying information within confidential records that have become subject to disclosure either by waiver or by an exception.\" Roe, 912 N.E,2d at 71. And other than a desire to prove their claim with additional, duplicative information, Plaintiffs have offered no reason, such as a competing right, which compels production of any information in the records.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"883 N.W.2d 711, 723","parenthetical":"allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to proffer a defense","sentence":"See Milstead v. Smith, 2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32, 883 N.W.2d 711, 723 (allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to proffer a defense); Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, 883 N.W.2d 725 (holding the same); see also Novotny v. Sacred Heart Health Servs., 2016 S.D. 75, 887 N.W.2d 83 (rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege","sentence":"See Milstead v. Smith, 2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32, 883 N.W.2d 711, 723 (allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to proffer a defense); Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, 883 N.W.2d 725 (holding the same); see also Novotny v. Sacred Heart Health Servs., 2016 S.D. 75, 887 N.W.2d 83 (rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege)."},"case_id":12152029,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Oh this point, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained: \"Redaction of personal information, however, does not divest the privileged status of confidential records. Redaction is merely a tool that a court may use to safeguard the personal, identifying information within confidential records that have become subject to disclosure either by waiver or by an exception.\" Roe, 912 N.E,2d at 71. And other than a desire to prove their claim with additional, duplicative information, Plaintiffs have offered no reason, such as a competing right, which compels production of any information in the records.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"883 N.W.2d 711, 723","parenthetical":"allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to proffer a defense","sentence":"See Milstead v. Smith, 2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32, 883 N.W.2d 711, 723 (allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to proffer a defense); Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, 883 N.W.2d 725 (holding the same); see also Novotny v. Sacred Heart Health Servs., 2016 S.D. 75, 887 N.W.2d 83 (rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege","sentence":"See Milstead v. Smith, 2016 S.D. 55, \u00b6 32, 883 N.W.2d 711, 723 (allqwing, under enumerated circumstances, production of protected law enforcement personnel records in light of a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional right to proffer a defense); Milstead v. Johnson, 2016 S.D. 56, 883 N.W.2d 725 (holding the same); see also Novotny v. Sacred Heart Health Servs., 2016 S.D. 75, 887 N.W.2d 83 (rejecting procedural due.process and open courts challenge to medical peer review privilege)."},"case_id":12152029,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is the government's position that use of the word \"testimony\" implies that the speaker was under oath. The government cites a number of cases in support of this position.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"149 F. 636, 640","parenthetical":"finding that \"[t]he word 'testimony' or to 'testify' implies the usual preliminary qualification of taking an oath to speak the truth\"","sentence":"See e.g. Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636, 640 (8th Cir.1906) (finding that \u201c[t]he word \u2018testimony\u2019 or to \u2018testify\u2019 implies the usual preliminary qualification of taking an oath to speak the truth\u201d); see also United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 651 n. 6 (11th Cir.1983) (concluding that \u201c[t]he fact that the proceedings take place before a court or a grand jury gives rise to an inference that the defendant was under oath while testifying\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that \"[t]he fact that the proceedings take place before a court or a grand jury gives rise to an inference that the defendant was under oath while testifying\"","sentence":"See e.g. Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636, 640 (8th Cir.1906) (finding that \u201c[t]he word \u2018testimony\u2019 or to \u2018testify\u2019 implies the usual preliminary qualification of taking an oath to speak the truth\u201d); see also United States v. Molinares, 700 F.2d 647, 651 n. 6 (11th Cir.1983) (concluding that \u201c[t]he fact that the proceedings take place before a court or a grand jury gives rise to an inference that the defendant was under oath while testifying\u201d)."},"case_id":950818,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"417 U.S. 85, 87","parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182","parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"409 U.S. 322, 328-31","parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17","parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"384 U.S. 757, 763-64","parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832","parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"328 U.S. 582, 587-91","parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61","parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"322 U.S. 694, 699","parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251","parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"226 U.S. 478, 489","parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"33 S.Ct. 158, 162","parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"221 U.S. 361, 377","parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 S.Ct. 538, 543","parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"116 U.S. 616, 634-35","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"417 U.S. 85, 87","parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182","parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"409 U.S. 322, 328-31","parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17","parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"384 U.S. 757, 763-64","parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832","parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"328 U.S. 582, 587-91","parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61","parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"322 U.S. 694, 699","parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251","parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"226 U.S. 478, 489","parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"33 S.Ct. 158, 162","parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"221 U.S. 361, 377","parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 S.Ct. 538, 543","parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"6 S.Ct. 524, 534","parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"417 U.S. 85, 87","parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182","parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"409 U.S. 322, 328-31","parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17","parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"384 U.S. 757, 763-64","parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832","parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one's papers.\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"328 U.S. 582, 587-91","parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61","parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"322 U.S. 694, 699","parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251","parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \"protects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"226 U.S. 478, 489","parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"33 S.Ct. 158, 162","parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"221 U.S. 361, 377","parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 S.Ct. 538, 543","parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Fifth Amendment provides that \"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.\" This privilege has been construed to protect an individual from being compelled to produce personal records that might incriminate him.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \"undoubtedly\" protects one \"against the compulsory production of his private books and papers\"","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that \"a compulsory production of the private books and papers\" of a person constitutes compelling him \"to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\" and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment","sentence":"See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35, 6 S.Ct. 524, 534, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (finding that \u201ca compulsory production of the private books and papers\u201d of a person constitutes compelling him \u201cto be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution\u201d and also is an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 2182, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974) (\u201cIt has long been established ... that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral testimony.\u201d); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328-31, 93 S.Ct. 611, 615-17, 34 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination adheres basically to the person and not to the potentially incriminating information, and that the privilege applies to the possessor and not the owner of the information); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1832, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (\u201cIt is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused\u2019s communications, whatever form they might take, and the compulsion of responses which are also communications, for example, compliance with a subpoena to produce one\u2019s papers.\u201d); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587-91, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1258-61, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946) (distinguishing private papers from public property in the custody of a citizen in applying the Fifth Amendment privilege); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 1251, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (1944) (stating that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination \u201cprotects the individual from any disclosure, in the form of oral testimony, documents or chattels, sought by the legal process against him as a witness\u201d); Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489, 33 S.Ct. 158, 162, 57 L.Ed. 309 (1913) (holding that there is no self-incrimination where one is compelled to produce the papers of a business that has no privilege); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377, 31 S.Ct. 538, 543, 55 L.Ed. 771 (1911) (finding that the privilege against self-incrimination \u201cundoubtedly\u201d protects one \u201cagainst the compulsory production of his private books and papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3719838,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We note that, while a stricter compliance with the version of rule 1.442 in effect at the time of the proposal might have helped eliminate some ambiguity, as is often the case, the release attached to the proposal caused, rather than clarified, confusion and ambiguity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"936 So.2d 676, 679","parenthetical":"discrepancy between settlement proposal and attached release created an ambiguity as to the settlement amount offered by defendant","sentence":"See Stasio v. McManaway, 936 So.2d 676, 679 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (discrepancy between settlement proposal and attached release created an ambiguity as to the settlement amount offered by defendant); see also Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 904 So.2d 652, 653-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (proposed general release attached to proposal for settlement caused confusion as to whether the release would extinguish claims unrelated to those in the pending action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"904 So.2d 652, 653-54","parenthetical":"proposed general release attached to proposal for settlement caused confusion as to whether the release would extinguish claims unrelated to those in the pending action","sentence":"See Stasio v. McManaway, 936 So.2d 676, 679 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (discrepancy between settlement proposal and attached release created an ambiguity as to the settlement amount offered by defendant); see also Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 904 So.2d 652, 653-54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (proposed general release attached to proposal for settlement caused confusion as to whether the release would extinguish claims unrelated to those in the pending action)."},"case_id":12177151,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Yet, his offer to buy the unit, made in November, did not respond in any way to the company's safety concerns and was, as the district court put it, simply \"an impotent attempt\" to renew his earlier request. Scotts's reiteration of its earlier denial was, at most, \"merely a consequence of its [earlier] discriminatory act,\" and not, as Hall contends, the culmination of an interactive process to accommodate his disability.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 130, 135","parenthetical":"explaining that \"[t]he rejection of a proposed accommodation is a single completed action when taken\"","sentence":"Conner v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 84 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Allowing [the plaintiff] to restart the statute of limitations by sending a letter requesting reasonable accommodations after she has been unequivocally fired would destroy the statute of limitations.\u201d); see also Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2003) (explaining that \u201c[t]he rejection of a proposed accommodation is a single completed action when taken\u201d); Zdziech v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 114 Fed.Appx. 469, 472 (3d Cir.2004) (unpublished) (\u201cTo permit [an employee] to reset the statutory requirements for the timely filing of a complaint merely by writing a new letter to his former employer would clearly vitiate the intent behind the 300-day time limit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"84 F.3d 1100, 1102","parenthetical":"\"[Allowing [the plaintiff] to restart the statute of limitations by sending a letter requesting reasonable accommodations after she has been unequivocally fired would destroy the statute of limitations.\"","sentence":"Conner v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 84 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Allowing [the plaintiff] to restart the statute of limitations by sending a letter requesting reasonable accommodations after she has been unequivocally fired would destroy the statute of limitations.\u201d); see also Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2003) (explaining that \u201c[t]he rejection of a proposed accommodation is a single completed action when taken\u201d); Zdziech v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 114 Fed.Appx. 469, 472 (3d Cir.2004) (unpublished) (\u201cTo permit [an employee] to reset the statutory requirements for the timely filing of a complaint merely by writing a new letter to his former employer would clearly vitiate the intent behind the 300-day time limit.\u201d)."},"case_id":3918626,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Yet, his offer to buy the unit, made in November, did not respond in any way to the company's safety concerns and was, as the district court put it, simply \"an impotent attempt\" to renew his earlier request. Scotts's reiteration of its earlier denial was, at most, \"merely a consequence of its [earlier] discriminatory act,\" and not, as Hall contends, the culmination of an interactive process to accommodate his disability.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"114 Fed.Appx. 469, 472","parenthetical":"\"To permit [an employee] to reset the statutory requirements for the timely filing of a complaint merely by writing a new letter to his former employer would clearly vitiate the intent behind the 300-day time limit.\"","sentence":"Conner v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 84 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Allowing [the plaintiff] to restart the statute of limitations by sending a letter requesting reasonable accommodations after she has been unequivocally fired would destroy the statute of limitations.\u201d); see also Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2003) (explaining that \u201c[t]he rejection of a proposed accommodation is a single completed action when taken\u201d); Zdziech v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 114 Fed.Appx. 469, 472 (3d Cir.2004) (unpublished) (\u201cTo permit [an employee] to reset the statutory requirements for the timely filing of a complaint merely by writing a new letter to his former employer would clearly vitiate the intent behind the 300-day time limit.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"84 F.3d 1100, 1102","parenthetical":"\"[Allowing [the plaintiff] to restart the statute of limitations by sending a letter requesting reasonable accommodations after she has been unequivocally fired would destroy the statute of limitations.\"","sentence":"Conner v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., 84 F.3d 1100, 1102 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201c[Allowing [the plaintiff] to restart the statute of limitations by sending a letter requesting reasonable accommodations after she has been unequivocally fired would destroy the statute of limitations.\u201d); see also Elmenayer v. ABF Freight Sys., 318 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2003) (explaining that \u201c[t]he rejection of a proposed accommodation is a single completed action when taken\u201d); Zdziech v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 114 Fed.Appx. 469, 472 (3d Cir.2004) (unpublished) (\u201cTo permit [an employee] to reset the statutory requirements for the timely filing of a complaint merely by writing a new letter to his former employer would clearly vitiate the intent behind the 300-day time limit.\u201d)."},"case_id":3918626,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no indication that the IJ gave any consideration to factors militating in petitioner's favor and establishing good cause. Especially where an attorney-client relationship pre-dates the alien's detention or transfer to a remote location, the right to representation by counsel of choice is a compelling reason for venue change.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"776 F.2d 863, 863","parenthetical":"transfer to remote location one element in host of agency actions that interfered with statutory right to obtain counsel","sentence":"See Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 863 (transfer to remote location one element in host of agency actions that interfered with statutory right to obtain counsel); Chlomos, 516 F.2d at 314 (where petitioner resided, obtained counsel and initially appeared before immigration court in New Jersey, agency\u2019s decision to hold deportation hearings in Florida violated right to counsel); see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 92-93 (statutory right to present evidence violated where immigration judge denied motion to change venue to place where witnesses were located)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"856 F.2d 92, 92-93","parenthetical":"statutory right to present evidence violated where immigration judge denied motion to change venue to place where witnesses were located","sentence":"See Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 863 (transfer to remote location one element in host of agency actions that interfered with statutory right to obtain counsel); Chlomos, 516 F.2d at 314 (where petitioner resided, obtained counsel and initially appeared before immigration court in New Jersey, agency\u2019s decision to hold deportation hearings in Florida violated right to counsel); see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 92-93 (statutory right to present evidence violated where immigration judge denied motion to change venue to place where witnesses were located)."},"case_id":11562668,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no indication that the IJ gave any consideration to factors militating in petitioner's favor and establishing good cause. Especially where an attorney-client relationship pre-dates the alien's detention or transfer to a remote location, the right to representation by counsel of choice is a compelling reason for venue change.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"516 F.2d 314, 314","parenthetical":"where petitioner resided, obtained counsel and initially appeared before immigration court in New Jersey, agency's decision to hold deportation hearings in Florida violated right to counsel","sentence":"See Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 863 (transfer to remote location one element in host of agency actions that interfered with statutory right to obtain counsel); Chlomos, 516 F.2d at 314 (where petitioner resided, obtained counsel and initially appeared before immigration court in New Jersey, agency\u2019s decision to hold deportation hearings in Florida violated right to counsel); see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 92-93 (statutory right to present evidence violated where immigration judge denied motion to change venue to place where witnesses were located)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"856 F.2d 92, 92-93","parenthetical":"statutory right to present evidence violated where immigration judge denied motion to change venue to place where witnesses were located","sentence":"See Rios-Berrios, 776 F.2d at 863 (transfer to remote location one element in host of agency actions that interfered with statutory right to obtain counsel); Chlomos, 516 F.2d at 314 (where petitioner resided, obtained counsel and initially appeared before immigration court in New Jersey, agency\u2019s decision to hold deportation hearings in Florida violated right to counsel); see also Baires, 856 F.2d at 92-93 (statutory right to present evidence violated where immigration judge denied motion to change venue to place where witnesses were located)."},"case_id":11562668,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First -- contrary to Stackhouse's arguments on appeal -- the court's Guidelines calculations were correct, the court did not impose a sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e), the court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory, and the court was not obligated to order a new presen-tence report (PSR).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"584 F.3d 1105, 1108","parenthetical":"district court's interpretation and application of Guidelines are reviewed de novo, and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error","sentence":"See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1234 (2d Cir.2002) (Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 does not require updated PSR for resentencing if, e.g., parties are given full opportunity to be heard and to supplement PSR as needed); United States v. Crank, 21 Fed.Appx. 521, 522-28 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (where basis for remand was limited, rejecting argument that district court should have required new PSR before resentencing); see also United States v. Bates, 584 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir.2009) (district court\u2019s interpretation and application of Guidelines are reviewed de novo, and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"306 F.3d 1217, 1234","parenthetical":"Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 does not require updated PSR for resentencing if, e.g., parties are given full opportunity to be heard and to supplement PSR as needed","sentence":"See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1234 (2d Cir.2002) (Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 does not require updated PSR for resentencing if, e.g., parties are given full opportunity to be heard and to supplement PSR as needed); United States v. Crank, 21 Fed.Appx. 521, 522-28 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (where basis for remand was limited, rejecting argument that district court should have required new PSR before resentencing); see also United States v. Bates, 584 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir.2009) (district court\u2019s interpretation and application of Guidelines are reviewed de novo, and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error)."},"case_id":4204174,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First -- contrary to Stackhouse's arguments on appeal -- the court's Guidelines calculations were correct, the court did not impose a sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. SS 924(e), the court did not treat the Guidelines as mandatory, and the court was not obligated to order a new presen-tence report (PSR).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"584 F.3d 1105, 1108","parenthetical":"district court's interpretation and application of Guidelines are reviewed de novo, and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error","sentence":"See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1234 (2d Cir.2002) (Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 does not require updated PSR for resentencing if, e.g., parties are given full opportunity to be heard and to supplement PSR as needed); United States v. Crank, 21 Fed.Appx. 521, 522-28 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (where basis for remand was limited, rejecting argument that district court should have required new PSR before resentencing); see also United States v. Bates, 584 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir.2009) (district court\u2019s interpretation and application of Guidelines are reviewed de novo, and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"21 Fed.Appx. 521, 522-28","parenthetical":"where basis for remand was limited, rejecting argument that district court should have required new PSR before resentencing","sentence":"See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1234 (2d Cir.2002) (Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 does not require updated PSR for resentencing if, e.g., parties are given full opportunity to be heard and to supplement PSR as needed); United States v. Crank, 21 Fed.Appx. 521, 522-28 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (where basis for remand was limited, rejecting argument that district court should have required new PSR before resentencing); see also United States v. Bates, 584 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir.2009) (district court\u2019s interpretation and application of Guidelines are reviewed de novo, and its factual findings are reviewed for clear error)."},"case_id":4204174,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 U.S. 360, 360-63","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to employee's claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"65 F.3d 1229, 1238","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 U.S. 360, 360-63","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to employee's claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 U.S. 357, 357","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 U.S. 360, 360-63","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to employee's claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying doctrine to employee's claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"65 F.3d 1229, 1238","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying doctrine to employee's claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 U.S. 357, 357","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying doctrine to employee's claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\"ADEA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"a"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"65 F.3d 1229, 1238","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"62 F.3d 374, 378","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\"EPA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"513 U.S. 357, 357","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"62 F.3d 374, 378","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\"EPA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"b"}
{"context":"According to the Fourth Circuit, the after-acquired evidence doctrine \"concerns the effect of evidence of employee misconduct acquired by the employer after the employee has been terminated\" for an improper reason -- precisely the factual scenario presented in this case. Though the Court is unaware of any reported decisions that apply the doctrine to claims under the EPPA, other courts have applied it broadly to claims for improper termination under other provisions of Title 29 of the United States Code.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. SSSS 2000e-17","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"62 F.3d 374, 378","parenthetical":"applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\"EPA\"","sentence":"See, e.g., McKennon, 513 U.S. at 360-63, 115 S.Ct. 879 (applying doctrine to employee\u2019s claim for unlawful termination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (\u201cADEA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 621 et seq.); Miller, 250 F.3d at 836-38 (quoting McKennon and applying the doctrine to claim for wrongful termination under the Family and Medical Leave Act (\u201cFMLA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2601-2654); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc) (applying doctrine to claim for violation of the Equal Pay Act (\u201cEPA\u201d), 29 U.S.C. \u00a7 206(d)(1)); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir.1995) (applying doctrine to claim for unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 2000e-17). Because the EPPA \u2014 like the ADEA, EPA, and Title VII \u2014 is similarly \u201cbut part of a wider statutory scheme to protect employees in the workplace nationwide\u201d, McKennon, 513 U.S. at 357, 115 S.Ct. 879, the Court finds the after-acquired evidence doctrine instructive as to the effect of Plaintiffs alleged falsehood on his ability to claim wrongful termination under the EPPA."},"case_id":5909509,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Second Hickenlooper Amendment did overrule, at least with respect to confiscations of property, the Sabbatino decision to the extent that it held that the act of state doctrine would apply without regard to whether a foreign state's actions violated international law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Hickenlooper Amendment [] prevents any United States court from applying the federal act of state doctrine if the confiscation violated international law.\"","sentence":"Compare Sab-batino, 376 U.S. at 428, 84 S.Ct. at 940 (\"[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government ... even if ... the taking violates customary international law.\"), with 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 2370(e)(2) (\"[N]o court in the United States shall decline . . . to make a determination on the merits ... in a case [involving confiscations of property] by an act of [] state in violation of the principles of international law . . .\"); see also Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203 n. 10 (5th Cir.1978) (\"The Hickenlooper Amendment [] prevents any United States court from applying the federal act of state doctrine if the confiscation violated international law.\")."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"84 S.Ct. 940, 940","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government ... even if ... the taking violates customary international law.\"","sentence":"Compare Sab-batino, 376 U.S. at 428, 84 S.Ct. at 940 (\"[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government ... even if ... the taking violates customary international law.\"), with 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 2370(e)(2) (\"[N]o court in the United States shall decline . . . to make a determination on the merits ... in a case [involving confiscations of property] by an act of [] state in violation of the principles of international law . . .\"); see also Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203 n. 10 (5th Cir.1978) (\"The Hickenlooper Amendment [] prevents any United States court from applying the federal act of state doctrine if the confiscation violated international law.\")."},"case_id":9487764,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"446 U.S. 608, 616-17","parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"446 U.S. 608, 616-17","parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"446 U.S. 608, 616-17","parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"474 P.2d 673, 680-81","parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"474 P.2d 673, 680-81","parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the canon of construction that \"to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other,\" Black's Law Dictionary 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining \"expressio unius est exclusio alterius\"), the express proscription of the making or broadcasting of indecent visual recordings implies that the viewing of indecent visual recordings is not proscribed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"474 P.2d 673, 680-81","parenthetical":"applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\"","sentence":"See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980) (\u201c[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.\u201d) (citation and footnote omitted); see also People v. Nichols, 3 Cal.3d 150, 89 Cal.Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673, 680-81 (1970) (applying the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius to conclude that the statutory proscription on arson did not include the burning of a car)."},"case_id":4349706,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Even if Plaintiff had proven that Defendants trespassed on Plaintiffs land, Plaintiffs claim would fail, insofar as it relates to the two steel barges, because Plaintiff did not mitigate his damages. New York courts adhere to the universally accepted common law principle that a harmed plaintiff must mitigate damages.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"757 F.2d 494, 494","parenthetical":"holding that the district court properly applied New York's mitigation doctrine against plaintiff stockholders who brought suit for breach of contract.","sentence":"Air Et Chaleur, 757 F.2d at 494 (holding that the district court properly applied New York\u2019s mitigation doctrine against plaintiff stockholders who brought suit for breach of contract.); see also Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72, 76-77 (N.Y.1863) (requiring \u201creasonable exertions to render the injury as light as possible\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"28 N.Y. 72, 76-77","parenthetical":"requiring \"reasonable exertions to render the injury as light as possible\"","sentence":"Air Et Chaleur, 757 F.2d at 494 (holding that the district court properly applied New York\u2019s mitigation doctrine against plaintiff stockholders who brought suit for breach of contract.); see also Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N.Y. 72, 76-77 (N.Y.1863) (requiring \u201creasonable exertions to render the injury as light as possible\u201d)."},"case_id":9271045,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Woodland was not held because he was an alleged criminal but because his mental health at the time warranted such confinement. This period should not be used to calculate a speedy trial violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"799 P.2d 706, 706","parenthetical":"stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state","sentence":"See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (holding that \u201c[ajppellant can not complain of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of his confinement in a State mental institution after dismissal of the former indictment\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"333 F.2d 371, 374","parenthetical":"holding that \"[ajppellant can not complain of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of his confinement in a State mental institution after dismissal of the former indictment\"","sentence":"See Trafny, 799 P.2d at 706 (stating that time spent holding defendant on separate parole violation following formal dismissal of charges cannot be attributable to state); see also Johnson v. United States, 333 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1964) (holding that \u201c[ajppellant can not complain of the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of his confinement in a State mental institution after dismissal of the former indictment\u201d)."},"case_id":11899770,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It is true that a court sitting in equity would not assert jurisdiction over a disputed interest in real property if the plaintiff could obtain full, complete, and adequate relief through an action for ejectment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he mere fact that damages are sought is not determinative of the legal or equitable nature of the action, because damages may be recovered in purely equitable proceedings.\"","sentence":"See Hawkins, 268 Mich at 488 (\u201cOf course, where a court of chancery has jurisdiction of the subject matter on an independent ground, it may determine the question of title although an action of ejectment would likewise be open.\u201d). That is, while an action for ejectment was limited to a narrow set of circumstances and never permitted the grant of equitable relief, an equitable action \u2014 such as one to quiet title \u2014 could apply to a broad array of factual patterns and included both equitable relief and relief traditionally thought of as legal. Whipple, 3 Mich at 446; see also Madugula, 496 Mich at 713-714; Anzaldua, 216 Mich App at 576 n 4 (\u201c[T]he mere fact that damages are sought is not determinative of the legal or equitable nature of the action, because damages may be recovered in purely equitable proceedings.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"268 Mich 488, 488","parenthetical":"\"Of course, where a court of chancery has jurisdiction of the subject matter on an independent ground, it may determine the question of title although an action of ejectment would likewise be open.\"","sentence":"See Hawkins, 268 Mich at 488 (\u201cOf course, where a court of chancery has jurisdiction of the subject matter on an independent ground, it may determine the question of title although an action of ejectment would likewise be open.\u201d). That is, while an action for ejectment was limited to a narrow set of circumstances and never permitted the grant of equitable relief, an equitable action \u2014 such as one to quiet title \u2014 could apply to a broad array of factual patterns and included both equitable relief and relief traditionally thought of as legal. Whipple, 3 Mich at 446; see also Madugula, 496 Mich at 713-714; Anzaldua, 216 Mich App at 576 n 4 (\u201c[T]he mere fact that damages are sought is not determinative of the legal or equitable nature of the action, because damages may be recovered in purely equitable proceedings.\u201d)."},"case_id":4281806,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is true that a court sitting in equity would not assert jurisdiction over a disputed interest in real property if the plaintiff could obtain full, complete, and adequate relief through an action for ejectment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"3 Mich 446, 446","parenthetical":"\"Of course, where a court of chancery has jurisdiction of the subject matter on an independent ground, it may determine the question of title although an action of ejectment would likewise be open.\"","sentence":"See Hawkins, 268 Mich at 488 (\u201cOf course, where a court of chancery has jurisdiction of the subject matter on an independent ground, it may determine the question of title although an action of ejectment would likewise be open.\u201d). That is, while an action for ejectment was limited to a narrow set of circumstances and never permitted the grant of equitable relief, an equitable action \u2014 such as one to quiet title \u2014 could apply to a broad array of factual patterns and included both equitable relief and relief traditionally thought of as legal. Whipple, 3 Mich at 446; see also Madugula, 496 Mich at 713-714; Anzaldua, 216 Mich App at 576 n 4 (\u201c[T]he mere fact that damages are sought is not determinative of the legal or equitable nature of the action, because damages may be recovered in purely equitable proceedings.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he mere fact that damages are sought is not determinative of the legal or equitable nature of the action, because damages may be recovered in purely equitable proceedings.\"","sentence":"See Hawkins, 268 Mich at 488 (\u201cOf course, where a court of chancery has jurisdiction of the subject matter on an independent ground, it may determine the question of title although an action of ejectment would likewise be open.\u201d). That is, while an action for ejectment was limited to a narrow set of circumstances and never permitted the grant of equitable relief, an equitable action \u2014 such as one to quiet title \u2014 could apply to a broad array of factual patterns and included both equitable relief and relief traditionally thought of as legal. Whipple, 3 Mich at 446; see also Madugula, 496 Mich at 713-714; Anzaldua, 216 Mich App at 576 n 4 (\u201c[T]he mere fact that damages are sought is not determinative of the legal or equitable nature of the action, because damages may be recovered in purely equitable proceedings.\u201d)."},"case_id":4281806,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff has requested monetary damages for mental and emotional injuries, he has not demonstrated that he suffered any physical injuries as a result of any of his alleged constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"523 U.S. 574, 596","parenthetical":"noting that the PLRA contains a provision barring \"suits for mental or emotional injury unless there is a prior showing of physical injury\"","sentence":"See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (noting that the PLRA contains a provision barring \u201csuits for mental or emotional injury unless there is a prior showing of physical injury\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the PLRA's damage limits in SS 1997e(e","sentence":"But see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 747 n. 20 (5th Cir.2002) (noting that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the PLRA\u2019s damage limits in \u00a7 1997e(e) only to prisoners\u2019 alleged claims of cruel and unusual punish ment under the Eighth Amendment and has not considered its applicability to constitutional violations usually unaccompanied by physical injury, such as First Amendment retaliation claims, privacy claims, and equal protection claims)."},"case_id":9236525,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff has requested monetary damages for mental and emotional injuries, he has not demonstrated that he suffered any physical injuries as a result of any of his alleged constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the PLRA contains a provision barring \"suits for mental or emotional injury unless there is a prior showing of physical injury\"","sentence":"See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (noting that the PLRA contains a provision barring \u201csuits for mental or emotional injury unless there is a prior showing of physical injury\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the PLRA's damage limits in SS 1997e(e","sentence":"But see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 747 n. 20 (5th Cir.2002) (noting that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the PLRA\u2019s damage limits in \u00a7 1997e(e) only to prisoners\u2019 alleged claims of cruel and unusual punish ment under the Eighth Amendment and has not considered its applicability to constitutional violations usually unaccompanied by physical injury, such as First Amendment retaliation claims, privacy claims, and equal protection claims)."},"case_id":9236525,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff has requested monetary damages for mental and emotional injuries, he has not demonstrated that he suffered any physical injuries as a result of any of his alleged constitutional violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the PLRA contains a provision barring \"suits for mental or emotional injury unless there is a prior showing of physical injury\"","sentence":"See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (noting that the PLRA contains a provision barring \u201csuits for mental or emotional injury unless there is a prior showing of physical injury\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the PLRA's damage limits in SS 1997e(e","sentence":"But see Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 747 n. 20 (5th Cir.2002) (noting that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the PLRA\u2019s damage limits in \u00a7 1997e(e) only to prisoners\u2019 alleged claims of cruel and unusual punish ment under the Eighth Amendment and has not considered its applicability to constitutional violations usually unaccompanied by physical injury, such as First Amendment retaliation claims, privacy claims, and equal protection claims)."},"case_id":9236525,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Citizens have a First Amendment right to criticize court decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"158 N.W.2d 744, 747","parenthetical":"collecting cases and concluding a letter of criticism was not punishable in contempt proceeding","sentence":"See Brown v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 158 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1968) (collecting cases and concluding a letter of criticism was not punishable in contempt proceeding), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 707-09 (Iowa 1986); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att\u2019y Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 792, 878 N.W.2d 189, 194-96 (Iowa 2016) (reviewing First Amendment protection for an attorney\u2019s ex parte email criticizing the presiding judge after an adverse ruling)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"878 N.W.2d 189, 194-96","parenthetical":"reviewing First Amendment protection for an attorney's ex parte email criticizing the presiding judge after an adverse ruling","sentence":"See Brown v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 158 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1968) (collecting cases and concluding a letter of criticism was not punishable in contempt proceeding), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 707-09 (Iowa 1986); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att\u2019y Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 792, 878 N.W.2d 189, 194-96 (Iowa 2016) (reviewing First Amendment protection for an attorney\u2019s ex parte email criticizing the presiding judge after an adverse ruling)."},"case_id":12339026,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Citizens have a First Amendment right to criticize court decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"380 N.W.2d 706, 707-09","parenthetical":"collecting cases and concluding a letter of criticism was not punishable in contempt proceeding","sentence":"See Brown v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 158 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1968) (collecting cases and concluding a letter of criticism was not punishable in contempt proceeding), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 707-09 (Iowa 1986); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att\u2019y Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 792, 878 N.W.2d 189, 194-96 (Iowa 2016) (reviewing First Amendment protection for an attorney\u2019s ex parte email criticizing the presiding judge after an adverse ruling)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"878 N.W.2d 189, 194-96","parenthetical":"reviewing First Amendment protection for an attorney's ex parte email criticizing the presiding judge after an adverse ruling","sentence":"See Brown v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 158 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1968) (collecting cases and concluding a letter of criticism was not punishable in contempt proceeding), overruled on other grounds by Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 380 N.W.2d 706, 707-09 (Iowa 1986); cf. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att\u2019y Disciplinary Bd. v. Attorney Doe No. 792, 878 N.W.2d 189, 194-96 (Iowa 2016) (reviewing First Amendment protection for an attorney\u2019s ex parte email criticizing the presiding judge after an adverse ruling)."},"case_id":12339026,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This is be cause the death of another was the act intended although the attempt to accomplish this result failed. There is no such offense as attempted manslaughter in Alabama since \"intent\" and \"recklessness\" are incompatible terms.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"one cannot recklessly attempt [i.e. intend but fail] to commit murder\"","sentence":"See Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied (Ala.1984) (\u201cone cannot recklessly attempt [i.e. intend but fail] to commit murder\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although the appellant contended that the trial court should have charged on attempted manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder, this Court did not address this issue and held only that reckless manslaughter is a lesser included offense of intentional murder","sentence":"But see Paige v. State, 494 So.2d 795 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied (Ala.1986) (although the appellant contended that the trial court should have charged on attempted manslaughter as a lesser included offense of attempted murder, this Court did not address this issue and held only that reckless manslaughter is a lesser included offense of intentional murder)."},"case_id":11945390,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"341 Pa.Super. 338, 342","parenthetical":"prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \"mitigated\" to \"aggravated\" at a particular step","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 41, 50","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 41, 50","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"491 A.2d 845, 847","parenthetical":"prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \"mitigated\" to \"aggravated\" at a particular step","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 41, 50","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"326 Pa. Super. 304, 309","parenthetical":"court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 41, 50","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"473 A.2d 1103, 1106","parenthetical":"court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105","parenthetical":"court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 41, 50","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"438 U.S. 41, 50","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"466 A.2d 1082, 1084","parenthetical":"court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"341 Pa.Super. 338, 342","parenthetical":"prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \"mitigated\" to \"aggravated\" at a particular step","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"491 A.2d 845, 847","parenthetical":"prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \"mitigated\" to \"aggravated\" at a particular step","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"326 Pa. Super. 304, 309","parenthetical":"court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"473 A.2d 1103, 1106","parenthetical":"court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105","parenthetical":"court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"466 A.2d 1082, 1084","parenthetical":"court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615","parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"341 Pa.Super. 338, 342","parenthetical":"prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \"mitigated\" to \"aggravated\" at a particular step","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"491 A.2d 845, 847","parenthetical":"prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \"mitigated\" to \"aggravated\" at a particular step","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"326 Pa. Super. 304, 309","parenthetical":"court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"473 A.2d 1103, 1106","parenthetical":"court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105","parenthetical":"court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The deaths of the children directly figure into petitioner's sentence for leaving the scene of the accident according to Pennsylvania's statute. In addition, the sentencing judge has traditionally been permitted to conduct \"an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"taking into account a defendant's false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"466 A.2d 1082, 1084","parenthetical":"court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence","sentence":"United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 2615, 57 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (taking into account a defendant\u2019s false testimony does not constitute punishment for the crime of perjury for which the defendant has not been tried or convicted by due process); see also Commonwealth v. Lupatsky, 341 Pa.Super. 338, 342, 491 A.2d 845, 847 (1985) (prior convictions excluded in computing prior record score may still be considered in fixing the penalty within the range of \u201cmitigated\u201d to \u201caggravated\u201d at a particular step); Commonwealth v. Holler, 326 Pa. Super. 304, 309, 473 A.2d 1103, 1106 (1984) (court has broad discretion in sentencing that will not be disturbed absent abuse); Commonwealth v. Weldon, 320 Pa.Super. 102, 104-105, 466 A.2d 1082, 1084 (1983) (court is bound to examine a range of factors concerning the person and history of defendant, and the particular circumstances of the crime in fashioning a sentence). Finally, in addition to the deaths of the two children, the court relied on the presentence investigation report, the seriousness of the offenses, and the history, character, and condition of petitioner. This court finds no error."},"case_id":123028,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Immigration Judge's (IJ) reliance on Ban Htoi's delay in referencing the rapes as a basis for the adverse credibility finding is at odds with our circuit precedent. We have held that \"cultural reluctance\" is a \"compelling explanation\" for a woman's \"failure to mention her rape at an earlier time in the [immigration] proceedings.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"530 F.3d 1025, 1027-28","parenthetical":"\"That Mousa, a Chaldean Christian woman from Iraq, was not forthcoming with details about her rape is hardly an irreconcilable problem with her asylum application.\"","sentence":"Mousa v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir.2008) (\u201cThat Mousa, a Chaldean Christian woman from Iraq, was not forthcoming with details about her rape is hardly an irreconcilable problem with her asylum application.\u201d); see also Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir.2002) (\u201cParamasamy provided a strong, unrebutted explanation for her reluctance to reveal details \u2014 her cultural reluctance to tell male interviewers that she had been violated.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"295 F.3d 1047, 1053","parenthetical":"\"Paramasamy provided a strong, unrebutted explanation for her reluctance to reveal details -- her cultural reluctance to tell male interviewers that she had been violated.\"","sentence":"Mousa v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir.2008) (\u201cThat Mousa, a Chaldean Christian woman from Iraq, was not forthcoming with details about her rape is hardly an irreconcilable problem with her asylum application.\u201d); see also Paramasamy v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir.2002) (\u201cParamasamy provided a strong, unrebutted explanation for her reluctance to reveal details \u2014 her cultural reluctance to tell male interviewers that she had been violated.\u201d)."},"case_id":3317219,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although appellant contends that the exclusionary rule is the usual and, in this instance, only effective way to enforce the treaty's requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"699 F.2d 18, 29","parenthetical":"rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule \"was not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not 'authorized' by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.\"","sentence":"See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule \u201cwas not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not \u2018authorized\u2019 by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.\u201d); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 n. 5 (4th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1991) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or evidence that Congress intended exclusion as a remedy); United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir.1986) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"196 F.3d 1034, 1040","parenthetical":"\"The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.\u201d)."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although appellant contends that the exclusionary rule is the usual and, in this instance, only effective way to enforce the treaty's requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"161 F.3d 414, 424","parenthetical":"holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right","sentence":"See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule \u201cwas not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not \u2018authorized\u2019 by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.\u201d); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 n. 5 (4th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1991) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or evidence that Congress intended exclusion as a remedy); United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir.1986) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"196 F.3d 1034, 1040","parenthetical":"\"The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.\u201d)."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although appellant contends that the exclusionary rule is the usual and, in this instance, only effective way to enforce the treaty's requirement, this and other circuits have held in recent years that an exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations, not for statutory or treaty violations.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"936 F.2d 1249, 1251","parenthetical":"holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or evidence that Congress intended exclusion as a remedy","sentence":"See also United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.1983) (rejecting suppression as a remedy for a treaty violation because the exclusionary rule \u201cwas not fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not \u2018authorized\u2019 by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individuals.\u201d); United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir.1998) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right); United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1289 n. 5 (4th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1991) (holding a statutory violation insufficient to justify imposition of the exclusionary rule, absent an underlying constitutional violation or right or evidence that Congress intended exclusion as a remedy); United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 60, 69 (2d Cir.1987) (same); United States v. Kington, 801 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir.1986) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"196 F.3d 1034, 1040","parenthetical":"\"The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Smith, 196 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir.1999) (\u201cThe use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.\u201d)."},"case_id":11457289,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Healthy doctrine in summary disposition analyses have held that if a plaintiff brings forth evidence of pretext, the determination whether the employer's stated reasons are pretextual is a fact issue reserved for the jury. Courts deciding the causation issue by summary disposition have generally done so only when the employer's reasons have not been controverted.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"37 F.3d 1151, 1151","parenthetical":"holding that the plaintiff did not present evidence of retaliation and, therefore, the plaintiff failed to allege facts that would allow a rational jury to conclude that the employer's reasons for termination were pretextual","sentence":"See Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1151 (holding that the plaintiff did not present evidence of retaliation and, therefore, the plaintiff failed to allege facts that would allow a rational jury to conclude that the employer\u2019s reasons for termination were pretextual); see also Beattie, 254 F.3d at 604 (finding that the plaintiff had not offered evidence to rebut the employer\u2019s evidence that it would have terminated the plaintiff in the absence of the protected speech and, therefore, summary judgment was proper)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"254 F.3d 604, 604","parenthetical":"finding that the plaintiff had not offered evidence to rebut the employer's evidence that it would have terminated the plaintiff in the absence of the protected speech and, therefore, summary judgment was proper","sentence":"See Pierce, 37 F.3d at 1151 (holding that the plaintiff did not present evidence of retaliation and, therefore, the plaintiff failed to allege facts that would allow a rational jury to conclude that the employer\u2019s reasons for termination were pretextual); see also Beattie, 254 F.3d at 604 (finding that the plaintiff had not offered evidence to rebut the employer\u2019s evidence that it would have terminated the plaintiff in the absence of the protected speech and, therefore, summary judgment was proper)."},"case_id":4064673,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Penleys, the evidence reveals no genuine issues of material fact as to whether Lieutenant Weippert's use of force was reasonably necessary. Under Florida law, Lieutenant Weippert had no duty to retreat and his use of force was justifiable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"451 F.3d 759, 768","parenthetical":"relying on \"facts and reasoning set forth\" in Fourth Amendment analysis to evaluate whether, under Florida law, an officer's use of force was excessive","sentence":"See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that after being chased by a car-full of angry men, it would have been reasonable for Mr. Rivera, a private citizen, to believe that deadly force was necessary, even if only a single, unarmed pursuer had approached his now-stopped car, \u201cbecause [the pursuer] and his friends had already threatened Rivera\u2019s life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a high-speed chase and throwing deadly missiles,\u201d namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 (11th Cir.2006) (relying on \u201cfacts and reasoning set forth\u201d in Fourth Amendment analysis to evaluate whether, under Florida law, an officer\u2019s use of force was excessive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"719 So.2d 335, 337-38","parenthetical":"holding that after being chased by a car-full of angry men, it would have been reasonable for Mr. Rivera, a private citizen, to believe that deadly force was necessary, even if only a single, unarmed pursuer had approached his now-stopped car, \"because [the pursuer] and his friends had already threatened Rivera's life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a high-speed chase and throwing deadly missiles,\" namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna","sentence":"See State v. Rivera, 719 So.2d 335, 337-38 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (holding that after being chased by a car-full of angry men, it would have been reasonable for Mr. Rivera, a private citizen, to believe that deadly force was necessary, even if only a single, unarmed pursuer had approached his now-stopped car, \u201cbecause [the pursuer] and his friends had already threatened Rivera\u2019s life and the lives of other innocent people by engaging in a high-speed chase and throwing deadly missiles,\u201d namely a bottle of soda and a can of tuna); see also Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 768 (11th Cir.2006) (relying on \u201cfacts and reasoning set forth\u201d in Fourth Amendment analysis to evaluate whether, under Florida law, an officer\u2019s use of force was excessive)."},"case_id":6054328,"label":"b"}
{"context":"When reviewing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging an unconstitutional conviction due to insufficient evidence, federal courts do not review the reasoning underlying the state court's decision. Instead, we focus on whether the state court's ultimate decision -- affirmation of the conviction -- was supported by sufficient record evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"255 F.3d 77, 86","parenthetical":"explaining that when conducting ha-beas review, \"we are determining the reasonableness of the state courts' 'decision,' 28 U.S.C. SS 2254(d","sentence":"See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1 )-(2) (providing that petition for writ shall only be granted if the state court\u2019s \u201cadjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision \u201d that was contrary to federal law or based on \u201cunreasonable determination of the facts\u201d (emphasis added)); Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 180 n. 3 (3d Cir.1998) (noting state appellate court\u2019s reasoning was incorrect, but because result was proper, petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief); see also Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that when conducting ha-beas review, \u201cwe are determining the reasonableness of the state courts\u2019 \u2018decision,\u2019 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1), not grading their papers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting state appellate court's reasoning was incorrect, but because result was proper, petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief","sentence":"See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1 )-(2) (providing that petition for writ shall only be granted if the state court\u2019s \u201cadjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision \u201d that was contrary to federal law or based on \u201cunreasonable determination of the facts\u201d (emphasis added)); Hollman v. Wilson, 158 F.3d 177, 180 n. 3 (3d Cir.1998) (noting state appellate court\u2019s reasoning was incorrect, but because result was proper, petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief); see also Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that when conducting ha-beas review, \u201cwe are determining the reasonableness of the state courts\u2019 \u2018decision,\u2019 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1), not grading their papers\u201d)."},"case_id":3628137,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It contained no specific terms as to the length of employment and created an at-will employment relationship. The employer's label of \"independent contractor\" carries little weight in defining the Guards' status as independent contractors; after all, the purpose of the economic realities test is to set aside such conclusory classifications and evaluate the totality of circumstances bearing on the working relationship.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"814 F.2d 1042, 1044","parenthetical":"\"[Fjacile labels and subjective factors are only relevant to the extent that they mirror 'economic reality.' \"","sentence":"Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir.1992) (status as an employee under FLSA depends on the \u201ceconomic reality\u201d of the employment relationship, rather than any \u201ctechnical label\u201d); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947); see, e.g., Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1044 (5th Cir.1987) (\u201c[Fjacile labels and subjective factors are only relevant to the extent that they mirror \u2018economic reality.\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"974 F.2d 806, 808","parenthetical":"status as an employee under FLSA depends on the \"economic reality\" of the employment relationship, rather than any \"technical label\"","sentence":"Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 808 (7th Cir.1992) (status as an employee under FLSA depends on the \u201ceconomic reality\u201d of the employment relationship, rather than any \u201ctechnical label\u201d); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947); see, e.g., Brock v. Mr. W Fireworks, Inc., 814 F.2d 1042, 1044 (5th Cir.1987) (\u201c[Fjacile labels and subjective factors are only relevant to the extent that they mirror \u2018economic reality.\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":4195903,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The most nearly analogous cases sustaining convictions for mail fraud have involved sales tactics and representations which have tended to mislead the purchaser, or prospective purchaser, as to the quality or effectiveness of the thing being sold, or to mislead him with regard to the advantages of the bargain which should accrue to him. Thus claims or statements in advertising may go beyond mere puffing and enter the realm of fraud where the product must inherently fail to do what is claimed for it. And promotion of an inherently useful item may also be fraud when the scheme of promotion is based on claims of additional benefits to accrue to the customer, if the benefits as represented are not realistically attainable by the customer.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"similar knitting machine promotion -- conviction reversed for insufficiency of evidence to establish intent to defraud","sentence":"But see United States v. Rabinowitz, 327 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1964) (similar knitting machine promotion \u2014 conviction reversed for insufficiency of evidence to establish intent to defraud)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"411 F.2d 60, 64","parenthetical":"carpet sold at inflated price on customer's expectation that defendant's \"chain referral\" scheme would return purchase price and produce profit for him","sentence":"United States v. Armantrout, 411 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. May 16, 1969) (carpet sold at inflated price on customer\u2019s expectation that defendant\u2019s \u201cchain referral\u201d scheme would return purchase price and produce profit for him); United States v. Baren, 305 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962) (promotion of knitting machines on representation that women customers could easily make complicated knitted garmets for profitable resale, after it became known that average prospects could not so operate them)."},"case_id":2156045,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The most nearly analogous cases sustaining convictions for mail fraud have involved sales tactics and representations which have tended to mislead the purchaser, or prospective purchaser, as to the quality or effectiveness of the thing being sold, or to mislead him with regard to the advantages of the bargain which should accrue to him. Thus claims or statements in advertising may go beyond mere puffing and enter the realm of fraud where the product must inherently fail to do what is claimed for it. And promotion of an inherently useful item may also be fraud when the scheme of promotion is based on claims of additional benefits to accrue to the customer, if the benefits as represented are not realistically attainable by the customer.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"promotion of knitting machines on representation that women customers could easily make complicated knitted garmets for profitable resale, after it became known that average prospects could not so operate them","sentence":"United States v. Armantrout, 411 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. May 16, 1969) (carpet sold at inflated price on customer\u2019s expectation that defendant\u2019s \u201cchain referral\u201d scheme would return purchase price and produce profit for him); United States v. Baren, 305 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1962) (promotion of knitting machines on representation that women customers could easily make complicated knitted garmets for profitable resale, after it became known that average prospects could not so operate them)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"similar knitting machine promotion -- conviction reversed for insufficiency of evidence to establish intent to defraud","sentence":"But see United States v. Rabinowitz, 327 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 1964) (similar knitting machine promotion \u2014 conviction reversed for insufficiency of evidence to establish intent to defraud)."},"case_id":2156045,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no dispute that the IDEA required the implementation of the final decision of the SEHO.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t [would] be curious for Congress to have established section 1415's detailed procedural apparatus solely in order to generate advisory opinions.\"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that IDEA\u2019S procedural requirements \u201ccan only be fairly construed to contemplate that once a final favorable administrative decision has been gained by a plaintiff, the State will carry out that decision although it may have opposed the position of the plaintiff in the administrative proceedings\u201d); see also Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 n. 13 (3rd Cir.1996) (\u201c[I]t [would] be curious for Congress to have established section 1415\u2019s detailed procedural apparatus solely in order to generate advisory opinions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"810 F.2d 1270, 1274","parenthetical":"holding that IDEA'S procedural requirements \"can only be fairly construed to contemplate that once a final favorable administrative decision has been gained by a plaintiff, the State will carry out that decision although it may have opposed the position of the plaintiff in the administrative proceedings\"","sentence":"See Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 1270, 1274 (4th Cir.1987) (holding that IDEA\u2019S procedural requirements \u201ccan only be fairly construed to contemplate that once a final favorable administrative decision has been gained by a plaintiff, the State will carry out that decision although it may have opposed the position of the plaintiff in the administrative proceedings\u201d); see also Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 279 n. 13 (3rd Cir.1996) (\u201c[I]t [would] be curious for Congress to have established section 1415\u2019s detailed procedural apparatus solely in order to generate advisory opinions.\u201d)."},"case_id":11357107,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the magistrate may not have had the authority to enter the order under Ind.Code SS 33-24-5-8, Father does not argue on appeal that the order was defective because it contained the signature of the magistrate only and the record does not indicate that either party argued below that die order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication the order was approved by the trial court. Accordingly, the parties have waived any challenge to the validity of the appealed order by failing to make any objection or call the court's attention to the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191","parenthetical":"holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge","sentence":"See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind.2001) (noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his case lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings and holding that Tapia waived any claims in regards to the magistrate\u2019s authority because he failed to object); In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 834 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (noting some irregularities with the final appealed order in the case and that the order of commitment was defective because it was signed only by a magistrate and holding that, the \u201cdefect notwithstanding, A.M. has waived any claim to reversible error because she did not raise it at the hearing or on appeal\u2019\u2019 and that \"having failed to timely call the court's attention to1 the commitment order signed only by [the magistrate], A.M. has waived the issue for our review\u201d); City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230-231 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (holding that, while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court, the City waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the Indiana Supreme Court \u201chas long held that defects in the authority of a court officer, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself, to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection\u201d and \u201d[m]ore recently, this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs, or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect\u201d) (citations omitted), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied; see also Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"753 N.E.2d 581, 588","parenthetical":"noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his case lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings and holding that Tapia waived any claims in regards to the magistrate's authority because he failed to object","sentence":"See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind.2001) (noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his case lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings and holding that Tapia waived any claims in regards to the magistrate\u2019s authority because he failed to object); In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 834 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (noting some irregularities with the final appealed order in the case and that the order of commitment was defective because it was signed only by a magistrate and holding that, the \u201cdefect notwithstanding, A.M. has waived any claim to reversible error because she did not raise it at the hearing or on appeal\u2019\u2019 and that \"having failed to timely call the court's attention to1 the commitment order signed only by [the magistrate], A.M. has waived the issue for our review\u201d); City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230-231 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (holding that, while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court, the City waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the Indiana Supreme Court \u201chas long held that defects in the authority of a court officer, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself, to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection\u201d and \u201d[m]ore recently, this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs, or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect\u201d) (citations omitted), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied; see also Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge)."},"case_id":6892744,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the magistrate may not have had the authority to enter the order under Ind.Code SS 33-24-5-8, Father does not argue on appeal that the order was defective because it contained the signature of the magistrate only and the record does not indicate that either party argued below that die order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication the order was approved by the trial court. Accordingly, the parties have waived any challenge to the validity of the appealed order by failing to make any objection or call the court's attention to the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191","parenthetical":"holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge","sentence":"See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind.2001) (noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his case lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings and holding that Tapia waived any claims in regards to the magistrate\u2019s authority because he failed to object); In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 834 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (noting some irregularities with the final appealed order in the case and that the order of commitment was defective because it was signed only by a magistrate and holding that, the \u201cdefect notwithstanding, A.M. has waived any claim to reversible error because she did not raise it at the hearing or on appeal\u2019\u2019 and that \"having failed to timely call the court's attention to1 the commitment order signed only by [the magistrate], A.M. has waived the issue for our review\u201d); City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230-231 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (holding that, while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court, the City waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the Indiana Supreme Court \u201chas long held that defects in the authority of a court officer, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself, to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection\u201d and \u201d[m]ore recently, this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs, or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect\u201d) (citations omitted), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied; see also Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting some irregularities with the final appealed order in the case and that the order of commitment was defective because it was signed only by a magistrate and holding that, the \"defect notwithstanding, A.M. has waived any claim to reversible error because she did not raise it at the hearing or on appeal'' and that \"having failed to timely call the court's attention to1 the commitment order signed only by [the magistrate], A.M. has waived the issue for our review\"","sentence":"See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind.2001) (noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his case lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings and holding that Tapia waived any claims in regards to the magistrate\u2019s authority because he failed to object); In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 834 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (noting some irregularities with the final appealed order in the case and that the order of commitment was defective because it was signed only by a magistrate and holding that, the \u201cdefect notwithstanding, A.M. has waived any claim to reversible error because she did not raise it at the hearing or on appeal\u2019\u2019 and that \"having failed to timely call the court's attention to1 the commitment order signed only by [the magistrate], A.M. has waived the issue for our review\u201d); City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230-231 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (holding that, while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court, the City waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the Indiana Supreme Court \u201chas long held that defects in the authority of a court officer, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself, to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection\u201d and \u201d[m]ore recently, this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs, or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect\u201d) (citations omitted), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied; see also Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge)."},"case_id":6892744,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the magistrate may not have had the authority to enter the order under Ind.Code SS 33-24-5-8, Father does not argue on appeal that the order was defective because it contained the signature of the magistrate only and the record does not indicate that either party argued below that die order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication the order was approved by the trial court. Accordingly, the parties have waived any challenge to the validity of the appealed order by failing to make any objection or call the court's attention to the issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191","parenthetical":"holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge","sentence":"See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind.2001) (noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his case lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings and holding that Tapia waived any claims in regards to the magistrate\u2019s authority because he failed to object); In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 834 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (noting some irregularities with the final appealed order in the case and that the order of commitment was defective because it was signed only by a magistrate and holding that, the \u201cdefect notwithstanding, A.M. has waived any claim to reversible error because she did not raise it at the hearing or on appeal\u2019\u2019 and that \"having failed to timely call the court's attention to1 the commitment order signed only by [the magistrate], A.M. has waived the issue for our review\u201d); City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230-231 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (holding that, while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court, the City waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the Indiana Supreme Court \u201chas long held that defects in the authority of a court officer, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself, to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection\u201d and \u201d[m]ore recently, this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs, or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect\u201d) (citations omitted), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied; see also Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"932 N.E.2d 227, 230-231","parenthetical":"holding that, while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court, the City waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the Indiana Supreme Court \"has long held that defects in the authority of a court officer, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself, to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection\" and \"[m]ore recently, this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs, or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect\"","sentence":"See Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 588 (Ind.2001) (noting that Tapia claimed that a magistrate who issued several orders in his case lacked authority over his post-conviction proceedings and holding that Tapia waived any claims in regards to the magistrate\u2019s authority because he failed to object); In re Involuntary Commitment of A.M., 959 N.E.2d 832, 834 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (noting some irregularities with the final appealed order in the case and that the order of commitment was defective because it was signed only by a magistrate and holding that, the \u201cdefect notwithstanding, A.M. has waived any claim to reversible error because she did not raise it at the hearing or on appeal\u2019\u2019 and that \"having failed to timely call the court's attention to1 the commitment order signed only by [the magistrate], A.M. has waived the issue for our review\u201d); City of Indianapolis v. Hicks, 932 N.E.2d 227, 230-231 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (holding that, while a magistrate lacked the authority to enter an order granting a motion to correct error and thus that the order was defective for failing to contain the judge's signature or another indication it was approved or adopted by the trial court, the City waived any challenge to the validity of the order by failing to make a timely objection and observing that the Indiana Supreme Court \u201chas long held that defects in the authority of a court officer, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the trial court itself, to enter a final order will be waived if not raised through a timely objection\u201d and \u201d[m]ore recently, this court has applied the same principle to civil proceedings and clarified that any objection to the authority of an adjudicative officer must be raised at the first instance the irregularity occurs, or at least within such time as the tribunal is able to remedy the defect\u201d) (citations omitted), reh\u2019g denied, trans. denied; see also Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 187-191 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding that appellant, by failing to object to commissioners' authority before or at the administrative hearing, waived any challenge)."},"case_id":6892744,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This is not enough by itself to render her tax debt nondischargeable. Unless her non-payment was \"knowing and deliberate,\" the tax obligations were discharged in her bankruptcy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"48 F.3d 1153, 1158","parenthetical":"holding that mere non-payment is not sufficient to satisfy the conduct element of SS 523(a","sentence":"See Stamper, 360 F.3d at 557 (noting that \u201ca \u2018knowing and deliberate\u2019 nonpayment provides the basis for determining that the tax debt is non-dischargeable\u201d); but see Haas v. IRS (In re Haas), 48 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that mere non-payment is not sufficient to satisfy the conduct element of \u00a7 523(a)(1)(C), and thereby the government\u2019s burden, without regard to debtor\u2019s mental state), overruled in part by Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith), 206 F.3d 1389, 1396 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc); see also United States v. Fretz (In re Fretz), 244 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (11th Cir.2001)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"360 F.3d 557, 557","parenthetical":"noting that \"a 'knowing and deliberate' nonpayment provides the basis for determining that the tax debt is non-dischargeable\"","sentence":"See Stamper, 360 F.3d at 557 (noting that \u201ca \u2018knowing and deliberate\u2019 nonpayment provides the basis for determining that the tax debt is non-dischargeable\u201d); but see Haas v. IRS (In re Haas), 48 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that mere non-payment is not sufficient to satisfy the conduct element of \u00a7 523(a)(1)(C), and thereby the government\u2019s burden, without regard to debtor\u2019s mental state), overruled in part by Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith), 206 F.3d 1389, 1396 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc); see also United States v. Fretz (In re Fretz), 244 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (11th Cir.2001)."},"case_id":6049258,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This is not enough by itself to render her tax debt nondischargeable. Unless her non-payment was \"knowing and deliberate,\" the tax obligations were discharged in her bankruptcy.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"206 F.3d 1389, 1396","parenthetical":"holding that mere non-payment is not sufficient to satisfy the conduct element of SS 523(a","sentence":"See Stamper, 360 F.3d at 557 (noting that \u201ca \u2018knowing and deliberate\u2019 nonpayment provides the basis for determining that the tax debt is non-dischargeable\u201d); but see Haas v. IRS (In re Haas), 48 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that mere non-payment is not sufficient to satisfy the conduct element of \u00a7 523(a)(1)(C), and thereby the government\u2019s burden, without regard to debtor\u2019s mental state), overruled in part by Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith), 206 F.3d 1389, 1396 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc); see also United States v. Fretz (In re Fretz), 244 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (11th Cir.2001)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"360 F.3d 557, 557","parenthetical":"noting that \"a 'knowing and deliberate' nonpayment provides the basis for determining that the tax debt is non-dischargeable\"","sentence":"See Stamper, 360 F.3d at 557 (noting that \u201ca \u2018knowing and deliberate\u2019 nonpayment provides the basis for determining that the tax debt is non-dischargeable\u201d); but see Haas v. IRS (In re Haas), 48 F.3d 1153, 1158 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that mere non-payment is not sufficient to satisfy the conduct element of \u00a7 523(a)(1)(C), and thereby the government\u2019s burden, without regard to debtor\u2019s mental state), overruled in part by Griffith v. United States (In re Griffith), 206 F.3d 1389, 1396 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc); see also United States v. Fretz (In re Fretz), 244 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (11th Cir.2001)."},"case_id":6049258,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We reject Morales' contention that due process was violated by denial'of continuance.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"204 F.3d 1246, 1246","parenthetical":"requiring error and prejudice to prevail on a due process challenge","sentence":"See Lata, 204 F.3d at 1246 (requiring error and prejudice to prevail on a due process challenge)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"638 F.3d 1264, 1274","parenthetical":"\"[T]he IJ [is] not required to grant a continuance based on ... speculation.\"","sentence":"See also Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir.2011) (\u201c[T]he IJ [is] not required to grant a continuance based on ... speculation.\u201d)."},"case_id":4232348,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the second scenario, Brown's belief would have been correct; the third scenario admits the possibility of reasonable mistake. That difference is irrelevant to the probable cause requirement urged by the majority.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"605 F.3d 843, 853","parenthetical":"affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun","sentence":"See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer\u2019s good-faith belief \u201cbe correct or more likely true than false\u201d); see also Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 853 (11th Cir.2010) (affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"460 U.S. 730, 742","parenthetical":"explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer's good-faith belief \"be correct or more likely true than false\"","sentence":"See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer\u2019s good-faith belief \u201cbe correct or more likely true than false\u201d); see also Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 853 (11th Cir.2010) (affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun)."},"case_id":4064534,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In the second scenario, Brown's belief would have been correct; the third scenario admits the possibility of reasonable mistake. That difference is irrelevant to the probable cause requirement urged by the majority.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer's good-faith belief \"be correct or more likely true than false\"","sentence":"See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer\u2019s good-faith belief \u201cbe correct or more likely true than false\u201d); see also Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 853 (11th Cir.2010) (affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"605 F.3d 843, 853","parenthetical":"affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun","sentence":"See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer\u2019s good-faith belief \u201cbe correct or more likely true than false\u201d); see also Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 853 (11th Cir.2010) (affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun)."},"case_id":4064534,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In the second scenario, Brown's belief would have been correct; the third scenario admits the possibility of reasonable mistake. That difference is irrelevant to the probable cause requirement urged by the majority.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"605 F.3d 843, 853","parenthetical":"affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun","sentence":"See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer\u2019s good-faith belief \u201cbe correct or more likely true than false\u201d); see also Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 853 (11th Cir.2010) (affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer's good-faith belief \"be correct or more likely true than false\"","sentence":"See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (explaining that probable cause does not demand that officer\u2019s good-faith belief \u201cbe correct or more likely true than false\u201d); see also Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 853 (11th Cir.2010) (affirming judgment for officers on claim that they used excessive force by shooting student waving toy gun)."},"case_id":4064534,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court concludes that the fact that the moving institutional defendants entered into the Institutional Match Contract and communicated information concerning their individual programs to the NRMP up to ten times a year in order to effectuate an accurate Match does not by itself form a basis for personal jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"46 F.3d 1071, 1076-77","parenthetical":"non-forum defendant's phone calls and ten to twenty faxes to in-forum plaintiff during course of contract negotiation were insufficient to establish minimum contacts under transacting business prong of state long-arm","sentence":"See Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (10th Cir.1995) (non-forum defendant\u2019s phone calls and ten to twenty faxes to in-forum plaintiff during course of contract negotiation were insufficient to establish minimum contacts under transacting business prong of state long-arm); see also Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir.1999) (defendant\u2019s numerous communications into forum cannot serve as basis of jurisdiction if they do not themselves form basis of complaint). The Court must focus on the quality of the contacts rather than their quantity."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"195 F.3d 208, 213","parenthetical":"defendant's numerous communications into forum cannot serve as basis of jurisdiction if they do not themselves form basis of complaint","sentence":"See Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (10th Cir.1995) (non-forum defendant\u2019s phone calls and ten to twenty faxes to in-forum plaintiff during course of contract negotiation were insufficient to establish minimum contacts under transacting business prong of state long-arm); see also Wien Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 213 (5th Cir.1999) (defendant\u2019s numerous communications into forum cannot serve as basis of jurisdiction if they do not themselves form basis of complaint). The Court must focus on the quality of the contacts rather than their quantity."},"case_id":9287799,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts have generally allowed paid informants to testify as long as the agreements are not contingent upon the conviction of particular persons.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"720 F.2d 1527, 1539-40","parenthetical":"informant's testimony admissible because reward was not dependent upon making a case against particular persons specified in advance","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1539-40 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, Gustin v. United States, 465 U.S. 1108, 104 S.Ct. 1614, 80 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (informant\u2019s testimony admissible because reward was not dependent upon making a case against particular persons specified in advance); United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\". . . [Bjenefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 201 n. 9 (1st Cir.1985) (\u201c. . . [Bjenefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.\u201d)."},"case_id":1521775,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts have generally allowed paid informants to testify as long as the agreements are not contingent upon the conviction of particular persons.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's testimony admissible because reward was not dependent upon making a case against particular persons specified in advance","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1539-40 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, Gustin v. United States, 465 U.S. 1108, 104 S.Ct. 1614, 80 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (informant\u2019s testimony admissible because reward was not dependent upon making a case against particular persons specified in advance); United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\". . . [Bjenefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 201 n. 9 (1st Cir.1985) (\u201c. . . [Bjenefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.\u201d)."},"case_id":1521775,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Courts have generally allowed paid informants to testify as long as the agreements are not contingent upon the conviction of particular persons.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\". . . [Bjenefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 201 n. 9 (1st Cir.1985) (\u201c. . . [Bjenefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's testimony admissible because reward was not dependent upon making a case against particular persons specified in advance","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1539-40 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, Gustin v. United States, 465 U.S. 1108, 104 S.Ct. 1614, 80 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (informant\u2019s testimony admissible because reward was not dependent upon making a case against particular persons specified in advance); United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981) (same)."},"case_id":1521775,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Courts have generally allowed paid informants to testify as long as the agreements are not contingent upon the conviction of particular persons.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's testimony admissible because reward was not dependent upon making a case against particular persons specified in advance","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1539-40 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, Gustin v. United States, 465 U.S. 1108, 104 S.Ct. 1614, 80 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984) (informant\u2019s testimony admissible because reward was not dependent upon making a case against particular persons specified in advance); United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 499 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1091, 101 S.Ct. 887, 66 L.Ed.2d 820 (1981) (same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\". . . [Bjenefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.\"","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192, 201 n. 9 (1st Cir.1985) (\u201c. . . [Bjenefits made contingent upon subsequent indictments or convictions skate very close to, if indeed they do not cross, the limits imposed by the due process clause.\u201d)."},"case_id":1521775,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To avoid the procedural default bar, a habeas petitioner claiming a structural error need not show actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"221 F.3d 8, 17","parenthetical":"\"If [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\"","sentence":"Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1 st Cir.2007) (holding that \u201ca defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\u201d); see also Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201cIf [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\u201d); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel\u2019s failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997) (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"483 F.3d 48, 64-65","parenthetical":"holding that \"a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\"","sentence":"Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1 st Cir.2007) (holding that \u201ca defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\u201d); see also Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201cIf [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\u201d); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel\u2019s failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997) (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error)."},"case_id":3793809,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To avoid the procedural default bar, a habeas petitioner claiming a structural error need not show actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"403 F.3d 541, 549","parenthetical":"suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel's failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice","sentence":"Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1 st Cir.2007) (holding that \u201ca defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\u201d); see also Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201cIf [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\u201d); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel\u2019s failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997) (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"483 F.3d 48, 64-65","parenthetical":"holding that \"a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\"","sentence":"Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1 st Cir.2007) (holding that \u201ca defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\u201d); see also Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201cIf [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\u201d); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel\u2019s failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997) (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error)."},"case_id":3793809,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To avoid the procedural default bar, a habeas petitioner claiming a structural error need not show actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"163 F.3d 470, 475","parenthetical":"holding that where counsel's deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed","sentence":"Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1 st Cir.2007) (holding that \u201ca defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\u201d); see also Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201cIf [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\u201d); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel\u2019s failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997) (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"483 F.3d 48, 64-65","parenthetical":"holding that \"a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\"","sentence":"Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1 st Cir.2007) (holding that \u201ca defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\u201d); see also Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201cIf [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\u201d); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel\u2019s failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997) (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error)."},"case_id":3793809,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To avoid the procedural default bar, a habeas petitioner claiming a structural error need not show actual prejudice.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"483 F.3d 48, 64-65","parenthetical":"holding that \"a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\"","sentence":"Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1 st Cir.2007) (holding that \u201ca defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\u201d); see also Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201cIf [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\u201d); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel\u2019s failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997) (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"126 F.3d 352, 364","parenthetical":"even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error","sentence":"Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 64-65 (1 st Cir.2007) (holding that \u201ca defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice\u201d); see also Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (\u201cIf [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.\u201d); Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel\u2019s failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel\u2019s deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997) (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error)."},"case_id":3793809,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To the extent that the Secretary contends that, to preserve the SS 3.156(c) issue for judicial review, Mr. Emerson was required to articulate as fully developed an argument before the Board as he now presents, such contention is not consistent with case law.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"557 F.3d 1361, 1361","parenthetical":"holding that \"[i]n direct appeals, all filings must be read  1\/8  a liberal manner' whether or not the veteran is represented\"","sentence":"See Robinson I, 21 Vet.App. at 553 (\u201cAs a nonadversarial adjudicator, the Board\u2019s obligation to analyze claims goes beyond the arguments explicitly made.\u201d); see also Robinson II, 557 F.3d at 1361 (holding that \u201c[i]n direct appeals, all filings must be read \u215b a liberal manner\u2019 whether or not the veteran is represented\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"21 Vet.App. 553, 553","parenthetical":"\"As a nonadversarial adjudicator, the Board's obligation to analyze claims goes beyond the arguments explicitly made.\"","sentence":"See Robinson I, 21 Vet.App. at 553 (\u201cAs a nonadversarial adjudicator, the Board\u2019s obligation to analyze claims goes beyond the arguments explicitly made.\u201d); see also Robinson II, 557 F.3d at 1361 (holding that \u201c[i]n direct appeals, all filings must be read \u215b a liberal manner\u2019 whether or not the veteran is represented\u201d)."},"case_id":12274814,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Where agency publications have not been so promulgated, the agency's decision to analyze impacts by other methods is not an automatic violation of the law. As such, it is subject to review under the normal \"arbitrary and capricious standard\" used to review agency action under the APA.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"116 Fed.Appx. 9, 9-10","parenthetical":"\"Thus the Air Force retained discretion to analyze impacts on livestock by methods other than those contained in the Handbook, and we must address the adequacy of the Air Force's chosen method according to the arbitrary and capricious standard\"","sentence":"Davis Mountains, 116 Fed.Appx. at 9-10 (\u201cThus the Air Force retained discretion to analyze impacts on livestock by methods other than those contained in the Handbook, and we must address the adequacy of the Air Force\u2019s chosen method according to the arbitrary and capricious standard\u201d); see also Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. (CARE) v. F.A.A., 355 F.3d 678, 688 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that even though an executive order mandating agency consideration of environmental justice concerns created no private right of action for an agency\u2019s failure to comply with that mandate, the court would review the agency\u2019s action as an exercise of discretion under the APA and NEPA)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"355 F.3d 678, 688","parenthetical":"holding that even though an executive order mandating agency consideration of environmental justice concerns created no private right of action for an agency's failure to comply with that mandate, the court would review the agency's action as an exercise of discretion under the APA and NEPA","sentence":"Davis Mountains, 116 Fed.Appx. at 9-10 (\u201cThus the Air Force retained discretion to analyze impacts on livestock by methods other than those contained in the Handbook, and we must address the adequacy of the Air Force\u2019s chosen method according to the arbitrary and capricious standard\u201d); see also Communities Against Runway Expansion, Inc. (CARE) v. F.A.A., 355 F.3d 678, 688 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that even though an executive order mandating agency consideration of environmental justice concerns created no private right of action for an agency\u2019s failure to comply with that mandate, the court would review the agency\u2019s action as an exercise of discretion under the APA and NEPA)."},"case_id":3262528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In 1994, however, the legislature amended the statutory definition of the insanity defense and shifted the burden of proof entirely to the defendant. Insanity was declared an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove \"by a preponderance of the evidence.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"621 N.W.2d 719, 719","parenthetical":"holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the \"defendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent\"","sentence":"Mette, 621 N.W.2d at 719 (holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the \u201cdefendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent\u201d); see also Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d at 282 (\u201c[T]he Court of Appeals held that a defendant seeking to present a diminished capacity defense bears the burden of establishing such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"627 N.W.2d 282, 282","parenthetical":"\"[T]he Court of Appeals held that a defendant seeking to present a diminished capacity defense bears the burden of establishing such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence.\"","sentence":"Mette, 621 N.W.2d at 719 (holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the \u201cdefendant had to establish by evidence that outweighed the evidence against him that he lacked the capacity to form specific intent\u201d); see also Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d at 282 (\u201c[T]he Court of Appeals held that a defendant seeking to present a diminished capacity defense bears the burden of establishing such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d)."},"case_id":3895524,"label":"a"}
{"context":"(ECF No. 41-8 at 8.) The Board does not dispute that it learned of these complaints before July 26, 2013, the date it demoted Brown to vice principal and transferred him to Kingsbury Elementary School. (ECF No. 41-6 at 9-10.) The filing of complaints occurred a little over three months before the demotion--which is not \"prohibitively remote\" under Second Circuit caselaw.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"252 F.3d 545, 555","parenthetical":"suggesting the lapse of five months between protected activity and retaliation may show a causal connection","sentence":"Summa, 708 F.3d at 128 (finding that seven months between the retaliatory action and the protected activity satisfied causal requirement); see also Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op. Extension of Schenectedy Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001)(suggesting the lapse of five months between protected activity and retaliation may show a causal connection); Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009)(concluding that lapse of \u201conly six months between dismissal of [plaintiffs] lawsuit\u201d and retaliatory conduct was sufficient for causal connection)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"708 F.3d 128, 128","parenthetical":"finding that seven months between the retaliatory action and the protected activity satisfied causal requirement","sentence":"Summa, 708 F.3d at 128 (finding that seven months between the retaliatory action and the protected activity satisfied causal requirement); see also Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op. Extension of Schenectedy Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001)(suggesting the lapse of five months between protected activity and retaliation may show a causal connection); Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009)(concluding that lapse of \u201conly six months between dismissal of [plaintiffs] lawsuit\u201d and retaliatory conduct was sufficient for causal connection)."},"case_id":12274463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"(ECF No. 41-8 at 8.) The Board does not dispute that it learned of these complaints before July 26, 2013, the date it demoted Brown to vice principal and transferred him to Kingsbury Elementary School. (ECF No. 41-6 at 9-10.) The filing of complaints occurred a little over three months before the demotion--which is not \"prohibitively remote\" under Second Circuit caselaw.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"558 F.3d 119, 129","parenthetical":"concluding that lapse of \"only six months between dismissal of [plaintiffs] lawsuit\" and retaliatory conduct was sufficient for causal connection","sentence":"Summa, 708 F.3d at 128 (finding that seven months between the retaliatory action and the protected activity satisfied causal requirement); see also Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op. Extension of Schenectedy Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001)(suggesting the lapse of five months between protected activity and retaliation may show a causal connection); Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009)(concluding that lapse of \u201conly six months between dismissal of [plaintiffs] lawsuit\u201d and retaliatory conduct was sufficient for causal connection)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"708 F.3d 128, 128","parenthetical":"finding that seven months between the retaliatory action and the protected activity satisfied causal requirement","sentence":"Summa, 708 F.3d at 128 (finding that seven months between the retaliatory action and the protected activity satisfied causal requirement); see also Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Co-op. Extension of Schenectedy Cty., 252 F.3d 545, 555 (2d Cir. 2001)(suggesting the lapse of five months between protected activity and retaliation may show a causal connection); Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009)(concluding that lapse of \u201conly six months between dismissal of [plaintiffs] lawsuit\u201d and retaliatory conduct was sufficient for causal connection)."},"case_id":12274463,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Bituminous has cited to several federal statutes in its complaint, none of which alone can act as a waiver of sovereign immunity.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"485 F.3d 836, 838","parenthetical":"noting that because plaintiff had named the secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in his official capacity in his complaint, plaintiff had to identify a waiver of sovereign immunity, as well as invoke 28 U.S.C. SS 1331, in order to proceed","sentence":"See, e.g., Toledo v. Jackson, 485 F.3d 836, 838 (6th Cir.2007) (noting that because plaintiff had named the secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in his official capacity in his complaint, plaintiff had to identify a waiver of sovereign immunity, as well as invoke 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331, in order to proceed); see also Dover v. United States, 2008 WL 2704446, at *1 (E.D.Tenn. July 3, 2008) (\u201cThe Declaratory Judgment Act [codified at 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, et seq.] does not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2008 WL 2704446, at *1","parenthetical":"\"The Declaratory Judgment Act [codified at 28 U.S.C. SS 2201, et seq.] does not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Toledo v. Jackson, 485 F.3d 836, 838 (6th Cir.2007) (noting that because plaintiff had named the secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in his official capacity in his complaint, plaintiff had to identify a waiver of sovereign immunity, as well as invoke 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1331, in order to proceed); see also Dover v. United States, 2008 WL 2704446, at *1 (E.D.Tenn. July 3, 2008) (\u201cThe Declaratory Judgment Act [codified at 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201, et seq.] does not provide a waiver of sovereign immunity.\u201d)."},"case_id":3674689,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, this Court has recognized that jury verdicts improperly influenced by passion and prejudice can be indicated by their size.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"754 F.2d 1233, 1240","parenthetical":"finding a large verdict accompanied by a prejudicial closing argument can lead to the conclusion that the argument had an influential impact upon the jury's deliberations","sentence":"Whitehead, 163 F.3d at 278 (\u201cWithout deciding that the awards are excessive, we note that, at the very least, they are at the high end of the spectrum for such damages.\u201d); see also Westbrook v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1240 (5th Cir.1985) (finding a large verdict accompanied by a prejudicial closing argument can lead to the conclusion that the argument had an influential impact upon the jury\u2019s deliberations)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"163 F.3d 278, 278","parenthetical":"\"Without deciding that the awards are excessive, we note that, at the very least, they are at the high end of the spectrum for such damages.\"","sentence":"Whitehead, 163 F.3d at 278 (\u201cWithout deciding that the awards are excessive, we note that, at the very least, they are at the high end of the spectrum for such damages.\u201d); see also Westbrook v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1240 (5th Cir.1985) (finding a large verdict accompanied by a prejudicial closing argument can lead to the conclusion that the argument had an influential impact upon the jury\u2019s deliberations)."},"case_id":9295039,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As to victim McCaskill, Johnson highlights evidence suggesting that he received substandard treatment while in the nursing home. However, even construing the evidence so as to find that these other factors contributed to the victims' deaths, the fact remains that the violent attacks Johnson perpetrated against both victims constituted the proximate cause of both of their deaths.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"290 Ga. 757, 760","parenthetical":"proximate causation established by evidence that underlying felony \" 'directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death' \"","sentence":"See Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 760 (4) (725 SE2d 280) (2012) (proximate causation established by evidence that underlying felony \u201c \u2018directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death\u2019 \u201d); see also Larkin v. State, 247 Ga. 586 (1) (278 SE2d 365) (1981) (knife attack by defendant was proximate cause of victim\u2019s death, where victim died from complications of surgery performed on knife wound); Wilson v. State, 190 Ga. 824 (2) (10 SE2d 861) (1940) (assault by defendant was proximate cause of victim\u2019s death, where victim died nine months after assault from infection that was secondary to the wounds sustained in the assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"knife attack by defendant was proximate cause of victim's death, where victim died from complications of surgery performed on knife wound","sentence":"See Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 760 (4) (725 SE2d 280) (2012) (proximate causation established by evidence that underlying felony \u201c \u2018directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death\u2019 \u201d); see also Larkin v. State, 247 Ga. 586 (1) (278 SE2d 365) (1981) (knife attack by defendant was proximate cause of victim\u2019s death, where victim died from complications of surgery performed on knife wound); Wilson v. State, 190 Ga. 824 (2) (10 SE2d 861) (1940) (assault by defendant was proximate cause of victim\u2019s death, where victim died nine months after assault from infection that was secondary to the wounds sustained in the assault)."},"case_id":4107398,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As to victim McCaskill, Johnson highlights evidence suggesting that he received substandard treatment while in the nursing home. However, even construing the evidence so as to find that these other factors contributed to the victims' deaths, the fact remains that the violent attacks Johnson perpetrated against both victims constituted the proximate cause of both of their deaths.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"assault by defendant was proximate cause of victim's death, where victim died nine months after assault from infection that was secondary to the wounds sustained in the assault","sentence":"See Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 760 (4) (725 SE2d 280) (2012) (proximate causation established by evidence that underlying felony \u201c \u2018directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death\u2019 \u201d); see also Larkin v. State, 247 Ga. 586 (1) (278 SE2d 365) (1981) (knife attack by defendant was proximate cause of victim\u2019s death, where victim died from complications of surgery performed on knife wound); Wilson v. State, 190 Ga. 824 (2) (10 SE2d 861) (1940) (assault by defendant was proximate cause of victim\u2019s death, where victim died nine months after assault from infection that was secondary to the wounds sustained in the assault)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"290 Ga. 757, 760","parenthetical":"proximate causation established by evidence that underlying felony \" 'directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death' \"","sentence":"See Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 757, 760 (4) (725 SE2d 280) (2012) (proximate causation established by evidence that underlying felony \u201c \u2018directly and materially contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate cause of the death\u2019 \u201d); see also Larkin v. State, 247 Ga. 586 (1) (278 SE2d 365) (1981) (knife attack by defendant was proximate cause of victim\u2019s death, where victim died from complications of surgery performed on knife wound); Wilson v. State, 190 Ga. 824 (2) (10 SE2d 861) (1940) (assault by defendant was proximate cause of victim\u2019s death, where victim died nine months after assault from infection that was secondary to the wounds sustained in the assault)."},"case_id":4107398,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court properly invoked the \"compelling reasons\" standard in considering the sealing request. The only reasons provided for sealing the records--to avoid embarrassment or annoyance to Kontrabecki and to prevent an undue burden on his professional endeavors--are not \"compelling,\" particularly because the proceedings had been a matter of public record since at least 2004.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 F.2d 894, 894","parenthetical":"\"[A] naked conclusory statement that publication of the Report will injure the bank in the industry and local community falls woeful ly short of the kind of showing which raises even an arguable issue as to whether it may be kept under seal.\"","sentence":"See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (\u201cThe mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant\u2019s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.\u201d); see also Joy, 692 F.2d at 894 (\u201c[A] naked conclusory statement that publication of the Report will injure the bank in the industry and local community falls woeful ly short of the kind of showing which raises even an arguable issue as to whether it may be kept under seal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"447 F.3d 1179, 1179","parenthetical":"\"The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant's embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.\"","sentence":"See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (\u201cThe mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant\u2019s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.\u201d); see also Joy, 692 F.2d at 894 (\u201c[A] naked conclusory statement that publication of the Report will injure the bank in the industry and local community falls woeful ly short of the kind of showing which raises even an arguable issue as to whether it may be kept under seal.\u201d)."},"case_id":4169906,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In a similar case, a sister court of appeals determined \"[a] police department cannot be forced to let individual officers add religious symbols to their official uniforms.\" In Daniels, a police officer refused to remove a gold cross pin on his uniform, in non-compliance with a no-pins official policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"156 F.3d 771, 779","parenthetical":"\"The importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead 'undue hardship'.... \"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"413 U.S. 548, 565","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"case_id":5893980,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In a similar case, a sister court of appeals determined \"[a] police department cannot be forced to let individual officers add religious symbols to their official uniforms.\" In Daniels, a police officer refused to remove a gold cross pin on his uniform, in non-compliance with a no-pins official policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"156 F.3d 771, 779","parenthetical":"\"The importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead 'undue hardship'.... \"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"case_id":5893980,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In a similar case, a sister court of appeals determined \"[a] police department cannot be forced to let individual officers add religious symbols to their official uniforms.\" In Daniels, a police officer refused to remove a gold cross pin on his uniform, in non-compliance with a no-pins official policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"156 F.3d 771, 779","parenthetical":"\"The importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead 'undue hardship'.... \"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"case_id":5893980,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In a similar case, a sister court of appeals determined \"[a] police department cannot be forced to let individual officers add religious symbols to their official uniforms.\" In Daniels, a police officer refused to remove a gold cross pin on his uniform, in non-compliance with a no-pins official policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"507 F.2d 1383, 1386","parenthetical":"recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"413 U.S. 548, 565","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"case_id":5893980,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In a similar case, a sister court of appeals determined \"[a] police department cannot be forced to let individual officers add religious symbols to their official uniforms.\" In Daniels, a police officer refused to remove a gold cross pin on his uniform, in non-compliance with a no-pins official policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"507 F.2d 1383, 1386","parenthetical":"recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"case_id":5893980,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In a similar case, a sister court of appeals determined \"[a] police department cannot be forced to let individual officers add religious symbols to their official uniforms.\" In Daniels, a police officer refused to remove a gold cross pin on his uniform, in non-compliance with a no-pins official policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\"","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"507 F.2d 1383, 1386","parenthetical":"recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof","sentence":"Id. at 503. Other courts have recognized the interests of a governmental entity in maintaining the appearance of neutrality. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771, 779 (7th Cir.1998) (Posner, C.J., concurring) (\u201cThe importance of public confidence in the neutrality of its protectors is so great that a police department or a fire department ... should be able to plead \u2018undue hardship\u2019.... \u201d); Paulos v. Breier, 507 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir.1974) (recognizing and protecting the interest of municipality in preserving nonpartisan police force and appearance thereof); see also United States Civil Serv. Comm\u2019n v. Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973) (\u201c[I]t is not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.\u201d)."},"case_id":5893980,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Taking these standards into account, the Court does not hesitate to conclude that Mullin's argument fails to meet the high threshold for'nonrecognition on public policy grounds. Lloyd's cause of action in the English Action was for breach of contract. There is no support for any contention that a cause of action for breach of contract is repugnant to Pennsylvania public policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"792 A.2d 1269, 1272","parenthetical":"listing essential elements of breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law","sentence":"See Turner, 303 F.3d at 333 (affirming recognition of judgment obtained by Lloyds against a Name, and rejecting argument that breach of contract cause of action contravenes Texas public policy); Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir.1999) (holding \u201ccause of action for collection on a promissory note\u201d is not repugnant to Texas public policy); cf. J.F.Walker Co., Inc. v. Excalibur Oil Group, Inc., 792 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa.Super.2002) (listing essential elements of breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"303 F.3d 333, 333","parenthetical":"affirming recognition of judgment obtained by Lloyds against a Name, and rejecting argument that breach of contract cause of action contravenes Texas public policy","sentence":"See Turner, 303 F.3d at 333 (affirming recognition of judgment obtained by Lloyds against a Name, and rejecting argument that breach of contract cause of action contravenes Texas public policy); Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir.1999) (holding \u201ccause of action for collection on a promissory note\u201d is not repugnant to Texas public policy); cf. J.F.Walker Co., Inc. v. Excalibur Oil Group, Inc., 792 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa.Super.2002) (listing essential elements of breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law)."},"case_id":9129680,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Taking these standards into account, the Court does not hesitate to conclude that Mullin's argument fails to meet the high threshold for'nonrecognition on public policy grounds. Lloyd's cause of action in the English Action was for breach of contract. There is no support for any contention that a cause of action for breach of contract is repugnant to Pennsylvania public policy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"792 A.2d 1269, 1272","parenthetical":"listing essential elements of breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law","sentence":"See Turner, 303 F.3d at 333 (affirming recognition of judgment obtained by Lloyds against a Name, and rejecting argument that breach of contract cause of action contravenes Texas public policy); Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir.1999) (holding \u201ccause of action for collection on a promissory note\u201d is not repugnant to Texas public policy); cf. J.F.Walker Co., Inc. v. Excalibur Oil Group, Inc., 792 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa.Super.2002) (listing essential elements of breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"169 F.3d 317, 321","parenthetical":"holding \"cause of action for collection on a promissory note\" is not repugnant to Texas public policy","sentence":"See Turner, 303 F.3d at 333 (affirming recognition of judgment obtained by Lloyds against a Name, and rejecting argument that breach of contract cause of action contravenes Texas public policy); Southwest Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir.1999) (holding \u201ccause of action for collection on a promissory note\u201d is not repugnant to Texas public policy); cf. J.F.Walker Co., Inc. v. Excalibur Oil Group, Inc., 792 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa.Super.2002) (listing essential elements of breach of contract claim under Pennsylvania law)."},"case_id":9129680,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nor is there any evidence that Bratt caused the destruction or loss of the tape or that its destruction or loss was undertaken in bad faith. No inference of bad faith would arise from the destruction of the tape pursuant to routine policy after the conclusion of a criminal case, particularly in view of the fact that plaintiff apparently never sought the tape while it was in the defendants' possession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"221 F.3d 656, 663","parenthetical":"A Brady violation that resulted in the overturning of the SS 1983 plaintiffs conviction is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for SS 1983 liability on the part of the police.","sentence":"See also Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656, 663 (4th Cir.2000) (A Brady violation that resulted in the overturning of the \u00a7 1983 plaintiffs conviction is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for \u00a7 1983 liability on the part of the police.)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"166 F.3d 1307, 1310","parenthetical":"the withholding or destruction of evidence violates a criminal defendant's constitutional rights only if, as a result of the withholding or destruction of evidence, the criminal defendant is denied a fair trial","sentence":"See Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.1999) (the withholding or destruction of evidence violates a criminal defendant\u2019s constitutional rights only if, as a result of the withholding or destruction of evidence, the criminal defendant is denied a fair trial)."},"case_id":9169225,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, Prolacto has availed itself of not only United States law, but of District of Columbia law. A party that chooses to initiate litigation and invoke the legal protections of the forum should expect to appear for deposition in that jurisdiction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"213 F.R.D. 43, 47","parenthetical":"holding that an elderly named representative class member failed to present sufficient evidence that his health problems require holding his deposition in Montana rather than Washington, D.C.","sentence":"See Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 43, 47 (D.D.C.2003) (holding that an elderly named representative class member failed to present sufficient evidence that his health problems require holding his deposition in Montana rather than Washington, D.C.); see also Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Tomlin, 102 F.R.D. 93, 94 (M.D.Tenn.1984) (\u201c[Ajccording to another general rule, the plaintiff will not be heard to complain about having to appear in the forum-district for the taking of its deposition, since it selected that forum in the first instance.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"102 F.R.D. 93, 94","parenthetical":"\"[Ajccording to another general rule, the plaintiff will not be heard to complain about having to appear in the forum-district for the taking of its deposition, since it selected that forum in the first instance.\"","sentence":"See Cobell v. Norton, 213 F.R.D. 43, 47 (D.D.C.2003) (holding that an elderly named representative class member failed to present sufficient evidence that his health problems require holding his deposition in Montana rather than Washington, D.C.); see also Dollar Sys., Inc. v. Tomlin, 102 F.R.D. 93, 94 (M.D.Tenn.1984) (\u201c[Ajccording to another general rule, the plaintiff will not be heard to complain about having to appear in the forum-district for the taking of its deposition, since it selected that forum in the first instance.\u201d)."},"case_id":4258509,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149","parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149","parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149","parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We view the district court's rejection of the section 333(b) felony theory argued by the government at trial as an implied acquittal of charges based on that theory. An implied acquittal bars reprosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jury's failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals","sentence":"Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957) (holding that jury\u2019s failure to address first degree murder charge amounted to a verdict of not guilty on that charge); see also Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (according same weight to an acquittal by a jury, or in a bench trial, or on appellate review); Bullard v. Estelle, 665 F.2d 1347, 1355 nn. 17-18 (5th Cir.1982) (discussing this aspect of Burks and indicating same weight applies to implied acquittals), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1139, 103 S.Ct. 776, 74 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)."},"case_id":1700001,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In other words, they apply to a myriad of decisions made by political or taxing subdivisions or their agencies. So our adoption of reasonableness as a basis for judicial review of a unilateral annexation decision is also consistent with our preference for specific rules over general ones.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"299 Kan. 911, 930","parenthetical":"rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case","sentence":"See Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 613, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"299 Kan. 607, 613","parenthetical":"a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap","sentence":"See Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 613, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case)."},"case_id":12417940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In other words, they apply to a myriad of decisions made by political or taxing subdivisions or their agencies. So our adoption of reasonableness as a basis for judicial review of a unilateral annexation decision is also consistent with our preference for specific rules over general ones.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"299 Kan. 607, 613","parenthetical":"a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap","sentence":"See Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 613, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case","sentence":"See Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 613, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case)."},"case_id":12417940,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In other words, they apply to a myriad of decisions made by political or taxing subdivisions or their agencies. So our adoption of reasonableness as a basis for judicial review of a unilateral annexation decision is also consistent with our preference for specific rules over general ones.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap","sentence":"See Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 613, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"299 Kan. 911, 930","parenthetical":"rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case","sentence":"See Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 613, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case)."},"case_id":12417940,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In other words, they apply to a myriad of decisions made by political or taxing subdivisions or their agencies. So our adoption of reasonableness as a basis for judicial review of a unilateral annexation decision is also consistent with our preference for specific rules over general ones.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case","sentence":"See Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 613, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap","sentence":"See Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 613, 325 P.3d 1114 (2014) (a specific statute controls over a general one when the relevant provisions overlap); see also State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 930, 329 P.3d 400 (2014) (rule that general statute should yield to specific one is rule of interpretation used to determine which statute legislature intended to be applied in particular case)."},"case_id":12417940,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"87 S.Ct. 1937, 1937","parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"394 U.S. 440, 443","parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":130122,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"87 S.Ct. 1937, 1937","parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129","parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":130122,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"87 S.Ct. 1937, 1937","parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":130122,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"394 U.S. 440, 443","parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"390 U.S. 377, 385","parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"case_id":130122,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"390 U.S. 377, 385","parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129","parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":130122,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"390 U.S. 377, 385","parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"case_id":130122,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"394 U.S. 440, 443","parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"case_id":130122,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129","parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":130122,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":130122,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"394 U.S. 440, 443","parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"case_id":130122,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129","parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"case_id":130122,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We agree with the district court that the comments of the United States Attorney to the victim during the lineup to \"take her time\" were unwise.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"a model statute \"would enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\"","sentence":"See also id. at 236 n. 26, 87 S.Ct. at 1937 (a model statute \u201cwould enjoin the police from suggesting to any viewer that one or more persons in the lineup had been arrested as a suspect\u201d). In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court noted that there was no evidence of verbal guidance by the police."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, 'This is the man' \"","sentence":"Cf. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969) (\u201c[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to the witness, \u2018This is the man\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":130122,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For that reason, SDCL 15-6-23 is not applicable via SDCL 1-26-32.1. Therefore, we hold that neither SDCL ch. 1-26 nor SDCL ch. 10-59 authorize class action claims against the State nor waive sovereign immunity to such an extent as to allow class actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"139 N.M. 591, 591-92","parenthetical":"noting \"a taxpayer\" and \"the taxpayer\" in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"285 N.W.2d 600, 600","parenthetical":"\"The [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\" (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"case_id":7086808,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For that reason, SDCL 15-6-23 is not applicable via SDCL 1-26-32.1. Therefore, we hold that neither SDCL ch. 1-26 nor SDCL ch. 10-59 authorize class action claims against the State nor waive sovereign immunity to such an extent as to allow class actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"285 N.W.2d 600, 600","parenthetical":"\"The [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\" (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 P.3d 1001, 1001-02","parenthetical":"noting \"a taxpayer\" and \"the taxpayer\" in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"case_id":7086808,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For that reason, SDCL 15-6-23 is not applicable via SDCL 1-26-32.1. Therefore, we hold that neither SDCL ch. 1-26 nor SDCL ch. 10-59 authorize class action claims against the State nor waive sovereign immunity to such an extent as to allow class actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"139 N.M. 591, 591-92","parenthetical":"noting \"a taxpayer\" and \"the taxpayer\" in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\" (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"case_id":7086808,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For that reason, SDCL 15-6-23 is not applicable via SDCL 1-26-32.1. Therefore, we hold that neither SDCL ch. 1-26 nor SDCL ch. 10-59 authorize class action claims against the State nor waive sovereign immunity to such an extent as to allow class actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\" (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 P.3d 1001, 1001-02","parenthetical":"noting \"a taxpayer\" and \"the taxpayer\" in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"case_id":7086808,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For that reason, SDCL 15-6-23 is not applicable via SDCL 1-26-32.1. Therefore, we hold that neither SDCL ch. 1-26 nor SDCL ch. 10-59 authorize class action claims against the State nor waive sovereign immunity to such an extent as to allow class actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\" (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"139 N.M. 591, 591-92","parenthetical":"noting \"a taxpayer\" and \"the taxpayer\" in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"case_id":7086808,"label":"a"}
{"context":"For that reason, SDCL 15-6-23 is not applicable via SDCL 1-26-32.1. Therefore, we hold that neither SDCL ch. 1-26 nor SDCL ch. 10-59 authorize class action claims against the State nor waive sovereign immunity to such an extent as to allow class actions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 P.3d 1001, 1001-02","parenthetical":"noting \"a taxpayer\" and \"the taxpayer\" in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\" (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201","sentence":"See Lick, 285 N.W.2d at 600 (\u201cThe [S]tate has waived its right of sovereign immunity only to the extent provided by the express terms of [the applicable refund] statutes.\u201d (citing Darnall, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201)); see also U.S. Xpress, 139 N.M. at 591-92, 136 P.3d at 1001-02 (noting \u201ca taxpayer\u201d and \u201cthe taxpayer\u201d in New Mexico refund statute require individual claims as prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction)."},"case_id":7086808,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As the majority candidly acknowledges, the cases on which it relies only hold that constructive possession may be inferred from a defendant's exclusive control of the premises in which the firearms are found; the cases do not indicate that a defendant's exclusive control of the premises necessitates an inference of constructive possession.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"235 F.3d 565, 571","parenthetical":"holding that \"the defendant's dominion, control, and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that \u201cthe defendant\u2019s dominion, control, and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found\u201d (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that \u201cif the government demonstrates that the defendant had \u2018exclusive control\u2019 over the property where the contraband was discovered, a jury may reasonably infer that he constructively possessed the items, including the contraband, found on that property\u201d (emphasis added)); United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that \u201cconstructive possession may be established by a showing that the firearm was seized at the defendant\u2019s residence\u201d (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 867 (7th Cir. 2000)))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"684 F.3d 691, 695","parenthetical":"noting that \"if the government demonstrates that the defendant had 'exclusive control' over the property where the contraband was discovered, a jury may reasonably infer that he constructively possessed the items, including the contraband, found on that property\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See United States v. Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 571 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that \u201cthe defendant\u2019s dominion, control, and knowledge may be inferred if he had exclusive possession of the premises on which the object was found\u201d (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Griffin, 684 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting that \u201cif the government demonstrates that the defendant had \u2018exclusive control\u2019 over the property where the contraband was discovered, a jury may reasonably infer that he constructively possessed the items, including the contraband, found on that property\u201d (emphasis added)); United States v. Alanis, 265 F.3d 576, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that \u201cconstructive possession may be established by a showing that the firearm was seized at the defendant\u2019s residence\u201d (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Walls, 225 F.3d 858, 867 (7th Cir. 2000)))."},"case_id":4339599,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 234, 238","parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"411 U.S. 475, 499","parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 234, 238","parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"391 U.S. 234, 238","parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"411 U.S. 475, 499","parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"411 U.S. 475, 499","parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The thrust of this argument seems to be that application of the Heck doctrine would deprive Huey of a federal forum for his Eighth Amendment claim. Because he is no longer \"in custody\" for his disciplinary infraction, Huey cannot seek a writ of habeas corpus challenging the legality of his detention.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be 'in custody' when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\"","sentence":"See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968) (stating that \u201c[t]he federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be \u2018in custody\u2019 when the application for habeas corpus is filed.\u201d); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (\u201cWhen a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.\u201d)."},"case_id":1094351,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"450 U.S. 261, 268","parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 692, 692","parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 692, 692","parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 692, 692","parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"33 F.3d 1133, 1135","parenthetical":"remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 692, 692","parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"782 F.2d 118, 120","parenthetical":"recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"466 U.S. 692, 692","parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"450 U.S. 261, 268","parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"33 F.3d 1133, 1135","parenthetical":"remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'\"","sentence":"See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (\u201cPrejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel \u2018actively represented conflicting interests\u2019 and that \u2018an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019\u201d); Dawan, 31 F.3d at 721-22. Assuming without deciding that petitioner\u2019s trial team acted under an actual conflict of interest by accepting payment from petitioner\u2019s father, I must decide Whether there is any evidence in the record establishing that this conflict actually affected the adequacy of their representation."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"782 F.2d 118, 120","parenthetical":"recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"782 F.2d 118, 120","parenthetical":"recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"450 U.S. 261, 268","parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"782 F.2d 118, 120","parenthetical":"recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"782 F.2d 118, 120","parenthetical":"recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, the petitioner must establish that his attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest, not merely a potential one. Second, the petitioner must establish that the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of the representation.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"782 F.2d 118, 120","parenthetical":"recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"33 F.3d 1133, 1135","parenthetical":"remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government","sentence":"Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (finding sufficient possibility of conflict of interest to remand for fact finding on issue of actual conflict of interest where employer hired attorney to defend employees); Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994) (remanding for hearing on Cuyler issue where a defendant in a drug ease was represented by an attorney paid for by an anonymous third party and the attorney suggested that the defendant not accept the plea offer from the government); but see United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986) (recognizing inherent dangers of third-party-payer arrangement, but finding defendant failed to prove that those dangers ripened into an actual conflict of interest)."},"case_id":1621797,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"131 N.J. 176, 239-40","parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"131 N.J. 176, 239-40","parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \"part and parcel\" of a kidnapping","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \"part and parcel\" of a kidnapping","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \"part and parcel\" of a kidnapping","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \"part and parcel\" of a kidnapping","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \"part and parcel\" of a kidnapping","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"threats against victim's spouse and theft of victim's car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \"part and parcel\" of a kidnapping","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"338 N.J.Super. 227, 239","parenthetical":"prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"338 N.J.Super. 227, 239","parenthetical":"prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"173 N.J. 153, 153-58","parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of our determination as to admissibility of the State's evidential proffers under Rule 404(b), we need not discuss in detail the State's alternative argument that all of the evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception. Evidence admissible as res gestae is \"part and parcel\" of the crime charged.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c","sentence":"See also Long, supra, 173 N.J. at 153-58, 801 A.2d 221 (statement by victim to mother of conversation with defendant held admissible in murder case under Rule 803(c)(3) as res gestae because the statements were \u201cpart of the \u2018mosaic\u2019 of the criminal event\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct","sentence":"State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 239-40, 619 A.2d 1208 (1993), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995) (threats against victim\u2019s spouse and theft of victim\u2019s car held not Rule 404(b) evidence but \u201cpart and parcel\u201d of a kidnapping); State v. L.P., 338 N.J.Super. 227, 239, 768 A.2d 795 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 205, 785 A.2d 434 (2001) (prior sexual assaults of child victim formed a continuous course of conduct with overriding objective that tied together disparate conduct)."},"case_id":3561621,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence established that plaintiff contributed to Medicare, resulting in the court's conclusion that such payments are from a collateral source under Pennsylvania law.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden on claimant to trace contributions to the Social Security fund in order to determine the percentage contributed to the fund by the government and ultimately the amount of Social Security payments that could be considered nondeductible","sentence":"But see Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.1977) (burden on claimant to trace contributions to the Social Security fund in order to determine the percentage contributed to the fund by the government and ultimately the amount of Social Security payments that could be considered nondeductible)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Social Security Survivor benefits paid a widow and children not deducted from widow's damage award from government under FTCA","sentence":"Id. at 174. See also Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.1978) (Social Security Survivor benefits paid a widow and children not deducted from widow\u2019s damage award from government under FTCA); United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.1961) (Civil Service Retirement benefits not deductible); and United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir.1949) (National Service Life Insurance Policy benefits not deductible from FTCA damage award)."},"case_id":1866591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence established that plaintiff contributed to Medicare, resulting in the court's conclusion that such payments are from a collateral source under Pennsylvania law.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden on claimant to trace contributions to the Social Security fund in order to determine the percentage contributed to the fund by the government and ultimately the amount of Social Security payments that could be considered nondeductible","sentence":"But see Steckler v. United States, 549 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.1977) (burden on claimant to trace contributions to the Social Security fund in order to determine the percentage contributed to the fund by the government and ultimately the amount of Social Security payments that could be considered nondeductible)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"National Service Life Insurance Policy benefits not deductible from FTCA damage award","sentence":"Id. at 174. See also Smith v. United States, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir.1978) (Social Security Survivor benefits paid a widow and children not deducted from widow\u2019s damage award from government under FTCA); United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.1961) (Civil Service Retirement benefits not deductible); and United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir.1949) (National Service Life Insurance Policy benefits not deductible from FTCA damage award)."},"case_id":1866591,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Here, Agent Knoll did appear at trial. And as discussed above, the record supports a finding that Agent Knoll's testimony about Mr. Valenzuela-Carrillo's immigration status derived from his own observations -- not those of any out-of-court declarant. Because Ms. Gutierrez's counsel had a full opportunity to cross-examine Agent Knoll about these observations, no Confrontation Clause violation occurred.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.\"","sentence":"See id. at 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (\u201cThe Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.\u201d); see also United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 1191 (7th Cir.2013) (\u201cBlock\u2019s testimony on these points, which were within his personal knowledge, posed no Confrontation Clause problem.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"709 F.3d 1187, 1191","parenthetical":"\"Block's testimony on these points, which were within his personal knowledge, posed no Confrontation Clause problem.\"","sentence":"See id. at 60 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (\u201cThe Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.\u201d); see also United States v. Turner, 709 F.3d 1187, 1191 (7th Cir.2013) (\u201cBlock\u2019s testimony on these points, which were within his personal knowledge, posed no Confrontation Clause problem.\u201d)."},"case_id":4151056,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In short, this Magistrate Judge sees no reason to revisit the holdings in Wyss and Iacampo regarding RICRA when those holdings are based on an interpretation of state law which appears consistent with general view of the statute as expressed by the state supreme court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 2075132, at *2","parenthetical":"finding that defendant \"may be individually liable for conduct constituting a violation under RI-CRA\"","sentence":"See Allen v. Attorney Gen. of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 575 n. 6 (1st Cir.1996) (noting \u201cthe general proposition that federal courts must defer to a state supreme court\u2019s interpretation of a statute of the state\u201d); see also Evans v. Rhode Island Dep\u2019t of Bus. Regulation, No. Civ.A. 01-1122, 2004 WL 2075132, at *2 (R.I.Super. Aug. 21, 2004) (finding that defendant \u201cmay be individually liable for conduct constituting a violation under RI-CRA\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting \"the general proposition that federal courts must defer to a state supreme court's interpretation of a statute of the state\"","sentence":"See Allen v. Attorney Gen. of Maine, 80 F.3d 569, 575 n. 6 (1st Cir.1996) (noting \u201cthe general proposition that federal courts must defer to a state supreme court\u2019s interpretation of a statute of the state\u201d); see also Evans v. Rhode Island Dep\u2019t of Bus. Regulation, No. Civ.A. 01-1122, 2004 WL 2075132, at *2 (R.I.Super. Aug. 21, 2004) (finding that defendant \u201cmay be individually liable for conduct constituting a violation under RI-CRA\u201d)."},"case_id":4269108,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We reject this argument as unpersuasive for reasons similar to those given by the Magistrate Judge and District Court. We have held, and both the Magistrate Judge and District Court assumed, that a prisoner's civil rights case may be heard on the merits notwithstanding the failure to file a DC-ADM 804 grievance under certain limited circumstances.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"285 F.3d 287, 297-98","parenthetical":"declining to decide question whether prisoner may satisfy exhaustion requirement in course of proceedings charging prisoner with misconduct under DC-ADM 801","sentence":"Cf. Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 297-98 (3d Cir.2002) (declining to decide question whether prisoner may satisfy exhaustion requirement in course of proceedings charging prisoner with misconduct under DC-ADM 801)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"219 F.3d 279, 281","parenthetical":"exhaustion requirement met where Office of Professional Responsibility fully examined merits of excessive force claim and correctional officers may have impeded filing of grievance","sentence":"See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2000) (exhaustion requirement met where Office of Professional Responsibility fully examined merits of excessive force claim and correctional officers may have impeded filing of grievance). See also Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 110 (3d Cir.2002) (assuming that prisoner with failure to protect claim is entitled to rely on instruction by prison officials to wait for outcome of internal security investigation before filing grievance)."},"case_id":1298701,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court recognizes that class certification serves the interests of judicial economy and provides, in some eases, the most effective means for potential plaintiffs to adjudi cate their claims. These arguments, however, are more appropriately considered in evaluating the superiority requirement of RCFC 23.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"68 Fed.Cl. 499, 499","parenthetical":"\"Essentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\"","sentence":"Barnes, 68 Fed.Cl. at 499 (\u201cEssentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\u201d); see also Curry v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 328, 337 (2008) (adopting Quinault\u2019s [453 F.2d at 1276] determination that the \u201cclaims of many allottees are so small that it is doubtful that they would be pursued other than through this case,\u201d as part of the superiority analysis); Fisher v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 193, 205 (2006) (considering the relative size of potential individual claims under the superiority requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"81 Fed.Cl. 328, 337","parenthetical":"adopting Quinault's [453 F.2d at 1276] determination that the \"claims of many allottees are so small that it is doubtful that they would be pursued other than through this case,\" as part of the superiority analysis","sentence":"Barnes, 68 Fed.Cl. at 499 (\u201cEssentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\u201d); see also Curry v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 328, 337 (2008) (adopting Quinault\u2019s [453 F.2d at 1276] determination that the \u201cclaims of many allottees are so small that it is doubtful that they would be pursued other than through this case,\u201d as part of the superiority analysis); Fisher v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 193, 205 (2006) (considering the relative size of potential individual claims under the superiority requirement)."},"case_id":4283404,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court recognizes that class certification serves the interests of judicial economy and provides, in some eases, the most effective means for potential plaintiffs to adjudi cate their claims. These arguments, however, are more appropriately considered in evaluating the superiority requirement of RCFC 23.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"68 Fed.Cl. 499, 499","parenthetical":"\"Essentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\"","sentence":"Barnes, 68 Fed.Cl. at 499 (\u201cEssentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\u201d); see also Curry v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 328, 337 (2008) (adopting Quinault\u2019s [453 F.2d at 1276] determination that the \u201cclaims of many allottees are so small that it is doubtful that they would be pursued other than through this case,\u201d as part of the superiority analysis); Fisher v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 193, 205 (2006) (considering the relative size of potential individual claims under the superiority requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"453 F.2d 1276, 1276","parenthetical":"adopting Quinault's [453 F.2d at 1276] determination that the \"claims of many allottees are so small that it is doubtful that they would be pursued other than through this case,\" as part of the superiority analysis","sentence":"Barnes, 68 Fed.Cl. at 499 (\u201cEssentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\u201d); see also Curry v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 328, 337 (2008) (adopting Quinault\u2019s [453 F.2d at 1276] determination that the \u201cclaims of many allottees are so small that it is doubtful that they would be pursued other than through this case,\u201d as part of the superiority analysis); Fisher v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 193, 205 (2006) (considering the relative size of potential individual claims under the superiority requirement)."},"case_id":4283404,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court recognizes that class certification serves the interests of judicial economy and provides, in some eases, the most effective means for potential plaintiffs to adjudi cate their claims. These arguments, however, are more appropriately considered in evaluating the superiority requirement of RCFC 23.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"68 Fed.Cl. 499, 499","parenthetical":"\"Essentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\"","sentence":"Barnes, 68 Fed.Cl. at 499 (\u201cEssentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\u201d); see also Curry v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 328, 337 (2008) (adopting Quinault\u2019s [453 F.2d at 1276] determination that the \u201cclaims of many allottees are so small that it is doubtful that they would be pursued other than through this case,\u201d as part of the superiority analysis); Fisher v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 193, 205 (2006) (considering the relative size of potential individual claims under the superiority requirement)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"69 Fed.Cl. 193, 205","parenthetical":"considering the relative size of potential individual claims under the superiority requirement","sentence":"Barnes, 68 Fed.Cl. at 499 (\u201cEssentially, under [the superiority] prong of the analysis, the court is obliged to conduct a cosi\/benefit analysis, weighing any potential problems with the manageability or fairness of a class action against the benefits to the system and the individual members likely to be derived from maintaining such an action.\u201d); see also Curry v. United States, 81 Fed.Cl. 328, 337 (2008) (adopting Quinault\u2019s [453 F.2d at 1276] determination that the \u201cclaims of many allottees are so small that it is doubtful that they would be pursued other than through this case,\u201d as part of the superiority analysis); Fisher v. United States, 69 Fed.Cl. 193, 205 (2006) (considering the relative size of potential individual claims under the superiority requirement)."},"case_id":4283404,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The judgment protected by the injunction is the judgment in Canady I, which was properly issued in federal court, as it is undisputed that appellants properly filed their original class action complaint in federal court. As long as the original lawsuit was properly brought in federal court, the federal court retains subject matter jurisdiction to remove any subsequent state law action to federal court for purposes of applying the All Writs Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"195 F.3d 424, 426-27","parenthetical":"holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under All Writs Act","sentence":"See Xiong v. Minnesota, 195 F.3d 424, 426-27 (8th Cir.1999) (Xiong) (holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under All Writs Act); see also NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 144 F.3d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir.1998) (NAACP II) (concluding that federal court properly exercised removal jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to the All Writs Act)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"144 F.3d 1168, 1171","parenthetical":"concluding that federal court properly exercised removal jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to the All Writs Act","sentence":"See Xiong v. Minnesota, 195 F.3d 424, 426-27 (8th Cir.1999) (Xiong) (holding that removal to federal court was proper for claims asserted under All Writs Act); see also NAACP v. Metropolitan Council, 144 F.3d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir.1998) (NAACP II) (concluding that federal court properly exercised removal jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to the All Writs Act)."},"case_id":9475147,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Some courts are reluctant to deny debtors the opportunity to claim exemptions unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, while others have denied improperly claimed exemptions in their entirety.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"109 B.R. 548, 550","parenthetical":"\"reluctantly\" allowing debtor's original claim of exemptions although bankruptcy schedules were filed eight months after commencement of case, and concluding that \"absent a clear showing of bad faith or prejudice, we have no discretion to deny [the debtor] his right to said exemptions\"","sentence":"See In re Slentz, 157 B.R. 418, 421 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1993) (denying improper and excessive exemption in its entirety); In re Gaudet, 109 B.R. 548, 550 (Bankr.D.R.1.1989) (\u201creluctantly\u201d allowing debtor\u2019s original claim of exemptions although bankruptcy schedules were filed eight months after commencement of case, and concluding that \u201cabsent a clear showing of bad faith or prejudice, we have no discretion to deny [the debtor] his right to said exemptions\u201d); see also In re Schwarb, 150 B.R. 470, 472 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1992) (holding that under Code \u00a7 522, the debtor\u2019s exemption may be denied where there is a finding of fraudulent bankruptcy planning)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"150 B.R. 470, 472","parenthetical":"holding that under Code SS 522, the debtor's exemption may be denied where there is a finding of fraudulent bankruptcy planning","sentence":"See In re Slentz, 157 B.R. 418, 421 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1993) (denying improper and excessive exemption in its entirety); In re Gaudet, 109 B.R. 548, 550 (Bankr.D.R.1.1989) (\u201creluctantly\u201d allowing debtor\u2019s original claim of exemptions although bankruptcy schedules were filed eight months after commencement of case, and concluding that \u201cabsent a clear showing of bad faith or prejudice, we have no discretion to deny [the debtor] his right to said exemptions\u201d); see also In re Schwarb, 150 B.R. 470, 472 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1992) (holding that under Code \u00a7 522, the debtor\u2019s exemption may be denied where there is a finding of fraudulent bankruptcy planning)."},"case_id":6467415,"label":"a"}
{"context":"WCSPA thus has at most two years to challenge the denial of its motion to intervene before its challenge becomes moot. Both the Supreme Court and this court have held that two years is too short in duration for a case to be fully litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"219 U.S. 498, 514-16","parenthetical":"order that expires by its terms after two years evades review","sentence":"S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (order that expires by its terms after two years evades review); Alaska Ctr. for Env\u2019t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1999) (a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review); see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30","parenthetical":"fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review","sentence":"S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (order that expires by its terms after two years evades review); Alaska Ctr. for Env\u2019t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1999) (a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review); see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review)."},"case_id":5648014,"label":"a"}
{"context":"WCSPA thus has at most two years to challenge the denial of its motion to intervene before its challenge becomes moot. Both the Supreme Court and this court have held that two years is too short in duration for a case to be fully litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30","parenthetical":"fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review","sentence":"S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (order that expires by its terms after two years evades review); Alaska Ctr. for Env\u2019t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1999) (a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review); see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"order that expires by its terms after two years evades review","sentence":"S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (order that expires by its terms after two years evades review); Alaska Ctr. for Env\u2019t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1999) (a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review); see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review)."},"case_id":5648014,"label":"b"}
{"context":"WCSPA thus has at most two years to challenge the denial of its motion to intervene before its challenge becomes moot. Both the Supreme Court and this court have held that two years is too short in duration for a case to be fully litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30","parenthetical":"fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review","sentence":"S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (order that expires by its terms after two years evades review); Alaska Ctr. for Env\u2019t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1999) (a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review); see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"order that expires by its terms after two years evades review","sentence":"S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (order that expires by its terms after two years evades review); Alaska Ctr. for Env\u2019t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1999) (a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review); see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review)."},"case_id":5648014,"label":"b"}
{"context":"WCSPA thus has at most two years to challenge the denial of its motion to intervene before its challenge becomes moot. Both the Supreme Court and this court have held that two years is too short in duration for a case to be fully litigated.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"189 F.3d 851, 855","parenthetical":"a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review","sentence":"S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (order that expires by its terms after two years evades review); Alaska Ctr. for Env\u2019t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1999) (a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review); see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30","parenthetical":"fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review","sentence":"S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911) (order that expires by its terms after two years evades review); Alaska Ctr. for Env\u2019t v. U.S. Forest Serv., 189 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir.1999) (a permit that expired in two years is too short for judicial review); see also Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1992) (fishing quota specifications that expire in one year evade review)."},"case_id":5648014,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As to the requests for promotion, the commission relied in part on the recognition in some federal cases that a discriminatory failure to promote represents an actionable continuing violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"419 N.W.2d 379, 379","parenthetical":"\"Failure to promote is viewed as ongoing, while failure to hire is viewed as an [isolated] act\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 402 (5th Cir.1983); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir.1975) (failure to promote, unlike hiring or discharge or other events often found as not constituting continuing discrimination, does not take place on a particular day, \u201cit invariably arises during a lengthy period of time.\u201d); see also Annear, 419 N.W.2d at 379 (\u201cFailure to promote is viewed as ongoing, while failure to hire is viewed as an [isolated] act\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"522 F.2d 333, 348","parenthetical":"failure to promote, unlike hiring or discharge or other events often found as not constituting continuing discrimination, does not take place on a particular day, \"it invariably arises during a lengthy period of time.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 402 (5th Cir.1983); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 348 (10th Cir.1975) (failure to promote, unlike hiring or discharge or other events often found as not constituting continuing discrimination, does not take place on a particular day, \u201cit invariably arises during a lengthy period of time.\u201d); see also Annear, 419 N.W.2d at 379 (\u201cFailure to promote is viewed as ongoing, while failure to hire is viewed as an [isolated] act\u201d)."},"case_id":10596503,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have interpreted Supreme Court case law as establishing that the Remmer presumption is, in fact, vital, though its use should not be automatic regardless of the level of prejudicial impact that is likely to flow from a given intrusion. What is more, we have implied, though not stated directly, that the Remmer presumption is clearly established federal law under AEDPA, meaning state courts must apply the Remmer presumption to avoid running afoul of the federal Constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"368 F.3d 936, 942-43","parenthetical":"stating in a post-AEDPA habeas case reviewing a state court conviction, \"The post-conviction court's finding that there was no prejudice was especially unreasonable due to the fact that a presumption of prejudice applies in situations where ex parte communications were made to the jury by a third party\"","sentence":"See Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 942-43 (7th Cir.2004) (stating in a post-AEDPA habeas case reviewing a state court conviction, \u201cThe post-conviction court\u2019s finding that there was no prejudice was especially unreasonable due to the fact that a presumption of prejudice applies in situations where ex parte communications were made to the jury by a third party\u201d); see also Wisehart, 408 F.3d at 326-28 (noting in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the State must carry the burden of showing harmlessness in a Remmer hearing); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708 (7th Cir.2001) (holding in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the Remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury, implying that the Remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"408 F.3d 326, 326-28","parenthetical":"noting in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the State must carry the burden of showing harmlessness in a Remmer hearing","sentence":"See Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 942-43 (7th Cir.2004) (stating in a post-AEDPA habeas case reviewing a state court conviction, \u201cThe post-conviction court\u2019s finding that there was no prejudice was especially unreasonable due to the fact that a presumption of prejudice applies in situations where ex parte communications were made to the jury by a third party\u201d); see also Wisehart, 408 F.3d at 326-28 (noting in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the State must carry the burden of showing harmlessness in a Remmer hearing); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708 (7th Cir.2001) (holding in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the Remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury, implying that the Remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context)."},"case_id":3514973,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have interpreted Supreme Court case law as establishing that the Remmer presumption is, in fact, vital, though its use should not be automatic regardless of the level of prejudicial impact that is likely to flow from a given intrusion. What is more, we have implied, though not stated directly, that the Remmer presumption is clearly established federal law under AEDPA, meaning state courts must apply the Remmer presumption to avoid running afoul of the federal Constitution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"368 F.3d 936, 942-43","parenthetical":"stating in a post-AEDPA habeas case reviewing a state court conviction, \"The post-conviction court's finding that there was no prejudice was especially unreasonable due to the fact that a presumption of prejudice applies in situations where ex parte communications were made to the jury by a third party\"","sentence":"See Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 942-43 (7th Cir.2004) (stating in a post-AEDPA habeas case reviewing a state court conviction, \u201cThe post-conviction court\u2019s finding that there was no prejudice was especially unreasonable due to the fact that a presumption of prejudice applies in situations where ex parte communications were made to the jury by a third party\u201d); see also Wisehart, 408 F.3d at 326-28 (noting in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the State must carry the burden of showing harmlessness in a Remmer hearing); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708 (7th Cir.2001) (holding in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the Remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury, implying that the Remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the Remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury, implying that the Remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context","sentence":"See Moore v. Knight, 368 F.3d 936, 942-43 (7th Cir.2004) (stating in a post-AEDPA habeas case reviewing a state court conviction, \u201cThe post-conviction court\u2019s finding that there was no prejudice was especially unreasonable due to the fact that a presumption of prejudice applies in situations where ex parte communications were made to the jury by a third party\u201d); see also Wisehart, 408 F.3d at 326-28 (noting in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the State must carry the burden of showing harmlessness in a Remmer hearing); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708 (7th Cir.2001) (holding in a post-AEDPA habeas case that the Remmer presumption did not apply due to the innocuous nature of an intrusion upon a jury, implying that the Remmer presumption could apply in the habeas context)."},"case_id":3514973,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But more importantly, Insty*Bit predates the Supreme Court's opinion in TrafFix. The appellate decisions since TrafFix that discuss functionality in the context of trade dress claims analogous to those asserted by Honeywell here consistently show that a mere combination of functional components with nondescript or common colors, shapes, and configurations does not meet the requisite standards. While the Groeneveld and Eppendorf opinions specifically discuss evidence of the functions served by the design elements at issue, they are decisions overturning jury determinations of nonfunctionality, i.e. they were rendered after jury trials in' which both sides presented evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"668 F.3d 686, 686","parenthetical":"observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\" in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality","sentence":"See Cel-otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (confirming that \u2018 summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\u201d even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element); see also Secalt, 668 F.3d at 686 (observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\u201d in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"477 U.S. 317, 322","parenthetical":"confirming that ' summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\" even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element","sentence":"See Cel-otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (confirming that \u2018 summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\u201d even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element); see also Secalt, 668 F.3d at 686 (observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\u201d in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality)."},"case_id":3972408,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But more importantly, Insty*Bit predates the Supreme Court's opinion in TrafFix. The appellate decisions since TrafFix that discuss functionality in the context of trade dress claims analogous to those asserted by Honeywell here consistently show that a mere combination of functional components with nondescript or common colors, shapes, and configurations does not meet the requisite standards. While the Groeneveld and Eppendorf opinions specifically discuss evidence of the functions served by the design elements at issue, they are decisions overturning jury determinations of nonfunctionality, i.e. they were rendered after jury trials in' which both sides presented evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confirming that ' summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\" even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element","sentence":"See Cel-otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (confirming that \u2018 summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\u201d even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element); see also Secalt, 668 F.3d at 686 (observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\u201d in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"668 F.3d 686, 686","parenthetical":"observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\" in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality","sentence":"See Cel-otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (confirming that \u2018 summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\u201d even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element); see also Secalt, 668 F.3d at 686 (observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\u201d in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality)."},"case_id":3972408,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But more importantly, Insty*Bit predates the Supreme Court's opinion in TrafFix. The appellate decisions since TrafFix that discuss functionality in the context of trade dress claims analogous to those asserted by Honeywell here consistently show that a mere combination of functional components with nondescript or common colors, shapes, and configurations does not meet the requisite standards. While the Groeneveld and Eppendorf opinions specifically discuss evidence of the functions served by the design elements at issue, they are decisions overturning jury determinations of nonfunctionality, i.e. they were rendered after jury trials in' which both sides presented evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"668 F.3d 686, 686","parenthetical":"observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\" in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality","sentence":"See Cel-otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (confirming that \u2018 summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\u201d even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element); see also Secalt, 668 F.3d at 686 (observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\u201d in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"confirming that ' summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\" even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element","sentence":"See Cel-otex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (confirming that \u2018 summary judgment is proper \"against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial\u201d even in the absence of an affirmative showing of evidence from the nonmoving party negating the element); see also Secalt, 668 F.3d at 686 (observing the absence of \"any evidence that these functional aspects of the trade dress were adorned with arbitrary, ornamental embellishments\u201d in affirming summary judgment for failure to establish non-functionality)."},"case_id":3972408,"label":"b"}
{"context":". At oral argument on the summary judgment motion, Medeiros intimated that Amendment 3 and Regulation 15.18 infringe upon his fundamental right to pursue the livelihood or occupation of his choosing: in this case, lob-stering. Both for equal protection and substantive due process purposes, however, see infra Section II.B, it is well settled that no such fundamental right exists, and that legislation or regulation impinging upon such a right therefore is subject only to \"rational basis\" review, rather than \"strict scrutiny.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir. 1994); Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Sisk v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep\u2019t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981) (\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\u201d); Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823-24 (R.I.2004); cf. Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\u201d under the Privileges and Immunities Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"723 F.2d 110, 112","parenthetical":"noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause","sentence":"See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir. 1994); Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Sisk v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep\u2019t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981) (\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\u201d); Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823-24 (R.I.2004); cf. Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\u201d under the Privileges and Immunities Clause)."},"case_id":1618085,"label":"a"}
{"context":". At oral argument on the summary judgment motion, Medeiros intimated that Amendment 3 and Regulation 15.18 infringe upon his fundamental right to pursue the livelihood or occupation of his choosing: in this case, lob-stering. Both for equal protection and substantive due process purposes, however, see infra Section II.B, it is well settled that no such fundamental right exists, and that legislation or regulation impinging upon such a right therefore is subject only to \"rational basis\" review, rather than \"strict scrutiny.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause","sentence":"See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir. 1994); Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Sisk v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep\u2019t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981) (\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\u201d); Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823-24 (R.I.2004); cf. Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\u201d under the Privileges and Immunities Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir. 1994); Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Sisk v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep\u2019t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981) (\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\u201d); Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823-24 (R.I.2004); cf. Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\u201d under the Privileges and Immunities Clause)."},"case_id":1618085,"label":"b"}
{"context":". At oral argument on the summary judgment motion, Medeiros intimated that Amendment 3 and Regulation 15.18 infringe upon his fundamental right to pursue the livelihood or occupation of his choosing: in this case, lob-stering. Both for equal protection and substantive due process purposes, however, see infra Section II.B, it is well settled that no such fundamental right exists, and that legislation or regulation impinging upon such a right therefore is subject only to \"rational basis\" review, rather than \"strict scrutiny.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause","sentence":"See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir. 1994); Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Sisk v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep\u2019t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981) (\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\u201d); Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823-24 (R.I.2004); cf. Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\u201d under the Privileges and Immunities Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir. 1994); Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Sisk v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep\u2019t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981) (\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\u201d); Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823-24 (R.I.2004); cf. Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\u201d under the Privileges and Immunities Clause)."},"case_id":1618085,"label":"b"}
{"context":". At oral argument on the summary judgment motion, Medeiros intimated that Amendment 3 and Regulation 15.18 infringe upon his fundamental right to pursue the livelihood or occupation of his choosing: in this case, lob-stering. Both for equal protection and substantive due process purposes, however, see infra Section II.B, it is well settled that no such fundamental right exists, and that legislation or regulation impinging upon such a right therefore is subject only to \"rational basis\" review, rather than \"strict scrutiny.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause","sentence":"See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir. 1994); Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Sisk v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep\u2019t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981) (\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\u201d); Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823-24 (R.I.2004); cf. Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\u201d under the Privileges and Immunities Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1031 n. 5 (9th Cir.1999); N.Y. State Trawlers Ass'n v. Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303, 1311 (2d Cir. 1994); Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1993); Sisk v. Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep\u2019t, 644 F.2d 1056, 1058 n. 5 (5th Cir.1981) (\"[Fjishing is not a fundamental right nor is the class of commercial fishermen a suspect class.\u201d); Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 823-24 (R.I.2004); cf. Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 723 F.2d 110, 112 (1st Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 274, 105 S.Ct. 1272, 84 L.Ed.2d 205 (1985) (noting .that right to make a living may be \"fundamental\u201d under the Privileges and Immunities Clause)."},"case_id":1618085,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The failure of the district court to adequately cite its reasons for a sentence on the record is ordinarily reversible error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting failure to provide adequate \"statement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"622 N.W.2d 304, 304-05","parenthetical":"remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \"this\" defendant and \"this\" offense","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"case_id":6881192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The failure of the district court to adequately cite its reasons for a sentence on the record is ordinarily reversible error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"622 N.W.2d 304, 304-05","parenthetical":"remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \"this\" defendant and \"this\" offense","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"541 A.2d 332, 340","parenthetical":"noting failure to provide adequate \"statement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"case_id":6881192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The failure of the district court to adequately cite its reasons for a sentence on the record is ordinarily reversible error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting failure to provide adequate \"statement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"542 N.W.2d 816, 816","parenthetical":"requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"case_id":6881192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The failure of the district court to adequately cite its reasons for a sentence on the record is ordinarily reversible error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"541 A.2d 332, 340","parenthetical":"noting failure to provide adequate \"statement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"542 N.W.2d 816, 816","parenthetical":"requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"case_id":6881192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The failure of the district court to adequately cite its reasons for a sentence on the record is ordinarily reversible error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 N.W.2d 802, 802","parenthetical":"vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting failure to provide adequate \"statement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"case_id":6881192,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The failure of the district court to adequately cite its reasons for a sentence on the record is ordinarily reversible error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"541 A.2d 332, 340","parenthetical":"noting failure to provide adequate \"statement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 N.W.2d 802, 802","parenthetical":"vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate","sentence":"See, e.g., Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d at 304-05 (remanding for resentencing when trial court used boilerplate language in sentencing order which did not adequately state reasons related to \u201cthis\u201d defendant and \u201cthis\u201d offense); Uthe, 542 N.W.2d at 816 (requiring resentencing when court failed to adequately explain its imposition of consecutive sentences); Cooper, 403 N.W.2d at 802 (vacating sentence and remanding for resentencing after finding sentencing record inadequate); see also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 340 (Ct.1988) (noting failure to provide adequate \u201cstatement of reasons for the sentence imposed is reversible error requiring resentencing\u201d)."},"case_id":6881192,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, a trial court is not required to give the jury an instruction defining an affirmative defense if proof of the elements of the charged offense necessarily requires disproof of the issue raised by the affirmative defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"proof of victim's nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence","sentence":"See People v. Fink, 194 Colo. 516, 574 P.2d 81 (1978) (refusal of instruction that self-defense was an affirmative defense to criminally negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter was proper because jury could not find defendant guilty of either offense without necessarily finding that he acted unreasonably (a finding inconsistent with a theory of self-defense)); People v. Cruz, 923 P.2d 311 (Colo.App.1996)(separate instruction on affirmative defense of consent was unnecessary because proof that defendant caused victim to submit to sexual assault by application of physical force or violence necessarily required prosecution to prove lack of consent); see also Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571 (Colo.1995) (proof of victim\u2019s nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusal of instruction that self-defense was an affirmative defense to criminally negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter was proper because jury could not find defendant guilty of either offense without necessarily finding that he acted unreasonably (a finding inconsistent with a theory of self-defense","sentence":"See People v. Fink, 194 Colo. 516, 574 P.2d 81 (1978) (refusal of instruction that self-defense was an affirmative defense to criminally negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter was proper because jury could not find defendant guilty of either offense without necessarily finding that he acted unreasonably (a finding inconsistent with a theory of self-defense)); People v. Cruz, 923 P.2d 311 (Colo.App.1996)(separate instruction on affirmative defense of consent was unnecessary because proof that defendant caused victim to submit to sexual assault by application of physical force or violence necessarily required prosecution to prove lack of consent); see also Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571 (Colo.1995) (proof of victim\u2019s nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence)."},"case_id":11874205,"label":"b"}
{"context":"However, a trial court is not required to give the jury an instruction defining an affirmative defense if proof of the elements of the charged offense necessarily requires disproof of the issue raised by the affirmative defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusal of instruction that self-defense was an affirmative defense to criminally negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter was proper because jury could not find defendant guilty of either offense without necessarily finding that he acted unreasonably (a finding inconsistent with a theory of self-defense","sentence":"See People v. Fink, 194 Colo. 516, 574 P.2d 81 (1978) (refusal of instruction that self-defense was an affirmative defense to criminally negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter was proper because jury could not find defendant guilty of either offense without necessarily finding that he acted unreasonably (a finding inconsistent with a theory of self-defense)); People v. Cruz, 923 P.2d 311 (Colo.App.1996)(separate instruction on affirmative defense of consent was unnecessary because proof that defendant caused victim to submit to sexual assault by application of physical force or violence necessarily required prosecution to prove lack of consent); see also Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571 (Colo.1995) (proof of victim\u2019s nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"proof of victim's nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence","sentence":"See People v. Fink, 194 Colo. 516, 574 P.2d 81 (1978) (refusal of instruction that self-defense was an affirmative defense to criminally negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter was proper because jury could not find defendant guilty of either offense without necessarily finding that he acted unreasonably (a finding inconsistent with a theory of self-defense)); People v. Cruz, 923 P.2d 311 (Colo.App.1996)(separate instruction on affirmative defense of consent was unnecessary because proof that defendant caused victim to submit to sexual assault by application of physical force or violence necessarily required prosecution to prove lack of consent); see also Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571 (Colo.1995) (proof of victim\u2019s nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence)."},"case_id":11874205,"label":"a"}
{"context":"However, a trial court is not required to give the jury an instruction defining an affirmative defense if proof of the elements of the charged offense necessarily requires disproof of the issue raised by the affirmative defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"proof of victim's nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence","sentence":"See People v. Fink, 194 Colo. 516, 574 P.2d 81 (1978) (refusal of instruction that self-defense was an affirmative defense to criminally negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter was proper because jury could not find defendant guilty of either offense without necessarily finding that he acted unreasonably (a finding inconsistent with a theory of self-defense)); People v. Cruz, 923 P.2d 311 (Colo.App.1996)(separate instruction on affirmative defense of consent was unnecessary because proof that defendant caused victim to submit to sexual assault by application of physical force or violence necessarily required prosecution to prove lack of consent); see also Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571 (Colo.1995) (proof of victim\u2019s nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"separate instruction on affirmative defense of consent was unnecessary because proof that defendant caused victim to submit to sexual assault by application of physical force or violence necessarily required prosecution to prove lack of consent","sentence":"See People v. Fink, 194 Colo. 516, 574 P.2d 81 (1978) (refusal of instruction that self-defense was an affirmative defense to criminally negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter was proper because jury could not find defendant guilty of either offense without necessarily finding that he acted unreasonably (a finding inconsistent with a theory of self-defense)); People v. Cruz, 923 P.2d 311 (Colo.App.1996)(separate instruction on affirmative defense of consent was unnecessary because proof that defendant caused victim to submit to sexual assault by application of physical force or violence necessarily required prosecution to prove lack of consent); see also Dunton v. People, 898 P.2d 571 (Colo.1995) (proof of victim\u2019s nonconsent is implicit within the elements of first degree sexual assault by force or violence)."},"case_id":11874205,"label":"b"}
{"context":". For the first time on appeal, the parties raise the competency and reliability of certain declarations submitted in the district court. Because neither party raised these evidentiary objections in the district court, we deem them waived.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"83 F.3d 1060, 1066-67","parenthetical":"holding that a party waives an objection by failing to request a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence before the district court","sentence":"See United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir.1990) (explaining that to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, a party must make a timely and specific objection to evidentiary issues before the trial court); see also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that a party waives an objection by failing to request a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence before the district court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"908 F.2d 497, 500","parenthetical":"explaining that to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, a party must make a timely and specific objection to evidentiary issues before the trial court","sentence":"See United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir.1990) (explaining that to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal, a party must make a timely and specific objection to evidentiary issues before the trial court); see also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1060, 1066-67 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that a party waives an objection by failing to request a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence before the district court)."},"case_id":4340205,"label":"b"}
{"context":"117However, Judge Amy, who would have affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree cruelty to juveniles, dissented on this point as well in light of \"the child's age as well as the serious and repetitive nature of the abuse.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"538 U.S. 11, 25","parenthetical":"\"A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028","parenthetical":"\"A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"case_id":7037264,"label":"a"}
{"context":"117However, Judge Amy, who would have affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree cruelty to juveniles, dissented on this point as well in light of \"the child's age as well as the serious and repetitive nature of the abuse.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"538 U.S. 11, 25","parenthetical":"\"A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"case_id":7037264,"label":"b"}
{"context":"117However, Judge Amy, who would have affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree cruelty to juveniles, dissented on this point as well in light of \"the child's age as well as the serious and repetitive nature of the abuse.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028","parenthetical":"\"A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187","parenthetical":"\"A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"case_id":7037264,"label":"b"}
{"context":"117However, Judge Amy, who would have affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree cruelty to juveniles, dissented on this point as well in light of \"the child's age as well as the serious and repetitive nature of the abuse.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187","parenthetical":"\"A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"case_id":7037264,"label":"a"}
{"context":"117However, Judge Amy, who would have affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree cruelty to juveniles, dissented on this point as well in light of \"the child's age as well as the serious and repetitive nature of the abuse.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028","parenthetical":"\"A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"case_id":7037264,"label":"a"}
{"context":"117However, Judge Amy, who would have affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for second degree cruelty to juveniles, dissented on this point as well in light of \"the child's age as well as the serious and repetitive nature of the abuse.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\"","sentence":"See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (\u201cA sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2028, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2009) (\u201cA sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the offense.\u201d)"},"case_id":7037264,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Rule of Two also does not require the contracting officer to find that any two specific small businesses are responsible; the contracting officer only must \"reasonably expect\" that two responsible small businesses will submit offers.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"78 Fed.Cl. 715, 726","parenthetical":"\"[T]he actual merits of the individual bids are not dispositive on the issue of the reasonableness of the contracting officer's expectations.\"","sentence":"See Adams & Assocs. II, 741 F.3d at 111 (\u201ca set-aside determination requires only that the contracting officer have a reasonable expectation that likely small business offerors will survive a future responsibility determination\u201d); see also McKing Consulting Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed.Cl. 715, 726 (2007) (\u201c[T]he actual merits of the individual bids are not dispositive on the issue of the reasonableness of the contracting officer\u2019s expectations.\u201d); Greenleaf Constr. Co. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 350, 361 (2005) (\u201cThe logic behind the Rule [of Two] is obvious\u2014it may not be possible for a [contracting officer] to gauge bidder responsibility and price fairness before a solicitation is even issued.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"741 F.3d 111, 111","parenthetical":"\"a set-aside determination requires only that the contracting officer have a reasonable expectation that likely small business offerors will survive a future responsibility determination\"","sentence":"See Adams & Assocs. II, 741 F.3d at 111 (\u201ca set-aside determination requires only that the contracting officer have a reasonable expectation that likely small business offerors will survive a future responsibility determination\u201d); see also McKing Consulting Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed.Cl. 715, 726 (2007) (\u201c[T]he actual merits of the individual bids are not dispositive on the issue of the reasonableness of the contracting officer\u2019s expectations.\u201d); Greenleaf Constr. Co. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 350, 361 (2005) (\u201cThe logic behind the Rule [of Two] is obvious\u2014it may not be possible for a [contracting officer] to gauge bidder responsibility and price fairness before a solicitation is even issued.\u201d)."},"case_id":12309159,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Rule of Two also does not require the contracting officer to find that any two specific small businesses are responsible; the contracting officer only must \"reasonably expect\" that two responsible small businesses will submit offers.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"67 Fed.Cl. 350, 361","parenthetical":"\"The logic behind the Rule [of Two] is obvious--it may not be possible for a [contracting officer] to gauge bidder responsibility and price fairness before a solicitation is even issued.\"","sentence":"See Adams & Assocs. II, 741 F.3d at 111 (\u201ca set-aside determination requires only that the contracting officer have a reasonable expectation that likely small business offerors will survive a future responsibility determination\u201d); see also McKing Consulting Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed.Cl. 715, 726 (2007) (\u201c[T]he actual merits of the individual bids are not dispositive on the issue of the reasonableness of the contracting officer\u2019s expectations.\u201d); Greenleaf Constr. Co. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 350, 361 (2005) (\u201cThe logic behind the Rule [of Two] is obvious\u2014it may not be possible for a [contracting officer] to gauge bidder responsibility and price fairness before a solicitation is even issued.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"741 F.3d 111, 111","parenthetical":"\"a set-aside determination requires only that the contracting officer have a reasonable expectation that likely small business offerors will survive a future responsibility determination\"","sentence":"See Adams & Assocs. II, 741 F.3d at 111 (\u201ca set-aside determination requires only that the contracting officer have a reasonable expectation that likely small business offerors will survive a future responsibility determination\u201d); see also McKing Consulting Corp. v. United States, 78 Fed.Cl. 715, 726 (2007) (\u201c[T]he actual merits of the individual bids are not dispositive on the issue of the reasonableness of the contracting officer\u2019s expectations.\u201d); Greenleaf Constr. Co. v. United States, 67 Fed.Cl. 350, 361 (2005) (\u201cThe logic behind the Rule [of Two] is obvious\u2014it may not be possible for a [contracting officer] to gauge bidder responsibility and price fairness before a solicitation is even issued.\u201d)."},"case_id":12309159,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, the 40-month sentence imposed was well below the 120-month statutory maximum, which is another factor demonstrating its reasonableness.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"451 F.3d 751, 751-52","parenthetical":"considering that a sentence was \"appreciably below the length of the statutory maximum\" in assessing its reasonableness","sentence":"See Valnor, 451 F.3d at 751-52 (considering that a sentence was \u201cappreciably below the length of the statutory maximum\u201d in assessing its reasonableness); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (noting that the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is determined in light of the' totality of the circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"552 U.S. 51, 51","parenthetical":"noting that the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is determined in light of the' totality of the circumstances","sentence":"See Valnor, 451 F.3d at 751-52 (considering that a sentence was \u201cappreciably below the length of the statutory maximum\u201d in assessing its reasonableness); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (noting that the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is determined in light of the' totality of the circumstances)."},"case_id":5890940,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, the 40-month sentence imposed was well below the 120-month statutory maximum, which is another factor demonstrating its reasonableness.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"451 F.3d 751, 751-52","parenthetical":"considering that a sentence was \"appreciably below the length of the statutory maximum\" in assessing its reasonableness","sentence":"See Valnor, 451 F.3d at 751-52 (considering that a sentence was \u201cappreciably below the length of the statutory maximum\u201d in assessing its reasonableness); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (noting that the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is determined in light of the' totality of the circumstances)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"128 S.Ct. 597, 597","parenthetical":"noting that the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is determined in light of the' totality of the circumstances","sentence":"See Valnor, 451 F.3d at 751-52 (considering that a sentence was \u201cappreciably below the length of the statutory maximum\u201d in assessing its reasonableness); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (noting that the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is determined in light of the' totality of the circumstances)."},"case_id":5890940,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With regard to the Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim against Garcia, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not address a Fourteenth Amendment gender discrimination claim against Garcia in his opposition papers. To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim,-the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination by Garcia. In any event, the Second Circuit has explained, albeit in the racial discrimination context, that no such cause of action exists.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 F.3d 338, 340-41","parenthetical":"finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination","sentence":"Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201c[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\u201d); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201c[Rjight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\u201d); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cdefendants\u2019 alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"79 F.3d 318, 323","parenthetical":"\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\"","sentence":"Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201c[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\u201d); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201c[Rjight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\u201d); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cdefendants\u2019 alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3582340,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With regard to the Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim against Garcia, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not address a Fourteenth Amendment gender discrimination claim against Garcia in his opposition papers. To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim,-the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination by Garcia. In any event, the Second Circuit has explained, albeit in the racial discrimination context, that no such cause of action exists.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"885 F.2d 399, 414","parenthetical":"\"[Rjight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\"","sentence":"Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201c[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\u201d); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201c[Rjight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\u201d); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cdefendants\u2019 alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"79 F.3d 318, 323","parenthetical":"\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\"","sentence":"Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201c[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\u201d); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201c[Rjight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\u201d); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cdefendants\u2019 alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3582340,"label":"b"}
{"context":"With regard to the Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claim against Garcia, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not address a Fourteenth Amendment gender discrimination claim against Garcia in his opposition papers. To the extent the Plaintiff continues to seek to pursue this claim,-the Court finds that there are no facts alleged or evidence put forth that supports a claim of gender discrimination by Garcia. In any event, the Second Circuit has explained, albeit in the racial discrimination context, that no such cause of action exists.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"79 F.3d 318, 323","parenthetical":"\"[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\"","sentence":"Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201c[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\u201d); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201c[Rjight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\u201d); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cdefendants\u2019 alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419","parenthetical":"\"defendants' alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\"","sentence":"Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 323 (2d Cir.1996) (\u201c[ajlthough claims of retaliation are commonly brought under the First Amendment ... and may also be brought under Title VII ... we know of no court that has recognized a claim under the equal protection clause for retaliation following complaints of racial discrimination.\u201d); see also Ratliff v. DeKalb County, 62 F.3d 338, 340-41 (11th Cir.1995) (finding no established right under the equal protection clause to be free from retaliation for complaints of gender discrimination); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 414 (7th Cir.1989) (\u201c[Rjight to be free from retaliation for protesting sexual harassment and sex discrimination is a right created by Title VII, not the equal protection clause.\u201d); Lange v. Town of Monroe, 213 F.Supp.2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (\u201cdefendants\u2019 alleged retaliation in response to plaintiffs sexual harassment complaints is not cognizable as an equal protection violation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3582340,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Of course, the nondelegation doctrine still holds firm in instances where the power delegated was not lawfully delegable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"legislature improperly delegated authority to supreme court to promulgate sentencing guidelines","sentence":"See also Smith v. State, 537 So.2d 982 (Fla.1989) (legislature improperly delegated authority to supreme court to promulgate sentencing guidelines)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"legislature improperly delegated appropriations function, which could only constitutionally be exercised by legislative branch","sentence":"Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260 (Fla.1991) (legislature improperly delegated appropriations function, which could only constitutionally be exercised by legislative branch); Barry v. Garcia, 573 So.2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA) (city commission had no authority to grant subpoena power to independent investigatory body), review denied, 583 So.2d 1034 (Fla.1991)."},"case_id":7475014,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Of course, the nondelegation doctrine still holds firm in instances where the power delegated was not lawfully delegable.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"city commission had no authority to grant subpoena power to independent investigatory body","sentence":"Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260 (Fla.1991) (legislature improperly delegated appropriations function, which could only constitutionally be exercised by legislative branch); Barry v. Garcia, 573 So.2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA) (city commission had no authority to grant subpoena power to independent investigatory body), review denied, 583 So.2d 1034 (Fla.1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"legislature improperly delegated authority to supreme court to promulgate sentencing guidelines","sentence":"See also Smith v. State, 537 So.2d 982 (Fla.1989) (legislature improperly delegated authority to supreme court to promulgate sentencing guidelines)."},"case_id":7475014,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Of course, the nondelegation doctrine still holds firm in instances where the power delegated was not lawfully delegable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"legislature improperly delegated authority to supreme court to promulgate sentencing guidelines","sentence":"See also Smith v. State, 537 So.2d 982 (Fla.1989) (legislature improperly delegated authority to supreme court to promulgate sentencing guidelines)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"city commission had no authority to grant subpoena power to independent investigatory body","sentence":"Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So.2d 260 (Fla.1991) (legislature improperly delegated appropriations function, which could only constitutionally be exercised by legislative branch); Barry v. Garcia, 573 So.2d 932 (Fla. 3d DCA) (city commission had no authority to grant subpoena power to independent investigatory body), review denied, 583 So.2d 1034 (Fla.1991)."},"case_id":7475014,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We have also previously explained that \"maintenance work is not the kind of regulatory activity\" to which the Supreme Court envisioned the discretionary function exception applying.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"831 F.2d 195, 195","parenthetical":"rejecting government's characterization of its failure to maintain a segment of a road in a national park as a policy-grounded decision","sentence":"ARA Leisure Servs., 831 F.2d at 195 (rejecting government\u2019s characterization of its failure to maintain a segment of a road in a national park as a policy-grounded decision); see also id. (noting an absence of any \u201cclear link between Park Service road policies and the condition of Thoroughfare Pass\u201d); O\u2019Toole, 295 F.3d at 1036 (holding that Bureau of Indian Affairs\u2019 failure to repair an irrigation system \u201cinvolve[d] a mundane question of routine ditch maintenance\u201d and was \u201cnot the sort of public policy issue that the discretionary function exception is designed to protect\u201d). \u201cThe danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA is especially great where the government takes on the role of a private landowner,\u201d O\u2019Toole, 295 F.3d at 1037, and we are mindful of our duty \u201cto effectuate Congress\u2019s intent to compensate individuals harmed by government negligence[ by liberally construing] the FTCA, as a remedial statute\u201d and by reading \u201cits exceptions ... narrowly,\u201d id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"295 F.3d 1036, 1036","parenthetical":"holding that Bureau of Indian Affairs' failure to repair an irrigation system \"involve[d] a mundane question of routine ditch maintenance\" and was \"not the sort of public policy issue that the discretionary function exception is designed to protect\"","sentence":"ARA Leisure Servs., 831 F.2d at 195 (rejecting government\u2019s characterization of its failure to maintain a segment of a road in a national park as a policy-grounded decision); see also id. (noting an absence of any \u201cclear link between Park Service road policies and the condition of Thoroughfare Pass\u201d); O\u2019Toole, 295 F.3d at 1036 (holding that Bureau of Indian Affairs\u2019 failure to repair an irrigation system \u201cinvolve[d] a mundane question of routine ditch maintenance\u201d and was \u201cnot the sort of public policy issue that the discretionary function exception is designed to protect\u201d). \u201cThe danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA is especially great where the government takes on the role of a private landowner,\u201d O\u2019Toole, 295 F.3d at 1037, and we are mindful of our duty \u201cto effectuate Congress\u2019s intent to compensate individuals harmed by government negligence[ by liberally construing] the FTCA, as a remedial statute\u201d and by reading \u201cits exceptions ... narrowly,\u201d id."},"case_id":3329739,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We have also previously explained that \"maintenance work is not the kind of regulatory activity\" to which the Supreme Court envisioned the discretionary function exception applying.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"295 F.3d 1037, 1037","parenthetical":"holding that Bureau of Indian Affairs' failure to repair an irrigation system \"involve[d] a mundane question of routine ditch maintenance\" and was \"not the sort of public policy issue that the discretionary function exception is designed to protect\"","sentence":"ARA Leisure Servs., 831 F.2d at 195 (rejecting government\u2019s characterization of its failure to maintain a segment of a road in a national park as a policy-grounded decision); see also id. (noting an absence of any \u201cclear link between Park Service road policies and the condition of Thoroughfare Pass\u201d); O\u2019Toole, 295 F.3d at 1036 (holding that Bureau of Indian Affairs\u2019 failure to repair an irrigation system \u201cinvolve[d] a mundane question of routine ditch maintenance\u201d and was \u201cnot the sort of public policy issue that the discretionary function exception is designed to protect\u201d). \u201cThe danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA is especially great where the government takes on the role of a private landowner,\u201d O\u2019Toole, 295 F.3d at 1037, and we are mindful of our duty \u201cto effectuate Congress\u2019s intent to compensate individuals harmed by government negligence[ by liberally construing] the FTCA, as a remedial statute\u201d and by reading \u201cits exceptions ... narrowly,\u201d id."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"831 F.2d 195, 195","parenthetical":"rejecting government's characterization of its failure to maintain a segment of a road in a national park as a policy-grounded decision","sentence":"ARA Leisure Servs., 831 F.2d at 195 (rejecting government\u2019s characterization of its failure to maintain a segment of a road in a national park as a policy-grounded decision); see also id. (noting an absence of any \u201cclear link between Park Service road policies and the condition of Thoroughfare Pass\u201d); O\u2019Toole, 295 F.3d at 1036 (holding that Bureau of Indian Affairs\u2019 failure to repair an irrigation system \u201cinvolve[d] a mundane question of routine ditch maintenance\u201d and was \u201cnot the sort of public policy issue that the discretionary function exception is designed to protect\u201d). \u201cThe danger that the discretionary function exception will swallow the FTCA is especially great where the government takes on the role of a private landowner,\u201d O\u2019Toole, 295 F.3d at 1037, and we are mindful of our duty \u201cto effectuate Congress\u2019s intent to compensate individuals harmed by government negligence[ by liberally construing] the FTCA, as a remedial statute\u201d and by reading \u201cits exceptions ... narrowly,\u201d id."},"case_id":3329739,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A cause of action for fraud accrues on the date the plaintiff actually discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in tort causes of action \"accrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\"","sentence":"See German v. Pope John Paul II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (st Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cThe statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\u201d); see also Kronos, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d at 292 (in tort causes of action \u201caccrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\u201d). The'New York legislature codified the accrual rule in \u00a7 203(g):"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\"","sentence":"See German v. Pope John Paul II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (st Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cThe statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\u201d); see also Kronos, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d at 292 (in tort causes of action \u201caccrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\u201d). The'New York legislature codified the accrual rule in \u00a7 203(g):"},"case_id":11424636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A cause of action for fraud accrues on the date the plaintiff actually discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"612 N.E.2d 292, 292","parenthetical":"in tort causes of action \"accrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\"","sentence":"See German v. Pope John Paul II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (st Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cThe statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\u201d); see also Kronos, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d at 292 (in tort causes of action \u201caccrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\u201d). The'New York legislature codified the accrual rule in \u00a7 203(g):"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\"","sentence":"See German v. Pope John Paul II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (st Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cThe statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\u201d); see also Kronos, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d at 292 (in tort causes of action \u201caccrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\u201d). The'New York legislature codified the accrual rule in \u00a7 203(g):"},"case_id":11424636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A cause of action for fraud accrues on the date the plaintiff actually discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312","parenthetical":"\"The statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\"","sentence":"See German v. Pope John Paul II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (st Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cThe statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\u201d); see also Kronos, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d at 292 (in tort causes of action \u201caccrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\u201d). The'New York legislature codified the accrual rule in \u00a7 203(g):"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in tort causes of action \"accrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\"","sentence":"See German v. Pope John Paul II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (st Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cThe statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\u201d); see also Kronos, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d at 292 (in tort causes of action \u201caccrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\u201d). The'New York legislature codified the accrual rule in \u00a7 203(g):"},"case_id":11424636,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A cause of action for fraud accrues on the date the plaintiff actually discovered the fraud or could have discovered it with reasonable diligence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"612 N.E.2d 292, 292","parenthetical":"in tort causes of action \"accrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\"","sentence":"See German v. Pope John Paul II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (st Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cThe statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\u201d); see also Kronos, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d at 292 (in tort causes of action \u201caccrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\u201d). The'New York legislature codified the accrual rule in \u00a7 203(g):"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312","parenthetical":"\"The statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\"","sentence":"See German v. Pope John Paul II, 211 A.D.2d 456, 621 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (st Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cThe statute of limitations began to run when Plaintiff first became aware of the ... alleged improprieties giving rise to the cause of action for fraud, breach of contract [and] unjust enrichment.\u201d); see also Kronos, 595 N.Y.S.2d 931, 612 N.E.2d at 292 (in tort causes of action \u201caccrual occurs when the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.\u201d). The'New York legislature codified the accrual rule in \u00a7 203(g):"},"case_id":11424636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"659 S.W.2d 510, 513","parenthetical":"holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"659 S.W.2d 510, 513","parenthetical":"holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband's unvested stock options as marital property","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband's unvested stock options as marital property","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685","parenthetical":"holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband's unvested stock options as marital property","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685","parenthetical":"holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband's unvested stock options as marital property","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"404 N.W.2d 848, 850","parenthetical":"holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"404 N.W.2d 848, 850","parenthetical":"holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"660 A.2d 485, 499","parenthetical":"holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"660 A.2d 485, 499","parenthetical":"holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"361 A.2d 561, 563-64","parenthetical":"holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Several other state courts have also held that unvested stock options acquired during the marriage constitute marital property.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"363 S.E.2d 189, 196","parenthetical":"holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property","sentence":"But see In re Marriage of Moody, 119 Ill.App.3d 1043, 75 Ill.Dec. 581, 457 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options were not marital property); Hall v. Hall, 88 N.C.App. 297, 363 S.E.2d 189, 196 (1987) (holding that stock options not exercisable as of the date of separation and which may be lost as a result of events occurring in the future are never marital property)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"361 A.2d 561, 563-64","parenthetical":"holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust","sentence":"See Richardson v. Richardson, 280 Ark. 498, 659 S.W.2d 510, 513 (1983) (holding that unexercised stock options obtained during the marriage are marital property just like traded options or traded common stock); In re Marriage of Hug, 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676, 685 (1984) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allocating the husband\u2019s unvested stock options as marital property); Salstrom v. Salstrom, 404 N.W.2d 848, 850 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (holding that the trial court properly determined that unvested stock options have marital aspect); Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 660 A.2d 485, 499 (1995) (holding that, like pension benefits, stock options are a form of deferred compensation for efforts expended during the marriage); Callahan v. Callahan, 142 N.J.Super. 325, 361 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1976) (holding that unvested stock options are a form of compensation and constituted marital property that could be distributed through use of a constructive trust)."},"case_id":11433933,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While the state bears the burden of proving a valid waiver of the right to counsel prior to a custodial interrogation, the burden shifts after that right has been waived. Where, as here, a suspect makes an equivocal request for counsel prior to waiving Miranda, rights, the police are limited to questions intended to clarify the request until the suspect either clearly invokes his right to counsel or waives it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"518 F.3d 1080, 1080","parenthetical":"\"Prior to obtaining an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver, a duty rests with the interrogating officer to clarify any ambiguity before beginning general interrogation.\"","sentence":"See State v. Blackburn, 766 N.W.2d 177, 182-83 (S.D.2009) (\u201c[I]n a pre-waiver situation where the accused has not yet validly waived the Miranda rights, the officers must clarify the waiver before proceeding with the interview.\u201d); see also Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1080 (\u201cPrior to obtaining an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver, a duty rests with the interrogating officer to clarify any ambiguity before beginning general interrogation.\u201d); Collins, 937 So.2d at 93 (\u201cBecause [the defendant] did not waive her Miranda rights before she asked the questions about obtaining a lawyer, the ambiguity of her questions required the interrogating officer to ask follow-up questions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"766 N.W.2d 177, 182-83","parenthetical":"\"[I]n a pre-waiver situation where the accused has not yet validly waived the Miranda rights, the officers must clarify the waiver before proceeding with the interview.\"","sentence":"See State v. Blackburn, 766 N.W.2d 177, 182-83 (S.D.2009) (\u201c[I]n a pre-waiver situation where the accused has not yet validly waived the Miranda rights, the officers must clarify the waiver before proceeding with the interview.\u201d); see also Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1080 (\u201cPrior to obtaining an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver, a duty rests with the interrogating officer to clarify any ambiguity before beginning general interrogation.\u201d); Collins, 937 So.2d at 93 (\u201cBecause [the defendant] did not waive her Miranda rights before she asked the questions about obtaining a lawyer, the ambiguity of her questions required the interrogating officer to ask follow-up questions.\u201d)."},"case_id":7298256,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Exempted from its scope, however, are \"[ajctions or transactions specifically authorized under laws administered by or rules and regulations promulgated by any regulatory agency of this state or the United States.\" And because residential mortgage transactions are regulated by both state and federal law, the FBPA does not apply.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"233 Ga. App. 38, 45","parenthetical":"\"The General Assembly intended that the Georgia FBPA have a restricted application only to the unregulated consumer marketplace and that FBPA not apply in regulated areas of activity . . .\"","sentence":"See Stewart v. SunTrust Mtg., 331 Ga. App. at 640 (5); Chancellor v. Gateway Lincoln-Mercury, 233 Ga. App. 38, 45 (2) (502 SE2d 799) (1998) (\u201cThe General Assembly intended that the Georgia FBPA have a restricted application only to the unregulated consumer marketplace and that FBPA not apply in regulated areas of activity . . .\u201d); see also Zinn v. GMAC Mtg., No. 1:05 CV 01747 MHS, 2006 WL 418437, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006) (\u201c[T]he [Georgia] FBPA does not apply to residential mortgage transactions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2006 WL 418437, at *4","parenthetical":"\"[T]he [Georgia] FBPA does not apply to residential mortgage transactions.\"","sentence":"See Stewart v. SunTrust Mtg., 331 Ga. App. at 640 (5); Chancellor v. Gateway Lincoln-Mercury, 233 Ga. App. 38, 45 (2) (502 SE2d 799) (1998) (\u201cThe General Assembly intended that the Georgia FBPA have a restricted application only to the unregulated consumer marketplace and that FBPA not apply in regulated areas of activity . . .\u201d); see also Zinn v. GMAC Mtg., No. 1:05 CV 01747 MHS, 2006 WL 418437, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2006) (\u201c[T]he [Georgia] FBPA does not apply to residential mortgage transactions.\u201d)."},"case_id":4364496,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The particular plays containing such language were specifically chosen by the school and incorporated as part of the school's official curriculum. Furthermore, if a school newspaper and a project to paint and post glazed and fired tiles in a school hallway can be considered school-sponsored speech, then surely student speech that takes place inside the classroom, as part of a class assignment, can also be considered school-sponsored speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"298 F.3d 925, 925","parenthetical":"\"We think that the Court's language that activities are 'school-sponsored' speech if they are 'designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences,' means activities that affect learning, or in other words, affect pedagogical concerns.\"","sentence":"See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925 (\u201cWe think that the Court\u2019s language that activities are \u2018school-sponsored\u2019 speech if they are \u2018designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences,\u2019 means activities that affect learning, or in other words, affect pedagogical concerns.\u201d) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562) (citation omitted); see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562 (listing theatrical productions that are part of the school curriculum as an example of school-sponsored speech)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"484 U.S. 271, 271","parenthetical":"listing theatrical productions that are part of the school curriculum as an example of school-sponsored speech","sentence":"See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925 (\u201cWe think that the Court\u2019s language that activities are \u2018school-sponsored\u2019 speech if they are \u2018designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences,\u2019 means activities that affect learning, or in other words, affect pedagogical concerns.\u201d) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562) (citation omitted); see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562 (listing theatrical productions that are part of the school curriculum as an example of school-sponsored speech)."},"case_id":785456,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The particular plays containing such language were specifically chosen by the school and incorporated as part of the school's official curriculum. Furthermore, if a school newspaper and a project to paint and post glazed and fired tiles in a school hallway can be considered school-sponsored speech, then surely student speech that takes place inside the classroom, as part of a class assignment, can also be considered school-sponsored speech.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"298 F.3d 925, 925","parenthetical":"\"We think that the Court's language that activities are 'school-sponsored' speech if they are 'designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences,' means activities that affect learning, or in other words, affect pedagogical concerns.\"","sentence":"See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925 (\u201cWe think that the Court\u2019s language that activities are \u2018school-sponsored\u2019 speech if they are \u2018designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences,\u2019 means activities that affect learning, or in other words, affect pedagogical concerns.\u201d) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562) (citation omitted); see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562 (listing theatrical productions that are part of the school curriculum as an example of school-sponsored speech)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"listing theatrical productions that are part of the school curriculum as an example of school-sponsored speech","sentence":"See Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925 (\u201cWe think that the Court\u2019s language that activities are \u2018school-sponsored\u2019 speech if they are \u2018designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences,\u2019 means activities that affect learning, or in other words, affect pedagogical concerns.\u201d) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562) (citation omitted); see also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562 (listing theatrical productions that are part of the school curriculum as an example of school-sponsored speech)."},"case_id":785456,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Ultimately the qualification of an interpreter is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"860 F.2d 706, 740","parenthetical":"\"Matters regarding the use of an interpreter are left to the discretion of the district court.\"","sentence":"See CRE 702; U.S. v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 740 (7th Cir.1988) (\u201cMatters regarding the use of an interpreter are left to the discretion of the district court.\u201d); cf. State v. Givens, 719 S.W.2d 25 (Mo.App.1986) (The appointment of an interpreter is within the discretion of the trial court as is the competency of witnesses to testify)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"The appointment of an interpreter is within the discretion of the trial court as is the competency of witnesses to testify","sentence":"See CRE 702; U.S. v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 740 (7th Cir.1988) (\u201cMatters regarding the use of an interpreter are left to the discretion of the district court.\u201d); cf. State v. Givens, 719 S.W.2d 25 (Mo.App.1986) (The appointment of an interpreter is within the discretion of the trial court as is the competency of witnesses to testify)."},"case_id":10350000,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That information, as a matter of law, constituted probable cause to believe that plaintiff had committed the robbery. Therefore, no action for malicious prosecution will lie.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"570 F.Supp. 196, 196, 200","parenthetical":"finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs","sentence":"Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 45; compare Deary, 570 F.Supp. at 196, 200 (finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs), rev\u2019d, 746 F.2d 185, 190 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that in a \u00a7 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.) (finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"553 F.2d 824, 826","parenthetical":"finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs","sentence":"Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 45; compare Deary, 570 F.Supp. at 196, 200 (finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs), rev\u2019d, 746 F.2d 185, 190 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that in a \u00a7 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.) (finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977)."},"case_id":4065769,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That information, as a matter of law, constituted probable cause to believe that plaintiff had committed the robbery. Therefore, no action for malicious prosecution will lie.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"570 F.Supp. 196, 196, 200","parenthetical":"finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs","sentence":"Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 45; compare Deary, 570 F.Supp. at 196, 200 (finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs), rev\u2019d, 746 F.2d 185, 190 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that in a \u00a7 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.) (finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs","sentence":"Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 45; compare Deary, 570 F.Supp. at 196, 200 (finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs), rev\u2019d, 746 F.2d 185, 190 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that in a \u00a7 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.) (finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977)."},"case_id":4065769,"label":"a"}
{"context":"That information, as a matter of law, constituted probable cause to believe that plaintiff had committed the robbery. Therefore, no action for malicious prosecution will lie.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs","sentence":"Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 45; compare Deary, 570 F.Supp. at 196, 200 (finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs), rev\u2019d, 746 F.2d 185, 190 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that in a \u00a7 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.) (finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"570 F.Supp. 196, 196, 200","parenthetical":"finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs","sentence":"Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 45; compare Deary, 570 F.Supp. at 196, 200 (finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs), rev\u2019d, 746 F.2d 185, 190 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that in a \u00a7 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.) (finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977)."},"case_id":4065769,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That information, as a matter of law, constituted probable cause to believe that plaintiff had committed the robbery. Therefore, no action for malicious prosecution will lie.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs","sentence":"Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 45; compare Deary, 570 F.Supp. at 196, 200 (finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs), rev\u2019d, 746 F.2d 185, 190 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that in a \u00a7 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.) (finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"570 F.Supp. 196, 196, 200","parenthetical":"finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs","sentence":"Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 45; compare Deary, 570 F.Supp. at 196, 200 (finding probable cause and granting summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim where arresting officers identified plaintiff from bank photographs), rev\u2019d, 746 F.2d 185, 190 (3d Cir.1984) (holding that in a \u00a7 1983 action issue of probable cause is for the jury); Miss Universe, Inc. v. Patricelli, 753 F.2d 235 (2d Cir.1985); cf. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.) (finding of probable cause based on identifi cation from bank photographs), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977)."},"case_id":4065769,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The majority cites cases from three of our sister circuits to support its contention that appeals to general deterrence might be appropriate at the sentencing phase of a death penalty case. Although federal cases are not relevant in light of Tennessee's unambiguous conclusion that the prosecutor's argument was improper, I note that, in this circuit, general-deterrence arguments are disfavored, especially where, as here, the argument is \"calculated to inflame passion and prejudice.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"209 F.3d 486, 539","parenthetical":"holding that a prosecutor's comment that jurors \"should impose the death penalty ... in order to fulfill their societal duty\" was not improper because the prosecutor \"d[id] not ask the jury to send a message to other potential murderers or robbers\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1150-53, 1155 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that a prosecutor\u2019s entreaty in closing argument to convict a defendant in order to \u201csend a message and strike a blow to the drug problem\u201d was \u201ca single misstep so destructive to defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial that it constitute^] reversible error.\u201d); cf. Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 539 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that a prosecutor\u2019s comment that jurors \u201cshould impose the death penalty ... in order to fulfill their societal duty\u201d was not improper because the prosecutor \u201cd[id] not ask the jury to send a message to other potential murderers or robbers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"937 F.2d 1146, 1150-53, 1155","parenthetical":"holding that a prosecutor's entreaty in closing argument to convict a defendant in order to \"send a message and strike a blow to the drug problem\" was \"a single misstep so destructive to defendant's right to a fair trial that it constitute^] reversible error.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1150-53, 1155 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that a prosecutor\u2019s entreaty in closing argument to convict a defendant in order to \u201csend a message and strike a blow to the drug problem\u201d was \u201ca single misstep so destructive to defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial that it constitute^] reversible error.\u201d); cf. Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 539 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that a prosecutor\u2019s comment that jurors \u201cshould impose the death penalty ... in order to fulfill their societal duty\u201d was not improper because the prosecutor \u201cd[id] not ask the jury to send a message to other potential murderers or robbers\u201d)."},"case_id":3642257,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"520 U.S. 351, 364","parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"479 U.S. 189, 194-95","parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"479 U.S. 189, 194-95","parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"479 U.S. 189, 194-95","parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"520 U.S. 351, 364","parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"520 U.S. 351, 364","parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Central to the resolution of that question is not whether Defendants and Intervenors have articulated a sufficient empirical justification for the provision's existence and application. They have no such burden.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that the court does not \"require elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State's asserted jus tifications\"","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that a state need not \"make a particularized showing\" to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access","sentence":"See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95, 107 S.Ct. 533, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (noting that a state need not \u201cmake a particularized showing\u201d to support the enforcement of reasonable restrictions on ballot access); see also Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997) (stating that the court does not \u201crequire elaborate, empirical verification of the weightiness of the State\u2019s asserted jus tifications\u201d)."},"case_id":5763923,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, we think it significant that Smart World's counsel was retained on a contingency basis. In derivative standing cases, courts often view favorably the willingness of the party seeking derivative standing to absorb the costs of litigation, since such willingness not only demonstrates a belief in the merits of the claim, but also spares the bankruptcy estate from absorbing any further costs.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that contingent fee arrangement indicated \"a limited cost factor\"","sentence":"See STN, 779 F.2d at 906 (noting that under contingent fee arrangement, pursuit of litigation would not \u201cimpose a net burden on the bankruptcy estate\u201d); see also Louisiana World Exposition, 858 F.2d at 248 n. 15 (noting that contingent fee arrangement indicated \u201ca limited cost factor\u201d); of."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"779 F.2d 906, 906","parenthetical":"noting that under contingent fee arrangement, pursuit of litigation would not \"impose a net burden on the bankruptcy estate\"","sentence":"See STN, 779 F.2d at 906 (noting that under contingent fee arrangement, pursuit of litigation would not \u201cimpose a net burden on the bankruptcy estate\u201d); see also Louisiana World Exposition, 858 F.2d at 248 n. 15 (noting that contingent fee arrangement indicated \u201ca limited cost factor\u201d); of."},"case_id":8925062,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Averments (1), (2), and (4) are too \"conclusory and lacking in specific facts\" to provide a basis for opposing Smith's motion.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"435 Fed.Appx. 85, 91-92","parenthetical":"in the absence of other employees's names or an explanation of how other employees were terminated, plaintiffs representation that he was aware of similarly situated -employees who had been terminated was inadequate to defeat summary judgment","sentence":"Bailey v. Viacom Inc., 435 Fed.Appx. 85, 91-92 (3d Cir.2011) (in the absence of other employees's names or an explanation of how other employees were terminated, plaintiffs representation that he was aware of similarly situated -employees who had been terminated was inadequate to defeat summary judgment)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"733 F.Supp.2d 597, 613","parenthetical":"\"While Plaintiff testified that he was subject to sexual harassment half the time that he worked, when questioned about this estimate at his deposition, he only identified a number of discrete events or incidents of harassing conduct, thus, the Court will not credit Plaintiffs unsubstantiated estimation.\"","sentence":"See also Dreshman v. Henry Clay Villa, 733 F.Supp.2d 597, 613 (W.D.Pa.2010) (\"While Plaintiff testified that he was subject to sexual harassment half the time that he worked, when questioned about this estimate at his deposition, he only identified a number of discrete events or incidents of harassing conduct, thus, the Court will not credit Plaintiffs unsubstantiated estimation.\u201d); Stephenson v. City of Philadelphia, 2006 WL 1804570, *11 n. 2 (E.D.Pa. June 28, 2006) (refusing to credit plaintiff's \"unsubstantiated allegations that discriminatory treatment occurred 'all the time'\u201d)."},"case_id":3823145,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Averments (1), (2), and (4) are too \"conclusory and lacking in specific facts\" to provide a basis for opposing Smith's motion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"refusing to credit plaintiff's \"unsubstantiated allegations that discriminatory treatment occurred 'all the time'\"","sentence":"See also Dreshman v. Henry Clay Villa, 733 F.Supp.2d 597, 613 (W.D.Pa.2010) (\"While Plaintiff testified that he was subject to sexual harassment half the time that he worked, when questioned about this estimate at his deposition, he only identified a number of discrete events or incidents of harassing conduct, thus, the Court will not credit Plaintiffs unsubstantiated estimation.\u201d); Stephenson v. City of Philadelphia, 2006 WL 1804570, *11 n. 2 (E.D.Pa. June 28, 2006) (refusing to credit plaintiff's \"unsubstantiated allegations that discriminatory treatment occurred 'all the time'\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"435 Fed.Appx. 85, 91-92","parenthetical":"in the absence of other employees's names or an explanation of how other employees were terminated, plaintiffs representation that he was aware of similarly situated -employees who had been terminated was inadequate to defeat summary judgment","sentence":"Bailey v. Viacom Inc., 435 Fed.Appx. 85, 91-92 (3d Cir.2011) (in the absence of other employees's names or an explanation of how other employees were terminated, plaintiffs representation that he was aware of similarly situated -employees who had been terminated was inadequate to defeat summary judgment)."},"case_id":3823145,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Judge Price also misapprehends the significance of the procedural posture of this case. He complains that the State did not ask the court of appeals to take judicial notice of the reliability of grooming testimony.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"State appellee may raise for the first time in a petition for discretionary review an estoppel argument that was not raised on original submission in the court of appeals or addressed by that court","sentence":"See also Rhodes v. State, 240 S.W.3d 882, 886 ns. 8, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (State appellee may raise for the first time in a petition for discretionary review an estoppel argument that was not raised on original submission in the court of appeals or addressed by that court)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"227 S.W.3d 77, 79, 80","parenthetical":"State appellee may raise for the first time in a petition for discretionary review the argument that a statutory defense was inapplicable to the county in which the conduct occurred","sentence":"Id. at 675. But as the prevailing party at trial, the State \"was not required to raise any allegations before the court of appeals.\u201d Volosen v. State, 227 S.W.3d 77, 79, 80 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (State appellee may raise for the first time in a petition for discretionary review the argument that a statutory defense was inapplicable to the county in which the conduct occurred)."},"case_id":7317072,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This key fit the lock to the front door of the apartment. That Garcia had the sole key to the apartment among the eight men present supported an inference that he had allowed the other men into the apartment to conduct drug activity, thus supporting a finding of ability and intention to exercise control over the drugs.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"442 Mass. 95, 101","parenthetical":"where drugs were hidden in apartment, defendant's brief entry into apartment and possession of keys to premises did not establish defendant's knowledge of drugs hidden in apartment","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Sespedes, 442 Mass. 95, 101 (2004) (where drugs were hidden in apartment, defendant\u2019s brief entry into apartment and possession of keys to premises did not establish defendant\u2019s knowledge of drugs hidden in apartment). Further, Garcia\u2019s conduct in attempting to hide the key permitted an inference of consciousness of guilt, providing further support for constructive possession."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"31 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 175-176","parenthetical":"sufficient evidence to support constructive possession of drugs found in automobile, located near defendant's dwelling, because defendant had the key to the vehicle, attempted to secrete the key during booking, was seen using the vehicle, and was engaged in other illicit drug activity","sentence":"See Com monwealth v. Dion, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 175-176 (1991) (sufficient evidence to support constructive possession of drugs found in automobile, located near defendant\u2019s dwelling, because defendant had the key to the vehicle, attempted to secrete the key during booking, was seen using the vehicle, and was engaged in other illicit drug activity)."},"case_id":3830408,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The discretion courts have in determining the factual issue of children's best interests, however, is not unfettered.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72","parenthetical":"non-exhaustively listing factors courts consider in determining whether termination of parental rights is in children's best interests","sentence":"See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.1976) (non-exhaustively listing factors courts consider in determining whether termination of parental rights is in children's best interests); see also In re Jane-Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex.2000) (applying non-exhaustive list of Holley factors \"for determining a minor's best interests\u201d to factual determination of best interest of minor in parental notification case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"19 S.W.3d 278, 282","parenthetical":"applying non-exhaustive list of Holley factors \"for determining a minor's best interests\" to factual determination of best interest of minor in parental notification case","sentence":"See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex.1976) (non-exhaustively listing factors courts consider in determining whether termination of parental rights is in children's best interests); see also In re Jane-Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex.2000) (applying non-exhaustive list of Holley factors \"for determining a minor's best interests\u201d to factual determination of best interest of minor in parental notification case)."},"case_id":7299427,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Generally speaking, under our precedents, establishing an R.S. 2477 right-of-way. requires showing, inter alia, that it had been \" 'accepted' by the public\" before the repeal of R.S. 2477. Determining the existence and scope of an R.S. 2477 route is an evidence-intensive inquiry.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"425 F.3d 743, 743","parenthetical":"describing preliminary BLM determination of an R.S. 2477 route as involving \"review! ] [of] a variety of documents, including U.S. and county public land records and surveys, maps and aerial photography, wilderness inventory records, and BLM planning, grazing and maintenance records\" as well as \"field investigations of each disputed route\"","sentence":"See id. at 772-76 (surveying Utah and other states\u2019 cases making use of extensive historical evidence to establish the extent and nature of use over the. required period); see also San Juan Cty., 754 F.3d at 791 (describing broadly the evidence presented over the course of a \u201cnine-day bench trial\u201d involving the determination of the existence of an R.S. 2477 route); cf. SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d at 743 (describing preliminary BLM determination of an R.S. 2477 route as involving \u201creview! ] [of] a variety of documents, including U.S. and county public land records and surveys, maps and aerial photography, wilderness inventory records, and BLM planning, grazing and maintenance records\u201d as well as \u201cfield investigations of each disputed route\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"754 F.3d 791, 791","parenthetical":"describing broadly the evidence presented over the course of a \"nine-day bench trial\" involving the determination of the existence of an R.S. 2477 route","sentence":"See id. at 772-76 (surveying Utah and other states\u2019 cases making use of extensive historical evidence to establish the extent and nature of use over the. required period); see also San Juan Cty., 754 F.3d at 791 (describing broadly the evidence presented over the course of a \u201cnine-day bench trial\u201d involving the determination of the existence of an R.S. 2477 route); cf. SUWA v. BLM, 425 F.3d at 743 (describing preliminary BLM determination of an R.S. 2477 route as involving \u201creview! ] [of] a variety of documents, including U.S. and county public land records and surveys, maps and aerial photography, wilderness inventory records, and BLM planning, grazing and maintenance records\u201d as well as \u201cfield investigations of each disputed route\u201d)."},"case_id":12267098,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We decline to decide whether the proffered evidence would have been admissible to show SrA B's motive to lie. When military judges exclude evidence, we review their exercise of discretion on the basis of the record before them. Since the defense did not proffer the evidence to show motive to lie, the military judge had no duty to consider it for this purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 MJ 98, 107","parenthetical":"accused may not withhold \"trump card\" and play it on appeal if he loses at trial","sentence":"See also United States v. Clark, 35 MJ 98, 107 (CMA 1992) (accused may not withhold \u201ctrump card\u201d and play it on appeal if he loses at trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"appellant not allowed to relitigate motion on different factual basis for the first time on appeal","sentence":"See United States v. Rust, 41 MJ 472, 479 n. 3 (1995) (appellant not allowed to relitigate motion on different factual basis for the first time on appeal); United States v. Vangelisti, 30 MJ 234, 237 (CMA 1990), quoting United States v. Roberts, 7 USCMA 322, 325, 22 CMR 112, 115 (1956) (\u201cOrdinarily, appellate courts review claimed errors only on the basis of the error as presented to the lower courts.\u201d)."},"case_id":431937,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We decline to decide whether the proffered evidence would have been admissible to show SrA B's motive to lie. When military judges exclude evidence, we review their exercise of discretion on the basis of the record before them. Since the defense did not proffer the evidence to show motive to lie, the military judge had no duty to consider it for this purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"30 MJ 234, 237","parenthetical":"\"Ordinarily, appellate courts review claimed errors only on the basis of the error as presented to the lower courts.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Rust, 41 MJ 472, 479 n. 3 (1995) (appellant not allowed to relitigate motion on different factual basis for the first time on appeal); United States v. Vangelisti, 30 MJ 234, 237 (CMA 1990), quoting United States v. Roberts, 7 USCMA 322, 325, 22 CMR 112, 115 (1956) (\u201cOrdinarily, appellate courts review claimed errors only on the basis of the error as presented to the lower courts.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 MJ 98, 107","parenthetical":"accused may not withhold \"trump card\" and play it on appeal if he loses at trial","sentence":"See also United States v. Clark, 35 MJ 98, 107 (CMA 1992) (accused may not withhold \u201ctrump card\u201d and play it on appeal if he loses at trial)."},"case_id":431937,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We decline to decide whether the proffered evidence would have been admissible to show SrA B's motive to lie. When military judges exclude evidence, we review their exercise of discretion on the basis of the record before them. Since the defense did not proffer the evidence to show motive to lie, the military judge had no duty to consider it for this purpose.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"35 MJ 98, 107","parenthetical":"accused may not withhold \"trump card\" and play it on appeal if he loses at trial","sentence":"See also United States v. Clark, 35 MJ 98, 107 (CMA 1992) (accused may not withhold \u201ctrump card\u201d and play it on appeal if he loses at trial)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"7 USCMA 322, 325","parenthetical":"\"Ordinarily, appellate courts review claimed errors only on the basis of the error as presented to the lower courts.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Rust, 41 MJ 472, 479 n. 3 (1995) (appellant not allowed to relitigate motion on different factual basis for the first time on appeal); United States v. Vangelisti, 30 MJ 234, 237 (CMA 1990), quoting United States v. Roberts, 7 USCMA 322, 325, 22 CMR 112, 115 (1956) (\u201cOrdinarily, appellate courts review claimed errors only on the basis of the error as presented to the lower courts.\u201d)."},"case_id":431937,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The resolution is also invalid and ineffective as applied to the private water companies (Parkland Light). A local regulation that conflicts with state law fails in its entirety.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"70 Wn. App. 471, 482","parenthetical":"holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens","sentence":"See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 618, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991) (holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 Wn.2d 606, 618","parenthetical":"holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses","sentence":"See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 618, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991) (holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses)."},"case_id":428179,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The resolution is also invalid and ineffective as applied to the private water companies (Parkland Light). A local regulation that conflicts with state law fails in its entirety.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses","sentence":"See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 618, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991) (holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"70 Wn. App. 471, 482","parenthetical":"holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens","sentence":"See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 618, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991) (holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses)."},"case_id":428179,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The resolution is also invalid and ineffective as applied to the private water companies (Parkland Light). A local regulation that conflicts with state law fails in its entirety.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens","sentence":"See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 618, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991) (holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 Wn.2d 606, 618","parenthetical":"holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses","sentence":"See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 618, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991) (holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses)."},"case_id":428179,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The resolution is also invalid and ineffective as applied to the private water companies (Parkland Light). A local regulation that conflicts with state law fails in its entirety.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses","sentence":"See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 618, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991) (holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens","sentence":"See Adams v. Thurston County, 70 Wn. App. 471, 482, 855 P.2d 284 (1993) (holding that a county ordinance conflicted with state laws and was invalid as applied to all citizens); see also Employco Pers. Servs., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 618, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991) (holding that an entire ordinance which gave the city of Seattle blanket immunity from liability for damages for loss of electrical services was void because it conflicted with state statutes authorizing suits against utilities and permitting recovery of damages for negligently caused losses)."},"case_id":428179,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The re-dressability of an injury to a procedural right turns on the potential impact of the court's action on the injury-causing party. Circuit precedent establishes that there is standing to assert procedural allegations under NEPA against state defendants in order to preserve the environmental status quo pending federal review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"544 F.2d 1036, 1037","parenthetical":"analyzing a NEPA claim that an actor failed to prepare a required EIS as presenting a federal question for the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction","sentence":"See Ely v. Velde (\u201cEly II\u201d), 497 F.2d 252, 257 (4th Cir.1974) (finding that if a state were to undertake construction on a project subject to NEPA requirements absent procedural compliance with the Act, the federal court should enjoin such action); see also Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir.1976) (analyzing a NEPA claim that an actor failed to prepare a required EIS as presenting a federal question for the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"497 F.2d 252, 257","parenthetical":"finding that if a state were to undertake construction on a project subject to NEPA requirements absent procedural compliance with the Act, the federal court should enjoin such action","sentence":"See Ely v. Velde (\u201cEly II\u201d), 497 F.2d 252, 257 (4th Cir.1974) (finding that if a state were to undertake construction on a project subject to NEPA requirements absent procedural compliance with the Act, the federal court should enjoin such action); see also Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir.1976) (analyzing a NEPA claim that an actor failed to prepare a required EIS as presenting a federal question for the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction)."},"case_id":5735550,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At most, plaintiff has demonstrated that some of the witnesses had varying points of view concerning the incident. This does not, however, demonstrate perjury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 F.Supp. 1037, 1042","parenthetical":"holding that fact that one witness's testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury","sentence":"State v. Barker, 18 Kan.App.2d 292, 294, 851 P.2d 394, 396 (1993) (perjury cannot be established by one person\u2019s testimony countering another person\u2019s testimony); see also Dukes v. State of New York, 743 F.Supp. 1037, 1042 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (holding that fact that one witness\u2019s testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury). Likewise, plaintiff advances no facts to support her claim of conspiracy. That is, she provides no evidence that Alton, Li-vengood, and Mr. Serrano met, determined to conspire against plaintiff, and carried out the conspiracy through a course of conduct."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"18 Kan.App.2d 292, 294","parenthetical":"perjury cannot be established by one person's testimony countering another person's testimony","sentence":"State v. Barker, 18 Kan.App.2d 292, 294, 851 P.2d 394, 396 (1993) (perjury cannot be established by one person\u2019s testimony countering another person\u2019s testimony); see also Dukes v. State of New York, 743 F.Supp. 1037, 1042 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (holding that fact that one witness\u2019s testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury). Likewise, plaintiff advances no facts to support her claim of conspiracy. That is, she provides no evidence that Alton, Li-vengood, and Mr. Serrano met, determined to conspire against plaintiff, and carried out the conspiracy through a course of conduct."},"case_id":9495832,"label":"b"}
{"context":"At most, plaintiff has demonstrated that some of the witnesses had varying points of view concerning the incident. This does not, however, demonstrate perjury.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"851 P.2d 394, 396","parenthetical":"perjury cannot be established by one person's testimony countering another person's testimony","sentence":"State v. Barker, 18 Kan.App.2d 292, 294, 851 P.2d 394, 396 (1993) (perjury cannot be established by one person\u2019s testimony countering another person\u2019s testimony); see also Dukes v. State of New York, 743 F.Supp. 1037, 1042 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (holding that fact that one witness\u2019s testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury). Likewise, plaintiff advances no facts to support her claim of conspiracy. That is, she provides no evidence that Alton, Li-vengood, and Mr. Serrano met, determined to conspire against plaintiff, and carried out the conspiracy through a course of conduct."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"743 F.Supp. 1037, 1042","parenthetical":"holding that fact that one witness's testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury","sentence":"State v. Barker, 18 Kan.App.2d 292, 294, 851 P.2d 394, 396 (1993) (perjury cannot be established by one person\u2019s testimony countering another person\u2019s testimony); see also Dukes v. State of New York, 743 F.Supp. 1037, 1042 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (holding that fact that one witness\u2019s testimony is at odds with testimony of another witness does not supply a sufficient basis for allegations of perjury). Likewise, plaintiff advances no facts to support her claim of conspiracy. That is, she provides no evidence that Alton, Li-vengood, and Mr. Serrano met, determined to conspire against plaintiff, and carried out the conspiracy through a course of conduct."},"case_id":9495832,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Even in prison, case law indicates that the Fourth Amendment protects, to some degree, prisoners' bodily integrity against unreasonable intrusions into their bodies.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"71 F.3d 260, 260-61","parenthetical":"insertion of catheter into prisoner's bladder was subject to Fourth Amendment, but defendant physician was entitled to qualified immunity","sentence":"See Sparks, 71 F.3d at 260-61 (insertion of catheter into prisoner\u2019s bladder was subject to Fourth Amendment, but defendant physician was entitled to qualified immunity); Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep\u2019t of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir.1998) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in judgment) (Fourth Amendment protects prisoners from unreasonable bodily intrusions but not inspections of appearance of their bodies); see also Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 44-48 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating dismissal of prisoner\u2019s Fourth Amendment claim based on abdominal surgery used to search for evidence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"590 F.3d 31, 44-48","parenthetical":"vacating dismissal of prisoner's Fourth Amendment claim based on abdominal surgery used to search for evidence","sentence":"See Sparks, 71 F.3d at 260-61 (insertion of catheter into prisoner\u2019s bladder was subject to Fourth Amendment, but defendant physician was entitled to qualified immunity); Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep\u2019t of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir.1998) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in judgment) (Fourth Amendment protects prisoners from unreasonable bodily intrusions but not inspections of appearance of their bodies); see also Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 44-48 (1st Cir.2009) (vacating dismissal of prisoner\u2019s Fourth Amendment claim based on abdominal surgery used to search for evidence)."},"case_id":4075040,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The novelty of this attempt does not give us pause, however. Given the general similarity between the role of the Commission and the role of the SEC in remedying wrongs within their respective spheres, it is entirely appropriate to allow the Commission to proceed against nominal defendants under the same circumstances in which the SEC could proceed against such defendants.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"591 F.2d 1211, 1223","parenthetical":"noting that although the CEA does not contain the same explicit grant of broad equitable authority found in the SEA, \"neither does [the CEA] have any provision restricting the equitable power of the district court\"","sentence":"See Colello, 139 F.3d at 676 (stating generally that \"ample authority supports the proposition that the broad equitable powers of the federal courts can be employed to recover ill gotten gains for the benefit of the victims of wrongdoing, whether held by the original wrongdoer or by one who has received the proceeds after the wrong\u201d); cf. CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that although the CEA does not contain the same explicit grant of broad equitable authority found in the SEA, \"neither does [the CEA] have any provision restricting the equitable power of the district court\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"139 F.3d 676, 676","parenthetical":"stating generally that \"ample authority supports the proposition that the broad equitable powers of the federal courts can be employed to recover ill gotten gains for the benefit of the victims of wrongdoing, whether held by the original wrongdoer or by one who has received the proceeds after the wrong\"","sentence":"See Colello, 139 F.3d at 676 (stating generally that \"ample authority supports the proposition that the broad equitable powers of the federal courts can be employed to recover ill gotten gains for the benefit of the victims of wrongdoing, whether held by the original wrongdoer or by one who has received the proceeds after the wrong\u201d); cf. CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that although the CEA does not contain the same explicit grant of broad equitable authority found in the SEA, \"neither does [the CEA] have any provision restricting the equitable power of the district court\u201d)."},"case_id":9451835,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although Franklin testified that \"the idea that [Cortez's attorneys] had some big strategy before the [polygraph] question was asked is not true,\" Cortez's attorneys also testified that they were surprised by the question regarding polygraph testimony and did not expect the question to be asked. In this vein, the Supreme Court has stated \"[j]ust as there is no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or tactician, an attorney may not be faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote possibilities.\" Accordingly, even if we were to address this claim as a standalone issue, Cortez has failed to show that his counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion in limine regarding inadmissible polygraph evidence.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"629 F.3d 494, 502","parenthetical":"holding that pre-trial motions in limine \"were not feasible because counsel could not have anticipated [inadmissible] testimony\"","sentence":"See Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that pre-trial motions in limine \u201cwere not feasible because counsel could not have anticipated [inadmissible] testimony\u201d); see also Dodson v. Stephens, 611 Fed.Appx. 168, 175-77 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that it was \"reasonable that [counsel] would not anticipate that the prosecution would attempt to offer inadmissible [polygraph] evidence\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"611 Fed.Appx. 168, 175-77","parenthetical":"holding that it was \"reasonable that [counsel] would not anticipate that the prosecution would attempt to offer inadmissible [polygraph] evidence\"","sentence":"See Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that pre-trial motions in limine \u201cwere not feasible because counsel could not have anticipated [inadmissible] testimony\u201d); see also Dodson v. Stephens, 611 Fed.Appx. 168, 175-77 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that it was \"reasonable that [counsel] would not anticipate that the prosecution would attempt to offer inadmissible [polygraph] evidence\u201d)."},"case_id":12394596,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I have no doubt the work of the Commission is in aid of that function. Other, arguably less \"judicial,\" functions have been assigned to courts of law and have withstood constitutional challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"261 U.S. 428, 442-43","parenthetical":"ruling that Congress' power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"100 U.S. 371, 397-98","parenthetical":"upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"case_id":10537723,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I have no doubt the work of the Commission is in aid of that function. Other, arguably less \"judicial,\" functions have been assigned to courts of law and have withstood constitutional challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49","parenthetical":"ruling that Congress' power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"100 U.S. 371, 397-98","parenthetical":"upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"case_id":10537723,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I have no doubt the work of the Commission is in aid of that function. Other, arguably less \"judicial,\" functions have been assigned to courts of law and have withstood constitutional challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"100 U.S. 371, 397-98","parenthetical":"upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ruling that Congress' power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"case_id":10537723,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I have no doubt the work of the Commission is in aid of that function. Other, arguably less \"judicial,\" functions have been assigned to courts of law and have withstood constitutional challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"108 S.Ct. 2610, 2610","parenthetical":"holding that special court's appointment of independent prosecutor not incongruous","sentence":"Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398; see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2610 (holding that special court\u2019s appointment of independent prosecutor not incongruous); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F.Supp. 902, 914 (D.D.C.1967) (\u201cThe limitation which is referred to in Siebold is not an affirmative requirement that the duty ... be related to the administration of justice. It is a negative requirement that the duty may not have \u2018such incongruity\u2019 with the judicial function as would void the power sought to be conferred.\u201d) (upholding power of district court to appoint members of D.C. school board)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"100 U.S. 371, 397-98","parenthetical":"upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"case_id":10537723,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I have no doubt the work of the Commission is in aid of that function. Other, arguably less \"judicial,\" functions have been assigned to courts of law and have withstood constitutional challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"261 U.S. 428, 442-43","parenthetical":"ruling that Congress' power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"case_id":10537723,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I have no doubt the work of the Commission is in aid of that function. Other, arguably less \"judicial,\" functions have been assigned to courts of law and have withstood constitutional challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49","parenthetical":"ruling that Congress' power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"case_id":10537723,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I have no doubt the work of the Commission is in aid of that function. Other, arguably less \"judicial,\" functions have been assigned to courts of law and have withstood constitutional challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"ruling that Congress' power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"case_id":10537723,"label":"a"}
{"context":"I have no doubt the work of the Commission is in aid of that function. Other, arguably less \"judicial,\" functions have been assigned to courts of law and have withstood constitutional challenge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"108 S.Ct. 2610, 2610","parenthetical":"holding that special court's appointment of independent prosecutor not incongruous","sentence":"Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398; see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2610 (holding that special court\u2019s appointment of independent prosecutor not incongruous); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F.Supp. 902, 914 (D.D.C.1967) (\u201cThe limitation which is referred to in Siebold is not an affirmative requirement that the duty ... be related to the administration of justice. It is a negative requirement that the duty may not have \u2018such incongruity\u2019 with the judicial function as would void the power sought to be conferred.\u201d) (upholding power of district court to appoint members of D.C. school board)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors","sentence":"See Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 21 S.Ct. 406, 45 L.Ed. 577 (1901) (upholding court appointment of commissioners to handle extradition matters); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (upholding statute which permitted circuit courts to appoint election supervisors); see also Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. at 2613, 2614 n. 20 (detailing other non-adversarial functions courts may exercise); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 442-43, 43 S.Ct. 445, 448-49, 67 L.Ed. 731 (1923) (ruling that Congress\u2019 power to exercise exclusive legislation over District of Columbia permitted it to assign district courts the responsibility to oversee Public Utilities Commission). . The test is whether an assignment of authority to the judicial branch presents an \u201cincongruity in the duty required as to excuse the courts from its performance, or to render their acts void.\u201d"},"case_id":10537723,"label":"b"}
{"context":".\"'Garcia argues that even if trial counsel's individual acts or omissions are insufficient ' to establish he was prejudiced, the cumulative effect was substantial enough- to meet Strickland's test.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"59 F.3d 673, 682","parenthetical":"\"In making this showing, a'petitioner may demonstrate that-the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland's test\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.1995) (\u201cIn making this showing, a'petitioner may demonstrate that-the cumulative effect of counsel\u2019s individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland\u2019s test\u201d); but see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1990) (\u201ccumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas .claim must stand or fall on its own\u201d).\u2019"},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"915 F.2d 1188, 1191","parenthetical":"\"cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas .claim must stand or fall on its own\"","sentence":"See Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.1995) (\u201cIn making this showing, a'petitioner may demonstrate that-the cumulative effect of counsel\u2019s individual acts or omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland\u2019s test\u201d); but see Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1990) (\u201ccumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas .claim must stand or fall on its own\u201d).\u2019"},"case_id":6789899,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs assert that they have a due process right to not be deprived of one's already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2014 WL 1418395, *9","parenthetical":"applying intermediate scrutiny where Ohio is \"intruding into fact erasing\" the marriage relationship","sentence":"See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp.2d 968, 978 (S.D.Ohio 2013) (finding that nonrecognition invokes \u201cthe right not to be deprived of one\u2019s already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections.\u201d); see also Henry v. Himes, No. l:14-cv-129, - F.Supp.2d -, -, 2014 WL 1418395, *9 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 14, 2014) (applying intermediate scrutiny where Ohio is \u201cintruding into fact erasing\u201d the marriage relationship); see also De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp.2d 632, 662 (W.D.Tex.2014) (applying rational basis review and finding \u201cthat by declaring lawful same-sex marriages void and denying married couples the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of marriage, Texas denies same-sex couples who have been married in other states their due process\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"962 F.Supp.2d 968, 978","parenthetical":"finding that nonrecognition invokes \"the right not to be deprived of one's already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections.\"","sentence":"See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp.2d 968, 978 (S.D.Ohio 2013) (finding that nonrecognition invokes \u201cthe right not to be deprived of one\u2019s already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections.\u201d); see also Henry v. Himes, No. l:14-cv-129, - F.Supp.2d -, -, 2014 WL 1418395, *9 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 14, 2014) (applying intermediate scrutiny where Ohio is \u201cintruding into fact erasing\u201d the marriage relationship); see also De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp.2d 632, 662 (W.D.Tex.2014) (applying rational basis review and finding \u201cthat by declaring lawful same-sex marriages void and denying married couples the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of marriage, Texas denies same-sex couples who have been married in other states their due process\u201d)."},"case_id":5755718,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Plaintiffs assert that they have a due process right to not be deprived of one's already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"975 F.Supp.2d 632, 662","parenthetical":"applying rational basis review and finding \"that by declaring lawful same-sex marriages void and denying married couples the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of marriage, Texas denies same-sex couples who have been married in other states their due process\"","sentence":"See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp.2d 968, 978 (S.D.Ohio 2013) (finding that nonrecognition invokes \u201cthe right not to be deprived of one\u2019s already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections.\u201d); see also Henry v. Himes, No. l:14-cv-129, - F.Supp.2d -, -, 2014 WL 1418395, *9 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 14, 2014) (applying intermediate scrutiny where Ohio is \u201cintruding into fact erasing\u201d the marriage relationship); see also De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp.2d 632, 662 (W.D.Tex.2014) (applying rational basis review and finding \u201cthat by declaring lawful same-sex marriages void and denying married couples the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of marriage, Texas denies same-sex couples who have been married in other states their due process\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"962 F.Supp.2d 968, 978","parenthetical":"finding that nonrecognition invokes \"the right not to be deprived of one's already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections.\"","sentence":"See Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F.Supp.2d 968, 978 (S.D.Ohio 2013) (finding that nonrecognition invokes \u201cthe right not to be deprived of one\u2019s already-existing legal marriage and its attendant benefits and protections.\u201d); see also Henry v. Himes, No. l:14-cv-129, - F.Supp.2d -, -, 2014 WL 1418395, *9 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 14, 2014) (applying intermediate scrutiny where Ohio is \u201cintruding into fact erasing\u201d the marriage relationship); see also De Leon v. Perry, 975 F.Supp.2d 632, 662 (W.D.Tex.2014) (applying rational basis review and finding \u201cthat by declaring lawful same-sex marriages void and denying married couples the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of marriage, Texas denies same-sex couples who have been married in other states their due process\u201d)."},"case_id":5755718,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"238 F.3d 1038, 1038-39","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant's own purchase of drugs from the defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 U.S. 575, 575-76, 578-79","parenthetical":"informant's sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant's purchase of illicit whiskey at that address","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"403 U.S. 575, 575-76, 578-79","parenthetical":"informant's sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant's purchase of illicit whiskey at that address","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"472 A.2d 293, 293, 296-97","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"238 F.3d 1038, 1038-39","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant's own purchase of drugs from the defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant's purchase of illicit whiskey at that address","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"informant's sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant's purchase of illicit whiskey at that address","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"472 A.2d 293, 293, 296-97","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"588 A.2d 608, 608","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant's own involvement in that operation","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"238 F.3d 1038, 1038-39","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant's own purchase of drugs from the defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"588 A.2d 608, 608","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant's own involvement in that operation","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"472 A.2d 293, 293, 296-97","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"416 A.2d 686, 686","parenthetical":"informant's tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant's purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"238 F.3d 1038, 1038-39","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant's own purchase of drugs from the defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"472 A.2d 293, 293, 296-97","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"416 A.2d 686, 686","parenthetical":"informant's tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant's purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The statement-against-penal-interest concept is closely tied to the informant's basis of knowledge, another relevant consideration in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"238 F.3d 1038, 1038-39","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant's own purchase of drugs from the defendant","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"472 A.2d 293, 293, 296-97","parenthetical":"informant's tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen","sentence":"See, e.g., Harris, 403 U.S. at 575-76, 578-79, 91 S.Ct. 2075 (informant\u2019s sworn tip that the defendant sold illicit whiskey at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of illicit whiskey at that address); Grossi, 588 A.2d at 608 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was involved in a drug-smuggling ring was based on informant\u2019s own involvement in that operation); Germano, 559 A.2d at 1033, 1035 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was selling cocaine out of his home was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of cocaine from the defendant; informant also had visited the defendant\u2019s home on numerous occasions and observed the defendant sell cocaine); Read, 416 A.2d at 686 (informant\u2019s tip that marijuana was located at a particular address was based on informant\u2019s purchase of marijuana at that location earlier that evening); see also Tyler, 238 F.3d at 1038-39 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was a drug dealer was based, in part, on informant\u2019s own purchase of drugs from the defendant); cf. Ricci, 472 A.2d at 293, 296-97 (informant\u2019s tip that the defendant was in possession of stolen earrings was based on the fact that the defendant gave informant a sample of the stolen earrings, and informant confirmed with the victim of the theft that the earrings were stolen)."},"case_id":6800472,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under some circumstances, the contacts of a resident subsidiary may be imputed to a nonresident defendant for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction. Such contacts will only be attributed to the nonresident corporation where the subsidiary is (1) its alter ego, (2) a mere department of it, or (3) its agent.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"943 F.Supp. 559, 562-63","parenthetical":"reciting the three tests under which a subsidiary's contacts can be imputed to the parent","sentence":"See Brooks v. Bacardi Rum Corp., 943 F.Supp. 559, 562-63 (E.D.Pa.1996) (reciting the three tests under which a subsidiary\u2019s contacts can be imputed to the parent); see also Arch, 984 F.Supp. at 837 (suggesting comprehensive approach whereby \u201call relevant factors\u201d contained in the three tests are considered at once)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"984 F.Supp. 837, 837","parenthetical":"suggesting comprehensive approach whereby \"all relevant factors\" contained in the three tests are considered at once","sentence":"See Brooks v. Bacardi Rum Corp., 943 F.Supp. 559, 562-63 (E.D.Pa.1996) (reciting the three tests under which a subsidiary\u2019s contacts can be imputed to the parent); see also Arch, 984 F.Supp. at 837 (suggesting comprehensive approach whereby \u201call relevant factors\u201d contained in the three tests are considered at once)."},"case_id":9321641,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Court also rejects Plaintiffs' argument that Travelers has waived its coverage defenses by violating the Claims Administration Statute, Fla. Stat. SS 627.426(2). The statute in relevant part precludes an insurer from denying coverage based on a particular coverage defense unless (1) the insurer gives a written reservation of rights within 30 days of when the insurer knew or should have known of a coverage defense, and (2) the insurer retains independent counsel, mutually agreeable to the parties, within 60 days. Fla. Stat. SS 627.426(2)(a), (b)(3). Strict compliance with the statute is required \"unless actual notice to the insured of the insurer's position has occurred on a timely basis.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"542 So.2d 1030, 1031-32","parenthetical":"actual notice was timely and finding strict compliance not required where the insured admits actual notice","sentence":"Mid-Continent Cas.Co. v. Basdeo, 742 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1332 (S.D.Fla.2010) (stating this proposition of law but finding no evidence that the insured in that case actually received a notice of reservation of rights or denial of coverage); see also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 542 So.2d 1030, 1031-32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (actual notice was timely and finding strict compliance not required where the insured admits actual notice)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"742 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1332","parenthetical":"stating this proposition of law but finding no evidence that the insured in that case actually received a notice of reservation of rights or denial of coverage","sentence":"Mid-Continent Cas.Co. v. Basdeo, 742 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1332 (S.D.Fla.2010) (stating this proposition of law but finding no evidence that the insured in that case actually received a notice of reservation of rights or denial of coverage); see also Phoenix Ins. Co. v. McCormick, 542 So.2d 1030, 1031-32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (actual notice was timely and finding strict compliance not required where the insured admits actual notice)."},"case_id":4063309,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We therefore find that two employment evaluations that have \"areas\" Plaintiff believes have \"reflected poorly or less desirably on her performance\" are insufficient to constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. See Hay v. GMAC Mortg.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"89 F.3d 437, 442-43","parenthetical":"undeserved negative evaluations alone cannot be an adverse employment action","sentence":"Corp., 2003 WL 22133801*6 (E.D.Pa.2003)(\u201cEven a poor performance rating does not give rise to an adverse employment action unless it has a tangible effect on recipient\u2019s employment\u201d); see also Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442-43 (7th Cir.1996)(undeserved negative evaluations alone cannot be an adverse employment action)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2003 WL 22133801, *6","parenthetical":"\"Even a poor performance rating does not give rise to an adverse employment action unless it has a tangible effect on recipient's employment\"","sentence":"Corp., 2003 WL 22133801*6 (E.D.Pa.2003)(\u201cEven a poor performance rating does not give rise to an adverse employment action unless it has a tangible effect on recipient\u2019s employment\u201d); see also Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442-43 (7th Cir.1996)(undeserved negative evaluations alone cannot be an adverse employment action)."},"case_id":9298845,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Fulltime employment does not necessarily contradict a 70% disability rating.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"785 F.3d 258, 259","parenthetical":"noting that \"[a] veteran is deemed totally disabled if he suffers from an impairment that would 'render it impossible for the average person to follow a substantially gainful occupation,' even if the veteran applying for benefits is able, through exceptional ability or exertion, to work full time\"","sentence":"See e.g., Jarrard v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 669 F.3d 1320, 1321 (Fed.Cir. 2012) (80 percent rating qualifying for federal hiring preference under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 2108(3)(C)); Spence v. Foxx, 159 F.Supp.3d 483, 488 (D.N.J. 2014), appeal dismissed (Mar. 19, 2015); (Title Redacted by Agency), Bd. Vet.App. 1524856 (June 10, 2015) (finding only 70 percent PTSD rating warranted for employed veteran); (Title Redacted by Agency), Bd. Vet.App. 1513531 (Mar. 30, 2015) (granting a veteran 70 percent rating for PTSD while \u201cstill employed and [having] a good relationship with his wife and child\u201d); (Title Redacted by Agency), Bd. Vet.App. 1442296 (Sept. 22, 2014) (veteran employed with 70 percent rating for PTSD); (Title Redacted by Agency), Bd. Vet.App. 1440791 (Sept. 12, 2014) (granting a veteran 70 percent rating for PTSD while still gainfully employed); cf. Rutledge v. Illinois Dep't of Human Servs., 785 F.3d 258, 259 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that \u201c[a] veteran is deemed totally disabled if he suffers from an impairment that would \u2018render it impossible for the average person to follow a substantially gainful occupation,\u2019 even if the veteran applying for benefits is able, through exceptional ability or exertion, to work full time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"669 F.3d 1320, 1321","parenthetical":"80 percent rating qualifying for federal hiring preference under 5 U.S.C. SS 2108(3)(C","sentence":"See e.g., Jarrard v. Dep\u2019t of Justice, 669 F.3d 1320, 1321 (Fed.Cir. 2012) (80 percent rating qualifying for federal hiring preference under 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 2108(3)(C)); Spence v. Foxx, 159 F.Supp.3d 483, 488 (D.N.J. 2014), appeal dismissed (Mar. 19, 2015); (Title Redacted by Agency), Bd. Vet.App. 1524856 (June 10, 2015) (finding only 70 percent PTSD rating warranted for employed veteran); (Title Redacted by Agency), Bd. Vet.App. 1513531 (Mar. 30, 2015) (granting a veteran 70 percent rating for PTSD while \u201cstill employed and [having] a good relationship with his wife and child\u201d); (Title Redacted by Agency), Bd. Vet.App. 1442296 (Sept. 22, 2014) (veteran employed with 70 percent rating for PTSD); (Title Redacted by Agency), Bd. Vet.App. 1440791 (Sept. 12, 2014) (granting a veteran 70 percent rating for PTSD while still gainfully employed); cf. Rutledge v. Illinois Dep't of Human Servs., 785 F.3d 258, 259 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that \u201c[a] veteran is deemed totally disabled if he suffers from an impairment that would \u2018render it impossible for the average person to follow a substantially gainful occupation,\u2019 even if the veteran applying for benefits is able, through exceptional ability or exertion, to work full time\u201d)."},"case_id":12130886,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although no cases have been found within the Eleventh Circuit, there is caselaw from other circuits finding that imprisonment beyond the expiration of prisoner's sentence violates \"the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"256 F.3d 695, 700","parenthetical":"granting qualified immunity on claim of former prison inmate that he was detained beyond his prison release date in violation of the Eighth Amendment","sentence":"Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993), citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.1989); see also Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir.2001)(granting qualified immunity on claim of former prison inmate that he was detained beyond his prison release date in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986)(holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Mitchell v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 996 F.2d 311, 1993 WL 191810 (10th Cir.1993)(Table); Douglas v. Murphy, 6 F.Supp.2d 430, 431 (E.D.Pa.1998)(finding an Eighth Amendment violation for detain ing a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence where a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner\u2019s problem, the official failed to act \u201cindicating that his\/her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner\u2019s plight\u201d and \u201cthere exists a causal connection between the official\u2019s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.\u201d); Campbell v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 907 F.Supp. 1173, 1179-80 (N.D.Ill.1995)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"203 F.3d 875, 880-881","parenthetical":"denying existence of a SS 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause","sentence":"But see Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880-881 (5th Cir.2000) (denying existence of a \u00a7 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause)."},"case_id":9369412,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although no cases have been found within the Eleventh Circuit, there is caselaw from other circuits finding that imprisonment beyond the expiration of prisoner's sentence violates \"the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"203 F.3d 875, 880-881","parenthetical":"denying existence of a SS 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause","sentence":"But see Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880-881 (5th Cir.2000) (denying existence of a \u00a7 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment","sentence":"Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993), citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.1989); see also Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir.2001)(granting qualified immunity on claim of former prison inmate that he was detained beyond his prison release date in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986)(holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Mitchell v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 996 F.2d 311, 1993 WL 191810 (10th Cir.1993)(Table); Douglas v. Murphy, 6 F.Supp.2d 430, 431 (E.D.Pa.1998)(finding an Eighth Amendment violation for detain ing a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence where a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner\u2019s problem, the official failed to act \u201cindicating that his\/her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner\u2019s plight\u201d and \u201cthere exists a causal connection between the official\u2019s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.\u201d); Campbell v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 907 F.Supp. 1173, 1179-80 (N.D.Ill.1995)."},"case_id":9369412,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although no cases have been found within the Eleventh Circuit, there is caselaw from other circuits finding that imprisonment beyond the expiration of prisoner's sentence violates \"the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"203 F.3d 875, 880-881","parenthetical":"denying existence of a SS 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause","sentence":"But see Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880-881 (5th Cir.2000) (denying existence of a \u00a7 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment","sentence":"Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993), citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.1989); see also Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir.2001)(granting qualified immunity on claim of former prison inmate that he was detained beyond his prison release date in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986)(holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Mitchell v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 996 F.2d 311, 1993 WL 191810 (10th Cir.1993)(Table); Douglas v. Murphy, 6 F.Supp.2d 430, 431 (E.D.Pa.1998)(finding an Eighth Amendment violation for detain ing a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence where a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner\u2019s problem, the official failed to act \u201cindicating that his\/her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner\u2019s plight\u201d and \u201cthere exists a causal connection between the official\u2019s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.\u201d); Campbell v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 907 F.Supp. 1173, 1179-80 (N.D.Ill.1995)."},"case_id":9369412,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although no cases have been found within the Eleventh Circuit, there is caselaw from other circuits finding that imprisonment beyond the expiration of prisoner's sentence violates \"the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment","sentence":"Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993), citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.1989); see also Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir.2001)(granting qualified immunity on claim of former prison inmate that he was detained beyond his prison release date in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986)(holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Mitchell v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 996 F.2d 311, 1993 WL 191810 (10th Cir.1993)(Table); Douglas v. Murphy, 6 F.Supp.2d 430, 431 (E.D.Pa.1998)(finding an Eighth Amendment violation for detain ing a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence where a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner\u2019s problem, the official failed to act \u201cindicating that his\/her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner\u2019s plight\u201d and \u201cthere exists a causal connection between the official\u2019s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.\u201d); Campbell v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 907 F.Supp. 1173, 1179-80 (N.D.Ill.1995)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"203 F.3d 875, 880-881","parenthetical":"denying existence of a SS 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause","sentence":"But see Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880-881 (5th Cir.2000) (denying existence of a \u00a7 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause)."},"case_id":9369412,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although no cases have been found within the Eleventh Circuit, there is caselaw from other circuits finding that imprisonment beyond the expiration of prisoner's sentence violates \"the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"203 F.3d 875, 880-881","parenthetical":"denying existence of a SS 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause","sentence":"But see Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880-881 (5th Cir.2000) (denying existence of a \u00a7 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment","sentence":"Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993), citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.1989); see also Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir.2001)(granting qualified immunity on claim of former prison inmate that he was detained beyond his prison release date in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986)(holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Mitchell v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 996 F.2d 311, 1993 WL 191810 (10th Cir.1993)(Table); Douglas v. Murphy, 6 F.Supp.2d 430, 431 (E.D.Pa.1998)(finding an Eighth Amendment violation for detain ing a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence where a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner\u2019s problem, the official failed to act \u201cindicating that his\/her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner\u2019s plight\u201d and \u201cthere exists a causal connection between the official\u2019s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.\u201d); Campbell v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 907 F.Supp. 1173, 1179-80 (N.D.Ill.1995)."},"case_id":9369412,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although no cases have been found within the Eleventh Circuit, there is caselaw from other circuits finding that imprisonment beyond the expiration of prisoner's sentence violates \"the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"203 F.3d 875, 880-881","parenthetical":"denying existence of a SS 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause","sentence":"But see Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880-881 (5th Cir.2000) (denying existence of a \u00a7 1983 cause of action under the Eighth Amendment for continued detention or incarceration beyond expiration of sentence, but finding there was a cause of action under Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Due Process Clause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"6 F.Supp.2d 430, 431","parenthetical":"finding an Eighth Amendment violation for detain ing a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence where a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem, the official failed to act \"indicating that his\/her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight\" and \"there exists a causal connection between the official's response to the problem and the unjustified detention.\"","sentence":"Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 686 (3d Cir.1993), citing Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir.1989); see also Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir.2001)(granting qualified immunity on claim of former prison inmate that he was detained beyond his prison release date in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 3333, 92 L.Ed.2d 739 (1986)(holding prison officials ultimately violated the plaintiffs right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Mitchell v. New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 996 F.2d 311, 1993 WL 191810 (10th Cir.1993)(Table); Douglas v. Murphy, 6 F.Supp.2d 430, 431 (E.D.Pa.1998)(finding an Eighth Amendment violation for detain ing a prisoner beyond the termination of his sentence where a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner\u2019s problem, the official failed to act \u201cindicating that his\/her response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner\u2019s plight\u201d and \u201cthere exists a causal connection between the official\u2019s response to the problem and the unjustified detention.\u201d); Campbell v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 907 F.Supp. 1173, 1179-80 (N.D.Ill.1995)."},"case_id":9369412,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"791 F.2d 778, 779-80","parenthetical":"finding that the respondent's visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"626 F.2d 721, 725","parenthetical":"finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"589 F.2d 957, 959","parenthetical":"finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"381 F.2d 368, 369","parenthetical":"finding that the respondent's admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the respondent's admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the respondent's admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We did not suggest that merely setting forth a prima facie case of alienage based on circumstantial evidence of foreign birth shifts the burden of persuasion to the respondent. We specifically discussed the government's burden of establishing alienage as a precondition to the burden-shifting presumption.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Once alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. SS 1361 arises.\"","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that the respondent's admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage","sentence":"See Corona-Palomera, 661 F.2d at 816 n. 2, 818 (\u201cOnce alienage is established, the presumption raised by 8 U.S.C. \u00a7 1361 arises.\u201d); see also Veneracion v. INS, 791 F.2d 778, 779-80 (9th Cir.1986) (finding that the respondent\u2019s visa application and attached foreign birth certificate created a burden-shifting presumption under sections 1184 and 1361); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that once alienage is established by admission of foreign birth, the burden of proof shifts to alien to prove time, place, and manner of entry), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2280, 73 L.Ed.2d 1291 (1982); Cabral-Avila v. INS, 589 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979) (finding that the INS had established alienage with the properly admitted and uncontested 1-213 form and testimony of INS agents, where the respondent failed to testify and controvert that evidence, and then shifting the burden to the aliens to demonstrate nondeportability); Farrell v. United States, 381 F.2d 368, 369 (9th Cir.) (finding that the respondent\u2019s admission of foreign birth and his foreign birth certificate conclusively established alienage), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 963, 88 S.Ct. 349, 19 L.Ed.2d 377 (1967)."},"case_id":7411166,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One year later, the Kansas court revisited the issue and found it unacceptable that a defendant \"have no appellate forum available in the Kansas courts to vindicate a valid double jeopardy claim before he is in fact subjected to such jeopardy.\" The court concluded that habeas corpus, a proceeding that afforded the defendant a \"speedy remedy,\" was the appropriate vehicle for challenging a trial court's pretrial denial of a claim of double jeopardy.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus","sentence":"See also Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (finding constitutional right to review of double jeopardy claim and affording relief by habeas corpus); State v. Mestas, 93 N.M. 765, 605 P.2d 1164 (App.1980) (finding no right to appeal as final judgment but finding it unnecessary to reach question whether final judgment should be construed to include an order denying a double jeopardy claim because pursuant to statutory authority court of appeals permitted to grant interlocutory appeals); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980) (upon reconsideration, court modified initial opinion that held a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss because of double jeopardy claim was a final order appealable under statute, and held such an order did not satisfy statutory test for finality and was not appealable by right under statute, but instead, was a nonfinal order appealable only by permission of court of appeals); People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey, 74 Ill.2d 527, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 387 N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, Mosley v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979) (no right to appeal, but defendant not foreclosed from review because he may file writ of prohibition or mandamus); cf. State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1978) (no right to appeal on double jeopardy charge when state refiled charges after federal court released defendant in habeas proceeding)."},"case_id":1537860,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The AFFH certification was not a mere boilerplate formality, but rather was a substantive requirement, rooted in the history and purpose of the fair housing laws and regulations, requiring the County to conduct an AI, take appropriate actions in response, and to document its analysis and actions. The County's motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"352 F.3d 908, 915-17","parenthetical":"rejecting argument that a certification was not material simply because the federal government continued to fund a subcontract after learning the certification was false where the certification was a prerequisite for bidding on the subcontract","sentence":"See Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1175 (finding the parties\u2019 argument over whether the false statements were material \u201clargely academic\u201d where the government funding was expressly conditioned on the particular requirement to which the false statements pertained); see also United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. (\u201c.Harrison II\u201d), 352 F.3d 908, 915-17 (4th Cir.2003) (rejecting argument that a certification was not material simply because the federal government continued to fund a subcontract after learning the certification was false where the certification was a prerequisite for bidding on the subcontract)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"461 F.3d 1175, 1175","parenthetical":"finding the parties' argument over whether the false statements were material \"largely academic\" where the government funding was expressly conditioned on the particular requirement to which the false statements pertained","sentence":"See Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1175 (finding the parties\u2019 argument over whether the false statements were material \u201clargely academic\u201d where the government funding was expressly conditioned on the particular requirement to which the false statements pertained); see also United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co. (\u201c.Harrison II\u201d), 352 F.3d 908, 915-17 (4th Cir.2003) (rejecting argument that a certification was not material simply because the federal government continued to fund a subcontract after learning the certification was false where the certification was a prerequisite for bidding on the subcontract)."},"case_id":3808635,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"413 Pa.Super. 538, 545","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"605 A.2d 1248, 1252","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"413 Pa.Super. 538, 545","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"605 A.2d 1248, 1252","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 413 Pa.Super. 95, 111-13, 604 A.2d 1036, 1045 (1992) (en banc), appeal denied, 531 Pa. 638, 611 A.2d 711 (1992) (records of confidential communication between sexual assault victim and psychotherapist are absolutely privileged pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1, and not subject to in camera review).-"},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"413 Pa.Super. 538, 545","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"605 A.2d 1248, 1252","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"413 Pa.Super. 538, 545","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"605 A.2d 1248, 1252","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review","sentence":"Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987) (psychologist-client privilege established by 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5944 is absolute and not subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"413 Pa.Super. 538, 545","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"605 A.2d 1248, 1252","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"413 Pa.Super. 538, 545","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"605 A.2d 1248, 1252","parenthetical":"\"[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\"","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Majority herein finds that an in camera review of the documents requested by defendant would properly determine which documents are privileged within the scope of SS 5943. However, I am of the opinion that such an inspection would make the clergy privilege an illusory one. An in camera review of documents that are absolutely privileged constitutes error.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"although 42 Pa.C.S.A. SS 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Wilson\/Aultman, 529 Pa. 268, 602 A.2d 1290 (1992), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2952, 119 L.Ed.2d 574 (1992) (privilege codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5945.1 is absolute); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, 516 Pa. 184, 532 A.2d 346 (1987) (although 42 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 5942 provides absolute privilege of confidential communication between media and informant, protection not attaching to non-confidential material in defamation case)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"since 11 P.S. SS 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. SS 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Eck, 413 Pa.Super. 538, 545, 605 A.2d 1248, 1252 (1992) (\u201c[A] privilege which is statutorily enacted, but which is subject to exceptions, is not absolute and access to a criminal defendant may be required.\u201d); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (since 11 P.S. \u00a7 2215 (now 23 Pa.C.S.A. \u00a7 6339) provided various exceptions to non-disclosure of information, privilege was not absolute and thus information was subject to in camera review)."},"case_id":706489,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549","parenthetical":"allowing \"piggybacking\" of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"799 F.2d 397, 400","parenthetical":"charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under SS 216(b","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"799 F.2d 397, 400","parenthetical":"charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under SS 216(b","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"621 F.2d 749, 755","parenthetical":"refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied SS 626(d","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"799 F.2d 397, 400","parenthetical":"charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under SS 216(b","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"561 F.2d 609, 610-11","parenthetical":"affirming district court's order that \"opt-in\" procedure be used for FLSA SS 16(b","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"649 F.2d 691, 697","parenthetical":"notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549","parenthetical":"allowing \"piggybacking\" of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"621 F.2d 749, 755","parenthetical":"refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied SS 626(d","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"649 F.2d 691, 697","parenthetical":"notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"649 F.2d 691, 697","parenthetical":"notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"561 F.2d 609, 610-11","parenthetical":"affirming district court's order that \"opt-in\" procedure be used for FLSA SS 16(b","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549","parenthetical":"allowing \"piggybacking\" of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"639 F.2d 588, 593-94","parenthetical":"charges alleging employer's \"arbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\" and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"639 F.2d 588, 593-94","parenthetical":"charges alleging employer's \"arbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\" and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"621 F.2d 749, 755","parenthetical":"refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied SS 626(d","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"639 F.2d 588, 593-94","parenthetical":"charges alleging employer's \"arbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\" and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"561 F.2d 609, 610-11","parenthetical":"affirming district court's order that \"opt-in\" procedure be used for FLSA SS 16(b","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"600 F.2d 754, 760","parenthetical":"notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \"discrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\"","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549","parenthetical":"allowing \"piggybacking\" of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"600 F.2d 754, 760","parenthetical":"notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \"discrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\"","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"621 F.2d 749, 755","parenthetical":"refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied SS 626(d","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"600 F.2d 754, 760","parenthetical":"notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \"discrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\"","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"561 F.2d 609, 610-11","parenthetical":"affirming district court's order that \"opt-in\" procedure be used for FLSA SS 16(b","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549","parenthetical":"allowing \"piggybacking\" of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"621 F.2d 749, 755","parenthetical":"refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied SS 626(d","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The majority of courts that have addressed the issue since the 1978 amendment have held that individuals can rely on the named plaintiffs' timely charge if it gives notice of class discrimination.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"561 F.2d 609, 610-11","parenthetical":"affirming district court's order that \"opt-in\" procedure be used for FLSA SS 16(b","sentence":"But see McCorstin v. U.S. Steel Corp., 621 F.2d 749, 755 (5th Cir.1980) (refusing to decide issue of whether notice embracing claims of similarly situated employees satisfied \u00a7 626(d) since district court\u2019s finding that notice did not purport to include others similarly situateed was not clearly erroneous); Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 561 F.2d 609, 610-11 (5th Cir.1977) (affirming district court\u2019s order that \u201copt-in\u201d procedure be used for FLSA \u00a7 16(b) class actions, thereby implicitly requiring both filing of notice of intent to sue and written consent from opt-in plaintiffs to be included in class)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549","parenthetical":"allowing \"piggybacking\" of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative","sentence":"See Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986) (charge must allege class-wide age discrimination or claim to represent class in order to serve as basis for ADEA class action under \u00a7 216(b)); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (notice inadequate because complainant expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 593-94 (10th Cir.1980) (charges alleging employer\u2019s \u201carbitrary action constitutes age discrimination against workers over 40\u201d and notice to agencies that suit was intended to be class action gave agencies opportunity to investigate and act within statute of limitations); Bean v. Crocker Nat\u2019l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979) (notice filed on behalf of named plaintiffs and others similarly situated put Secretary and employer on notice that \u201cdiscrimination charges encompassed a pattern of unlawful conduct transcending an isolated individual claim and that they should act accordingly\u201d); see also Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 631 F.Supp. 1546, 1549 (N.D.Ill.1986) (allowing \u201cpiggybacking\u201d of opt-in ADEA claimants although EEOC charge was not expressly representative)."},"case_id":10535307,"label":"b"}
{"context":"'Acts of zoning enforcement rather than rulemaking are not legislative.'","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"923 F.2d 1482, 1485-86","parenthetical":"county commissioners who voted to deny a permit for the development of a landfill were not entitled to legislative immunity, because denial of the permit was the 'application of policy to a specific party5","sentence":"Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (11th Cir.1991)(em-phasis added)(county commissioners who voted to deny a permit for the development of a landfill were not entitled to legislative immunity, because denial of the permit was the \u2018application of policy to a specific party5); see also Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cwhen municipal officials \u201cdo more than adopt prospective, legislative-type rules and take the next step into the area of enforcement,\u201d \u2019 they cannot claim legislative immunity).\u201d"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"865 F.2d 77, 79","parenthetical":"\"when municipal officials \"do more than adopt prospective, legislative-type rules and take the next step into the area of enforcement,\" ' they cannot claim legislative immunity","sentence":"Crymes v. DeKalb County, 923 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (11th Cir.1991)(em-phasis added)(county commissioners who voted to deny a permit for the development of a landfill were not entitled to legislative immunity, because denial of the permit was the \u2018application of policy to a specific party5); see also Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cwhen municipal officials \u201cdo more than adopt prospective, legislative-type rules and take the next step into the area of enforcement,\u201d \u2019 they cannot claim legislative immunity).\u201d"},"case_id":7040057,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although ulti mately we need not definitively decide the point, we assume that the district court erred under Rule 17(b) in conducting the open coui't inquiry into Mr. Wardell's necessity rationale and that the error was obvious and clear. However, Mr. Wardell has made absolutely no showing that the court's approach affected his substantial rights, as he was obliged to under the third prong of plain error review.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"412 F.3d 1179, 1194-95","parenthetical":"discussing the third prong of the plain error test, which requires a showing that the alleged error affected substantial rights","sentence":"See United States v. Meriwether, 486 F.2d 498, 506-07 (5th Cir.1973) (noting that \u201calthough the presence of the Assistant United States Attorney at application proceedings held under Rule 17(b) violates the rule,\u201d \u201cto obtain a reversal of the conviction, defendant is required to show that he was prejudiced by the failure to comply with the rule,\u201d and concluding that defendant \u201cfailed to make such a showing\u201d); see also United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1194-95 (10th Cir.2005) (discussing the third prong of the plain error test, which requires a showing that the alleged error affected substantial rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"486 F.2d 498, 506-07","parenthetical":"noting that \"although the presence of the Assistant United States Attorney at application proceedings held under Rule 17(b","sentence":"See United States v. Meriwether, 486 F.2d 498, 506-07 (5th Cir.1973) (noting that \u201calthough the presence of the Assistant United States Attorney at application proceedings held under Rule 17(b) violates the rule,\u201d \u201cto obtain a reversal of the conviction, defendant is required to show that he was prejudiced by the failure to comply with the rule,\u201d and concluding that defendant \u201cfailed to make such a showing\u201d); see also United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1194-95 (10th Cir.2005) (discussing the third prong of the plain error test, which requires a showing that the alleged error affected substantial rights)."},"case_id":5756275,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is the district court's ultimate resolution of Mr. Sue's habeas petition that is our focus. And, as explicated infra, we deny Mr. Sue a COA because we conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate that ultimate resolution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that we can deny a COA \"so long as we are confident in the correctness of the district court's ultimate resolution of his habeas claims--and we are\"","sentence":"See Self v. Milyard, 522 Fed.Appx. 435, 437 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that we can deny a COA \"so long as we are confident in the correctness of the district court's ultimate resolution of his habeas claims\u2014and we are\u201d); see also Brown v. Roberts, 501 Fed. Appx. 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2012)- (\"While we arrive at that conclusion through a somewhat different path than that employed by the district court, we find that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the district court\u2019s ultimate resolution in dismissing the petition.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"501 Fed. Appx. 825, 830","parenthetical":"\"While we arrive at that conclusion through a somewhat different path than that employed by the district court, we find that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the district court's ultimate resolution in dismissing the petition.\"","sentence":"See Self v. Milyard, 522 Fed.Appx. 435, 437 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that we can deny a COA \"so long as we are confident in the correctness of the district court's ultimate resolution of his habeas claims\u2014and we are\u201d); see also Brown v. Roberts, 501 Fed. Appx. 825, 830 (10th Cir. 2012)- (\"While we arrive at that conclusion through a somewhat different path than that employed by the district court, we find that reasonable jurists could not disagree with the district court\u2019s ultimate resolution in dismissing the petition.\u201d)."},"case_id":12142539,"label":"a"}
{"context":"With respect to his own application, Zheng argues that the BIA erred in rejecting as impermissibly speculative his application for CAT relief based on his fear of forced sterilization. However, where a petitioner is not married and does not have children, his fear of forced sterilization based on a hypothetical future violation of the family planning policy is too speculative to warrant relief.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917-18","parenthetical":"finding that petitioner's reliance on a string of suppositions in support of his CAT claim was too speculative to warrant relief","sentence":"See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir.2005) (absent solid support in the record for petitioner\u2019s assertion that he would be subjected to forced sterilization, his fear was \u201cspeculative at best\u201d); see also Matter of J.F.F., 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917-18 (A.G.2006) (finding that petitioner\u2019s reliance on a string of suppositions in support of his CAT claim was too speculative to warrant relief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"421 F.3d 125, 128-29","parenthetical":"absent solid support in the record for petitioner's assertion that he would be subjected to forced sterilization, his fear was \"speculative at best\"","sentence":"See Jian Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir.2005) (absent solid support in the record for petitioner\u2019s assertion that he would be subjected to forced sterilization, his fear was \u201cspeculative at best\u201d); see also Matter of J.F.F., 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917-18 (A.G.2006) (finding that petitioner\u2019s reliance on a string of suppositions in support of his CAT claim was too speculative to warrant relief)."},"case_id":5746428,"label":"b"}
{"context":"While it is true that the testimony of another witness who had identified Evans as the perpetrator of the offense was presented, her identification was the more equivocal of the two and was made only after she had learned that her co-worker, Crispino, had made an identification. This fact, coupled with the frequency of the hearsay references to Crispino's out-of-court identification, and the jury's request for \"the police report from Teresa Crispino reporting the robbery,\" make it impossible for us to state, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not affect the verdict.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"491 So.2d 1129, 1136","parenthetical":"\"[H]armless error analysis must not become a device whereby the appellate court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible evidence, excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that the evidence of guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the permissible evidence.\"","sentence":"See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1136 (Fla.1986)(\u201c[H]armless error analysis must not become a device whereby the appellate court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible evidence, excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that the evidence of guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the permissible evidence.\u201d); see also Ciccarelli v. State, 531 So.2d 129, 132 (Fla.1988)(stating with regard to the harmless error analysis, \u201cThe court must determine not if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, but if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict could not have been affected by the error.\u201d)(emphasis in original). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"531 So.2d 129, 132","parenthetical":"stating with regard to the harmless error analysis, \"The court must determine not if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, but if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict could not have been affected by the error.\"","sentence":"See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1136 (Fla.1986)(\u201c[H]armless error analysis must not become a device whereby the appellate court substitutes itself for the jury, examines the permissible evidence, excludes the impermissible evidence, and determines that the evidence of guilt is sufficient or even overwhelming based on the permissible evidence.\u201d); see also Ciccarelli v. State, 531 So.2d 129, 132 (Fla.1988)(stating with regard to the harmless error analysis, \u201cThe court must determine not if there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, but if it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict could not have been affected by the error.\u201d)(emphasis in original). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial."},"case_id":11824208,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The law of the case is an established doctrine with roots reaching back to the earliest days of statehood. Under the doctrine jury instructions not objected to become the law of the case. In criminal cases, the State assumes the burden of proving otherwise unnecessary elements of the offense when such added elements are included without objection in the \"to convict\" instruction.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"128 Wn.2d 151, 159","parenthetical":"\"Added elements become the law of the case . . . when they are included in instructions to the jury.\"","sentence":"State v. Lee, 128 Wn.2d 151, 159, 904 P.2d 1143 (1995) (\u201cAdded elements become the law of the case . . . when they are included in instructions to the jury.\u201d) (citing State v. Hobbs, 71 Wn. App. 419, 423, 859 P.2d 73 (1993); State v. Rivas, 49 Wn. App. 677, 683, 746 P.2d 312 (1987))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"32 Wn. App. 882, 887-88","parenthetical":"\"Although the charging statute . . . did not require reference to [the added element], by including that reference in the information and in the instructions, it became the law of the case and the State had the burden of proving it.\"","sentence":"See also State v. Barringer, 32 Wn. App. 882, 887-88, 650 P.2d 1129 (1982) (\u201cAlthough the charging statute . . . did not require reference to [the added element], by including that reference in the information and in the instructions, it became the law of the case and the State had the burden of proving it.\u201d) (citing State v. Worland, 20 Wn. App. 559, 565-66, 582 P.2d 539 (1978)), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Monson, 113 Wn.2d 833, 849-50, 784 P.2d 485 (1989)."},"case_id":812857,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The law of the case is an established doctrine with roots reaching back to the earliest days of statehood. Under the doctrine jury instructions not objected to become the law of the case. In criminal cases, the State assumes the burden of proving otherwise unnecessary elements of the offense when such added elements are included without objection in the \"to convict\" instruction.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"128 Wn.2d 151, 159","parenthetical":"\"Added elements become the law of the case . . . when they are included in instructions to the jury.\"","sentence":"State v. Lee, 128 Wn.2d 151, 159, 904 P.2d 1143 (1995) (\u201cAdded elements become the law of the case . . . when they are included in instructions to the jury.\u201d) (citing State v. Hobbs, 71 Wn. App. 419, 423, 859 P.2d 73 (1993); State v. Rivas, 49 Wn. App. 677, 683, 746 P.2d 312 (1987))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Although the charging statute . . . did not require reference to [the added element], by including that reference in the information and in the instructions, it became the law of the case and the State had the burden of proving it.\"","sentence":"See also State v. Barringer, 32 Wn. App. 882, 887-88, 650 P.2d 1129 (1982) (\u201cAlthough the charging statute . . . did not require reference to [the added element], by including that reference in the information and in the instructions, it became the law of the case and the State had the burden of proving it.\u201d) (citing State v. Worland, 20 Wn. App. 559, 565-66, 582 P.2d 539 (1978)), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Monson, 113 Wn.2d 833, 849-50, 784 P.2d 485 (1989)."},"case_id":812857,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The law of the case is an established doctrine with roots reaching back to the earliest days of statehood. Under the doctrine jury instructions not objected to become the law of the case. In criminal cases, the State assumes the burden of proving otherwise unnecessary elements of the offense when such added elements are included without objection in the \"to convict\" instruction.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Added elements become the law of the case . . . when they are included in instructions to the jury.\"","sentence":"State v. Lee, 128 Wn.2d 151, 159, 904 P.2d 1143 (1995) (\u201cAdded elements become the law of the case . . . when they are included in instructions to the jury.\u201d) (citing State v. Hobbs, 71 Wn. App. 419, 423, 859 P.2d 73 (1993); State v. Rivas, 49 Wn. App. 677, 683, 746 P.2d 312 (1987))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"32 Wn. App. 882, 887-88","parenthetical":"\"Although the charging statute . . . did not require reference to [the added element], by including that reference in the information and in the instructions, it became the law of the case and the State had the burden of proving it.\"","sentence":"See also State v. Barringer, 32 Wn. App. 882, 887-88, 650 P.2d 1129 (1982) (\u201cAlthough the charging statute . . . did not require reference to [the added element], by including that reference in the information and in the instructions, it became the law of the case and the State had the burden of proving it.\u201d) (citing State v. Worland, 20 Wn. App. 559, 565-66, 582 P.2d 539 (1978)), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Monson, 113 Wn.2d 833, 849-50, 784 P.2d 485 (1989)."},"case_id":812857,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The law of the case is an established doctrine with roots reaching back to the earliest days of statehood. Under the doctrine jury instructions not objected to become the law of the case. In criminal cases, the State assumes the burden of proving otherwise unnecessary elements of the offense when such added elements are included without objection in the \"to convict\" instruction.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Added elements become the law of the case . . . when they are included in instructions to the jury.\"","sentence":"State v. Lee, 128 Wn.2d 151, 159, 904 P.2d 1143 (1995) (\u201cAdded elements become the law of the case . . . when they are included in instructions to the jury.\u201d) (citing State v. Hobbs, 71 Wn. App. 419, 423, 859 P.2d 73 (1993); State v. Rivas, 49 Wn. App. 677, 683, 746 P.2d 312 (1987))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Although the charging statute . . . did not require reference to [the added element], by including that reference in the information and in the instructions, it became the law of the case and the State had the burden of proving it.\"","sentence":"See also State v. Barringer, 32 Wn. App. 882, 887-88, 650 P.2d 1129 (1982) (\u201cAlthough the charging statute . . . did not require reference to [the added element], by including that reference in the information and in the instructions, it became the law of the case and the State had the burden of proving it.\u201d) (citing State v. Worland, 20 Wn. App. 559, 565-66, 582 P.2d 539 (1978)), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Monson, 113 Wn.2d 833, 849-50, 784 P.2d 485 (1989)."},"case_id":812857,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, whether Hunter consented really is irrelevant because Sergeant Mushinsky not only smelled marijuana as he stood next to the minivan, but also, as Mosby concedes in his brief, saw marijuana in clear view on top of the garbage bag and on Mosb\/s seat inside the minivan. The smell alone was enough to give rise to probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including closed containers like the garbage bag.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 F.3d 808, 814","parenthetical":"noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband","sentence":"See United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that smell of marijuana is \u201csimple and compelling foundation\u201d for searching entire car); United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 761 (7th Cir.1986) (noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs); see also United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"436 F.3d 769, 772","parenthetical":"noting that smell of marijuana is \"simple and compelling foundation\" for searching entire car","sentence":"See United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that smell of marijuana is \u201csimple and compelling foundation\u201d for searching entire car); United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 761 (7th Cir.1986) (noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs); see also United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband)."},"case_id":3752282,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, whether Hunter consented really is irrelevant because Sergeant Mushinsky not only smelled marijuana as he stood next to the minivan, but also, as Mosby concedes in his brief, saw marijuana in clear view on top of the garbage bag and on Mosb\/s seat inside the minivan. The smell alone was enough to give rise to probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including closed containers like the garbage bag.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"337 F.3d 947, 950-51","parenthetical":"noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana","sentence":"See United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that smell of marijuana is \u201csimple and compelling foundation\u201d for searching entire car); United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 761 (7th Cir.1986) (noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs); see also United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 F.3d 808, 814","parenthetical":"noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband","sentence":"See United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that smell of marijuana is \u201csimple and compelling foundation\u201d for searching entire car); United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 761 (7th Cir.1986) (noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs); see also United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband)."},"case_id":3752282,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, whether Hunter consented really is irrelevant because Sergeant Mushinsky not only smelled marijuana as he stood next to the minivan, but also, as Mosby concedes in his brief, saw marijuana in clear view on top of the garbage bag and on Mosb\/s seat inside the minivan. The smell alone was enough to give rise to probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including closed containers like the garbage bag.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 F.3d 808, 814","parenthetical":"noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband","sentence":"See United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that smell of marijuana is \u201csimple and compelling foundation\u201d for searching entire car); United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 761 (7th Cir.1986) (noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs); see also United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"782 F.2d 757, 761","parenthetical":"noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found","sentence":"See United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that smell of marijuana is \u201csimple and compelling foundation\u201d for searching entire car); United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 761 (7th Cir.1986) (noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs); see also United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband)."},"case_id":3752282,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Nevertheless, whether Hunter consented really is irrelevant because Sergeant Mushinsky not only smelled marijuana as he stood next to the minivan, but also, as Mosby concedes in his brief, saw marijuana in clear view on top of the garbage bag and on Mosb\/s seat inside the minivan. The smell alone was enough to give rise to probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including closed containers like the garbage bag.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"449 F.3d 808, 814","parenthetical":"noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband","sentence":"See United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that smell of marijuana is \u201csimple and compelling foundation\u201d for searching entire car); United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 761 (7th Cir.1986) (noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs); see also United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"183 F.3d 753, 756","parenthetical":"holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs","sentence":"See United States v. Cherry, 436 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that smell of marijuana is \u201csimple and compelling foundation\u201d for searching entire car); United States v. Wimbush, 337 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that search of car was justified after officer saw open container of alcohol and smelled marijuana); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d 757, 761 (7th Cir.1986) (noting that odor of marijuana provides probable cause to search vehicle at least until likely source of odor is found); United States v. Neumann, 183 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that alcohol odor provided probable cause to search vehicle for open container and smell of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle for drugs); see also United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that, under automobile exception to warrant requirement, police may search vehicle if they have probable cause to believe search will uncover contraband)."},"case_id":3752282,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, even assuming that \"its\" applied to the entire list of categories as the Haires contend, we cannot say based upon the language of the Release whether, on the one hand, being a Haspin Acres' rider requires a certain type of relationship between the rider and Has-pin Acres or, on the other hand, one of Haspin Acres' riders is merely a person in Parker's position, i.e., someone who went to Haspin Acres, stopped at the gate, went inside, showed them identification, signed a waiver, gave Haspin Acres money, and rode his ATV around Haspin Acres. We conclude that there is a question of fact as to whether Parker was a rider for purposes of the Release.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"845 N.E.2d 1097, 1108","parenthetical":"holding that summary disposition was improper as there were factual issues regarding the scope and effect of a release","sentence":"See Cummins v. McIntosh, 845 N.E.2d 1097, 1108 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (holding that summary disposition was improper as there were factual issues regarding the scope and effect of a release), trans. denied; see also Huffman, 588 N.E.2d at 1267 (holding that contradictory references clouded the intent of the document, \u201cparol evidence may be utilized to determine the parties\u2019 true intentions respecting the document\u2019s application,\u201d and that the entry of summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a factual determination)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"588 N.E.2d 1267, 1267","parenthetical":"holding that contradictory references clouded the intent of the document, \"parol evidence may be utilized to determine the parties' true intentions respecting the document's application,\" and that the entry of summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a factual determination","sentence":"See Cummins v. McIntosh, 845 N.E.2d 1097, 1108 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (holding that summary disposition was improper as there were factual issues regarding the scope and effect of a release), trans. denied; see also Huffman, 588 N.E.2d at 1267 (holding that contradictory references clouded the intent of the document, \u201cparol evidence may be utilized to determine the parties\u2019 true intentions respecting the document\u2019s application,\u201d and that the entry of summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for a factual determination)."},"case_id":7131426,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one's fifth amendment right to silence","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The creation of a right is often meaningless without the ancillary right to be free from retaliation for the exercise or assertion of that right.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"termination of benefits under New York's Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches","sentence":"But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 91 S.Ct. 381, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (termination of benefits under New York\u2019s Aid to Families With Dependent Children program for refusal of required home visit not violative of fourth amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (death penalty may not be imposed solely on those who exercise their constitutional right to a jury trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229,14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (penalty in form of comment by court and prosecutor may not be imposed on the exercise of one\u2019s fifth amendment right to silence). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969) (burden in form of residency requirement for welfare benefits may not be imposed on constitutional right to travel, absent compelling justification); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (burden in form of choice between receiving unemployment benefits or observing the Sabbath may not be imposed on right of free exercise of religion, absent compelling state interest)."},"case_id":1292881,"label":"b"}
{"context":"[P 11] C.G.'s argument that C.N. cannot be classified as a deprived child because C.N.'s mother is capably raising him also fails. The relevant inquiry is whether C.G. can provide proper parental care for the child, which C.G. cannot do while incarcerated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a child was \"deprived,\" as required to terminate the child's incarcerated father's parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child's mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old","sentence":"See, e.g., In re C.R., 1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 602 N.W.2d 520 (finding under a deprivation analysis that a child\u2019s positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual\u2019s inability to provide proper parental care for the child); see also In re M.H.S., 261 Ga.App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (finding that a child was \u201cdeprived,\u201d as required to terminate the child\u2019s incarcerated father\u2019s parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child\u2019s mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6","parenthetical":"finding under a deprivation analysis that a child's positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual's inability to provide proper parental care for the child","sentence":"See, e.g., In re C.R., 1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 602 N.W.2d 520 (finding under a deprivation analysis that a child\u2019s positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual\u2019s inability to provide proper parental care for the child); see also In re M.H.S., 261 Ga.App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (finding that a child was \u201cdeprived,\u201d as required to terminate the child\u2019s incarcerated father\u2019s parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child\u2019s mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old)."},"case_id":7064184,"label":"b"}
{"context":"[P 11] C.G.'s argument that C.N. cannot be classified as a deprived child because C.N.'s mother is capably raising him also fails. The relevant inquiry is whether C.G. can provide proper parental care for the child, which C.G. cannot do while incarcerated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6","parenthetical":"finding under a deprivation analysis that a child's positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual's inability to provide proper parental care for the child","sentence":"See, e.g., In re C.R., 1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 602 N.W.2d 520 (finding under a deprivation analysis that a child\u2019s positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual\u2019s inability to provide proper parental care for the child); see also In re M.H.S., 261 Ga.App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (finding that a child was \u201cdeprived,\u201d as required to terminate the child\u2019s incarcerated father\u2019s parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child\u2019s mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a child was \"deprived,\" as required to terminate the child's incarcerated father's parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child's mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old","sentence":"See, e.g., In re C.R., 1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 602 N.W.2d 520 (finding under a deprivation analysis that a child\u2019s positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual\u2019s inability to provide proper parental care for the child); see also In re M.H.S., 261 Ga.App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (finding that a child was \u201cdeprived,\u201d as required to terminate the child\u2019s incarcerated father\u2019s parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child\u2019s mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old)."},"case_id":7064184,"label":"a"}
{"context":"[P 11] C.G.'s argument that C.N. cannot be classified as a deprived child because C.N.'s mother is capably raising him also fails. The relevant inquiry is whether C.G. can provide proper parental care for the child, which C.G. cannot do while incarcerated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding under a deprivation analysis that a child's positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual's inability to provide proper parental care for the child","sentence":"See, e.g., In re C.R., 1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 602 N.W.2d 520 (finding under a deprivation analysis that a child\u2019s positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual\u2019s inability to provide proper parental care for the child); see also In re M.H.S., 261 Ga.App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (finding that a child was \u201cdeprived,\u201d as required to terminate the child\u2019s incarcerated father\u2019s parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child\u2019s mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a child was \"deprived,\" as required to terminate the child's incarcerated father's parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child's mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old","sentence":"See, e.g., In re C.R., 1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 602 N.W.2d 520 (finding under a deprivation analysis that a child\u2019s positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual\u2019s inability to provide proper parental care for the child); see also In re M.H.S., 261 Ga.App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (finding that a child was \u201cdeprived,\u201d as required to terminate the child\u2019s incarcerated father\u2019s parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child\u2019s mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old)."},"case_id":7064184,"label":"a"}
{"context":"[P 11] C.G.'s argument that C.N. cannot be classified as a deprived child because C.N.'s mother is capably raising him also fails. The relevant inquiry is whether C.G. can provide proper parental care for the child, which C.G. cannot do while incarcerated.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that a child was \"deprived,\" as required to terminate the child's incarcerated father's parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child's mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old","sentence":"See, e.g., In re C.R., 1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 602 N.W.2d 520 (finding under a deprivation analysis that a child\u2019s positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual\u2019s inability to provide proper parental care for the child); see also In re M.H.S., 261 Ga.App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (finding that a child was \u201cdeprived,\u201d as required to terminate the child\u2019s incarcerated father\u2019s parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child\u2019s mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding under a deprivation analysis that a child's positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual's inability to provide proper parental care for the child","sentence":"See, e.g., In re C.R., 1999 ND 221, \u00b6\u00b6 5-6, 602 N.W.2d 520 (finding under a deprivation analysis that a child\u2019s positive development in foster care does not negate an incarcerated individual\u2019s inability to provide proper parental care for the child); see also In re M.H.S., 261 Ga.App. 686, 583 S.E.2d 471 (2003) (finding that a child was \u201cdeprived,\u201d as required to terminate the child\u2019s incarcerated father\u2019s parental rights, where the child lived with its mother because the father raped a third party, wrote a threatening note to the child\u2019s mother and would not be eligible for parole until the child is twenty-seven years old)."},"case_id":7064184,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 U.S. 106, 109-10","parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 S.Ct. 882, 884","parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 U.S. 106, 109-10","parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 U.S. 106, 109-10","parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"25 F.3d 1, 8","parenthetical":"sustaining, on safety grounds, a \"[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"434 U.S. 106, 109-10","parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 S.Ct. 882, 884","parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"25 F.3d 1, 8","parenthetical":"sustaining, on safety grounds, a \"[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"117 S.Ct. 882, 884","parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, I find no case law which precludes law enforcement officers from resorting to an appropriate prophylactic SOP in circumstances which pose particularly serious safety risks either to the traveling public or the law enforcement officers themselves. Instead, there is considerable authority to the contrary.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"25 F.3d 1, 8","parenthetical":"sustaining, on safety grounds, a \"[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"endorsing government position that although \"[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a 'precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (endorsing government position that although \u201c[i]t was apparently [police] practice to order all drivers out of their vehicles as a matter of course whenever they had been stopped for a traffic violation, ... this practice was adopted as a \u2018precautionary measure to afford a degree of protection to the officer and that it may be justified on that ground.\u201d); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997) (extending Mimms to an SOP allowing police to order all occupants from a stopped car); United States v. Kimball, 25 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1994) (sustaining, on safety grounds, a \u201c[police] department policy not to engage in detailed interviews on the side of the road\u201d)."},"case_id":11671277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"210 N.J. 300, 300","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"210 N.J. 300, 300","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"210 N.J. 300, 300","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"135 N.J. 13, 13","parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"210 N.J. 300, 300","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"135 N.J. 13, 13","parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 N.J. 533, 533","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 N.J. 533, 533","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"135 N.J. 13, 13","parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 N.J. 533, 533","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"125 N.J. 533, 533","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"135 N.J. 13, 13","parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"b"}
{"context":"First, as previously discussed, the mere existence of a semen stain on Sara's shorts, without proof of when it was deposited or who deposited it, is irrelevant to the issue of consent and insufficient to support defendant's third-party guilt defense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 'depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense' \" (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reaffirming that the \"probative value\" of evidence is \"its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\" (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237","sentence":"See J.A.C., supra, 210 N.J. at 300, 44 A.3d 1085 (noting that \u201c[t]he probative value of sexual conduct covered by N.J.S.A. 2C:14-7 \u2018depends on clear proof that [the conduct] occurred, that [it [35] is] relevant to a material issue in the case, and that [it is] necessary to a defense\u2019 \u201d (quoting Budis, supra, 125 N.J. at 533, 593 A.2d 784)); see also Garron, supra, 177 N.J. at 167 n. 2, 827 A.2d 243 (reaffirming that the \u201cprobative value\u201d of evidence is \u201cits tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove\u201d (citing Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A.2d 1237))."},"case_id":6793411,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Of course, the inevitable consequence of any multi-factored test, as highlighted above in the criticisms of the Leser\/Wolff test, is that it devolves into a \"totality of the circumstances\" or \"case-by-case\" analysis, thereby running the risk of being depicted as an ad hoc, potentially purely subjective determination.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"39 F.3d 212, 214","parenthetical":"noting that the application of the \"discriminate unfairly\" standard may \"involve little more than exercise of the bankruptcy court's broad discretion\"","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Groves, 39 F.3d 212, 214 (8th Cir.1994) (noting that the application of the \u201cdiscriminate unfairly\u201d standard may \u201cinvolve little more than exercise of the bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion\u201d); cf. In re Crawford, 324 F.3d 539 (7th Cir.2003) (referring to exercise of bankruptcy court\u2019s discretion in nonpe-jorative terms)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"referring to exercise of bankruptcy court's discretion in nonpe-jorative terms","sentence":"See, e.g., In re Groves, 39 F.3d 212, 214 (8th Cir.1994) (noting that the application of the \u201cdiscriminate unfairly\u201d standard may \u201cinvolve little more than exercise of the bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion\u201d); cf. In re Crawford, 324 F.3d 539 (7th Cir.2003) (referring to exercise of bankruptcy court\u2019s discretion in nonpe-jorative terms)."},"case_id":3674215,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Sanchez-Lopez is the binding precedent of our circuit, which a three-judge panel may not overrule absent intervening Supreme Court or en banc authority (of which we have found none).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"400 F.3d 691, 699-701","parenthetical":"recognizing and resolving tension among Ninth Circuit cases applying conflicting versions of the harmless error standard in civil cases","sentence":"See Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 699-701 (9th Cir.2005) (recognizing and resolving tension among Ninth Circuit cases applying conflicting versions of the harmless error standard in civil cases); see also H & D Tire & Automotive-Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir.2000) (\u201cWhen panel opinions appear to conflict, we are bound to follow the earlier opinion.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"227 F.3d 326, 330","parenthetical":"\"When panel opinions appear to conflict, we are bound to follow the earlier opinion.\"","sentence":"See Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 699-701 (9th Cir.2005) (recognizing and resolving tension among Ninth Circuit cases applying conflicting versions of the harmless error standard in civil cases); see also H & D Tire & Automotive-Hardware, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir.2000) (\u201cWhen panel opinions appear to conflict, we are bound to follow the earlier opinion.\u201d)."},"case_id":8935931,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The policy reasons which govern when the Fifth Amendment privilege is properly invoked are applicable when a privilege of another sort is asserted, and also when there is no valid claim of privilege at all. Putting a witness on the stand in front of the jury for the sole purpose of observing his refusal to testify invites the jury to speculate and draw impermissible inferences.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"577 N.W.2d 436, 436","parenthetical":"\"The impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\"","sentence":"See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 436 (\u201cThe impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\u201d). A witness should be questioned outside the presence of the jury when it is clear that the witness will refuse to testify on the basis of any privilege or reason. See Hagez v. State of Maryland, 110 Md. App. 194, 676 A.2d 992, 1005 (1996) (State\u2019s unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 478 n. 19 (4th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury\u2019s presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Morrison v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (1966) (prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party\u2019s failure to call an available witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"365 F.2d 521, 524","parenthetical":"prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party's failure to call an available witness","sentence":"See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 436 (\u201cThe impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\u201d). A witness should be questioned outside the presence of the jury when it is clear that the witness will refuse to testify on the basis of any privilege or reason. See Hagez v. State of Maryland, 110 Md. App. 194, 676 A.2d 992, 1005 (1996) (State\u2019s unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 478 n. 19 (4th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury\u2019s presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Morrison v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (1966) (prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party\u2019s failure to call an available witness)."},"case_id":11244107,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The policy reasons which govern when the Fifth Amendment privilege is properly invoked are applicable when a privilege of another sort is asserted, and also when there is no valid claim of privilege at all. Putting a witness on the stand in front of the jury for the sole purpose of observing his refusal to testify invites the jury to speculate and draw impermissible inferences.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"365 F.2d 521, 524","parenthetical":"prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party's failure to call an available witness","sentence":"See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 436 (\u201cThe impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\u201d). A witness should be questioned outside the presence of the jury when it is clear that the witness will refuse to testify on the basis of any privilege or reason. See Hagez v. State of Maryland, 110 Md. App. 194, 676 A.2d 992, 1005 (1996) (State\u2019s unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 478 n. 19 (4th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury\u2019s presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Morrison v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (1966) (prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party\u2019s failure to call an available witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"State's unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 436 (\u201cThe impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\u201d). A witness should be questioned outside the presence of the jury when it is clear that the witness will refuse to testify on the basis of any privilege or reason. See Hagez v. State of Maryland, 110 Md. App. 194, 676 A.2d 992, 1005 (1996) (State\u2019s unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 478 n. 19 (4th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury\u2019s presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Morrison v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (1966) (prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party\u2019s failure to call an available witness)."},"case_id":11244107,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The policy reasons which govern when the Fifth Amendment privilege is properly invoked are applicable when a privilege of another sort is asserted, and also when there is no valid claim of privilege at all. Putting a witness on the stand in front of the jury for the sole purpose of observing his refusal to testify invites the jury to speculate and draw impermissible inferences.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"365 F.2d 521, 524","parenthetical":"prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party's failure to call an available witness","sentence":"See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 436 (\u201cThe impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\u201d). A witness should be questioned outside the presence of the jury when it is clear that the witness will refuse to testify on the basis of any privilege or reason. See Hagez v. State of Maryland, 110 Md. App. 194, 676 A.2d 992, 1005 (1996) (State\u2019s unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 478 n. 19 (4th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury\u2019s presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Morrison v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (1966) (prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party\u2019s failure to call an available witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"676 A.2d 992, 1005","parenthetical":"State's unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity","sentence":"See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 436 (\u201cThe impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\u201d). A witness should be questioned outside the presence of the jury when it is clear that the witness will refuse to testify on the basis of any privilege or reason. See Hagez v. State of Maryland, 110 Md. App. 194, 676 A.2d 992, 1005 (1996) (State\u2019s unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 478 n. 19 (4th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury\u2019s presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Morrison v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (1966) (prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party\u2019s failure to call an available witness)."},"case_id":11244107,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The policy reasons which govern when the Fifth Amendment privilege is properly invoked are applicable when a privilege of another sort is asserted, and also when there is no valid claim of privilege at all. Putting a witness on the stand in front of the jury for the sole purpose of observing his refusal to testify invites the jury to speculate and draw impermissible inferences.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"365 F.2d 521, 524","parenthetical":"prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party's failure to call an available witness","sentence":"See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 436 (\u201cThe impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\u201d). A witness should be questioned outside the presence of the jury when it is clear that the witness will refuse to testify on the basis of any privilege or reason. See Hagez v. State of Maryland, 110 Md. App. 194, 676 A.2d 992, 1005 (1996) (State\u2019s unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 478 n. 19 (4th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury\u2019s presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Morrison v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (1966) (prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party\u2019s failure to call an available witness)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury's presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\"","sentence":"See Gearns, 577 N.W.2d at 436 (\u201cThe impermissible inference is no less present when the privilege might be invalid.\u201d). A witness should be questioned outside the presence of the jury when it is clear that the witness will refuse to testify on the basis of any privilege or reason. See Hagez v. State of Maryland, 110 Md. App. 194, 676 A.2d 992, 1005 (1996) (State\u2019s unrelenting questioning of witness in presence of jury prejudiced defendant even though witness asserted invalid claim of spousal immunity); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 478 n. 19 (4th Cir.1982) (\u201cWe think that the best procedure to follow after a witness has improperly invoked the Fifth Amendment or any privilege in such a situation, is to issue an order, outside of the jury\u2019s presence, directing him to testify and admonishing him that his continued refusal to testify would be punishable by contempt.\u201d) (citations omitted); cf. Morrison v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 365 F.2d 521, 524 (1966) (prior to giving a missing witness instruction to the jury, the trial court, in its discretion, must determine whether it is reasonable for the jury to be permitted to draw an adverse inference from a party\u2019s failure to call an available witness)."},"case_id":11244107,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"530 U.S. 57, 66","parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"533 U.S. 678, 693","parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"530 U.S. 57, 66","parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"530 U.S. 57, 66","parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"533 U.S. 678, 693","parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"533 U.S. 678, 693","parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the court's reasoning, virtually any offense that could lead to deportation -- even a minor one committed long before the parent's children were born -- would create such an unstable and uncertain environment as to establish endangerment, subjecting countless immigrants to the potential loss of their children. The court's broad reasoning necessarily applies to citizens as well. Any offense committed by a citizen that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would also apparently establish endangerment, simply because the parent's ability to be present in his children's lives would be uncertain. Our nation's Constitution forbids such a far-reaching interpretation of our parental rights termination statutes.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting the \"extensive precedent\" establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \"protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that \"the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\"","sentence":"See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (noting the \u201cextensive precedent\u201d establishing that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment \u201cprotects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children\u201d); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (observing that \u201cthe Due Process Clause applies to all \u2018persons\u2019 within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent\u201d). Here, though Francisco engaged in a criminal act and left Wisconsin without completing his probation before his children were born, there is no evidence that these actions created such uncertainty and instability for his children sufficient to establish endangerment."},"case_id":7095996,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"632 F.2d 670, 679","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is well settled that 'each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"832 F.2d 1021, 1027","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"632 F.2d 670, 679","parenthetical":"\"[I]t is well settled that 'each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"881 F.2d 466, 472","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is well settled that 'each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"832 F.2d 1021, 1027","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is well settled that 'each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"881 F.2d 466, 472","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"832 F.2d 1021, 1027","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is well settled that 'each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"881 F.2d 466, 472","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is well settled that 'each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is well settled that 'each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"832 F.2d 1021, 1027","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[I]t is well settled that 'each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.' \"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"881 F.2d 466, 472","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"832 F.2d 1021, 1027","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Each separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1343.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Each separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1343.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"881 F.2d 466, 472","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"a"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"832 F.2d 1021, 1027","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Each separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1343.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"881 F.2d 466, 472","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Each separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1343.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"832 F.2d 1021, 1027","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Each separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1343.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"881 F.2d 466, 472","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Each separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1343.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"832 F.2d 1021, 1027","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Each separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1343.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"One matter requires clarification at the outset of this discussion. Assuming for the moment that the complaint adequately sets forth a scheme to defraud in connection with the mail and wire fraud allegations, each mailing or telephone call in furtherance of that scheme constitutes a separate violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes, and thus a separate predicate act for purposes of the racketeering statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"881 F.2d 466, 472","parenthetical":"two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO","sentence":"See also Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021, 1027 (7th Cir.1987) (two separate mailings in furtherance of single scheme to defraud sufficient to meet the two-act requirement of RICO). Furthermore, an individual who participated in the scheme to defraud need not have personally mailed the letter or placed the telephone which supplies the basis for liability under the mail and wire fraud statutes in order to be held accountable, if use of the mails or wires in connection with the scheme was known or reasonably foreseeable to him or her. United States v. Kuzniar, 881 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1989)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Each separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. SS 1343.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.) (\u201c[I]t is well settled that \u2018each mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved.\u2019 \u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 998, 101 S.Ct. 539, 66 L.Ed.2d 296 (1980); and United States v. Clausen, 792 F.2d 102, 104 n. 4 (8th Cir.) (\u201cEach separate interstate telephone call in furtherance of a scheme to defraud ... constitutes a separate offense under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1343.\u201d) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 858, 107 S.Ct. 202, 93 L.Ed.2d 133 (1986)."},"case_id":4095825,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We observe at the outset that the mailing in a federal mail fraud prosecution need not be sent by the defendant or his co-conspirator. It may be sent by a victim of the plot or an innocent third party, so long as the mailing is \"incident to an essential part of the scheme, ... or a step in [the] plot.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"mailing element satisfied by defrauded investors' mailing money to defendant","sentence":"See also United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469 (5th Cir.1995) (mailing element satisfied by defrauded investors\u2019 mailing money to defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"489 U.S. 705, 710-11","parenthetical":"mailing element supplied by duped used-ear retailers submitting title applications to state motor vehicles bureau","sentence":"Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1448, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (mailing element supplied by duped used-ear retailers submitting title applications to state motor vehicles bureau)."},"case_id":695043,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We observe at the outset that the mailing in a federal mail fraud prosecution need not be sent by the defendant or his co-conspirator. It may be sent by a victim of the plot or an innocent third party, so long as the mailing is \"incident to an essential part of the scheme, ... or a step in [the] plot.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"109 S.Ct. 1443, 1448","parenthetical":"mailing element supplied by duped used-ear retailers submitting title applications to state motor vehicles bureau","sentence":"Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1448, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (mailing element supplied by duped used-ear retailers submitting title applications to state motor vehicles bureau)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"mailing element satisfied by defrauded investors' mailing money to defendant","sentence":"See also United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469 (5th Cir.1995) (mailing element satisfied by defrauded investors\u2019 mailing money to defendant)."},"case_id":695043,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We observe at the outset that the mailing in a federal mail fraud prosecution need not be sent by the defendant or his co-conspirator. It may be sent by a victim of the plot or an innocent third party, so long as the mailing is \"incident to an essential part of the scheme, ... or a step in [the] plot.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"mailing element supplied by duped used-ear retailers submitting title applications to state motor vehicles bureau","sentence":"Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1448, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (mailing element supplied by duped used-ear retailers submitting title applications to state motor vehicles bureau)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"mailing element satisfied by defrauded investors' mailing money to defendant","sentence":"See also United States v. Pepper, 51 F.3d 469 (5th Cir.1995) (mailing element satisfied by defrauded investors\u2019 mailing money to defendant)."},"case_id":695043,"label":"a"}
{"context":"All of the foregoing arguments incorporated by reference either relate to defendants' collection of Disputed Fees in alleged breach of the contract, save for the claim that the Facsimile Fee was collected in violation of New York law, a claim that is preempted, as discussed supra. Consequently, it is plain to the Court that plaintiffs' fraud claim is merely duplicative of the breach of contract claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"480 F.3d 140, 148","parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of fraud claim as duplicative of breach of contract claim","sentence":"See Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir.2007) (affirming dismissal of fraud claim as duplicative of breach of contract claim); see also Linea Nuova, S.A. v. Slowchowsky, 62 A.D.3d 473, 877 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y.App.Div.2009) (same); Krantz v. Chateau Stores of Canada, 256 A.D.2d 186, 187, 683 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) (\u201cA cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"256 A.D.2d 186, 187","parenthetical":"\"A cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract.\"","sentence":"See Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir.2007) (affirming dismissal of fraud claim as duplicative of breach of contract claim); see also Linea Nuova, S.A. v. Slowchowsky, 62 A.D.3d 473, 877 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y.App.Div.2009) (same); Krantz v. Chateau Stores of Canada, 256 A.D.2d 186, 187, 683 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) (\u201cA cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":3800460,"label":"a"}
{"context":"All of the foregoing arguments incorporated by reference either relate to defendants' collection of Disputed Fees in alleged breach of the contract, save for the claim that the Facsimile Fee was collected in violation of New York law, a claim that is preempted, as discussed supra. Consequently, it is plain to the Court that plaintiffs' fraud claim is merely duplicative of the breach of contract claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"480 F.3d 140, 148","parenthetical":"affirming dismissal of fraud claim as duplicative of breach of contract claim","sentence":"See Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir.2007) (affirming dismissal of fraud claim as duplicative of breach of contract claim); see also Linea Nuova, S.A. v. Slowchowsky, 62 A.D.3d 473, 877 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y.App.Div.2009) (same); Krantz v. Chateau Stores of Canada, 256 A.D.2d 186, 187, 683 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) (\u201cA cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract.\"","sentence":"See Guilbert v. Gardner, 480 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir.2007) (affirming dismissal of fraud claim as duplicative of breach of contract claim); see also Linea Nuova, S.A. v. Slowchowsky, 62 A.D.3d 473, 877 N.Y.S.2d 891 (N.Y.App.Div.2009) (same); Krantz v. Chateau Stores of Canada, 256 A.D.2d 186, 187, 683 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y.App.Div.1998) (\u201cA cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract.\u201d)."},"case_id":3800460,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, it is clear from the record that the inmates at the Facility had some reasonable alternatives to- plaintiffs legal assistance. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment must be granted on this claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"10 F.3d 373, 379","parenthetical":"plaintiff permitted to amend complaint to allege lack of reasonable alternatives to ensure prisoners' access to the courts","sentence":"See Gassler v. Rayl, 862 F.2d 706, 708 n. 3 (8th Cir.1988) (plaintiff\u2019s claim that his removal as law library clerk unconstitutionally interfered with his right to provide legal assistance to other prisoners rejected where record clearly showed that law library and inmate law clerks were available); but see Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 379 (6th Cir.1993) (plaintiff permitted to amend complaint to allege lack of reasonable alternatives to ensure prisoners\u2019 access to the courts)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"plaintiff's claim that his removal as law library clerk unconstitutionally interfered with his right to provide legal assistance to other prisoners rejected where record clearly showed that law library and inmate law clerks were available","sentence":"See Gassler v. Rayl, 862 F.2d 706, 708 n. 3 (8th Cir.1988) (plaintiff\u2019s claim that his removal as law library clerk unconstitutionally interfered with his right to provide legal assistance to other prisoners rejected where record clearly showed that law library and inmate law clerks were available); but see Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373, 379 (6th Cir.1993) (plaintiff permitted to amend complaint to allege lack of reasonable alternatives to ensure prisoners\u2019 access to the courts)."},"case_id":7846422,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\" are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\" are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\" are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\" are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"917 N.E.2d 450, 459","parenthetical":"noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\" are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"917 N.E.2d 450, 459","parenthetical":"noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\" are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that under South Carolina law \"slander is actionable per se\" where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that under South Carolina law \"slander is actionable per se\" where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"656 S.E.2d 382, 389","parenthetical":"holding that under South Carolina law \"slander is actionable per se\" where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"656 S.E.2d 382, 389","parenthetical":"holding that under South Carolina law \"slander is actionable per se\" where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"99 P.3d 75, 79","parenthetical":"holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"99 P.3d 75, 79","parenthetical":"holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"20 P.3d 1097, 1107","parenthetical":"holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"20 P.3d 1097, 1107","parenthetical":"holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"860 S.W.2d 303, 312","parenthetical":"holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"860 S.W.2d 303, 312","parenthetical":"holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"524 So.2d 915, 921","parenthetical":"holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"524 So.2d 915, 921","parenthetical":"holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that private detective's report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\"","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that private detective's report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\"","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that private detective's report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\"","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that private detective's report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\"","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"285 A.2d 166, 171","parenthetical":"report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"a"}
{"context":". In McFarland, the court collected the cases from other jurisdictions supporting the proposition that an accusation of adultery is defam atory per se.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"285 A.2d 166, 171","parenthetical":"report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se","sentence":"McFarland, 684 F.Supp.2d at 1086-87 (citing Green v. Rogers, 234 Ill.2d 478, 334 Ill.Dec. 624, 917 N.E.2d 450, 459 (2009) (noting that \"words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication\u201d are considered defamatory per se under Illinois law); Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 656 S.E.2d 382, 389 (S.C.Ct.App.2007) (holding that under South Carolina law \u201cslander is actionable per se\u201d where plaintiff is alleged to have committed adultery); Gordon v. Boyles, 99 P.3d 75, 79 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (holding that a statement that plaintiff had engaged in an extramarital affair was defamatory per se under Colorado law); City of Fairbanks v. Rice, 20 P.3d 1097, 1107 (Alaska 2000) (holding that statements that plaintiff had had an extramarital affair were defamatory per se); Baskin v. Rogers, 229 Ga.App. 250, 493 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1997) (statements that plaintiff had \"affairs\u201d constituted slander per se); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo.1993) (holding that statements that insinuated that plaintiff was an adulteress were actionable as slander per se under Missouri law); Gorman v. Swaggart, 524 So.2d 915, 921 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988) (holding that statements imputing adultery are defamatory under Louisiana law); Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J.Super. 446, 371 A.2d 380 (N.J.Super.Ct.1977) (holding that private detective\u2019s report \"imputing to plaintiffs an adulterous relationship, constitutes libel as a matter of law.\u201d); Baird v. Dun and Bradstreet, 446 Pa. 266, 285 A.2d 166, 171 (1971) (report stating that plaintiff had been indicted for adultery was libelous per se); see also Donati v. Queens Ledger Newspaper Group, 240 A.D.2d 696, 659 N.Y.S.2d 306 (1997) (reversing dismissal of defamation claim where plaintiff alleged that item in newspaper was capable of defamatory connotation that plaintiff had been engaged in a longstanding extramarital affair)."},"case_id":6896454,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court finds for another reason under Mississippi law that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over the contempt proceeding.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"516 So.2d 485, 487","parenthetical":"finding that \"[t]he authorities are legion that the power to punish for contempt rests solely with the court contemned, and one court cannot punish a contempt against another court.\"","sentence":"See e.g. Culpepper v. Mississippi, 516 So.2d 485, 487 (Miss.1987) (finding that \u201c[t]he authorities are legion that the power to punish for contempt rests solely with the court contemned, and one court cannot punish a contempt against another court.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"293 So.2d 815, 815","parenthetical":"holding that \"[i]t is a well established rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned, and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another court.\"","sentence":"See also Kitchens v. State, 293 So.2d 815, 815 (Miss.1974) (holding that \u201c[i]t is a well established rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned, and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another court.\u201d)."},"case_id":9407682,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We held that the right to procreate was not implicated by the custody battle, which dealt with parental rights after birth. We observed, however, that \"the rights of personal intimacy, of marriage, of sex, of family, of procreation ... are fundamental rights protected by both the federal and state Constitutions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"87 N.J. 53, 66","parenthetical":"allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect","sentence":"Id. at 447, 537 A.2d 1227; see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-48, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \u201cany doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\u201d and holding that \u201can individual\u2019s constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\u201d); cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"85 N.J. 235, 247-48","parenthetical":"recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \"any doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\" and holding that \"an individual's constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\"","sentence":"Id. at 447, 537 A.2d 1227; see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-48, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \u201cany doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\u201d and holding that \u201can individual\u2019s constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\u201d); cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect)."},"case_id":246482,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We held that the right to procreate was not implicated by the custody battle, which dealt with parental rights after birth. We observed, however, that \"the rights of personal intimacy, of marriage, of sex, of family, of procreation ... are fundamental rights protected by both the federal and state Constitutions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect","sentence":"Id. at 447, 537 A.2d 1227; see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-48, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \u201cany doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\u201d and holding that \u201can individual\u2019s constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\u201d); cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"85 N.J. 235, 247-48","parenthetical":"recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \"any doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\" and holding that \"an individual's constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\"","sentence":"Id. at 447, 537 A.2d 1227; see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-48, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \u201cany doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\u201d and holding that \u201can individual\u2019s constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\u201d); cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect)."},"case_id":246482,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We held that the right to procreate was not implicated by the custody battle, which dealt with parental rights after birth. We observed, however, that \"the rights of personal intimacy, of marriage, of sex, of family, of procreation ... are fundamental rights protected by both the federal and state Constitutions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \"any doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\" and holding that \"an individual's constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\"","sentence":"Id. at 447, 537 A.2d 1227; see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-48, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \u201cany doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\u201d and holding that \u201can individual\u2019s constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\u201d); cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"87 N.J. 53, 66","parenthetical":"allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect","sentence":"Id. at 447, 537 A.2d 1227; see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-48, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \u201cany doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\u201d and holding that \u201can individual\u2019s constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\u201d); cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect)."},"case_id":246482,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We held that the right to procreate was not implicated by the custody battle, which dealt with parental rights after birth. We observed, however, that \"the rights of personal intimacy, of marriage, of sex, of family, of procreation ... are fundamental rights protected by both the federal and state Constitutions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \"any doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\" and holding that \"an individual's constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\"","sentence":"Id. at 447, 537 A.2d 1227; see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-48, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \u201cany doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\u201d and holding that \u201can individual\u2019s constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\u201d); cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect","sentence":"Id. at 447, 537 A.2d 1227; see also In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 247-48, 426 A.2d 467 (1981) (recognizing that decisions in Griswold and Eisenstadt ended \u201cany doubt about a personal right to prevent conception,\u201d and holding that \u201can individual\u2019s constitutional right of privacy includes the right to undergo sterilization voluntarily\u201d); cf. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (allowing recovery against defendants whose negligent diagnosis deprived mother of right to choose not to conceive child with genetic defect)."},"case_id":246482,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In cases involving strikingly similar facts, which addressed the propriety of the voir dire procedure conducted in trials commenced after the Robinson rule was announced, we found the error of excluding a defendant from bench conferences at voir dire questioning to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"705 F.2d 498, 498","parenthetical":"limited portion of voir dire at bench, and the two jurors questioned at the bench who actually served on the jury were questioned before defense counsel requested defendant's presence at the bench","sentence":"See also Washington, supra, 227 U.S.App.D.C. at 193, 705 F.2d at 498 (limited portion of voir dire at bench, and the two jurors questioned at the bench who actually served on the jury were questioned before defense counsel requested defendant\u2019s presence at the bench)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"499 A.2d 835, 835","parenthetical":"only two prospective jurors questioned at the bench actually served on panel, and defense counsel did not use one peremptory strike","sentence":"See Gary, supra, 499 A.2d at 835 (only two prospective jurors questioned at the bench actually served on panel, and defense counsel did not use one peremptory strike); Young, supra, 478 A.2d at 290-91 (only limited portion of entire voir dire was conducted at bench, only two prospective jurors so questioned served on panel, and defense counsel did not use one peremptory challenge)."},"case_id":7899604,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In cases involving strikingly similar facts, which addressed the propriety of the voir dire procedure conducted in trials commenced after the Robinson rule was announced, we found the error of excluding a defendant from bench conferences at voir dire questioning to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"478 A.2d 290, 290-91","parenthetical":"only limited portion of entire voir dire was conducted at bench, only two prospective jurors so questioned served on panel, and defense counsel did not use one peremptory challenge","sentence":"See Gary, supra, 499 A.2d at 835 (only two prospective jurors questioned at the bench actually served on panel, and defense counsel did not use one peremptory strike); Young, supra, 478 A.2d at 290-91 (only limited portion of entire voir dire was conducted at bench, only two prospective jurors so questioned served on panel, and defense counsel did not use one peremptory challenge)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"705 F.2d 498, 498","parenthetical":"limited portion of voir dire at bench, and the two jurors questioned at the bench who actually served on the jury were questioned before defense counsel requested defendant's presence at the bench","sentence":"See also Washington, supra, 227 U.S.App.D.C. at 193, 705 F.2d at 498 (limited portion of voir dire at bench, and the two jurors questioned at the bench who actually served on the jury were questioned before defense counsel requested defendant\u2019s presence at the bench)."},"case_id":7899604,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In so doing, Plaintiff misses the mark. To be exact, the question is not whether Defendants correctly believed that Plaintiff had established an improper relationship with Moore.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"867 F.2d 823, 829","parenthetical":"\"Bad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\"","sentence":"See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 829 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cBad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\u201d); cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (\u201cWe must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"426 U.S. 341, 349-50","parenthetical":"\"We must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\"","sentence":"See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 829 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cBad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\u201d); cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (\u201cWe must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\u201d)."},"case_id":3947494,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In so doing, Plaintiff misses the mark. To be exact, the question is not whether Defendants correctly believed that Plaintiff had established an improper relationship with Moore.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"867 F.2d 823, 829","parenthetical":"\"Bad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\"","sentence":"See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 829 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cBad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\u201d); cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (\u201cWe must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\"","sentence":"See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 829 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cBad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\u201d); cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (\u201cWe must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\u201d)."},"case_id":3947494,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In so doing, Plaintiff misses the mark. To be exact, the question is not whether Defendants correctly believed that Plaintiff had established an improper relationship with Moore.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"We must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\"","sentence":"See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 829 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cBad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\u201d); cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (\u201cWe must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"867 F.2d 823, 829","parenthetical":"\"Bad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\"","sentence":"See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 829 (4th Cir.1989) (\u201cBad or mistaken reasons for a decision may yet be non-discriminatory.\u201d); cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (\u201cWe must accept the harsh fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-today administration of our affairs.\u201d)."},"case_id":3947494,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Marble also contends that the statute did not define the phrase \"living in the household\" and that, therefore, it could have conceivably applied to a parent exercising non-custodial visitation rights. However, because Marble did not raise these statutory construction arguments in his brief, we decline to address the merits of the arguments here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1999 UT 36, \u00b6 25","parenthetical":"noting that appellant's issue was raised \"too late\" when he \"first made [the] assertion in his oral argument\"","sentence":"See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"); see also Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \u00b6 25, 977 P.2d 1201 (Howe, C.J., concurring) (noting that appellant's issue was raised \"too late\" when he \"first made [the] assertion in his oral argument\"); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989) (\"It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been designated as issues on appeal in docketing statement or in the briefs.\"); First See."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"961 P.2d 305, 313","parenthetical":"\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"","sentence":"See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"); see also Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \u00b6 25, 977 P.2d 1201 (Howe, C.J., concurring) (noting that appellant's issue was raised \"too late\" when he \"first made [the] assertion in his oral argument\"); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989) (\"It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been designated as issues on appeal in docketing statement or in the briefs.\"); First See."},"case_id":8317232,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Marble also contends that the statute did not define the phrase \"living in the household\" and that, therefore, it could have conceivably applied to a parent exercising non-custodial visitation rights. However, because Marble did not raise these statutory construction arguments in his brief, we decline to address the merits of the arguments here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that appellant's issue was raised \"too late\" when he \"first made [the] assertion in his oral argument\"","sentence":"See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"); see also Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \u00b6 25, 977 P.2d 1201 (Howe, C.J., concurring) (noting that appellant's issue was raised \"too late\" when he \"first made [the] assertion in his oral argument\"); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989) (\"It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been designated as issues on appeal in docketing statement or in the briefs.\"); First See."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"961 P.2d 305, 313","parenthetical":"\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"","sentence":"See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"); see also Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \u00b6 25, 977 P.2d 1201 (Howe, C.J., concurring) (noting that appellant's issue was raised \"too late\" when he \"first made [the] assertion in his oral argument\"); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989) (\"It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been designated as issues on appeal in docketing statement or in the briefs.\"); First See."},"case_id":8317232,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Marble also contends that the statute did not define the phrase \"living in the household\" and that, therefore, it could have conceivably applied to a parent exercising non-custodial visitation rights. However, because Marble did not raise these statutory construction arguments in his brief, we decline to address the merits of the arguments here.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"770 P.2d 987, 994","parenthetical":"\"It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been designated as issues on appeal in docketing statement or in the briefs.\"","sentence":"See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"); see also Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \u00b6 25, 977 P.2d 1201 (Howe, C.J., concurring) (noting that appellant's issue was raised \"too late\" when he \"first made [the] assertion in his oral argument\"); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989) (\"It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been designated as issues on appeal in docketing statement or in the briefs.\"); First See."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"961 P.2d 305, 313","parenthetical":"\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"","sentence":"See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998) (\"It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief.\"); see also Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, \u00b6 25, 977 P.2d 1201 (Howe, C.J., concurring) (noting that appellant's issue was raised \"too late\" when he \"first made [the] assertion in his oral argument\"); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989) (\"It is generally inappropriate to raise issues at oral argument that have not been designated as issues on appeal in docketing statement or in the briefs.\"); First See."},"case_id":8317232,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To satisfy this causation requirement, a plaintiff needs to show that the conduct at issue \"contributed] significantly to a defendant's continued monopoly power.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"892 F.2d 1361, 1361-63","parenthetical":"in rejecting a SS 2 claim arising from alleged predatory pricing, (1","sentence":"See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80 (at least in an equitable enforcement action as opposed to an action for money damages, holding that to prove causation plaintiff must prove the conduct was \u201creasonably capable of contributing significantly to a defendant\u2019s continued monopoly power\u201d); see also Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1182 (\u201c \u2018Exclusionary conduct\u2019 is defined as \u2018conduct, other than competition on the merits or restraints reasonably necessary to competition on the merits, that reasonably appears capable of making a significant contribution to creating or maintaining monopoly power.\u2019 \u201d (internal citations omitted)); cf. Morgan, 892 F.2d at 1361-63 (in rejecting a \u00a7 2 claim arising from alleged predatory pricing, (1) suggesting that \u00a7 2 liability requires that the pricing have a \u201cmeasurable impact on [plaintiffs] overall viability as a competitor[,]\u201d and (2) \u201cfinding] insufficient evidence\u201d that the pricing \u201chad any more than a negligible impact on [plaintiffs] viability as a competitor\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"253 F.3d 80, 80","parenthetical":"at least in an equitable enforcement action as opposed to an action for money damages, holding that to prove causation plaintiff must prove the conduct was \"reasonably capable of contributing significantly to a defendant's continued monopoly power\"","sentence":"See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80 (at least in an equitable enforcement action as opposed to an action for money damages, holding that to prove causation plaintiff must prove the conduct was \u201creasonably capable of contributing significantly to a defendant\u2019s continued monopoly power\u201d); see also Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1182 (\u201c \u2018Exclusionary conduct\u2019 is defined as \u2018conduct, other than competition on the merits or restraints reasonably necessary to competition on the merits, that reasonably appears capable of making a significant contribution to creating or maintaining monopoly power.\u2019 \u201d (internal citations omitted)); cf. Morgan, 892 F.2d at 1361-63 (in rejecting a \u00a7 2 claim arising from alleged predatory pricing, (1) suggesting that \u00a7 2 liability requires that the pricing have a \u201cmeasurable impact on [plaintiffs] overall viability as a competitor[,]\u201d and (2) \u201cfinding] insufficient evidence\u201d that the pricing \u201chad any more than a negligible impact on [plaintiffs] viability as a competitor\u201d)."},"case_id":5723011,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, if an individual does not expose himself to public view, he maintains an expectation of privacy and is therefore in his home and not a public place.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that defendant did not voluntarily expose himself to the public when he opened his door following the forceful knocks of police, who had positioned themselves in front of the sole exit to his apartment with their guns drawn","sentence":"Cummings, 418 F.3d at 686; see also id. at 685 (noting that plaintiffs attempt to talk to officers through a window, his partial opening of his front door, and his refusal to grant the officers\u2019 request to enter his home manifested his intent to maintain his expectation of privacy in his home); United States v. Saari, 272 F.3d 804 (6th Cir.2001) (finding that defendant did not voluntarily expose himself to the public when he opened his door following the forceful knocks of police, who had positioned themselves in front of the sole exit to his apartment with their guns drawn)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that defendant forfeited his expectation of privacy in his home when he voluntarily opened his door for a delivery woman","sentence":"But see United States v. Gori, 230 F.3d 44 (2d Cir.2000), cited with approval and distinguished in Saari (noting that defendant forfeited his expectation of privacy in his home when he voluntarily opened his door for a delivery woman)."},"case_id":5747901,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the burden is minimal, it is not nonexistent. To comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state must establish, on the face of its documents, that: (1) the person sought was convicted of a crime; (2) a period of probation or parole was imposed; (3) the person has broken the terms of his or her probation or parole; and (4) the sentence had not expired at the time of the alleged violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"148 Vt. 544, 546","parenthetical":"probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"243 Ga. 788, 788","parenthetical":"\"A probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is 'charged with crime' within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\"","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"case_id":4826968,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the burden is minimal, it is not nonexistent. To comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state must establish, on the face of its documents, that: (1) the person sought was convicted of a crime; (2) a period of probation or parole was imposed; (3) the person has broken the terms of his or her probation or parole; and (4) the sentence had not expired at the time of the alleged violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"148 Vt. 544, 546","parenthetical":"probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"256 S.E.2d 778, 779","parenthetical":"\"A probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is 'charged with crime' within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\"","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"case_id":4826968,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the burden is minimal, it is not nonexistent. To comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state must establish, on the face of its documents, that: (1) the person sought was convicted of a crime; (2) a period of probation or parole was imposed; (3) the person has broken the terms of his or her probation or parole; and (4) the sentence had not expired at the time of the alleged violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04","parenthetical":"person is \"charged with crime\" under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"148 Vt. 544, 546","parenthetical":"probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"case_id":4826968,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although the burden is minimal, it is not nonexistent. To comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state must establish, on the face of its documents, that: (1) the person sought was convicted of a crime; (2) a period of probation or parole was imposed; (3) the person has broken the terms of his or her probation or parole; and (4) the sentence had not expired at the time of the alleged violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"648 P.2d 255, 257-58","parenthetical":"person is \"charged with crime\" under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"148 Vt. 544, 546","parenthetical":"probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"case_id":4826968,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Although the burden is minimal, it is not nonexistent. To comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state must establish, on the face of its documents, that: (1) the person sought was convicted of a crime; (2) a period of probation or parole was imposed; (3) the person has broken the terms of his or her probation or parole; and (4) the sentence had not expired at the time of the alleged violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"537 A.2d 135, 137","parenthetical":"probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"243 Ga. 788, 788","parenthetical":"\"A probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is 'charged with crime' within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\"","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"case_id":4826968,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the burden is minimal, it is not nonexistent. To comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state must establish, on the face of its documents, that: (1) the person sought was convicted of a crime; (2) a period of probation or parole was imposed; (3) the person has broken the terms of his or her probation or parole; and (4) the sentence had not expired at the time of the alleged violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"537 A.2d 135, 137","parenthetical":"probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"256 S.E.2d 778, 779","parenthetical":"\"A probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is 'charged with crime' within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\"","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"case_id":4826968,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the burden is minimal, it is not nonexistent. To comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state must establish, on the face of its documents, that: (1) the person sought was convicted of a crime; (2) a period of probation or parole was imposed; (3) the person has broken the terms of his or her probation or parole; and (4) the sentence had not expired at the time of the alleged violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"537 A.2d 135, 137","parenthetical":"probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04","parenthetical":"person is \"charged with crime\" under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"case_id":4826968,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although the burden is minimal, it is not nonexistent. To comply with the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, the demanding state must establish, on the face of its documents, that: (1) the person sought was convicted of a crime; (2) a period of probation or parole was imposed; (3) the person has broken the terms of his or her probation or parole; and (4) the sentence had not expired at the time of the alleged violation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"537 A.2d 135, 137","parenthetical":"probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"648 P.2d 255, 257-58","parenthetical":"person is \"charged with crime\" under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation","sentence":"See In re Hval, 148 Vt. 544, 546, 537 A.2d 135, 137 (1987) (probationer subject to extradition as a fugitive where shown to be a convict with an unexpired sentence); see also Ingram v. Dodd, 243 Ga. 788, 788, 256 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1979) (\u201cA probationer whose probation has been revoked because of a violation of its conditions may be extradited ... on the ground that he is a convict whose sentence has not expired, and who is \u2018charged with crime\u2019 within the meaning of the United States Constitution.\u201d); Sloss v. Sheriff of Leavenworth County, 7 Kan. App. 2d 702, 703-04, 648 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1982) (person is \u201ccharged with crime\u201d under extradition act where there has been a judgment of conviction, the sentence has not expired, and the person has violated the terms of his probation)."},"case_id":4826968,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The District Court also determined that Martin could not establish the> objective element of his claim because the deprivation of running water for just over a day was insufficiently serious to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. In determining whether the conditions of confinement amount to a constitutional violation, the \" 'circumstances, nature, and duration' of the conditions must be carefully considered\" but the \"length of exposure #.. is often of prime importance.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"437 U.S. 678, 686-87","parenthetical":"\"A filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\"","sentence":"DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (\u201cA filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\u201d); see also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (\u201cthe length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"16 F.3d 954, 958","parenthetical":"\"the length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\"","sentence":"DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (\u201cA filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\u201d); see also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (\u201cthe length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\u201d)."},"case_id":12406995,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The District Court also determined that Martin could not establish the> objective element of his claim because the deprivation of running water for just over a day was insufficiently serious to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. In determining whether the conditions of confinement amount to a constitutional violation, the \" 'circumstances, nature, and duration' of the conditions must be carefully considered\" but the \"length of exposure #.. is often of prime importance.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"16 F.3d 954, 958","parenthetical":"\"the length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\"","sentence":"DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (\u201cA filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\u201d); see also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (\u201cthe length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\"","sentence":"DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (\u201cA filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\u201d); see also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (\u201cthe length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\u201d)."},"case_id":12406995,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The District Court also determined that Martin could not establish the> objective element of his claim because the deprivation of running water for just over a day was insufficiently serious to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. In determining whether the conditions of confinement amount to a constitutional violation, the \" 'circumstances, nature, and duration' of the conditions must be carefully considered\" but the \"length of exposure #.. is often of prime importance.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"A filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\"","sentence":"DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (\u201cA filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\u201d); see also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (\u201cthe length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"16 F.3d 954, 958","parenthetical":"\"the length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\"","sentence":"DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (\u201cA filthy, overcrowded cell .., might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.\u201d); see also Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954, 958 (8th Cir. 1994) (\u201cthe length of time required before a constitutional violation is made out decreases as the level of filthiness endured increases\u201d)."},"case_id":12406995,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Court recognizes that Napue states that false testimony may require a new trial even where the falsehood does not bear directly upon defendant's guilt. But that part of Napue presumes that the falsehood bears on the witness's overall credibility and, in Napue itself, involved the crucial matter of whether the cooperating witness had been promised leniency.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"637 F.2d 799, 801","parenthetical":"\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\"","sentence":"See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony\u2019\u2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\u201d), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C.Cir.1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"360 U.S. 267, 267","parenthetical":"the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony''","sentence":"See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony\u2019\u2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\u201d), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C.Cir.1981)."},"case_id":4195899,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court recognizes that Napue states that false testimony may require a new trial even where the falsehood does not bear directly upon defendant's guilt. But that part of Napue presumes that the falsehood bears on the witness's overall credibility and, in Napue itself, involved the crucial matter of whether the cooperating witness had been promised leniency.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\"","sentence":"See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony\u2019\u2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\u201d), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C.Cir.1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"360 U.S. 267, 267","parenthetical":"the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony''","sentence":"See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony\u2019\u2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\u201d), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C.Cir.1981)."},"case_id":4195899,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court recognizes that Napue states that false testimony may require a new trial even where the falsehood does not bear directly upon defendant's guilt. But that part of Napue presumes that the falsehood bears on the witness's overall credibility and, in Napue itself, involved the crucial matter of whether the cooperating witness had been promised leniency.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"637 F.2d 799, 801","parenthetical":"\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\"","sentence":"See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony\u2019\u2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\u201d), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C.Cir.1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony''","sentence":"See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony\u2019\u2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\u201d), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C.Cir.1981)."},"case_id":4195899,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Court recognizes that Napue states that false testimony may require a new trial even where the falsehood does not bear directly upon defendant's guilt. But that part of Napue presumes that the falsehood bears on the witness's overall credibility and, in Napue itself, involved the crucial matter of whether the cooperating witness had been promised leniency.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony''","sentence":"See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony\u2019\u2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\u201d), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C.Cir.1981)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\"","sentence":"See Napue, 360 U.S. at 267, 79 S.Ct. 1173 (the witness \"had falsely testified that he had been promised no consideration for his testimony\u2019\u2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 637 F.2d 799, 801 (D.C.Cir.1980) (\"when a principal prosecution witness falsely claims that no promises of leniency were made ... the defendant may be entitled to a new trial on due process grounds\u201d), modified on other grounds, 648 F.2d 737 (D.C.Cir.1981)."},"case_id":4195899,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Indeed, the PCC's own policies make clear that the timing of citizenship is not a work-related qualification. As noted in Part I, from 1984 to 1989 four plaintiffs received the PCC's equity adjustment package; yet there is no claim that their work was less acceptable than that of employees with earlier citizenship who also received the package during the same time period.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"401 U.S. 431, 431-32","parenthetical":"noting that hiring and transfer requirements that were inapplicable to some employees who nevertheless \"perform satisfactorily ... suggests the possibility that the requirements may not be needed\"","sentence":"See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1421 (holding that five-month period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a \u201cminimum objective qualification,\u201d and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it \u201csatisfies the bedrock requirements of job-relatedness\u201d); cf. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 91 S.Ct. 849 (noting that hiring and transfer requirements that were inapplicable to some employees who nevertheless \u201cperform satisfactorily ... suggests the possibility that the requirements may not be needed\u201d). Even more telling, the PCC continues to make the equity package and vacation benefits available to those who have never become American citizens, as long as they were recruited from outside of Panama. See 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 3646; PCC Cross-Motion (R. 13), Exs. 20, 54, 67."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"843 F.2d 1421, 1421","parenthetical":"holding that five-month period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a \"minimum objective qualification,\" and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it \"satisfies the bedrock requirements of job-relatedness\"","sentence":"See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1421 (holding that five-month period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a \u201cminimum objective qualification,\u201d and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it \u201csatisfies the bedrock requirements of job-relatedness\u201d); cf. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 91 S.Ct. 849 (noting that hiring and transfer requirements that were inapplicable to some employees who nevertheless \u201cperform satisfactorily ... suggests the possibility that the requirements may not be needed\u201d). Even more telling, the PCC continues to make the equity package and vacation benefits available to those who have never become American citizens, as long as they were recruited from outside of Panama. See 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 3646; PCC Cross-Motion (R. 13), Exs. 20, 54, 67."},"case_id":3669560,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Indeed, the PCC's own policies make clear that the timing of citizenship is not a work-related qualification. As noted in Part I, from 1984 to 1989 four plaintiffs received the PCC's equity adjustment package; yet there is no claim that their work was less acceptable than that of employees with earlier citizenship who also received the package during the same time period.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"843 F.2d 1421, 1421","parenthetical":"holding that five-month period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a \"minimum objective qualification,\" and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it \"satisfies the bedrock requirements of job-relatedness\"","sentence":"See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1421 (holding that five-month period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a \u201cminimum objective qualification,\u201d and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it \u201csatisfies the bedrock requirements of job-relatedness\u201d); cf. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 91 S.Ct. 849 (noting that hiring and transfer requirements that were inapplicable to some employees who nevertheless \u201cperform satisfactorily ... suggests the possibility that the requirements may not be needed\u201d). Even more telling, the PCC continues to make the equity package and vacation benefits available to those who have never become American citizens, as long as they were recruited from outside of Panama. See 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 3646; PCC Cross-Motion (R. 13), Exs. 20, 54, 67."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that hiring and transfer requirements that were inapplicable to some employees who nevertheless \"perform satisfactorily ... suggests the possibility that the requirements may not be needed\"","sentence":"See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1421 (holding that five-month period in which employer did not insist on employment qualification precluded claim that it was a \u201cminimum objective qualification,\u201d and noting that employer could not rely on a qualification unless it \u201csatisfies the bedrock requirements of job-relatedness\u201d); cf. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32, 91 S.Ct. 849 (noting that hiring and transfer requirements that were inapplicable to some employees who nevertheless \u201cperform satisfactorily ... suggests the possibility that the requirements may not be needed\u201d). Even more telling, the PCC continues to make the equity package and vacation benefits available to those who have never become American citizens, as long as they were recruited from outside of Panama. See 22 U.S.C. \u00a7 3646; PCC Cross-Motion (R. 13), Exs. 20, 54, 67."},"case_id":3669560,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The record is fully developed and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Furthermore, to remand the case for further proceedings would result in unnecessary delay on an application that plaintiff filed over four years ago.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"209 F.3d 117, 124","parenthetical":"remanding for the sole purpose of calculating an award of benefits where record compelled finding of disability and plaintiffs application had been pending more than six years","sentence":"See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir.1998)(remanding for benefits where application had been pending for four years); see also Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir.2000)(remanding for the sole purpose of calculating an award of benefits where record compelled finding of disability and plaintiffs application had been pending more than six years)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"142 F.3d 75, 82","parenthetical":"remanding for benefits where application had been pending for four years","sentence":"See Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir.1998)(remanding for benefits where application had been pending for four years); see also Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir.2000)(remanding for the sole purpose of calculating an award of benefits where record compelled finding of disability and plaintiffs application had been pending more than six years)."},"case_id":962636,"label":"b"}
{"context":"To begin, the Supreme Court concluded that notice-of-alibi rules like those in Florida do not violate a defendant's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, including a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Similarly, a trial court does not violate a defendant's due process rights by requiring an evidentiary proffer.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"161 F.3d 610, 619","parenthetical":"\"[Njoth-ing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles the defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the nature of his defense.\" (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 85, 90 S.Ct. 1893","sentence":"Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 619 (10th Cir. 1998) (\u201c[Njoth-ing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles the defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State\u2019s case before announcing the nature of his defense.\u201d (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 85, 90 S.Ct. 1893)); Lakin v. Stine, 80 Fed.Appx. 368, 378 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (concluding that defendant\u2019s failure, pre-trial, to establish sufficiency of duress defense as defined under Michigan law, deprived him of ability to present defense at trial and did not violate his due process rights); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994) (\u201c[Wjhere there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support an element of the affirmative defense, the defendant can be precluded from presenting any evidence of duress to the jury,\u201d and such a ruling does not violate a defendant\u2019s due process rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"379 A.2d 1129, 1131","parenthetical":"\"[I]t was entirely proper for the Trial Court to settle pretrial as many questions of law as possible [on the issue of duress\/justification], including questions of relevancy and adequacy of certain lines of evidence.\"","sentence":"See also Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Del. 1977) (\u201c[I]t was entirely proper for the Trial Court to settle pretrial as many questions of law as possible [on the issue of duress\/justification], including questions of relevancy and adequacy of certain lines of evidence.\u201d)."},"case_id":12144992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To begin, the Supreme Court concluded that notice-of-alibi rules like those in Florida do not violate a defendant's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, including a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Similarly, a trial court does not violate a defendant's due process rights by requiring an evidentiary proffer.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"399 U.S. 85, 85","parenthetical":"\"[Njoth-ing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles the defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the nature of his defense.\" (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 85, 90 S.Ct. 1893","sentence":"Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 619 (10th Cir. 1998) (\u201c[Njoth-ing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles the defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State\u2019s case before announcing the nature of his defense.\u201d (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 85, 90 S.Ct. 1893)); Lakin v. Stine, 80 Fed.Appx. 368, 378 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (concluding that defendant\u2019s failure, pre-trial, to establish sufficiency of duress defense as defined under Michigan law, deprived him of ability to present defense at trial and did not violate his due process rights); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994) (\u201c[Wjhere there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support an element of the affirmative defense, the defendant can be precluded from presenting any evidence of duress to the jury,\u201d and such a ruling does not violate a defendant\u2019s due process rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"379 A.2d 1129, 1131","parenthetical":"\"[I]t was entirely proper for the Trial Court to settle pretrial as many questions of law as possible [on the issue of duress\/justification], including questions of relevancy and adequacy of certain lines of evidence.\"","sentence":"See also Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Del. 1977) (\u201c[I]t was entirely proper for the Trial Court to settle pretrial as many questions of law as possible [on the issue of duress\/justification], including questions of relevancy and adequacy of certain lines of evidence.\u201d)."},"case_id":12144992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To begin, the Supreme Court concluded that notice-of-alibi rules like those in Florida do not violate a defendant's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, including a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Similarly, a trial court does not violate a defendant's due process rights by requiring an evidentiary proffer.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[Njoth-ing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles the defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State's case before announcing the nature of his defense.\" (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 85, 90 S.Ct. 1893","sentence":"Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 619 (10th Cir. 1998) (\u201c[Njoth-ing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles the defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State\u2019s case before announcing the nature of his defense.\u201d (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 85, 90 S.Ct. 1893)); Lakin v. Stine, 80 Fed.Appx. 368, 378 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (concluding that defendant\u2019s failure, pre-trial, to establish sufficiency of duress defense as defined under Michigan law, deprived him of ability to present defense at trial and did not violate his due process rights); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994) (\u201c[Wjhere there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support an element of the affirmative defense, the defendant can be precluded from presenting any evidence of duress to the jury,\u201d and such a ruling does not violate a defendant\u2019s due process rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"379 A.2d 1129, 1131","parenthetical":"\"[I]t was entirely proper for the Trial Court to settle pretrial as many questions of law as possible [on the issue of duress\/justification], including questions of relevancy and adequacy of certain lines of evidence.\"","sentence":"See also Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Del. 1977) (\u201c[I]t was entirely proper for the Trial Court to settle pretrial as many questions of law as possible [on the issue of duress\/justification], including questions of relevancy and adequacy of certain lines of evidence.\u201d)."},"case_id":12144992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To begin, the Supreme Court concluded that notice-of-alibi rules like those in Florida do not violate a defendant's due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, including a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Similarly, a trial court does not violate a defendant's due process rights by requiring an evidentiary proffer.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"24 F.3d 618, 621","parenthetical":"\"[Wjhere there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support an element of the affirmative defense, the defendant can be precluded from presenting any evidence of duress to the jury,\" and such a ruling does not violate a defendant's due process rights","sentence":"Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 619 (10th Cir. 1998) (\u201c[Njoth-ing in the Fifth Amendment privilege entitles the defendant as a matter of constitutional right to await the end of the State\u2019s case before announcing the nature of his defense.\u201d (quoting Williams, 399 U.S. at 85, 90 S.Ct. 1893)); Lakin v. Stine, 80 Fed.Appx. 368, 378 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (concluding that defendant\u2019s failure, pre-trial, to establish sufficiency of duress defense as defined under Michigan law, deprived him of ability to present defense at trial and did not violate his due process rights); United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994) (\u201c[Wjhere there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support an element of the affirmative defense, the defendant can be precluded from presenting any evidence of duress to the jury,\u201d and such a ruling does not violate a defendant\u2019s due process rights)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"379 A.2d 1129, 1131","parenthetical":"\"[I]t was entirely proper for the Trial Court to settle pretrial as many questions of law as possible [on the issue of duress\/justification], including questions of relevancy and adequacy of certain lines of evidence.\"","sentence":"See also Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129, 1131 (Del. 1977) (\u201c[I]t was entirely proper for the Trial Court to settle pretrial as many questions of law as possible [on the issue of duress\/justification], including questions of relevancy and adequacy of certain lines of evidence.\u201d)."},"case_id":12144992,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A trial court has broad discretion to determine challenges for cause, and appellate courts have almost never interfered with that discretion. However, the trial court's discretion is not unlimited.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"1 Colo. 56, 58","parenthetical":"\"If upon such examination it appears that the [potential] juror is, from any cause, under any influence of fear, favor, or affection, or that he has in any way and on any cause made up an opinion as to the merits of the cause, he is ... an incompetent juror in that cause.\"","sentence":"See also Fitzgerald v. People, 1 Colo. 56, 58 (1867) (\u201cIf upon such examination it appears that the [potential] juror is, from any cause, under any influence of fear, favor, or affection, or that he has in any way and on any cause made up an opinion as to the merits of the cause, he is ... an incompetent juror in that cause.\u201d)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court abused discretion in denying challenge for cause where potential juror had close association with law enforcement establishment and crime scene in question","sentence":"See People v. Rogers, 690 P.2d 886 (Colo.App.1984) (trial court abused discretion in denying challenge for cause where potential juror had close association with law enforcement establishment and crime scene in question); Beeman v. People, 193 Colo. 337, 340, 565 P.2d 1340, 1342 (1977) (trial court abused discretion in not excusing for cause juror whose daughter had possible earlier contact with defendant; \u201cthe most sincere assurances and good faith belief by the juror in her capacity to act impartially cannot compensate for factors which inherently produce prejudice\u201d)."},"case_id":11892897,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For instance, the methods used to conduct the searches at issue are limited to visual inspections of vehicles and their trunks and brief examinations of the contents of ear-ry-on baggage. Ample notice is given to individuals seeking to board LCT ferries that they are subject to search and that they may avoid the search by exiting the premises.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"498 F.2d 501, 501","parenthetical":"\"The point is ... that in order to bring itself within the test of reasonableness applicable to airport searches, the Government must give the citizen fair warning, before he enters the area of search, that he is at liberty to proceed no farther.\"","sentence":"See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 273 (\u201c[Pjassengers receive notice of the searches and may decline to be searched so long as they leave the subway....\u201d); Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499-500 (finding notice central to upholding the constitutionality of airport searches where large signs had been posted near the boarding gates warning: \u201cPASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO SEARCH\u201d). Such notice helps \u201creduc[e] to a minimum any unsettling show of authority that may be associated with unexpected intrusions on privacy.\u201d Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Edwards, 498 F.2d at 501 (\u201cThe point is ... that in order to bring itself within the test of reasonableness applicable to airport searches, the Government must give the citizen fair warning, before he enters the area of search, that he is at liberty to proceed no farther.\u201d). Notice also serves to eliminate any stigma associated with the search."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"460 F.3d 273, 273","parenthetical":"\"[Pjassengers receive notice of the searches and may decline to be searched so long as they leave the subway....\"","sentence":"See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 273 (\u201c[Pjassengers receive notice of the searches and may decline to be searched so long as they leave the subway....\u201d); Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499-500 (finding notice central to upholding the constitutionality of airport searches where large signs had been posted near the boarding gates warning: \u201cPASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO SEARCH\u201d). Such notice helps \u201creduc[e] to a minimum any unsettling show of authority that may be associated with unexpected intrusions on privacy.\u201d Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Edwards, 498 F.2d at 501 (\u201cThe point is ... that in order to bring itself within the test of reasonableness applicable to airport searches, the Government must give the citizen fair warning, before he enters the area of search, that he is at liberty to proceed no farther.\u201d). Notice also serves to eliminate any stigma associated with the search."},"case_id":5252288,"label":"b"}
{"context":"For instance, the methods used to conduct the searches at issue are limited to visual inspections of vehicles and their trunks and brief examinations of the contents of ear-ry-on baggage. Ample notice is given to individuals seeking to board LCT ferries that they are subject to search and that they may avoid the search by exiting the premises.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"498 F.2d 499, 499-500","parenthetical":"finding notice central to upholding the constitutionality of airport searches where large signs had been posted near the boarding gates warning: \"PASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO SEARCH\"","sentence":"See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 273 (\u201c[Pjassengers receive notice of the searches and may decline to be searched so long as they leave the subway....\u201d); Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499-500 (finding notice central to upholding the constitutionality of airport searches where large signs had been posted near the boarding gates warning: \u201cPASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO SEARCH\u201d). Such notice helps \u201creduc[e] to a minimum any unsettling show of authority that may be associated with unexpected intrusions on privacy.\u201d Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Edwards, 498 F.2d at 501 (\u201cThe point is ... that in order to bring itself within the test of reasonableness applicable to airport searches, the Government must give the citizen fair warning, before he enters the area of search, that he is at liberty to proceed no farther.\u201d). Notice also serves to eliminate any stigma associated with the search."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"498 F.2d 501, 501","parenthetical":"\"The point is ... that in order to bring itself within the test of reasonableness applicable to airport searches, the Government must give the citizen fair warning, before he enters the area of search, that he is at liberty to proceed no farther.\"","sentence":"See MacWade, 460 F.3d at 273 (\u201c[Pjassengers receive notice of the searches and may decline to be searched so long as they leave the subway....\u201d); Edwards, 498 F.2d at 499-500 (finding notice central to upholding the constitutionality of airport searches where large signs had been posted near the boarding gates warning: \u201cPASSENGERS AND BAGGAGE SUBJECT TO SEARCH\u201d). Such notice helps \u201creduc[e] to a minimum any unsettling show of authority that may be associated with unexpected intrusions on privacy.\u201d Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 1384 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Edwards, 498 F.2d at 501 (\u201cThe point is ... that in order to bring itself within the test of reasonableness applicable to airport searches, the Government must give the citizen fair warning, before he enters the area of search, that he is at liberty to proceed no farther.\u201d). Notice also serves to eliminate any stigma associated with the search."},"case_id":5252288,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, she contends, the District Court could only have applied the drug trafficking guideline by way of the limited exception found in U.S.S.G. SS IB 1.2(a). She then argues that this exception would not apply to her because she did not stipulate to any facts that would establish the elements of any offense for which the drug trafficking guideline, U.S.S.G. SS 2D1.1, would apply.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"500 U.S. 344, 349-50","parenthetical":"applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. SS 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \"specifically established\" the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under","sentence":"See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 IB 1.2, app. note 1 (explaining that U.S.S.G. \u00a7 lB1.2(a) applies \u201cin a case in which the elements of an offense more serious than the offense of conviction are established by a plea agreement\u201d) (emphasis added); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349-50, 114 L. Ed. 2d 385, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991) (applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. \u00a7 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \u201cspecifically established\u201d the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under); see also United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 1999) (\u201cthe text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a \u2018stipulation only if: (i) it is part of a defendants written plea agreement; (ii) it is explicitly annexed thereto; or (iii) both the government and the defendant explicitly agree at a factual basis hearing that the facts being put on the record are stipulations that might subject a defendant to the provisions of section 1B1.2(a)\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"188 F.3d 190, 201","parenthetical":"\"the text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a 'stipulation only if: (i","sentence":"See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 IB 1.2, app. note 1 (explaining that U.S.S.G. \u00a7 lB1.2(a) applies \u201cin a case in which the elements of an offense more serious than the offense of conviction are established by a plea agreement\u201d) (emphasis added); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349-50, 114 L. Ed. 2d 385, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991) (applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. \u00a7 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \u201cspecifically established\u201d the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under); see also United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 1999) (\u201cthe text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a \u2018stipulation only if: (i) it is part of a defendants written plea agreement; (ii) it is explicitly annexed thereto; or (iii) both the government and the defendant explicitly agree at a factual basis hearing that the facts being put on the record are stipulations that might subject a defendant to the provisions of section 1B1.2(a)\u201d)."},"case_id":1121195,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Therefore, she contends, the District Court could only have applied the drug trafficking guideline by way of the limited exception found in U.S.S.G. SS IB 1.2(a). She then argues that this exception would not apply to her because she did not stipulate to any facts that would establish the elements of any offense for which the drug trafficking guideline, U.S.S.G. SS 2D1.1, would apply.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"188 F.3d 190, 201","parenthetical":"\"the text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a 'stipulation only if: (i","sentence":"See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 IB 1.2, app. note 1 (explaining that U.S.S.G. \u00a7 lB1.2(a) applies \u201cin a case in which the elements of an offense more serious than the offense of conviction are established by a plea agreement\u201d) (emphasis added); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349-50, 114 L. Ed. 2d 385, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991) (applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. \u00a7 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \u201cspecifically established\u201d the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under); see also United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 1999) (\u201cthe text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a \u2018stipulation only if: (i) it is part of a defendants written plea agreement; (ii) it is explicitly annexed thereto; or (iii) both the government and the defendant explicitly agree at a factual basis hearing that the facts being put on the record are stipulations that might subject a defendant to the provisions of section 1B1.2(a)\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. SS 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \"specifically established\" the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under","sentence":"See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 IB 1.2, app. note 1 (explaining that U.S.S.G. \u00a7 lB1.2(a) applies \u201cin a case in which the elements of an offense more serious than the offense of conviction are established by a plea agreement\u201d) (emphasis added); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349-50, 114 L. Ed. 2d 385, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991) (applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. \u00a7 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \u201cspecifically established\u201d the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under); see also United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 1999) (\u201cthe text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a \u2018stipulation only if: (i) it is part of a defendants written plea agreement; (ii) it is explicitly annexed thereto; or (iii) both the government and the defendant explicitly agree at a factual basis hearing that the facts being put on the record are stipulations that might subject a defendant to the provisions of section 1B1.2(a)\u201d)."},"case_id":1121195,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Therefore, she contends, the District Court could only have applied the drug trafficking guideline by way of the limited exception found in U.S.S.G. SS IB 1.2(a). She then argues that this exception would not apply to her because she did not stipulate to any facts that would establish the elements of any offense for which the drug trafficking guideline, U.S.S.G. SS 2D1.1, would apply.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. SS 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \"specifically established\" the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under","sentence":"See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 IB 1.2, app. note 1 (explaining that U.S.S.G. \u00a7 lB1.2(a) applies \u201cin a case in which the elements of an offense more serious than the offense of conviction are established by a plea agreement\u201d) (emphasis added); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349-50, 114 L. Ed. 2d 385, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991) (applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. \u00a7 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \u201cspecifically established\u201d the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under); see also United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 1999) (\u201cthe text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a \u2018stipulation only if: (i) it is part of a defendants written plea agreement; (ii) it is explicitly annexed thereto; or (iii) both the government and the defendant explicitly agree at a factual basis hearing that the facts being put on the record are stipulations that might subject a defendant to the provisions of section 1B1.2(a)\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"188 F.3d 190, 201","parenthetical":"\"the text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a 'stipulation only if: (i","sentence":"See U.S.S.G. \u00a7 IB 1.2, app. note 1 (explaining that U.S.S.G. \u00a7 lB1.2(a) applies \u201cin a case in which the elements of an offense more serious than the offense of conviction are established by a plea agreement\u201d) (emphasis added); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349-50, 114 L. Ed. 2d 385, 111 S. Ct. 1854 (1991) (applying an earlier version of U.S.S.G. \u00a7 1B1.2 and looking to see whether a defendant had stipulated to facts that \u201cspecifically established\u201d the elements of the offense the District Court sought to sentence the defendant under); see also United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 1999) (\u201cthe text of section lB1.2(a) ... indicates that a statement is a \u2018stipulation only if: (i) it is part of a defendants written plea agreement; (ii) it is explicitly annexed thereto; or (iii) both the government and the defendant explicitly agree at a factual basis hearing that the facts being put on the record are stipulations that might subject a defendant to the provisions of section 1B1.2(a)\u201d)."},"case_id":1121195,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Had the prosecution believed that any part of this argument opened the way to the jury's use of biblical texts in the jury room, it could have asked the trial court to allow their introduction and use. Surely, if this request had been made, the trial court would have limited the prosecution to, at most, a suitable responsive argument to the jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"706 F.Supp. 1560, 1560","parenthetical":"finding error where trial court agreed to jurors' request to take Bibles into jury room","sentence":"See Jones v. Francis, 252 Ga. 60, 312 S.E.2d 300, 303 (1984)(in closing of penalty phase, defense counsel traced at length the changes in approach to punishment between the Old Testament and the New Testament, but it was still error to allow jurors to take Bible into jury room); cf. Kemp, 706 F.Supp. at 1560 (finding error where trial court agreed to jurors\u2019 request to take Bibles into jury room)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in closing of penalty phase, defense counsel traced at length the changes in approach to punishment between the Old Testament and the New Testament, but it was still error to allow jurors to take Bible into jury room","sentence":"See Jones v. Francis, 252 Ga. 60, 312 S.E.2d 300, 303 (1984)(in closing of penalty phase, defense counsel traced at length the changes in approach to punishment between the Old Testament and the New Testament, but it was still error to allow jurors to take Bible into jury room); cf. Kemp, 706 F.Supp. at 1560 (finding error where trial court agreed to jurors\u2019 request to take Bibles into jury room)."},"case_id":9014064,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Had the prosecution believed that any part of this argument opened the way to the jury's use of biblical texts in the jury room, it could have asked the trial court to allow their introduction and use. Surely, if this request had been made, the trial court would have limited the prosecution to, at most, a suitable responsive argument to the jury.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"312 S.E.2d 300, 303","parenthetical":"in closing of penalty phase, defense counsel traced at length the changes in approach to punishment between the Old Testament and the New Testament, but it was still error to allow jurors to take Bible into jury room","sentence":"See Jones v. Francis, 252 Ga. 60, 312 S.E.2d 300, 303 (1984)(in closing of penalty phase, defense counsel traced at length the changes in approach to punishment between the Old Testament and the New Testament, but it was still error to allow jurors to take Bible into jury room); cf. Kemp, 706 F.Supp. at 1560 (finding error where trial court agreed to jurors\u2019 request to take Bibles into jury room)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"706 F.Supp. 1560, 1560","parenthetical":"finding error where trial court agreed to jurors' request to take Bibles into jury room","sentence":"See Jones v. Francis, 252 Ga. 60, 312 S.E.2d 300, 303 (1984)(in closing of penalty phase, defense counsel traced at length the changes in approach to punishment between the Old Testament and the New Testament, but it was still error to allow jurors to take Bible into jury room); cf. Kemp, 706 F.Supp. at 1560 (finding error where trial court agreed to jurors\u2019 request to take Bibles into jury room)."},"case_id":9014064,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Granting the parties the right to file affidavits following oral argument was a measure necessary to settling the question. The Court of Appeals' action was proper and within its purview.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed","sentence":"See Windham v. Sanders, 287 S.C. 170, 337 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed); cf. Gray v. The Club Group, 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000), cert. denied (stating in a Workers\u2019 Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating in a Workers' Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction","sentence":"See Windham v. Sanders, 287 S.C. 170, 337 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed); cf. Gray v. The Club Group, 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000), cert. denied (stating in a Workers\u2019 Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction)."},"case_id":1109983,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Granting the parties the right to file affidavits following oral argument was a measure necessary to settling the question. The Court of Appeals' action was proper and within its purview.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating in a Workers' Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction","sentence":"See Windham v. Sanders, 287 S.C. 170, 337 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed); cf. Gray v. The Club Group, 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000), cert. denied (stating in a Workers\u2019 Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed","sentence":"See Windham v. Sanders, 287 S.C. 170, 337 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed); cf. Gray v. The Club Group, 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000), cert. denied (stating in a Workers\u2019 Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction)."},"case_id":1109983,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Granting the parties the right to file affidavits following oral argument was a measure necessary to settling the question. The Court of Appeals' action was proper and within its purview.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating in a Workers' Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction","sentence":"See Windham v. Sanders, 287 S.C. 170, 337 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed); cf. Gray v. The Club Group, 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000), cert. denied (stating in a Workers\u2019 Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed","sentence":"See Windham v. Sanders, 287 S.C. 170, 337 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed); cf. Gray v. The Club Group, 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000), cert. denied (stating in a Workers\u2019 Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction)."},"case_id":1109983,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Granting the parties the right to file affidavits following oral argument was a measure necessary to settling the question. The Court of Appeals' action was proper and within its purview.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed","sentence":"See Windham v. Sanders, 287 S.C. 170, 337 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed); cf. Gray v. The Club Group, 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000), cert. denied (stating in a Workers\u2019 Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating in a Workers' Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction","sentence":"See Windham v. Sanders, 287 S.C. 170, 337 S.E.2d 205 (1985) (applying former rules governing appeals from a master-in-equity, the Supreme Court permitted appellant to supplement record on appeal following its submission with documentation demonstrating that direct appeal from the master was authorized by order of the Circuit Court or by consent of parties for the purpose of conclusively establishing whether subject matter jurisdiction in the appellate court existed); cf. Gray v. The Club Group, 339 S.C. 173, 528 S.E.2d 435 (Ct.App.2000), cert. denied (stating in a Workers\u2019 Compensation case, subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which in turn permits the court to make findings of fact relating to jurisdiction)."},"case_id":1109983,"label":"a"}
{"context":"We agree with the Hearing Committee that Respondent's violation of Rule 1.11(a) and the corresponding disqualification motion, without more, does not support a finding that the conduct was a serious interference with the administration of justice. Not every action that requires a court to decide a motion interferes with the administration of justice, even though the court expends resources in deciding the matter.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"violation of conditions of probation in criminal case insufficient to prove violation of DR 1-102(A","sentence":"See In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366, 375 (D.C.2003) (holding that the submission of a deficient voucher undoubtedly \u201cplaced an unnecessary burden on the administrative processes of the Superior Court and on the presiding judge\u201d but a Rule 8.4(d) violation generally requires \u201cegregious conduct\u201d or \u201cintentional disregard for the effect that an action may have on judicial proceedings.\u201d); see also In re Reynolds, 649 A.2d 818 (D.C.1994) (per curiam) (violation of conditions of probation in criminal case insufficient to prove violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) (predecessor to Rule 8.4(d)) although hearings had to be held)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"831 A.2d 366, 375","parenthetical":"holding that the submission of a deficient voucher undoubtedly \"placed an unnecessary burden on the administrative processes of the Superior Court and on the presiding judge\" but a Rule 8.4(d","sentence":"See In re Hallmark, 831 A.2d 366, 375 (D.C.2003) (holding that the submission of a deficient voucher undoubtedly \u201cplaced an unnecessary burden on the administrative processes of the Superior Court and on the presiding judge\u201d but a Rule 8.4(d) violation generally requires \u201cegregious conduct\u201d or \u201cintentional disregard for the effect that an action may have on judicial proceedings.\u201d); see also In re Reynolds, 649 A.2d 818 (D.C.1994) (per curiam) (violation of conditions of probation in criminal case insufficient to prove violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) (predecessor to Rule 8.4(d)) although hearings had to be held)."},"case_id":7289677,"label":"b"}
{"context":". While the district court did not discuss the constitutionality of the search of Robertson's person, its findings of fact are sufficient for us to resolve the issue without remand.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"917 F.2d 1271, 1275","parenthetical":"declining to remand for further findings on the defendant's privacy expectation \"because the legally operative facts\" were undisputed","sentence":"See United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir.1990) (declining to remand for further findings on the defendant\u2019s privacy expectation \"because the legally operative facts\u201d were undisputed); cf. United States v. Fields, 371 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir.2004) (remanding for further factual findings because the appellate court could not \"review the record in a meaningful manner\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"371 F.3d 910, 917","parenthetical":"remanding for further factual findings because the appellate court could not \"review the record in a meaningful manner\"","sentence":"See United States v. Rubio-Rivera, 917 F.2d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir.1990) (declining to remand for further findings on the defendant\u2019s privacy expectation \"because the legally operative facts\u201d were undisputed); cf. United States v. Fields, 371 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir.2004) (remanding for further factual findings because the appellate court could not \"review the record in a meaningful manner\u201d)."},"case_id":3986586,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This Court has already determined that a unitary filing with the EEOC in which the complainant checked the box at the bottom of the standard EEOC charge form requesting that the charge be filed with both the EEOC and the state agency satisfies the requirement that plaintiffs commence proceedings under state law. Other federal courts in Virginia have reached the same or similar conclusions.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim, but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination","sentence":"But see Walker v. Electrolux Corp., 55 F.Supp.2d 501 (W.D.Va.1999) (holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim, but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff had exhausted state remedies where EEOC transmitted charge to VCHR pursuant to the worksharing agreement and VCHR declined to investigate","sentence":"See Harris v. TJX Companies, Inc., 60 F.Supp.2d 562 (W.D.Va.1999) (holding that plaintiff had exhausted state remedies where EEOC transmitted charge to VCHR pursuant to the worksharing agreement and VCHR declined to investigate); Grimes v. Canadian American Transportation, C.A.T., Inc., Civ. Action No. 98-0409-R, 59 F.Supp.2d 572 (W.D.Va., Roanoke Div., July 28, 1999) (holding that jurisdiction in federal court is proper where plaintiff checked box and EEOC transmitted charge but VCHR declined to investigate); Flippo v. American Home Prods., 59 F.Supp.2d 572 (E.D.Va.1999) (holding same)."},"case_id":11554528,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This Court has already determined that a unitary filing with the EEOC in which the complainant checked the box at the bottom of the standard EEOC charge form requesting that the charge be filed with both the EEOC and the state agency satisfies the requirement that plaintiffs commence proceedings under state law. Other federal courts in Virginia have reached the same or similar conclusions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that jurisdiction in federal court is proper where plaintiff checked box and EEOC transmitted charge but VCHR declined to investigate","sentence":"See Harris v. TJX Companies, Inc., 60 F.Supp.2d 562 (W.D.Va.1999) (holding that plaintiff had exhausted state remedies where EEOC transmitted charge to VCHR pursuant to the worksharing agreement and VCHR declined to investigate); Grimes v. Canadian American Transportation, C.A.T., Inc., Civ. Action No. 98-0409-R, 59 F.Supp.2d 572 (W.D.Va., Roanoke Div., July 28, 1999) (holding that jurisdiction in federal court is proper where plaintiff checked box and EEOC transmitted charge but VCHR declined to investigate); Flippo v. American Home Prods., 59 F.Supp.2d 572 (E.D.Va.1999) (holding same)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim, but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination","sentence":"But see Walker v. Electrolux Corp., 55 F.Supp.2d 501 (W.D.Va.1999) (holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim, but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination)."},"case_id":11554528,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Other federal circuit courts have also rejected the BOP's interpretation of the statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"170 F.3d 442, 447","parenthetical":"finding that the 1995 BOP regulation and program statement constitute a reasonable interpretation of the statute","sentence":"See Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395, 1397 (11th Cir.1998) (BOP could not rely on inmate\u2019s firearm sentence enhancement to deny application for sentence reduction under \u00a7 3621 because violations of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 846 and 841(a)(1) are not crimes of violence and \u00a7 3621(e)(2)(B) addresses the act of conviction, not sentence enhancement); Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir.1998); Bush v. Pitzer, 133 F.3d 455 (7th Cir.1997); Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.1997); but see Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir.1999) (finding that the 1995 BOP regulation and program statement constitute a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760, 763 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1108, 118 S.Ct. 1679, 140 L.Ed.2d 817 (1998); LaPlante v. Pontesso, 961 F.Supp. 186, 189 (E.D.Mich.1997) (Rosen, J.) (\u201cThe Court acknowledges that violations of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1) generally are not considered to be crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924. This Court, however, has chosen to take a case by case approach here by inquiring into the facts underlying petitioner\u2019s conviction.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"142 F.3d 1395, 1397","parenthetical":"BOP could not rely on inmate's firearm sentence enhancement to deny application for sentence reduction under SS 3621 because violations of 21 U.S.C. SSSS 846 and 841(a","sentence":"See Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395, 1397 (11th Cir.1998) (BOP could not rely on inmate\u2019s firearm sentence enhancement to deny application for sentence reduction under \u00a7 3621 because violations of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 846 and 841(a)(1) are not crimes of violence and \u00a7 3621(e)(2)(B) addresses the act of conviction, not sentence enhancement); Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir.1998); Bush v. Pitzer, 133 F.3d 455 (7th Cir.1997); Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.1997); but see Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir.1999) (finding that the 1995 BOP regulation and program statement constitute a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760, 763 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1108, 118 S.Ct. 1679, 140 L.Ed.2d 817 (1998); LaPlante v. Pontesso, 961 F.Supp. 186, 189 (E.D.Mich.1997) (Rosen, J.) (\u201cThe Court acknowledges that violations of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1) generally are not considered to be crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924. This Court, however, has chosen to take a case by case approach here by inquiring into the facts underlying petitioner\u2019s conviction.\u201d)."},"case_id":647318,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Other federal circuit courts have also rejected the BOP's interpretation of the statute.","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"961 F.Supp. 186, 189","parenthetical":"\"The Court acknowledges that violations of 21 U.S.C. SS 841(a","sentence":"See Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395, 1397 (11th Cir.1998) (BOP could not rely on inmate\u2019s firearm sentence enhancement to deny application for sentence reduction under \u00a7 3621 because violations of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 846 and 841(a)(1) are not crimes of violence and \u00a7 3621(e)(2)(B) addresses the act of conviction, not sentence enhancement); Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir.1998); Bush v. Pitzer, 133 F.3d 455 (7th Cir.1997); Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.1997); but see Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir.1999) (finding that the 1995 BOP regulation and program statement constitute a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760, 763 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1108, 118 S.Ct. 1679, 140 L.Ed.2d 817 (1998); LaPlante v. Pontesso, 961 F.Supp. 186, 189 (E.D.Mich.1997) (Rosen, J.) (\u201cThe Court acknowledges that violations of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1) generally are not considered to be crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924. This Court, however, has chosen to take a case by case approach here by inquiring into the facts underlying petitioner\u2019s conviction.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"142 F.3d 1395, 1397","parenthetical":"BOP could not rely on inmate's firearm sentence enhancement to deny application for sentence reduction under SS 3621 because violations of 21 U.S.C. SSSS 846 and 841(a","sentence":"See Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395, 1397 (11th Cir.1998) (BOP could not rely on inmate\u2019s firearm sentence enhancement to deny application for sentence reduction under \u00a7 3621 because violations of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 846 and 841(a)(1) are not crimes of violence and \u00a7 3621(e)(2)(B) addresses the act of conviction, not sentence enhancement); Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir.1998); Bush v. Pitzer, 133 F.3d 455 (7th Cir.1997); Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159 (3d Cir.1997); but see Pelissero v. Thompson, 170 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir.1999) (finding that the 1995 BOP regulation and program statement constitute a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760, 763 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1108, 118 S.Ct. 1679, 140 L.Ed.2d 817 (1998); LaPlante v. Pontesso, 961 F.Supp. 186, 189 (E.D.Mich.1997) (Rosen, J.) (\u201cThe Court acknowledges that violations of 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 841(a)(1) generally are not considered to be crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 924. This Court, however, has chosen to take a case by case approach here by inquiring into the facts underlying petitioner\u2019s conviction.\u201d)."},"case_id":647318,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is hardly uncommon for a person's family members and friends to have photographs of the person and to know where he or she stays, while knowing little of -- or at least lacking \"special familiarity\" with -- the person's criminal activities. If there is any correlation between possession of a person's photograph or knowledge of the person's address and special knowledge of the person's criminal activities, it is likely a weak one, insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system -- thus makng it possible to identify him or her later","sentence":"See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous informant\u2019s \u201cability to predict respondent\u2019s future behavior\u201d \u2014 namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine \u2014 \u201cdemonstrated insid\u00e9 information[,] a special familiarity with resp\u00f3ndent\u2019s affairs,\u201d and thus rendered the informant\u2019s tip sufficiently reliable \u2014 although it was a \u201cclose case\u201d); see also Navarette v. California, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system \u2014 thus makng it possible to identify him or her later)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"496 U.S. 332, 332","parenthetical":"holding that an anonymous informant's \"ability to predict respondent's future behavior\" -- namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine -- \"demonstrated inside information[,] a special familiarity with respondent's affairs,\" and thus rendered the informant's tip sufficiently reliable -- although it was a \"close case\"","sentence":"See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous informant\u2019s \u201cability to predict respondent\u2019s future behavior\u201d \u2014 namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine \u2014 \u201cdemonstrated insid\u00e9 information[,] a special familiarity with resp\u00f3ndent\u2019s affairs,\u201d and thus rendered the informant\u2019s tip sufficiently reliable \u2014 although it was a \u201cclose case\u201d); see also Navarette v. California, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system \u2014 thus makng it possible to identify him or her later)."},"case_id":12321576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is hardly uncommon for a person's family members and friends to have photographs of the person and to know where he or she stays, while knowing little of -- or at least lacking \"special familiarity\" with -- the person's criminal activities. If there is any correlation between possession of a person's photograph or knowledge of the person's address and special knowledge of the person's criminal activities, it is likely a weak one, insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system -- thus makng it possible to identify him or her later","sentence":"See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous informant\u2019s \u201cability to predict respondent\u2019s future behavior\u201d \u2014 namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine \u2014 \u201cdemonstrated insid\u00e9 information[,] a special familiarity with resp\u00f3ndent\u2019s affairs,\u201d and thus rendered the informant\u2019s tip sufficiently reliable \u2014 although it was a \u201cclose case\u201d); see also Navarette v. California, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system \u2014 thus makng it possible to identify him or her later)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"496 U.S. 332, 332","parenthetical":"holding that an anonymous informant's \"ability to predict respondent's future behavior\" -- namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine -- \"demonstrated inside information[,] a special familiarity with respondent's affairs,\" and thus rendered the informant's tip sufficiently reliable -- although it was a \"close case\"","sentence":"See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous informant\u2019s \u201cability to predict respondent\u2019s future behavior\u201d \u2014 namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine \u2014 \u201cdemonstrated insid\u00e9 information[,] a special familiarity with resp\u00f3ndent\u2019s affairs,\u201d and thus rendered the informant\u2019s tip sufficiently reliable \u2014 although it was a \u201cclose case\u201d); see also Navarette v. California, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system \u2014 thus makng it possible to identify him or her later)."},"case_id":12321576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is hardly uncommon for a person's family members and friends to have photographs of the person and to know where he or she stays, while knowing little of -- or at least lacking \"special familiarity\" with -- the person's criminal activities. If there is any correlation between possession of a person's photograph or knowledge of the person's address and special knowledge of the person's criminal activities, it is likely a weak one, insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system -- thus makng it possible to identify him or her later","sentence":"See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous informant\u2019s \u201cability to predict respondent\u2019s future behavior\u201d \u2014 namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine \u2014 \u201cdemonstrated insid\u00e9 information[,] a special familiarity with resp\u00f3ndent\u2019s affairs,\u201d and thus rendered the informant\u2019s tip sufficiently reliable \u2014 although it was a \u201cclose case\u201d); see also Navarette v. California, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system \u2014 thus makng it possible to identify him or her later)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an anonymous informant's \"ability to predict respondent's future behavior\" -- namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine -- \"demonstrated inside information[,] a special familiarity with respondent's affairs,\" and thus rendered the informant's tip sufficiently reliable -- although it was a \"close case\"","sentence":"See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous informant\u2019s \u201cability to predict respondent\u2019s future behavior\u201d \u2014 namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine \u2014 \u201cdemonstrated insid\u00e9 information[,] a special familiarity with resp\u00f3ndent\u2019s affairs,\u201d and thus rendered the informant\u2019s tip sufficiently reliable \u2014 although it was a \u201cclose case\u201d); see also Navarette v. California, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system \u2014 thus makng it possible to identify him or her later)."},"case_id":12321576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is hardly uncommon for a person's family members and friends to have photographs of the person and to know where he or she stays, while knowing little of -- or at least lacking \"special familiarity\" with -- the person's criminal activities. If there is any correlation between possession of a person's photograph or knowledge of the person's address and special knowledge of the person's criminal activities, it is likely a weak one, insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system -- thus makng it possible to identify him or her later","sentence":"See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous informant\u2019s \u201cability to predict respondent\u2019s future behavior\u201d \u2014 namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine \u2014 \u201cdemonstrated insid\u00e9 information[,] a special familiarity with resp\u00f3ndent\u2019s affairs,\u201d and thus rendered the informant\u2019s tip sufficiently reliable \u2014 although it was a \u201cclose case\u201d); see also Navarette v. California, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system \u2014 thus makng it possible to identify him or her later)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an anonymous informant's \"ability to predict respondent's future behavior\" -- namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine -- \"demonstrated inside information[,] a special familiarity with respondent's affairs,\" and thus rendered the informant's tip sufficiently reliable -- although it was a \"close case\"","sentence":"See White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (holding that an anonymous informant\u2019s \u201cability to predict respondent\u2019s future behavior\u201d \u2014 namely, the route that respondent would take to deliver a package of cocaine \u2014 \u201cdemonstrated insid\u00e9 information[,] a special familiarity with resp\u00f3ndent\u2019s affairs,\u201d and thus rendered the informant\u2019s tip sufficiently reliable \u2014 although it was a \u201cclose case\u201d); see also Navarette v. California, \u2014 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1683, 188 L.Ed.2d 680 (2014) (finding an anonymous tip sufficiently reliable because, inter alia, there were reasons to believe that the informant actually witnessed the criminal activity reported, and because the informant used the 911 emergency system \u2014 thus makng it possible to identify him or her later)."},"case_id":12321576,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"811 F.2d 1453, 1459","parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"877 F.2d 281, 291","parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"877 F.2d 281, 291","parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"877 F.2d 281, 291","parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"877 F.2d 281, 291","parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"811 F.2d 1453, 1459","parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"811 F.2d 1453, 1459","parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113","parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113","parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113","parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113","parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"811 F.2d 1453, 1459","parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The evidence which Aloi presented supports the inference that the Allen charge given by Judge Emmons was, under the circumstances of the case, coercive. This Court recognizes that, on at least one occasion, the Sixth Circuit upheld an Allen charge which mentioned the cost of the trial, but the Circuit did so without commenting on that aspect of the charge.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \"did not place undue emphasis on this factor\" and therefore was not coercive","sentence":"U.S. v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1981); see also U.S. v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 291 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869, 110 S.Ct. 195, 377, 1113, 107 L.Ed.2d 149 (1990) (disapproving reference, but finding that instruction in question \u201cdid not place undue emphasis on this factor\u201d and therefore was not coercive); but cf. U.S. v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1459 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 103, 98 L.Ed.2d 63 (1987) (reluctantly upholding Allen charge which made reference to costs of trial in light of controlling precedent)."},"case_id":3714740,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting -- a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge -- but that is not dispositive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"425 N.J.Super. 335, 372","parenthetical":"observing that it \"was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\"","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"691 F.2d 646, 652-53","parenthetical":"holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting -- a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge -- but that is not dispositive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"425 N.J.Super. 335, 372","parenthetical":"observing that it \"was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\"","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"596 F.2d 84, 87-88","parenthetical":"holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert's lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting -- a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge -- but that is not dispositive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"194 N.J. 16, 16","parenthetical":"holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert's lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"425 N.J.Super. 335, 372","parenthetical":"observing that it \"was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\"","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting -- a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge -- but that is not dispositive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert's lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"425 N.J.Super. 335, 372","parenthetical":"observing that it \"was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\"","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting -- a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge -- but that is not dispositive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"691 F.2d 646, 652-53","parenthetical":"holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that it \"was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\"","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting -- a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge -- but that is not dispositive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"596 F.2d 84, 87-88","parenthetical":"holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert's lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that it \"was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\"","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting -- a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge -- but that is not dispositive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that it \"was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\"","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"194 N.J. 16, 16","parenthetical":"holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert's lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting -- a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge -- but that is not dispositive.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert's lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"observing that it \"was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\"","sentence":"See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it \u201cwas not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability\u201d); see also Hammond v. Int\u2019l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer, whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair, could testify in a products liability action involving tractors); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an expert could testify that unguarded elevator buttons constituted a design defect despite the expert\u2019s lack of a specific background in design and manufacture of elevators). Although the determination as to whether our evidence rules permit admission of a particular expert\u2019s testimony lies within the sound exercise of the trial judge\u2019s discretion, see Hisenaj, supra, 194 N.J. at 16, 942 A.2d 769, we agree the trial judge mistakenly rested his order excluding Elson\u2019s testimony on Elson\u2019s lack of expertise in the insurance industry."},"case_id":12299816,"label":"b"}
{"context":"This is not an instance where Plaintiff merely did not know that she needed to name the individual defendants in the caption but adequately described conduct attributed to them in her original complaints. Rather, as indicated, Plaintiffs original complaints are completely devoid of any factual allegations describing Bove or Holdren's role in U.S. Airways' denial of her accommodation or the grievance process.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"130 S.Ct. 2494, 2494","parenthetical":"distinguishing between a mistake, where \"a plaintiff might know that the prospective defendant exists but nonetheless harbor a misunderstanding about his status or role in the events,\" and a \"deliberate choice to sue one party instead of another while fully understanding the factual and legal differences between the two parties\"","sentence":"See Krupski 130 S.Ct. at 2494 (distinguishing between a mistake, where \u201ca plaintiff might know that the prospective defendant exists but nonetheless harbor a misunderstanding about his status or role in the events,\u201d and a \u201cdeliberate choice to sue one party instead of another while fully understanding the factual and legal differences between the two parties\u201d); see also In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 718 F.Supp.2d at 507 (indicating that Rule 15 allows relation back to remedy instances where a plaintiff wrongfully identified a defendant \u201cwhose conduct is described in the complaint.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"718 F.Supp.2d 507, 507","parenthetical":"indicating that Rule 15 allows relation back to remedy instances where a plaintiff wrongfully identified a defendant \"whose conduct is described in the complaint.\"","sentence":"See Krupski 130 S.Ct. at 2494 (distinguishing between a mistake, where \u201ca plaintiff might know that the prospective defendant exists but nonetheless harbor a misunderstanding about his status or role in the events,\u201d and a \u201cdeliberate choice to sue one party instead of another while fully understanding the factual and legal differences between the two parties\u201d); see also In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 718 F.Supp.2d at 507 (indicating that Rule 15 allows relation back to remedy instances where a plaintiff wrongfully identified a defendant \u201cwhose conduct is described in the complaint.\u201d)."},"case_id":4237698,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 29 Assuming, without deciding, that prosecutors knowingly pursued an intent to kill theory at trial in contravention of the court's order, as a matter of law, Martinson cannot establish the requisite prejudice arising from that conduct that would bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"186 Ariz. 168, 185","parenthetical":"where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor","sentence":"See State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \u201cintentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\u201d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185, 920 P.2d 290 (1996) (where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11","parenthetical":"rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \"intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\"","sentence":"See State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \u201cintentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\u201d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185, 920 P.2d 290 (1996) (where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor)."},"case_id":12310111,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 29 Assuming, without deciding, that prosecutors knowingly pursued an intent to kill theory at trial in contravention of the court's order, as a matter of law, Martinson cannot establish the requisite prejudice arising from that conduct that would bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor","sentence":"See State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \u201cintentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\u201d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185, 920 P.2d 290 (1996) (where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11","parenthetical":"rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \"intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\"","sentence":"See State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \u201cintentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\u201d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185, 920 P.2d 290 (1996) (where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor)."},"case_id":12310111,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 29 Assuming, without deciding, that prosecutors knowingly pursued an intent to kill theory at trial in contravention of the court's order, as a matter of law, Martinson cannot establish the requisite prejudice arising from that conduct that would bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \"intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\"","sentence":"See State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \u201cintentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\u201d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185, 920 P.2d 290 (1996) (where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"186 Ariz. 168, 185","parenthetical":"where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor","sentence":"See State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \u201cintentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\u201d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185, 920 P.2d 290 (1996) (where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor)."},"case_id":12310111,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 29 Assuming, without deciding, that prosecutors knowingly pursued an intent to kill theory at trial in contravention of the court's order, as a matter of law, Martinson cannot establish the requisite prejudice arising from that conduct that would bar retrial on double jeopardy grounds.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \"intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\"","sentence":"See State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \u201cintentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\u201d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185, 920 P.2d 290 (1996) (where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor","sentence":"See State v. Aguilar, 217 Ariz. 235, 238-39, \u00b6 11, 172 P.3d 423 (App. 2007) (rejecting claim that prosecutorial misconduct barred retrial on double jeopardy grounds and holding there must be \u201cintentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial\u201d) (emphasis added); see also State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 168, 185, 920 P.2d 290 (1996) (where there has been misconduct but no error, or the error is harmless, the proper remedy is generally not reversal but affirmance followed by appropriate sanctions against the offending actor)."},"case_id":12310111,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Similarly, we would be hard-pressed to assume that such a layman has the lawyer's love of precision in language. The record sheds no light as to the specific form or content of the comments Jolliff made to Young. But even if we assume that those comments were Young's sole basis for including the logbooks statement in the letter, it is not unreasonable to believe that Jolliff was careless or at least inartful in his construction of his complaint and that Young was equally careless or inartful in his retelling of the complaint. Given these facts, it was unwarranted for the board to infer that Young had knowledge of the statement's falsity solely from the fact that Jolliff conceded he had not personally been asked to fix the logbooks.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"586 F.2d 1108, 1113","parenthetical":"\"Courts must be cautious about letting libel cases go to the jury under the malice standard where there is no proof that the reporter or his newspaper knew or suspected that the statements in his article were false.\"","sentence":"Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1236-37 (6th Cir.1981) (\u201cWhen the truth is uncertain and seems undiscoverable through further investigation, reliance on other sources is not unreasonable.\u201d); cf. Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1113 (6th Cir.1978) (\u201cCourts must be cautious about letting libel cases go to the jury under the malice standard where there is no proof that the reporter or his newspaper knew or suspected that the statements in his article were false.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"645 F.2d 1227, 1236-37","parenthetical":"\"When the truth is uncertain and seems undiscoverable through further investigation, reliance on other sources is not unreasonable.\"","sentence":"Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1236-37 (6th Cir.1981) (\u201cWhen the truth is uncertain and seems undiscoverable through further investigation, reliance on other sources is not unreasonable.\u201d); cf. Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1113 (6th Cir.1978) (\u201cCourts must be cautious about letting libel cases go to the jury under the malice standard where there is no proof that the reporter or his newspaper knew or suspected that the statements in his article were false.\u201d)."},"case_id":3163812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Considerations of fairness convince us that for purposes of deciding which law applies, the removal proceedings in this case should be viewed as commencing at least on that date, June 28, 1995, when the show cause order had been served and the warrant of detainer lodged.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"47 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1224","parenthetical":"asserting that \"fairness requires that the INS, having placed Mercado under its authority, should also live with the results of that decision\"","sentence":"See Mercado-Amador, 47 F.Supp.2d at 1224 (asserting that \u201cfairness requires that the INS, having placed Mercado under its authority, should also live with the results of that decision\u201d); see also Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999) (noting that \u201c[t]he date at which the [INS] regulations consider a case to have commenced is essentially random\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458","parenthetical":"noting that \"[t]he date at which the [INS] regulations consider a case to have commenced is essentially random\"","sentence":"See Mercado-Amador, 47 F.Supp.2d at 1224 (asserting that \u201cfairness requires that the INS, having placed Mercado under its authority, should also live with the results of that decision\u201d); see also Canela v. United States Dept. of Justice, 64 F.Supp.2d 456, 458 (E.D.Pa.1999) (noting that \u201c[t]he date at which the [INS] regulations consider a case to have commenced is essentially random\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":1757430,"label":"a"}
{"context":"An alien's delay in seeking asylum may weigh against credibility. We, however, have disregarded an alien's failure to claim persecution at the first possible moment where irregularities taint the IJ's other bases for finding the applicant not credible.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"403 F.3d 945, 950-51","parenthetical":"rejecting adverse credibility finding that was \"improper because it relies far too much on [the IJ's] own personal experience and beliefs\" even though one ground was alien's failure to mention persecution at initial airport screening interview","sentence":"Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting adverse credibility finding that was \u201cimproper because it relies far too much on [the IJ\u2019s] own personal experience and beliefs\u201d even though one ground was alien\u2019s failure to mention persecution at initial airport screening interview); cf. Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir.2003) (vacating order of removal when five of six reasons for adverse credibility finding were improper or unsupported). On this record, we cannot say that this last ground \u2014 Kiggundu\u2019s use of a business visa to enter the United States and his failure to immediately seek asylum once in the United States \u2014 is alone sufficient to uphold the adverse credibility finding."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"328 F.3d 962, 970","parenthetical":"vacating order of removal when five of six reasons for adverse credibility finding were improper or unsupported","sentence":"Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 945, 950-51 (7th Cir.2005) (rejecting adverse credibility finding that was \u201cimproper because it relies far too much on [the IJ\u2019s] own personal experience and beliefs\u201d even though one ground was alien\u2019s failure to mention persecution at initial airport screening interview); cf. Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir.2003) (vacating order of removal when five of six reasons for adverse credibility finding were improper or unsupported). On this record, we cannot say that this last ground \u2014 Kiggundu\u2019s use of a business visa to enter the United States and his failure to immediately seek asylum once in the United States \u2014 is alone sufficient to uphold the adverse credibility finding."},"case_id":1591410,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition to claiming that Congress did not intend the stop-time rule to be retroactively applied, Heaven also asserts that the retroactive application violates his due process rights. Even if Congress has been clear that a statute should be applied retroactively, retroactive application of the statute may still be impermissible if it violates a constitutional provision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 U.S. 316, 316","parenthetical":"noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \"within constitutional limits\"","sentence":"See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 267, 267","parenthetical":"noting that \"[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\"","sentence":"See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d)."},"case_id":2536945,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition to claiming that Congress did not intend the stop-time rule to be retroactively applied, Heaven also asserts that the retroactive application violates his due process rights. Even if Congress has been clear that a statute should be applied retroactively, retroactive application of the statute may still be impermissible if it violates a constitutional provision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\"","sentence":"See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"533 U.S. 316, 316","parenthetical":"noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \"within constitutional limits\"","sentence":"See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d)."},"case_id":2536945,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In addition to claiming that Congress did not intend the stop-time rule to be retroactively applied, Heaven also asserts that the retroactive application violates his due process rights. Even if Congress has been clear that a statute should be applied retroactively, retroactive application of the statute may still be impermissible if it violates a constitutional provision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \"within constitutional limits\"","sentence":"See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 267, 267","parenthetical":"noting that \"[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\"","sentence":"See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d)."},"case_id":2536945,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition to claiming that Congress did not intend the stop-time rule to be retroactively applied, Heaven also asserts that the retroactive application violates his due process rights. Even if Congress has been clear that a statute should be applied retroactively, retroactive application of the statute may still be impermissible if it violates a constitutional provision.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \"within constitutional limits\"","sentence":"See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that \"[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\"","sentence":"See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 316,121 S.Ct. 2271 (noting that Congress may enact retrospective laws \u201cwithin constitutional limits\u201d); see also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (noting that \u201c[a]bsent a violation of [a constitutional provision], the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope\u201d)."},"case_id":2536945,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on the district court's findings, we reject Holders' contention that Cronic's presumption applies simply because Shaw conceded the all-but-undisputable fact of his participation in the robbery.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"298 F.3d 375, 381-82","parenthetical":"Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \"nearly conclusive proof' that the defendant committed the crimes, but \"remained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution's case on the issue of intent\"","sentence":"See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.2002) (Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \u201cnearly conclusive proof\u2019 that the defendant committed the crimes, but \u201cremained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution\u2019s case on the issue of intent\u201d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (stating that Cronic\u2019s per se rule applies only when \u201ccounsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\u201d not merely \u201cat specific points\u201d (emphasis added)); White, 341 F.3d at 678 (\u201cThe failure to oppose the prosecution\u2019s case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"535 U.S. 685, 696-98","parenthetical":"stating that Cronic's per se rule applies only when \"counsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\" not merely \"at specific points\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.2002) (Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \u201cnearly conclusive proof\u2019 that the defendant committed the crimes, but \u201cremained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution\u2019s case on the issue of intent\u201d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (stating that Cronic\u2019s per se rule applies only when \u201ccounsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\u201d not merely \u201cat specific points\u201d (emphasis added)); White, 341 F.3d at 678 (\u201cThe failure to oppose the prosecution\u2019s case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\u201d)."},"case_id":5756212,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on the district court's findings, we reject Holders' contention that Cronic's presumption applies simply because Shaw conceded the all-but-undisputable fact of his participation in the robbery.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"298 F.3d 375, 381-82","parenthetical":"Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \"nearly conclusive proof' that the defendant committed the crimes, but \"remained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution's case on the issue of intent\"","sentence":"See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.2002) (Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \u201cnearly conclusive proof\u2019 that the defendant committed the crimes, but \u201cremained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution\u2019s case on the issue of intent\u201d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (stating that Cronic\u2019s per se rule applies only when \u201ccounsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\u201d not merely \u201cat specific points\u201d (emphasis added)); White, 341 F.3d at 678 (\u201cThe failure to oppose the prosecution\u2019s case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that Cronic's per se rule applies only when \"counsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\" not merely \"at specific points\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.2002) (Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \u201cnearly conclusive proof\u2019 that the defendant committed the crimes, but \u201cremained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution\u2019s case on the issue of intent\u201d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (stating that Cronic\u2019s per se rule applies only when \u201ccounsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\u201d not merely \u201cat specific points\u201d (emphasis added)); White, 341 F.3d at 678 (\u201cThe failure to oppose the prosecution\u2019s case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\u201d)."},"case_id":5756212,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Based on the district court's findings, we reject Holders' contention that Cronic's presumption applies simply because Shaw conceded the all-but-undisputable fact of his participation in the robbery.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that Cronic's per se rule applies only when \"counsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\" not merely \"at specific points\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.2002) (Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \u201cnearly conclusive proof\u2019 that the defendant committed the crimes, but \u201cremained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution\u2019s case on the issue of intent\u201d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (stating that Cronic\u2019s per se rule applies only when \u201ccounsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\u201d not merely \u201cat specific points\u201d (emphasis added)); White, 341 F.3d at 678 (\u201cThe failure to oppose the prosecution\u2019s case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"298 F.3d 375, 381-82","parenthetical":"Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \"nearly conclusive proof' that the defendant committed the crimes, but \"remained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution's case on the issue of intent\"","sentence":"See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.2002) (Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \u201cnearly conclusive proof\u2019 that the defendant committed the crimes, but \u201cremained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution\u2019s case on the issue of intent\u201d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (stating that Cronic\u2019s per se rule applies only when \u201ccounsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\u201d not merely \u201cat specific points\u201d (emphasis added)); White, 341 F.3d at 678 (\u201cThe failure to oppose the prosecution\u2019s case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\u201d)."},"case_id":5756212,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Based on the district court's findings, we reject Holders' contention that Cronic's presumption applies simply because Shaw conceded the all-but-undisputable fact of his participation in the robbery.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"341 F.3d 678, 678","parenthetical":"\"The failure to oppose the prosecution's case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\"","sentence":"See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.2002) (Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \u201cnearly conclusive proof\u2019 that the defendant committed the crimes, but \u201cremained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution\u2019s case on the issue of intent\u201d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (stating that Cronic\u2019s per se rule applies only when \u201ccounsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\u201d not merely \u201cat specific points\u201d (emphasis added)); White, 341 F.3d at 678 (\u201cThe failure to oppose the prosecution\u2019s case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"298 F.3d 375, 381-82","parenthetical":"Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \"nearly conclusive proof' that the defendant committed the crimes, but \"remained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution's case on the issue of intent\"","sentence":"See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 381-82 (5th Cir.2002) (Cronic standard does not apply where defense counsel conceded the underlying rape and robbery in view of \u201cnearly conclusive proof\u2019 that the defendant committed the crimes, but \u201cremained active at trial, probing weaknesses in the prosecution\u2019s case on the issue of intent\u201d); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (stating that Cronic\u2019s per se rule applies only when \u201ccounsel fail[s] to oppose the prosecution throughout [a] ... proceeding as a whole,\u201d not merely \u201cat specific points\u201d (emphasis added)); White, 341 F.3d at 678 (\u201cThe failure to oppose the prosecution\u2019s case must involve the entire proceeding, not just isolated portions.\u201d)."},"case_id":5756212,"label":"b"}
{"context":"That is, an employee may fail to prove an \"unlawful employment practice\" and nevertheless prevail on his claim of unlawful retaliation. However, the opposed conduct must fairly fall within the protection of Title VII to sustain a claim of unlawful retaliation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"588 F.2d 695, 695-96","parenthetical":"\"[although the [district] court made no explicit finding that Sias' opposition was based on a reasonable belief that the City's employment practices violated Title VII, such a finding is implicit here\"","sentence":"Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 142 (9th Cir.1978) (\u201cunder the clear language of the \u201copposition\u201d clause of [section] 704(a), a case of retaliation has not been made out unless the \u201cretaliation\u201d relates to the employee\u2019s opposition to a [section] 703 violation\u201d); see also Sias, 588 F.2d at 695-96 (\u201c[although the [district] court made no explicit finding that Sias\u2019 opposition was based on a reasonable belief that the City\u2019s employment practices violated Title VII, such a finding is implicit here\u201d) (footnote omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"586 F.2d 138, 142","parenthetical":"\"under the clear language of the \"opposition\" clause of [section] 704(a","sentence":"Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 142 (9th Cir.1978) (\u201cunder the clear language of the \u201copposition\u201d clause of [section] 704(a), a case of retaliation has not been made out unless the \u201cretaliation\u201d relates to the employee\u2019s opposition to a [section] 703 violation\u201d); see also Sias, 588 F.2d at 695-96 (\u201c[although the [district] court made no explicit finding that Sias\u2019 opposition was based on a reasonable belief that the City\u2019s employment practices violated Title VII, such a finding is implicit here\u201d) (footnote omitted)."},"case_id":655851,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Lyons Aff., Ex. F, Homecoming Farm, Inc. ACVSMR Educ. Materials, ECF No. 95-2. Thus, the evidence indicates that Homecoming has offered services under the ACVSMR mark beginning in 2000. But the length of use of a mark, without more, is not sufficient to show the kind of consumer association required to achieve secondary meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"882 F.Supp. 1173, 1174","parenthetical":"deciding that plaintiffs will likely prevail on secondary significance claim where mark was used for 16 years with \"apparent considerable success\" and \"broad ... and pervasive\" advertising","sentence":"Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 118 F.Supp.2d 92, 111 (D.Mass.2000) (Gertner, J.) (deciding that evidence of more than twenty years of exclusive use of trademark is not sufficient to prove secondary meaning); cf. Shames v. Coontz, 882 F.Supp. 1173, 1174 (D.Mass.1995) (Lasker, J.) (deciding that plaintiffs will likely prevail on secondary significance claim where mark was used for 16 years with \u201capparent considerable success\u201d and \u201cbroad ... and pervasive\u201d advertising) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"581 F.3d 1146, 1146","parenthetical":"\"[C]ourts have summarily rejected claims of secondary meaning predicated solely upon the continued use of the mark for many years[J\"","sentence":"See Art Attacks Ink, 581 F.3d at 1146 (\u201c[C]ourts have summarily rejected claims of secondary meaning predicated solely upon the continued use of the mark for many years[J\u201d) (first alteration in original) (quoting Vision Center v. Opticks, 596 F.2d 111, 119 (5th Cir.1979)); I.P."},"case_id":4090163,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Lyons Aff., Ex. F, Homecoming Farm, Inc. ACVSMR Educ. Materials, ECF No. 95-2. Thus, the evidence indicates that Homecoming has offered services under the ACVSMR mark beginning in 2000. But the length of use of a mark, without more, is not sufficient to show the kind of consumer association required to achieve secondary meaning.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"882 F.Supp. 1173, 1174","parenthetical":"deciding that plaintiffs will likely prevail on secondary significance claim where mark was used for 16 years with \"apparent considerable success\" and \"broad ... and pervasive\" advertising","sentence":"Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 118 F.Supp.2d 92, 111 (D.Mass.2000) (Gertner, J.) (deciding that evidence of more than twenty years of exclusive use of trademark is not sufficient to prove secondary meaning); cf. Shames v. Coontz, 882 F.Supp. 1173, 1174 (D.Mass.1995) (Lasker, J.) (deciding that plaintiffs will likely prevail on secondary significance claim where mark was used for 16 years with \u201capparent considerable success\u201d and \u201cbroad ... and pervasive\u201d advertising) (emphasis added)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"118 F.Supp.2d 92, 111","parenthetical":"deciding that evidence of more than twenty years of exclusive use of trademark is not sufficient to prove secondary meaning","sentence":"Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 118 F.Supp.2d 92, 111 (D.Mass.2000) (Gertner, J.) (deciding that evidence of more than twenty years of exclusive use of trademark is not sufficient to prove secondary meaning); cf. Shames v. Coontz, 882 F.Supp. 1173, 1174 (D.Mass.1995) (Lasker, J.) (deciding that plaintiffs will likely prevail on secondary significance claim where mark was used for 16 years with \u201capparent considerable success\u201d and \u201cbroad ... and pervasive\u201d advertising) (emphasis added)."},"case_id":4090163,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The theory of a hostile-environment claim is that the cumulative effect of ongoing harassment is abusive. It would not be right to require a judgment against Haf-ford if the sum of all of the harassment he experienced was abusive, but the incidents could be separated into several categories, with no one category containing enough incidents to amount to \"pervasive\" harassment. Although there is enough evidence of racial harassment for that claim to stand on its own, the district court should allow at trial for consideration of the possibility that the racial animus of Hafford's co-workers was augmented by their bias against his religion.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"allowing white men to pursue sex discrimination claim based on affirmative action policy that sought to increase employment of women and racial minorities","sentence":"See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415-17 (10th Cir.1987) (answering in the affirmative the question \u201cwhether incidents of racial harassment which may, by themselves, be insufficient to support a racially hostile work environment claim can be combined with incidents of sexual harassment to prove a pervasive pattern of discriminatory harassment in violation of Title VII\u201d); cf. Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.1989) (allowing white men to pursue sex discrimination claim based on affirmative action policy that sought to increase employment of women and racial minorities)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"833 F.2d 1406, 1415-17","parenthetical":"answering in the affirmative the question \"whether incidents of racial harassment which may, by themselves, be insufficient to support a racially hostile work environment claim can be combined with incidents of sexual harassment to prove a pervasive pattern of discriminatory harassment in violation of Title VII\"","sentence":"See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415-17 (10th Cir.1987) (answering in the affirmative the question \u201cwhether incidents of racial harassment which may, by themselves, be insufficient to support a racially hostile work environment claim can be combined with incidents of sexual harassment to prove a pervasive pattern of discriminatory harassment in violation of Title VII\u201d); cf. Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.1989) (allowing white men to pursue sex discrimination claim based on affirmative action policy that sought to increase employment of women and racial minorities)."},"case_id":11545391,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of this mandate, the suspension or rescission of a noncustodial parent's visitation rights is a grave matter and one not to be entered into lightly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"146 A.2d 365, 367","parenthetical":"\"It is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\"","sentence":"See Breznick v. Breznick, 127 Vt. 80, 82-83, 238 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1968) (\u201c[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\u201d); Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 157, 513 A.2d 612, 614 (1986) (\u201cA visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\u201d); see also In re Duckworth, 146 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (\u201cIt is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"127 Vt. 80, 82-83","parenthetical":"\"[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\"","sentence":"See Breznick v. Breznick, 127 Vt. 80, 82-83, 238 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1968) (\u201c[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\u201d); Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 157, 513 A.2d 612, 614 (1986) (\u201cA visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\u201d); see also In re Duckworth, 146 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (\u201cIt is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":226738,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of this mandate, the suspension or rescission of a noncustodial parent's visitation rights is a grave matter and one not to be entered into lightly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"146 A.2d 365, 367","parenthetical":"\"It is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\"","sentence":"See Breznick v. Breznick, 127 Vt. 80, 82-83, 238 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1968) (\u201c[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\u201d); Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 157, 513 A.2d 612, 614 (1986) (\u201cA visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\u201d); see also In re Duckworth, 146 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (\u201cIt is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"238 A.2d 643, 645-46","parenthetical":"\"[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\"","sentence":"See Breznick v. Breznick, 127 Vt. 80, 82-83, 238 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1968) (\u201c[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\u201d); Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 157, 513 A.2d 612, 614 (1986) (\u201cA visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\u201d); see also In re Duckworth, 146 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (\u201cIt is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":226738,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of this mandate, the suspension or rescission of a noncustodial parent's visitation rights is a grave matter and one not to be entered into lightly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"146 A.2d 365, 367","parenthetical":"\"It is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\"","sentence":"See Breznick v. Breznick, 127 Vt. 80, 82-83, 238 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1968) (\u201c[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\u201d); Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 157, 513 A.2d 612, 614 (1986) (\u201cA visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\u201d); see also In re Duckworth, 146 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (\u201cIt is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"147 Vt. 154, 157","parenthetical":"\"A visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\"","sentence":"See Breznick v. Breznick, 127 Vt. 80, 82-83, 238 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1968) (\u201c[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\u201d); Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 157, 513 A.2d 612, 614 (1986) (\u201cA visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\u201d); see also In re Duckworth, 146 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (\u201cIt is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":226738,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because of this mandate, the suspension or rescission of a noncustodial parent's visitation rights is a grave matter and one not to be entered into lightly.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"146 A.2d 365, 367","parenthetical":"\"It is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\"","sentence":"See Breznick v. Breznick, 127 Vt. 80, 82-83, 238 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1968) (\u201c[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\u201d); Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 157, 513 A.2d 612, 614 (1986) (\u201cA visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\u201d); see also In re Duckworth, 146 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (\u201cIt is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"513 A.2d 612, 614","parenthetical":"\"A visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\"","sentence":"See Breznick v. Breznick, 127 Vt. 80, 82-83, 238 A.2d 643, 645-46 (1968) (\u201c[T]he law attempts to preserve . . . the relationship between each parent and child, in spite of the legal separation [and, therefore, unless] some sufficient opposing cause, relating to the welfare of the child, is shown, a visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent as a matter of course.\u201d); Cleverly v. Cleverly, 147 Vt. 154, 157, 513 A.2d 612, 614 (1986) (\u201cA visitation privilege of some sort is the right of a parent unless good cause exists to deny visitation.\u201d); see also In re Duckworth, 146 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1958) (\u201cIt is against public policy to destroy or to limit the relation of a parent and child [and, therefore, as] a general rule, both parents should see their children and the estrangement of parent and child should be avoided wherever possible.\u201d)."},"case_id":226738,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In and of itself, Paragraph 6 is no more than a legal conclusion. Therefore, the language in that paragraph does not sustain this complaint against a challenge on sufficiency grounds.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"1999 WL 1077075, *1","parenthetical":"rejecting argument that plaintiff properly pleaded that defendant was \"debt collector\" when only conclusions of law were offered","sentence":"See Garland v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 1999 WL 1077075 *1 (E.D.Pa.) (rejecting argument that plaintiff properly pleaded that defendant was \u201cdebt collector\u201d when only conclusions of law were offered); Williams v. Edelman, 408 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (S.D.Fla.2005) (stating that mere allegation that defendant is a \u201cdebt collector\u201d fails to satisfy pleading requirement); see also Bilal v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2006 WL 1650008 *3 (N.D.Ill.) (dismissing count which identifies defendant as \u201cdebt collector\u201d without any factual basis); and see also Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 127 F.Supp.2d 889, 896 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (stating in dicta that legal conclusions regarding defendant\u2019s alleged status as \u201cdebt collector\u201d insufficient to survive motion to dismiss; complaint dismissed for lack of factual allegations of FDCPA violation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2006 WL 1650008, *3","parenthetical":"dismissing count which identifies defendant as \"debt collector\" without any factual basis","sentence":"See Garland v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 1999 WL 1077075 *1 (E.D.Pa.) (rejecting argument that plaintiff properly pleaded that defendant was \u201cdebt collector\u201d when only conclusions of law were offered); Williams v. Edelman, 408 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (S.D.Fla.2005) (stating that mere allegation that defendant is a \u201cdebt collector\u201d fails to satisfy pleading requirement); see also Bilal v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2006 WL 1650008 *3 (N.D.Ill.) (dismissing count which identifies defendant as \u201cdebt collector\u201d without any factual basis); and see also Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 127 F.Supp.2d 889, 896 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (stating in dicta that legal conclusions regarding defendant\u2019s alleged status as \u201cdebt collector\u201d insufficient to survive motion to dismiss; complaint dismissed for lack of factual allegations of FDCPA violation)."},"case_id":3650289,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In and of itself, Paragraph 6 is no more than a legal conclusion. Therefore, the language in that paragraph does not sustain this complaint against a challenge on sufficiency grounds.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"408 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265","parenthetical":"stating that mere allegation that defendant is a \"debt collector\" fails to satisfy pleading requirement","sentence":"See Garland v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 1999 WL 1077075 *1 (E.D.Pa.) (rejecting argument that plaintiff properly pleaded that defendant was \u201cdebt collector\u201d when only conclusions of law were offered); Williams v. Edelman, 408 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (S.D.Fla.2005) (stating that mere allegation that defendant is a \u201cdebt collector\u201d fails to satisfy pleading requirement); see also Bilal v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2006 WL 1650008 *3 (N.D.Ill.) (dismissing count which identifies defendant as \u201cdebt collector\u201d without any factual basis); and see also Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 127 F.Supp.2d 889, 896 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (stating in dicta that legal conclusions regarding defendant\u2019s alleged status as \u201cdebt collector\u201d insufficient to survive motion to dismiss; complaint dismissed for lack of factual allegations of FDCPA violation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2006 WL 1650008, *3","parenthetical":"dismissing count which identifies defendant as \"debt collector\" without any factual basis","sentence":"See Garland v. Enterprise Leasing Co., 1999 WL 1077075 *1 (E.D.Pa.) (rejecting argument that plaintiff properly pleaded that defendant was \u201cdebt collector\u201d when only conclusions of law were offered); Williams v. Edelman, 408 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1265 (S.D.Fla.2005) (stating that mere allegation that defendant is a \u201cdebt collector\u201d fails to satisfy pleading requirement); see also Bilal v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 2006 WL 1650008 *3 (N.D.Ill.) (dismissing count which identifies defendant as \u201cdebt collector\u201d without any factual basis); and see also Havens-Tobias v. Eagle, 127 F.Supp.2d 889, 896 (S.D.Ohio 2001) (stating in dicta that legal conclusions regarding defendant\u2019s alleged status as \u201cdebt collector\u201d insufficient to survive motion to dismiss; complaint dismissed for lack of factual allegations of FDCPA violation)."},"case_id":3650289,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Many courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that \" 'mere legal error' is insufficient to support a finding of ethical misconduct.\" We note that the majority of cases cited by both petitioner and the commission concerning judicial misconduct based on legal error resulted from multiple instances of misconduct and involved more than a single litigant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a judge committed misconduct when, for six years, she followed a course of judicial conduct that violated the legal and constitutional rights of the parties appearing before her","sentence":"See Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1162-63 (Me.1985) (holding that \u201c[something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct\u201d); see also In re Scott, 377 Mass. 364, 386 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1979) (holding that a judge committed misconduct when, for six years, she followed a course of judicial conduct that violated the legal and constitutional rights of the parties appearing before her)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"487 A.2d 1158, 1162-63","parenthetical":"holding that \"[something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct\"","sentence":"See Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1162-63 (Me.1985) (holding that \u201c[something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct\u201d); see also In re Scott, 377 Mass. 364, 386 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1979) (holding that a judge committed misconduct when, for six years, she followed a course of judicial conduct that violated the legal and constitutional rights of the parties appearing before her)."},"case_id":8334522,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Many courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that \" 'mere legal error' is insufficient to support a finding of ethical misconduct.\" We note that the majority of cases cited by both petitioner and the commission concerning judicial misconduct based on legal error resulted from multiple instances of misconduct and involved more than a single litigant.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"386 N.E.2d 218, 221","parenthetical":"holding that a judge committed misconduct when, for six years, she followed a course of judicial conduct that violated the legal and constitutional rights of the parties appearing before her","sentence":"See Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1162-63 (Me.1985) (holding that \u201c[something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct\u201d); see also In re Scott, 377 Mass. 364, 386 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1979) (holding that a judge committed misconduct when, for six years, she followed a course of judicial conduct that violated the legal and constitutional rights of the parties appearing before her)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"487 A.2d 1158, 1162-63","parenthetical":"holding that \"[something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct\"","sentence":"See Matter of Benoit, 487 A.2d 1158, 1162-63 (Me.1985) (holding that \u201c[something more than a mere error of law is required to constitute misconduct\u201d); see also In re Scott, 377 Mass. 364, 386 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1979) (holding that a judge committed misconduct when, for six years, she followed a course of judicial conduct that violated the legal and constitutional rights of the parties appearing before her)."},"case_id":8334522,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that appellant was entitled to a self-defense instruction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim","sentence":"See State v. Bongalis, 180 W.Va. 584, 378 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant); see also Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d at 891 (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant","sentence":"See State v. Bongalis, 180 W.Va. 584, 378 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant); see also Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d at 891 (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense."},"case_id":8577421,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that appellant was entitled to a self-defense instruction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant","sentence":"See State v. Bongalis, 180 W.Va. 584, 378 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant); see also Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d at 891 (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 S.E.2d 891, 891","parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim","sentence":"See State v. Bongalis, 180 W.Va. 584, 378 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant); see also Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d at 891 (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense."},"case_id":8577421,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that appellant was entitled to a self-defense instruction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim","sentence":"See State v. Bongalis, 180 W.Va. 584, 378 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant); see also Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d at 891 (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant","sentence":"See State v. Bongalis, 180 W.Va. 584, 378 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant); see also Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d at 891 (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense."},"case_id":8577421,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Consequently, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that appellant was entitled to a self-defense instruction.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"415 S.E.2d 891, 891","parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim","sentence":"See State v. Bongalis, 180 W.Va. 584, 378 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant); see also Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d at 891 (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"trial court's refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant","sentence":"See State v. Bongalis, 180 W.Va. 584, 378 S.E.2d 449 (1989) (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction upheld where appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence that victim was about to inflict death or serious bodily injury to appellant); see also Asbury, 187 W.Va. 87, 415 S.E.2d at 891 (trial court\u2019s refusal to give self-defense instruction was affirmed where no evidence produced to show accused was threatened by victim). Accordingly, the trial court committed no error in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense."},"case_id":8577421,"label":"b"}
{"context":"He also argues that the district court erred in relying on those statements despite the government's failure to provide sufficient evidence corroborating their content. But we have no need to consider either of those issues because the record contains sufficient facts -- affected neither by the alleged coercion nor by the lack of corroboration -- to support the district court's conclusion that Esmail was \"part of' al Qaeda at the time of his capture.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"609 F.3d 416, 423","parenthetical":"clarifying that in habeas appeals involving Guantanamo Bay detainees, we review district court fact findings for clear error, and we review the ultimate issue of whether the detainee was \"part of' al Qaeda de novo","sentence":"See Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 724-25 (D.C.Cir.2010) (\u201c[T]he [Authorization for Use of Military Force] authorizes the Executive to detain, at the least, any individual who is functionally part of al Qaeda.\u201d); see also Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C.Cir.2010) (clarifying that in habeas appeals involving Guantanamo Bay detainees, we review district court fact findings for clear error, and we review the ultimate issue of whether the detainee was \u201cpart of\u2019 al Qaeda de novo)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"610 F.3d 718, 724-25","parenthetical":"\"[T]he [Authorization for Use of Military Force] authorizes the Executive to detain, at the least, any individual who is functionally part of al Qaeda.\"","sentence":"See Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 724-25 (D.C.Cir.2010) (\u201c[T]he [Authorization for Use of Military Force] authorizes the Executive to detain, at the least, any individual who is functionally part of al Qaeda.\u201d); see also Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 423 (D.C.Cir.2010) (clarifying that in habeas appeals involving Guantanamo Bay detainees, we review district court fact findings for clear error, and we review the ultimate issue of whether the detainee was \u201cpart of\u2019 al Qaeda de novo)."},"case_id":4202294,"label":"b"}
{"context":"NEPA regulations direct the agency to consider the degree of adverse effect on a species, not the impact on individuals of that species.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"359 F.3d 1257, 1276","parenthetical":"\"[Issuance of an incidental take statement 'anticipating' the loss of some members of a threatened species does not automatically lead to the requirement to prepare a full EIS.\"","sentence":"See Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1240 (\u201c[I]t does not follow that the presence of some negative effects neces sarily rises to the level of demonstrating a significant effect on the environment.\u201d); see also Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1276(10th Cir.2004) (\u201c[Issuance of an incidental take statement \u2018anticipating\u2019 the loss of some members of a threatened species does not automatically lead to the requirement to prepare a full EIS.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"428 F.3d 1240, 1240","parenthetical":"\"[I]t does not follow that the presence of some negative effects neces sarily rises to the level of demonstrating a significant effect on the environment.\"","sentence":"See Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at 1240 (\u201c[I]t does not follow that the presence of some negative effects neces sarily rises to the level of demonstrating a significant effect on the environment.\u201d); see also Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1276(10th Cir.2004) (\u201c[Issuance of an incidental take statement \u2018anticipating\u2019 the loss of some members of a threatened species does not automatically lead to the requirement to prepare a full EIS.\u201d)."},"case_id":3271669,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the court has not invoked this rule in every capital case.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 F.Supp. 807, 816","parenthetical":"discussing SS 17-110.1 and noting that Virginia's contemporaneous objection rule applies to \"other issues\"","sentence":"See Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 452 S.E.2d 862, 871 (1995) (reviewing on the merits capital appellant's challenge to Commonwealth\u2019s opening statement, after noting that appellant \u201cfailed to object to any of the opening statement\"); cf. Briley v. Bass, 584 F.Supp. 807, 816 (E.D.Va.1984) (discussing \u00a7 17-110.1 and noting that Virginia\u2019s contemporaneous objection rule applies to \u201cother issues\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"reviewing on the merits capital appellant's challenge to Commonwealth's opening statement, after noting that appellant \"failed to object to any of the opening statement\"","sentence":"See Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 452 S.E.2d 862, 871 (1995) (reviewing on the merits capital appellant's challenge to Commonwealth\u2019s opening statement, after noting that appellant \u201cfailed to object to any of the opening statement\"); cf. Briley v. Bass, 584 F.Supp. 807, 816 (E.D.Va.1984) (discussing \u00a7 17-110.1 and noting that Virginia\u2019s contemporaneous objection rule applies to \u201cother issues\u201d)."},"case_id":7637785,"label":"b"}
{"context":"But the court has not invoked this rule in every capital case.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"452 S.E.2d 862, 871","parenthetical":"reviewing on the merits capital appellant's challenge to Commonwealth's opening statement, after noting that appellant \"failed to object to any of the opening statement\"","sentence":"See Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 452 S.E.2d 862, 871 (1995) (reviewing on the merits capital appellant's challenge to Commonwealth\u2019s opening statement, after noting that appellant \u201cfailed to object to any of the opening statement\"); cf. Briley v. Bass, 584 F.Supp. 807, 816 (E.D.Va.1984) (discussing \u00a7 17-110.1 and noting that Virginia\u2019s contemporaneous objection rule applies to \u201cother issues\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"584 F.Supp. 807, 816","parenthetical":"discussing SS 17-110.1 and noting that Virginia's contemporaneous objection rule applies to \"other issues\"","sentence":"See Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 452 S.E.2d 862, 871 (1995) (reviewing on the merits capital appellant's challenge to Commonwealth\u2019s opening statement, after noting that appellant \u201cfailed to object to any of the opening statement\"); cf. Briley v. Bass, 584 F.Supp. 807, 816 (E.D.Va.1984) (discussing \u00a7 17-110.1 and noting that Virginia\u2019s contemporaneous objection rule applies to \u201cother issues\u201d)."},"case_id":7637785,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In addition, the shocks the conscience standard recognizes \"the dilemma of conflicting obligations.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"398 F.3d 198, 198","parenthetical":"noting physicians must be able \"to operate effectively to protect the interests of the individuals about whom they [make assessments of risk] and of the public\"","sentence":"Olivier, 398 F.3d at 198 (noting physicians must be able \u201cto operate effectively to protect the interests of the individuals about whom they [make assessments of risk] and of the public\u201d); see also Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 82 (\u201cIn the apparent absence of harmless options at the time decisions must be made, an attempt to choose the least of evils is not itself shocking\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"485 F.3d 82, 82","parenthetical":"\"In the apparent absence of harmless options at the time decisions must be made, an attempt to choose the least of evils is not itself shocking\"","sentence":"Olivier, 398 F.3d at 198 (noting physicians must be able \u201cto operate effectively to protect the interests of the individuals about whom they [make assessments of risk] and of the public\u201d); see also Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 82 (\u201cIn the apparent absence of harmless options at the time decisions must be made, an attempt to choose the least of evils is not itself shocking\u201d)."},"case_id":5876579,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In reviewing an award of attorneys' fees, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. However, we require district courts \"to clearly set forth their reasoning for fee awards so that we will have a sufficient basis to review\" them.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"130 S.Ct. 1662, 1676","parenthetical":"in analogous statutory fee-shifting case, remanding for re-calculation of attorneys' fees where district court's methodology prevented appellate courts from exercising \"meaningful appellate review\"","sentence":"Cf. Perdue v. Kenny A., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1676, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010) (in analogous statutory fee-shifting case, remanding for re-calculation of attorneys\u2019 fees where district court\u2019s methodology prevented appellate courts from exercising \u201cmeaningful appellate review\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"243 F.3d 728, 728","parenthetical":"district court must perform \"extensive analysis and inquiry before determining the amount of fees\" so court of appeals can exercise its \"independent interest in monitoring ... awards\"","sentence":"Id. at 301; see also Cendant PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d at 728 (district court must perform \u201cextensive analysis and inquiry before determining the amount of fees\u201d so court of appeals can exercise its \u201cindependent interest in monitoring ... awards\u201d)."},"case_id":4079071,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In reviewing an award of attorneys' fees, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. However, we require district courts \"to clearly set forth their reasoning for fee awards so that we will have a sufficient basis to review\" them.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in analogous statutory fee-shifting case, remanding for re-calculation of attorneys' fees where district court's methodology prevented appellate courts from exercising \"meaningful appellate review\"","sentence":"Cf. Perdue v. Kenny A., \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1676, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010) (in analogous statutory fee-shifting case, remanding for re-calculation of attorneys\u2019 fees where district court\u2019s methodology prevented appellate courts from exercising \u201cmeaningful appellate review\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"243 F.3d 728, 728","parenthetical":"district court must perform \"extensive analysis and inquiry before determining the amount of fees\" so court of appeals can exercise its \"independent interest in monitoring ... awards\"","sentence":"Id. at 301; see also Cendant PRIDES Litig., 243 F.3d at 728 (district court must perform \u201cextensive analysis and inquiry before determining the amount of fees\u201d so court of appeals can exercise its \u201cindependent interest in monitoring ... awards\u201d)."},"case_id":4079071,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Since its enactment in 1967, the OTCA has applied to some claims against public bodies that were not barred by sovereign immunity. At common law, sovereign immunity applied to municipal corporations, such as the city, only when they were engaged in \"governmental functions\"; municipal corporations had no sovereign immunity as to \"proprietary functions.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"308 Or 523, 523","parenthetical":"OTCA \"widened\" class of plaintiffs \"by removing the requirement that an injured party show that the municipal corporation's activity that led to the injury was a proprietary one\"","sentence":"See Or Laws 1967, ch 627, \u00a7 2 (\u201cSubject to the limitations of this Act, every public body is liable for its torts * * * whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.\u201d), codified as since amended at ORS 30.265(1) (\u201cSubject to the limitations of ORS 30.260 to 30.300, every public body is subject to action or suit for its torts * * * whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function * * *.\u201d); Hale, 308 Or at 523 (OTCA \u201cwidened\u201d class of plaintiffs \u201cby removing the requirement that an injured party show that the municipal corporation\u2019s activity that led to the injury was a proprietary one\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"308 Or 508, 518-19","parenthetical":"noting that maintenance of roads and streets had been considered to be proprietary activity, while operation of a city park had been considered to be governmental","sentence":"Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 518-19, 783 P2d 506 (1990) (noting that maintenance of roads and streets had been considered to be proprietary activity, while operation of a city park had been considered to be governmental). With the enactment of the OTCA, the legislature effectively abolished the \u201cgovernmental\/proprietary\u201d function distinction, making both types of claims subject to the limitations contained within the OTCA."},"case_id":3667686,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36","parenthetical":"court approved finding of prior conviction when \"state introduced a certified copy of California's Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\" because \"[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including 'a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.' \"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Ariz. 314, n. 4","parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"984 P.2d 16, 27","parenthetical":"court approved finding of prior conviction when \"state introduced a certified copy of California's Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\" because \"[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including 'a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.' \"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Ariz. 314, n. 4","parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"143 Ariz. 403, 403","parenthetical":"court approved finding of prior conviction when \"state introduced a certified copy of California's Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\" because \"[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including 'a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.' \"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Ariz. 314, n. 4","parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"694 P.2d 233, 233","parenthetical":"court approved finding of prior conviction when \"state introduced a certified copy of California's Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\" because \"[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including 'a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.' \"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Ariz. 314, n. 4","parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"154 Ariz. 124, 132","parenthetical":"without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \"to prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Ariz. 314, n. 4","parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"741 P.2d 257, 265","parenthetical":"without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \"to prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Ariz. 314, n. 4","parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"147 Ariz. 330, 338-39","parenthetical":"\"documents ... from the Department of Corrections' file on the defendant\" sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Ariz. 314, n. 4","parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"207 Ariz. 314, n. 4","parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"710 P.2d 440, 448-49","parenthetical":"\"documents ... from the Department of Corrections' file on the defendant\" sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36","parenthetical":"court approved finding of prior conviction when \"state introduced a certified copy of California's Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\" because \"[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including 'a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.' \"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"984 P.2d 16, 27","parenthetical":"court approved finding of prior conviction when \"state introduced a certified copy of California's Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\" because \"[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including 'a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.' \"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"143 Ariz. 403, 403","parenthetical":"court approved finding of prior conviction when \"state introduced a certified copy of California's Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\" because \"[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including 'a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.' \"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"694 P.2d 233, 233","parenthetical":"court approved finding of prior conviction when \"state introduced a certified copy of California's Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\" because \"[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including 'a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.' \"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"154 Ariz. 124, 132","parenthetical":"without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \"to prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"741 P.2d 257, 265","parenthetical":"without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \"to prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\"","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"147 Ariz. 330, 338-39","parenthetical":"\"documents ... from the Department of Corrections' file on the defendant\" sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 17 Robles argues that Nash is distinguishable from Hauss because Nash committed his crime and was sentenced before Hauss was decided. But the result in Nash was not based on those procedural facts, our supreme court has continued to follow Nash, and we are bound by its decisions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"710 P.2d 440, 448-49","parenthetical":"\"documents ... from the Department of Corrections' file on the defendant\" sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"courts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court","sentence":"State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, n. 4, 86 P.3d 370, 374 n. 4 (2004) (\u201ccourts of this state are bound by the decisions of\" Arizona Supreme Court); see White, 160 Ariz. at 28, 770 P.2d at 332 (applying Nash); see also State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, \u00b6\u00b6 37, 36, 984 P.2d 16, 27 (1999) (court approved finding of prior conviction when \u201cstate introduced a certified copy of California\u2019s Disposition of Arrest and Court Action\u201d because \u201c[t]he state can make that showing through the use of extrinsic evidence, including \u2018a certified copy of a judgment of conviction.\u2019 \u201d) (emphasis added), quoting Nash, 143 Ariz. at 403, 694 P.2d at 233; State v. Hurley, 154 Ariz. 124, 132, 741 P.2d 257, 265 (1987) (without specifying which documents were required, but finding a presentence report insufficient, court stated, \u201cto prove prior convictions, the state must offer in evidence a certified copy of the documents establishing the conviction\u201d); State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338-39, 710 P.2d 440, 448-49 (1985) (\u201cdocuments ... from the Department of Corrections\u2019 file on the defendant\u201d sufficient to prove crime committed while defendant was on release status); State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 579, 804 P.2d 109, 112 (App.1990) (same as Hurley). In sum, relying on the certified copy of the DOC documents showing Robles\u2019s prior convictions as well as testimony that linked those records to him, the trial court had sufficient evidence before it to find he had prior convictions."},"case_id":5269086,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 63, 74-75","parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 63, 74-75","parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"468 U.S. 63, 74-75","parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, a defendant must at the very least know he is being deceptive while sending multiple commercial emails. Under Mor-issette, and its progeny, this satisfies the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \"evil-meaning mind\" requirement with respect to that element of the crime","sentence":"Cf. Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 432 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (interpreting Yermian as holding that requiring government to prove defendant knowingly and willingly made a false statement satisfied the \u201cevil-meaning mind\u201d requirement with respect to that element of the crime)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \"trap for the unwary\"","sentence":"See U.S. v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74-75, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984) (holding statute imposing criminal sanctions for deliberately false statements submitted to federal agency, even without a showing that defendant knew they were being submitted to the federal government, did not constitute a \u201ctrap for the unwary\u201d)."},"case_id":3941065,"label":"b"}
{"context":"We previously have examined the concept of scienter, and the allegations of scienter that must be made to survive a motion to dismiss, in the context of claims under SS 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. SS 78j(b) (1982), and SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. SS 240.10b-5 (1986). Insofar as these cases deal with the adequacy of allegations of scienter, they are applicable to claims under the Williams Act.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"472 U.S. 1, 10","parenthetical":"SS 14(e) is \"modeled on the anti-fraud provisions of SS 10(b) ... and Rule 10b-5\"","sentence":"Chris-Craft, supra, 480 F.2d at 362 (principles developed under Rule 10b-5 are applicable in determining whether \u00a7 14(e) violations were committed); see also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (\u00a7 14(e) is \u201cmodeled on the anti-fraud provisions of \u00a7 10(b) ... and Rule 10b-5\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"480 F.2d 362, 362","parenthetical":"principles developed under Rule 10b-5 are applicable in determining whether SS 14(e","sentence":"Chris-Craft, supra, 480 F.2d at 362 (principles developed under Rule 10b-5 are applicable in determining whether \u00a7 14(e) violations were committed); see also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (\u00a7 14(e) is \u201cmodeled on the anti-fraud provisions of \u00a7 10(b) ... and Rule 10b-5\u201d)."},"case_id":1369240,"label":"b"}
{"context":"84. Class certification requires also that the class representatives represent adequately the interests of the class. Although it is not necessary for the putative class representatives' claims to be identical to those of absent class members, due process precludes certification if the named plaintiffs possess potentially conflicting interests that may impair the vigorous prosecution of the class claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"612 F.2d 84, 109-110","parenthetical":"possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 F.3d 631, 631","parenthetical":"\"presently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs' interests and vice versa\"","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"case_id":11989675,"label":"b"}
{"context":"84. Class certification requires also that the class representatives represent adequately the interests of the class. Although it is not necessary for the putative class representatives' claims to be identical to those of absent class members, due process precludes certification if the named plaintiffs possess potentially conflicting interests that may impair the vigorous prosecution of the class claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 F.3d 631, 631","parenthetical":"\"presently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs' interests and vice versa\"","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"case_id":11989675,"label":"b"}
{"context":"84. Class certification requires also that the class representatives represent adequately the interests of the class. Although it is not necessary for the putative class representatives' claims to be identical to those of absent class members, due process precludes certification if the named plaintiffs possess potentially conflicting interests that may impair the vigorous prosecution of the class claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 F.3d 631, 631","parenthetical":"\"presently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs' interests and vice versa\"","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"case_id":11989675,"label":"a"}
{"context":"84. Class certification requires also that the class representatives represent adequately the interests of the class. Although it is not necessary for the putative class representatives' claims to be identical to those of absent class members, due process precludes certification if the named plaintiffs possess potentially conflicting interests that may impair the vigorous prosecution of the class claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 F.3d 631, 631","parenthetical":"\"presently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs' interests and vice versa\"","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"case_id":11989675,"label":"b"}
{"context":"84. Class certification requires also that the class representatives represent adequately the interests of the class. Although it is not necessary for the putative class representatives' claims to be identical to those of absent class members, due process precludes certification if the named plaintiffs possess potentially conflicting interests that may impair the vigorous prosecution of the class claims.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"83 F.3d 631, 631","parenthetical":"\"presently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs' interests and vice versa\"","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"788 F.2d 918, 929","parenthetical":"holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation","sentence":"See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631 (\u201cpresently injured class representatives cannot adequately represent the future plaintiffs\u2019 interests and vice versa\u201d); GM Trucks 55 F.2d at 801 (\u201c[W]e must be concerned that the individual owners had no incentive to maximize the recovery of the government entities; they could skew the terms of the settlement to their own benefit.\u201d); contrast Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 109-110 (3d Cir.1979) (possible disagreement among class members as to appropriate relief is no bar to certification at the liability stage), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Link v. Mercedes-Benz, 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.1986) (holding in suit against manufacturers and dealers for price fixing or repairs that fact that class members obtained repairs from different dealerships did not create antagonism to preclude finding of adequate representation)."},"case_id":11989675,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. \"Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"625 F.2d 486, 489-90","parenthetical":"holding an applicant for a disabled child's annuity was denied due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 1334, 1352","parenthetical":"concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"case_id":4037477,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. \"Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 1334, 1352","parenthetical":"concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"91 F.3d 630, 634-35","parenthetical":"concluding that a statute's mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"case_id":4037477,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. \"Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 1334, 1352","parenthetical":"concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"368 F.3d 549, 559-60","parenthetical":"affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"case_id":4037477,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. \"Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 1334, 1352","parenthetical":"concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"587 F.2d 345, 354","parenthetical":"\"[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\"","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"case_id":4037477,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. \"Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 1334, 1352","parenthetical":"concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"742 F.2d 1128, 1132","parenthetical":"refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"case_id":4037477,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. \"Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"914 F.2d 1197, 1203","parenthetical":"\"An applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\"","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 1334, 1352","parenthetical":"concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"case_id":4037477,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. \"Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"692 F.2d 1212, 1214","parenthetical":"affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 1334, 1352","parenthetical":"concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"case_id":4037477,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, seven of our sister circuits have addressed similar questions concerning statutorily mandated benefits. \"Every regional circuit to address the question ... has concluded that applicants for benefits, no less than benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of public welfare entitlements.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"603 F.2d 118, 119","parenthetical":"holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 F.3d 1334, 1352","parenthetical":"concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process","sentence":"Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir.2005); see, e.g., Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489-90 (3d Cir.1980) (holding an applicant for a disabled child\u2019s annuity was denied due process); Mallette v. Arlington Cnty. Employees\u2019 Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 634-35 (4th Cir.1996) (concluding that a statute\u2019s mandatory language gives an applicant a property interest in retirement benefits which triggers procedural due process protection); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 559-60 (6th Cir.2004) (affirming that eligible applicants for Medicaid benefits have a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes procedural due process); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir.1978) (\u201c[Benefit] denials do not necessarily deserve less due process than terminations.\u201d); Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., Iowa, 742 F.2d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir.1984) (refusing to distinguish between applicants and recipients when analyzing the due process requirements for determining eligibility for Iowa welfare benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (\u201cAn applicant for social security benefits has a property interest in those benefits.\u201d); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir.1982) (affirming that applicants for federal rent subsidies are entitled to due process protection); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir.1979) (holding that applicants for welfare benefits had a property interest or legitimate claim of entitlement and were entitled to due process to protect that interest); see also Cook v. Principi, 318 F.3d 1334, 1352 (Fed.Cir.2002) (en banc) (Gajarsa, J. dissenting) (concluding that the statutory mandate of veteran disability benefits entitles applicants to procedural due process)."},"case_id":4037477,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But cf. Thomas v. Adams (In re Gary Brew Enters.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"in debtor's adversary proceeding against third parties, bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because the debtor's discrimination claims were properly characterized as \"personal injury tort\" claims within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. SS 157(b","sentence":"Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (Peterson, C.J.) (concluding that racial discrimination claim was in the nature of a \"personal injury tort\u201d necessitating trial in the district court); see also Williamson v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 150 B.R. 367, 368 (E.D.Va.1993); cf. Boyer v. Balanoff (In re Boyer), 93 B.R. 313 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1988) (Gerling, J.) (in debtor\u2019s adversary proceeding against third parties, bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because the debtor\u2019s discrimination claims were properly characterized as \"personal injury tort\u201d claims within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 157(b)(5)); Smith v. New York State Higher Education Servs."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that racial discrimination claim was in the nature of a \"personal injury tort\" necessitating trial in the district court","sentence":"Ltd.), 198 B.R. 616 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1996) (Peterson, C.J.) (concluding that racial discrimination claim was in the nature of a \"personal injury tort\u201d necessitating trial in the district court); see also Williamson v. Patterson (In re Patterson), 150 B.R. 367, 368 (E.D.Va.1993); cf. Boyer v. Balanoff (In re Boyer), 93 B.R. 313 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1988) (Gerling, J.) (in debtor\u2019s adversary proceeding against third parties, bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction because the debtor\u2019s discrimination claims were properly characterized as \"personal injury tort\u201d claims within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 157(b)(5)); Smith v. New York State Higher Education Servs."},"case_id":940498,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendant, however, claims that \"the IAD is the exclusive means to secure the presence of a defendant for purposes of prosecution.\" Br. of Appellant at 14. Defendant's contention is clearly mistaken. First, Indiana has definitively denominated two methods of securing the presence of defendants who are in the custody of foreign jurisdictions -- the IAD pursuant to Ind.Code SS 35-33-10-4 and the Writ set forth in Ind.Code SS 35-33-10-5. Second, as we discussed supra, the Writ has continued to be accepted as a proper procedure for securing the presence of prisoners for criminal prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"311 N.W.2d 721, 721","parenthetical":"\"The decision by federal authorities to honor a writ in the absence of a detainer as a matter of comity does not trigger the provision of the [IAD].\"","sentence":"See also McLemore, 311 N.W.2d at 721 (\u201cThe decision by federal authorities to honor a writ in the absence of a detainer as a matter of comity does not trigger the provision of the [IAD].\u201d); Flick, 887 F.2d at 778. And finally, a Writ does not constitute a detainer for purposes of the IAD."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"436 U.S. 358, 358","parenthetical":"\"The role and functioning of the ad prosequendum writ are rooted in history, and they bear little resemblance to the typical detainer which activates the provisions of the [IAD].\"","sentence":"See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 358, 98 S.Ct. 1834 (\u201cThe role and functioning of the ad prosequendum writ are rooted in history, and they bear little resemblance to the typical detainer which activates the provisions of the [IAD].\u201d)."},"case_id":11762050,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendant, however, claims that \"the IAD is the exclusive means to secure the presence of a defendant for purposes of prosecution.\" Br. of Appellant at 14. Defendant's contention is clearly mistaken. First, Indiana has definitively denominated two methods of securing the presence of defendants who are in the custody of foreign jurisdictions -- the IAD pursuant to Ind.Code SS 35-33-10-4 and the Writ set forth in Ind.Code SS 35-33-10-5. Second, as we discussed supra, the Writ has continued to be accepted as a proper procedure for securing the presence of prisoners for criminal prosecution.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The role and functioning of the ad prosequendum writ are rooted in history, and they bear little resemblance to the typical detainer which activates the provisions of the [IAD].\"","sentence":"See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 358, 98 S.Ct. 1834 (\u201cThe role and functioning of the ad prosequendum writ are rooted in history, and they bear little resemblance to the typical detainer which activates the provisions of the [IAD].\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"311 N.W.2d 721, 721","parenthetical":"\"The decision by federal authorities to honor a writ in the absence of a detainer as a matter of comity does not trigger the provision of the [IAD].\"","sentence":"See also McLemore, 311 N.W.2d at 721 (\u201cThe decision by federal authorities to honor a writ in the absence of a detainer as a matter of comity does not trigger the provision of the [IAD].\u201d); Flick, 887 F.2d at 778. And finally, a Writ does not constitute a detainer for purposes of the IAD."},"case_id":11762050,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Put simply, there is no evidence in the record establishing to a reasonable degree of certainty that Horizon would have won the Westlake contract absent the defendants' misconduct, and Balcombe specifically acknowledged that he based his calculations on the assumption that Horizon would have won the Westlake contract had the defendants not committed the underlying torts. Thus, Horizon failed to establish the fact of damages relating to the Westlake contract with reasonable certainty.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"136 S.W.3d 227, 232","parenthetical":"\"Opinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact 'more probable or less probable.'\" (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 401","sentence":"See Heine, 835 S.W.2d at 85 (\u201c[T]he bare assertion that contracts were lost does not demonstrate a reasonably certain objective determination of lost profits.\u201d); see also Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004) (\u201cOpinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact \u2018more probable or less probable.\u2019\u201d (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 401))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"835 S.W.2d 85, 85","parenthetical":"\"[T]he bare assertion that contracts were lost does not demonstrate a reasonably certain objective determination of lost profits.\"","sentence":"See Heine, 835 S.W.2d at 85 (\u201c[T]he bare assertion that contracts were lost does not demonstrate a reasonably certain objective determination of lost profits.\u201d); see also Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004) (\u201cOpinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact \u2018more probable or less probable.\u2019\u201d (quoting Tex. R. Evid. 401))."},"case_id":12383182,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As Kansas Attorney General and later as Johnson County District Attorney, Kline held positions of particular honor, responsibility, and trust--positions bestowed on him by the citizens of Kansas and the Johnson County Republican Central Committee, respectively. When Kline violated rules regulating his professional conduct, he betrayed that trust, causing \"incalculable harm to the public's perception\" of both offices.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74","parenthetical":"By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \"those government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 So. 2d 305, 312-13","parenthetical":"Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney's professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public's perception of the legal profession.","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"case_id":12416649,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As Kansas Attorney General and later as Johnson County District Attorney, Kline held positions of particular honor, responsibility, and trust--positions bestowed on him by the citizens of Kansas and the Johnson County Republican Central Committee, respectively. When Kline violated rules regulating his professional conduct, he betrayed that trust, causing \"incalculable harm to the public's perception\" of both offices.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74","parenthetical":"By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \"those government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \"speaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"case_id":12416649,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As Kansas Attorney General and later as Johnson County District Attorney, Kline held positions of particular honor, responsibility, and trust--positions bestowed on him by the citizens of Kansas and the Johnson County Republican Central Committee, respectively. When Kline violated rules regulating his professional conduct, he betrayed that trust, causing \"incalculable harm to the public's perception\" of both offices.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74","parenthetical":"By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \"those government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"48 A.3d 1231, 1240","parenthetical":"Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \"speaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"case_id":12416649,"label":"a"}
{"context":"As Kansas Attorney General and later as Johnson County District Attorney, Kline held positions of particular honor, responsibility, and trust--positions bestowed on him by the citizens of Kansas and the Johnson County Republican Central Committee, respectively. When Kline violated rules regulating his professional conduct, he betrayed that trust, causing \"incalculable harm to the public's perception\" of both offices.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"819 So. 2d 305, 312-13","parenthetical":"Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney's professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public's perception of the legal profession.","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \"those government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"case_id":12416649,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As Kansas Attorney General and later as Johnson County District Attorney, Kline held positions of particular honor, responsibility, and trust--positions bestowed on him by the citizens of Kansas and the Johnson County Republican Central Committee, respectively. When Kline violated rules regulating his professional conduct, he betrayed that trust, causing \"incalculable harm to the public's perception\" of both offices.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \"speaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \"those government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"case_id":12416649,"label":"b"}
{"context":"As Kansas Attorney General and later as Johnson County District Attorney, Kline held positions of particular honor, responsibility, and trust--positions bestowed on him by the citizens of Kansas and the Johnson County Republican Central Committee, respectively. When Kline violated rules regulating his professional conduct, he betrayed that trust, causing \"incalculable harm to the public's perception\" of both offices.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \"those government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"48 A.3d 1231, 1240","parenthetical":"Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \"speaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\"","sentence":"See Disciplinary Counsel v. Dann, 134 Ohio St. 3d 68, 74, 979 N.E.2d 1263 (2012) (By violating ethical rules in filing false financial disclosure forms and soliciting improper compensation, Ohio Attorney General caused significant harm not only to his office but also to \u201cthose government agencies, departments, and institutions that the attorney general advises and represents.\u201d); see also In re Marinoff, 819 So. 2d 305, 312-13 (La. 2002) (Adverse publicity from assistant city attorney\u2019s professional misconduct in making false statements regarding automobile accident harmed tire public\u2019s perception of the legal profession.); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cappuccio, 616 Pa. 439, 48 A.3d 1231, 1240 (2012) (Misconduct of attorneys serving in public positions \u201cspeaks directly to the integrity of the legal system by placing the reputation of those tasked with serving and protecting the public at issue.\u201d)."},"case_id":12416649,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Judge Ivers also concludes, without supporting citation or analysis, that the appellant's counsel bore \"the lion's share of the responsibility for keeping the Court and VA advised under the facts in this case\" as to the September 1992 RO award. I fail to see how the appellant's counsel is responsible for advising the Secretary what his own agents have done. I also fail to see how the Secretary and his counsel are somehow less responsible than the appellant for keeping the Court properly advised about adjudication actions by their own Department that may have a bearing on a pending appeal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2 Vet.App. 655, 657","parenthetical":"Secretary's counsel has \"a duty, as an officer of this Court, to weigh and consider carefully the propriety of the response to be given the Court\"","sentence":"See MacWhorter v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 655, 657 (1992) (Secretary\u2019s counsel has \"a duty, as an officer of this Court, to weigh and consider carefully the propriety of the response to be given the Court\u201d); MacWhorter v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 133, 135 (1992) (\"counsel has an ethical obligation to correctly advise the Court of the facts and the law\u201d); cf. Jones (Joseph) v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 596, 606 (1991) (\"Court must be able to rely on the representations of those who practice before it\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"1 Vet.App. 596, 606","parenthetical":"\"Court must be able to rely on the representations of those who practice before it\"","sentence":"See MacWhorter v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 655, 657 (1992) (Secretary\u2019s counsel has \"a duty, as an officer of this Court, to weigh and consider carefully the propriety of the response to be given the Court\u201d); MacWhorter v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 133, 135 (1992) (\"counsel has an ethical obligation to correctly advise the Court of the facts and the law\u201d); cf. Jones (Joseph) v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 596, 606 (1991) (\"Court must be able to rely on the representations of those who practice before it\u201d)."},"case_id":6459477,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Judge Ivers also concludes, without supporting citation or analysis, that the appellant's counsel bore \"the lion's share of the responsibility for keeping the Court and VA advised under the facts in this case\" as to the September 1992 RO award. I fail to see how the appellant's counsel is responsible for advising the Secretary what his own agents have done. I also fail to see how the Secretary and his counsel are somehow less responsible than the appellant for keeping the Court properly advised about adjudication actions by their own Department that may have a bearing on a pending appeal.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2 Vet.App. 133, 135","parenthetical":"\"counsel has an ethical obligation to correctly advise the Court of the facts and the law\"","sentence":"See MacWhorter v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 655, 657 (1992) (Secretary\u2019s counsel has \"a duty, as an officer of this Court, to weigh and consider carefully the propriety of the response to be given the Court\u201d); MacWhorter v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 133, 135 (1992) (\"counsel has an ethical obligation to correctly advise the Court of the facts and the law\u201d); cf. Jones (Joseph) v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 596, 606 (1991) (\"Court must be able to rely on the representations of those who practice before it\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"1 Vet.App. 596, 606","parenthetical":"\"Court must be able to rely on the representations of those who practice before it\"","sentence":"See MacWhorter v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 655, 657 (1992) (Secretary\u2019s counsel has \"a duty, as an officer of this Court, to weigh and consider carefully the propriety of the response to be given the Court\u201d); MacWhorter v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.App. 133, 135 (1992) (\"counsel has an ethical obligation to correctly advise the Court of the facts and the law\u201d); cf. Jones (Joseph) v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 596, 606 (1991) (\"Court must be able to rely on the representations of those who practice before it\u201d)."},"case_id":6459477,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant responds that it was not required to affirmatively plead that it is a religious institution \"because religious institution status is not a defense, but a statutorily granted exemption.\" Contrary to defendant's position, the courts have consistently held that statutory exemptions, particularly from remedial statutes, must be pled as affirmative defenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"246 F.3d 458, 467","parenthetical":"holding that defendants waived defense of \"personal staff' exception to Title VII by failing to plead same","sentence":"See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that defendants waived defense of \u201cpersonal staff\u2019 exception to Title VII by failing to plead same); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(holding that \u201c[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\u201d); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that cases \u201chave generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\u201d); Schwind v. EW & Assoc., Inc., 357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived); see also Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Center, No. 3-03-CV-1660-BD(P), 2004 WL 2348229, at 3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (recognizing that \u201c[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the \u2018utmost liberality\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 2348229, at 3","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the 'utmost liberality' \"","sentence":"See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that defendants waived defense of \u201cpersonal staff\u2019 exception to Title VII by failing to plead same); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(holding that \u201c[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\u201d); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that cases \u201chave generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\u201d); Schwind v. EW & Assoc., Inc., 357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived); see also Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Center, No. 3-03-CV-1660-BD(P), 2004 WL 2348229, at 3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (recognizing that \u201c[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the \u2018utmost liberality\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3176168,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant responds that it was not required to affirmatively plead that it is a religious institution \"because religious institution status is not a defense, but a statutorily granted exemption.\" Contrary to defendant's position, the courts have consistently held that statutory exemptions, particularly from remedial statutes, must be pled as affirmative defenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 2348229, at 3","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the 'utmost liberality' \"","sentence":"See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that defendants waived defense of \u201cpersonal staff\u2019 exception to Title VII by failing to plead same); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(holding that \u201c[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\u201d); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that cases \u201chave generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\u201d); Schwind v. EW & Assoc., Inc., 357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived); see also Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Center, No. 3-03-CV-1660-BD(P), 2004 WL 2348229, at 3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (recognizing that \u201c[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the \u2018utmost liberality\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280","parenthetical":"holding that \"[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\"","sentence":"See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that defendants waived defense of \u201cpersonal staff\u2019 exception to Title VII by failing to plead same); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(holding that \u201c[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\u201d); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that cases \u201chave generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\u201d); Schwind v. EW & Assoc., Inc., 357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived); see also Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Center, No. 3-03-CV-1660-BD(P), 2004 WL 2348229, at 3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (recognizing that \u201c[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the \u2018utmost liberality\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3176168,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Defendant responds that it was not required to affirmatively plead that it is a religious institution \"because religious institution status is not a defense, but a statutorily granted exemption.\" Contrary to defendant's position, the courts have consistently held that statutory exemptions, particularly from remedial statutes, must be pled as affirmative defenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"678 F.2d 992, 1013","parenthetical":"recognizing that cases \"have generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\"","sentence":"See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that defendants waived defense of \u201cpersonal staff\u2019 exception to Title VII by failing to plead same); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(holding that \u201c[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\u201d); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that cases \u201chave generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\u201d); Schwind v. EW & Assoc., Inc., 357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived); see also Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Center, No. 3-03-CV-1660-BD(P), 2004 WL 2348229, at 3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (recognizing that \u201c[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the \u2018utmost liberality\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 2348229, at 3","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the 'utmost liberality' \"","sentence":"See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that defendants waived defense of \u201cpersonal staff\u2019 exception to Title VII by failing to plead same); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(holding that \u201c[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\u201d); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that cases \u201chave generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\u201d); Schwind v. EW & Assoc., Inc., 357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived); see also Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Center, No. 3-03-CV-1660-BD(P), 2004 WL 2348229, at 3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (recognizing that \u201c[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the \u2018utmost liberality\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3176168,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defendant responds that it was not required to affirmatively plead that it is a religious institution \"because religious institution status is not a defense, but a statutorily granted exemption.\" Contrary to defendant's position, the courts have consistently held that statutory exemptions, particularly from remedial statutes, must be pled as affirmative defenses.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2004 WL 2348229, at 3","parenthetical":"recognizing that \"[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the 'utmost liberality' \"","sentence":"See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that defendants waived defense of \u201cpersonal staff\u2019 exception to Title VII by failing to plead same); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(holding that \u201c[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\u201d); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that cases \u201chave generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\u201d); Schwind v. EW & Assoc., Inc., 357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived); see also Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Center, No. 3-03-CV-1660-BD(P), 2004 WL 2348229, at 3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (recognizing that \u201c[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the \u2018utmost liberality\u2019 \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697","parenthetical":"defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived","sentence":"See Oden v. Oktibbeha County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that defendants waived defense of \u201cpersonal staff\u2019 exception to Title VII by failing to plead same); Suiter v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., 151 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (10th Cir.1998)(holding that \u201c[a] claim of exemption is an affirmative defense, which must be specifically pleaded.\u201d); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1013 (11th Cir.1982) (recognizing that cases \u201chave generally treated statutory exceptions from remedial statutes as affirmative defenses\u201d); Schwind v. EW & Assoc., Inc., 357 F.Supp.2d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (defense of exemption under a remedial statute must be specifically pled or will be waived); see also Vore v. Colonial Manor Nursing Center, No. 3-03-CV-1660-BD(P), 2004 WL 2348229, at 3 (N.D.Tex. Oct. 19, 2004) (recognizing that \u201c[cjonsistent with the remedial purposes of the ADA, a charge of employment discrimination must be construed with the \u2018utmost liberality\u2019 \u201d)."},"case_id":3176168,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"183 P.2d 973, 977","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 P.2d 1110, 1116","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"57 P.2d 750, 754","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 P. 480, 482","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"183 P.2d 973, 977","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 P. 480, 482","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 P. 480, 482","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 P. 480, 482","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"62 P.2d 1110, 1116","parenthetical":"finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 P. 480, 482","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"b"}
{"context":". We are concerned our analysis may give rise to constitutional challenge every time a victim is allowed to remain in the courtroom during a criminal trial. Accordingly, we reiterate the observation made in Rangel, that \"inconsistent statements of witnesses, whether they be by the actual victim or others, are in many cases simply a credibility factor that the finder of fact must weigh in determining the outcome.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"57 P.2d 750, 754","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"269 P. 480, 482","parenthetical":"finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\"","sentence":"See State v. Bonza, 72 Utah 177, 269 P. 480, 482 (1928) (finding no prejudice from trial court's refusal to exclude sister of rape victim from courtroom, noting \"[t]here is no absolute right to have witnesses excluded during the progress of a trial.\u201d); see also State v. Moore, 111 Utah 458, 183 P.2d 973, 977 (1947) (finding no prejudice from presence of rape victim throughout trial where she was first witness and her subsequent rebuttal testimony \"merely categorically denied certain testimony\"); State v. Smith, 90 Utah 482, 62 P.2d 1110, 1116 (1936) (finding no abuse of discretion where trial court allowed witness who violated exclusion order to testify); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 754 (1936) (finding no prejudice where witness who violated exclusion order referred to testimony of earlier witness in own testimony)."},"case_id":10317525,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"655 F.2d 463, 469-71","parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"312 U.S. 262, 268","parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"312 U.S. 262, 268","parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"312 U.S. 262, 268","parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"312 U.S. 262, 268","parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"655 F.2d 463, 469-71","parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 S.Ct. 493, 497","parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 S.Ct. 493, 497","parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 S.Ct. 493, 497","parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"61 S.Ct. 493, 497","parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"655 F.2d 463, 469-71","parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"936 F.2d 199, 204","parenthetical":"recognizing bankruptcy court's broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"655 F.2d 463, 469-71","parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"936 F.2d 199, 204","parenthetical":"recognizing bankruptcy court's broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"936 F.2d 199, 204","parenthetical":"recognizing bankruptcy court's broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"936 F.2d 199, 204","parenthetical":"recognizing bankruptcy court's broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"158 B.R. 883, 884","parenthetical":"recognizing that any payment to debtor's attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"655 F.2d 463, 469-71","parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"158 B.R. 883, 884","parenthetical":"recognizing that any payment to debtor's attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"158 B.R. 883, 884","parenthetical":"recognizing that any payment to debtor's attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Additionally, the court's broad discretion in awarding and denying fees paid in connection with bankruptcy proceedings empowers the bankruptcy court to order disgorgement as a sanction to debtors' counsel for nondisclosure.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"158 B.R. 883, 884","parenthetical":"recognizing that any payment to debtor's attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel's eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel's retainer agreement","sentence":"See 11 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 327, 1107(a) (requiring court approval before debtor-in-possession may employ counsel); id. \u00a7 330(a) (requiring court approval of professional fees); Woods v. City Nat\u2019l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 268, 61 S.Ct. 493, 497, 85 L.Ed. 820 (1941) (using denial of compensation as tool for strict enforcement of conflict-of-interest rules); Anderson v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 936 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.1991) (recognizing bankruptcy court\u2019s broad discretion as court of equity to grant or deny fees and noting that attorney has no absolute right to fee award absent compliance with Code and rules); In re Key Largo Land, Inc., 158 B.R. 883, 884 (Bankr.S.D.Fla.1993) (recognizing that any payment to debtor\u2019s attorney, regardless of the source, is reviewable by the bankruptcy court); see also Futuronics Corp. v. Arutt, Nachamie, & Benjamin (In re Futuronics Corp.), 655 F.2d 463, 469-71 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that total denial of compensation is the only appropriate sanction for nondisclosure of all facts bearing upon counsel\u2019s eligibility and all connections with debtor, including counsel\u2019s retainer agreement), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); In re Arlan\u2019s Dept."},"case_id":6118831,"label":"a"}
{"context":"These two sentences cannot meet NIH's burden with respect to Exemption 4.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"781 F.Supp. 31, 33","parenthetical":"rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was \"speculative\"","sentence":"See 5 U.S.C. \u00a7 552(a)(4)(B) (an agency bears the burden of demonstrating the validity of any exemption that it asserts). NIH fails to identify with any level of specificity what it means by \u201ccost and rate\u201d information, nor explain how such information could be used by competitors to cause substantial harm to CRL. NIH\u2019s failure in this regard is problematic, as courts in this Circuit routinely reject Exemption 4 arguments that are grounded in generalizations. See Ctr. for Public Integrity v. Dep\u2019t of Energy, 191 F.Supp.2d 187, 194-95 (D.D.C.2002) (\u201cThe Courts of this Circuit have viewed [Exemption 4] arguments with skepticism, generally requiring agencies to disclose information under Exemption 4\u2019s competitive harm prong unless they are able to demonstrate that release of the information would be of substantial assistance to competitors in estimating and undercutting a bidder\u2019s future bids.\u201d); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v. Dep\u2019t of Air Force, 781 F.Supp. 31, 33 (D.D.C.1991) (rejecting application of Exemption 4 because the harm that would allegedly result from disclosure of pricing information was \u201cspeculative\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"457 F.Supp.2d 11, 11","parenthetical":"holding that competitive harm would result where the agency identified 212 competitors and explained how the requested information could be used in combination with publicly available information to \"disrupt supply, product lines, supply chains, and customers\"","sentence":"Cf. Gilda Indus., 457 F.Supp.2d at 11 (holding that competitive harm would result where the agency identified 212 competitors and explained how the requested information could be used in combination with publicly available information to \u201cdisrupt supply, product lines, supply chains, and customers\u201d)."},"case_id":4062319,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court reviews remand determinations for compliance with the court's remand order. NMB Sing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"23 CIT 80, 82","parenthetical":"affirming after \"review[ing] Commerce's compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\" and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law","sentence":"Ltd. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1252, 341 F.Supp.2d 1327 (2004)(affirming International Trade Commission\u2019s determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 80, 82, 36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416 (1999)(affirming after \u201creview[ing] Commerce\u2019s compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\u201d and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming International Trade Commission's determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order","sentence":"Ltd. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1252, 341 F.Supp.2d 1327 (2004)(affirming International Trade Commission\u2019s determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 80, 82, 36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416 (1999)(affirming after \u201creview[ing] Commerce\u2019s compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\u201d and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law)."},"case_id":3529908,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The court reviews remand determinations for compliance with the court's remand order. NMB Sing.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming International Trade Commission's determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order","sentence":"Ltd. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1252, 341 F.Supp.2d 1327 (2004)(affirming International Trade Commission\u2019s determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 80, 82, 36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416 (1999)(affirming after \u201creview[ing] Commerce\u2019s compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\u201d and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416","parenthetical":"affirming after \"review[ing] Commerce's compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\" and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law","sentence":"Ltd. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1252, 341 F.Supp.2d 1327 (2004)(affirming International Trade Commission\u2019s determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 80, 82, 36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416 (1999)(affirming after \u201creview[ing] Commerce\u2019s compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\u201d and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law)."},"case_id":3529908,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court reviews remand determinations for compliance with the court's remand order. NMB Sing.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming International Trade Commission's determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order","sentence":"Ltd. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1252, 341 F.Supp.2d 1327 (2004)(affirming International Trade Commission\u2019s determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 80, 82, 36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416 (1999)(affirming after \u201creview[ing] Commerce\u2019s compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\u201d and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"23 CIT 80, 82","parenthetical":"affirming after \"review[ing] Commerce's compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\" and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law","sentence":"Ltd. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1252, 341 F.Supp.2d 1327 (2004)(affirming International Trade Commission\u2019s determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 80, 82, 36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416 (1999)(affirming after \u201creview[ing] Commerce\u2019s compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\u201d and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law)."},"case_id":3529908,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The court reviews remand determinations for compliance with the court's remand order. NMB Sing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416","parenthetical":"affirming after \"review[ing] Commerce's compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\" and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law","sentence":"Ltd. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1252, 341 F.Supp.2d 1327 (2004)(affirming International Trade Commission\u2019s determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 80, 82, 36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416 (1999)(affirming after \u201creview[ing] Commerce\u2019s compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\u201d and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming International Trade Commission's determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order","sentence":"Ltd. v. United States, 28 C.I.T. 1252, 341 F.Supp.2d 1327 (2004)(affirming International Trade Commission\u2019s determinations on remand where the determinations were in accordance with law, supported by substantial evidence, and otherwise satisfied the remand order); see also Olympia Indus., Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 80, 82, 36 F.Supp.2d 414, 416 (1999)(affirming after \u201creview[ing] Commerce\u2019s compliance with these instructions in its Remand Results\u201d and finding the determination to be supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with law)."},"case_id":3529908,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, even if the underlying tort must be a common-law tort, workplace actions that amount to sexual or racial harassment can and frequently do constitute common-law torts.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"495 S.E.2d 398, 398","parenthetical":"concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \"sexual misconduct\" of the minister","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"case_id":9115159,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Moreover, even if the underlying tort must be a common-law tort, workplace actions that amount to sexual or racial harassment can and frequently do constitute common-law torts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"495 S.E.2d 398, 398","parenthetical":"concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \"sexual misconduct\" of the minister","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"case_id":9115159,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, even if the underlying tort must be a common-law tort, workplace actions that amount to sexual or racial harassment can and frequently do constitute common-law torts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming jury's determination that co-worker's pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"case_id":9115159,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, even if the underlying tort must be a common-law tort, workplace actions that amount to sexual or racial harassment can and frequently do constitute common-law torts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming jury's determination that co-worker's pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"case_id":9115159,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, even if the underlying tort must be a common-law tort, workplace actions that amount to sexual or racial harassment can and frequently do constitute common-law torts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming jury's determination that co-worker's pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"case_id":9115159,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Moreover, even if the underlying tort must be a common-law tort, workplace actions that amount to sexual or racial harassment can and frequently do constitute common-law torts.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming jury's determination that co-worker's pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim","sentence":"See Smith, 495 S.E.2d at 398 (concluding that the First Amendment did not preclude prosecution of negligent retention claim against a church by church employees based upon the \u201csexual misconduct\u201d of the minister); Brown v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 93 N.C.App. 431, 378 S.E.2d 232 (1989) (affirming jury\u2019s determination that co-worker\u2019s pattern of sexual harassment amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress, which provided the basis for a verdict against the employer on a negligent retention claim); cf. Bryant v. Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 113 N.C.App. 1, 437 S.E.2d 519 (1993) (concluding that evidence of sexual harassment by a supervisor supported verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress)."},"case_id":9115159,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The gun was sitting on a nightstand in the bedroom. (Tr. at 16.) Although it was covered by a hat (id.), one can be certain that the police did not dispatch up to eighteen well-trained and specially selected officers to be foiled by a hat. They would certainly have found the gun and, given all of the circumstances, including its being found within two feet of his personal identification (see id. at 17), would have seized it for use as evidence in this case.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if arrest of defendant had been initiated by law enforcement agent lacking probable cause, it is apparent that an agent who did have knowledge constituting probable cause arrived on scene and would have imminently and lawfully discovered and arrested defendant","sentence":"See United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 392-93 (5th Cir.1997) (gun discovered by officer during an allegedly unlawful search was properly admitted in evidence because other officers, having commenced a proper inventory search, would inevitably have discovered it); United States v. Lockett, 2004 WL 73726, *4 (E.D.Pa.2004) (contraband, including gun, would have inevitably been discovered in defendant\u2019s luggage during a lawful inventory search, so even if consent to search luggage had been revoked, gun was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine); cf. United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 198 n. 12 (1st Cir.1997) (even if arrest of defendant had been initiated by law enforcement agent lacking probable cause, it is apparent that an agent who did have knowledge constituting probable cause arrived on scene and would have imminently and lawfully discovered and arrested defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"111 F.3d 390, 392-93","parenthetical":"gun discovered by officer during an allegedly unlawful search was properly admitted in evidence because other officers, having commenced a proper inventory search, would inevitably have discovered it","sentence":"See United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 392-93 (5th Cir.1997) (gun discovered by officer during an allegedly unlawful search was properly admitted in evidence because other officers, having commenced a proper inventory search, would inevitably have discovered it); United States v. Lockett, 2004 WL 73726, *4 (E.D.Pa.2004) (contraband, including gun, would have inevitably been discovered in defendant\u2019s luggage during a lawful inventory search, so even if consent to search luggage had been revoked, gun was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine); cf. United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 198 n. 12 (1st Cir.1997) (even if arrest of defendant had been initiated by law enforcement agent lacking probable cause, it is apparent that an agent who did have knowledge constituting probable cause arrived on scene and would have imminently and lawfully discovered and arrested defendant)."},"case_id":9216728,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The gun was sitting on a nightstand in the bedroom. (Tr. at 16.) Although it was covered by a hat (id.), one can be certain that the police did not dispatch up to eighteen well-trained and specially selected officers to be foiled by a hat. They would certainly have found the gun and, given all of the circumstances, including its being found within two feet of his personal identification (see id. at 17), would have seized it for use as evidence in this case.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"even if arrest of defendant had been initiated by law enforcement agent lacking probable cause, it is apparent that an agent who did have knowledge constituting probable cause arrived on scene and would have imminently and lawfully discovered and arrested defendant","sentence":"See United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 392-93 (5th Cir.1997) (gun discovered by officer during an allegedly unlawful search was properly admitted in evidence because other officers, having commenced a proper inventory search, would inevitably have discovered it); United States v. Lockett, 2004 WL 73726, *4 (E.D.Pa.2004) (contraband, including gun, would have inevitably been discovered in defendant\u2019s luggage during a lawful inventory search, so even if consent to search luggage had been revoked, gun was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine); cf. United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 198 n. 12 (1st Cir.1997) (even if arrest of defendant had been initiated by law enforcement agent lacking probable cause, it is apparent that an agent who did have knowledge constituting probable cause arrived on scene and would have imminently and lawfully discovered and arrested defendant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2004 WL 73726, *4","parenthetical":"contraband, including gun, would have inevitably been discovered in defendant's luggage during a lawful inventory search, so even if consent to search luggage had been revoked, gun was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine","sentence":"See United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390, 392-93 (5th Cir.1997) (gun discovered by officer during an allegedly unlawful search was properly admitted in evidence because other officers, having commenced a proper inventory search, would inevitably have discovered it); United States v. Lockett, 2004 WL 73726, *4 (E.D.Pa.2004) (contraband, including gun, would have inevitably been discovered in defendant\u2019s luggage during a lawful inventory search, so even if consent to search luggage had been revoked, gun was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine); cf. United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 198 n. 12 (1st Cir.1997) (even if arrest of defendant had been initiated by law enforcement agent lacking probable cause, it is apparent that an agent who did have knowledge constituting probable cause arrived on scene and would have imminently and lawfully discovered and arrested defendant)."},"case_id":9216728,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant argues that he was the subject of an unreasonable seizure when, after being issued the written warning for speeding, he was further detained and subjected to Baxley's additional questioning and the drug dog sniff. Appellant's claim is premised on the principle that an investigative detention should last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"147 Ariz. 440, 447","parenthetical":"Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \"they are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\"","sentence":"Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (1985) (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \u201cthey are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\u201d); cf. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 992 P.2d 1135 (App.1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver\u2019s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"continued detention of passenger following driver's arrest justified by reasonable suspicion","sentence":"Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (1985) (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \u201cthey are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\u201d); cf. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 992 P.2d 1135 (App.1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver\u2019s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":152598,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Appellant argues that he was the subject of an unreasonable seizure when, after being issued the written warning for speeding, he was further detained and subjected to Baxley's additional questioning and the drug dog sniff. Appellant's claim is premised on the principle that an investigative detention should last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"continued detention of passenger following driver's arrest justified by reasonable suspicion","sentence":"Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (1985) (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \u201cthey are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\u201d); cf. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 992 P.2d 1135 (App.1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver\u2019s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"147 Ariz. 440, 447","parenthetical":"Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \"they are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\"","sentence":"Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (1985) (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \u201cthey are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\u201d); cf. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 992 P.2d 1135 (App.1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver\u2019s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":152598,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant argues that he was the subject of an unreasonable seizure when, after being issued the written warning for speeding, he was further detained and subjected to Baxley's additional questioning and the drug dog sniff. Appellant's claim is premised on the principle that an investigative detention should last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"continued detention of passenger following driver's arrest justified by reasonable suspicion","sentence":"Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (1985) (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \u201cthey are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\u201d); cf. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 992 P.2d 1135 (App.1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver\u2019s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"711 P.2d 579, 586","parenthetical":"Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \"they are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\"","sentence":"Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (1985) (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \u201cthey are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\u201d); cf. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 992 P.2d 1135 (App.1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver\u2019s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":152598,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Appellant argues that he was the subject of an unreasonable seizure when, after being issued the written warning for speeding, he was further detained and subjected to Baxley's additional questioning and the drug dog sniff. Appellant's claim is premised on the principle that an investigative detention should last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"711 P.2d 579, 586","parenthetical":"Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \"they are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\"","sentence":"Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (1985) (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \u201cthey are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\u201d); cf. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 992 P.2d 1135 (App.1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver\u2019s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"continued detention of passenger following driver's arrest justified by reasonable suspicion","sentence":"Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); see State v. Winegar, 147 Ariz. 440, 447, 711 P.2d 579, 586 (1985) (Terry stops tolerated absent probable cause because \u201cthey are brief and as narrowly circumscribed as possible\u201d); cf. State v. Riley, 196 Ariz. 40, 992 P.2d 1135 (App.1999) (continued detention of passenger following driver\u2019s arrest justified by reasonable suspicion)."},"case_id":152598,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Geders the Court held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied by a district court order barring consultation between the defendant and his attorney during an overnight recess that fell between the direct examination and the cross-examination of the defendant. The Court, however, expressly noted that it was not considering an order that merely barred a defendant from consulting his attorney during a brief routine recess during the trial day.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dicta that the court has \"grave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant's right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\"","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"case_id":1417707,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Geders the Court held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied by a district court order barring consultation between the defendant and his attorney during an overnight recess that fell between the direct examination and the cross-examination of the defendant. The Court, however, expressly noted that it was not considering an order that merely barred a defendant from consulting his attorney during a brief routine recess during the trial day.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dicta that the court has \"grave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant's right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\"","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a restriction on a defendant's right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \"a minute\", is constitutionally impermissible","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"case_id":1417707,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In Geders the Court held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied by a district court order barring consultation between the defendant and his attorney during an overnight recess that fell between the direct examination and the cross-examination of the defendant. The Court, however, expressly noted that it was not considering an order that merely barred a defendant from consulting his attorney during a brief routine recess during the trial day.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a restriction on a defendant's right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \"a minute\", is constitutionally impermissible","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dicta that the court has \"grave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant's right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\"","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"case_id":1417707,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Geders the Court held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied by a district court order barring consultation between the defendant and his attorney during an overnight recess that fell between the direct examination and the cross-examination of the defendant. The Court, however, expressly noted that it was not considering an order that merely barred a defendant from consulting his attorney during a brief routine recess during the trial day.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a restriction on a defendant's right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \"a minute\", is constitutionally impermissible","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dicta that the court has \"grave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant's right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\"","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"case_id":1417707,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In Geders the Court held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied by a district court order barring consultation between the defendant and his attorney during an overnight recess that fell between the direct examination and the cross-examination of the defendant. The Court, however, expressly noted that it was not considering an order that merely barred a defendant from consulting his attorney during a brief routine recess during the trial day.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"dicta that the court has \"grave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant's right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\"","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a restriction on a defendant's right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \"a minute\", is constitutionally impermissible","sentence":"United States v. Bryant, 545 F.2d 1035 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding an order directing defendant not to converse with anyone during an hour lunch break violative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 1179, 51 L.Ed.2d 584 (1977) (holding that a restriction on a defendant\u2019s right to consult with his attorney during two brief routine recesses, one 20 minutes and the other \u201ca minute\u201d, is constitutionally impermissible); see United States v. Vesaas, 586 F.2d 101, 102 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1978) (dicta that the court has \u201cgrave doubts that even a brief restriction on a criminal defendant\u2019s right to confer with counsel can be squared with the Sixth Amendment\u201d)."},"case_id":1417707,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The California courts had held that the contract sufficiently expressed the parties' intent to incorporate California arbitration rules into their agreement. Thus, the Court's analysis in Volt presupposed that the contract had expressed the parties' clear intent to depart from the FAA's rules.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Volt and Mastrobuono both direct courts to respect the terms of the agreement without regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.\"","sentence":"See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 n. 9, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (\u201cVolt and Mastrobuono both direct courts to respect the terms of the agreement without regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.\"","sentence":"Id. at 474, 109 S.Ct. 1248 (stating that \"the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.\u201d). The holding of Volt is simply that parties may modify the rules of arbitration with clear contractual language."},"case_id":9293143,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The California courts had held that the contract sufficiently expressed the parties' intent to incorporate California arbitration rules into their agreement. Thus, the Court's analysis in Volt presupposed that the contract had expressed the parties' clear intent to depart from the FAA's rules.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Volt and Mastrobuono both direct courts to respect the terms of the agreement without regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.\"","sentence":"See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 n. 9, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (\u201cVolt and Mastrobuono both direct courts to respect the terms of the agreement without regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.\"","sentence":"Id. at 474, 109 S.Ct. 1248 (stating that \"the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.\u201d). The holding of Volt is simply that parties may modify the rules of arbitration with clear contractual language."},"case_id":9293143,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The California courts had held that the contract sufficiently expressed the parties' intent to incorporate California arbitration rules into their agreement. Thus, the Court's analysis in Volt presupposed that the contract had expressed the parties' clear intent to depart from the FAA's rules.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that \"the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.\"","sentence":"Id. at 474, 109 S.Ct. 1248 (stating that \"the interpretation of private contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.\u201d). The holding of Volt is simply that parties may modify the rules of arbitration with clear contractual language."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Volt and Mastrobuono both direct courts to respect the terms of the agreement without regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.\"","sentence":"See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 n. 9, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (\u201cVolt and Mastrobuono both direct courts to respect the terms of the agreement without regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.\u201d)."},"case_id":9293143,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The 1937 act imposed strict liability on anyone who allowed a pollutant to escape into the waters of the State.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"103 N.J.Super. 190, 192-94","parenthetical":"landfill operator held liable under the statute, even in the absence of \"guilty knowledge,\" because the landfill polluted streams","sentence":"State v. Kinsley, 103 N.J.Super. 190, 192-94 (Law Div.1968), aff\u2019d, 105 N.J.Super. 347 (App.Div.1969) (landfill operator held liable under the statute, even in the absence of \u201cguilty knowledge,\u201d because the landfill polluted streams); see Lansco, Inc. v. De partment of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J.Super. 275 (Ch.Div.1975) (insurer held liable under comprehensive liability policy covering \u201call sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ...\u201d because insured, the owner of a tank farm, was strictly liable under statute for cleaning up oil spill even if the spill was caused by a third party)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insurer held liable under comprehensive liability policy covering \"all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ...\" because insured, the owner of a tank farm, was strictly liable under statute for cleaning up oil spill even if the spill was caused by a third party","sentence":"State v. Kinsley, 103 N.J.Super. 190, 192-94 (Law Div.1968), aff\u2019d, 105 N.J.Super. 347 (App.Div.1969) (landfill operator held liable under the statute, even in the absence of \u201cguilty knowledge,\u201d because the landfill polluted streams); see Lansco, Inc. v. De partment of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J.Super. 275 (Ch.Div.1975) (insurer held liable under comprehensive liability policy covering \u201call sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ...\u201d because insured, the owner of a tank farm, was strictly liable under statute for cleaning up oil spill even if the spill was caused by a third party)."},"case_id":1347474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The 1937 act imposed strict liability on anyone who allowed a pollutant to escape into the waters of the State.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"landfill operator held liable under the statute, even in the absence of \"guilty knowledge,\" because the landfill polluted streams","sentence":"State v. Kinsley, 103 N.J.Super. 190, 192-94 (Law Div.1968), aff\u2019d, 105 N.J.Super. 347 (App.Div.1969) (landfill operator held liable under the statute, even in the absence of \u201cguilty knowledge,\u201d because the landfill polluted streams); see Lansco, Inc. v. De partment of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J.Super. 275 (Ch.Div.1975) (insurer held liable under comprehensive liability policy covering \u201call sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ...\u201d because insured, the owner of a tank farm, was strictly liable under statute for cleaning up oil spill even if the spill was caused by a third party)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"insurer held liable under comprehensive liability policy covering \"all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ...\" because insured, the owner of a tank farm, was strictly liable under statute for cleaning up oil spill even if the spill was caused by a third party","sentence":"State v. Kinsley, 103 N.J.Super. 190, 192-94 (Law Div.1968), aff\u2019d, 105 N.J.Super. 347 (App.Div.1969) (landfill operator held liable under the statute, even in the absence of \u201cguilty knowledge,\u201d because the landfill polluted streams); see Lansco, Inc. v. De partment of Envtl. Protection, 138 N.J.Super. 275 (Ch.Div.1975) (insurer held liable under comprehensive liability policy covering \u201call sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages ...\u201d because insured, the owner of a tank farm, was strictly liable under statute for cleaning up oil spill even if the spill was caused by a third party)."},"case_id":1347474,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Kuciemba's claim that the Pasows are a mother and father to him is also unavailing. Even if Kuciemba's relationship with the Pa-sows resembles a parent-child relationship, Congress, through the plain language of the statute, precluded a functional definition for the term \"parent.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"107 S.Ct. 382, 382","parenthetical":"because a niece is not a \"child\" within the meaning of the statute, hardship to petitioner's nieces need not be considered","sentence":"See id. at 90,107 S.Ct. at 382 (because a niece is not a \u201cchild\u201d within the meaning of the statute, hardship to petitioner\u2019s nieces need not be considered); see also Dill v. INS, 773 F.2d 25, 31 (3rd Cir.1985) (hardship to petitioner\u2019s uncle and aunt who were also her de facto parents was not relevant)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"773 F.2d 25, 31","parenthetical":"hardship to petitioner's uncle and aunt who were also her de facto parents was not relevant","sentence":"See id. at 90,107 S.Ct. at 382 (because a niece is not a \u201cchild\u201d within the meaning of the statute, hardship to petitioner\u2019s nieces need not be considered); see also Dill v. INS, 773 F.2d 25, 31 (3rd Cir.1985) (hardship to petitioner\u2019s uncle and aunt who were also her de facto parents was not relevant)."},"case_id":7628451,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court correctly decided that Jaymz could not maintain a substantive due process claim premised on his initial removal. \"[SJubstantive due process may not be called upon when a specific constitutional provision (here, the Fourth Amendment) protects the right allegedly infringed upon.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"235 F.3d 1000, 1017-18","parenthetical":"concluding that child's substantive due process claim could not succeed to the extent it was premised on his removal from his home because the Fourth Amendment addressed that seizure","sentence":"Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 518 n. 23 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that a child\u2019s constitutional claim premised on his seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than substantive due process unless it is alleged that the seizure \u201ccoincided with other conduct amounting to an interference with the parent-child relationship\u201d); see also Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1017-18 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that child\u2019s substantive due process claim could not succeed to the extent it was premised on his removal from his home because the Fourth Amendment addressed that seizure)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"concluding that a child's constitutional claim premised on his seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than substantive due process unless it is alleged that the seizure \"coincided with other conduct amounting to an interference with the parent-child relationship\"","sentence":"Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 518 n. 23 (7th Cir.2003) (concluding that a child\u2019s constitutional claim premised on his seizure is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than substantive due process unless it is alleged that the seizure \u201ccoincided with other conduct amounting to an interference with the parent-child relationship\u201d); see also Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1017-18 (7th Cir.2000) (concluding that child\u2019s substantive due process claim could not succeed to the extent it was premised on his removal from his home because the Fourth Amendment addressed that seizure)."},"case_id":3834412,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A suspect is \"in custody\" for purposes of Miranda \"when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"845 F.2d 593, 596","parenthetical":"adding that \"the reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation--that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"","sentence":"United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc) (adding that \u201cthe reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation\u2014that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (\u201cthe only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation\u201d); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.2006)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"511 U.S. 318, 324","parenthetical":"\"the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation\"","sentence":"United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc) (adding that \u201cthe reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation\u2014that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (\u201cthe only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation\u201d); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.2006)."},"case_id":12272568,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A suspect is \"in custody\" for purposes of Miranda \"when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"845 F.2d 593, 596","parenthetical":"adding that \"the reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation--that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"","sentence":"United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc) (adding that \u201cthe reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation\u2014that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (\u201cthe only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation\u201d); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.2006)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation\"","sentence":"United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc) (adding that \u201cthe reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation\u2014that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (\u201cthe only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation\u201d); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.2006)."},"case_id":12272568,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A suspect is \"in custody\" for purposes of Miranda \"when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation\"","sentence":"United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc) (adding that \u201cthe reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation\u2014that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (\u201cthe only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation\u201d); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.2006)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"845 F.2d 593, 596","parenthetical":"adding that \"the reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation--that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"","sentence":"United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc) (adding that \u201cthe reasonable person through whom we view the situation must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation\u2014that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances\"); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (\u201cthe only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect\u2019s position would have understood his situation\u201d); United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.2006)."},"case_id":12272568,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Instead of asserting an inability to raise these claims in his initial SS 2255 motion, Mr. Jones argues that his current inability to assert the claims in a successive SS 2255 motion -- due to the one-year time-bar and the restrictions identified in SS 2255(h)-- demonstrates that the SS 2255 remedial regime is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of his detention. But we have squarely rejected such arguments on multiple occasions.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"609 F.3d 1073, 1073","parenthetical":"\"A district court's erroneous decision on a SS 2255 motion does not render the SS 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective.\"","sentence":"See Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (\u201c[W]e agree with the district court that the mere fact [a prisoner] is precluded from filing a second \u00a7 2255 petition does not establish that the remedy in \u00a7 2255 is inadequate.\u201d); see also Prost, 636 F.3d at 588 (noting \u00a7 2255(h)\u2019s limitation on filing second and successive \u00a7 2255 motions \u201cdoesn\u2019t mean that the \u00a7 2255 remedial regime is inadequate or ineffective\u201d); Sines, 609 F.3d at 1073 (\u201cA district court\u2019s erroneous decision on a \u00a7 2255 motion does not render the \u00a7 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective.\u201d); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (\u201cFailure to obtain relief under [\u00a7 ] 2255 does not establish that the remedy so provided is either inadequate or ineffective.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. O\u2019Bryant, 162 F.3d 1175, 1998 WL 704673, at *2 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that the fact [a prisoner] is barred by the one-year limitation period from asserting his claims pursuant to \u00a7 2255 does not establish that the remedy in \u00a7 2255 is \u2018inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255(e))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"177 F.3d 1177, 1179","parenthetical":"\"[W]e agree with the district court that the mere fact [a prisoner] is precluded from filing a second SS 2255 petition does not establish that the remedy in SS 2255 is inadequate.\"","sentence":"See Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (\u201c[W]e agree with the district court that the mere fact [a prisoner] is precluded from filing a second \u00a7 2255 petition does not establish that the remedy in \u00a7 2255 is inadequate.\u201d); see also Prost, 636 F.3d at 588 (noting \u00a7 2255(h)\u2019s limitation on filing second and successive \u00a7 2255 motions \u201cdoesn\u2019t mean that the \u00a7 2255 remedial regime is inadequate or ineffective\u201d); Sines, 609 F.3d at 1073 (\u201cA district court\u2019s erroneous decision on a \u00a7 2255 motion does not render the \u00a7 2255 remedy inadequate or ineffective.\u201d); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (\u201cFailure to obtain relief under [\u00a7 ] 2255 does not establish that the remedy so provided is either inadequate or ineffective.\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. O\u2019Bryant, 162 F.3d 1175, 1998 WL 704673, at *2 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished) (\u201cWe agree with the district court that the fact [a prisoner] is barred by the one-year limitation period from asserting his claims pursuant to \u00a7 2255 does not establish that the remedy in \u00a7 2255 is \u2018inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2255(e))."},"case_id":12411626,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Contrary to the Court's approach, the purposes of the Rule, not dictionary definitions, have guided courts in construing this term of art. For instance, the Court's assumption that \"disclosure\" does not occur when a party seeking to utilize information is already in legitimate possession of it is belied by \"the well settled rule that a witness is not entitled to a copy of his grand jury testimony on demand, even though he obviously was present in the grand jury room during the receipt of evidence, since a rule of automatic access would expose grand jury witnesses to potential intimidation\" by making it possible for those with power over the witness to monitor his or her testimony. Brief for United States 26, n. 20 (emphasis added).","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"565 F. 2d 111, 113-114","parenthetical":"treating as \"disclosure\" access of grand jury witness to own prior testimony, noting \"policy reasons justifying strict preservation of the secrecy\" of grand jury proceedings","sentence":"See, e. g., United States v. Clavey, 565 F. 2d 111, 113-114 (CA7 1978) (treating as \u201cdisclosure\u201d access of grand jury witness to own prior testimony, noting \u201cpolicy reasons justifying strict preservation of the secrecy\u201d of grand jury proceedings); Bast v. United States, 542 F. 2d 893, 895-896 (CA4 1976) (treating as \u201cdisclosure\u201d access of grand jury witness to own prior testimony, noting that \u201cthe secrecy of grand jury proceedings encourages witnesses to testify without fear of retaliation and protects the independence of the grand jury\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"702 F. 2d 406, 408-409","parenthetical":"treating as \"disclosure\" access to grand jury material by a party familiar with such material by virtue of earlier Rule 6(e) disclosure order","sentence":"Cf. Executive Securities Corp. v. Doe, 702 F. 2d 406, 408-409 (CA2 1983) (treating as \u201cdisclosure\u201d access to grand jury material by a party familiar with such material by virtue of earlier Rule 6(e) disclosure order)."},"case_id":6210154,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Contrary to the Court's approach, the purposes of the Rule, not dictionary definitions, have guided courts in construing this term of art. For instance, the Court's assumption that \"disclosure\" does not occur when a party seeking to utilize information is already in legitimate possession of it is belied by \"the well settled rule that a witness is not entitled to a copy of his grand jury testimony on demand, even though he obviously was present in the grand jury room during the receipt of evidence, since a rule of automatic access would expose grand jury witnesses to potential intimidation\" by making it possible for those with power over the witness to monitor his or her testimony. Brief for United States 26, n. 20 (emphasis added).","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"702 F. 2d 406, 408-409","parenthetical":"treating as \"disclosure\" access to grand jury material by a party familiar with such material by virtue of earlier Rule 6(e) disclosure order","sentence":"Cf. Executive Securities Corp. v. Doe, 702 F. 2d 406, 408-409 (CA2 1983) (treating as \u201cdisclosure\u201d access to grand jury material by a party familiar with such material by virtue of earlier Rule 6(e) disclosure order)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"542 F. 2d 893, 895-896","parenthetical":"treating as \"disclosure\" access of grand jury witness to own prior testimony, noting that \"the secrecy of grand jury proceedings encourages witnesses to testify without fear of retaliation and protects the independence of the grand jury\"","sentence":"See, e. g., United States v. Clavey, 565 F. 2d 111, 113-114 (CA7 1978) (treating as \u201cdisclosure\u201d access of grand jury witness to own prior testimony, noting \u201cpolicy reasons justifying strict preservation of the secrecy\u201d of grand jury proceedings); Bast v. United States, 542 F. 2d 893, 895-896 (CA4 1976) (treating as \u201cdisclosure\u201d access of grand jury witness to own prior testimony, noting that \u201cthe secrecy of grand jury proceedings encourages witnesses to testify without fear of retaliation and protects the independence of the grand jury\u201d)."},"case_id":6210154,"label":"b"}
{"context":"It is not at all clear whether there lies a private right of action under either rule.","citation_a":{"signal":"but cf.","identifier":"465 F.Supp. 1233, 1236","parenthetical":"broker's violations of New York Stock Exchange Rules can be remedied by state law actions for breach of contract and negligence","sentence":"See Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F.Supp. 848, 859-60 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing cases); Jaksich v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no private right of action for violation of the stock exchange rules); but cf. Siedman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 1233, 1236 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (broker\u2019s violations of New York Stock Exchange Rules can be remedied by state law actions for breach of contract and negligence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"no private right of action for violation of the stock exchange rules","sentence":"See Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent & Co., 884 F.Supp. 848, 859-60 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (citing cases); Jaksich v. Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc., 582 F.Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (no private right of action for violation of the stock exchange rules); but cf. Siedman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 465 F.Supp. 1233, 1236 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (broker\u2019s violations of New York Stock Exchange Rules can be remedied by state law actions for breach of contract and negligence)."},"case_id":6458398,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, this Court has explained that Lopez is inapposite to convictions secured pursuant to section 844(i) and does not raise the government's evidentiary burden on the jurisdictional element of the offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"135 F.3d 116, 123-24","parenthetical":"'We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, SS 844(i","sentence":"See United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cwe do not find Lopez\u2019s analysis applicable due to the \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s express jurisdictional element\u201d); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cThe Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\u201d); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u2018We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, \u00a7 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government\u2019s burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution.\u201d); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201cThe regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute\u2019s constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 F.3d 567, 573","parenthetical":"\"we do not find Lopez's analysis applicable due to the SS 844(i","sentence":"See United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cwe do not find Lopez\u2019s analysis applicable due to the \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s express jurisdictional element\u201d); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cThe Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\u201d); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u2018We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, \u00a7 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government\u2019s burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution.\u201d); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201cThe regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute\u2019s constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\u201d)."},"case_id":11770577,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, this Court has explained that Lopez is inapposite to convictions secured pursuant to section 844(i) and does not raise the government's evidentiary burden on the jurisdictional element of the offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 F.3d 187, 190","parenthetical":"\"The regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute's constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\"","sentence":"See United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cwe do not find Lopez\u2019s analysis applicable due to the \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s express jurisdictional element\u201d); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cThe Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\u201d); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u2018We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, \u00a7 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government\u2019s burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution.\u201d); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201cThe regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute\u2019s constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"101 F.3d 567, 573","parenthetical":"\"we do not find Lopez's analysis applicable due to the SS 844(i","sentence":"See United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cwe do not find Lopez\u2019s analysis applicable due to the \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s express jurisdictional element\u201d); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cThe Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\u201d); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u2018We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, \u00a7 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government\u2019s burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution.\u201d); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201cThe regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute\u2019s constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\u201d)."},"case_id":11770577,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, this Court has explained that Lopez is inapposite to convictions secured pursuant to section 844(i) and does not raise the government's evidentiary burden on the jurisdictional element of the offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"135 F.3d 116, 123-24","parenthetical":"'We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, SS 844(i","sentence":"See United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cwe do not find Lopez\u2019s analysis applicable due to the \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s express jurisdictional element\u201d); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cThe Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\u201d); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u2018We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, \u00a7 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government\u2019s burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution.\u201d); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201cThe regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute\u2019s constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"76 F.3d 967, 973-74","parenthetical":"\"The Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cwe do not find Lopez\u2019s analysis applicable due to the \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s express jurisdictional element\u201d); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cThe Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\u201d); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u2018We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, \u00a7 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government\u2019s burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution.\u201d); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201cThe regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute\u2019s constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\u201d)."},"case_id":11770577,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, this Court has explained that Lopez is inapposite to convictions secured pursuant to section 844(i) and does not raise the government's evidentiary burden on the jurisdictional element of the offense.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"106 F.3d 187, 190","parenthetical":"\"The regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute's constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\"","sentence":"See United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cwe do not find Lopez\u2019s analysis applicable due to the \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s express jurisdictional element\u201d); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cThe Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\u201d); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u2018We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, \u00a7 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government\u2019s burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution.\u201d); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201cThe regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute\u2019s constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"76 F.3d 967, 973-74","parenthetical":"\"The Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\"","sentence":"See United States v. Melina, 101 F.3d 567, 573 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cwe do not find Lopez\u2019s analysis applicable due to the \u00a7 844(i)\u2019s express jurisdictional element\u201d); United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973-74 (8th Cir.1996) (\u201cThe Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.\u201d); see also United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2nd Cir.1998) (\u2018We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, \u00a7 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government\u2019s burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution.\u201d); United States v. Hicks, 106 F.3d 187, 190 (7th Cir.1997) (\u201cThe regulated activity must have a substantial effect, but this requirement is a condition of the statute\u2019s constitutionality ... rather than an element of the crime____\u201d)."},"case_id":11770577,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Grace. Under Jackson, enforcement and interpretation of the warranty is a matter for . the state courts -- if the employees obtain a favorable award from the Department of Labor, they can enforce it only in the state forum.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The union, of course, can pursue a contract action in state court\"","sentence":"Id. 457 U.S. at 29 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. at 2210 n. 13 (\u201cThe union, of course, can pursue a contract action in state court\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"667 F.2d 1333, 1333","parenthetical":"\"[Tjhere is no question but that there is a private cause of action for breach of a 13(c","sentence":"See also Local Division 732, 667 F.2d at 1333 (\u201c[Tjhere is no question but that there is a private cause of action for breach of a 13(c) agreement."},"case_id":311832,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Grace. Under Jackson, enforcement and interpretation of the warranty is a matter for . the state courts -- if the employees obtain a favorable award from the Department of Labor, they can enforce it only in the state forum.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"The union, of course, can pursue a contract action in state court\"","sentence":"Id. 457 U.S. at 29 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. at 2210 n. 13 (\u201cThe union, of course, can pursue a contract action in state court\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"667 F.2d 1333, 1333","parenthetical":"\"[Tjhere is no question but that there is a private cause of action for breach of a 13(c","sentence":"See also Local Division 732, 667 F.2d at 1333 (\u201c[Tjhere is no question but that there is a private cause of action for breach of a 13(c) agreement."},"case_id":311832,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under Erie, this Court is now bound by the holdings in Martin and Jimmie Lee Brown on questions of Florida preclusion law as it pertains to Engle notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bernice Brown II. That is, of course, unless doing so would violate Defendants' federal due process rights.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"517 U.S. 797, 797","parenthetical":"\"State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is 'fundamental in character' \"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"499 U.S. 225, 226","parenthetical":"\"Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4138320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under Erie, this Court is now bound by the holdings in Martin and Jimmie Lee Brown on questions of Florida preclusion law as it pertains to Engle notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bernice Brown II. That is, of course, unless doing so would violate Defendants' federal due process rights.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"499 U.S. 225, 226","parenthetical":"\"Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is 'fundamental in character' \"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4138320,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under Erie, this Court is now bound by the holdings in Martin and Jimmie Lee Brown on questions of Florida preclusion law as it pertains to Engle notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bernice Brown II. That is, of course, unless doing so would violate Defendants' federal due process rights.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"517 U.S. 797, 797","parenthetical":"\"State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is 'fundamental in character' \"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4138320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under Erie, this Court is now bound by the holdings in Martin and Jimmie Lee Brown on questions of Florida preclusion law as it pertains to Engle notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bernice Brown II. That is, of course, unless doing so would violate Defendants' federal due process rights.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is 'fundamental in character' \"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4138320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under Erie, this Court is now bound by the holdings in Martin and Jimmie Lee Brown on questions of Florida preclusion law as it pertains to Engle notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bernice Brown II. That is, of course, unless doing so would violate Defendants' federal due process rights.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"517 U.S. 797, 797","parenthetical":"\"State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is 'fundamental in character' \"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4138320,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under Erie, this Court is now bound by the holdings in Martin and Jimmie Lee Brown on questions of Florida preclusion law as it pertains to Engle notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bernice Brown II. That is, of course, unless doing so would violate Defendants' federal due process rights.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is 'fundamental in character' \"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Erie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\"","sentence":"See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) (\u201cErie mandates that a federal court sitting in diversity apply the substantive law of the forum State, absent a federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary\u201d); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (\u201cState courts are generally free to develop their own rules for protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however, that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is \u2018fundamental in character\u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted)."},"case_id":4138320,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because I believe the Board should never have reached the question of obviousness on this record, I do not analyze the majority's obviousness analysis in detail. I take issue, however, with the fact that the majority bases its judgment on grounds that differ from those upon which the Board relied. This Court may not stray from the Board's reasoning for purposes of supporting its judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"332 U.S. 194, 196","parenthetical":"\"[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\"","sentence":"See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (\u201c[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\u201d); see also, In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed.Cir.2012) (\u201cThe Board\u2019s judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 F.3d 1289, 1294","parenthetical":"\"The Board's judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\"","sentence":"See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (\u201c[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\u201d); see also, In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed.Cir.2012) (\u201cThe Board\u2019s judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\u201d)."},"case_id":4085006,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Because I believe the Board should never have reached the question of obviousness on this record, I do not analyze the majority's obviousness analysis in detail. I take issue, however, with the fact that the majority bases its judgment on grounds that differ from those upon which the Board relied. This Court may not stray from the Board's reasoning for purposes of supporting its judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 F.3d 1289, 1294","parenthetical":"\"The Board's judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\"","sentence":"See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (\u201c[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\u201d); see also, In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed.Cir.2012) (\u201cThe Board\u2019s judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\"","sentence":"See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (\u201c[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\u201d); see also, In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed.Cir.2012) (\u201cThe Board\u2019s judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\u201d)."},"case_id":4085006,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because I believe the Board should never have reached the question of obviousness on this record, I do not analyze the majority's obviousness analysis in detail. I take issue, however, with the fact that the majority bases its judgment on grounds that differ from those upon which the Board relied. This Court may not stray from the Board's reasoning for purposes of supporting its judgment.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"692 F.3d 1289, 1294","parenthetical":"\"The Board's judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\"","sentence":"See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (\u201c[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\u201d); see also, In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed.Cir.2012) (\u201cThe Board\u2019s judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\"","sentence":"See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) (\u201c[A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.\u201d); see also, In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed.Cir.2012) (\u201cThe Board\u2019s judgment must be reviewed on the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.\u201d)."},"case_id":4085006,"label":"b"}
{"context":"These courts reasoned that the Court of Criminal Appeals has analogously held that there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding, even though a statute provided for appointment of habeas counsel. A Chapter 64 proceeding itself, however, is not a post-conviction collateral attack.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"185 S.W.3d 894, 894-97","parenthetical":"discussing that favorable result from DNA testing under Chapter 64 has no effect on conviction but may be used in a post-conviction habeas corpus","sentence":"Thacker, 177 S.W.3d at 927 (\u201cUnlike a state application for writ of habeas corpus, a motion for DNA testing cannot, by itself, result in relief from a conviction or sentence.\u201d); see also Baker, 185 S.W.3d at 894-97 (discussing that favorable result from DNA testing under Chapter 64 has no effect on conviction but may be used in a post-conviction habeas corpus)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"177 S.W.3d 927, 927","parenthetical":"\"Unlike a state application for writ of habeas corpus, a motion for DNA testing cannot, by itself, result in relief from a conviction or sentence.\"","sentence":"Thacker, 177 S.W.3d at 927 (\u201cUnlike a state application for writ of habeas corpus, a motion for DNA testing cannot, by itself, result in relief from a conviction or sentence.\u201d); see also Baker, 185 S.W.3d at 894-97 (discussing that favorable result from DNA testing under Chapter 64 has no effect on conviction but may be used in a post-conviction habeas corpus)."},"case_id":8421154,"label":"b"}
{"context":"These courts reasoned that the Court of Criminal Appeals has analogously held that there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding, even though a statute provided for appointment of habeas counsel. A Chapter 64 proceeding itself, however, is not a post-conviction collateral attack.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"177 S.W.3d 927, 927","parenthetical":"\"Unlike a state application for writ of habeas corpus, a motion for DNA testing cannot, by itself, result in relief from a conviction or sentence.\"","sentence":"Thacker, 177 S.W.3d at 927 (\u201cUnlike a state application for writ of habeas corpus, a motion for DNA testing cannot, by itself, result in relief from a conviction or sentence.\u201d); see also Baker, 185 S.W.3d at 894-97 (discussing that favorable result from DNA testing under Chapter 64 has no effect on conviction but may be used in a post-conviction habeas corpus)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"107 S.W.3d 697, 697","parenthetical":"\"Although these holdings were made in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings, they are equally applicable to a post-conviction request for forensic DNA testing under chapter 64, which is another form of collateral attack.\"","sentence":"But see Beasley, 107 S.W.3d at 697 (\u201cAlthough these holdings were made in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings, they are equally applicable to a post-conviction request for forensic DNA testing under chapter 64, which is another form of collateral attack.\u201d)."},"case_id":8421154,"label":"a"}
{"context":"These courts reasoned that the Court of Criminal Appeals has analogously held that there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding, even though a statute provided for appointment of habeas counsel. A Chapter 64 proceeding itself, however, is not a post-conviction collateral attack.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"185 S.W.3d 894, 894-97","parenthetical":"discussing that favorable result from DNA testing under Chapter 64 has no effect on conviction but may be used in a post-conviction habeas corpus","sentence":"Thacker, 177 S.W.3d at 927 (\u201cUnlike a state application for writ of habeas corpus, a motion for DNA testing cannot, by itself, result in relief from a conviction or sentence.\u201d); see also Baker, 185 S.W.3d at 894-97 (discussing that favorable result from DNA testing under Chapter 64 has no effect on conviction but may be used in a post-conviction habeas corpus)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"107 S.W.3d 697, 697","parenthetical":"\"Although these holdings were made in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings, they are equally applicable to a post-conviction request for forensic DNA testing under chapter 64, which is another form of collateral attack.\"","sentence":"But see Beasley, 107 S.W.3d at 697 (\u201cAlthough these holdings were made in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings, they are equally applicable to a post-conviction request for forensic DNA testing under chapter 64, which is another form of collateral attack.\u201d)."},"case_id":8421154,"label":"a"}
{"context":". We assume, without deciding, that possession of methamphetamine is a sufficiently \"serious crime.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"836 F.2d 1268, 1273","parenthetical":"\"the sale of illegal drugs is a sufficiently severe offense\"","sentence":"See United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir.1991) (\"Drug trafficking crimes are serious ...\u201d); United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.1988) (\"the sale of illegal drugs is a sufficiently severe offense\u201d); but see United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir.2004) (\"the only crime for which there was probable cause was possession of a small quantity of marijuana, in all likelihood a misdemean- or, a crime that does not reach the level of a \u2018serious crime\u2019 required by Acquino \u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"360 F.3d 1235, 1242","parenthetical":"\"the only crime for which there was probable cause was possession of a small quantity of marijuana, in all likelihood a misdemean- or, a crime that does not reach the level of a 'serious crime' required by Acquino \"","sentence":"See United States v. Carr, 939 F.2d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir.1991) (\"Drug trafficking crimes are serious ...\u201d); United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.1988) (\"the sale of illegal drugs is a sufficiently severe offense\u201d); but see United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir.2004) (\"the only crime for which there was probable cause was possession of a small quantity of marijuana, in all likelihood a misdemean- or, a crime that does not reach the level of a \u2018serious crime\u2019 required by Acquino \u201d)."},"case_id":69510,"label":"a"}
{"context":"But upon being asked when his wife tried to locate the doctor, Lin changed his testimony, stating several times that he \"misspoke,\" and that his wife did not attempt to obtain a certificate, explaining that he thought he had been asked whether his wife had seen a doctor during her pregnancy, not whether she had tried to obtain a certificate verifying her abortion. The agency did not err in rejecting this explanation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"534 F.3d 167, 167","parenthetical":"the agency may \"rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the 'totality of the circumstances' establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.\"","sentence":"See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (the agency need not credit an applicant\u2019s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (the agency may \u201crely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the \u2018totality of the circumstances\u2019 establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"430 F.3d 77, 80-81","parenthetical":"the agency need not credit an applicant's explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so","sentence":"See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80-81 (2d Cir.2005) (the agency need not credit an applicant\u2019s explanations for inconsistent testimony unless those explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do so); see also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (the agency may \u201crely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the \u2018totality of the circumstances\u2019 establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.\u201d)."},"case_id":3627700,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Board also stated that Mr. Arneson's statements were \"not competent medical evidence.\" R. at 17. This is true. But if the Board found his testimony credible, Mr. Arneson would not need competent medical evidence to substantiate his claim.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"10 Vet.App. 488, 495-96","parenthetical":"holding that, per 38 C.F.R. SS 3.303(b), medical evidence of nexus is not required for benefits if the veteran demonstrates continuity of symptoms between his present disability and service","sentence":"See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488, 495-96 (1997) (holding that, per 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.303(b), medical evidence of nexus is not required for benefits if the veteran demonstrates continuity of symptoms between his present disability and service); see also Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed.Cir.2009) (vacating this Court\u2019s decision that \u201cstated categorically that \u2018a valid medical opinion\u2019 was required to establish nexus, and that [a layperson] was \u2018not competent\u2019 to provide testimony as to nexus\u201d). Finding Mr. Arneson\u2019s testimony credible and yet assigning it little weight could very well reflect the fact that the credibility assessment was based, in part, on second-hand conveyance or record review, as opposed to personal assessment."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"581 F.3d 1313, 1316","parenthetical":"vacating this Court's decision that \"stated categorically that 'a valid medical opinion' was required to establish nexus, and that [a layperson] was 'not competent' to provide testimony as to nexus\"","sentence":"See Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet.App. 488, 495-96 (1997) (holding that, per 38 C.F.R. \u00a7 3.303(b), medical evidence of nexus is not required for benefits if the veteran demonstrates continuity of symptoms between his present disability and service); see also Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed.Cir.2009) (vacating this Court\u2019s decision that \u201cstated categorically that \u2018a valid medical opinion\u2019 was required to establish nexus, and that [a layperson] was \u2018not competent\u2019 to provide testimony as to nexus\u201d). Finding Mr. Arneson\u2019s testimony credible and yet assigning it little weight could very well reflect the fact that the credibility assessment was based, in part, on second-hand conveyance or record review, as opposed to personal assessment."},"case_id":4152745,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 2. This court accepted jurisdiction over this appeal on a petition to bypass. Wis. Stat. SS (Rule) 809.60 (2013-14). We have previously stated that when a tie vote occurs in this court on a bypass or certification, \"justice is better served in such an instance by remanding to the court of appeals for their consideration.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85","parenthetical":"restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue","sentence":"State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification); see also State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97","parenthetical":"remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification","sentence":"State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification); see also State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue)."},"case_id":4357392,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 2. This court accepted jurisdiction over this appeal on a petition to bypass. Wis. Stat. SS (Rule) 809.60 (2013-14). We have previously stated that when a tie vote occurs in this court on a bypass or certification, \"justice is better served in such an instance by remanding to the court of appeals for their consideration.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97","parenthetical":"remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification","sentence":"State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification); see also State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue","sentence":"State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification); see also State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue)."},"case_id":4357392,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 2. This court accepted jurisdiction over this appeal on a petition to bypass. Wis. Stat. SS (Rule) 809.60 (2013-14). We have previously stated that when a tie vote occurs in this court on a bypass or certification, \"justice is better served in such an instance by remanding to the court of appeals for their consideration.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification","sentence":"State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification); see also State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85","parenthetical":"restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue","sentence":"State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification); see also State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue)."},"case_id":4357392,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 2. This court accepted jurisdiction over this appeal on a petition to bypass. Wis. Stat. SS (Rule) 809.60 (2013-14). We have previously stated that when a tie vote occurs in this court on a bypass or certification, \"justice is better served in such an instance by remanding to the court of appeals for their consideration.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue","sentence":"State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification); see also State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification","sentence":"State v. Richard Knutson, Inc., 191 Wis. 2d 395, 396-97, 528 N.W.2d 430 (1995) (remanding to court of appeals on a tie vote on certification); see also State v. Elam, 195 Wis. 2d 683, 684-85, 538 N.W.2d 249 (1995) (restating rule but declining to remand to court of appeals on a tie vote on bypass because court of appeals had previously decided issue)."},"case_id":4357392,"label":"b"}
{"context":"On the other hand, as many courts have noted, the policy statements cannot be viewed as equivalent to the Guidelines themselves.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"940 F.2d 877, 893","parenthetical":"\"Whereas guidelines are binding on the courts, policy statements are merely advisory.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 772-73 (10th Cir.1992) (policy statements are \u201cadvisory\u201d); United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 893 (3d Cir.) (\u201cWhereas guidelines are binding on the courts, policy statements are merely advisory.\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 611, 116 L.Ed.2d 634 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"942 F.2d 606, 609-14","parenthetical":"Sentencing Commission's commentary must be treated as something more than legislative history but less than Guidelines","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 609-14 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (Sentencing Commission\u2019s commentary must be treated as something more than legislative history but less than Guidelines)."},"case_id":42787,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the other hand, as many courts have noted, the policy statements cannot be viewed as equivalent to the Guidelines themselves.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Whereas guidelines are binding on the courts, policy statements are merely advisory.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 772-73 (10th Cir.1992) (policy statements are \u201cadvisory\u201d); United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 893 (3d Cir.) (\u201cWhereas guidelines are binding on the courts, policy statements are merely advisory.\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 611, 116 L.Ed.2d 634 (1991)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"942 F.2d 606, 609-14","parenthetical":"Sentencing Commission's commentary must be treated as something more than legislative history but less than Guidelines","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 609-14 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (Sentencing Commission\u2019s commentary must be treated as something more than legislative history but less than Guidelines)."},"case_id":42787,"label":"a"}
{"context":"On the other hand, as many courts have noted, the policy statements cannot be viewed as equivalent to the Guidelines themselves.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"942 F.2d 606, 609-14","parenthetical":"Sentencing Commission's commentary must be treated as something more than legislative history but less than Guidelines","sentence":"Cf. United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 609-14 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc) (Sentencing Commission\u2019s commentary must be treated as something more than legislative history but less than Guidelines)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"Whereas guidelines are binding on the courts, policy statements are merely advisory.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 772-73 (10th Cir.1992) (policy statements are \u201cadvisory\u201d); United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 893 (3d Cir.) (\u201cWhereas guidelines are binding on the courts, policy statements are merely advisory.\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 611, 116 L.Ed.2d 634 (1991)."},"case_id":42787,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Under the circumstances, we think that the prosecutor's questioning in this case approached the constitutional line, and likely crossed it. However, we need not decide definitively whether the Government's questions violated Doyle, because we will affirm the District Court's judgment even assuming that they did.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"43 F.3d 117, 122","parenthetical":"assuming for the sake of argument that a Doyle violation occurred where the \"prosecutor's questions were sufficiently broad as to be construed as commentary on [the defendant's] failure to come forward with his alibi (1","sentence":"See United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 122 (5th Cir.1995) (assuming for the sake of argument that a Doyle violation occurred where the \u201cprosecutor\u2019s questions were sufficiently broad as to be construed as commentary on [the defendant\u2019s] failure to come forward with his alibi (1) prior to arrest, (2) immediately after arrest and Miranda warnings ..., and (3) during the time period prior to trial but following his arrest\u201d); cf. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 440 (3d Cir.1996) (assuming arguendo that the prosecutor\u2019s questions violated Doyle and proceeding to harmless-error analysis)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"91 F.3d 427, 440","parenthetical":"assuming arguendo that the prosecutor's questions violated Doyle and proceeding to harmless-error analysis","sentence":"See United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 122 (5th Cir.1995) (assuming for the sake of argument that a Doyle violation occurred where the \u201cprosecutor\u2019s questions were sufficiently broad as to be construed as commentary on [the defendant\u2019s] failure to come forward with his alibi (1) prior to arrest, (2) immediately after arrest and Miranda warnings ..., and (3) during the time period prior to trial but following his arrest\u201d); cf. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 440 (3d Cir.1996) (assuming arguendo that the prosecutor\u2019s questions violated Doyle and proceeding to harmless-error analysis)."},"case_id":3781212,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A duty not to misappropriate the whiskey supplies existed, however, only if Plaintiff had a property right in those supplies, based on Plaintiffs own efforts in creating the Michael Collins specifications.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"698 F.Supp. 521, 527","parenthetical":"design features of building interior as designer's property until building sold","sentence":"See, e.g., Astroworks, 257 F.Supp.2d at 619 (alleged proprietary and confidential idea as counterclaimant\u2019s property); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 698 F.Supp. 521, 527 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (design features of building interior as designer\u2019s property until building sold); cf. Gen. Sec., Inc. v. APX Alarm Sec. Solutions, Inc., 647 F.Supp.2d 207, 213-14 (N.D.N.Y.2009) (noting no authority cited for proposition that prior acquisition of customers constitutes property right or commercial advantage)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"647 F.Supp.2d 207, 213-14","parenthetical":"noting no authority cited for proposition that prior acquisition of customers constitutes property right or commercial advantage","sentence":"See, e.g., Astroworks, 257 F.Supp.2d at 619 (alleged proprietary and confidential idea as counterclaimant\u2019s property); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 698 F.Supp. 521, 527 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (design features of building interior as designer\u2019s property until building sold); cf. Gen. Sec., Inc. v. APX Alarm Sec. Solutions, Inc., 647 F.Supp.2d 207, 213-14 (N.D.N.Y.2009) (noting no authority cited for proposition that prior acquisition of customers constitutes property right or commercial advantage)."},"case_id":4119457,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In short, we would be required to speculate as to how the trial court reached its $50,000 attorney fee award. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the supplemental judgment for attorney fees for the trial court to further explain the basis of its award.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"199 Or App 330, 339-40","parenthetical":"vacating award of attorney fees because the trial court failed to identify which statutory factors supported its decision","sentence":"See Nieth and Nieth, 199 Or App 330, 339-40, 111 P3d 746, adh\u2019d to as clarified on recons, 200 Or App 582, 116 P3d 234 (2005) (vacating award of attorney fees because the trial court failed to identify which statutory factors supported its decision); cf. McCarthy, 327 Or at 188 n 1 (\u201cIf a petition seeks payment for 60 hours of attorney time at $200 per hour, and the court believes that some lesser award is appropriate, the court could state in its order that, relying on the factors in ORS 20.075(2)(a) and (g), the court concludes that a reasonable number of hours is 50 and a reasonable hourly rate is $175 per hour."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If a petition seeks payment for 60 hours of attorney time at $200 per hour, and the court believes that some lesser award is appropriate, the court could state in its order that, relying on the factors in ORS 20.075(2","sentence":"See Nieth and Nieth, 199 Or App 330, 339-40, 111 P3d 746, adh\u2019d to as clarified on recons, 200 Or App 582, 116 P3d 234 (2005) (vacating award of attorney fees because the trial court failed to identify which statutory factors supported its decision); cf. McCarthy, 327 Or at 188 n 1 (\u201cIf a petition seeks payment for 60 hours of attorney time at $200 per hour, and the court believes that some lesser award is appropriate, the court could state in its order that, relying on the factors in ORS 20.075(2)(a) and (g), the court concludes that a reasonable number of hours is 50 and a reasonable hourly rate is $175 per hour."},"case_id":3698853,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In short, we would be required to speculate as to how the trial court reached its $50,000 attorney fee award. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the supplemental judgment for attorney fees for the trial court to further explain the basis of its award.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"vacating award of attorney fees because the trial court failed to identify which statutory factors supported its decision","sentence":"See Nieth and Nieth, 199 Or App 330, 339-40, 111 P3d 746, adh\u2019d to as clarified on recons, 200 Or App 582, 116 P3d 234 (2005) (vacating award of attorney fees because the trial court failed to identify which statutory factors supported its decision); cf. McCarthy, 327 Or at 188 n 1 (\u201cIf a petition seeks payment for 60 hours of attorney time at $200 per hour, and the court believes that some lesser award is appropriate, the court could state in its order that, relying on the factors in ORS 20.075(2)(a) and (g), the court concludes that a reasonable number of hours is 50 and a reasonable hourly rate is $175 per hour."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"If a petition seeks payment for 60 hours of attorney time at $200 per hour, and the court believes that some lesser award is appropriate, the court could state in its order that, relying on the factors in ORS 20.075(2","sentence":"See Nieth and Nieth, 199 Or App 330, 339-40, 111 P3d 746, adh\u2019d to as clarified on recons, 200 Or App 582, 116 P3d 234 (2005) (vacating award of attorney fees because the trial court failed to identify which statutory factors supported its decision); cf. McCarthy, 327 Or at 188 n 1 (\u201cIf a petition seeks payment for 60 hours of attorney time at $200 per hour, and the court believes that some lesser award is appropriate, the court could state in its order that, relying on the factors in ORS 20.075(2)(a) and (g), the court concludes that a reasonable number of hours is 50 and a reasonable hourly rate is $175 per hour."},"case_id":3698853,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, that issue was not before the court. That decision is not, therefore, binding precedent on this issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"572 F.3d 1161, 1161","parenthetical":"\"Contrary to [the defendant's] assertion, this court has not held that CaLPenal Code SS 211 is broader than the generic definition of robbery. Rather, in ServinAcosta, we simply explained that the government had conceded the point.\"","sentence":"See Juarez-Galvan, 572 F.3d at 1161 (\u201cContrary to [the defendant\u2019s] assertion, this court has not held that CaLPenal Code \u00a7 211 is broader than the generic definition of robbery. Rather, in ServinAcosta, we simply explained that the government had conceded the point.\u201d); see also Romero, 491 F.3d at 1177 (\u201c[S]tare decisis requires that we accord precedential value to [our prior decision] as to the particular issues that it actually decided.\u201d (emphasis added)); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 156b v. Albertson\u2019s, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1199-1200 (10th Cir.2000) (refusing to grant precedential weight to a jurisdictional question assumed, but not explicitly decided, by a prior panel, even though that jurisdictional issue was necessary to the holding in the prior case, and stating that \u201c \u2018[i]n order for a decision to be given stare decisis effect with respect to a particular issue, that issue must have been actually decided by the court\u2019 \u201d (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore, et ah, Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 134.04[5] (3d ed.1999)))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"491 F.3d 1177, 1177","parenthetical":"\"[S]tare decisis requires that we accord precedential value to [our prior decision] as to the particular issues that it actually decided.\" (emphasis added","sentence":"See Juarez-Galvan, 572 F.3d at 1161 (\u201cContrary to [the defendant\u2019s] assertion, this court has not held that CaLPenal Code \u00a7 211 is broader than the generic definition of robbery. Rather, in ServinAcosta, we simply explained that the government had conceded the point.\u201d); see also Romero, 491 F.3d at 1177 (\u201c[S]tare decisis requires that we accord precedential value to [our prior decision] as to the particular issues that it actually decided.\u201d (emphasis added)); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 156b v. Albertson\u2019s, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1199-1200 (10th Cir.2000) (refusing to grant precedential weight to a jurisdictional question assumed, but not explicitly decided, by a prior panel, even though that jurisdictional issue was necessary to the holding in the prior case, and stating that \u201c \u2018[i]n order for a decision to be given stare decisis effect with respect to a particular issue, that issue must have been actually decided by the court\u2019 \u201d (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore, et ah, Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 134.04[5] (3d ed.1999)))."},"case_id":3486053,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, that issue was not before the court. That decision is not, therefore, binding precedent on this issue.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"572 F.3d 1161, 1161","parenthetical":"\"Contrary to [the defendant's] assertion, this court has not held that CaLPenal Code SS 211 is broader than the generic definition of robbery. Rather, in ServinAcosta, we simply explained that the government had conceded the point.\"","sentence":"See Juarez-Galvan, 572 F.3d at 1161 (\u201cContrary to [the defendant\u2019s] assertion, this court has not held that CaLPenal Code \u00a7 211 is broader than the generic definition of robbery. Rather, in ServinAcosta, we simply explained that the government had conceded the point.\u201d); see also Romero, 491 F.3d at 1177 (\u201c[S]tare decisis requires that we accord precedential value to [our prior decision] as to the particular issues that it actually decided.\u201d (emphasis added)); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 156b v. Albertson\u2019s, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1199-1200 (10th Cir.2000) (refusing to grant precedential weight to a jurisdictional question assumed, but not explicitly decided, by a prior panel, even though that jurisdictional issue was necessary to the holding in the prior case, and stating that \u201c \u2018[i]n order for a decision to be given stare decisis effect with respect to a particular issue, that issue must have been actually decided by the court\u2019 \u201d (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore, et ah, Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 134.04[5] (3d ed.1999)))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"207 F.3d 1193, 1199-1200","parenthetical":"refusing to grant precedential weight to a jurisdictional question assumed, but not explicitly decided, by a prior panel, even though that jurisdictional issue was necessary to the holding in the prior case, and stating that \" '[i]n order for a decision to be given stare decisis effect with respect to a particular issue, that issue must have been actually decided by the court' \" (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore, et ah, Moore's Federal Practice SS 134.04[5] (3d ed.1999","sentence":"See Juarez-Galvan, 572 F.3d at 1161 (\u201cContrary to [the defendant\u2019s] assertion, this court has not held that CaLPenal Code \u00a7 211 is broader than the generic definition of robbery. Rather, in ServinAcosta, we simply explained that the government had conceded the point.\u201d); see also Romero, 491 F.3d at 1177 (\u201c[S]tare decisis requires that we accord precedential value to [our prior decision] as to the particular issues that it actually decided.\u201d (emphasis added)); United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 156b v. Albertson\u2019s, Inc., 207 F.3d 1193, 1199-1200 (10th Cir.2000) (refusing to grant precedential weight to a jurisdictional question assumed, but not explicitly decided, by a prior panel, even though that jurisdictional issue was necessary to the holding in the prior case, and stating that \u201c \u2018[i]n order for a decision to be given stare decisis effect with respect to a particular issue, that issue must have been actually decided by the court\u2019 \u201d (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore, et ah, Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 134.04[5] (3d ed.1999)))."},"case_id":3486053,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To invoke Tucker Act jurisdiction over a tax refund claim, however, a plaintiff must meet three jurisdictional prerequisites. First, a plaintiff must make full payment of the tax, penalties, and interest at issue under the so called \"full payment rule.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"9 F.3d 1524, 1527","parenthetical":"holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims","sentence":"See Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1993) (holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims); see also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (\u201c[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"362 U.S. 145, 163","parenthetical":"\"[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\"","sentence":"See Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1993) (holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims); see also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (\u201c[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\u201d)."},"case_id":8455343,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To invoke Tucker Act jurisdiction over a tax refund claim, however, a plaintiff must meet three jurisdictional prerequisites. First, a plaintiff must make full payment of the tax, penalties, and interest at issue under the so called \"full payment rule.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"9 F.3d 1524, 1527","parenthetical":"holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims","sentence":"See Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1993) (holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims); see also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (\u201c[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\"","sentence":"See Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1993) (holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims); see also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (\u201c[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\u201d)."},"case_id":8455343,"label":"a"}
{"context":"To invoke Tucker Act jurisdiction over a tax refund claim, however, a plaintiff must meet three jurisdictional prerequisites. First, a plaintiff must make full payment of the tax, penalties, and interest at issue under the so called \"full payment rule.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"9 F.3d 1524, 1527","parenthetical":"holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims","sentence":"See Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1993) (holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims); see also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (\u201c[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\"","sentence":"See Shore v. United States, 9 F.3d 1524, 1527 (Fed.Cir.1993) (holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the Court of Federal Claims); see also Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960) (\u201c[F]ull payment of an illegal assessment is a condition upon the jurisdiction of a District Court to entertain a suit for refund[.]\u201d)."},"case_id":8455343,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Plaintiff' also cites to OSRAM's suit in Germany against Citizen, but this is not relevant because it was filed after January 18, 2005. Reasonable apprehension must exist at the time suit was filed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"846 F.2d 736, 736","parenthetical":"holding that-jurisdiction depends on \"the facts existing when the complaint is filed\"","sentence":"See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (holding that-jurisdiction depends on \u201cthe facts existing when the complaint is filed\u201d); Holley Performance Prods., Inc. v. Barry Grant, Inc., No. 04-5758, 2004 WL 3119017, at *4 (N.D.Ill.Dec.20, 2004) (\"Grant's subsequent filing of an infringement suit is irrelevant to the reasonable apprehension prong because reasonable apprehension must be assessed as of the time Holley filed this complaint\u201d); CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 957 F.Supp. 784, 789-90 & nn. 16-17 (E.D.Va.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"4 F.3d 980, 980","parenthetical":"\"Although it is the situation at the time suit was filed that establishes the existence vel non of an actual controversy, subsequent events can reinforce the correctness of the conclusion.\"","sentence":"But see BP Chemicals Ltd., 4 F.3d at 980 (\u201cAlthough it is the situation at the time suit was filed that establishes the existence vel non of an actual controversy, subsequent events can reinforce the correctness of the conclusion.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":8936926,"label":"a"}
{"context":".Plaintiff' also cites to OSRAM's suit in Germany against Citizen, but this is not relevant because it was filed after January 18, 2005. Reasonable apprehension must exist at the time suit was filed.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2004 WL 3119017, at *4","parenthetical":"\"Grant's subsequent filing of an infringement suit is irrelevant to the reasonable apprehension prong because reasonable apprehension must be assessed as of the time Holley filed this complaint\"","sentence":"See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736 (holding that-jurisdiction depends on \u201cthe facts existing when the complaint is filed\u201d); Holley Performance Prods., Inc. v. Barry Grant, Inc., No. 04-5758, 2004 WL 3119017, at *4 (N.D.Ill.Dec.20, 2004) (\"Grant's subsequent filing of an infringement suit is irrelevant to the reasonable apprehension prong because reasonable apprehension must be assessed as of the time Holley filed this complaint\u201d); CAE Screenplates, Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 957 F.Supp. 784, 789-90 & nn. 16-17 (E.D.Va.1997)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"4 F.3d 980, 980","parenthetical":"\"Although it is the situation at the time suit was filed that establishes the existence vel non of an actual controversy, subsequent events can reinforce the correctness of the conclusion.\"","sentence":"But see BP Chemicals Ltd., 4 F.3d at 980 (\u201cAlthough it is the situation at the time suit was filed that establishes the existence vel non of an actual controversy, subsequent events can reinforce the correctness of the conclusion.\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":8936926,"label":"a"}
{"context":"It must as a matter of equity, however, be recognized that much of the work performed, and to be performed, by PSC II on behalf of plaintiffs in the multi-district federal litigation will benefit state plaintiffs. This result is desirable. It will reduce the burden placed on the state-federal court structure by this mass litigation, and reduce unnecessary duplicitous work.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"263 F.2d 65, 69","parenthetical":"\"The benefits achieved by consolidation and the appointment of general counsel, i.e. elimination of duplication and repetition and in effect the creation of a coordinator of diffuse plaintiffs through whom motions and discovery proceedings will be channeled, will most certainly redound to the benefit of all parties to the litigation.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir.1958) (\u201cThe benefits achieved by consolidation and the appointment of general counsel, i.e. elimination of duplication and repetition and in effect the creation of a coordinator of diffuse plaintiffs through whom motions and discovery proceedings will be channeled, will most certainly redound to the benefit of all parties to the litigation.\u201d); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596, 2006 WL 898105, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. April 16, 2006) (\u201cCoordination and cooperation between state and federal courts has been encouraged.\u201d); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596, 2006 WL 197151 (E.D.N.Y."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2006 WL 898105, at *1","parenthetical":"\"Coordination and cooperation between state and federal courts has been encouraged.\"","sentence":"See, e.g., MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir.1958) (\u201cThe benefits achieved by consolidation and the appointment of general counsel, i.e. elimination of duplication and repetition and in effect the creation of a coordinator of diffuse plaintiffs through whom motions and discovery proceedings will be channeled, will most certainly redound to the benefit of all parties to the litigation.\u201d); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596, 2006 WL 898105, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. April 16, 2006) (\u201cCoordination and cooperation between state and federal courts has been encouraged.\u201d); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-01596, 2006 WL 197151 (E.D.N.Y."},"case_id":3776386,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Defense counsel's omission of a request for an instruction on the subject appears consistent with an all-or-nothing defense strategy in which the defendant's alibi played the leading role. The judge had no duty to undercut such a strategy by volunteering an instruction on a middle ground.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"35 Mass. App. Ct. 788, 791-792","parenthetical":"\"[a] judge has no duty to undercut [defendant's all-or-nothing] strategy\"","sentence":"See Commonwealth v. Pagan, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 788, 791-792 (1994) (\u201c[a] judge has no duty to undercut [defendant\u2019s all-or-nothing] strategy\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"407 Mass. 731, 737-739","parenthetical":"judge commits no error by respecting defendant's strategy to submit \"all-or-nothing choice\" to the jury","sentence":"See also Commonwealth v. Roberts, 407 Mass. 731, 737-739 (1990) (judge commits no error by respecting defendant\u2019s strategy to submit \u201call-or-nothing choice\u201d to the jury)."},"case_id":987521,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to consider whether the use of the same language in another statute aids in a determination of its scope in this one. We presume that when enacting new legislation, Congress is aware of similar language in old statutes, and chooses to repeat that language based on an understanding of relevant law interpreting it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53","parenthetical":"\"Where the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\"","sentence":"See Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53 (8th Cir.1969) (\u201cWhere the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\u201d); accord Yuen v. Internal Revenue Service, 649 F.2d 163, 167 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053, 102 S.Ct. 597, 70 L.Ed.2d 588 (1981); see also Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498-99, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943) (applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"318 U.S. 125, 131-32","parenthetical":"applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar","sentence":"See Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53 (8th Cir.1969) (\u201cWhere the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\u201d); accord Yuen v. Internal Revenue Service, 649 F.2d 163, 167 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053, 102 S.Ct. 597, 70 L.Ed.2d 588 (1981); see also Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498-99, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943) (applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar)."},"case_id":1539765,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to consider whether the use of the same language in another statute aids in a determination of its scope in this one. We presume that when enacting new legislation, Congress is aware of similar language in old statutes, and chooses to repeat that language based on an understanding of relevant law interpreting it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53","parenthetical":"\"Where the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\"","sentence":"See Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53 (8th Cir.1969) (\u201cWhere the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\u201d); accord Yuen v. Internal Revenue Service, 649 F.2d 163, 167 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053, 102 S.Ct. 597, 70 L.Ed.2d 588 (1981); see also Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498-99, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943) (applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"63 S.Ct. 494, 498-99","parenthetical":"applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar","sentence":"See Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53 (8th Cir.1969) (\u201cWhere the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\u201d); accord Yuen v. Internal Revenue Service, 649 F.2d 163, 167 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053, 102 S.Ct. 597, 70 L.Ed.2d 588 (1981); see also Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498-99, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943) (applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar)."},"case_id":1539765,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to consider whether the use of the same language in another statute aids in a determination of its scope in this one. We presume that when enacting new legislation, Congress is aware of similar language in old statutes, and chooses to repeat that language based on an understanding of relevant law interpreting it.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53","parenthetical":"\"Where the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\"","sentence":"See Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53 (8th Cir.1969) (\u201cWhere the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\u201d); accord Yuen v. Internal Revenue Service, 649 F.2d 163, 167 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053, 102 S.Ct. 597, 70 L.Ed.2d 588 (1981); see also Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498-99, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943) (applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar","sentence":"See Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352-53 (8th Cir.1969) (\u201cWhere the interpretation of a particular statute at issue is in doubt, the express language and legislative construction of another statute not strictly in pari materia but employing similar language and applying to similar persons, things, or cognate relationships may control by force of analogy.\u201d); accord Yuen v. Internal Revenue Service, 649 F.2d 163, 167 n. 4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1053, 102 S.Ct. 597, 70 L.Ed.2d 588 (1981); see also Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 131-32, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498-99, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943) (applying same scope to language used in statutes which although not strictly analogous, were similar)."},"case_id":1539765,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The fact that KPMG also probably knew it to be false is irrelevant for purposes of this penalty. Even if the statements that Mr. Bluin had independently reviewed the economics of the transaction and found them to be profitable were boilerplate, several other courts have found similar misrepresentations and omissions relevant in determining that reliance on a tax adviser was not reasonable.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding no reasonable reliance where taxpayer affirmed he reviewed economic substance of transactions when he had not","sentence":"See also Kerman v. Commissioner, 713 F.3d 849 (6th Cir.2013) (finding no reasonable reliance where taxpayer affirmed he reviewed economic substance of transactions when he had not)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"708 F.3d 519, 519","parenthetical":"finding no reasonable reliance because Mr. Crispin represented to a law firm that provided him with a tax opinion (1","sentence":"See, e.g., Crispin, 708 F.3d at 519 (finding no reasonable reliance because Mr. Crispin represented to a law firm that provided him with a tax opinion (1) that he had a valid business purpose when he knew or should have known that representation was false; and (2) that no party had provided him any tax related promotional material to him prior to his entering into the transaction even though he had received such materials)."},"case_id":3732537,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination that Reyes-Matul failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution in Guatemala on account of a political opinion or imputed political opinion.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"622 F.3d 1007, 1016","parenthetical":"\"[petitioner's] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.\"","sentence":"See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1997) (record did not compel a finding that persecution occurred \u201con account of\u2019 political beliefs absent sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (\u201c[petitioner\u2019s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.\u201d) (internal citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"103 F.3d 1482, 1490-91","parenthetical":"record did not compel a finding that persecution occurred \"on account of' political beliefs absent sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence","sentence":"See Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1490-91 (9th Cir. 1997) (record did not compel a finding that persecution occurred \u201con account of\u2019 political beliefs absent sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence); see also Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (\u201c[petitioner\u2019s] desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground.\u201d) (internal citation omitted)."},"case_id":12388099,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 8. In contrast, we have not allowed compensation for losses that occur when traffic is only routed away from a business, as the owner of a business does not have a property right in the flow of traffic to the business.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"128 Vt. 278, 283","parenthetical":"\"Benefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\"","sentence":"See Howe v. State Highway Bd., 128 Vt. 278, 283, 187 A.2d 342, 345 (1963) (\u201cBenefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\u201d); see also Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 408, 175 A.2d 511, 513 (1961) (stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \u201cthe legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"122 Vt. 406, 408","parenthetical":"stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \"the legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\"","sentence":"See Howe v. State Highway Bd., 128 Vt. 278, 283, 187 A.2d 342, 345 (1963) (\u201cBenefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\u201d); see also Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 408, 175 A.2d 511, 513 (1961) (stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \u201cthe legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3148674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 8. In contrast, we have not allowed compensation for losses that occur when traffic is only routed away from a business, as the owner of a business does not have a property right in the flow of traffic to the business.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"175 A.2d 511, 513","parenthetical":"stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \"the legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\"","sentence":"See Howe v. State Highway Bd., 128 Vt. 278, 283, 187 A.2d 342, 345 (1963) (\u201cBenefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\u201d); see also Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 408, 175 A.2d 511, 513 (1961) (stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \u201cthe legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"128 Vt. 278, 283","parenthetical":"\"Benefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\"","sentence":"See Howe v. State Highway Bd., 128 Vt. 278, 283, 187 A.2d 342, 345 (1963) (\u201cBenefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\u201d); see also Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 408, 175 A.2d 511, 513 (1961) (stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \u201cthe legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3148674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"P 8. In contrast, we have not allowed compensation for losses that occur when traffic is only routed away from a business, as the owner of a business does not have a property right in the flow of traffic to the business.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 A.2d 342, 345","parenthetical":"\"Benefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\"","sentence":"See Howe v. State Highway Bd., 128 Vt. 278, 283, 187 A.2d 342, 345 (1963) (\u201cBenefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\u201d); see also Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 408, 175 A.2d 511, 513 (1961) (stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \u201cthe legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"122 Vt. 406, 408","parenthetical":"stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \"the legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\"","sentence":"See Howe v. State Highway Bd., 128 Vt. 278, 283, 187 A.2d 342, 345 (1963) (\u201cBenefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\u201d); see also Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 408, 175 A.2d 511, 513 (1961) (stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \u201cthe legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3148674,"label":"a"}
{"context":"P 8. In contrast, we have not allowed compensation for losses that occur when traffic is only routed away from a business, as the owner of a business does not have a property right in the flow of traffic to the business.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"175 A.2d 511, 513","parenthetical":"stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \"the legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\"","sentence":"See Howe v. State Highway Bd., 128 Vt. 278, 283, 187 A.2d 342, 345 (1963) (\u201cBenefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\u201d); see also Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 408, 175 A.2d 511, 513 (1961) (stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \u201cthe legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"187 A.2d 342, 345","parenthetical":"\"Benefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\"","sentence":"See Howe v. State Highway Bd., 128 Vt. 278, 283, 187 A.2d 342, 345 (1963) (\u201cBenefits attached to the currents of public travel are not vested rights and so diversion of traffic does not furnish a ground for compensation.\u201d); see also Spear v. State Highway Bd., 122 Vt. 406, 408, 175 A.2d 511, 513 (1961) (stating that when a highway relocation project has resulted in the loss of business, \u201cthe legislature has never attempted to provide compensation____Our statute relates business loss to property taken, not to highway relocation.\u201d)."},"case_id":3148674,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, the ALJ assigned too much relative weight to the opinions provided by consultative examiner Dr. Hill, who only saw Plaintiff on one occasion; and the non-examining State Agency review consultant, who only reviewed Plaintiffs medical records, which were incomplete.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"912 F.2d 8, 13","parenthetical":"\"[I]n evaluating a claimant's disability, a consulting physician's opinions or report should be given limited weight.\"","sentence":"See Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir.1990) (\u201c[I]n evaluating a claimant\u2019s disability, a consulting physician\u2019s opinions or report should be given limited weight.\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Torres v. Bowen, 700 F.Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (\u201c[Cjonsultative exams are often brief, are generally performed without benefit or review of claimant\u2019s medical history and, at best, only give a glimpse of the claimant on a single day.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"700 F.Supp. 1306, 1312","parenthetical":"\"[Cjonsultative exams are often brief, are generally performed without benefit or review of claimant's medical history and, at best, only give a glimpse of the claimant on a single day.\"","sentence":"See Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir.1990) (\u201c[I]n evaluating a claimant\u2019s disability, a consulting physician\u2019s opinions or report should be given limited weight.\u201d) (citation omitted); see also Torres v. Bowen, 700 F.Supp. 1306, 1312 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (\u201c[Cjonsultative exams are often brief, are generally performed without benefit or review of claimant\u2019s medical history and, at best, only give a glimpse of the claimant on a single day.\u201d)."},"case_id":4168392,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no rigid limit on the duration of a traffic stop. A traffic stop may continue as long as reasonable suspicion remains, provided that police act \"diligently and reasonably.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"470 U.S. 675, 686","parenthetical":"\"In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\"","sentence":"State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1990) (stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \u201cdepends on the facts and circumstances\u201d and that \u201c[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\u201d); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (\u201cIn assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"450 N.W.2d 116, 119","parenthetical":"stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \"depends on the facts and circumstances\" and that \"[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\"","sentence":"State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1990) (stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \u201cdepends on the facts and circumstances\u201d and that \u201c[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\u201d); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (\u201cIn assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\u201d)."},"case_id":6968268,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is no rigid limit on the duration of a traffic stop. A traffic stop may continue as long as reasonable suspicion remains, provided that police act \"diligently and reasonably.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"450 N.W.2d 116, 119","parenthetical":"stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \"depends on the facts and circumstances\" and that \"[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\"","sentence":"State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1990) (stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \u201cdepends on the facts and circumstances\u201d and that \u201c[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\u201d); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (\u201cIn assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575","parenthetical":"\"In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\"","sentence":"State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1990) (stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \u201cdepends on the facts and circumstances\u201d and that \u201c[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\u201d); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (\u201cIn assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\u201d)."},"case_id":6968268,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is no rigid limit on the duration of a traffic stop. A traffic stop may continue as long as reasonable suspicion remains, provided that police act \"diligently and reasonably.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\"","sentence":"State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1990) (stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \u201cdepends on the facts and circumstances\u201d and that \u201c[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\u201d); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (\u201cIn assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"450 N.W.2d 116, 119","parenthetical":"stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \"depends on the facts and circumstances\" and that \"[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\"","sentence":"State v. Moffatt, 450 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Minn.1990) (stating that the reasonableness of the length of a traffic stop \u201cdepends on the facts and circumstances\u201d and that \u201c[s]ometimes a 20-minute detention will be too long, sometimes a detention of more than an hour will not be unreasonable\u201d); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (\u201cIn assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.\u201d)."},"case_id":6968268,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Further, as discussed above, prior art relevant to the obviousness inquiry is not strictly limited to the specific field of endeavor of the invention at issue, but extends to fields logically related to the general problem facing the inventor.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"620 F.Supp.2d 4, 19-20","parenthetical":"\"Where an inventor is considering how to design a particular mechanism to fit a specific type of device, he 'would naturally look to references employing' other forms of that mechanism, even where they are found in different types of devices.\" (omitting citations and quotations","sentence":"See In re ICON Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1379-80 (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed.Cir.1992); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed.Cir.2006); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481-82 (Fed.Cir.1994); Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. v. Doll, 620 F.Supp.2d 4, 19-20 (D.D.C.2009) (\u201cWhere an inventor is considering how to design a particular mechanism to fit a specific type of device, he \u2018would naturally look to references employing\u2019 other forms of that mechanism, even where they are found in different types of devices.\u201d (omitting citations and quotations)); cf. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (\u201c[F]amiliar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"550 U.S. 420, 420","parenthetical":"\"[F]amiliar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.\"","sentence":"See In re ICON Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1379-80 (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed.Cir.1992); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed.Cir.2006); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481-82 (Fed.Cir.1994); Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. v. Doll, 620 F.Supp.2d 4, 19-20 (D.D.C.2009) (\u201cWhere an inventor is considering how to design a particular mechanism to fit a specific type of device, he \u2018would naturally look to references employing\u2019 other forms of that mechanism, even where they are found in different types of devices.\u201d (omitting citations and quotations)); cf. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (\u201c[F]amiliar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3800812,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Further, as discussed above, prior art relevant to the obviousness inquiry is not strictly limited to the specific field of endeavor of the invention at issue, but extends to fields logically related to the general problem facing the inventor.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[F]amiliar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.\"","sentence":"See In re ICON Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1379-80 (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed.Cir.1992); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed.Cir.2006); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481-82 (Fed.Cir.1994); Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. v. Doll, 620 F.Supp.2d 4, 19-20 (D.D.C.2009) (\u201cWhere an inventor is considering how to design a particular mechanism to fit a specific type of device, he \u2018would naturally look to references employing\u2019 other forms of that mechanism, even where they are found in different types of devices.\u201d (omitting citations and quotations)); cf. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (\u201c[F]amiliar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"620 F.Supp.2d 4, 19-20","parenthetical":"\"Where an inventor is considering how to design a particular mechanism to fit a specific type of device, he 'would naturally look to references employing' other forms of that mechanism, even where they are found in different types of devices.\" (omitting citations and quotations","sentence":"See In re ICON Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1379-80 (citing In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed.Cir.1992); In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987 (Fed.Cir.2006); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1481-82 (Fed.Cir.1994); Hitachi Koki Co., Ltd. v. Doll, 620 F.Supp.2d 4, 19-20 (D.D.C.2009) (\u201cWhere an inventor is considering how to design a particular mechanism to fit a specific type of device, he \u2018would naturally look to references employing\u2019 other forms of that mechanism, even where they are found in different types of devices.\u201d (omitting citations and quotations)); cf. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (\u201c[F]amiliar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.\u201d)."},"case_id":3800812,"label":"b"}
{"context":"I reach a somewhat different conclusion as to Ms. Mendoza's claimed expenses. Although I find it inequitable and \"clearly inappropriate\" to award any attorney's fees, I note that the claim for expenses is far more reasonable and that awarding at least some expenses against Mr. Medina is not \"clearly inappropriate,\" as a matter of equity. This is so, in part, because Mr. Medina's defense of this case also benefitted to some extent from Ms. Mendoza's translations of various documents; in part, because, even considering Mr. Medina's financial condition, awarding some share of Ms. Mendoza's expenses is consistent with the goals of Article 26 of the 1980 Hague Convention and 42 U.S.C. SS 11607(b)(3); and, in part, because Ms. Mendoza has some obligation to pay these expenses out-of-pocket, even if her legal representation was pro Bono.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"2008 WL 5273677, at *2","parenthetical":"finding an award of any attorney's fees \"clearly inappropriate\" because of respondent's inability \"to shoulder the burden\" of the \"115,872.26 in attorney fees, copying costs, etc. that Petitioner's counsel is requesting,\" where respondent \"has limited financial means and has found little gainful employment in the United States,\" and awarding the petitioner only his \"out-of-pocket costs\"","sentence":"See Vale, 2008 WL 5273677 at *2 (finding an award of any attorney\u2019s fees \u201cclearly inappropriate\u201d because of respondent\u2019s inability \u201cto shoulder the burden\u201d of the \u201c115,872.26 in attorney fees, copying costs, etc. that Petitioner\u2019s counsel is requesting,\u201d where respondent \u201chas limited financial means and has found little gainful employment in the United States,\u201d and awarding the petitioner only his \u201cout-of-pocket costs\u201d); cf. Rydder, 49 F.3d at 373-74 (reducing by almost half the claimed attorney\u2019s fees awarded, but awarding all of the claimed expenses)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"49 F.3d 373, 373-74","parenthetical":"reducing by almost half the claimed attorney's fees awarded, but awarding all of the claimed expenses","sentence":"See Vale, 2008 WL 5273677 at *2 (finding an award of any attorney\u2019s fees \u201cclearly inappropriate\u201d because of respondent\u2019s inability \u201cto shoulder the burden\u201d of the \u201c115,872.26 in attorney fees, copying costs, etc. that Petitioner\u2019s counsel is requesting,\u201d where respondent \u201chas limited financial means and has found little gainful employment in the United States,\u201d and awarding the petitioner only his \u201cout-of-pocket costs\u201d); cf. Rydder, 49 F.3d at 373-74 (reducing by almost half the claimed attorney\u2019s fees awarded, but awarding all of the claimed expenses)."},"case_id":4312558,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Given the information in the affidavit that established the defendant's decade-long history of using his place of residence as a base for his drug selling operation, it is reasonable to infer that he continued this well-established pattern of selling drugs from his residence when he moved into a motel on or about January 13, 2002. As the motion judge concluded, this inference is bolstered by the information in the affidavit that suggests that the defendant \"left . . . that room to conduct his nefarious business, and returned to it shortly thereafter, establish[ing] a reasonable basis for believing that evidence of his crimes would be found in the room.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"440 Mass. 302, 302-304","parenthetical":"despite the lack of any direct evidence linking the defendant's residence to his drug selling activity at local bars, additional information supplied by State troopers regarding activity at the defendant's home -- e.g., brief visits to his home by numerous people, and observation of the defendant during two surveillances in which he was seen to go directly from his residence to the pub where he apparently engaged in drug transactions -- and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom were sufficient to establish probable cause","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. O\u2019Day, 440 Mass. at 302-304 (despite the lack of any direct evidence linking the defendant\u2019s residence to his drug selling activity at local bars, additional information supplied by State troopers regarding activity at the defendant\u2019s home \u2014 e.g., brief visits to his home by numerous people, and observation of the defendant during two surveillances in which he was seen to go directly from his residence to the pub where he apparently engaged in drug transactions \u2014 and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom were sufficient to establish probable cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"30 Mass. App. Ct. 596, 599-601","parenthetical":"no specific information in affidavit tying defendant's residence to illegal drug transactions","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Olivares, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 596, 599-601 (1991) (no specific information in affidavit tying defendant\u2019s residence to illegal drug transactions); Commonwealth v. Laughlin, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 926-927 (1996) (affidavit established that defendant was a drug dealer, but did not connect drugs to his residence); Commonwealth v. Chongarlides, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 370 (2001) (affidavit contained no evidence that the defendant had ever kept drugs at his residence)."},"case_id":3769923,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Given the information in the affidavit that established the defendant's decade-long history of using his place of residence as a base for his drug selling operation, it is reasonable to infer that he continued this well-established pattern of selling drugs from his residence when he moved into a motel on or about January 13, 2002. As the motion judge concluded, this inference is bolstered by the information in the affidavit that suggests that the defendant \"left . . . that room to conduct his nefarious business, and returned to it shortly thereafter, establish[ing] a reasonable basis for believing that evidence of his crimes would be found in the room.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"40 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 926-927","parenthetical":"affidavit established that defendant was a drug dealer, but did not connect drugs to his residence","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Olivares, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 596, 599-601 (1991) (no specific information in affidavit tying defendant\u2019s residence to illegal drug transactions); Commonwealth v. Laughlin, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 926-927 (1996) (affidavit established that defendant was a drug dealer, but did not connect drugs to his residence); Commonwealth v. Chongarlides, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 370 (2001) (affidavit contained no evidence that the defendant had ever kept drugs at his residence)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"440 Mass. 302, 302-304","parenthetical":"despite the lack of any direct evidence linking the defendant's residence to his drug selling activity at local bars, additional information supplied by State troopers regarding activity at the defendant's home -- e.g., brief visits to his home by numerous people, and observation of the defendant during two surveillances in which he was seen to go directly from his residence to the pub where he apparently engaged in drug transactions -- and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom were sufficient to establish probable cause","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. O\u2019Day, 440 Mass. at 302-304 (despite the lack of any direct evidence linking the defendant\u2019s residence to his drug selling activity at local bars, additional information supplied by State troopers regarding activity at the defendant\u2019s home \u2014 e.g., brief visits to his home by numerous people, and observation of the defendant during two surveillances in which he was seen to go directly from his residence to the pub where he apparently engaged in drug transactions \u2014 and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom were sufficient to establish probable cause)."},"case_id":3769923,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Given the information in the affidavit that established the defendant's decade-long history of using his place of residence as a base for his drug selling operation, it is reasonable to infer that he continued this well-established pattern of selling drugs from his residence when he moved into a motel on or about January 13, 2002. As the motion judge concluded, this inference is bolstered by the information in the affidavit that suggests that the defendant \"left . . . that room to conduct his nefarious business, and returned to it shortly thereafter, establish[ing] a reasonable basis for believing that evidence of his crimes would be found in the room.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"440 Mass. 302, 302-304","parenthetical":"despite the lack of any direct evidence linking the defendant's residence to his drug selling activity at local bars, additional information supplied by State troopers regarding activity at the defendant's home -- e.g., brief visits to his home by numerous people, and observation of the defendant during two surveillances in which he was seen to go directly from his residence to the pub where he apparently engaged in drug transactions -- and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom were sufficient to establish probable cause","sentence":"Compare Commonwealth v. O\u2019Day, 440 Mass. at 302-304 (despite the lack of any direct evidence linking the defendant\u2019s residence to his drug selling activity at local bars, additional information supplied by State troopers regarding activity at the defendant\u2019s home \u2014 e.g., brief visits to his home by numerous people, and observation of the defendant during two surveillances in which he was seen to go directly from his residence to the pub where he apparently engaged in drug transactions \u2014 and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom were sufficient to establish probable cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"contra","identifier":"52 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 370","parenthetical":"affidavit contained no evidence that the defendant had ever kept drugs at his residence","sentence":"Contrast Commonwealth v. Olivares, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 596, 599-601 (1991) (no specific information in affidavit tying defendant\u2019s residence to illegal drug transactions); Commonwealth v. Laughlin, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 926-927 (1996) (affidavit established that defendant was a drug dealer, but did not connect drugs to his residence); Commonwealth v. Chongarlides, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 370 (2001) (affidavit contained no evidence that the defendant had ever kept drugs at his residence)."},"case_id":3769923,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The Workers' Compensation Law creates a system in which employees can recover benefits for their injuries arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault. See Tenn.Code Ann. SS 50-6-103(a) (2008). There are, however, some circumstances in which an employee cannot recover for injuries that would otherwise be compensable. In this instance, the Employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding benefits because claims of this nature are barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-110(a), which provided, at the time of the accident, in pertinent part: \"No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death due to the employee's willful misconduct or intentional self-inflicted injury, due to intoxication or illegal drug usage, or willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty required by law.\" The bur den of proof is on the employer to demonstrate that the willful misconduct or the willful failure to use a safety appliance was the proximate cause of the injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"545 S.W.2d 1, 4","parenthetical":"stating, in the context of the same workers' compensation provision, that when a statute uses the language \"due to,\" this refers to proximate cause","sentence":"Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 50 \u2014 6\u2014110(b); Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540, 542 (1959) (explaining that the employer must \u201cshow that the injury was due to the willful misconduct of the employee\u201d); see also Overall v. S. Subaru Star, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn.1976) (stating, in the context of the same workers\u2019 compensation provision, that when a statute uses the language \u201cdue to,\u201d this refers to proximate cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that the employer must \"show that the injury was due to the willful misconduct of the employee\"","sentence":"Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 50 \u2014 6\u2014110(b); Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540, 542 (1959) (explaining that the employer must \u201cshow that the injury was due to the willful misconduct of the employee\u201d); see also Overall v. S. Subaru Star, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn.1976) (stating, in the context of the same workers\u2019 compensation provision, that when a statute uses the language \u201cdue to,\u201d this refers to proximate cause)."},"case_id":7315417,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The Workers' Compensation Law creates a system in which employees can recover benefits for their injuries arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault. See Tenn.Code Ann. SS 50-6-103(a) (2008). There are, however, some circumstances in which an employee cannot recover for injuries that would otherwise be compensable. In this instance, the Employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding benefits because claims of this nature are barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-110(a), which provided, at the time of the accident, in pertinent part: \"No compensation shall be allowed for an injury or death due to the employee's willful misconduct or intentional self-inflicted injury, due to intoxication or illegal drug usage, or willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or perform a duty required by law.\" The bur den of proof is on the employer to demonstrate that the willful misconduct or the willful failure to use a safety appliance was the proximate cause of the injuries.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"321 S.W.2d 540, 542","parenthetical":"explaining that the employer must \"show that the injury was due to the willful misconduct of the employee\"","sentence":"Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 50 \u2014 6\u2014110(b); Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540, 542 (1959) (explaining that the employer must \u201cshow that the injury was due to the willful misconduct of the employee\u201d); see also Overall v. S. Subaru Star, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn.1976) (stating, in the context of the same workers\u2019 compensation provision, that when a statute uses the language \u201cdue to,\u201d this refers to proximate cause)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"545 S.W.2d 1, 4","parenthetical":"stating, in the context of the same workers' compensation provision, that when a statute uses the language \"due to,\" this refers to proximate cause","sentence":"Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 50 \u2014 6\u2014110(b); Coleman v. Coker, 204 Tenn. 310, 321 S.W.2d 540, 542 (1959) (explaining that the employer must \u201cshow that the injury was due to the willful misconduct of the employee\u201d); see also Overall v. S. Subaru Star, Inc., 545 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn.1976) (stating, in the context of the same workers\u2019 compensation provision, that when a statute uses the language \u201cdue to,\u201d this refers to proximate cause)."},"case_id":7315417,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The defendants attached a copy of the Release to their motion to dismiss, but the plaintiffs had not referred to the Release in their complaint. A motion to dismiss relying on a paper outside the pleadings is generally permissible only where the complaint refers to that paper.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"permitting papers submitted with motion to dismiss to be considered part of pleadings \"if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the plaintiff's claim\"","sentence":"Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing dismissal as proper when based on \"those exhibits submitted by [a] defendant which can properly be considered as incorporated by reference into the complaint\u201d); see also City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 659 n. 6 (6th Cir.2005) (permitting papers submitted with motion to dismiss to be considered part of pleadings \"if they are referred to in the plaintiff\u2019s complaint and are central to the plaintiff\u2019s claim\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"108 F.3d 86, 89","parenthetical":"recognizing dismissal as proper when based on \"those exhibits submitted by [a] defendant which can properly be considered as incorporated by reference into the complaint\"","sentence":"Weiner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing dismissal as proper when based on \"those exhibits submitted by [a] defendant which can properly be considered as incorporated by reference into the complaint\u201d); see also City of Monroe Employees Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 659 n. 6 (6th Cir.2005) (permitting papers submitted with motion to dismiss to be considered part of pleadings \"if they are referred to in the plaintiff\u2019s complaint and are central to the plaintiff\u2019s claim\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"case_id":1179034,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Furthermore, we reject the state's alternative claim that, by signing the agreement, the defendant waived any objection to subject matter jurisdiction. A criminal defendant may not waive the statutory limits on the court's subject matter jurisdiction in a plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"no party can waive a defect in the court's subject matter jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See State v. Vincent, 194 Conn. 198, 203 n.7, 479 A.2d 237 (1984) (\u201cno party can waive a defect in the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction\u201d); see also State v. Jones, supra, 166 Conn. 627 (jurisdiction \u201cis a matter of law and can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jurisdiction \"is a matter of law and can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused\"","sentence":"See State v. Vincent, 194 Conn. 198, 203 n.7, 479 A.2d 237 (1984) (\u201cno party can waive a defect in the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction\u201d); see also State v. Jones, supra, 166 Conn. 627 (jurisdiction \u201cis a matter of law and can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused\u201d)."},"case_id":357929,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Furthermore, we reject the state's alternative claim that, by signing the agreement, the defendant waived any objection to subject matter jurisdiction. A criminal defendant may not waive the statutory limits on the court's subject matter jurisdiction in a plea agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"jurisdiction \"is a matter of law and can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused\"","sentence":"See State v. Vincent, 194 Conn. 198, 203 n.7, 479 A.2d 237 (1984) (\u201cno party can waive a defect in the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction\u201d); see also State v. Jones, supra, 166 Conn. 627 (jurisdiction \u201cis a matter of law and can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"no party can waive a defect in the court's subject matter jurisdiction\"","sentence":"See State v. Vincent, 194 Conn. 198, 203 n.7, 479 A.2d 237 (1984) (\u201cno party can waive a defect in the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction\u201d); see also State v. Jones, supra, 166 Conn. 627 (jurisdiction \u201cis a matter of law and can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused\u201d)."},"case_id":357929,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Because a defendant does not have an absolute right to insist on introduction of the whole of a confession or admission merely because a part has been introduced by the State, it follows that determining whether omitted portions of a confession or admission will yield distortion or exclude material that is substantially exculpatory to the portions introduced by the State remains a matter left to the discretion of the trial court.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"892 S.W.2d 695, 695-96","parenthetical":"holding that when danger of distortion or exclusions of substantially exculpatory information is not present \"it is not an abuse of discretion to fail to require the production of the remainder [of the statement]\"","sentence":"Collier, 892 S.W.2d at 695-96 (holding that when danger of distortion or exclusions of substantially exculpatory information is not present \u201cit is not an abuse of discretion to fail to require the production of the remainder [of the statement]\u201d) (quoting 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law section 885); see also State v. Silvers, 735 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Mo. App. S.D. 1987) (\u201cWhat may be considered reasonably separable [from the whole of a conversation or statement] is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.\u201d) (citing State v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo. App. E.D. 1979))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"735 S.W.2d 393, 397","parenthetical":"\"What may be considered reasonably separable [from the whole of a conversation or statement] is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.\"","sentence":"Collier, 892 S.W.2d at 695-96 (holding that when danger of distortion or exclusions of substantially exculpatory information is not present \u201cit is not an abuse of discretion to fail to require the production of the remainder [of the statement]\u201d) (quoting 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law section 885); see also State v. Silvers, 735 S.W.2d 393, 397 (Mo. App. S.D. 1987) (\u201cWhat may be considered reasonably separable [from the whole of a conversation or statement] is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.\u201d) (citing State v. Brown, 584 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Mo. App. E.D. 1979))."},"case_id":12374908,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Thus, our courts have safeguarded an individual's constitutional guaranty of due process by applying the scope of review under K.S.A. 60-2101(d).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"233 Kan. 69, 69, 77-78","parenthetical":"affirming district court's conclusion the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence and Commission had denied teacher's right to due process","sentence":"See Unruh v. U.S.D. No. 300, 245 Kan. 35, 43, 775 P.2d 171 (1989) (upholding district court\u2019s conclusion the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in denial of due process); see also Haddock, 233 Kan. at 69, 77-78 (affirming district court\u2019s conclusion the Commission\u2019s decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence and Commission had denied teacher\u2019s right to due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"245 Kan. 35, 43","parenthetical":"upholding district court's conclusion the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in denial of due process","sentence":"See Unruh v. U.S.D. No. 300, 245 Kan. 35, 43, 775 P.2d 171 (1989) (upholding district court\u2019s conclusion the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in denial of due process); see also Haddock, 233 Kan. at 69, 77-78 (affirming district court\u2019s conclusion the Commission\u2019s decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence and Commission had denied teacher\u2019s right to due process)."},"case_id":3686281,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Thus, our courts have safeguarded an individual's constitutional guaranty of due process by applying the scope of review under K.S.A. 60-2101(d).","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"233 Kan. 69, 69, 77-78","parenthetical":"affirming district court's conclusion the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence and Commission had denied teacher's right to due process","sentence":"See Unruh v. U.S.D. No. 300, 245 Kan. 35, 43, 775 P.2d 171 (1989) (upholding district court\u2019s conclusion the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in denial of due process); see also Haddock, 233 Kan. at 69, 77-78 (affirming district court\u2019s conclusion the Commission\u2019s decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence and Commission had denied teacher\u2019s right to due process)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"upholding district court's conclusion the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in denial of due process","sentence":"See Unruh v. U.S.D. No. 300, 245 Kan. 35, 43, 775 P.2d 171 (1989) (upholding district court\u2019s conclusion the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, resulting in denial of due process); see also Haddock, 233 Kan. at 69, 77-78 (affirming district court\u2019s conclusion the Commission\u2019s decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence and Commission had denied teacher\u2019s right to due process)."},"case_id":3686281,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter that order. We therefore direct the district court to ensure the money's return to Mr. Anglezis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"139 U.S. 216, 219","parenthetical":"\"[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\"","sentence":"See Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151 (1891) (\u201c[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\u201d); see also In re Graziadei, 32 F.3d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir.1994) (ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction); Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming order of restitution for void judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"32 F.3d 1408, 1411","parenthetical":"ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction","sentence":"See Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151 (1891) (\u201c[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\u201d); see also In re Graziadei, 32 F.3d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir.1994) (ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction); Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming order of restitution for void judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4))."},"case_id":5622618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter that order. We therefore direct the district court to ensure the money's return to Mr. Anglezis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\"","sentence":"See Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151 (1891) (\u201c[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\u201d); see also In re Graziadei, 32 F.3d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir.1994) (ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction); Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming order of restitution for void judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"32 F.3d 1408, 1411","parenthetical":"ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction","sentence":"See Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151 (1891) (\u201c[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\u201d); see also In re Graziadei, 32 F.3d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir.1994) (ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction); Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming order of restitution for void judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4))."},"case_id":5622618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The district court had no subject matter jurisdiction to enter that order. We therefore direct the district court to ensure the money's return to Mr. Anglezis.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"32 F.3d 1408, 1411","parenthetical":"ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction","sentence":"See Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151 (1891) (\u201c[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\u201d); see also In re Graziadei, 32 F.3d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir.1994) (ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction); Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming order of restitution for void judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4))."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"\"[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\"","sentence":"See Nw. Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216, 219, 11 S.Ct. 523, 35 L.Ed. 151 (1891) (\u201c[T]he power is inherent in every court, while the subject of controversy is in its custody, and the parties are before it, to undo what it had no authority to do originally, and in which it, therefore, acted erroneously, and to restore, so far as possible, the parties to their former position.\u201d); see also In re Graziadei, 32 F.3d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir.1994) (ordering restitution of funds paid by bankruptcy court lacking subject matter jurisdiction); Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) (affirming order of restitution for void judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4))."},"case_id":5622618,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The reduction of an SVP's access level is similar to the transfer of prisoners from the general prison population to administrative segregation. Such a transfer may deprive the prisoner of a state-created liberty interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"515 U.S. 472, 484","parenthetical":"holding that a state-created liberty interest in one's classification may exist where classification imposes \"atypical and significant hardship\"","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 F.3d 813, 815-16","parenthetical":"holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"case_id":5411139,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The reduction of an SVP's access level is similar to the transfer of prisoners from the general prison population to administrative segregation. Such a transfer may deprive the prisoner of a state-created liberty interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 F.3d 813, 815-16","parenthetical":"holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a state-created liberty interest in one's classification may exist where classification imposes \"atypical and significant hardship\"","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"case_id":5411139,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The reduction of an SVP's access level is similar to the transfer of prisoners from the general prison population to administrative segregation. Such a transfer may deprive the prisoner of a state-created liberty interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a state-created liberty interest in one's classification may exist where classification imposes \"atypical and significant hardship\"","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 F.3d 813, 815-16","parenthetical":"holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"case_id":5411139,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The reduction of an SVP's access level is similar to the transfer of prisoners from the general prison population to administrative segregation. Such a transfer may deprive the prisoner of a state-created liberty interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"515 U.S. 472, 484","parenthetical":"holding that a state-created liberty interest in one's classification may exist where classification imposes \"atypical and significant hardship\"","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 F.3d 813, 815-16","parenthetical":"holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"case_id":3775329,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The reduction of an SVP's access level is similar to the transfer of prisoners from the general prison population to administrative segregation. Such a transfer may deprive the prisoner of a state-created liberty interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 F.3d 813, 815-16","parenthetical":"holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a state-created liberty interest in one's classification may exist where classification imposes \"atypical and significant hardship\"","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"case_id":3775329,"label":"b"}
{"context":"The reduction of an SVP's access level is similar to the transfer of prisoners from the general prison population to administrative segregation. Such a transfer may deprive the prisoner of a state-created liberty interest.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that a state-created liberty interest in one's classification may exist where classification imposes \"atypical and significant hardship\"","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"31 F.3d 813, 815-16","parenthetical":"holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges","sentence":"See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that a state-created liberty interest in one\u2019s classification may exist where classification imposes \u201catypical and significant hardship\u201d); see also Barnett v. Centoni 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that a prison inmate was deprived of liberty and property because he was reclassified thereby losing certain privileges)."},"case_id":3775329,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although this fact was not brought to the Court's attention until the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, see Pis.' Mot. Reconsideration at 4 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs may have caused \"confusion\" by \"not provid[ing] details about the HAP members' precise immigration status\" earlier in the litigation), it is now clear that these members, as lawful permanent residents, fall within SS 1188(a)(1)'s zone of interests. Under Mendoza, HAP members also meet the requirements for Article III standing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"827 F.3d 59, 65","parenthetical":"\"An organization has associational standing to bring suit on its members' behalf when: (1","sentence":"See Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (\u201cAn organization has associational standing to bring suit on its members\u2019 behalf when: (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization\u2019s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hispanic Affairs Project, 206 F.Supp.3d at 369 n.8, 2016 WL 4734360 at *14 n.8 (explaining that HAP had met the requirements for associational standing except that it had not \u201cprovid[ed] the necessary information regarding whether any of its members are American workers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that HAP had met the requirements for associational standing except that it had not \"provid[ed] the necessary information regarding whether any of its members are American workers\"","sentence":"See Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (\u201cAn organization has associational standing to bring suit on its members\u2019 behalf when: (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization\u2019s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hispanic Affairs Project, 206 F.Supp.3d at 369 n.8, 2016 WL 4734360 at *14 n.8 (explaining that HAP had met the requirements for associational standing except that it had not \u201cprovid[ed] the necessary information regarding whether any of its members are American workers\u201d)."},"case_id":12309335,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Although this fact was not brought to the Court's attention until the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, see Pis.' Mot. Reconsideration at 4 (acknowledging that the plaintiffs may have caused \"confusion\" by \"not provid[ing] details about the HAP members' precise immigration status\" earlier in the litigation), it is now clear that these members, as lawful permanent residents, fall within SS 1188(a)(1)'s zone of interests. Under Mendoza, HAP members also meet the requirements for Article III standing.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"explaining that HAP had met the requirements for associational standing except that it had not \"provid[ed] the necessary information regarding whether any of its members are American workers\"","sentence":"See Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (\u201cAn organization has associational standing to bring suit on its members\u2019 behalf when: (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization\u2019s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hispanic Affairs Project, 206 F.Supp.3d at 369 n.8, 2016 WL 4734360 at *14 n.8 (explaining that HAP had met the requirements for associational standing except that it had not \u201cprovid[ed] the necessary information regarding whether any of its members are American workers\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"827 F.3d 59, 65","parenthetical":"\"An organization has associational standing to bring suit on its members' behalf when: (1","sentence":"See Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 59, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (\u201cAn organization has associational standing to bring suit on its members\u2019 behalf when: (1) at least one of its members would have standing to sue in his or her own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization\u2019s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hispanic Affairs Project, 206 F.Supp.3d at 369 n.8, 2016 WL 4734360 at *14 n.8 (explaining that HAP had met the requirements for associational standing except that it had not \u201cprovid[ed] the necessary information regarding whether any of its members are American workers\u201d)."},"case_id":12309335,"label":"b"}
{"context":"An open question, and one which occupies the bulk of the parties' briefs is whether such work-product protection extends to the present case. Yet, it is unnecessary to resolve this issue because we conclude, for the reasons stated above, that the district court's order does not constitute an abuse of discretion in any event.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"868 F.2d 792, 792","parenthetical":"\"Even when based on a conclusory statement of cause, discovery orders ... are rarely reversed for an abuse of discretion.\"","sentence":"See Sanders, 678 F.2d at 618 (\u201cA trial court enjoys wide discretion in determining the scope and effect of discovery ... [i]t is, in fact, unusual to find an abuse of discretion in discovery matters.\u201d); see also Scott, 868 F.2d at 792 (\u201cEven when based on a conclusory statement of cause, discovery orders ... are rarely reversed for an abuse of discretion.\u201d). The protective order permits inquiry into the employment-related matters at issue in Crosswhite\u2019s complaint and excludes only privileged materials or those that are unrelated to his employment and would provide an undue advantage to related adversaries of LIC in an unrelated case."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"678 F.2d 618, 618","parenthetical":"\"A trial court enjoys wide discretion in determining the scope and effect of discovery ... [i]t is, in fact, unusual to find an abuse of discretion in discovery matters.\"","sentence":"See Sanders, 678 F.2d at 618 (\u201cA trial court enjoys wide discretion in determining the scope and effect of discovery ... [i]t is, in fact, unusual to find an abuse of discretion in discovery matters.\u201d); see also Scott, 868 F.2d at 792 (\u201cEven when based on a conclusory statement of cause, discovery orders ... are rarely reversed for an abuse of discretion.\u201d). The protective order permits inquiry into the employment-related matters at issue in Crosswhite\u2019s complaint and excludes only privileged materials or those that are unrelated to his employment and would provide an undue advantage to related adversaries of LIC in an unrelated case."},"case_id":3905675,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Here, Mounts's agreement provides that it is \"binding on you unless you close your account with .30 days after receiving the card and you have not used or authorized use of the card\" [Doc. 14-1 p. 16]. Mounts used the Citi Account by making purchases on the account after it was opened, and he continued to do so after receiving the 2010 agreement [Id at 5, 21-64]. These circumstances satisfy the criteria set forth in SS 54-11-9 for the formation of a credit card agreement.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"928 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1199","parenthetical":"\"Under South Dakota law, because [the plaintiff] used both cards after receiving the cardmember agreements, she assented to the arbitration agreements .... \"","sentence":"See Cayanan v. Citi Holdings, Inc., 928 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (\u201cUnder South Dakota law, because [the plaintiff] used both cards after receiving the cardmember agreements, she assented to the arbitration agreements .... \u201d); see also Ackerberg v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 898 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (\u201cNumerous courts have found that continued use or failure to opt out of a card account after the issuer provides a change in terms, including an arbitration agreement, evidences the cardholder\u2019s acceptance of those terms.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"898 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176","parenthetical":"\"Numerous courts have found that continued use or failure to opt out of a card account after the issuer provides a change in terms, including an arbitration agreement, evidences the cardholder's acceptance of those terms.\"","sentence":"See Cayanan v. Citi Holdings, Inc., 928 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (\u201cUnder South Dakota law, because [the plaintiff] used both cards after receiving the cardmember agreements, she assented to the arbitration agreements .... \u201d); see also Ackerberg v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 898 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (\u201cNumerous courts have found that continued use or failure to opt out of a card account after the issuer provides a change in terms, including an arbitration agreement, evidences the cardholder\u2019s acceptance of those terms.\u201d)."},"case_id":12273848,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee's holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"146 S.E.2d 97, 100","parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee's holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"152 So. 222, 224-25","parenthetical":"holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee's holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"152 So. 222, 224-25","parenthetical":"holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee's holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"146 S.E.2d 97, 100","parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"case_id":11464306,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"406 So.2d 309, 311-12","parenthetical":"acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"case_id":11464306,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"146 S.E.2d 97, 100","parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"406 So.2d 309, 311-12","parenthetical":"acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"146 S.E.2d 97, 100","parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"case_id":11464306,"label":"a"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 S.E.2d 636, 639","parenthetical":"stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"146 S.E.2d 97, 100","parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"144 S.E.2d 636, 639","parenthetical":"stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \"termination\" of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \"a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\"","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"146 S.E.2d 97, 100","parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \"termination\" of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \"a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\"","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \"termination\" of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \"a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\"","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"case_id":11464306,"label":"b"}
{"context":"A separate group of courts have concluded that such an option may be exercised within a reasonable time after the expiration of the lease.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \"termination\" of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \"a reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\"","sentence":"See Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222, 224-25 (1934) (holding that an option to renew at the expiration of the original lease was effectively exercised because the lessee\u2019s holding over, without express notification of renewal, was deemed an election to renew the lease); Heritage Square Invs. v. Trouard, 406 So.2d 309, 311-12 (La.Ct.App.1981) (acknowledging that if a lease does not expressly designate a time frame for renewal, the lessee must exercise the option within a time which, under all the circumstances, the lessor intended to give the lessee to communicate the intent to renew); Kearney v. Hare, 265 N.C. 570, 144 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1965) (stating that with a lease containing a renewal option that did not require specific notice from the lessee, a presumption existed that the option was exercised where the lessee held over after the original term and continued to pay rent); Caito v. Ferri, 44 R.I. 261, 116 A. 897 (1922) (recognizing that a lease providing for renewal at the \u201ctermination\u201d of the lease did not require the lessee to exercise the option before the lease expired, nor did it require renewal at the precise hour of termination, but gave the lessee \u201ca reasonable time after the termination of the lease in which to make his election\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"146 S.E.2d 97, 100","parenthetical":"recognizing that a lessee's holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.","sentence":"Cf. Coulter v. Capitol Fin. Co., 266 N.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1966) (recognizing that a lessee\u2019s holding over, without giving the prescribed notice of renewal, gave rise to a presumption that the lessee was exercising the option to renew, but also recognizing that in such a situation the lessor could elect to treat the lessee as a trespasser or to waive the notice requirement and treat the lease as having been extended.)"},"case_id":11464306,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"341 F.2d 576, 577","parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"341 F.2d 576, 577","parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":"341 F.2d 576, 577","parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"341 F.2d 576, 577","parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"b"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, no one other than Deatherage was between the owners and the workers. The owners very rarely went to the job sites so if Deatherage was not a supervisor, the workers would be almost completely unsupervised.","citation_a":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \"that if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company's employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\"","sentence":"See Vega v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 576, 577 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 382 U.S. 862, 86 S.Ct. 123,15 L.Ed.2d 100 (1969) (affirming the Board finding of supervisory status and noting \u201cthat if the petitioners were not supervisors, the company\u2019s employees were entirely without supervision a large part of the time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time","sentence":"Cf. NLRB v. Gary Aircraft Corp., 368 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 387 U.S. 918, 87 S.Ct. 2032, 18 L.Ed.2d 971 (1967) (noting that if six leadmen were not supervisors, then 60 employees would be without supervision 80% of the time)."},"case_id":1376618,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Such a person has a well-founded fear of persecution because the NPA is \"capable of killing its opponents,\" and if it will \"kill business people who do not contribute to their cause, it takes little imagination to understand what they would do to a successful informer for the Philippine military.\" As a result, if an informer against the NPA appears on a NPA hit list, he has a well-founded fear of persecution based on imputed political opinion and is eligible for asylum.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"224 F.3d 933, 933","parenthetical":"retaliation by NPA against informer is on account of imputed political opinion","sentence":"Id; see also Lim, 224 F.3d at 933 (retaliation by NPA against informer is on account of imputed political opinion); cf. Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (refusal to pay NPA revolutionary tax in the face of threats constitutes an expression of political belief)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"175 F.3d 732, 736","parenthetical":"refusal to pay NPA revolutionary tax in the face of threats constitutes an expression of political belief","sentence":"Id; see also Lim, 224 F.3d at 933 (retaliation by NPA against informer is on account of imputed political opinion); cf. Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (refusal to pay NPA revolutionary tax in the face of threats constitutes an expression of political belief)."},"case_id":11452250,"label":"a"}
{"context":"The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sharma's motion to remand because the BIA acted within its broad discretion in determining the transcript was sufficient.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"319 F.3d 365, 382","parenthetical":"a motion to reopen is treated as a motion to remand","sentence":"See Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.2002) (the BIA\u2019s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is \u201carbitrary, irrational or contrary to law\u201d); see also Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 382 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (a motion to reopen is treated as a motion to remand)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"295 F.3d 1037, 1039","parenthetical":"the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is \"arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law\"","sentence":"See Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.2002) (the BIA\u2019s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is \u201carbitrary, irrational or contrary to law\u201d); see also Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 382 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (a motion to reopen is treated as a motion to remand)."},"case_id":4247894,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 1542, 1546","parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 U.S. 375, 385","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 U.S. 375, 385","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 U.S. 375, 385","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 U.S. 375, 385","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 1542, 1546","parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 836, 842","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 836, 842","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 836, 842","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 836, 842","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 1542, 1546","parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":10521277,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 1542, 1546","parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 U.S. 375, 385","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 U.S. 375, 385","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 U.S. 375, 385","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"383 U.S. 375, 385","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 1542, 1546","parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 836, 842","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 836, 842","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 836, 842","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"86 S.Ct. 836, 842","parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"739 F.2d 1542, 1546","parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"a"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"b"}
{"context":"There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has \"reasonable cause\" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of \"reasonable cause\"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \"might be incompetent to proceed,\" not whether the defendant is incompetent","sentence":"Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant\u2019s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant \u201cmight be incompetent to proceed,\u201d not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 4241(a), (d) (1988)."},"case_id":3493483,"label":"a"}
{"context":"In this case, Mr. Black alleges that he suffered \"injury to his professional reputation\" as a result of \"Defendant's practice of denying employees an impartial review of discipline actions and Plaintiffs independent acts of retaliation.\" See Am. Compl. at P 83. Mr. Black does not allege that his reassignment constitutes a demotion in rank or salary. Absent any allegation of demotion, Mr. Black's claim of pure reputational damage fails as a matter of law because such claims are not protected by the due process clause.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"65 F.Supp.3d 99, 107","parenthetical":"\"[C]ourts have routinely rejected claims that a mere reassignment or change of duties, without a corresponding reduction in rank or pay, amounts to a divestment of a property interest.\"","sentence":"Coleman v. Napolitano, 65 F.Supp.3d 99, 107 (D.D.C.2014) (\u201c[C]ourts have routinely rejected claims that a mere reassignment or change of duties, without a corresponding reduction in rank or pay, amounts to a divestment of a property interest.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also New Vision Photography Program, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 54 F.Supp.3d 12, 31 (D.D.C.2014) (holding that \u201cpurely, reputational damage does not qualify for due-process protection.\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"54 F.Supp.3d 12, 31","parenthetical":"holding that \"purely, reputational damage does not qualify for due-process protection.\"","sentence":"Coleman v. Napolitano, 65 F.Supp.3d 99, 107 (D.D.C.2014) (\u201c[C]ourts have routinely rejected claims that a mere reassignment or change of duties, without a corresponding reduction in rank or pay, amounts to a divestment of a property interest.\u201d) (citations omitted); see also New Vision Photography Program, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 54 F.Supp.3d 12, 31 (D.D.C.2014) (holding that \u201cpurely, reputational damage does not qualify for due-process protection.\u201d)."},"case_id":4160970,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Here, right after Lott's lawyer made the argument, the judge acknowledged that the letters \"gave him pause\" because Lott's \"family support\" carries a \"mitigating element.\" The judge identified, however, a stronger \"counterbalance\" to this element, chiding Lott for engaging in such risky conduct -- particularly asking his wife to risk jail for buying him the gun -- when Lott's family depended on him. Essentially the judge told Lott that his family circumstances looked more like an aggravating factor.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"411 Fed.Appx. 887, 892","parenthetical":"explaining that, in realm of discretionary sentencing, every defendant who proposes argument in mitigation runs the inherent risk that contention \"may sound to the court more like a factor in aggravation\"","sentence":"See United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 794-95 (7th Cir.2008) (rejecting contention that district court had failed to consider argument that defendant\u2019s youth was mitigating factor, since court did consider youth of defendant but decided that \u201cunfortunately ... it happens to cut against him in this case\u201d); see also United States v. Vazquez-Pita, 411 Fed.Appx. 887, 892 (7th Cir.2011) (nonprece-dential disposition) (explaining that, in realm of discretionary sentencing, every defendant who proposes argument in mitigation runs the inherent risk that contention \u201cmay sound to the court more like a factor in aggravation\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"547 F.3d 786, 794-95","parenthetical":"rejecting contention that district court had failed to consider argument that defendant's youth was mitigating factor, since court did consider youth of defendant but decided that \"unfortunately ... it happens to cut against him in this case\"","sentence":"See United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 794-95 (7th Cir.2008) (rejecting contention that district court had failed to consider argument that defendant\u2019s youth was mitigating factor, since court did consider youth of defendant but decided that \u201cunfortunately ... it happens to cut against him in this case\u201d); see also United States v. Vazquez-Pita, 411 Fed.Appx. 887, 892 (7th Cir.2011) (nonprece-dential disposition) (explaining that, in realm of discretionary sentencing, every defendant who proposes argument in mitigation runs the inherent risk that contention \u201cmay sound to the court more like a factor in aggravation\u201d)."},"case_id":3927505,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Second, this is not a case in which the trial court could have made the necessary finding regarding ability to pay if the issue had been brought to its attention; the record contains no evidence of defendant's financial resources. And, third, defendant was sentenced to a lengthy prison term, 300 months, making it even more speculative that defendant would have the funds to pay the fees or acquire them in the future.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"262 Or App 169, 171","parenthetical":"declining to exercise discretion to correct a plain error in imposing court-appointed attorney fees where the \"error is not grave because $510 is not a substantial amount given that defendant's probationary sentence does not prevent him from working and that defendant agreed to the state's recommendation of attorney fees in the same amount for another charge sentenced at the same time\"","sentence":"See State v. Callentano, 263 Or App 190, 191-92, 326 P3d 630 (2014) (exercising discretion to correct a similarly grave error under similar circumstances); cf. State v. Baco, 262 Or App 169, 171, 324 P3d 491 (2014) (declining to exercise discretion to correct a plain error in imposing court-appointed attorney fees where the \u201cerror is not grave because $510 is not a substantial amount given that defendant\u2019s probationary sentence does not prevent him from working and that defendant agreed to the state\u2019s recommendation of attorney fees in the same amount for another charge sentenced at the same time\u201d)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":"263 Or App 190, 191-92","parenthetical":"exercising discretion to correct a similarly grave error under similar circumstances","sentence":"See State v. Callentano, 263 Or App 190, 191-92, 326 P3d 630 (2014) (exercising discretion to correct a similarly grave error under similar circumstances); cf. State v. Baco, 262 Or App 169, 171, 324 P3d 491 (2014) (declining to exercise discretion to correct a plain error in imposing court-appointed attorney fees where the \u201cerror is not grave because $510 is not a substantial amount given that defendant\u2019s probationary sentence does not prevent him from working and that defendant agreed to the state\u2019s recommendation of attorney fees in the same amount for another charge sentenced at the same time\u201d)."},"case_id":5769887,"label":"b"}
{"context":"1. A rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated sexual battery beyond a reasonable doubt based on the victim's testimony that Lee inserted his fingers into her vagina without her consent.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"230 Ga. App. 604, 606","parenthetical":"a person who penetrates intentionally and without consent the sexual organ of another with his finger commits the offense of aggravated sexual battery","sentence":"OCGA \u00a7 16-6-22.1 (a) and (b); Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga. App. 604, 606 (4) (497 SE2d 236) (1997) (a person who penetrates intentionally and without consent the sexual organ of another with his finger commits the offense of aggravated sexual battery)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"269 Ga. App. 684, 687","parenthetical":"corroboration of a victim's testimony is not required in an aggravated sexual battery case","sentence":"See also Pate v. State, 269 Ga. App. 684, 687 (2) (605 SE2d 90) (2004) (corroboration of a victim\u2019s testimony is not required in an aggravated sexual battery case)."},"case_id":12163071,"label":"a"}
{"context":"This would require either having over two dozen special relationships that day and more than one hundred over the course of the year, as to each applicant being screened (which is not practical or possible), or holding that the response to the sudden disability by the ones initially called upon created that relationship. By definition of a special relationship, that is not practicable or legally possible.","citation_a":{"signal":"cf.","identifier":"891 A.2d 260, 276","parenthetical":"police presence on campus of Gallaudet University, and promise to protect some 2,000 students could not create 2,000 special relationships without \"nullifying] the [public duty] doctrine itself'","sentence":"Hines, supra, 580 A.2d at 136 (\u201cOur case law makes it clear that the mere fact that an individual has emerged from the general public and become an object of the special attention of public employees does not create a relationship which imposes a special legal duty.\u201d); cf. Varner, supra, 891 A.2d 260, 276 (D.C.2006) (police presence on campus of Gallaudet University, and promise to protect some 2,000 students could not create 2,000 special relationships without \u201cnullifying] the [public duty] doctrine itself\u2019)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"580 A.2d 136, 136","parenthetical":"\"Our case law makes it clear that the mere fact that an individual has emerged from the general public and become an object of the special attention of public employees does not create a relationship which imposes a special legal duty.\"","sentence":"Hines, supra, 580 A.2d at 136 (\u201cOur case law makes it clear that the mere fact that an individual has emerged from the general public and become an object of the special attention of public employees does not create a relationship which imposes a special legal duty.\u201d); cf. Varner, supra, 891 A.2d 260, 276 (D.C.2006) (police presence on campus of Gallaudet University, and promise to protect some 2,000 students could not create 2,000 special relationships without \u201cnullifying] the [public duty] doctrine itself\u2019)."},"case_id":6913436,"label":"b"}
{"context":"\"Under Georgia law, offenses merge and multiple punishment is prohibited if one offense is included in the other as a matter of law or fact.\" (Punctuation omitted.) A defendant \"may be prosecuted for both [statutory] rape and child molestation based upon the same conduct, but he may not be convicted of both.\" (Punctuation omitted.)","citation_a":{"signal":"but see","identifier":"251 Ga. App. 27, 29","parenthetical":"rejecting the defendant's contention that her conviction for child molestation merged with her conviction for statutory rape because \"merger does not lie as to separate offenses\"","sentence":"But see Hixon v. State, 251 Ga. App. 27, 29 (2) (553 SE2d 333) (2001) (rejecting the defendant\u2019s contention that her conviction for child molestation merged with her conviction for statutory rape because \u201cmerger does not lie as to separate offenses\u201d) (citation omitted)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"evidence of single act of sexual intercourse did not authorize conviction and sentence for both aggravated child molestation and statutory rape","sentence":"See Andrews v. State, 200 Ga. App. 47 (1) (406 SE2d 801) (1991) (evidence of single act of sexual intercourse did not authorize conviction and sentence for both aggravated child molestation and statutory rape)."},"case_id":2240432,"label":"b"}
{"context":"17 \"Remedial or procedural statutes may operate retrospectively only where they do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy vested rights. A substantive change that alters the rights or obligations of a party cannot be viewed as solely a remedial or procedural change and cannot be retrospectively applied.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11","parenthetical":"statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment","sentence":"Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16","parenthetical":"statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive","sentence":"Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive)."},"case_id":8347485,"label":"a"}
{"context":"17 \"Remedial or procedural statutes may operate retrospectively only where they do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy vested rights. A substantive change that alters the rights or obligations of a party cannot be viewed as solely a remedial or procedural change and cannot be retrospectively applied.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"127 P.3d 584, 590","parenthetical":"statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive","sentence":"Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11","parenthetical":"statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment","sentence":"Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive)."},"case_id":8347485,"label":"b"}
{"context":"17 \"Remedial or procedural statutes may operate retrospectively only where they do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy vested rights. A substantive change that alters the rights or obligations of a party cannot be viewed as solely a remedial or procedural change and cannot be retrospectively applied.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16","parenthetical":"statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive","sentence":"Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"78 P.3d 542, 547","parenthetical":"statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment","sentence":"Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive)."},"case_id":8347485,"label":"b"}
{"context":"17 \"Remedial or procedural statutes may operate retrospectively only where they do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy vested rights. A substantive change that alters the rights or obligations of a party cannot be viewed as solely a remedial or procedural change and cannot be retrospectively applied.\"","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"78 P.3d 542, 547","parenthetical":"statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment","sentence":"Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"127 P.3d 584, 590","parenthetical":"statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive","sentence":"Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, \u00b6 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, \u00b6 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive)."},"case_id":8347485,"label":"a"}
{"context":"Finally, Free threatens to ask other educational institutions to evaluate the quality of the students graduating from Alabama State University. The memorandum clearly addresses matters of public concern.","citation_a":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"858 F.2d 1546, 1553","parenthetical":"determining that issues such as poor student performance and preparation of students for careers touches upon matters of public concern","sentence":"See Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir.1985) (finding that educational standards and accreditation are matters of public concern); see also Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir.1988) (determining that issues such as poor student performance and preparation of students for careers touches upon matters of public concern)."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see","identifier":null,"parenthetical":"finding that educational standards and accreditation are matters of public concern","sentence":"See Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir.1985) (finding that educational standards and accreditation are matters of public concern); see also Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir.1988) (determining that issues such as poor student performance and preparation of students for careers touches upon matters of public concern)."},"case_id":226822,"label":"b"}
{"context":"Official immunity is not implicated in this case because IBM has not sought to hold the DOAS commissioner personally liable, but rather seeks to control the commissioner's actions in performing his official duties. Official immunity comes into play only when a suit is brought against a public official in his personal capacity.","citation_a":{"signal":"no signal","identifier":"262 Ga. 49, 56","parenthetical":"\"suits against public employees in their personal capacities involve official immunity\"","sentence":"Donaldson v. Dept, of Transp., 262 Ga. 49, 56 (414 SE2d 638) (1992) (Hunt, J., concurring) (\u201csuits against public employees in their personal capacities involve official immunity\u201d); see also Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 750 (basis for official immunity is to \u201cpreserve independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits\u201d) (emphasis supplied) quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 895D, comment b."},"citation_b":{"signal":"see also","identifier":"264 Ga. 750, 750","parenthetical":"basis for official immunity is to \"preserve independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits\"","sentence":"Donaldson v. Dept, of Transp., 262 Ga. 49, 56 (414 SE2d 638) (1992) (Hunt, J., concurring) (\u201csuits against public employees in their personal capacities involve official immunity\u201d); see also Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 750 (basis for official immunity is to \u201cpreserve independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits\u201d) (emphasis supplied) quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, \u00a7 895D, comment b."},"case_id":1241644,"label":"a"}