Context: Such a person has a well-founded fear of persecution because the NPA is "capable of killing its opponents," and if it will "kill business people who do not contribute to their cause, it takes little imagination to understand what they would do to a successful informer for the Philippine military." As a result, if an informer against the NPA appears on a NPA hit list, he has a well-founded fear of persecution based on imputed political opinion and is eligible for asylum.

Id; see also Lim, 224 F.3d at 933 (retaliation by NPA against informer is on account of imputed political opinion); cf. Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 736 (refusal to pay NPA revolutionary tax in the face of threats constitutes an expression of political belief).


Context: The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Sharma's motion to remand because the BIA acted within its broad discretion in determining the transcript was sufficient.

See Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir.2002) (the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is “arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law”); see also Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 365, 382 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc) (a motion to reopen is treated as a motion to remand).

the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen shall be reversed only if it is "arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law"


Context: There is a three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241 (1988). At the first stage of the competency determination process, a court may order a competency evaluation committing a defendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has "reasonable cause" to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. SS 4241(a). There is no precise definition of "reasonable cause"; however, the Supreme Court has held that any significant doubt as to the defendant's competency requires a competency evaluation.

test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant "might be incompetent to proceed," not whether the defendant is incompetent

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s competency, an evaluation must be held); see also United States v. Crosby, 739 F.2d 1542, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1076, 105 S.Ct. 576, 83 L.Ed.2d 515 (1984) (test is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant “might be incompetent to proceed,” not whether the defendant is incompetent). The information produced by the evaluation is presented at an adversarial hearing at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), (d) (1988).

where evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, an evaluation must be held


Context: In this case, Mr. Black alleges that he suffered "injury to his professional reputation" as a result of "Defendant's practice of denying employees an impartial review of discipline actions and Plaintiffs independent acts of retaliation." See Am. Compl. at P 83. Mr. Black does not allege that his reassignment constitutes a demotion in rank or salary. Absent any allegation of demotion, Mr. Black's claim of pure reputational damage fails as a matter of law because such claims are not protected by the due process clause.

"[C]ourts have routinely rejected claims that a mere reassignment or change of duties, without a corresponding reduction in rank or pay, amounts to a divestment of a property interest."

Coleman v. Napolitano, 65 F.Supp.3d 99, 107 (D.D.C.2014) (“[C]ourts have routinely rejected claims that a mere reassignment or change of duties, without a corresponding reduction in rank or pay, amounts to a divestment of a property interest.”) (citations omitted); see also New Vision Photography Program, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 54 F.Supp.3d 12, 31 (D.D.C.2014) (holding that “purely, reputational damage does not qualify for due-process protection.”).

holding that "purely, reputational damage does not qualify for due-process protection."


Context: Here, right after Lott's lawyer made the argument, the judge acknowledged that the letters "gave him pause" because Lott's "family support" carries a "mitigating element." The judge identified, however, a stronger "counterbalance" to this element, chiding Lott for engaging in such risky conduct -- particularly asking his wife to risk jail for buying him the gun -- when Lott's family depended on him. Essentially the judge told Lott that his family circumstances looked more like an aggravating factor.

explaining that, in realm of discretionary sentencing, every defendant who proposes argument in mitigation runs the inherent risk that contention "may sound to the court more like a factor in aggravation"

See United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 794-95 (7th Cir.2008) (rejecting contention that district court had failed to consider argument that defendant’s youth was mitigating factor, since court did consider youth of defendant but decided that “unfortunately ... it happens to cut against him in this case”); see also United States v. Vazquez-Pita, 411 Fed.Appx. 887, 892 (7th Cir.2011) (nonprece-dential disposition) (explaining that, in realm of discretionary sentencing, every defendant who proposes argument in mitigation runs the inherent risk that contention “may sound to the court more like a factor in aggravation”).

rejecting contention that district court had failed to consider argument that defendant's youth was mitigating factor, since court did consider youth of defendant but decided that "unfortunately ... it happens to cut against him in this case"


Context: Second, this is not a case in which the trial court could have made the necessary finding regarding ability to pay if the issue had been brought to its attention; the record contains no evidence of defendant's financial resources. And, third, defendant was sentenced to a lengthy prison term, 300 months, making it even more speculative that defendant would have the funds to pay the fees or acquire them in the future.

declining to exercise discretion to correct a plain error in imposing court-appointed attorney fees where the "error is not grave because $510 is not a substantial amount given that defendant's probationary sentence does not prevent him from working and that defendant agreed to the state's recommendation of attorney fees in the same amount for another charge sentenced at the same time"

See State v. Callentano, 263 Or App 190, 191-92, 326 P3d 630 (2014) (exercising discretion to correct a similarly grave error under similar circumstances); cf. State v. Baco, 262 Or App 169, 171, 324 P3d 491 (2014) (declining to exercise discretion to correct a plain error in imposing court-appointed attorney fees where the “error is not grave because $510 is not a substantial amount given that defendant’s probationary sentence does not prevent him from working and that defendant agreed to the state’s recommendation of attorney fees in the same amount for another charge sentenced at the same time”).


Context: 1. A rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of aggravated sexual battery beyond a reasonable doubt based on the victim's testimony that Lee inserted his fingers into her vagina without her consent.

OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (a) and (b); Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga. App. 604, 606 (4) (497 SE2d 236) (1997) (a person who penetrates intentionally and without consent the sexual organ of another with his finger commits the offense of aggravated sexual battery).

corroboration of a victim's testimony is not required in an aggravated sexual battery case

See also Pate v. State, 269 Ga. App. 684, 687 (2) (605 SE2d 90) (2004) (corroboration of a victim’s testimony is not required in an aggravated sexual battery case).


Context: This would require either having over two dozen special relationships that day and more than one hundred over the course of the year, as to each applicant being screened (which is not practical or possible), or holding that the response to the sudden disability by the ones initially called upon created that relationship. By definition of a special relationship, that is not practicable or legally possible.

police presence on campus of Gallaudet University, and promise to protect some 2,000 students could not create 2,000 special relationships without "nullifying] the [public duty] doctrine itself'

Hines, supra, 580 A.2d at 136 (“Our case law makes it clear that the mere fact that an individual has emerged from the general public and become an object of the special attention of public employees does not create a relationship which imposes a special legal duty.”); cf. Varner, supra, 891 A.2d 260, 276 (D.C.2006) (police presence on campus of Gallaudet University, and promise to protect some 2,000 students could not create 2,000 special relationships without “nullifying] the [public duty] doctrine itself’).

"Our case law makes it clear that the mere fact that an individual has emerged from the general public and become an object of the special attention of public employees does not create a relationship which imposes a special legal duty."


Context: "Under Georgia law, offenses merge and multiple punishment is prohibited if one offense is included in the other as a matter of law or fact." (Punctuation omitted.) A defendant "may be prosecuted for both [statutory] rape and child molestation based upon the same conduct, but he may not be convicted of both." (Punctuation omitted.)

rejecting the defendant's contention that her conviction for child molestation merged with her conviction for statutory rape because "merger does not lie as to separate offenses"

But see Hixon v. State, 251 Ga. App. 27, 29 (2) (553 SE2d 333) (2001) (rejecting the defendant’s contention that her conviction for child molestation merged with her conviction for statutory rape because “merger does not lie as to separate offenses”) (citation omitted).

See Andrews v. State, 200 Ga. App. 47 (1) (406 SE2d 801) (1991) (evidence of single act of sexual intercourse did not authorize conviction and sentence for both aggravated child molestation and statutory rape).


Context: 17 "Remedial or procedural statutes may operate retrospectively only where they do not create, enlarge, diminish or destroy vested rights. A substantive change that alters the rights or obligations of a party cannot be viewed as solely a remedial or procedural change and cannot be retrospectively applied."

Cole v. Silverado Foods, Inc., 2003 OK 81, ¶ 11, 78 P.3d 542, 547 (statute that shortened from five to three years the period during which claim must be pursued was a substantive amendment); see also King Mfg. v. Meadows, 2005 OK 78, ¶ 16, 127 P.3d 584, 590 (statutory limit for compensation in effect at time of initial injury applied because amendment limiting permanent partial disability to 100% was substantive).


Context: Finally, Free threatens to ask other educational institutions to evaluate the quality of the students graduating from Alabama State University. The memorandum clearly addresses matters of public concern.

See Johnson v. Lincoln Univ., 776 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir.1985) (finding that educational standards and accreditation are matters of public concern); see also Maples v. Martin, 858 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir.1988) (determining that issues such as poor student performance and preparation of students for careers touches upon matters of public concern).


Context: Official immunity is not implicated in this case because IBM has not sought to hold the DOAS commissioner personally liable, but rather seeks to control the commissioner's actions in performing his official duties. Official immunity comes into play only when a suit is brought against a public official in his personal capacity.

"suits against public employees in their personal capacities involve official immunity"

Donaldson v. Dept, of Transp., 262 Ga. 49, 56 (414 SE2d 638) (1992) (Hunt, J., concurring) (“suits against public employees in their personal capacities involve official immunity”); see also Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 750 (basis for official immunity is to “preserve independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits”) (emphasis supplied) quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, comment b.

basis for official immunity is to "preserve independence of action without deterrence or intimidation by the fear of personal liability and vexatious suits"